Proceedings of TripleA 5
Fieldwork Perspectives on the Semantics of African, Asian and Austronesian Languages

Ed. by M. Ryan Bochnak, Miriam Butt, Erlinde Meertens & Mark-Mattñias Zymla
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Default de se: The Interpretation of the Ewe logophor

Abigail Anne Bimpeh - Goethe University, Frankfurt

Abstract. This paper aims at evaluating two contradicting generalizations regarding the interpretation of logophoric pronouns, using data from Ewedomegbe (the Northern Ghanaian dialect of Ewe). Clements (1975), for instance, and many others propose that the default interpretation of the Ewe logophoric pronoun yè is unambiguously attitude de se like PRO in English, see Chierchia (1989). This view is challenged by Pearson (2015), who presents data that shows that yè may be read de re as well. I presented real-world examples of ‘mistaken’ identity to ten native informants, as well as examples of dream reports to two native informants. Regarding ‘mistaken identity’, the judgments confirm the standard view by Clements (1975) and others that the logophoric pronoun yè seems unambiguously attitude de se. For dream reports, the judgments show that they may not be useful in shedding light on the de re, de se distinction. I discuss possible explanations for the different judgments.

1 Introduction

Logophoric pronouns are pronouns used in indirect discourse to report the thoughts, feelings, emotions or attitudes of an individual (Clements 1975). As observed by Sells (1987), logophoric pronouns appear within sentential arguments of predicates of communication and mental experience. The canonical use of the logophoric pronoun is to distinguish the attitude holder (the one whose thoughts are being communicated) from all others. This means that in English, when Mawuse utters (1a), a report in the form of (1b) or (1c) is expected.

(1) a. Mawuse said “I am hungry”.
   b. Mawuse said she is hungry.
   c. Mawuse claimed PRO to be hungry.

Although (1b) effectively communicates Mawuse’s speech in (1a), it is ambiguous. The ambiguity of (1b) stems from the use of the pronoun she. Inasmuch as she refers to Mawuse, she could also refer to some other person who hasn’t been mentioned in the discourse. Consequently, to disambiguate (1b), PRO, the null pronominal element which acts as the subject of infinitives and gerunds (Chierchia 1989; Schlenker 1999) is used. PRO is used because when embedded un-
der an attitude verb, it is always understood to report a first person’s (or second person’s) thought (Schlenker 2011). Thus, (1c) does this successfully.

The notion of logophoricity was pioneered by Hagège (1974) who observed that unlike in English, in many African languages including Ewe (Clements 1975), there is a dedicated overt pronoun, different from the third person pronoun, to show logophoricity. The first part of this paper is concerned with the state of the art regarding logophoricity in Ewe, the notion of *de re* and *de se*, and two contrasting views regarding its interpretation. The rest of the paper addresses the problem arising from the contrasting views and outlines some explanations for the varying judgments.

2 Logophoricity in Ewe, *De re* and *De se* Attitude Reports

This section involves logophoricity in Ewe and briefly describes the concept of *de se* and *de re* in relation to logophoricity.

2.1 Logophoricity in Ewe

The logophoric pronoun in Ewe is *yè*. It is used exclusively in indirect discourse in Ewe, and is replaced in direct discourse by the appropriate first person singular pronoun (Clements 1975). Thus, *yè* is restricted to the environment of attitude predicates such as *think*, *say*, *believe*, among others. Should reference be made to any person other than the attitude holder, the third person singular pronoun is used. Notably, Ewe presents a case of obviation (i.e disjoint in reference)\(^3\). In the scope of attitude predicates, the third person pronoun *é* does not denote the attitude holder. The data\(^4\) below replicates Clements (1975)’s findings on logophoricity in Ewe. Consider (2).

(2) a. Mawuse *gblo* be “dɔ le nye wù-m”. **Direct discourse**
Mawuse said COMP stomach is 1SG kill-PROG
‘Mawuse said: “I am hungry”.’

b. Mawuse *gblo* be dɔ le *yè* wù-m. **Indirect discourse**
Mawuse said COMP stomach is LOG kill-PROG
‘Mawuse, said she/she is hungry.’

c. Mawuse *gblo* be dɔ le é wù-m. **Indirect discourse: obviation**
Mawuse said COMP stomach is 3SG kill-PROG
‘Mawuse, said she/ she is hungry.’

The logophoric pronoun *yè* also has a plural counterpart *yè-wó* which is used to report the thoughts and perceptions of plural attitude holders, as in (3). Note that, obviation pretains here as well (see (3-b)). *yè-wó* differs from the regular third person plural pronoun *wó* and again, in the scope of an attitude predicate *wó* does not refer to the subject of an attitude.

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\(^2\)I elicited *yì*, a variant of *yè* from my Peki informants.

\(^3\)I thank Rajesh Bhatt for discussions on the subject.

\(^4\)Some speakers prefer to use the order *wù nye* in (2a). I thank Chris Collins for notifying me.
a. Eli kple Mansa xæese be yè-wó dze-agbagba.
   Eli CONJ Mansa believe COMP LOG-PL do-well
   ‘Eli and Mansa, believed that they, did well.’

b. Eli kple Mansa xæese be wó dze-agbagba.
   Eli CONJ Mansa believe COMP 3PL do-well
   Eli and Mansa, believed that they, did well.’

In Ewe, there are cases where two attitude predicates can interract. As observed by Agbedor (2014), in such instances, coreference is between two possible antecedents, Adzóa and Ama in (4).

(4) Adzóa súsú be Ama gblɔ be yè lɔ Kofi.
   Adzóa think COMP Ama say COMP LOG love Kofi
   ‘Adzóa, thinks that Ama, said that she, loves Kofi’ (Agbedor 2014, p. 58 e.x. 17).

Remarkably, the complementizer be is a ‘logophoric licensor’ in that it always introduces an attitude which may be reported. As is the case cross-linguistically, the complementizer be seems to have developed historically from the verb be ‘say’. Consequently, irrespective of the attitude verb, a report without be renders the said report ungrammatical, as shown in (5a). In the case where the attitude verb is gblɔ, also ‘say’, the attitude is marked twice. Consider example (2) again. It is also possible to exclude gblɔ from (2) since gblɔ may be optional in Ewe. In such instances, as shown in (5b), be is assumed to serve as both the verb and complementizer.

(5) a. *Mawuse gblɔ/xæese/súsú do le yè wù-m.
    Mawuse said/believe/think stomach is LOG kill-PROG
    ‘Mawuse, said/believe/think she, is hungry.’
    [intended: Mawuse said/believed/thought that she is hungry]

b. Mawuse be do le yè wù-m.
   Mawuse said stomach is LOG kill-PROG
   ‘Mawuse, said she, is hungry.’

2.2 The Philosophical View of De re and De se

De re and de se are Latin words which mean ‘of the thing itself’ and ‘of oneself’ respectively (McKay and Nelson 2014). These terms are used in intensional semantics to make referential and attitudinal distinction. Following D. Lewis (1979, pp. 521-539), ascription of properties to individuals is known as attitude de re, whereas self-ascription of properties is termed attitude de se, also known as ‘self-ascription’ or ‘reference de se’. I illustrate this distinction with a well-known example from Kaplan (1989, p. 533).

5The term is used by Agbedor (2014).
6Examples: ku, kà, ka-ti and ke are complementizers derived from the verb say in Gokana, Igbo, Chewa and Efik respectively (c.f. Dimmendaal 2001, p. 143)
S1 (de se): Kaplan believes: “my pants are on fire.”

S2 (de re): Kaplan sees himself in a reflecting glass, unaware that he is watching himself. He ascribes to himself, under the description “the one I am watching”, the property of wearing pants that are on fire.

a. Kaplan believes that **his** pants are on fire. [✓ S1, ✓ S2]

b. Kaplan believes of **himself** that **his** pants are on fire. [✓ S1, # S2]

In S1, Kaplan holds a *de se* belief about himself. This means that he sees that his pants are on fire and he is aware of this fact. By contrast, in S2, Kaplan has a belief about a certain *res* i.e the one whose pants are on fire, although himself. His mental state is not of someone who says “my pants are on fire”. This is known as the *de re* reading. As such, (6-a) can be used to describe both S1 and S2 but (6-b) can only be used to describe S1.

Having described briefly logophoricity, PRO and the philosophical view of *de se* and *de re* attitudes, a close link can be observed between the logophoric pronoun, PRO and attitude *de se*. First, according to (Morgan 1970; Sells 1987, among others), logophoric pronouns behave semantically like PRO. The analogy, therefore, is that since it holds true that both PRO and logophoric pronouns can only be used to report an “I”-attitude, they must have an “I”-reading (*de se*). I move on to discuss the two views concerning this claim.

3 The Standard vs. The Competing View

In determining the interpretation of logophoric pronouns, contexts are known to play an essential role. As a result, scholars have generated scenarios such as (6) to tease apart different readings of logophors. We can summarise the issue at hand in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coreference de se</th>
<th>Coreference de re</th>
<th>Disjoint Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ yè</td>
<td>? yè</td>
<td>✓ é</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do logophoric pronouns like yè permit *de re* readings? Two generalisations can be found in the literature concerning the interpretation of the Ewe logophor. I classify them as “the standard” and “the competing” view. I use the term “the standard” in the sense that it is the widely-held view, and “the competing”, on the grounds that it stems from more current research that challenges the widely-held view.

“The standard” view generally assigns a *de se* interpretation to logophoric pronouns, i.e when the speech is reported from the first person’s perspective (see Sells 1987; Chierchia 1989, etc). In “the competing” view, however, ‘pure’ Ewe and Mina are used as a case study to show that a *de re* interpretation may be expressed (see Pearson 2012; Pearson 2015). In this section, I present both views with respect to ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios (3.1) and dream reports (3.2).
3.1 Mistaken Identity Scenarios

The standard take on logophoric pronouns is that they are *de se* elements (see Chierchia 1989; Schlenker 1999; Anand 2006, etc). To refer to an attitude holder in reported speech, a logophoric pronoun or PRO (for English) is used. As Clements (1975) rightly puts it, the logophoric pronoun unambiguously establishes the correct assignment of co-reference. One of the problems, however, arises in the so-called ‘mistaken’ identity contexts, where the attitude holder seems to be in an ‘un-conscious’ state such that he or she does not have knowledge of being the referent of the reported speech act. Consider (6) and (7).

(7) John is so drunk that he has forgotten he is a candidate in the election. He watches someone on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who should definitely be elected. Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching on TV is John himself (Schlenker 2011, p. 12).
   a. John hopes that he will be elected. true
   b. John hopes PRO to be elected (in real-life, John does not want to win). false

(8) John has just found an old paper that he wrote, but he doesn’t realize that he is the author of the paper. He reads it and is impressed by what a good paper it is. He says, “whoever wrote this paper is clever” (Pearson 2015, p. 79).
   a. John said that he is clever. true
   b. John claimed PRO to be clever. false

In the standard view, given (7) and (8), the (a) alternatives are read as true and ambiguous, since *he* can refer to John himself or someone other than John. On the contrary, it is false to report the (b) alternatives as John’s hope or speech. It is not the case that John thought “I should be elected” or “I am clever” in (7) and (8). Thus, PRO is not the candidate on TV nor the author of the paper. Alternatives (b) would then be construed *de se*. *De se* requires the awareness of an attitude holder for something to be attributed to him. The difference, therefore, between the alternatives in (a) and those in (b) is the awareness of John in both scenarios.

As stated earlier, logophoric pronouns seem to share distributional properties with PRO in the sense that they can only occur in an embedded clause and when they do, they obligatorily refer to some designated argument of the embedding verb (see Chierchia 1989; Schlenker 1999, etc). Also, as suggested by Reinhart (1990), signalling a *de se* reading is one of the functions of logophoric pronouns in a discourse. In effect, we may conclude that logophoric pronouns are unambiguously *de se* although it remains an empirical question. In Ewe, logophoricity has been investigated by Clements (1975) and Agbedor (2014), among others. The interpretation of the Ewe logophor was not discussed until Pearson (2015).

In the “competing view”, Pearson (2015) proposes *yè* to have a *de re* construal in ‘pure’ Ewe and Mina (dialect of Ewe spoken in Togo) see (9), a translation of (8) above. According to her, *yè* is a pronoun that picks out the bearer of the attitude (attitude holder) reported by the sentence in which it occurs but does not require that the attitude holder thinks of himself or herself in a first person way, hence, the use of *yè* in (9) with respect to the context in (8). I will return to ‘mistaken’ identity in (4.2).
3.2 Dream Reports

It is not possible for an individual to inhabit two different worlds at a given time. Thus, we are usually in the third person, when we dream of being another individual. Percus and Sauerland (2003) differentiate between the two identities we have in dreams namely, the ‘dream self’ (the individual we are in our dreams) and the ‘dream subject’ (the individual who does the dreaming). In (10), John is the ‘dream subject’ and Bill, the ‘dream self’.

(10) John dreamt that he was Bill and he got married to his granddaughter.

As discussed by Percus and Sauerland (2003), one might expect dream-sentences with more than one pronoun, like (10), to allow readings on which any pronoun can correlate with either the ‘dream self’ or the ‘dream subject’. However, this is not the case. Percus and Sauerland (2003) propose the Oneiric Reference Constraint, from here on, ORC, to, as it were, guide the interpretation of such dream sentences. The ORC says:

“A sentence of the form X dreamed that ...pronoun... allows a reading in which the pronoun has the dream-self as its correlate only when the following condition is met: some pronoun whose correlate is the dream-self on the reading in question must not be asymmetrically c-commanded by any pronoun whose correlate is X” (Percus and Sauerland 2003, p. 5).

In other words, a pronoun which picks out the dream self (de se) cannot be c-commanded by another pronoun that merely refers (de re) to the dreamer. ORC, therefore, disallows a reading in which the ‘dream self’, Bill, is the correlate of his and the ‘dream subject’, John, the correlate of he, given that he c-commands his. Pearson (2015) suggests that dream reports serve as productive grounds for testing the claims under discussion due to the possibility of a shift in reference. According to her, in dream reports, a de se pronoun should be able to select the ‘dream self’ whereas, a de re one should be able to select the ‘dream subject’. In the previous example (10), we can assume the following readings:

In John’s dream...

i. Bill\textsubscript{dese} was marrying Bill’s\textsubscript{dese} granddaughter.
ii. Bill\textsubscript{dese} was marrying John’s\textsubscript{dere} granddaughter.
iii. # John\textsubscript{dere} was marrying Bill’s\textsubscript{dese} granddaughter.
iv. John\textsubscript{dere} was marrying John’s\textsubscript{dere} granddaughter.

Given this pattern for English, we would expect Ewe to behave in a similar manner in (11) and (12). This means that yè should pick out Bill (dream self) and é should pick out John (dream
subject). On the contrary, yè picks out both the ‘dream subject’ and the ‘dream self’, similar to option (ii) in the English paradigm, a rather surprising observation. This observation poses questions to the widely-held view about logophorics: whether it is correct to pair up the notions of logophorics and de se on one hand, and pair up the concept of ‘dream self’, ‘dream subject’ with that of de re and de se on the other hand. I will maintain the view that the notion of logophoricity and de se are closely related. The consequence will be that the theory of interpreting dreams may not be useful for shedding light on the de re, de se distinction after all, given the behaviour of yè in (11) and (12). (11) and (12) simply show that in dreams everything is possible, the ‘dream subject’ can take the perspective of the ‘dream self’ because he perceives this person.

(11) John ḷudrō be ḷe ṭa ṭgbuiyɔvι.
John dream COMP LOG COP Bill CONJ LOG married LOG-POSS granddaughter
‘John dreamt that he was Bill and he married his granddaughter.’

(12) John ḷe ṭa ṭgɔkui.
John dream COMP LOG COP Barack Obama CONJ LOG gave LOG REL.
nu-nana aɖe.
th-ing-give.REDU INDEF
‘John dreamt that he was Barack Obama and he gave himself a gift.’

4 Interpretation of yè: default de se

In light of contrasting views in the literature on ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios and dream reports, this section contributes to the discussion on the interpretation of yè.

4.1 Data Collection

In order to test the interpretation of yè, I set up a small elicitation production task. Ten informants (native speakers of Ewedomegbe) evaluated the naturalness of sentences over Skype and WhatsApp video, coupled with introspection (native speaker intuition). The voice note feature on WhatsApp was also used to elicit data. Two informants come from Peki, one from Ho central, five from Hlefi and the other two come from suburbs of Ho namely, Sokode Gbogame and Abutia-Teti. The first part of the task was to expose them to structures that did not involve ‘mistaken’ identity. For instance, Mawuse and Akpene are chatting. Mawuse says to Akpene “I am hungry”. What did Mawuse say?

Then I provided scenarios from both “standard”, “competing” views and discovered scenarios (e.g. (6), (8), (14), etc) and asked my informants to report them in indirect discourse. To guide them, I would ask questions about what the attitude holder said, believed, thought, etc, depending

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7Ede Zimmermann and Rajesh Bhatt also thought this to be the case.
8My informants are multilinguals of Ewedomegbe (Ewe), English and Akan (Asanti twi dialect of Akan). They presently live in Ghana and have had some basic formal training in Ewe (they speak Ewedomegbe, read and write Ewe).
on the type of attitude predicate used. They were given a blank space to fill in the gaps with the appropriate pronoun. For instance, *John be ... nyá aghale/nú*. In order not to misconstrue the domain of *yè*, I required that they substitute the phrases involving *res* e.g. *John be wó a tsia ame si le *TV* la dzi* ‘the person on *TV*’, with the suitable pronoun since most of them produced such sentences. Elicitation took a maximum of 30 minutes per session depending on availability and cooperation of the research subjects. English and Ewedomegbe was used interchangeably during elicitation.

### 4.2 Mistaken Identity Scenarios

As a native speaker, I find Pearson (2015)’s conclusion (*yè* has a *de re* reading) rather untenable. I could think of a situation where a report can be made about what I have said about ‘someone, who is actually me’, with *yè*, but only as a manner of speaking, maybe for stylistic effects. Suppose I cooked for a group of friends and as a way of complementing myself, I say “whoever prepared this food is a good cook”, any of my friends could use (13) to represent my thoughts.

(13) Abby *be yè nye nu-qa-la nyui.*
    Abby say LOG is thing-cook-one.who good
    ‘Abby said she is a good cook.’

Apart from a context like (13), it is simply impossible to refer to one’s *res* with *yè*. I would not use *yè* in a ‘mistaken’ identity context. My research subjects were overwhelmed by the informational complexity of the ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios (e.g. Kaplan’s pants on fire). I therefore, took a detour from such scenarios and presented real-world examples9, which seemed to make the task easier. My research subjects could relate to these examples better.

(14) An Asian woman was declared missing from a party touring the Eldgjá volcanic region in south Iceland after getting off the party’s bus to freshen up. She only hopped off the bus briefly, but had also changed her clothes - and her fellow travelers did not recognize her when she climbed back on again to continue the party’s journey. When the details of the missing person were issued, the woman reportedly didn’t recognize her own description [woman with a pink sweater] and unwittingly joined the search party for herself, see *Daily Mail* for South Iceland Scenario10

In the South Iceland Scenario recapped as (15) and (16), (15) is supposed to report the state of mind of the Asian woman at the time of the search. “The Asian woman believes that she is lost” means “The Asian woman believes that the woman in the pink sweater is lost”. The difference between the readings is: in the *de se* reading the Asian woman knows that she is the woman with the pink sweater and in the *de re* reading she does not. My informants produced the following sentences with respect to (14):

i. Asia *nyõmu o xoese be ame ađe bũ* ‘The Asian woman believed someone was lost.’

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9I am grateful to Amy Rose Deal for this idea.

ii. Asia nyɔnu la búi be nyɔnu aɖe bú ‘The Asian woman thinks a woman is lost.’

Given the replacement task, they then preferred (15) to (16) to capture the belief of the Asian woman although (16) is grammatical in the language.

(15) Asia nyɔnu la xɔése be é bú.
Asian woman DEF believes COMP 3SG is lost
‘The Asian woman believes that she is lost.’
[é = the woman with the pink sweater]

(16) Asia nyɔnu la xɔése be yè bú.
Asian woman DEF believes COMP LOG is lost
# ‘The Asian woman believes of herself to be lost.’
[yè ≠ the woman with the pink sweater]

Pearson (2015)’s theory of interpreting logophoric pronouns predicts that the belief of the Asian woman in the South Iceland Scenario may be expressed in Ewe by means of the logophoric pronoun yè, having a genuine de re reading. However, based on (15), it is evident that logophoric yè may not be used in a de re reading in Ewedomegbe. It is impossible to interpret yè as representing the individual that everybody is looking for in the South Iceland Scenario. The Asian woman would never claim “I am lost” although she will learn at some point that she was missing. Another natural scenario 11 worth pondering over is as follows:

(17) Fatu loves singing. The problem is that she sings very badly. When she sings, she disturbs everybody around. Fatu, however is persuaded that she is a great singer, and that she could have a great artistic career. Things become worse when Fatu gets it into her head to bring out an album. In order to discourage her, her brother decided to record her discreetly on his mobile phone as she was singing in the kitchen. He then sent her the recording with the following question: “She sings well, doesn’t she?” Fatu listened to the recording, and answered his brother: “That girl sounds horrible. She doesn’t sing well at all”. Unfortunately, Fatu does not realize that it is her own voice that she has just heard.

(18) Fatu xɔése be yè me dzì na ha nuyie o.
Fatu believe COMP LOG NEG sing HAB song good NEG
‘Fatu believes that she does not sing well.’ [yè ≠ the person with the bad voice]

We can observe that (18) is unacceptable given (17). In all worlds compatible with Fatu’s believes, she is a great singer. She would never accept (18) as communicating her doxastic state.

4.3 Dream Reports

We have seen in section (3.2) above that yè selects both the ‘dream subject’ and the ‘dream self’. From the many discussions with my informants, I observed a difficulty to grasp the idea of “counter-identity” in dreams. Do we really dream of being another? This could be a psychological question and not a linguistic one. Subjects of attitudes may have counterparts to represent them

11Many thanks to Alassane Kiemtoré of University of Stuttgart for sharing this scenario with me.
in other worlds but they themselves are not there. My informants could relate to what is known as “malaria-dreams” or better, being younger than they are in reality in their dreams. However, the person they are in their dreams is still them. A possible explanation of yè in dream reports is that the use of yè signals cognitive access to both the ‘dream self’ and ‘dream subject’ even if they are different individuals; or that, yè prefers a ‘strict’-identity (John is John and John is Bill in all worlds). I tried to push the idea of “counter-identity” once more and (19) was the result. Alternative (i), (ii) and (iv) seemed to be available.

(19) John küdrò be yè nye Bill eye yè abe Bill qe yè-je togbuiyovi.
John dream COMP LOG COP Bill CONJ LOG as Bill married LOG-POSS granddaughter

‘John dreamt that he was Bill and as Bill he married his grand daughter.’

This means John’s mental state is of one that says the following: In John’s dream...

i. Billdese was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill and I, as Bill, married my granddaughter”).

ii. Billdese was marrying John’sdere granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill and I as Bill, married my real self’s granddaughter”).

iii. # Johndere was marrying Bill’sdese granddaughter.

iv. Johndere was marrying John’sdere granddaughter (“I dreamt that I was Bill (but it doesn’t matter who I was in my dream), I, as my real self, married my real self’s granddaughter”).

With (19), it is possible that the presence of abe ‘as’ forces a de se reading since “as-phrases” have a subject preference. However, this is the best my informants could give me given the difficulty at hand.

5 Explanations

This section attempts to offer some possible explanations to the differences in judgments with respect to ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios.

5.1 Dialectal Variation: ‘Pure’ Ewe and Togo Ewe

The differences in judgments could be an effect of different dialects or registers. Note, however, that all dialects of Ewe are mutually intelligible (Ameka 1991). I present the language situation in Ewe and Togo.

‘Pure’ Ewe belongs to the Kwa branch of the Niger-Congo language family. According to

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12 These are dreams people have after taking medication for malaria. It is usually in the form of nightmares (e.g. one could dream of being dead, in coma or admitted to the hospital). Worse, one could hallucinate.

13 Thanks to Idan Landau for pointing this out.

14 It is odd to refer to the variety of Ewe spoken in Ghana as ‘pure’. However, I suspect Pearson’s informants used the term to refer to the written standard variety of Ewe.
M. P. Lewis, Simons, Fennig, et al. (2009), Ewe can further be classified as an Atlantic-Congo, Volta-Congo, Left Bank, and Gbe language. It has been noted that the name Ewe applies to a written standard (developed in the nineteenth century, with a high degree of coastal content) and several spoken mutually intelligible dialects in the Volta region of Ghana and southern part of Togo (Ameke 1991). Broadly, the dialects spoken in Ghana can be grouped geographically into: Southern or coastal dialects and Northern or inland dialects, characterized indigenously as Ewe-domegbe. The southern dialects are spoken in areas such as Anlo (Anlɔ), Tongu (Toŋu), Avenor, Dzodze, etc. while the Northern dialects are spoken in areas such as Ho, Kpedze, Hohoe, Peki, Kpando, Fodome, Danyi, Kpele, among others.

Togo, on the other hand, is a multilingual country. According to M. P. Lewis, Simons, Fennig, et al. (2009), 44 languages are spoken in the country. Among the languages spoken, French is the official language, while the interethnic languages used are French and ‘Mina’ (i.e. the dialect of Ewe spoken in Lome, the capital of Togo). ‘Mina’ is also known as ‘Mina-Ewe’, ‘Ewe-Mina’, ‘Gengbe’ or simply ‘Gen’ (Essizewa 2009; C. F. Voegelein and F. M. Voegelein 1964, p. 62).

Strikingly, Gen belongs to the Gbe dialect cluster15 of which Ewe also belongs (Essizewa 2009). It remains unclear why Pearson’s informants chose yɛ in a ‘mistaken’ identity scenario if for all dialects of Ewe, spoken in both Ghana and Togo, yɛ is a logophoric pronoun used to report the attitude or feelings of some person.

5.2 Methodology

The difference in judgment may also be a result of methods used to elicit data. I adopted elicitation production, coupled with a truth value judgment task (selection and replacement task). The reason was to allow informants to demonstrate their knowledge of the logophoric pronoun, by producing sentences which required the use of this pronoun. The replacement task, particularly, allowed for comparison between my responses and Pearson’s. On the other hand, Pearson (2015) used grammaticality judgment as well as truth value judgment tasks. I suppose that the point of the task is not to judge whether or not a sentence is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the language; otherwise, all the sentences with yɛ is grammatical in the language. This may have influenced Pearson’s responses.

5.3 Confused Informants

Differences in judgment could occur as a result of confusion on the part of Pearson’s informants which was also the case for my informants. It was observed that the ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios were notoriously difficult to understand and it was difficult to explain the point of the judgment task to the informants. In such scenarios, the attitude holders are often temporarily disoriented and informants found it hard in deciding from what time to report their attitude; the time when the attitude holders don’t know who they are from the time they gained information about their identity.

The first three of my informants reported yɛ as possible in ‘mistaken’ identity reports as well, but it turned out that they didn’t realise a difference between the point of view of the attitude holder and point of view of the reporter. My informants (the first three) judged the sentences on

15https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Gbe_languages.png
the grounds that they knew the attitude holders meant to talk about themselves. They certainly misunderstood the point of the test and they confirmed that they may have lacked comprehension. One of them actually said to me “enya kpakpa mak.mako fomeviwo ka yé ne tsó va na mi?” ‘what kinds of confusing stories have you brought to us?’ I had to explain the distinction between the attitude holder as *res* meaning, he’s not aware that he is himself, and the attitude holder as himself several times for most of my data collection session.

Given that Pearson used grammaticality and truth judgment tasks, I am tempted to also attribute misrepresented sentences of (20), a real-life scenario, to be evaluated by informants. To see this, compare (20-a) with (20-b).

(20) Following a spate of burglaries, a policeman was alerted by CCTV operators that someone was acting suspiciously, and chased after that individual, unaware that it was himself16.

a. Sodza ọse be ụe ụjọ fiafita.
   Policeman believe COMPL LOG COP thief
   ‘The policeman, believed that he, was a thief’ (Pearson 2015, p. 99).

b. Kpovito la ọse be ụe ụjọ ụbụ ụjọ ọfe ụjọ la
   Policeman DEF believe COMP LOG is person 3SG think thiefing of him DEF
   search-PROG
   ‘The policeman believed that he was looking for a suspect’ [From my informant].

c. Kpovito la ọse be é nja fiafita.
   policeman DEF believe COMP 3SG COP thief
   ‘The policeman believed that he was a thief.’
   [é = the individual being chased by the policeman]

From (20-a) and (20-b) one can observe that the choice of words differ. Note, that one of Pearson’s consultants (consultant 3) consistently rejects sentence (20-a). The policeman believed he was looking for a suspect and not a thief. Trivial as this may seem, I think the *res* i.e the individual being chased is that of the CCTV operator (see footnote for full scenario) and not even the policeman. The judgments could have been sharper. Now, suppose it is the case that the policeman was looking for a thief, my informants would rather produce (20-c) as a suitable construction with respect to the scenario.

5.4 Verbs Used

Interpretation of the logophoric pronoun may depend on the kind(s) of verb. For instance, Chierchia (1989, p. 17) suggests that a verb like *persuade* in (21) has an unambiguos *de se* reading. Whereas, verbs of causation such as, *force, make*, etc in (22) unambiguously have a *de re* reading.

(21) a. John persuaded Mary to be fired.
    b. John persuaded Mary to bring about a situation where she is fired.

Chierchia (1989) proposes that (21-a) asymmetrically entails (21-b) while, (22-a) entails (22-b) and (22-b) in turn entails (22-a). Mary controls the complement of persuade in (21-a). She is persuaded to bring about a situation where she and nobody else is fired, involving an indirect attribution of the property of being fired to Mary. The same cannot be said for the use of force in (22). yè does not show up an equivalent Ewe example (23). Instead we use a connecting pronoun né, this needs further investigation.

(23) John té-qli Mary dzí be né dzó.
    John push-onto Mary prep COMP pronoun leave
    ‘John forced Mary to leave.’

Pearson (2015) investigates verbs like say, think and believe. Some of those verbs are known as control verbs and some as exceptional case marking verbs. For ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios, I found the same judgments for the verbs gblo ‘say’, xaese ‘believe’, mɔkɔkɔ ‘hope’ and bù/súsú ‘think’ in Ewedomegbe.

(24) a. John gblo be é nyá agbalè.
    John say COMP 3SG know book
    ‘John, said that he, is clever.’

b. John xaese be é nyá agbalè.
    John believed COMP 3SG know book
    ‘John, believed that he, is clever.’

c. John bù be é nyá agbalè.
    John thought COMP 3SG know book
    ‘John, thought that he, is clever.’

d. John na mɔkɔkɔ me be é nyá agbalè.
    John be hope in COMP 3SG know book
    ‘John, hoped that he, is clever.’

My informants would not use yè regarding these verbs to communicate John’s feelings, if he was unaware that he was the subject of the attitude. They always preferred é to yè.

6 Conclusion

I conclude that yè is a regular logophoric pronoun in Ewedomegbe, just like other logophoric pronouns in other languages. As discussed, an attitude report involving yè cannot be used to describe a situation where the attitude holder is unaware of his or her immediate condition. Thus, the awareness of the attitude holder is a prominent condition in determining the interpretation of the logophoric pronoun. Future research would have to show whether there are indeed dialectal dif-
ferences with respect to the interpretation of logophors. Also, future research would have to work with examples like the South Iceland scenario. It would be interesting to investigate the kinds of ‘mistaken’ identity scenarios that allow a de se reading. Although Pearson (2015) involved five informants and I, ten, involving more participants will be great for future work. Concerning dream reports, I propose that dream reports may not be good grounds for shedding light on the de re, de se distinction. The use of the notions de re and de se in dream reports seems to be different from the use of de re and de se in attitude reports. Ewe shows this. It is not possible to say that the dream subject is always de re.

References

Lewis, David (1979). “Attitudes de dicto and de se”. In: The philosophical review 88.4, pp. 513–543.


