http://hdl.handle.net/10900/53319 Tue, 12 May 2026 01:08:33 GMT 2026-05-12T01:08:33Z http://hdl.handle.net/10900/48046 Variable prizes in forced-distribution-systems: a sabotage-reducing approach? Glökler, Thomas Forced-Distribution-Systems (FDS) have many indisputable benefits (such as identification of high potential and low performers or incentive effects to exert higher efforts). However, many companies take a critical stance toward FDS, one of the main reasons being the agents' incentive to execute sabotage activities. While a large number of tournament studies deal with the problem of sabotage, to be best of my knowledge none of the studies investigates the impact of variable tournament prizes on sabotage activities. Variable prizes are a special tournament design where prizes are not fixed in advance, but are a function of a target variable set by the principal (see Güth et al. 2010). In this study, I theoretically analyze if variable tournament prizes can help in reducing sabotage activities in FDS. Two versions of variable prizes are considered for this study: variable prize levels and variable prize distribu- tions. In the former version, prize levels depend on the cumulative output (higher the output, higher the prize levels), and in the latter version, prize distribution depends on the cumulative output (higher the output, higher the portion of prizes for the winner and lower the portion of prizes for the loser). The findings of the model are as follows: Variable tournament prizes not only reduce sabotage activities effectively, but also incentivize agents to exert helping activities. Accordingly, variable tournament prizes could be of high importance in organizational practice. Wed, 01 Jan 2014 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10900/48046 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10900/48001 Die Bedeutung multinationaler Netzwerke für Migration Neubecker, Nina; Smolka, Marcel Der Migrationsstrom eines Landes in ein anderes Land hängt positiv von den bereits vor Ort befindlichen Migranten gleicher Nationalität (bzw. gleicher Herkunft) ab. Dieser Effekt wird in der Literatur häufig als Netzwerkeffekt bezeichnet. Wir zeigen in diesem Beitrag anhand der Migration nach Spanien im Zeitraum 1997-2006, dass der Migrationsstrom eines Landes in ein anderes Land auch positiv von den bereits vor Ort befindlichen Migranten anderer Nationalitäten abhängt, nämlich von den Migranten, die aus zu dem Herkunftsland angrenzenden Ländern stammen. Wir sprechen in diesem Zusammenhang von einem multinationalen Netzwerk. Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10900/48001 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47996 The market effects of the German two-tier enforcement of financial reporting. Hecker, Renate; Wild, Andreas This study contributes to the literature by analyzing the potential market penalties due to financial reporting violations detected by the German enforcement regime. Event study results provide evidence that official error announcements lead to significant negative (cumulative) abnormal returns. Investigating the variation between the cumulative abnormal returns, the cross-sectional analysis indicates that companies are able to dilute the (negative) capital market reaction by releasing other (positive) information simultaneously. The negative stock market reaction is less pronounced for profit-decreasing errors. The cumulative abnormal returns are more negative for companies that have been listed for a longer period of time. Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47996 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47959 Controlling Chaos in a Model with Heterogeneous Beliefs Heilig, Stephan; Schöbel, Rainer In this paper we generalize a chaos control method developed by Ott, Grebogi and Yorke (1990) to control saddle points in R2 which are embadded in a strange attractor of a chaotic system. Our generalized method admits to control any unstable equilibrium in R2. We apply our findings to control the dynamics of the chaotic asset pricing model of Brock and Hommes (1998). In this model chaotic price movements are caused by heterogenous market participants. We introduce a control authority which trades the risky asset like the other market participants. Using our control approach, it is possible for the authority to stabilize the market price with minimum effort. Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47959 2001-01-01T00:00:00Z