
#### Cahier 2005-16a

# The Integration Monitor 2005

The social integration of migrants monitored over time: trend and cohort analyses

R.V. Bijl A. Zorlu A.S. van Rijn R.P.W. Jennissen M. Blom





This report is a joint responsibility of the Ministry of Justice Research and Documentation Centre (*Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum* – WODC) and Statistics Netherlands (*Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* – CBS).

The study that is the subject of this report was funded in part by the Ministry of Justice. The WODC is responsible for the substantive development of the integration map; the CBS is responsible for supplying the correct data.

This report is a translation of the Dutch-written report 'Integratiekaart 2005 – De maatschappelijke integratie van migranten in de tijd gevolgd: trend- en cohortanalyses' (WODC-Cahier 2005-16) which was published September 2005.

Written orders for copies of this publication may be placed with

WODC Library, room KO 14 PO Box 20301 2500 EH The Hague The Netherlands

F: +31 (0)70 370 45 07 E: a.eind@minjus.nl I: www.wodc.nl

#### **Foreword**

In 2004, work started on the development of an Integration Monitor. The Integration Monitor is a project that is being implemented by the Ministry of Justice Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) [Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum] of the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with Statistics Netherlands [Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek]. The object is to develop a tool that can be used to monitor the integration, over a period of time, of first and second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities as objectively as possible. Alongside information from other sources, a monitoring tool of this nature can contribute to a better understanding of how and the rate at which the various ethnic minority groups are able to gain a place for themselves in Dutch society.

The Integration Monitor makes no pretension to measure policy effects, but does establish an important basis for sound effectiveness research. After all, developments are identified over time and for all of the various population groups. In order to answer questions on the social effects of policy interventions, there is a particular need for a <u>different</u> type of study, in which attention is given to the *working mechanisms* underlying the various measures and interventions which are intended to promote integration.

The first Integration Monitor was published in October 2004. The quantitative and longitudinal information available on integration from Dutch registers and random samples is increasing slowly but surely. In the past year, this has enabled us to achieve a number of improvements and substantive expansions, which can now be found in the Integration Monitor 2005.

The Integration Monitor 2005 has been funded in part by the Ministry of Justice. The WODC is responsible for the substantive development of the Integration Monitor, while Statistics Netherlands is responsible for supplying the correct data. The authors would like to thank their colleagues at Statistics Netherlands, in particular Ko Oudhof, Bart Bakker and Rik van Vliet, for their comments. However, responsibility for the ultimate contents of the chapters below rests entirely with the authors of this document.

## **Table of Contents**

Summ	ary	1
1 1.1 1.2	<b>Introduction</b> Object and study method used for the Integration Monitor Structure of the report	<b>7</b> 8 9
2 2.1 2.2 2.3	Starting points Definition of integration and actors in the integration process Integration processes Operationalisation: social domains and indicators	11 11 12 14
3.1 3.2 3.3	Demographic indicators Population composition 1996-2005 Age structure Future developments	19 19 20 20
4.1 4.2 4.2.1 4.3 4.4	Education Performance by final-examination candidates in secondary education – trends 1999-2003 Entry into higher education Choice of study Graduation from higher education Explanations for the ultimate level of education achieved	23 24 26 27 29
5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3.1 5.3.2	Work and Benefits: trends 1999 – 2003 Working as an employee Working on a self-employed basis Social security benefits Unemployment benefits and assistance benefits Disability	35 35 36 37 38 39
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.4.1 6.4.2 6.5	Labour market transitions: monitoring the 1999, 2000 and 2001 immigration cohorts Labour market participation: work and social security benefits Patterns of labour market participation The effect of economic stagnation Determinants of the achievement of a labour market position Male newcomers Female newcomers Effects of the economic climate	45 46 47 49 49 50 52 53
7	Contacts between ethnic minorities and the autochtonous Dutch population	69
7.1	Marriages between individuals from ethnic minorities and the autochtonous Dutch population	70
7.2	Marriages between individuals from ethnic minorities and partners from the country of origin	70
7.3	Proportion of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood	71

8	Crime	75
8.1	Suspected of crime: police registrations	75
8.1.1	Suspect determinants	77
8.1.2	Juvenile suspects	78
8.1.3	Type of criminal offence	78
8.2	Recidivism	79
9	Conclusions	87
9.1	Starting points and Integration Monitor approach	87
9.1.1	Integration indicators	88
9.1.2	Missing information	88
9.2	Results per social area	89
9.3	Concluding observations	93
Litera	ture	97
Appen	adices	101
1	Further methodological substantiation: state of affairs,	
	developments in generations, trends and cohorts	101
2	Data available: the Social Statistical Database	103
3	Data available; the Identification Service System (HKS)	104
4	The privacy guarantees of Statistics Netherlands	105
5	Documentation for the tables compiled in the framework	
	of the Integration Monitor 2005	106

# **Summary**

#### What is the core of the Integration Monitor?

In 2004, work started on the development of an Integration Monitor. The Integration Monitor is a project that is being implemented by the Research and Documentation Centre (*Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum* – WODC) of the Ministry of Justice in collaboration with Statistics Netherlands (*Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* – CBS). The object is to develop a tool that can be used to monitor the integration of first and second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities over time. Alongside information from other sources, a monitoring tool of this nature can contribute to a better understanding of the extent to which, and the rate at which, the various ethnic minority groups are able to gain a place for themselves in Dutch society.

In comparison with the first Integration Monitor published in 2004, the Integration Monitor 2005 features not only *more recent information*, but also a number of *new integration indicators*. The latter are data in terms of crime and entry into higher education. Another new aspect of the Integration Monitor 2005 is the expansion of the analyses made to cover three *cohorts of newcomers* that came to the Netherlands in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively.

Through the use of the Social Statistics Database (SSB) [Sociaal Statistisch Bestand] produced by Statistics Netherlands, with its data covering the entire population of the Netherlands, it has been possible, in many cases, to arrive at a detailed breakdown of groups according to their different countries of origin. In addition to a description of the traditional 'big four' (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans/Arubans), we also indicate, where possible, how smaller immigrant populations, which have come to the Netherlands in recent years, are participating in society.

Using longitudinal data, the Integration Monitor provides an insight into the progress of integration achieved by large and small origin groups over a longer period and in different domains of society. This is done by featuring *trends* over time and by monitoring *cohorts* of newcomers that settled in the Netherlands in a certain year, in order to see how they have fared.

The Integration Monitor focuses on *actual behaviour* and on the *actual social positions* held by individuals, as opposed to attitudes, perceptions, subjective experience and opinions.

#### **Demographic developments**

- The Netherlands' non-Western population has grown sharply in the last ten years. Since the beginning of 1996, the number of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities has increased by more than half a million people. The non-Western population is growing much faster than the autochtonous Dutch population, which has increased by just 185,000 people since 1996.
- The growth rate of the Dutch population has been falling for years. The growth rate for non-Western ethnic minorities has also started to fall, but only in recent years and less dramatically than the growth rate for the autochtonous Dutch population and that of the Western ethnic minority population. As a result of the difference in population growth, the non-Western ethnic minorities' share in the population has further increased. On 1 January 2005, approximately 1.7 million individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities and 1.4 million individuals from Western ethnic minorities were living in the Netherlands. Approximately 40% of the individuals from

- non-Western ethnic minorities and 59% of the individuals from Western ethnic minorities are second-generation.
- All groups of non-Western origin are younger, on average, than the autochtonous Dutch population and, what is more, are considerably less of an ageing population than the autochtonous Dutch population. The same applies for those groups that have already been in the Netherlands for a relatively long period of time, in particular people from Surinam, Turkey and Morocco. These groups will start to age in the next few decades.

#### **Education**

- In secondary education, the success rates posted by autochtonous Dutch students for final examinations in all types of schools are higher than those posted by non-Western ethnic minority students. The difference observable for pre-university education (VWO) and higher general secondary education (HAVO) is approximately 12%, while the difference for lower general secondary education (MAVO) and pre-vocational education (VBO) hovers at around the 8% mark. These differences remained virtually unchanged between 1999 and 2003. The lag in performance evident in the scores of final examination candidates from ethnic minorities in relation to the results achieved by autochtonous Dutch students has not yet been eliminated.
- Although it is generally assumed that the performance of older students is influenced less by the socio-economic background of their parents than that of younger students, significant differences still persist between autochtonous Dutch students and non-Western ethnic minority students attending final year secondary-education classes and higher education.
- When non-Western ethnic minority students have achieved a HAVO or VWO diploma, they move directly into higher education more frequently (on a relative scale) than autochtonous Dutch students do.
- Individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities tend, on average, to opt for studies within the economy and law sectors. This would appear to be at the expense of studies in the technology sector in particular.
- Quite a lot of successful ethnic minority students who transfer to higher education still fail. Of all autochtonous Dutch students entering higher education in 1995, it was found that 67% had graduated by 2003. For Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese and Antilleans, these percentages were 42%, 35% and 36% respectively. The success rate achieved by the group consisting of students from other non-Western ethnic minorities was also significantly lower than the success rate applicable for the autochtonous Dutch group. It would seem that a slow improvement is being achieved in this situation over the course of time.

#### Work and benefits: trends 1999 - 2003

- Labour market participation by various origin groups changed little between 1999 and 2003. The major differences in terms of the percentages of those in work between the different origin groups that existed in 1999 were still visible in 2003.
- Labour market participation amongst Turks and Moroccans is lower than that of the autochtonous Dutch population. By contrast, the Surinamese and Antilleans are almost as well represented in the labour market as the autochtonous Dutch population is.
- In most groups, we observe a relatively large proportion of employees (over 50%) in the second generation. In virtually all of the origin groups, the

- second generation has a higher level of labour market participation than the first generation does. Particularly as regards migrants from Morocco, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and China, labour market participation is considerably higher amongst the second generation than amongst the first generation. As regards labour market participation, it would appear that social participation is increasing with the emergence of new generations of migrants;
- Although the percentages are low, the proportion of self-employed individuals increased between 1999 and 2003 in most origin groups both in the first and second generations. Amongst the four major migrant groups, the increase in the proportion of self-employed individuals is particularly striking amongst the Turks. The increase amongst the Moroccans is relatively just as large and, as such, no less striking. However, the final figure is lower than that observed for the Turkish group. The number of individuals who are self-employed is by far the highest in the first generations. The greatest number of self-employed individuals can be found amongst the first generations. The highest numbers of self-employed individuals originate from Egypt (19.9%), Hong Kong (17.9%), China (16.6%), India (10.7%), Pakistan (9.5%), Vietnam (7.1%) and Turkey (5.5%). In comparison: 7.7% of the autochtonous Dutch population was self-employed in 2003;
- Between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of individuals receiving unemployment benefits increased. The figure for the autochtonous Dutch population increased from 1.6% to 1.9%. The increase in individuals receiving unemployment benefits was far more dramatic for individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities, i.e. from 1.9% in 1999 to 2.7% in 2003;
- The highest labour disability percentages are found amongst Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese. Moreover, in the period 1999-2003, the labour disability percentages amongst these groups particularly the first generation increased at a faster rate than amongst the autochtonous Dutch population. Amongst the autochtonous Dutch working population, the labour disability percentage increased from 8.0% in 1999 to 8.4% in 2003; amongst first-generation Turks, the increase was from 14.5% to 16.2%, amongst first-generation Moroccans, the increase recorded was from 9.8% to 11.1%, and amongst first-generation Surinamese, the increase recorded was from 8.8% in 1999 to 10.1% in 2003;
- Far lower labour disability percentages apply for second-generation non-Western groups which can partly be explained by the lower average age but here too an increase has been observed over the last five years. Added to this, the increase observed amongst second-generation non-Western groups is also stronger than that observed amongst the autochtonous Dutch population.

#### Labour market position: monitoring three cohorts of newcomers

- By monitoring immigration cohorts from 1999, 2000 and 2001 (consisting of more than 72,000, 79,000 and 87,000 individuals aged from 15 to 60 respectively) until 2004, we were able to produce a more precise analysis of the labour market position of new immigrants;
- More than 40% of Turkish and Moroccan men find work within a year of their arrival in the Netherlands (thus, within one year). In the second year, this percentage increases to over 60%, after which a less dramatic increase can be observed. The percentage of Turkish and Moroccan men in work reaches 70% in the third year following their arrival and for the time being does not increase any further;

- At the same time, the proportion of individuals on benefits is increasing gradually in both groups. In the 1999 cohort, 8% of Moroccan men and 11% of Turkish men were on benefits in their first year in the Netherlands. These percentages increase to 16% and 15% respectively after four years. Subsequent cohorts (2000 and 2001) consistently start their first year in the Netherlands with a relatively lower proportion of benefit recipients;
- In general, female immigrants are less likely to be in paid employment and are more likely to be on benefits than their male counterparts in the same origin groups. This does not vary from one cohort to another;
- In the year of entry, labour market participation by immigrants from *asylum countries* (principally Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan) is very low (up to approximately 10% for men and 2% for women). Although participation does increase in subsequent years, the figure remains low in comparison to other immigrants. The percentage of benefit recipients in this category of immigrants is relatively low during the entry year comparable with the percentage applicable for family formation migrants but grows sharply in subsequent years to 23- 40% amongst men and 38-70% amongst women. The highest percentages by far- can be observed amongst Afghans;
- After correction for country of origin, reason for migration and other background characteristics (such as age and length of stay), it appears that the difficult economic climate has had a negative impact on newcomers.
   After three years, the proportion of men in work in the 2000 and 2001 immigration cohorts is lower than the number applicable for the 1999 immigration cohort;
- Comparison of the three year-cohorts studied here shows that the labour market careers of migrant groups (by reason for migration) reveal no remarkable differences over the years. In all of the cohorts studied, we see a strong increase in the percentage of family migrants in work in their second year of residence in the Netherlands. The number of immigrants in work stabilises after the second year.

#### Social contacts: mixed and migration marriages

- Of the four major origin groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans/Arubans), the Turks and Moroccans in particular rarely marry Dutch partners. This applies to both the first and second generations. Between 1999 and 2001, there was a fall in the number of mixed marriages from 16% to 11% for Moroccan second-generation men. By contrast, the percentage of second-generation Moroccan women marrying Dutch partners almost doubled in the same period (increasing from 4.4% to 8.0%). However, when compared with other groups, this is still a low figure;
- Almost two-thirds of all marriages entered into by Turks and Moroccans are migration marriages. This applies to both men and women. Although these figures are slightly lower for second generations, percentages of between 50% and 60% still apply. The situation between 1999 and 2001 changes very little, and a reduction in the proportion of migration marriages can only be observed amongst Moroccan women, to just below 50% in 2001;
- A high percentage of marriage partners from the country of origin can sometimes also be observed in the smaller origin groups – particularly amongst men.

#### **Crime**

- Police records have been improved and are now more detailed. The police have also put greater efforts into crime detection. Apart from actual changes in terms of crime rates, the above has also resulted in increases in the percentages of suspects for more or less all groups both autochtonous Dutch and ethnic minorities for 2003, in comparison with the previous year;
- The overall picture is as follows. The percentages for male and female suspects from ethnic minorities are between twice and three times as high as for the autochtonous Dutch population. For ethnic minority men, the suspect percentage was 4.6% in comparison with 1.8% of autochtonous Dutch men; for ethnic minority women, the figure recorded was 0.9%, while the figure for autochtonous Dutch women is 0.3%;
- The five origin groups with the highest suspect percentages are Antilleans (8.0%), Somalians (4.7%), Surinamese (4.4%), Moroccans (3.9%) and Cape Verdeans (3.5%);
- By far the majority of offences are committed by young people and young adult men. This applies both to the autochtonous Dutch population and to ethnic minorities. Moroccans and Antilleans feature badly in both the 12-17 and the 18-24 age brackets. Where, for Antilleans, the first generation in particular includes a large number of suspects (approximately 15%; in both the age categories specified here), both first and second generation Moroccans are heavily represented in the suspects register. In this origin group, the peaks were particularly represented by young adults. In 2003, the police registered almost one in five young Turkish adults as suspects. Although the percentages applicable for the Surinamese, Cape Verdians and Somalians are lower, these are still higher than those applicable for autochtonous Dutch young men and, as such, are a matter for concern;
- Although suspect percentages are (far) lower for girls across the board than the percentage applicable for boys, there are some groups of non-Western origin from which a relatively large number of girls have been registered by the police, and in which figure no reduction has been observed between 2002 and 2003. A remarkably high percentage is observed amongst first-generation girls from the Netherlands Antilles (4.9% of suspects are aged 18-24 in 2003), followed by second-generation Moroccan (3.0%), Surinamese (2.5%) and Ghanaian (2.5%) girls. In comparison: the overall percentage of girls aged 18-24 from ethnic minorities and registered in the police Identification Service system (*HKS*) is 1.4%;
- Crimes against property are the most prevalent. This applies for virtually all of the origin groups. One in three offences is a crime against property. In 30% of cases, the offences committed by the autochtonous Dutch population are crimes against property. For offences involving individuals from ethnic minorities, this figure is 38%. In the case of violent crime, the level of overrepresentation of groups from ethnic minorities was less marked: 23% versus 20% for the autochtonous Dutch population;
- After just one year, almost one-third of Antilleans/Arubans and Moroccans who had been involved in criminal cases concluded in 1997 were in trouble with the law again. After three years, one-third (32.9%) of all individuals registered in relation to offences had committed further offences;
- For almost half (47%) of all 1997 offenders, the Public Prosecutions
   Department opened new cases in the eight years following the offence
   committed in 1997. There are several striking peaks. The highest percentage
   of repeat offenders is found amongst first-generation migrant perpetrators

from the Netherlands Antilles (72%), Cape Verde (66%), Morocco (63%) and Surinam (60%). Asians are unlikely to reoffend.

#### Conclusion

The authors conclude that although some finer distinction can be discerned in some areas within the impression presented by the data from this report on the progress of ethnic minority integration into Dutch society, the impression presented is one that does, in the main, give great cause for ongoing concern.

### 1 Introduction

According to the 'New Style Integration Policy letter', which the Minister for Immigration and Integration sent to the Lower house on 16 September 2003, the objective of the integration policy is 'shared citizenship'. This is a situation in which people participate in all aspects of society and make an active contribution to this society, speak the Dutch language and observe basic Dutch norms. The letter gives a number of examples of these norms. It is also noted that the obligation to comply with the Constitution is the focal point. 'Participation while maintaining diversity, that is the objective' (TK 2003-2004, 29 203, no. 1, p. 9).

According to the Minister, on the basis of this description, a group that has 'integrated' will meet the following conditions:

- its members have a good command of the Dutch language;
- the group participates proportionately in structural social domains;
- inter-ethnic contacts are maintained;
- its members subscribe to basic Dutch norms.

According to the Government, integration can be achieved in a number of ways: by providing migrants with 'resources' enabling them to develop the knowledge and skills required to acquire a position in society, by rapprochement between migrants and the autochtonous Dutch population, so that migrants and autochtonous Dutch residents can get to know and appreciate each other by maintaining social contacts, and by 'accessibility', which means that public sectors must open up for migrants.

Dutch integration policy focuses on the different categories of 'newcomers' (refugees, migrant workers, family reunification migrants, family formation migrants) as well as on migrants who have already been in the Netherlands for many years ('oldcomers') and second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities. The differences between these groups in terms of migration history, migration motives and many other background characteristics (socio-economic and political circumstances in the country of origin, education, etc.) imply that it may be expected that the extent and speed of integration and the different ways in which the integration process is achieved can differ considerably.

In 2005, the Minister for Immigration and Integration expressed the need to combine the various information flows on the integration of ethnic minorities. To this end, the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (SCP) [Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau], the WODC and Statistics Netherlands [Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek] were asked to work together to produce an Annual Report on Integration [Jaarrapport Integratie]. This annual report will replace the Minorities Report [Rapportage Minderheden] (produced by SCP), Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands [Allochtonen in Nederland] (produced by CBS) and the Integration Monitor [Integratiemonitor] (produced by the Institute for Sociological and Economic Research (ISEO) [Instituut voor Sociologisch-Economisch Onderzoek]), which reports have been published regularly since the mid nineteen nineties. The Annual Report is intended to provide an outline description and analysis of integration by ethnic minority groups for ten different subjects. For many subjects, the Annual Report draws from data obtained from sample surveys. Although these do not cover the entire population, they are

more in-depth than registration data. The idea is that the Annual Report on Integration will be published on an annual basis.

In 2004, the WODC commenced publication of an Integration Monitor [Integratiekaart]. The particular object of the Integration Monitor is to measure the progress of immigrant groups in different social fields. By analysing developments in the field of ethnic-minority integration over time, a better understanding can be gained of the integration process. On the one hand, this occurs by describing trends over time, focusing on both oldcomers and newcomers. On the other hand, this is achieved by following cohorts of immigrants from their arrival in the Netherlands for a longer period of time, enabling us to gain an insight into the extent and rate of integration and the routes along which this process occurs. As such, the Integration Monitor and the Annual Report on Integration complement each other.

#### 1.1 Object and study method used for the Integration Monitor

At the end of 2004, the WODC-CBS report entitled 'The Development of an Integration Monitor' (Van Rijn et al., 2004) was published. This report explores the possibility of following immigrant integration processes (in relation to both established immigrants and newcomers) over time. For the Integration Monitor, we draw from the Social Statistics Database (SSB) produced by the Statistics Netherlands. In this Database, a large number of registers (including those from the tax authorities, benefits agencies and the IB Group (the Information Management Group) are linked at an individual level to the municipal personal records database (GBA) [Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie]. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) [Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst] has agreed to allow its Central Aliens Register (CRV) [Centrale Registratie Vreemdelingen] to be linked to the SSB too, enabling us to investigate the significance of immigration motives for the integration process. Thanks to these links, the SSB provides individual data on all inhabitants of the Netherlands, including demographic characteristics, employment, benefits, income, education and immigration motives. As such, this enables us to learn about correlations between these different aspects. Because the different years are also interlinked, opportunities are created for longitudinal monitoring of people in the various registers. In addition to these registrations, personal surveys are linked to the SSB, so that missing data are added on a random test basis.

The Integration Monitor represents a new approach to the monitoring of integration in the Netherlands in various respects:

- By using the Social Statistics Database and their data on all of the Netherlands' inhabitants, it is becoming increasingly more possible to make a detailed breakdown according to different countries of origin. Besides describing the traditional 'big four' (the Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin groups), we also indicate the participation of small immigrant populations that have arrived in the Netherlands in more recent years¹.
- In addition, due to the availability of longitudinal data, insight can be provided into the course of integration for a number of groups over a longer period and in different social domains. This is done by featuring both *trends* over time and by monitoring *cohorts* of newcomers that settled in the Netherlands in a certain year, in order to see how they have fared.

\_

See Van Rijn et al. (2004) for a description of the Social Statistics Database.

— The Integration Monitor focuses on actual behaviour and actual social positions held by individuals, as opposed to attitudes, perceptions, subjective experience and opinions. To give an example: in this Integration Monitor, we present longitudinal data on examination results achieved by pupils and employment/unemployment data for various ethnic minority groups. However, we do not, for example, discuss discrimination experienced in the workplace or at school.

The Integration Monitor is a tool that will be developed further in the years ahead. In comparison with the first Integration Monitor in 2004, the Integration Monitor for 2005 presents not only *more recent data*, but also a number of *new integration indicators*. The latter are data in terms of crime and entry into higher education. Another new aspect of the Integration Monitor 2005 is the expansion of the analyses made to cover three *cohorts of newcomers* that came to the Netherlands in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively.

Monitoring how individuals and groups develop themselves in different social domains generates the material needed to be able to answer the question of the extent to which developments to be observed over the years in relation to integration are connected to developments within (government) policy. The Integration Monitor makes no pretension to measure policy effects, but does establish an important basis for sound effectiveness research. In order to measure policy effects, a <u>different</u> type of study is needed, in which attention is given to the *working mechanisms* underlying the measures and interventions which are intended to promote integration.

#### 1.2 Structure of the report

Chapter 2 will start by outlining the starting points of our study. We will also discuss the indicators that we use to study the integration process. In Chapter 3, we present social-demographic data on the size of the various origin groups in the Netherlands and the developments in these groups over time. Chapter 4 presents data on knowledge, skills and school performance. Following this, Chapter 5 looks at trends in the labour market position of individuals from ethnic minorities: work and benefits dependence. Next, Chapter 6 will compare the 1999, 2000 and 2001 immigration cohorts as regards their level of labour market participation and speed of entry into the labour market. Chapter 7 will discuss the subject of social contacts between members of ethnic minorities and the autochtonous Dutch population, operationalised, amongst other things, in terms of migration marriages and marriages between individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population and ethnic minorities. Chapter 8 will focus on an indicator of what can be referred to as 'negative' integration: crime. The report will conclude with a summary and the most important conclusions.

# 2 Starting points

#### 2.1 Definition of integration and actors in the integration process

Integration predominantly involves the process leading towards the achievement of citizenship status and participation in the society in which migrants take up residence. By using this general description, we are emphasising the process-based nature of integration and indicating the absence of an objective minimum or desired end situation.

The achievement of citizenship and participation in society covers at least three dimensions or domains: legal/political, socio-economic and socio-cultural (Penninx et al., 2004; Ager and Strang, 2004; Esser, 2003; European Committee, 2003; Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003; Hagendoorn et al., 2003; Bauböck et al., 1996). The central question in relation to the legal/political dimension of participation and citizenship is the extent to which ethnic minorities are regarded and actually participate as full members of the political community. To what extent do they have formal political rights and obligations, and are they able to achieve the positions enjoyed by the autochtonous Dutch population? The socio-economic dimension refers to social and economic rights, obligations and performance. To what extent do ethnic minorities have the (equal) right and opportunity to accept work and to use institutional provisions to find it? Do they have access to work-related provisions, such as unemployment benefits and insurance and other social security provisions made by the government. The third dimension refers to the domain of socio-cultural and religious rights of and possibilities for migrants. To what extent do they have the (equal) right and opportunity to organise and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic or religious groups? Are they recognised, accepted and treated the same as similar groups and are they entitled to similar provisions? To what extent do ethnic minority groups form part of the host society, or do they continue to distinguish themselves from it? Does any form of rapprochement exist between migrants and the autochtonous Dutch population? The legal/political dimension is of special significance, since the other two dimensions are determined by it to an important extent. Viewed from the perspective of individual immigrants, their legal position and the rights granted to them may, in the first place, have important positive or negative consequences for their behaviour and their efforts to integrate. For example, a long period of uncertainty about the question of whether or not an immigrant will legally be permitted to stay may have a negative impact on his willingness to make the effort to integrate. Secondly, the exclusion of migrants living in the Netherlands legally from access to local or national political systems and decision-making does not promote participation or integration and may lead migrants to feel that they are not regarded as full citizens, but as outsiders. Again, this does not invite immigrants to play an active role in the socio-economic and cultural domain. Generally, policy and attitudes of this nature will have a negative impact on migrant integration processes.

The actors involved in integration processes form a second aspect. In actual fact, there are two such parties: migrants and the host society. The interaction between these parties determines the direction and the outcomes of the integration process. Naturally, these partners are not equal in terms of (political) power and resources. The host society, its institutional structure and its response to newcomers are far more decisive for the outcome of the integration process. Integration policy is established via the political decision-making system and often encompasses the expectations and requirements held by society.

Thus, integration processes occur not only at the level of the *individual immigrant*, at which level integration is measured in terms of his housing, work and education, and his social and cultural adjustment to and participation in the new society. Integration also occurs at a *collective level* for immigrant group(s). Migrant organisations are the expression of mobilised resources and ambitions, and they may become an accepted part of society or may isolate themselves and even be excluded by society.

A third level at which integration processes occur is at *institution* level, both at a local and national level. General institutions, such as the education system, the labour market or the political system, are expected to serve all citizens in an equal manner. Laws, regulations, but also unwritten rules and practices form part of these institutions. However, these institutions can also impede access or equal outcomes for immigrants – whether formally or informally. This may occur, for example, where (informal) 'restriction to access' to institutions exists, or through forms of discrimination. Thus, at institutional level, social exclusion processes may also occur, with negative consequences for integration.

#### 2.2 Integration processes

Although the processes and mechanisms underlying the achievement of citizenship and participation in society are different at each of the three levels, the outcomes at each level do influence the other levels (Penninx, 2004). For example, institutional regulations (legislation, subsidy possibilities, etc.) also influence the opportunities and the scope or the development and orientation of immigrant organisations. Added to this, migrant organisations can use their activities (in the field of interest representation, for example) to help ensure that individual migrants are supported in terms of their participation in society.

Much literature on the subject of integration focuses on first-generation immigrants; thus, on individuals who have actually already entered the host country. For example, the recent report published by the British Home Office on indicators of integration (Ager and Strang, 2004) focuses completely on the integration of refugees. However, in the Netherlands the situation is essentially different. In the Netherlands, refugees (asylum seekers) form a relatively small group in comparison with other categories of immigrants. The great majority of immigrants are family reunification migrants, family formation migrants and migrant workers, and form important target groups for government policy. Added to this, second-generation migrants – individuals with an ethnic minority background (born in the Netherlands, into families in which at least one parent is born abroad) – are also one of the main aims of integration policy. In the strict sense of the word, these individuals are not migrants, but here too the question is whether and how they are able to fully participate as equal citizens in society. Intergenerational integration applies for second-generation migrants, i.e. the opportunities that second-generation children have to participate in society and the choices made by them to this end are determined (sometimes to a large extent) by the development of their parents' integration process. Traditional opinions on assimilation and adjustment mechanisms applicable to many migrant groups would no longer appear to be adequate in these situations (Esser, 2003).

In order to gain an understanding of the question of which processes occur during migrant integration, it is important to highlight the distinction between the various groups targeted by integration policy. The migration motives, personal backgrounds, starting position and initial qualifications, expectations and ambitions of a highly-educated employment migrant that comes to the Netherlands to work differ greatly from those of a traumatised refugee from a war area, or those of a poorly-educated partner who comes to the Netherlands in the context of family reunification, to join her partner who has already been living in the Netherlands for many years. Added to this, a young second-generation Moroccan male who is 'trapped' in a conflict of loyalty between his parents' culture and Dutch culture can find himself confronted with very different possibilities and choices in his life. Thus, the outcomes of integration processes will be very diverse.

Despite these differences, several basic principles can be distinguished, which can throw some light on the processes and mechanisms applicable to migrant integration. In addition to the competencies ('human capital') that individuals possess (language proficiency, level of education, psychological characteristics, social skills, etc.) and which can be tapped, other important concepts are 'social networks' and 'social capital' (Li, 2004; Portes, 1998; Woolcock, 1998). As a first step towards a further theoretical substantiation of studies into integration processes, in which the interaction between the individual and his environment, and that between individual migrants (both first and second generations) and migrant organisations and social institutions (such as the labour market and the political system) is sufficiently recognised, the social capital factor is interesting. This term refers to the social connections and social networks that influence personal interactions and behaviour (Flap and Völker, 2004; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2003). In many social domains (including voting behaviour, health, social integration (Lock Kunz and Li, 2004; Ager and Strang, 2004; Woolcock, 1998)), the notion of social capital has now been used to gain a better understanding of and offer explanations for individual and group differences. Social capital is promising as a theoretical concept as it reconciliates, as it were, the image of the 'undersocialised' actor that operates freely in a competitive market with the idea of an 'oversocialised' being who has been condemned to behaviour predetermined by external forces. Social links and connections and the shared knowledge, norms, rules and expectations present in them form the core of this approach. The notion of social capital suggests that people are able, by means of the social networks to which they belong, to create advantages for themselves, in the short or long term (Portes, 1998). By drawing from social networks and actively investing in them, they can achieve goals in life that could not otherwise have been achieved. By throwing light on the social bonds within the individual's own ethnic group, for example, the social bridges with members of other groups, and the social links with institutions, such as government agencies (Ager and Strang, 2004), it becomes possible to clarify which people are successful or unsuccessful in the different life arenas, and in which manner this occurs. Who obtains paid work - and how did the social network help to achieve this; who completes a course – and to what extent did the immediate social network play a role in this, in terms of mental or material support; who is unsuccessful in this respect – and did the immediate environment frustrate the efforts made by the individual, for example; and whose children have been successful in their lives? And what effect does it have on an immigrant's integration process if he establishes social networks in the Netherlands, but at the same time continues to focus on his country of origin, by maintaining a network there too and performing (economic) activities there, as well as culturally continuing to focus on his country of origin (transnationalism) (Pores et al., 1999)? The choices that people ultimately make, and the extent to which they utilise their own – as well as less immediate – social networks, can be clarified as part of the social capital approach.


It is also important to be able to clarify why the integration of certain groups – or of certain members of migrant groups – is not happening as well or as quickly as that of others, or better in certain social domains than in others, since networks can also lead to 'negative social capital'; not only solidarity, but also, for example, social pressure to avoid getting too involved with the rest of society, which could lead to 'mobility entrapment' amongst other things, and a restriction on the possibility to progress in the labour market, for example (Li, 2004). In this connection, Boyd (2003) describes the often problematic position of women in migration and integration processes. Discriminatory legislation and regulations, but also stereotypical images and traditional opinions and role patterns in either the host society or the migrant groups themselves can lead to unequal integration opportunities for men and women.

#### 2.3 Operationalisation: social domains and indicators

We have described integration as a process of acquiring citizenship and the participation of migrants in society in three domains (political, socio-economic and cultural). In this process, interaction occurs between the migrant/individual from an ethnic minority and society. The migrant makes efforts and invests – in his social networks, amongst other things – with the object of creating opportunities for himself, which he will utilise to achieve a position for himself in society. The host society offers opportunities to this end, but also formulates a number of requirements and restrictions.

**Figure 2.1** shows the factors relevant for the integration process for (groups of) migrants and the relationships between these factors.

Figure 2.1 Integration processes



The migrant uses his competencies and opportunities (human capital) and his social networks (social capital) to gain a position for himself in society. However, the starting positions – and, as such, the opportunities that the various ethnic minority groups have to invest in social participation – vary. A traumatised refugee has a different starting position to a migrant worker with a strongly supportive network and who has enjoyed a good level of education in his country of origin. However, intergenerational effects between first and second-generation migrants form another example. The socio-economic position of parents, for example, is an important predictor for the school level that their children will achieve (Gang and Zimmermann, 2000).

The motives for immigration are also relevant for the choices and efforts that a migrant can or wants to make. After all, differences in migration motives (for refugees, migrant workers, marriage migrants, etc.) impact on residential status, expectations for the future, ambitions and focus on the 'new' country.

The efforts made by the migrant take place within a social context, in which legislation and regulations, but also opinions and (pre)judgements about individuals from ethnic minorities partly determine the migrant's room for manoeuvre. Perceptions and inclusion and exclusion mechanisms related to this

have a great impact on migrants' opportunities for participation (Van Tubergen, 2004). The economic situation is also relevant: the possibilities that migrants/individuals from ethnic minorities have to find work and, in this manner, gain an independent social position for themselves fluctuate in line with economic developments.

The possession of sufficient basic knowledge of society and language skills is generally regarded as a condition for full participation in society (Chiswick et al., 2004). This can mean that it becomes easier to establish contacts with the autochtonous Dutch population, for example, which, in turn, can mean that language proficiency and the knowledge of and insight into society further improves or that the immigrant establishes a relevant (new) social network. (Compulsory) integration, which is one of the spearheads of current integration policy, presupposes the great relevance of sufficient language proficiency and knowledge of Dutch society for successful participation in society.

Thus, the extent to which and the rate at which participation in the relevant domains of politics, economy and culture will occur are interwoven with a complicated combination of individual-related and social factors that can reinforce each other, but also oppose each other. The level of participation or the rate at which the process develops may also vary for an individual or a group per social area. An example of this are the first-generation workers, who did take part in the labour process, but generally had inadequate Dutch language proficiency and maintained little or no social contacts with the Dutch population, and also remained disengaged from a political point of view.

Finally, the model makes it clear that as a result of migrant integration, changes may also occur in the host society. Legislation and regulations can be amended in accordance with changed needs and issues in society, public opinion on migration and migrants may change. Following this, migrants will be able to base their choices and possibilities on the new situation.

#### **Indicators**

In order to actually be able to determine the level of integration achieved by different ethnic minority groups, specific social domains must be distinguished in which the level of participation – and changes in this level – is measurable. Labour market participation and education participation are often regarded as the most relevant structural social domains for the integration process. Sometimes, housing and the use of (health)care provisions are also included in the equation. As regards the socio-cultural and political domains, in most cases the creation and maintenance of inter-ethnic social relationships, the level of political participation and the level of orientation towards the host society and identification with it are considered relevant for integration. Besides attention for actual participation or successes in these various social domains, attention is often given to the *enabling* aspects. An example is the determination of the level of language proficiency in individuals from ethnic minorities. Although language proficiency is not a goal in itself for integration, it is regarded as an essential condition for success, in the labour market for example.

The previous Integration Monitor report (Van Rijn et al., 2004) argued that a definitive list of indicators cannot be given. The indicators chosen to determine the various aspects of integration depend, for instance, on the level of detail required and on policy priorities. Ideally, we would like to have one or more

indicators for each of the areas described in our model. However, the limited availability of quantitative data compels us to be modest. In many areas, data that make it possible to reveal developments over time, or monitor the integration process of migrant/ethnic minority cohorts over the years are particularly absent.

On the basis of the integral data available at this point at the level of individuals – in order to be able to reveal trends and developments over time – we have been able to select the following indicators for the present Integration Monitor:

- Performance in education: success rates of secondary-school pupils in final examinations; extent of entry into higher education; choice of course of study in higher education; graduation from higher education;
- Labour market position: level and rate of labour market participation (as an employee or as someone who is self-employed) and the use of social benefits by newcomer cohorts; trends in labour market participation;
- Social contacts: the number of mixed marriages; marriages with partners from the country of origin; composition of residential areas according to the proportion of individuals from ethnic minorities within them;
- *Crime*: suspects being questioned by the police; type of offence; recidivism.

The above set of indicators – which will, where possible, distinguish between origin group, generation, length of stay, sex and age – does not (yet) enable us to cover all of the relevant areas in all the various domains of society. Added to this, these data only make it possible to demonstrate the two-sidedness of the integration process to a limited extent. As soon as more data become available, the number of indicators will be increased. Therefore the Integration Monitor is still very much in development.

# 3 Demographic indicators

The composition of the Dutch population is changing as a result of migration and natural population growth. The demographic changes amongst ethnic minorities are relatively large and, as such, the ethnic minority origin groups are making an important contribution to population dynamics in the Netherlands. In order to give the reader an idea of the composition of the population and of the size of the origin groups described in this report, we will include several demographic indicators in this chapter. We will base these on data from the Annual Report on Integration (SCP/WODC/CBS, 2005).

#### 3.1 Population composition 1996-2005

In the Netherlands, population growth has been falling for many years. The growth of the number of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities has also been falling in recent years, but less dramatically than that of the autochtonous Dutch population and Western ethnic minorities. As a result of this difference in population growth, the proportion of non-Western ethnic minorities in the population has increased further. On 1 January 2005, approximately 1.7 million individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities and 1.4 million individuals from Western ethnic minorities were living in the Netherlands. Approximately 40% of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities and 59% of individuals from Western ethnic minorities were born in the Netherlands and, as such, are second-generation immigrants. Between 1996 and 2005, the size of the Netherlands' population grew by more than 5%. Immigration played an important role in this growth, in addition to natural growth. In this period, particularly strong growth (45%) was observed in the non-Western ethnic minority category (Table 3.1). Together, the traditional groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) represent 67% of non-Western ethnic minorities. The remainder consists largely of immigrants and their descendants (generally) from asylum countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and China.

Amongst the non-Western ethnic minorities, the traditional groups have shown the highest increase in absolute numbers since 1996: Moroccans increased by more than 90,000, Turks by 87,000, the Surinamese by 49,000 and Antilleans/Arubans by 44,000. Groups that increased considerably in size both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of percentage are the Afghans, the Iraqis and the Iranians. In most cases, the increase in the size of groups originating from asylum countries can largely be attributed to the influx of new immigrants. In these groups, the growth of the second generation represents just 10% to 18% of the overall increase<sup>2</sup>.

\_

Not everyone who submits an asylum application is admitted to the Netherlands and registered as an immigrant in the municipal population registers. Those who are permitted to stay and who can, as such, actually be regarded as asylum migrants, are generally only registered in the municipal personal records database (GBA) some time after their submission of an asylum application. Registration in the municipal personal records database occurs once asylum seekers receive a residence permit and leave central reception. Asylum seekers who remain in a central reception facility for a period in excess of six months are also eligible for registration in the municipal personal records database. Until June 2000, a period of one year was still applicable.

#### 3.2 Age structure

All non-Western origin groups are younger on average than the autochtonous Dutch population (**see Table 3.2**). The differences between the groups stems from their migration history and their fertility. For example, with an average age of under 23, the Somalians are the youngest of the relatively large groups. The majority of Somalians came to the Netherlands in the nineteen-nineties and have had a relatively large number of children here. However, since immigration is now falling, the average age of this group has increased, just as it has in all of the other ethnic minority groups.

Added to the above, all groups of non-Western origin are considerably less of an ageing population than the autochtonous Dutch population. The same applies for those groups that have already been in the Netherlands for a relatively long period of time, in particular people from Surinam, Turkey and Morocco. These groups will start to age in the next few decades. This is partly due to falling immigration in these groups, as well as to emigration, particularly amongst young people from these groups. Therefore, the presence of non-Western ethnic minorities will have an increasingly less inhibiting effect on the ageing of the overall Dutch population.

#### 3.3 Future developments

Population projections describe the most probable future development on the basis of the most recent demographic information on migration and fertility, amongst other things. According to the latest ethnic-minority projection of Statistics Netherlands (Alders, 2005), the number of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities will exceed 1.8 million in 2010, 160,000 more than in 2004. This increase is smaller than those of recent years, due to the greatly reduced net migration. In the long term, the number of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities will grow further to 2.8 million in 2050. They will then form 16.6% of the total population, in comparison with 10.4% on 1 January 2005. In the same period, the proportion of the autochtonous Dutch population will fall from 80.9% to 70.3%.

Amongst non-Western ethnic minorities, the Asians in particular will increase greatly in numbers. Until 2010, their numbers will grow by 39,000, to 341,000. By 2050, their numbers will have doubled. The expectation is that, of the four big non-Western minorities, the Moroccans will increase in numbers the fastest, while the number of Antilleans in the Netherlands will barely increase at all. Growth in the number of Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese will chiefly be determined by the second generation.

Table 3.1 Several key figures on developments in the population composition according to origin group, period from 1 January 1996 to 1 January 2005  $^{\rm a}$ 

	Number of individuals per 1 January 2005	Of which 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	Size increase in total origin group since 1 January 1996	
-	x 1000	%	x 1000	%
Afghanistan	37,0	12	32,1	653
Angola	11,6	20	9,0	347
Brazil	12,3	38	5,7	87
China	43,9	30	20,4	87
Egypt	18,5	41	6,9	60
Ethiopia	10,3	31	2,3	29
Philippines	13,0	36	5,2	68
Ghana	19,1	37	6,6	53
Hong Kong	18,1	44	0,9	6
Iraq	43,7	18	32,4	288
Iran	28,7	17	12,2	74
Cape Verde	20,0	42	3,3	20
Morocco	315,8	47	90,7	40
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	130,5	37	43,7	50
Pakistan	17,9	40	3,8	27
Somalia	21,7	31	1,7	8
Surinam	329,4	43	48,8	17
Thailand	12,4	27	6,8	122
Turkey	358,8	45	87,3	32
Vietnam	18,0	33	5,1	39
Non-Western total	1.699,0	40	527,9	45
Western total (excl. the autochthonous Dutch population)	1.423,7	59	96,1	7
Autochthonous Dutch population	13.182,8		187,6	1

Source: Statistics Netherlands (population statistics)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> This table comprises those non-Western origin groups (according to the Statistics Netherlands definition, + Antilles/Aruba) with at least 10,000 individuals on 1 January 2005.

Table 3.2 Key figures on age structure according to origin group, 1 January 2005

0-19	20-64	65 or	average	increase
		older	age	since
				1/1/1996

	%			year	
Turks	38,2	58,9	2,8	27,4	2,9
Moroccans	42,2	54,9	2,9	26,0	2,3
Surinamese	31,6	63,9	4,5	31,7	3,4
Antilleans/Arubans	36,3	61,2	2,4	28,2	2,4
Iraqis	38,9	59,2	1,9	27,2	1,8
Afghans	44,0	54,0	2,0	25,6	2,2
Iranians	29,2	68,5	2,3	31,1	3,7
Somali	46,8	52,3	0,9	22,6	2,0
Other non-Western	37,4	60,7	1,9	27,1	1,3
Total non-Western	37,4	59,8	2,8	27,9	2,4
Total Western	18,2	67,2	14,7	41,4	1,9
of which former Yugoslavs	30,3	66,4	3,3	31,3	2,4
Autochthonous Dutch population	23,5	61,1	15,4	40,1	1,7
Total	24,5	61,5	14,0	39,0	1,4

Source: Statistics Netherlands (population statistics)

## 4 Education

Important indicators for the extent to which ethnic minorities gain knowledge and skills are found in their performance in education. Various studies have shown that the performance of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in primary education lags behind that of pupils from the autochtonous Dutch population (see, for example, Gijsberts, 2003). The (intergenerational transfer of a) language delay in individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities is probably the most important underlying cause of this. Despite the fact that some of the performance differences are eliminated during pupils' time in primary education, on average pupils from ethnic minorities receive lower recommendations from their primary schools in terms of their choice of secondary school than pupils from the autochtonous Dutch population do<sup>3</sup>.

At a later age, school performance and choice of school are influenced less by the socio-economic position of pupils' parents than they are at a younger age (Mare, 1981). Despite this fact and the existence of schools at different levels, which is in contrast to the situation in primary education, pupils from ethnic minorities continue, on average, to perform less well in secondary education than their classmates from the autochtonous Dutch population. To illustrate this, school drop-out rates in secondary education are considerably higher amongst pupils from ethnic minorities than they are amongst pupils from the autochtonous Dutch population (Herwijer, 2003). This is particularly true for Turkish and Moroccan pupils. In this chapter, we will focus particularly on the performance of final-examination candidates in secondary education and on educational performance and participation in higher education<sup>4</sup>.

# 4.1 Performance by final-examination candidates in secondary education – trends 1999-2003

This section answers the question regarding the extent to which different pass rates exist between the autochtonous Dutch population, Western ethnic minorities and non-Western ethnic minorities. Within the non-Western ethnic minority category, the pass rates for Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans are explained in more detail. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 shows the pass rates per type of secondary education, in the period 1999-2003. In both pre-university education and higher general secondary education, an increase of five percentage points and more in the pass rate applies for both the autochtonous Dutch population and the Western and non-Western ethnic minorities in this period. In lower general secondary education and prevocational education (VBO), pass rates have remained virtually the same. In all school types, young people from the autochtonous Dutch population score

Incidentally, these pupils receive a relatively high school recommendation if we correct for their language and maths performance in Group 8. This is due to the greater importance attached by primary schools to maths performance than to language performance.

When compiling descriptive statistics on performance and participation in higher education, data were used from the Central Register of Higher Education Enrolment (CRIHO) [Centraal Register Ingeschrevenen Hoger Onderwijs] and the municipal personal records database. Higher-education registrations that could not be linked to individuals have not been included. The majority of these registrations probably pertain to foreign students who studied temporarily in the Netherlands, or students living in Belgium or Germany and studying in Maastricht, Tilburg or Enschede, for example.

better than their non-Western counterparts. The difference observable for preuniversity education and higher general secondary education is approximately 12%, while the difference for lower general secondary education and prevocational education is approximately 8%. Apart from some fluctuations over the years, these differences remained unchanged between 1999 and 2003.

Amongst non-Western ethnic minority pupils, Turkish pupils achieved relatively poor scores. In both pre-university education and higher general secondary education, as many as a quarter failed to pass the final examination in 2003. In lower general secondary education, the same applied for 20%, and in prevocational education this was 16%. This relatively unfavourable performance was also visible in previous years. The performance of Turkish pupils only demonstrated a considerable improvement in higher general secondary education. Amongst the non-Western ethnic minorities, pupils of Antillean origin achieve the best final-examination performance. Particularly in pre-university education and to a slightly lesser extent in higher general secondary education, the Surinamese and Moroccan groups show progress in the period 1999-2003. In pre-university education, their pass rates increased by approximately 10%, and by approximately 5% in higher general secondary education. With the odd exception, girls and boys from every origin group achieved virtually the same pass rates in 2003 (Table 4.2). This applies for all school types. Several developments over time are salient. Between 1999 and 2003, Turkish and Moroccan girls made far more progress, especially in pre-university education, than boys from these origin groups. For instance, pass rates for Moroccan girls in pre-university education increased from 70% to 84%, while those for Moroccan boys increased from 76% to 83%. For Turkish girls, these percentages are 69% in 1999 and 76% in 2003, as opposed to 76% in 1999 and 72% (a fall, thus) in 2003 for Turkish boys. As the pass rates for pupils from the autochtonous Dutch population also increased, the position of ethnic minority pupils has not improved in relative terms.

The division of the origin groups into first and second generations (Table 4.1) results in a varied picture. In pre-vocational education and lower general secondary education between 1999 and 2003, the differences in pass rates between pupils from the first and second generations remained unchanged, and the pass rates for both groups are the same. More diversity is evident in higher general secondary education. The percentage of first-generation ethnic minority final-examination candidates from the four big groups that passed their examinations displays an increase of 10% or more between 1999 and 2003. However, in the other non-Western origin groups, a strong increase in the pass rate is evident for the second generation.

#### 4.2 Entry into higher education

Non-Western young people in the possession of a higher general secondary education or pre-university diploma often progress to higher education. They even progress directly to higher education more often than young people from the autochtonous Dutch population. For Turks and Moroccans, the percentage of young people with a higher general secondary education or pre-university diploma who progress to higher education in the next academic year exceeds 90%, while this percentage does not exceed 80% for pupils from the

autochtonous Dutch population<sup>5</sup>. What is more, young non-Western individuals are more likely to opt for the highest possible further education course (i.e. from higher general secondary education to higher professional education (HBO) and from pre-university education to university education) (Herweijer, 2003).

Absolute entry levels<sup>6</sup> into higher education have increased for almost all origin groups (see Table 4.3). An exception to this increase is the entry level applicable for Antilleans: in 2004, 849 Antilleans enrolled for a higher education programme in the Netherlands for the first time, whereas 1,441 had enrolled four years before. Possible explanations for this fall are the increased popularity of the University of the Netherlands Antilles and the fall in the number of individuals achieving a higher general secondary education diploma or pre-university education diploma in the Antilles or Aruba. In addition to the entry level applicable for Antilleans, the entry levels for Western ethnic minorities have also fallen slightly. The number of students starting their higher-education career with a university study is higher in 2004 in comparison with 2000 for all of the origin groups except the Moroccans. It must be observed here that this increase is the highest amongst students from the autochtonous Dutch population and Western ethnic minority students. The absolute numbers presented in Table 4.3 say nothing about the proportion of young people per origin group intending to commence higher education, as the number of young people in the population may have increased or decreased between 2000 and 2004. For this reason, we have included a table (4.4) in which the number of first enrolments for higher education has been expressed as a percentage based on the average of the number of 18, 19 and 20 year olds in the population<sup>7</sup>. On average, approximately 48% of young people aged 18—20 and living in the Netherlands enrol for a higher-education programme for the first time. In 2000, entry levels amongst the autochtonous Dutch population (50%), Antilleans (64%) and Western ethnic minorities (53%) were higher than average. The very high entry-level percentage for Antilleans can be explained by selective migration to the Netherlands. A large number of Antillean and Aruban young people with a higher general secondary education diploma or a pre-university education diploma migrated to the Netherlands in order to attend higher education here. Moroccans (26%), Turks (22%), Surinamese (40%) and the group comprising individuals from other non-Western ethnic minorities (40%) had lower than average entry-level percentages in 2000. The entry-level percentages for individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population, Moroccans, Turks and Surinamese were higher in 2004 than in 2000. In contrast to this, the entry-level percentage for Antilleans in the period 2000-2004 fell sharply. In fact, this percentage was more than halved. The changing nature of immigration from the Antilles may explain this situation. According to Van Kralingen (2003), a relatively large number of deprived young people from the Antilles have been coming to the Netherlands in recent years. Entry-level percentages for individuals from other non-Western ethnic minorities and Western ethnic minorities were also lower in 2004 than in 2000.

\_

These percentages do not necessarily mean that relatively more young people from non-Western ethnic minorities with a higher general secondary education or pre-university diploma ultimately end up in higher education. Some of those who do not immediately progress to higher education can do so after a gap period (to work or travel, for example) or with a higher general secondary education diploma, via an indirect learning pathway (via senior secondary vocational education (MBO) or pre-university education).

This concerns first-time main enrolments in higher education. Individuals who had been registered before and who subsequently re-enrolled following a gap period, are not included in this table.

This percentage is an acceptable indication for the number of young people that will ultimately end up in higher education.

In 2000, women represented more than half of autochtonous Dutch, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean and Western ethnic-minority entrants to higher education (see Table 4.3). To illustrate this, no less than 57% of Surinamese and 56% of Antillean entrants were women. Only Turkish and other non-Western men were still in the majority in 2000. The proportion of women entering higher education increased for all non-Western origin groups between 2000 and 2004. The proportion of women increased the most amongst Turkish and other non-Western entrants. Therefore, women were over-represented for all origin groups in 2004.

#### 4.2.1 Choice of study

The course of study chosen is important for an individual's opportunities in the labour market and, as such, is also relevant for integration. In this section, we will ascertain whether differences exist in the studies chosen by the various origin groups. Table 4.5 shows the percentage of individuals that have chosen a certain study in higher education, per origin group, for entry cohorts 2000 and 2004. Individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities opt more often than average for studies within the economy and law sectors, which it is assumed have higher success rates in the labour market (Van den Berg et al., 2001). In 2004, 29% of autochtonous Dutch entrants opted for a study within the economy sector. For individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities, percentages in this year varied between 34 (Antilleans) and 46 (Turks). Incidentally, the relatively high percentage of Turks and Moroccans opting for a programme within the economy sector can also be explained in part by their higher proportion of higher professional & business education students. The proportion of students within the economy sector is considerably higher in higher professional & business education than in universities: more than one-third of students enrolled for higher professional & business education are following a programme in this sector, while this proportion has remained under one-fifth in universities (Van Kralingen, 2003). The agriculture and nature, language and culture and healthcare sectors are less popular amongst individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in comparison with autochtonous Dutch students and Western ethnic minority students. It is striking that Turks and Moroccans avoid the healthcare sector in particular. Another striking finding with regard to Moroccan entrants is that they relatively often choose studies within the 'behaviour and society' sector and relatively seldom studies within the 'technology' sector. The 'education' sector in particular is less popular amongst individuals from the other non-Western ethnic minority group and amongst the Surinamese. An explanation for the behaviour of individuals from the non-Western ethnic minorities could be that individuals from this origin group have often not yet been in the Netherlands very long and, as such, have a disadvantage in terms of language skills. Therefore, a programme (and, subsequently, a job) in the education sector, in which lessons are predominately delivered in Dutch, is not very attractive to them.

If we compare the entry cohorts for 2000 and 2004, we see that the 'economy' sector (and, to a large extent, the 'law' sector too) has become even more popular amongst individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities than it already was. The popularity of the 'economy' sector would particularly appear to be at the expense of the 'technology' sector. The larger proportion of women in the total number of non-Western ethnic-minority entrants (see Table 4.3) could underlie the falling popularity of the technology sector. However, the technology sector has also fallen in popularity amongst the autochtonous Dutch population and Western ethnic minorities, in which the proportion of women has fallen. The

larger proportion of women has probably resulted in relatively higher entry levels in Moroccans, Turks, Antilleans and the other non-Western ethnic-minority group into the behaviour and society sector. We are able to conclude this with some degree of caution, since this sector has fallen in popularity amongst individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population and amongst Western ethnic minorities.

#### 4.3 Graduation from higher education

At an earlier point in this chapter, it was found that non-Western ethnic minority pupils perform worse in primary education and in secondary education than autochtonous Dutch pupils do. However, if these pupils achieve a higher general secondary education or pre-university diploma, they progress in at least equal proportions to higher education. This would appear to confirm the statement that, at an older age, pupils' school performance and choices are influenced less by the socio-economic position of their parents than they are at a young age.

The question now is whether differences still exist between students from various origin groups in the extent to and speed at which they graduate from higher education. On the basis of the above-mentioned statement, we ought to expect little to no differences. It could even be supposed that, on average, non-Western ethnic minority students complete their studies more often and faster than autochtonous Dutch students, since they have achieved a higher general secondary education diploma or pre-university diploma at a younger age, despite the greater obstacles faced by them (their language disadvantage, for example)<sup>8</sup>.

However, this expectation is not confirmed. Descriptive analyses of data from the Central Register of Higher Education Enrolment (CRIHO) show the opposite: autochtonous Dutch students graduate from higher education more often and more quickly than non-Western ethnic minority students. Figure 4.1 shows that 57% of all autochtonous Dutch entrants into higher education in 1995 had graduated<sup>9</sup> from higher education in 2000. In contrast to this, the corresponding percentages were just 42%, 35% and 36% for Moroccans, Turks and the Surinamese and Antilleans respectively. Three years later, in 2003, 67% of autochtonous Dutch students had already graduated as opposed to 51% of Moroccans, 45% of Turks and 48% of Surinamese and Antilleans. The percentages for the other non-Western ethnic minority group, which are not included in Figure 4.1, were also lower than those for autochtonous Dutch students. As Figure 4.2 shows, this situation would appear to show a slow improvement over time. Despite this, entry cohort 1998 shows the percentage of autochtonous Dutch individuals graduating in 2003 was still more than 17 percent points higher than the percentage of non-Western ethnic minority students graduating 10.

In Figure 4.3, a distinction is made according to the type of higher education concerned (higher professional education or university)<sup>11</sup>. Both for universities

27

It must, however, be observed that autochtonous Dutch students score lower on average for the national written examination, which could be an omen of poorer performance in higher education (Herweijer, 2003)

I.e. at least a HBO Bachelor degree, or a Bachelor or Master's degree at a university.

The descriptive analyses of entry cohorts 1996 and 1997, which are not included in Figure 4.2, also show similar results.

This figures takes into consideration all students who first enrolled for the *type* of higher education in question in 1995. Thus, in contrast to Figure 4.1, students who first enrolled for a

and higher professional & business education, large differences are evident in the extent to which and the speed at which autochtonous Dutch students and non-Western ethnic minority students graduate. In 2003, 60% of autochtonous Dutch students that first entered university education in 1995 had graduated. For non-Western ethnic minority students, this percentage was found to plateau at 43.5%. For students in higher professional & business education, these percentages were 68% and 51% for autochtonous Dutch students and non-Western ethnic minority students respectively. Figure 4.3 shows that, on average, students in higher professional & business education graduate more often and faster than students at universities. If we combine this fact with the fact that Western ethnic-minority students are the only origin group that are more likely to follow a university study than a study in higher professional & business education, we can explain the acceleration (i.e. the more rapid increase in the percentage that have graduated) made by Western ethnic minorities after five years in comparison with the other origin groups, as evident from Figure 4.1.

The percentage of students that graduate from higher education differs considerably between men and women (see Figure 4.4). On average, women graduate more often and faster than men. After eight years, 72% of women from entry cohort 1995 had graduated from higher education as opposed to 63% of men. Moroccan and Turkish women achieve percentages that are (to a certain extent) comparable with those for autochtonous Dutch men. Moroccan and Turkish men were found to lag far behind them. For example, less than 40% of Turkish men who started higher professional education in 1995 graduated before 2004.

A study by Crul and Wolff (2002) shows that age is an important determinant for study drop-out in the first and second years of a higher education programme. Older students have higher drop-out percentages, as the time that older students are able to spend on a study often has to be divided with time that has to be spent on work and/or the family. For ethnic minority students, this phenomenon overlaps to a great extent with the first-generation problem, since first-generation ethnic minority students are older, on average, when they start a study. According to Crul and Wolff, the higher dropout figures for the first generation cannot automatically be attributed to the first-generation problem, as they also observe greater dropout amongst older autochtonous Dutch students. For this reason, we will not make any further distinction, in this section, between first and second-generation ethnic minorities. What is more, it is likely that many of the first-generation ethnic minority students in higher education already emigrated to the Netherlands at a (very) young age <sup>12</sup>.

As already stated in Section 4.2.1, non-Western ethnic minority students possibly base their choice of study more on extrinsic motivations, on average, than autochtonous Dutch students do: they opt, more than average, for studies that they assume have higher success rates in the labour market. This may also contribute to the relatively low percentage of ethnic minority students that graduate from higher education. This is borne out by research by Van den Berg et al. (2001), which showed that students with a relatively high intrinsic study motivation achieve better study progress than students that attach relatively little importance to the technical aspects of their studies. The fact that proportionally

programme at a university and who had previously studied at an institution for higher professional education were also included in the calculations of the cumulative success rates.

Of course, this applies more for Moroccans, Turks and Surinamese than for Antilleans and ethnic minority individuals that have come to the Netherlands in the context of asylum migration, for example.

28

more older ethnic minority students start a higher education programme could also partly explain the lower percentage that graduates. Another cause could be the lesser extent to which (material) resources are available to these students. Perhaps non-Western ethnic minority students, whose parents on average have fewer material (financial) resources, are inclined to work more alongside their studies, which makes it relatively more difficult for them to focus on their studies. It may also be more difficult for them than autochtonous Dutch students to start another study after having failed their first study. A recent British study shows that financial problems and problems in combining a study with part-time work are important problems experienced by British students wanting to graduate from higher education (Connor et al., 2004). Students originating from ethnic minority groups experienced these problems more frequently than autochtonous Dutch students. This would also appear to be supported by the findings obtained by Hop et al. (1999), who studied the study choices and study motives of prospective and first-year students. Ethnic minority students do not expect to receive any support from their parents once their study grants stop. What is more, ethnic minority students believe that they will graduate from their studies with a study debt that is, on average, twice as high as those of autochtonous Dutch students.

#### 4.4 Explanations for the ultimate level of education achieved

The sections above discussed the choices made by individuals and their performance within the education system. In this section, we will look at the ultimate level of education achieved. The ultimate level of education achieved by individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities is lagging behind that achieved by autochtonous Dutch individuals (see, for example, Tesser et al., 1999). In the context of the Annual Report on Integration, Zorlu and Traag (2005) performed cumulative logistic regression analyses in order to explain the highest level of education achieved. Major differences were found between first and second-generation non-Western ethnic minority individuals: the level of education achieved by the first generation is considerably lower than that achieved by the second generation. Another striking result revealed by the regression analyses performed by Zorlu and Traag is that non-Western ethnic minority individuals who have married autochtonous Dutch partners have achieved a higher level of education, on average, than those who married partners from the same ethnic group, or who have a different civil status.

Figure 4.1 Percentage of students that graduate from higher education, based on origin, entry cohort 1995




Figure 4.2 Percentage of students that graduate from higher education, based on origin, entry cohorts 1995 and 1998





Figure 4.3 Percentage of students that graduate from higher education, based on origin and type of higher education, entry cohort 1995



Figuur 4.4 Percentage of students that graduate from higher education, based on origin and sex, entry cohort 1995




Table 4.1. Pass rate per type of secondary education, based on origin group and generation

	vwo					HAVO					
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	
	As a % of the	relevant exa	mination cand	lidate group ir	the population	As a % of the rele	vant exami	nation cand	idate group	in the populatio	n
Autochthonous Dutch	90	90	92	94	95	87	90	91	91	92	
Western ethnic minority	85	86	89	92	92	82	86	87	87	89	
1st generation	86	82	85	91	87	79	84	85	84	86	
2nd generation	85	87	90	92	93	83	87	88	87	90	
Non-western ethnic minority	77	75	80	83	83	72	76	79	80	79	
1st generation	72	78	82	83	81	70	74	78	77	76	
2nd generation incl.	79	75	80	83	84	73	77	79	82	80	
Turkey	73	58	73	77	74	64	68	72	75	73	
1st generation	X	Х	X	х	X	60	71	73	71	73	
2nd generation	72	57	72	77	73	64	68	72	76	72	
Marocco	73	80	81	79	83	76	81	80	85	82	
1st generation	66	83	Х	Х	X	69	78	82	84	79	
2nd generation	77	79	83	76	83	79	82	80	86	83	
Surinam	72	70	73	78	81	71	74	77	77	75	
1st generation	68	64	73	76	84	65	74	78	74	77	
2nd generation	73	71	74	79	81	72	74	77	77	74	
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	90	86	86	93	89	75	85	82	84	86	
1st generation	X	Х	Х	Х	X	71	Х	74	77	82	
2nd generation	90	87	84	94	90	76	87	84	87	88	
Other non-Western	81	81	85	86	86	77	78	82	82	81	
1st generation	73	83	85	83	80	76	74	78	77	75	
2nd generation	84	80	85	88	89	77	82	85	86	86	
	MAVO					VBO					
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	
	1999				2003 In the population						n
Autochthonous Dutch	1999					1999					n
Autochthonous Dutch Western ethnic minority	1999 As a % of the	relevant exa	mination cand	lidate group ir	the population	As a % of the rele	vant exami	nation cand	idate group	in the populatio	n
Western ethnic minority 1st generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94	96 94 91	96 94 92	lidate group ir 97 95 91	96 94 91	1999 As a % of the rele 95 92 91	95 92 92	96 94 95	97 95 94	in the populatio	on
Western ethnic minority	1999 As a % of the 96 94	relevant exa 96 94	mination cand 96 94	lidate group ir 97 95	96 94	1999 As a % of the rele 95 92	evant exami 95 92	nation cand 96 94	idate group 97 95	in the populatio	n
Western ethnic minority 1st generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94	96 94 91	96 94 92	lidate group ir 97 95 91	96 94 91	1999 As a % of the rele  95  92 91	95 92 92	96 94 95	97 95 94	in the populatio	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84	96 94 91 94 85 85	96 94 92 95 85 84	97 97 95 91 96 86 84	96 94 91 94 87 86	1999 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87	95 92 92 92 92 88 89	96 94 95 94 90 90	97 97 95 94 95 91	96 93 90 94 88 87	ρn
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94	96 94 91 94 85	96 94 92 95	97 97 95 91 96	96 94 91 94 87	1999 As a % of the release 95 92 91 93 87	95 92 92 92 92 88	96 94 95 94 90	97 97 95 94 95 91	in the populatio 96 93 90 94 88	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl.	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84	96 94 91 94 85 85	96 94 92 95 85 84	97 97 95 91 96 86 84	96 94 91 94 87 86	1999 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87	95 92 92 92 92 88 89	96 94 95 94 90 90	97 97 95 94 95 91	96 93 90 94 88 87	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 84	96 94 91 94 85 85 85	96 94 92 95 85 84 85	97 95 95 91 96 86 84 87	96 94 91 94 87 86 87	1999 As a % of the rele  95  92  91  93  87  87  88	95 92 92 92 92 92 88 89 87	96 94 95 94 90 91 90	97 95 94 95 91 91	96 93 90 94 88 87 89	ρn
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 84 76	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 85	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74	97 95 91 96 86 84 87	96 94 91 94 87 86 87	95  92 91 93 87 87 88 84	95 92 92 92 92 92 88 89 87	96 94 95 94 90 90 91 90	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91	96 93 90 94 88 87 89	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 87 76 77	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71	97 95 91 96 86 84 87	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77	1999 As a % of the rele  95  92  91  93  87  87  88  84  84	95 92 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89	97 97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80	ρn
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation 2nd generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 87 76	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80	95 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87 88 84 84 84	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91 88 90 88	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation Marocco	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 76 77 76	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78 82	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80	95 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87 88 84 84 84 87	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91 88 90 88	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation 2nd generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 76 77 76 84 85 84	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78 82 82 82	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 78 78 87 87	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 86 89	95 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87 88 84 84 84 84 87 86 87	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 90 89	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85 88 86 89	pΠ
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation 2nd generation 4nd generation Marocco 1st generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 87 76 77 76 84 85	96 94 91 94 85 85 87 73 78 82 82	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79 87	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 88	95  92 91 93  87 87 88  84 84 84 87 86	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 89 89	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85 88 86	ρn
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation 2nd generation Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation Surinam	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 87 76 77 76 84 85 84	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78 82 82 82 87	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 78 75 79 87 87	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 88 86 89	95 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87 88 84 84 84 84 87 86 87	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84 88 88	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 90 89 91	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93 92	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85 88 86 89 91	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation Surinam 1st generation 2nd generation 2nd generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 84 85 84 85	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78 82 82 82 87 85 87	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88 88 88 88	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79 87 87 88 85 89	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 86 89 87	95 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87 88 84 84 84 87 86 87 89 90	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84 88 88 88	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 89 91 90 89 91	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93 92	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85 88 86 89 91 91	ÞΠ
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation Surinam 1st generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 87 76 77 76 84 85 84	96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78 82 82 82 87 85	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88 88 88	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79 87 87 87 88	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 86 89 87	95 As a % of the rele 95 92 91 93 87 87 88 84 84 84 87 86 87 89 90	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84 88 88 88 88	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 90 89 91 90 89 91	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93 92	96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85 88 86 89 91 91	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation Surinam 1st generation 2nd generation Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 84 85 84 85 91	relevant exa 96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78 82 82 82 82 87 85 87	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88 88 84 89	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79 87 87 87 88 85 89	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 86 89 87	1999 As a % of the rele  95  92  91  93  87  87  88  84  84  84  87  86  87  90  89  90	95 92 92 92 92 93 88 89 87 84 85 84 88 88 88 89 90 89	96  94  95  94  90  91  90  87  89  87  90  89  91  92  94  91	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93 92 93 93	in the population 96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85 88 86 89 91 91 91 89	PΠ
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation Surinam 1st generation 2nd generation Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 1st generation 2nd generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 85 84 85 84 85 91 88 92	relevant exa 96 94 91 94 85 85 85 87 73 78 82 82 82 82 87 85 87 90 86 93	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88 88 88 89 91	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79 87 87 87 88 85 89 91 88	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 86 89 87 86 89 91	1999 As a % of the rele  95  92  91  93  87  87  88  84  84  84  87  86  87  90  89  90  89  88  91	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84 88 88 89 90 89 89	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 90 89 91 92 94 91 92 92	97 95 94 95 94 95 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93 92 93 92 91 89 93	in the population  96  93  90  94  88  87  89  84  80  85  88  86  89  91  91  91  89  88  92	PN
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation  Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation 2nd generation  Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation Surinam 1st generation 2nd generation Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 1st generation	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 87 76 77 76 84 85 84 85 84 85	relevant exa 96 94 91 94 85 85 85 87 73 78 82 82 82 82 87 85 87 89 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80	96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88 88 84 89 91	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79 87 87 87 88 85 89	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 88 86 89 87 86	1999 As a % of the rele  95  92  91  93  87  87  88  84  84  84  87  86  87  90  89  90  89  88	95 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84 88 88 89 90 89 89	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 90 89 91 92 94 91 92	97 95 94 95 91 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93 92 93 92 91 89	in the population  96  93  90  94  88  87  89  84  80  85  88  86  89  91  91  91  89  88	on
Western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation Non-western ethnic minority 1st generation 2nd generation incl. Turkey 1st generation 2nd generation Marocco 1st generation 2nd generation Surinam 1st generation 2nd generation Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 1st generation 2nd generation Other non-Western	1999 As a % of the 96 94 94 94 84 84 84 85 85 84 85 81 88 92	relevant exa 96 94 91 94 85 85 85 77 73 78 82 82 82 82 87 85 87 90 86 93 91	mination cand 96 94 92 95 85 84 85 74 71 75 88 90 88 88 84 89 91 89 93	97 95 91 96 86 84 87 78 75 79 87 87 87 88 85 89 91 88 93	96 94 91 94 87 86 87 80 77 80 88 86 89 87 86 89 87	1999 As a % of the rele  95  92  91  93  87  87  88  84  84  84  87  86  87  90  89  90  89  89  88  91	95 92 92 92 92 92 88 89 87 84 85 84 88 88 89 90 89 89 89	96 94 95 94 90 91 90 87 89 87 90 89 91 91 92 94 91 92 92 92	97 95 94 95 94 95 91 91 91 88 90 88 92 93 92 91 89 93	in the population 96 93 90 94 88 87 89 84 80 85 88 86 89 91 91 91 89 88 92	on

Source: Statistics Netherlands (population statistics)

Table 4.2. Pass rate per type of secondary education, based on origin group and sex

	vwo					HAVO				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
					n the population	As a % of the rele				
Autochthonous Dutch	90	90	92	94	95	87	90	91	91	92
men	90	90	92	94	94	88	90	91	91	92
women	90	90	92	94	95	87	90	91	91	93
Western ethnic minority	85	86	89	92	92	82	86	87	87	89
men	85	86	90	92	91	82	86	88	87	89
women	85	87	89	92	93	82	86	87	86	89
Non-western ethnic minority	77	75	80	83	83	72	76	79	80	79
men	79 76	77 74	79 81	83 84	84 83	72 72	76	80 78	81 80	79
women incl.	70	74	01	04	03	12	77	10	00	79
Turkey	73	58	73	77	74	64	68	72	75	73
men	76	61	70	68	72	62	69	76	74	70
women	69	55	77	86	76	65	67	68	77	75
Marocco	73	80	81	79	83	76	81	80	85	82
men	76	81	81	80	83	74	78	78	84	82
women	70	80	80	78	84	77	83	82	86	82
Surinam	72	70	73	78	81	71	74	77	77	75
men	73	69	71	80	82	70	74	79	78	77
women	72	71	75	77	81	71	75	76	76	73
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	90	86	86	93	89	75	85	82	84	86
men	90	85	89	93	87	80	88	85	87	84
women	90	86	84	93	91	72	84	80	82	89
Other non-Western	81	81	85	86	86	77	78	82	82	81
men	81	83	84	87	88	79	78	84	83	82
women	80	78	86	86	84	75	79	81	82	81
	MAVO 1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	VBO 1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
	1999	2000 relevant exa	2001 amination cand	2002 didate group in	2003 n the population	VBO 1999 As a % of the rele	2000 evant exami	2001 nation cand	2002 lidate group	2003 in the population
Autochthonous Dutch	1999 As a % of the	relevant exa	amination cand	didate group in	n the population	As a % of the rele	evant exami	nation cand	lidate group	in the population
Autochthonous Dutch men	1999 As a % of the	relevant exa	amination cand	didate group ii 97	the population 96	1999 As a % of the rele	evant exami 95	nation cand	lidate group 97	in the population 96
Autochthonous Dutch men women	1999 As a % of the	relevant exa	amination cand	didate group in	n the population	As a % of the rele	evant exami	nation cand	lidate group	in the population
men women	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96	96 96 96 96	96 96 96 96	didate group ii 97 97 97 97	96 96 96 96	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97	95 94 97	96 96 97	97 96 98	96 95 97
men women Western ethnic minority	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96	96 96 96 96 96	96 96 96 96 96	97 97 97 97 97	96 96 96 96 96	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97	95 94 97 92	96 96 97 94	97 96 98 95	96 95 97 93
men women	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96	96 96 96 96	96 96 96 96	didate group ii 97 97 97 97	96 96 96 96	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97	95 94 97	96 96 97	97 96 98	96 95 97
men women Western ethnic minority men women	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94	96 96 96 96 94 94 94	96 96 96 96 96 94 94	97 97 97 97 97 95 95 95	96 96 96 96 96 94 94 93	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97 92 91 94	95 94 97 92 91 94	96 96 97 97 94 93 96	97 96 98 95 93 97	96 95 97 93 91 96
men women Western ethnic minority men	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94	96 96 96 96 94 94	96 96 96 96 94 94	97 97 97 97 97 95 95	96 96 96 96 94 94	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97 92 91	95 94 97 92 91	96 96 97 94 93	97 96 98 95 93	96 95 97 93 91
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94 94	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 94	96 96 96 96 94 94 94	97 97 97 97 97 95 95 95	96 96 96 96 94 94 93	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97 92 91 94 87	95 94 97 92 91 94 88	96 96 97 94 93 96	97 96 98 95 93 97	96 95 97 93 91 96 88
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 84 85	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl. Turkey	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 84 85	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 85 85	97 97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 87	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 84 85	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87	1999 As a % of the rele 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.  Turkey men women women	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77	96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 86 78 79	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 87 80 80	95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.  Turkey men women Marocco	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77	96 96 96 94 94 94 94 77 85 87 88 88	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 78 79 78	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 87 80 80 79	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97  92 91 94  87 85 90  84 82 86 87	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86 89	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84 84
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.  Turkey men women women	1999 As a % of the 96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77	96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 86 78 79	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 87 80 80	95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl. Turkey men women  Marocco men women	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86	96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 87 78 78 78	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 87 87 80 80 79	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86 89 90 88	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84 88 87 89
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl. Turkey men women  Marocco men women  Surinam	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86	96 96 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76 82 78 85 87	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 78 79 78	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 80 80 79 88 88 89	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90 90	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86 89 90 88 93	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84 88 87 89
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl. Turkey men women  Marocco men women	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86	96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 87 78 78 78	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 87 87 80 80 79	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86 89 90 88	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84 88 87 89
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl. Turkey men women  Marocco men women  Surinam men women	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86 85	96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 85 77 78 76 82 78 85 87 87 87	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89 88	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 87 78 78 87 88 87	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 80 80 79 88 88 88 89	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90 90 87	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92 89 87 91	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86 89 90 88 93 92 90 88	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94 93 92 93	in the population  96 95 97  93 91 96  88 87 89  84 84 84 88 87 89  91 89 92
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl. Turkey men women  Marocco men women  Surinam men women  Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86 85 85	relevant exa 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76 82 78 85 87 87 86 90	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89 88	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 87 78 87 88 87 87	96 96 96 96 99 94 94 93 87 87 80 80 79 88 88 89 87	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90 90 87 94 89	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92 89 87 91	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 90 88 93 92 90 93 92	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94 93 92 93 91	in the population  96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84 88 87 89 91 89 92
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.  Turkey men women  Marocco men women  Surinam men women  Netherlands Antilles and Aruba men	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86 85 85	relevant exa 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76 82 78 85 87 87 86	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89 87	97 97 97 95 95 95 95 96 86 86 86 78 79 78 87 86 88 89 90 87	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 80 80 79 88 88 89 87 87	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90 90 87 94 89	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92 89 87 91	96 96 97 94 93 96 88 92 87 86 89 90 93 92 98 88	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94 93 92 93 91 89	96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84 88 87 89 91 89 92
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.  Turkey men women  Marocco men women  Surinam men women  Netherlands Antilles and Aruba men women	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86 85 85 85 91 93 89	relevant exa 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 87 78 76 82 78 85 87 87 86 90 92 89	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89 87 89	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 88 89 88 89 87 91 92	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 80 80 79 88 88 89 87 87 87	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90 90 90 87 94 88 89	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92 89 87 91	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86 89 90 93 92 98 89 95 95	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94 93 92 93 91 89 93	in the population  96 95 97  93 91 96  88 87 89  84 84 84 88 87 89  91 89 92 89 86 92
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl. Turkey men women  Marocco men women  Surinam men women  Netherlands Antilles and Aruba men women  Other non-Western	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86 85 85 85 91 93 89	relevant exa 96 96 96 94 94 94 85 84 85 77 78 76 82 78 85 87 87 86 90 92 89 91	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89 88 89 87	97 97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 87 87 88 87 91 92 90	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 80 80 79 88 88 89 87 87 87 88	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90 90 87 94 89 85 95 89	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92 89 87 91 89	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 90 93 92 88 95 92	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94 93 92 93 91 89 93	in the population  96 95 97 93 91 96 88 87 89 84 84 84 88 87 89 91 89 92 89 86 92
men women  Western ethnic minority men women  Non-western ethnic minority men women incl.  Turkey men women  Marocco men women  Surinam men women  Netherlands Antilles and Aruba men women	1999 As a % of the  96 96 96 94 94 94 84 83 84 76 76 77 84 83 86 85 85 85 91 93 89	relevant exa 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 87 78 76 82 78 85 87 87 86 90 92 89	96 96 96 96 94 94 94 94 85 85 85 74 76 72 88 87 89 87 89	97 97 97 97 95 95 95 95 95 86 86 86 88 89 88 89 87 91 92	96 96 96 96 94 94 93 87 87 80 80 79 88 88 89 87 87 87	1999 As a % of the release 95 94 97 92 91 94 87 85 90 84 82 86 87 84 90 90 90 87 94 88 89	95 94 97 92 91 94 88 85 90 84 81 87 88 84 92 89 87 91	96 96 97 94 93 96 90 88 92 87 86 89 90 93 92 98 89 95 95	97 96 98 95 93 97 91 90 93 88 87 90 92 90 94 93 92 93 91 89 93	in the population  96 95 97  93 91 96  88 87 89  84 84 84 88 87 89  91 89 92 89 86 92

Source: Statistics Netherlands (population statistics)

Table 4.3. Entry into higher education, based on type, origin and sex in 2000 and 2004

			2000		
	Total	men	women	HBO	WO
Autochthonous Dutch	74.592	47%	53%	76%	24%
Morocco	1.422	47%	53%	84%	16%
Turkije	1.272	51%	49%	84%	16%
Surinam	2.027	43%	57%	80%	20%
Antilles and Aruba	1.441	44%	56%	80%	20%
Other non-Western ethnic minority	2.978	52%	48%	72%	28%
Western ethnic minority	7.554	46%	54%	70%	30%
Total	91.286	47%	53%	76%	24%
			2004		
	Total	men	women	HBO	WO
Autochthonous Dutch	76.381	48%	52%	74%	26%
Morocco	1.629	46%	54%	87%	13%
Turkije	1.378	47%	53%	83%	17%
Surinam	2.139	41%	59%	79%	21%
Antilles and Aruba	849	41%	59%	80%	20%
Other non-Western ethnic minority	3.542	47%	53%	70%	30%
Western ethnic minority	6.309	47%	53%	67%	33%
Total	92.227	47%	53%	74%	26%

Table 4.4. Entry into higher education, as a percentage of the average of the number 18, 19 and 20 year olds, based on origin, in 2000 and 2004

	2000	2004
Autochthonous Dutch	50%	53%
Morocco	26%	28%
Turkey	22%	23%
Surinam	40%	36%
Antilles and Aruba	64%	31%
Other non-Western ethnic minority	40%	30%
Western ethnic minority	53%	45%
Total	48%	48%

Table 4.5. Course of study in higher education, based on origin, entry cohorts 2000 and 2004

13%

4%

17%

#### 2000

Autochthonous Dutch Marocco Turkey Surinam Antilles en Aruba Other non-Western ethnic minority Western ethnic minority	Education 15% 15% 13% 10% 12% 5% 12%	Agriculture and Nature 5% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4%	Technology 18% 14% 18% 18% 22% 22% 16%	Healthcare 9% 4% 4% 6% 7% 8% 8%	Economics 28% 37% 42% 39% 33% 41% 31%	Law 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 5%	Behavior and Society 16% 22% 15% 19% 16% 12% 16%	Language and Culture 5% 2% 2% 2% 3% 5% 10%	Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total	14%	5%	18%	9%	30%	3%	16%	5%	
2004		Agriculture					Behavior and	Language	
Autochthonous Dutch Marocco Turkey Surinam Antilles en Aruba Other non-Western ethnic minority Western ethnic minority	Education 14% 14% 14% 8% 12% 5% 9%	and Nature 5% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4%	Technology 17% 10% 12% 13% 17% 19%	Healthcare 11% 4% 4% 7% 9% 11% 10%	Economics 29% 43% 46% 44% 34% 41% 34%	Law 3% 3% 5% 6% 4% 4% 5%	Society 16% 23% 17% 18% 17% 13%	and Culture 6% 1% 1% 3% 4% 5% 8%	Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

11%

3%

16%

30%

6%

# Work and Benefits: trends 1999 –2003

Together with educational position, the labour market and income position forms the core of the structural integration of ethnic minority individuals. Therefore, in this Section, we will examine trends in the labour market and income position of the potential working population (i.e. all people aged from 15 to 64 inclusive) in the period 1999 – 2003. We will look at the actual position of individuals (working as employees, or who are self-employed, recipients of assistance benefit, unemployment benefit (WW) or disability benefit (WAO)). In addition to the four big non-Western ethnic minority groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans), a number of origin groups numbering in excess of 10,000 individuals in 2003 will also be distinguished. The origin groups India, Pakistan and Vietnam were not included in Integration Monitor 2004 and have now been added to Integration Monitor 2005. It must be noted that the second generation from some origin groups is so small that it is not possible or advisable (due to privacy reasons) to include data on them. We have set the lower limit at 100 people. See **Table 5.1** for a total overview.

Various explanations may underlie the differences in positions and the differences in overrepresentation or under-representation of the various origin groups in the labour market or in terms of social benefits. For example, personal backgrounds, such as migration motives, initial qualifications upon arrival in the Netherlands, age, work motivation, sex and length of stay may affect opportunities for social participation. The higher the average age of a group, the greater the proportion of people unfit for work will be, for example. However, institutional regulations and laws are also influential, such as restrictions preventing asylum seekers from entering the labour market. Through these and other differences in composition of the origin groups, comparisons and differences and similarities between them must be interpreted with some degree of caution.

#### 5.1 Working as an employee

**Table 5.1** shows the proportion of employees amongst the various migrant groups in the period 1999 – 2003, broken down into the different generations. The labour market participation of various origin groups changed little in this period. The big differences in percentages of individuals in work between the various origin groups in 1999 are still visible in 2003.

Turks and Moroccan labour market participation – as employees – is lower than that applicable for individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population. However, the labour market participation of the Surinamese and Antilleans is just slightly below that of individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population. In most groups, we see a relatively large proportion of employees (more than 50%) amongst the second generation. In virtually all of the origin groups, the second generation has greater labour market participation than the first generation. Labour market participation is significantly higher for migrants from Morocco, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and China in particular. This should warrant the cautious conclusion that social participation increases with further generations in this area. However, there are also exceptions. For example, the first generation from Surinam, Ghana, Vietnam and Cape Verde has a higher

proportion of employees in the labour market than the second generation. An explanation for this is that the second generation is younger on average and consists relatively more of school-age individuals or students. This is particularly true for second-generation Ghanese.

In most origin groups, the proportion of employees in the first generation is below 50%. Positive exceptions are the first generations from Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, Cape Verde, Ghana, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Vietnam.

In the period 1999 – 2003, the proportion of employees decreased in a number of origin groups, while increasing in others. This applies both for the first and second generations. For example, the proportion of employees was slightly lower in 2003 in comparison with 1999 for all four of the big groups, for both the first and second generations. A fall in the proportion of employees was also observed in second generation Iraqis, Iranians and Ethiopians. By contrast, second generation Hong Kong Chinese and the Vietnamese show an increase of more than 10%.

Amongst the new origin counties, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia, the proportion of individuals in work in the first generation is low. This was the case in 1999 and still applies in 2003. These differences are, of course, connected to length of stay and residency status. These new migrant groups include people who are often still in the asylum procedure at the time they register with the personal records database<sup>13</sup>. While they do not have a definite residence status, asylum seekers are not eligible for paid employment, or only to a limited extent. Therefore the low percentages applicable must be interpreted on the basis of this knowledge.

#### 5.2 Working on a self-employed basis

Working on a self-employed basis is an interesting indicator because independent entrepreneurship points to the effective use of social and ethnic networks on the one hand, whereas it can also represent a response to potential exclusion from the employment market on the other hand (Li, 2004; Waldinger et al., 1990). In addition, self-employed entrepreneurship says something about the extent to which people are prepared to take risks and - in this way - to seek out the Dutch entrepreneurial climate and find their way in it. Table 5.2 indicates the proportion of self-employed individuals amongst the various migrant groups in the period 1999-2003, broken down into different generations. The significant differences in percentages of self-employed individuals between the various origin groups in 1999 are still visible in 2003. We find by far the highest percentages of self-employed individuals (higher than the almost 8% of selfemployed individuals in the autochtonous Dutch population) amongst firstgenerations from Egypt (20%, China (17%) and Hong Kong (18%), and, to a slightly lesser extent, from India and Pakistan (11%). The proportion of selfemployed individuals in these origin groups is far higher amongst the first generation than amongst the second generation. This could point to many family businesses remaining in the hands of the first generation for a relatively long period of time<sup>14</sup>. What is more, self-employed individuals are often older than employed people, which explains the low representation amongst secondgeneration individuals (who are, after all, relatively young). It may also be that people are slowly but surely getting used to the phenomenon that having your

Asylum migrants often do not register with municipalities until after they have been granted their definite residence status. See: Nicolaas and Sprangers, 2001.

For a further explanation of ethnic entrepreneurship, see Van den Tillaart, 2001.

own business does not have society's top priority in the Netherlands (Wennekers et al., 2005). After all, the number of people starting their own businesses is also falling amongst the autochtonous Dutch population.

Although the percentages are low, the proportion of self-employed individuals increased between 1999 and 2003 – both amongst the first and the second generations – for most origin groups. Of the four big migrant groups, the increase in the proportion of self-employed individuals is particularly striking amongst the Turks. The increase amongst Moroccans is relatively as big and, as such no less striking; however, the ultimate level is lower than that applicable for the Turkish group.

#### 5.3 Social security benefits

The question of whether or not an individual is receiving social security benefits gives some indication of the extent to which people are able to build up an economically independent existence. **Table 5.1** shows the proportion of people aged 15 to 65 on social security benefits (unemployment, disability, assistance benefits and other social security benefits) amongst the various migrant groups in the period 1999-2003, broken down into the different generations. Most origin groups have higher percentages of individuals entitled to benefits than the individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population; this has not changed in the period 1999-2003. Significant differences can also still be observed between the various origin groups.

In 2003, approximately 13% of the autochtonous Dutch population were receiving social security benefits. Amongst the first generations of the four major origin groups, this percentage is two to two-and-a-half times as high This percentage is particularly high amongst first-generation individuals who have already been in the Netherlands for an extended period of time. Amongst first-generation Turks who have been in the Netherlands for 18 years or longer, 45% are receiving social security benefits; amongst Moroccans this is 43%, amongst the Surinamese 30% and amongst the Antilleans/Arubans this is 28% (see **Table 5.2, final column**).

A large proportion of first-generation Iraqis, Afghans and Somalians are also receiving social security benefits. This will be connected with their residence status, which often prevents them from participating in the labour market (at this time). The proportion of people receiving social security benefits is far lower for all origin groups in the second generation. This will certainly be an age effect. Assistance benefits and disability benefits are the most frequent forms of benefits paid (see **Table 5.1**). In 2003, 8% of the autochtonous Dutch population were receiving disability benefits and 4% assistance benefits. Amongst the four 'traditional' origin groups, 16% of first-generation Turks were receiving disability benefits in 2003, while 14% were receiving assistance benefits. For first-generation Moroccans, the percentages receiving these benefits were 11% and 19% respectively. For first-generation Surinamese the percentages were 10% and 12%, while for first-generation Antilleans/Arubans the percentages were 4% and 20%.

Amongst the other ('new') origin groups, a high proportion of these are receiving assistance benefits in particular. Several non-Western origin groups are striking in terms of the relatively low percentage of individuals entitled to assistance benefits: China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, India and Vietnam.

#### 5.3.1 Unemployment benefits and assistance benefits

Table 5.1 shows that between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of individuals receiving unemployment benefits increased. Amongst individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population, the increase observed was from 1.6% to 1.9%. Amongst individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities, the increase was far stronger, i.e. from 1.9% in 1999, to 2.7% in 2003. In 1999, the rate of unemployment amongst individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities was already higher than that applicable amongst individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population (1.9% as opposed to 1.6%; i.e. 30% higher); in 2003, the percentage was more than 50% higher (2.7% as opposed to 1.8%). In 1999, the figure for unemployment benefits was still below that applicable for the autochtonous Dutch population for most new migrant groups – which is not surprising, since these new migrants have often not yet built up any employment history and, as such, are not entitled to unemployment benefits. In 2003, by contrast, most origin groups did have higher rates of unemployment than the autochtonous Dutch population. The economic downturn of the last several years has hit individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities relatively hard. Due to the relatively small numbers, we are unable to analyse the new origin groups in any detail.

In **Table 5.3**, the rate of unemployment for the period 1999-2003 has been broken down according to age. In 1999, unemployment amongst individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities for the 25-45 age category was approximately twice as high as for individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population, and unemployment for the 45-55 age category was more than 50% higher than unemployment amongst autochtonous Dutch individuals. In all age categories, this difference in the rate of unemployment between autochtonous Dutch individuals and non-Western ethnic-minority groups increased in 2003 in comparison with 1999, particularly amongst the 45-55 age category. We see relatively high rates of unemployment amongst the Turks – both men and women – and amongst Moroccan men, to more than 5%.

**Table 5.4** shows major differences between different origin groups in terms of assistance benefit percentages. The percentage of benefit recipients amongst individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities was more than 6 times as high as amongst the autochtonous Dutch population in 1999. In 2003, this was still more than 6 times as high (13.9% against 2.2%). Amongst older individuals from ethnic minorities (age category 55-65), this percentage is 9 times as high as the percentage applicable for their Dutch native age-category counterparts.

Amongst the new origin groups, high assistance-benefit percentages are particularly evident amongst Iraqis (35%), Afghans (38%), Iranians (20%), Somalians (31%) and Ethiopians (22%) (**Table 5.1**). These high percentages can probably be ascribed to the migration motive of many individuals from these groups; refugees who are often still embroiled in the asylum procedure and who do not yet have any access to the labour market<sup>15</sup>.

Amongst the four big origin groups, the highest benefit-recipient percentages can be found amongst older Moroccan women (age category 55-65, at 44% in 2003, virtually unchanged since 1999; age category 45-55, at 33% in 2003, also unchanged in the last 5 years) and the 55-65 age category for Antillean women

also explain the high number of benefits, since anyone who is not registered in the personal records database. This may also explain the high number of benefits, since anyone who is not registered in the personal records database will not have been included in the analyses either. What is more, asylum seekers are able to register themselves in the personal records database after half a year, even if they have not yet completed the early precedure.

if they have not yet completed the asylum procedure.

One of the conditions applicable for (assistance) benefits under the ABW (National Assistance Act) is that the individual in question is registered in the personal records database. This may

(at 34% in 2003, there has been a fall since 1999 (43%)). Nevertheless, these percentages stand in shrill contrast to those of their Dutch native age-category counterparts: 3% benefit recipients in 2003.

# 5.3.2 Disability

Between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of individuals receiving disability benefits (AO) increased slightly (**Table 5.1**). Amongst the autochtonous Dutch population, the increase was from 8.0% to 8.4%. Amongst individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities, a similar increase occurred, i.e. from 6.8% in 1999 to 7.2% in 2003. The lower disability percentage for individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities can particularly be ascribed to the age structure of the origin groups: the non-Western ethnic minority groups are younger on average. Another partial explanation – which has less of an impact on the overall figure – is the fact that some of the individuals from the new origin groups are still unable or not permitted to work, and, as such, are by definition unable to become unfit for work.

Nevertheless, the highest disability percentages can be found amongst Turks, Moroccans and the Surinamese. What is more, in the period 1999-2003, the disability percentages for these groups – amongst the first-generation in particular – increased more than for the autochtonous Dutch population. Amongst first-generation Turks, the percentage was 14.5% in 1999 and 16.2% in 2003. Amongst first-generation Moroccans, these percentages are 9.8% and 11.1% respectively, and 8.8% and 10.1% respectively amongst first-generation Surinamese.

Far lower percentages are found amongst the second generations – which can be explained by their low average age – but here too an increase can be observed in the last 5 years that is stronger than the increase observed amongst the autochtonous Dutch population. An explanation for this relatively stronger increase in disability amongst ethnic minority groups could be that the economic recession of recent years has meant that employers have started to make increased demands on their employees. It is conceivable that certain ethnic-minority groups, which are proportionally less well educated and employed in lower positions, have been unable to meet these increased demands, and have dropped out. Added to this, it cannot be ruled out that disability benefits were still being used as redundancy schemes for supernumerary employees in the period 1999-2003. The next several years will show whether the new and stricter regulations on reassessments and entitlement to disability benefits will cause these figures to change.

Table 5.1 Proportion of individuals aged 15 to 65 in work and/or receiving benefits, by origin and generation (1999 and 2003)\*

															Receiving	Receiving
	Employee as a % of the r			Self-employed	Entrepreneur	Entrepreneur	AO	AO	ww	ww	ABW	ABW Ot	her benefits Oth	er benefits	benefits total	benefits total
	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003
Total	62,5	63,7	7,1	7,2	8,3		8,0	8,2	1,6	1,9	4,1	3,6	2,3	1,8	15,1	14,6
Autochthonous Dutch	64,5	66,5	7,6	7,7	8,9	9,2	8,0	8,4	1,6	1,8	2,6	2,2	2,2	1,7	13,6	13,2
Western ethnic minority	57,0	57,4	6,1	6,2	7,1		8,3	8,2	2,0	2,4	5,0	4,2	2,7	1,9	17,0	15,8
1st generation	49,5	49,4	5,4	5,3	6,1	6,0	7,4	7,1	2,2	2,6	6,5	5,2	2,8	1,8	17,9	15,8
2nd generation	62,3	63,6	6,6	6,9	7,8	8,2	8,9	9,1	1,9	2,3	4,0	3,4	2,6	2,0	16,4	15,8
Non Western ethnic minority	49,2	47,5	3,5		3,6		6,8	7,2	1,9	2,7	16,5	13,9	3,4	2,2	27,2	24,7
1st generation	47,8	45,8	3,7	4,2	3,9		7,7	8,3	2,1	3,0	18,8	16,2	3,7	2,4	30,8	28,3
2nd generation incl.	56,1	54,5	2,3	2,6	2,5	2,8	2,3	3,0	0,7	1,6	4,8	4,6	2,0	1,4	9,5	10,2
Turkey	45,7	44,5	3,8	4,9	3,9	5,1	12,2	13,2	2,7	3,7	14,6	11,4	4,7	3,4	32,3	29,5
1st generation	43,8	42,2	4,2		4,4	5,7	14,5	16,2	3,2	4,2	16,8	13,5	5,3	3,9	37,3	35,1
2nd generation	54,2	52,1	2,0	2,9	2,0	3,0	2,4	3,4	0,8	2,1	5,0	4,6	2,3	1,9	10,1	11,4
Marocco	45,2	44,0	1,7	2,2	1,7		8,5	9,2	1,9	2,9	18,2	15,8	4,0	2,8	30,7	28,8
1st generation	43,2	41,9	1,8	2,5	1,8	2,5	9,8	11,1	2,2	3,4	20,8	18,9	4,4	3,1	34,9	34,1
2nd generation	56,0	51,2	0,9	1,3	0,9	1,4	1,5	2,4	0,5	1,5	4,4	5,0	2,1	1,5	8,2	10,0
Surinam	62,0	60,8	2,8	3,2	3,0		7,4	8,2	1,8	2,8	13,2	10,4	3,2	2,0	24,5	22,2
1st generation	63,4	62,8	2,9	3,4	3,1		8,8	10,1	2,1	3,2	15,3	12,1	3,4	2,2	28,3	26,2
2nd generation	57,0	55,7	2,3	2,5	2,6	2,7	2,7	3,2	0,8	1,7	6,0	5,8	2,2	1,4	11,4	11,7
Netherlands Antilles en Aruba	57,2	55,2	1,9	2,1	2,1		3,7	4,0	1,4	2,5	19,2	16,3	3,1	1,7	26,6	23,7
1st generation	55,7	53,5	1,6	1,8	1,8		4,0	4,3	1,6	2,7	23,0	19,6	3,5	1,9	31,1	27,6
2nd generation	63,1	61,5	3,0	3,3	3,3	3,7	2,5	3,1	0,8	1,5	4,2	4,2	1,7	1,1	8,9	9,4
Iraq	25,8	26,8	1,3	2,8	1,3		0,4	1,4	0,4	1,6	39,5	35,0	2,0	1,3	41,8	38,6
1st generation	25,5	26,5	1,2		1,3		0,4	1,4	0,4	1,6	39,8	35,3	2,0	1,3	42,2	39,0
2nd generation	62,9	57,3	4,5	Х	5,0	3,6	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	Х	х	6,8	5,0
Afghanistan	23,2	30,7	0,7	1,9	0,7		0,1	0,5	0,4	1,0	34,7	37,7	1,6	1,3	36,3	40,0
1st generation	23,1	30,7	0,7	1,9	0,7	2,0	0,1	0,5	0,4	1,0	34,7	37,8	1,6	1,4	36,3	40,1
2nd generation	х	х	х	х	х	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	Х
China	33,6	35,5	16,3	15,0	16,9		1,7	1,6	1,0	1,0	13,2	8,1	1,3	0,8	16,7	11,1
1st generation	30,0	32,0	18,3	16,6	18,9		1,3	1,2	1,1	1,0	15,3	9,3	1,5	0,8	18,6	11,9
2nd generation	52,1	56,0	6,0	6,2	6,9	7,2	3,5	3,4	0,4	1,2	2,5	1,6	0,8	0,7	7,0	6,5

Iran 1st generation 2nd generation	37,4 36,8 59,0	39,5 39,1 53,6	3,1 3,1 5,5	4,5 4,5 5,8	3,3 3,2 6,0	4,8 4,7 7,0	1,4 1,4 2,4	3,1 3,1 2,0	1,0 1,0 x	2,3 2,4 x	27,7 28,3 4,3	20,1 20,6 3,2	2,7 2,7 x	1,7 1,8 x	32,0 32,6 9,0	26,5 27,0 6,8
Somalia	35,0	25,8	0,1	0,3	0,1	0,3	0,3	1,4	0,9	3,1	35,1	31,3	4,5	1,5	39,9	36,8
1st generation	35,0	25,8	0,1	0,3	0,1	0,3	0,3	1,4	0,9	3,1	35,1	31,3	4,5	1,5	40,0	36,8
2nd generation	X	x	X	X	X	X	X	x	X	X	X	X	х	x	X	X
Cape Verde	66,4	66,6	1,0	1,2	1,1	1,3	4,7	5,3	2,9	2,6	11,1	9,3	2,7	1,4	20,2	17,7
1st generation	69,4	70,7	1,2	1,2	1,3	1,3	5,5	6,5	3,5	3,0	12,1	10,2	3,0	1,5	22,6	20,1
2nd generation	53,5	54,6	0,4	1,2	0,5	1,2	1,2	1,8	Х	1,5	7,1	6,4	1,4	1,0	9,9	10,5
Ghana	64,0	60,8	1,4	2,0	1,4	2,0	2,0	3,5	2,6	4,0	11,7	11,7	4,3	2,4	19,6	20,4
1st generation	64,2	61,7	1,4	2,0	1,4	2,1	2,0	3,6	2,6	4,1	11,8	12,0	4,3	2,5	19,8	21,0
2nd generation	х	33,6	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	Х
Egypt	40,6	37,8	18,5	17,5	18,8	17,9	4,5	5,9	2,2	3,2	14,3	13,7	2,5	2,3	22,4	23,0
1st generation	39,5	35,8	20,1	19,9	20,3	20,2	4,7	6,4	2,4	3,6	15,5	15,4	2,7	2,5	24,1	25,5
2nd generation	51,2	50,5	3,6	2,8	4,4	3,3	3,0	2,7	x	0,9	3,0	2,9	x	1,2	6,9	7,4
Hongkong	46,4	53,8	13,3	12,7	13,7	13,4	1,5	1,9	1,5	1,3	12,1	8,1	1,1	0,9	15,6	11,7
1st generation	45,0	50,1	17,9	17,9	18,5	18,8	1,8	2,2	2,0	1,7	16,6	12,0	1,2	1,3	20,9	16,3
2nd generation	49,7	60,5	2,1	3,1	2,3	3,3	0,7	1,4	0,3	0,7	1,1	1,0	0,8	0,2	2,8	3,2
Philippines	50,8	54,5	2,2	2,2	2,5	2,4	2,9	2,9	1,5	1,7	3,9	3,2	1,7	1,1	9,7	8,5
1st generation	50,1	54,0	2,4	2,4	2,7	2,6	3,2	3,2	1,7	1,8	4,2	3,4	1,8	1,2	10,4	9,1
2nd generation	55,9	57,2	Х	1,4	Х	1,5	1,3	1,4	Х	0,8	Х	1,7	1,6	1,0	4,2	4,7
Ethiopia	44,2	40,1	1,2	1,5	1,2	1,5	1,1	2,8	1,6	3,3	27,5	21,7	3,2	1,7	32,6	28,3
1st generation	43,9	39,9	1,2	1,5	1,2	1,5	1,1	2,9	1,6	3,4	28,1	22,8	3,2	1,8	33,4	29,7
2nd generation	54,4	44,2	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	3,4
India	48,0	49,6	9,5	9,8	10,2	10,5	2,7	3,5	2,0	2,4	8,6	6,1	2,2	1,4	14,6	12,5
1st generation	47,0	48,6	10,4	10,7	11,1	11,5	2,8	3,7	2,1	2,6	9,3	6,8	2,3	1,6	15,7	13,6
2nd generation	55,8	55,7	2,6	4,0	3,2	4,3	1,8	2,2	Х	1,4	2,4	1,9	1,4	Х	5,9	5,9
Pakistan	40,4	38,2	7,7	9,5	7,9	9,8	4,1	5,3	2,3	2,7	18,4	15,0	2,4	1,9	26,1	23,2
1st generation	40,6	37,1	8,5	10,9	8,7	11,2	4,6	6,1	2,6	3,2	20,5	17,3	2,6	2,1	29,0	26,7
2nd generation	39,3	43,2	2,1	3,2	2,1	3,3	0,9	1,5	Х	0,7	3,3	4,6	0,8	0,7	4,9	7,3
Vietnam	53,6	52,8	6,7	6,4	6,8	6,6	1,9	2,8	1,4	2,8	14,3	8,8	2,2	1,3	19,4	15,1
1st generation	54,9	53,5	7,2	7,1	7,3	7,3	2,1	3,1	1,5	3,1	15,4	9,8	2,3	1,4	20,7	16,7
2nd generation	35,4	47,6	Х	0,8	Х	0,8	Х	0,8	x	Х	Х	1,0	Х	Х	Х	2,2

Table 5.2 Proportion of first-generation individuals aged 15 to 65 in work and/or receiving benefits, by origin and length of stay (2003)\*

Entrepreneur and/or managing Receiving benefits total NV/BV ww ABW Other benefits Employee Self-employed ΑO as a % of the relevant population group 47,0 4,6 Total first-generation ethnic minorities 5,0 7,9 2,9 12,6 2,2 24,2 Western ethnic minority 49,4 15,8 5,3 6,0 2,6 5,2 1,8 0 to 5 years old 5 to 18 years old 40,5 50,9 1,7 5,8 7,0 1,9 6,4 0,3 3,8 0,7 4,9 14,1 3,3 0,6 1,6 2,7 6,8 18 years and older 53,4 8,1 13,6 3,5 5,1 23,3 45,8 4,2 16,2 Non-Western ethnic minority 4,5 3,0 28,3 8,3 2,4 0 to 5 years old 5 to 18 years old 30,8 48,6 0,8 16,5 27,3 4,6 18 years and older 50,4 5,7 6,1 15,6 3,6 15,6 3,1 35,4 Turkey 42,2 5,7 13,5 35,1 5,5 16,2 4,2 3,9 0 to 5 years old 5 to 18 years old 39,0 46,3 1,5 6,3 0,8 9,4 1,2 4,9 6,9 13,2 10,7 29,3 1,5 2,0 3,9 18 years and older 39,6 5,9 6,2 25,2 4,2 15,3 4,3 45,3 18,9 41,9 2,5 2,5 Marocco 11,1 3,4 3,1 34,1 0 to 5 years old 5 to 18 years old 37,1 45,8 0,6 2,4 3,1 0,7 8,0 10,0 17,5 0.6 2.0 13.4 30,2 3.2 18 years and older 39.7 16.6 3.4 22.4 3,6 42.8 62,8 3,4 3,6 3,2 12,1 2,2 26,2 Surinam 10,1 0 to 5 years old 5 to 18 years old 51.6 0,7 2,4 4,1 0,7 2,5 1,3 6,1 1,0 2,9 1,6 1,8 10,7 21,0 12.7 18 years and older 63.4 4.4 3,6 13.0 2.4 29.9 Netherlands Antilles en Aruba 53,5 1,8 2,0 4,3 2,7 19,6 1,9 27,6 0,5 1,4 3,8 0 to 5 years old 5 to 18 years old 41,7 0,5 0,5 3,2 1,1 3,0 24,5 1,3 1,9 27,1 27,9 27,7 1,4 4,2 9,6 2,5 18 years and older 61,5 3,7 13,5 Other non-Western 39,3 5,3 5,6 2,7 2,2 17,7 1,5 0,7 1,8 1,9 23,3 0 to 5 years old 5 to 18 years old 18 years and older 0,9 5,7 12,4 0,1 2,7 7,5 0,4 3,1 2,8 24,4 1,0 15,6 16,7 44,9 50,7 20,4 14,0 27,0 24,8 13,2

<sup>\*</sup> There may be some overlap between the various categories. For example, the entrepreneurs group consists of self-employed individuals and some employees (i.e. managing directors of NVs and BVs and major shareholding directors). All individuals will be included for each of the categories applicable for them. Thus, an employee who is also receiving benefits will be included in both the first and the last categories.

Table 5.3 Number of individuals aged 15 to 65 receiving unemployment benefits; by origin, sex and age category

Table 5.3 Number of individuals	aged 15 to	65 receiv	ing une	employ	ment be	nefits; by origi Men	n, sex a	nd age c	ategory	,	Women				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
	as a % of th				2003	as a % of th				2003	as a % of th				2003
Total population	1,6	1,3	1,2	1,4	1,9	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,6	2,2	1,5	1,2	1,0	1,2	1,6
15 to 25 years old	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,5	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,5	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,5
25 to 35 years old	1,2	0,2	0,2	1,2	2,0	0,9	0,1	0,6	1,1	1,9	1,5	1,2	1,0	1,3	2,0
35 to 45 years old	1,3	1,0	0,8	1,3	2,0	1,1	0,7	0,8	1,3	2,2	1,5	1,1	1,0	1,3	1,9
45 to 55 years old	1,7	1,3	1,1	1,3	2.0	1.6	1,2	1,1	1,4	2,2	1,8	1,3	1,1	1,3	1,6
55 to 65 years old	4,4	4,0	3,4	3,0	3,2	6,4	5,7	4,9	4,3	4,5	2,4	2,2	2,0	1,8	1,9
33 to 63 years old	4,4	4,0	3,4	3,0	3,2	0,4	5,7	4,5	4,5		2,4	2,2		1,0	1,5
Autochthonous Dutch	1,6 0.2	1,3 0,2	1,1 0.1	1,3 0.2	1,8 0.4	1,7 0,2	1,4 0.1	1,3 0.1	1,5 0,2	2,1 0.4	1,4 0.3	1,1 0,2	1,0 0,2	1,1 0,2	1,5 0,5
15 to 25 years old 25 to 35 years old	1,1	0,2	0,1	1,0	1,7	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,2	1,6	0,3 1,5	1,1	0,2	1,2	1,8
35 to 45 years old	1,1	0,8	0,7	1,1	1,7	0,7	0,5	0,5	1,1	1,8	1,3	1,1	0,9	1,1	1,7
45 to 55 years old	1,6	1,2	1,0	1,2	1,8	1,4	1,1	1,0	1,3	2,1	1,7	1,3	1,0	1,1	1,5
55 to 65 years old	4,3	3,9	3,4	3,0	3,1	6,4	5,7	4,9	4,2	4,4	2,3	2,2	1,9	1,8	1,9
55 to 65 years old															
Western ethnic minority	2,0	1,7 0,2	1,5 0.1	1,7 0.3	2,4 0.5	2,3 0.2	2,0 0.2	1,7	2,1 0.3	2,9 0.5	1,7	1,4 0.2	1,2 0,2	1,4 0,3	2,0 0,5
Younger than 15 years old 25 to 35 years old	0,3 1,3	0,2	0,1	1,3	0,5 2,1	1,0	0,2	0,1 0,7	1,4	2,0	0,3 1,5	1,1	1,0	1,3	0,5 2,1
35 to 45 years old	1,5	1,2	1,1	1,6	2,1	1,4	1,1	1,0	1,4	2,0	1,5	1,1	1,0	1,6	2,1
45 to 55 years old	2.0	1,6	1,1	1,8	2,0	1,4	1,1	1,0	1,0	3.1	2,0	1,6	1,2	1,6	2,4
55 to 65 years old	5,3	4,7	4,2	3,7	3,9	7,6	6,8	5,9	5,1	5,5	2,0	2,7	2,4	2,2	2,3
oo to do years old	0,0	7,1	7,2	0,1	0,0	7,0	0,0	0,0	5,1	0,0	2,5	2,,	2,4	2,2	
Non-Western ethnic minority	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,8	2,7	2,1	1,7	1,5	2,0	3,1	1,6	1,3	1,2	1,5	2,3
15 to 25 years old	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,7	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,7	0,5	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,7
25 to 35 years old	2,1	1,7	1,6	2,2	3,5	2,1	1,7	1,4	2,2	3,7	2,0	1,8	1,7	2,2	3,2
35 to 45 years old	2,4	1,9	1,8	2,5	3,9	2,5	2,1	2,0	2,7	4,5	2,2	1,7	1,6	2,2	3,2
45 to 55 years old	2,5	1,9	1,7	2,1	3,1	3,1	2,4	2,1	2,6	4,0	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,5	2,2
55 to 65 years old	3,6	3,2	2,8	2,6	2,9	5,2	4,6	4,1	3,7	4,1	1,6	1,4	1,2	1,2	1,5
incl.											0.5				
Turkey	2,7 0,8	2,3 0,6	2,2 0.6	2,7 0.8	3,7 1,1	3,0 0,6	2,5 0,5	2,2 0,5	2,7 0,7	3,9 1,0	2,5 1,0	2,2 0,7	2,2 0,8	2,6 0,9	3,4 1,2
15 to 25 years old 25 to 35 years old	3,4	2,9	2,8	3,5	5,1	3,3	2,6	2,2	2,9	4,8	3,6	3,3	3,5	4,2	5,4
35 to 45 years old	3,7	3,2	3.1	3,7	5,1	3,3	3,1	3,0	3,7	5,3	3,8	3,3	3,3	3,8	5,4
45 to 55 years old	3.2	2.8	2.6	2,7	3.6	4.8	4.1	3.6	3,7	5.1	1,8	1.5	1.6	1.7	2,1
55 to 65 years old	3,3	2,9	2,5	2,3	2,3	4,8	4,3	4,0	3,7	3,6	0,8	0,7	0,5	0,5	0,6
•															
Marocco	1,9	1,6	1,5	1,9	2,9	2,6	2,2	2,1	2,5	3,9	1,0	0,9	0,9	1,2	1,8
15 to 25 years old	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,6	1,0	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,6	1,1	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,9
25 to 35 years old	2,2	2,0	1,9	2,6	4,2	2,6	2,2	2,1	3,0	5,0	1,7	1,7	1,6	2,2	3,4
35 to 45 years old	2,5	2,0	2,0	2,5	4,1	3,3	2,8	2,7	3,4	5,7	1,3	1,0	1,0	1,2	2,0
45 to 55 years old	2,4	2,0	1,7	1,9	2,7	3,7	3,0	2,7	3,2	4,6	1,0	0,8	0,6	0,7	0,9
55 to 65 years old	3,9	3,5	3,1	2,6	2,8	5,6	5,1	4,5	3,9	4,2	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Surinam	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,8	2,8	1,8	1,4	1,3	1,8	2,9	1,9	1,5	1,4	1,7	2,7
15 to 25 years old	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,7	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,7	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,7
25 to 35 years old	1,9	1,5	1,4	2,1	3,8	1,7	1,2	1,1	2,0	3,7	2,1	1,8	1,7	2,2	3,8
35 to 45 years old	2,2	1,8	1,5	2,2	3,6	1,8	1,6	1,4	2,1	3,7	2,5	1,9	1,7	2,4	3,5
45 to 55 years old	2,4	1,8	1,6	2,0	3,0	2,3	1,7	1,4	2,1	3,3	2,5	1,9	1,8	1,9	2,8
55 to 65 years old	3,9	3,6	3,1	2,9	3,4	5,4	4,9	4,3	3,9	4,5	2,6	2,5	2,0	1,9	2,4
Netherlands Antilles en Aruba	1,4	1,1	1,0	1,5	2,5	1,5	1,0	1,0	1,6	2,8	1,4	1,1	1,0	1,4	2,2
15 to 25 years old	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,6	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,3	0,7	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,5
25 to 35 years old	1,5	1,1	0,9	1,6	2,6	1,3	0,8	0,7	1,5	2,8	1,7	1,4	1,1	1,6	2,5
35 to 45 years old	1,9	1,3	1,3	2,1	3,7	1,9	1,1	1,2	2,1	3,9	2,0	1,6	1,5	2,2	3,4
45 to 55 years old	2,4	1,8	1,6	2,3	3,7	2,5	2,0	1,5	2,6	4,5	2,4	1,8	1,8	2,0	3,0
55 to 65 years old	3,8	2,8	2,7	2,9	3,4	6,3	4,6	4,1	4,2	4,6	2,0	1,4	1,5	1,9	2,4
Other non-Western	1,3	1,0	0,9	1,3	2,0	1,6	1,3	1,1	1,6	2,5	1,0	0,8	0,7	0,9	1,5
15 to 25 years old	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,4	0,2	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,3
25 to 35 years old	1,1	0,9	0,8	1,2	1,9	1,3	1,1	0,9	1,5	2,4	0,9	0,7	0,7	0,9	1,5
35 to 45 years old	1,8	1,4	1,3	2,0	3,2	2,1	1,7	1,6	2,3	3,9	1,5	1,1	1,1	1,6	2,4
45 to 55 years old	2,3	1,7	1,4	1,9	3,0	2,8	2,1	1,8	2,4	3,8	1,7	1,2	1,1	1,2	2,1
55 to 65 years old	3,3	3,0	2,6	2,3	2,9	4,5	4,1	3,5	3,1	4,0	1,9	1,8	1,5	1,3	1,7

Table 5.4 Number of individuals aged 15 to 65 receiving assistance benefits; by origin, sex and age category

Table 5.4 Number of individual		o 65 recei	iving assi	stance be	nefits; by o		ge catego	ory							
	Total	2000	2004	2002	2002	Men	2000	2004	2002	2002	Women	2000	2004	2002	2002
	1999 as a % of t	2000 he releva	2001 nt populati	2002 on group	2003	1999 as a % of ti	2000 ne relevar	2001 nt populati	2002 ion group	2003	1999 as a % of t	2000 he relevar	2001 nt populat	2002 ion group	2003
Total population	4,1	3,7	3,5	3,4	3,6	3,1	2,8	2,6	2,6	2,8	5,0	4,7	4,4	4,3	4,4
15 to 25 years old	1,8	1,6	1,5	1,5	1,8	1,4	1,1	1,0	1,1	1,4	2,3	2,1	1,9	2,0	2,2
25 to 35 years old	4,5	3,9	3,6	3,5	3,8	3,5	2,9	2,6	2,6	3,0	5,5	5,0	4,6	4,5	4,7
35 to 45 years old	4,7	4,3	4,0	3,9	4,0	3,7	3,3	3,1	3,0	3,2	5,8	5,4	5,0	4,8	4,9
45 to 55 years old	4,3	4,0	3,8	3,7	3,8	3,2	3,0	2,9	2,8	3,0	5,3	5,0	4,8	4,6	4,7
55 to 65 years old	4,7	4,6	4,5	4,3	4,2	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,2	3,1	5,8	5,8	5,6	5,5	5,3
Autochthonous Dutch	2,6	2,4	2,2	2,1	2,2	1,9	1,6	1,5	1,4	1,5	3,4	3,1	2,9	2,8	2,8
15 to 25 years old	0,9	0,8	0,7	0,7	0,9	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,4	0,6	1,3	1,1	1,0	1,0	1,2
25 to 35 years old	2,6	2,2	2,0	1,9	2,0	1,9	1,5	1,3	1,3	1,5	3,4	2,9	2,6	2,5	2,6
35 to 45 years old	3,0	2,7	2,4	2,3	2,3	2,1	1,8	1,6	1,6	1,7	3,9	3,5	3,2	3,0	3,0
45 to 55 years old	3,0	2,8	2,6	2,4	2,4	2,1	1,9	1,8	1,7	1,8	3,9	3,6	3,3	3,1	3,1
55 to 65 years old	3,4	3,3	3,2	3,1	3,0	2,4	2,3	2,2	2,1	2,0	4,4	4,4	4,2	4,1	4,0
Western ethnic minority	5.0	4,5	4,2	4.1	4,2	4.0	3.5	3.1	3.1	3,3	6.1	5.6	5,2	5.0	5,1
•	- 1 -						-,-								
Younger than 15 years old	2,2	1,8	1,6	1,7	1,9	1,6	1,2	1,1	1,1	1,4	2,7	2,4	2,2	2,2	2,4
25 to 35 years old	5,1	4,3	3,8	3,7	3,9	4,1	3,3	2,8	2,7	3,0	6,1	5,3	4,8	4,6	4,7
35 to 45 years old	5,7	5,0	4,5	4,3	4,5	4,5	3,8	3,5	3,4	3,6	6,8	6,0	5,5	5,2	5,3
45 to 55 years old	5,6	5,1	4,8	4,7	4,8	4,4	4,0	3,7	3,6	3,8	6,7	6,2	5,9	5,7	5,7
55 to 65 years old	5,9	5,8	5,7	5,5	5,3	4,5	4,4	4,2	4,1	4,0	7,3	7,3	7,1	6,9	6,7
Non-Western ethnic minority	16,5	15,0	13,9	13,5	13,9	14,0	12,4	11,4	11,1	11,7	19,1	17,8	16,7	16,0	16,2
15 to 25 years old	6,7	5,8	5,2	5,2	5,7	5,6	4,5	4,0	4,2	4,8	7,9	7,0	6,5	6,3	6,7
25 to 35 years old	17,2	15,0	13,5	13,0	13,6	14,2	11,9	10,4	10,3	11,2	20,4	18,2	16,8	15,8	16,1
35 to 45 years old	20,2	18,3	17,0	16,3	16,6	17,1	15,1	14,0	13,3	14,1	23,7	22,1	20,5	19,7	19,5
45 to 55 years old	22.6	21.5	20.4	19.7	19.7	19.8	18.5	17.2	16.6	16.9	25.6	24.7	23.7	22.8	22.6
55 to 65 years old	28,3	28,0	27,6	26,8	26,4	23,8	23,4	23,0	22,4	22,0	34,2	33,8	33,3	32,2	31,6
incl.	20,5	20,0	21,0	20,0	20,4	25,0	20,4	23,0	22,4	22,0	34,2	33,0	33,3	32,2	31,0
	110	40.0	44.0	44.0	44.4	40.5	40.7	0.5	0.0	0.0	10.0	15,3	44.0	40.7	44.0
Turkey	14,6	12,9	11,8	11,2	11,4	12,5	10,7	9,5 2,4	8,9	9,0 2.7	16,9		14,3	13,7	14,0
15 to 25 years old	5,7	4,2	3,6	3,2	3,6	4,2	2,9		2,2		7,1	5,4	4,7	4,2	4,5
25 to 35 years old	15,4	12,8	11,3	10,4	10,8	12,6	9,9	8,3	7,5	8,0	18,6	16,0	14,3	13,3	13,7
35 to 45 years old	17,8	15,7	14,1	13,4	13,3	14,6	12,5	10,8	10,0	9,9	22,0	20,1	18,5	17,9	17,7
45 to 55 years old	23,4	22,4	21,2	20,7	20,0	21,4	19,6	17,7	16,9	16,1	25,2	25,0	24,5	24,4	24,0
55 to 65 years old	22,6	23,0	23,0	23,0	23,4	21,0	21,2	21,5	21,4	21,4	25,1	25,5	25,2	25,0	25,8
Marocco	18,2	17,0	16,1	15,4	15,8	16,0	14,7	13,7	13,2	13,7	20,9	19,7	18,8	18,0	18,2
15 to 25 years old	5,9	4,9	4,4	4,3	4,9	5,4	4,5	3,9	3,8	4,6	6,3	5,2	5,0	4,6	5,2
25 to 35 years old	18,5	16,3	14,7	13,7	14,3	15,1	13,1	11,9	11,3	12,4	22,8	20,1	17,8	16,3	16,2
35 to 45 years old	26,0	24,4	22,9	21,6	21,3	21,6	19,7	18,3	17,1	17,1	32,0	30,9	29,4	28,1	27,4
45 to 55 years old	29,2	28,9	28,0	27,5	27,9	25,0	23,9	22,8	22,1	22,3	34,4	34,4	33,6	32,9	33,2
55 to 65 years old	31,9	32,4	32,8	32,4	32,1	27,3	27,2	27,2	26,5	26,0	41,3	42,7	43,7	43,6	43,6
Surinam	13,2	12,0	10,9	10,2	10,4	10,0	8,9	8,1	7,5	8,0	16,2	14,8	13,5	12,7	12,5
15 to 25 years old	5,6	4,8	4,3	4,0	4,6	4,1	3,1	2,6	2,3	3,0	7,1	6,6	5,9	5,8	6,1
25 to 35 years old	13.1	11.7	10.6	10.0	10.7	9.7	8.6	7.6	7.0	8.0	16.2	14.5	13.3	12.6	13.0
35 to 45 years old	15,3	13,6	12,2	11.1	10,8	12,4	10,9	9.8	9,0	9.0	17.8	15,9	14,2	12,8	12,2
45 to 55 years old	16,4	15,2	14,0	13,3	13,0	13,3	12,4	11,5	11,3	11,4	19,4	17,9	16,3	15,0	14,4
55 to 65 years old	24,5	23,4	21,9	20,3	19,4	16,3	15,4	14,2	13,1	13,2	31,9	30,5	29,0	27,0	25,1
Netherlands Antilles en Aruba	19,2	18.0	16,8	15.9	16.3	14,3	12,7	11,4	11,0	11.9	23.9	23.2	22.0	20.7	20,6
	10,4	9,8		8,0					5,0	5,8	12,8	12,9	12,0		
15 to 25 years old			8,9		8,4	8,0	6,8	5,7						11,0	11,0
25 to 35 years old	22,0	20,4	18,9	17,9	18,5	16,7	14,2	12,4	11,8	12,6	27,5	26,8	25,6	24,3	24,5
35 to 45 years old	22,9	21,2	19,7	19,0	19,5	17,6	15,6	14,0	13,9	15,0	28,1	26,8	25,3	24,0	23,9
45 to 55 years old	20,5	19,9	19,2	18,2	18,7	15,7	15,2	14,7	14,8	16,1	24,6	24,0	23,1	21,2	21,1
55 to 65 years old	33,6	32,7	30,7	28,6	26,5	20,8	20,8	19,3	18,4	17,0	43,4	42,0	39,8	36,9	34,3
Other non-Western	18,6	16,6	15,5	15,3	16,0	16,6	14,4	13,2	13,3	14,3	20,9	19,3	18,2	17,6	18,0
15 to 25 years old	7,9	6,9	6,4	6,9	7,4	7,2	5,9	5,2	6,3	6,7	8,8	8,0	7,7	7,8	8,1
25 to 35 years old	19,2	16,5	14,9	14,9	15,6	16,9	13,9	12,1	12,8	13,9	21,9	19,4	18,0	17,0	17,3
35 to 45 years old	22,1	20,0	18,8	18,4	19,5	19,5	17,0	16,1	15,7	17,5	25,4	23,8	22,2	21,7	22,0
45 to 55 years old	25,3	23,9	22,7	21,8	22,2	22,9	21,1	19,7	18,8	19,5	28,3	27,2	26,2	25,3	25,3
55 to 65 years old	35,0	33,7	33,6	32,6	32,4	32,3	30,9	30,4	29,4	28,7	38,2	37,0	37,3	36,2	36,7
	, -					,-					, =				

# 6 Labour market transitions: monitoring the 1999, 2000 and 2001 immigration cohorts

In the Integration Monitor 2004, we monitored a cohort of newcomers and studied how these migrants with different migration motives fared in the labour market. We monitored all newcomers (aged 15-60) who settled in the Netherlands between September 1998 and September 1999 (which we will now refer to as the 1999 cohort, consisting of 72,797 individuals), in the period up to and including 2002. For this version of the Integration Monitor, the same immigration cohort was monitored for another year, up to and including 2003. Added to this, we created two new cohorts, consisting, respectively, of newcomers who settled in the Netherlands between September 1999 and September 2000 (which we will now refer to as the 2000 cohort, with 79,426 individuals) and between September 2000 and September 2001 (the 2001 cohort: 86,670 individuals). The 2000 cohort was monitored for a period of four years, while the 2001 cohort was monitored for three years. All of the immigrants in these immigration cohorts were aged between 15 and 60 during their first year in the Netherlands 16.

Per year, we looked at immigrants' labour market position on the last Friday of September. We distinguish three labour market positions<sup>17</sup>. The first category comprises individuals *working* as employees or as independent entrepreneurs. The second category consists of individuals receiving social security benefits<sup>18</sup> and who are not in work (referred to as 'benefit recipients'). The third category is a residual category consisting of labour market non-participants. These individuals are neither in work nor receiving benefits, but are, for example, in education or are housewives/husbands. We examine the percentage of immigrants from the individual newcomer groups that belong to the cohorts that are in work or receiving benefits in successive years. By comparing the labour market position of the three cohorts through the years, we discover how quickly immigrants find their way onto the Dutch labour market in a period in which a change occurred in the economic situation. Following a period of economic growth, stagnation occurred after 2001. The effect of this change in the economic climate on the labour market position of immigrants from various origin

\_

The date of entry is the settlement date, thus the date of registration in the personal records database. In other words: excluding the period preceding this, which, in the case of asylum migrants, for instance, may have been spent in an asylum seekers' centre (AZC). When creating the cohorts, no data on duration of stay were used from the Central Aliens Register (CRV). Therefore, for some individuals the actual duration of stay may be considerably longer and could also systematically be connected with changes in policy on registration in the personal records database for asylum seekers in particular. For the other migration motives, the time lag between arrival and registration will probably be far smaller.

Our calculations do not include newcomers who have emigrated or died. This group of people is found in changing numbers in the various origin groups and migration motives. Immigrants from Western countries, India and South Africa, who are often employment migrants, are particularly likely to emigrate.

This includes all benefits: ABW (assistance benefits), WAO (disability benefits), WAZ (disability benefits for the self-employed, Wajong (benefits for young disabled people), WW (unemployment benefits), but also other benefits, such as Ziektewet (sickness benefits), IOAW (non-means tested welfare) and IOAZ (benefits for older individuals and the partially disabled, individuals formerly self-employed).

countries and with various migration motives (work, asylum, family formation, family reunification) can be revealed, as can the relationship between duration of stay and their incorporation process.

# 6.1 Labour market participation: work and social security benefits

Developments in the labour market position of the three immigrant cohorts by origin country and migration motive are indicated in Figures 6.1 to 6.4.

## Origin groups

The percentage of individuals in work amongst immigrants from Poland, other Western countries and South Africa is already relatively high in their first year in the Netherlands (more than 50%) (**see Figure 6.1**) and the proportion of benefit recipients in these groups is relatively low (**see Figure 6.3**). However, amongst the women in these groups, there is a combination of a low percentage of women in work and, at the same time, a low percentage of benefit recipients. As such, there is a relatively large 'residual group' in these origin groups, consisting of nonworking (wider) family members. This demonstrates that a proper interpretation of the labour market position of origin groups cannot be based solely on the percentage of individuals in work; the percentage of individuals receiving benefits must also be included.

The labour market participation of new Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean/Aruban immigrants displays a pattern that is comparable with that applicable for others individuals from their origin group who have already been living in the Netherlands for some time. More than 40% of Turkish and Moroccan men already have a job in their entry year (so, within one year). In the second year, this percentage increases to above 60%, after which a less pronounced increase occurs. The proportion of individuals in work amongst Turkish and Moroccan men reaches 70% in the third year after their arrival and does not then increase again. At the same time, the proportion of benefit recipients amongst both groups increases gradually. Amongst the 1999 cohort (consisting of individuals who arrived in the Netherlands in 1998/1999), 8% of Moroccan and 11% of Turkish men are receiving benefits within the first year of arrival. After four years in the Netherlands, these percentages increase to 16% and 15% respectively. In their first year in the Netherlands, the later cohorts (2000 and 2001) consistently start with a lower proportion of benefit recipients. The pattern for labour market participation amongst Surinamese and Antillean men is similar to that for Turkish and Moroccan men. Approximately 40% of these individuals have a job within one year of arrival. This percentage increases to above 60% for the Surinamese and to slightly more than 50% for Antillean/Aruban men. Antillean men are conspicuous with their relatively high percentage of benefit recipients (approximately 20%). For Antillean women this is even higher, at approximately 35%.

Migrants from the asylum countries have very low percentages of individuals in work. By contrast, the percentage of benefit recipients is relatively high after three or four years in the Netherlands.

#### Sex

Contrary to the men, Surinamese and Antillean/Aruban women enjoy a relatively favourable position in comparison with Turkish and Moroccan women. In their first year in the Netherlands (the entry year), more than one-third of Surinamese and a quarter of Antillean women find a job, and these percentages increase to approximately the same level as that applicable for males from their origin groups within 2 to 3 years. In contrast to this, Turkish and Moroccan women

start with a low percentage of individuals in work (approximately 15%); after four years, this percentage does not extend above approximately 30%. In general, female immigrants are in work less often than male immigrants are, and are more often benefit recipients than their male counterparts are. An important exception to this situation are female employment migrants and women from Surinam. The high participation level of Surinamese women in comparison with other immigrant women is striking. What is more, they are on a part with males from their origin groups, which is an exceptional situation. Antillean/Aruban and Polish women also have relatively high labour market participation. Considerably less Moroccan and Turkish women are in work than males from their respective origin groups. The percentage of women in employment amongst Afghan, Somalian, Iraqi and Sudanese women is also very low. Amongst the asylum countries, Iranian women are salient in a positive sense.

#### Migration motives

As regards the migration motive applicable, it can be observed that, as might be expected, employment migrants have a high level of labour market participation immediately after their arrival, and that the family formation migrants category also participate in the labour market in large numbers as of their second year in the Netherlands (70%). Asylum migrants remain far behind, which is particularly true for the 2001 cohort. In this asylum-migrant cohort, just 17% have a job after three years, whereas this figure was 25% after three years for the 1999 cohort.

#### 6.2 Patterns of labour market participation

#### Origin groups

Amongst the traditional groups (Turks, Moroccans, the Surinamese and Antilleans/Arubans), the percentage of benefit recipients and individuals in work in the year of entry to the Netherlands is relatively low. This is even more the case amongst immigrants from asylum countries, such as Iran, Iraq, Somalia, the Sudan and Afghanistan. However, in the second year, labour market participation shows a sudden increase. A similar pattern can also be observed amongst family formation immigrants and, to a lesser extent, amongst family reunification immigrants who often originate from the traditional groups. The low labour market participation by non-Western immigrants in particular (males as well as females) in their first year after arrival in the Netherlands is probably due to the integration programmes that these immigrants are obliged to attend immediately after their settlement (Zorlu and Van Rijn, 2005).

For virtually all of the immigrants in all of the three cohorts, the percentage of individuals receiving benefits increases as of the entry year. Antilleans and Afghans form exceptions to the 1999 cohort. Amongst these immigrants, the percentage of individuals on benefits falls after the third year.

Different rules apply for Antillean migrants than for the other immigrant groups: they are entitled to benefits as soon as they arrive in the Netherlands. This explains the relatively high probability that they will receive benefits in their first year in the Netherlands. After some time, some of them manage to find work, causing the proportion of individuals in work to increase in the Antillean group. The Antilleans also include a group that come to the Netherlands as coemigrating family members and/or for the purpose of education (so-called 'labour market non-participants'). After several years, they too appear in the labour market registers, whether as individuals in work or as benefit recipients.

#### Migration motives

Comparison of the cohorts on the basis of migration motive shows that the labour market careers of migrant groups do not demonstrate any startling differences in this respect over time (**Figures 6.2 and 6.4**). In all three cohorts, a strong increase occurs amongst family migrants of the number of individuals in work in their second year in the Netherlands; subsequently, the proportion of individuals in work stabilises. As of the second year of their stay in the Netherlands, the proportion of male family formation migrants with a job is at approximately the same level as that applicable for male employment migrants. The situation is different for female family formation migrants. More of these women receive benefits and are less often in work than female employment migrants are.

Family reunification migrants are often in a less favourable position than family formation migrants are. This can, perhaps, in part be explained by the fact that family reunification migrants are young, on average, and not (yet) planning to find a job. In contrast, family formation migrants are often young adults who have already completed their educations and are keen to enter the labour market.

In the individual asylum-migrant cohorts, we see an ongoing increase amongst both the proportion of individuals in work and the proportion of benefit recipients. However, clear differences do exist between men and women. Women are less often in work and more often on benefits. When compared to migrants with other migration motives, the percentage of asylum migrants in work is the lowest, and the proportion of benefit recipients is the highest amongst this group. This is due to the legal position and immigration history of asylum migrants. The labour market participation of immigrants from asylum countries is very low in the entry year (up to approximately 10% for men and 2% for women). This does increase in subsequent years, but remains low in comparison with other immigrants. The percentage of individuals receiving benefits amongst asylum migrants is relatively low during the entry year - comparable with the percentage applicable for family formation migrants – but shows a strong increase in subsequent years. We see (by far) the highest percentages of individuals receiving benefits – even up to 70% amongst women – amongst the Afghans.

The increase in the number of Afghans on assistance benefits is chiefly due to the new Aliens Act [Vreemdelingenwet] that entered into force on 1 April 2001. For many Afghan asylum seekers in particular, this change in legislation has changed their residence status from a temporary residence permit [voorlopige vergunning tot verblijf] into an asylum residence permit for a fixed period [verblijfsvergunning asiel voor bepaalde tijd]. This conversion has meant that they were eligible for benefits under the National Assistance Act [Algemene Bijstandswet]. This regulation did not have the same effect for Iraqis, Iranians and Somalians in 2001. Indeed, amongst these groups, the proportion of benefit recipients at the end of 2001 was lower than in the years before (Statistics Netherlands, 2003).

An explanation for the labour market pattern of Afghans within the asylum migrants category – many benefit recipients, but also a relatively high percentage of individuals in work, as regards men at least – is not immediately evident. The existing network of Afghans in the Netherlands, enabling newcomers to familiarise themselves more quickly with Dutch society, could play a role. Another factor, perhaps, is their higher age, on average, and the relatively high

level of education achieved by Afghan asylum migrants (Van den Maagdenberg, 2004).

## 6.3 The effect of economic stagnation

The monotonous increase in the percentage of benefit recipients for the 1999 and 2000 cohorts is striking (**Figure 6.3**). This is visible for most origin countries and applies regardless of the immigration motive bringing individuals to the Netherlands. This development is probably connected with the unfavourable economic climate since 2002. This suspicion is reinforced if we look at the labour market position of earlier immigration cohorts.

Sprangers et al. (2004a; 2004b) showed that after two to three years in the Netherlands, the benefit percentages for the 1990 to 2000 immigration cohorts fell during the favourable economic climate in the second half of the nineteennineties and the start of this century.

In around 2001-2002, the proportion of individuals in work amongst the groups that had, until this point, had a relatively high percentage of individuals in work, stagnates or even falls. This particularly applies for the labour migrant category, other male immigrants from the United States, other Western countries and the traditional groups (Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Antilles). Amongst asylum migrants and family migrants and amongst all female immigrants, a stagnation in the increase of individuals in work can actually be observed. For nearly all groups, the percentage of individuals in work in the entry year for the 2001 cohort is slightly lower than for the earlier 2000 and 1999 cohorts. Of the female family formation migrants from the 2000 immigration cohort, 41% are in work in the third year of their stay in the Netherlands. Subsequently, the increase in the proportion of individuals in work stagnates. In the most recent family formation cohort (2001), just 35% are in paid work in their third year. In both cohorts, the percentage of female family reunification migrants in work as employees or as self-employed individuals is also lower than the percentage applicable for the first cohort (1999).

This stagnation in active labour market participation is probably connected with the deterioration of the economic situation as of 2002, if, at least, we can assume that the *human capital* of the more recent cohorts (in terms of average education, expertise and motivation) is not less than that of immigrants that arrived in the Netherlands in earlier years, during better economic times.

#### 6.4 Determinants of the achievement of a labour market position

The sections above described developments in the labour market position of immigrants, by country of origin and immigration motive. We observed large differences in the incorporation process for immigrants from various origin groups and with different migration motives. These differences may be connected with demographic and other individual and contextual characteristics, such as age, civil status, whether or not an individual has young children and lives in a big city or elsewhere, or the proportion of ethnic-minority individuals in the district in which one lives. We have used regression analyses to determine the extent to which this applies. As described in Section 2, the opportunities that migrants are able to create to gain a place for themselves in society and the support that they receive or manage to gain in this respect (social capital) are connected with personal circumstances and skills and with their migration history, amongst other things. Although the characteristics referred to above are anything but exhaustive, they are indicative of the socio-economic and socio-

cultural circumstances of migrants and their possibilities to utilise their social capital.

As indicated above, we distinguish three different immigrant positions: in work, benefit recipient and labour market non-participant. We have calculated which factors play a role in finding work, or receiving benefits, and the weight of these factors. Added to this, immigrants with a job or on benefits were compared with immigrants with neither a job nor benefits (the non-participants). Due to the major differences in labour market participation between men and women, we indicate separate results for men and women. Our analyses were performed on a step-by-step basis. We started by ascertaining the extent to which the origin country and migration motive are relevant determinants of the extent to which migrants find work or receive benefits (we refer to this as Model I; see **Tables 6.1 and 6.2**). We subsequently ascertained the extent to which other

- an individual's age upon immigration (Model II);
- his duration of stay and the immigration cohort to which he belongs (Model III);

following characteristics were analysed, in the order indicated below:

- his civil status and whether or not he has children (in Model IV), and
- the municipality in which the individual is residing and the ratio of autochtonous Dutch individuals to ethnic minorities in the district where the individual lives (Model V).

factors are able to explain the differences in labour market participation. The

For each of these characteristics, one reference category was chosen for comparison with the other categories. These are stated in the table. For the 'immigration cohort' characteristic, for example, the 1999 cohort is the reference category against which the other cohorts, i.e. the 2000 and 2001 cohorts, are compared. This enables us to determine whether there are actually any (significant) differences in labour market position between the individuals from the different immigration cohorts.

#### 6.4.1 Male newcomers

Antillean, Surinamese and Afghan men have a job relatively more often than the reference group (South African men) (see Model I)<sup>19</sup>. The proportion of individuals in work amongst Polish, Turkish and Moroccan men does not vary significantly from the proportion applicable for the reference groups, while all other origin countries are in work relatively less often. The lowest percentage of individuals in work would appear to occur amongst American men<sup>20</sup>. However, this picture emerged following correction for migration motives. For instance, it can also be observed that, in comparison with labour migrants, fewer

\_

The autochtonous Dutch population is not a good comparison group here, since, by definition, they lack relevant characteristics that are specific to immigrants, such as immigration motive and duration of stay. Migrants from South Africa are the reference group chosen here. This country of origin consists virtually entirely of labour migrants with a Western orientation and, as such, are easier to compare with the autochtonous Dutch population than, for example, migrants from a non-Western country consisting chiefly of asylum migrants.

As evident from Chart 6.2, 'work' is not the most important source of income for a considerable proportion of the labour migrants that came to the Netherlands in 1995. We see this again immediately after arrival for more recent labour-migrant cohorts. This is surprising, since these immigrants come to the Netherlands to work. This is partly connected to the fact that some of the income on which tax is paid in the country of origin is not entered in the administrative files that form part of the basis for the Social Statistics Database. In addition, family members that accompany labour migrants coming to the Netherlands may be registered as labour migrants by the IND (Immigration and Naturalisation Service), rather than as family migrants.

immigrants with other migration motives have jobs. This is no surprise when one considers that, by definition, labour migrants have jobs soon after arrival. As might be expected, asylum migrants are least often likely to have a job. Immigrants who immigrated at a relatively older age would initially more often appear to have a job, but this picture changes when their civil status is taken into account (see Model IV). The correction for civil status would also seem relevant for family formation migrants: the chance of employment for immigrants who are married to an autochtonous Dutch partner is more than 25% higher (RRR =1.258) than the same likelihood for immigrants with partners from the same country. On the contrary, individuals that are not married have a considerably smaller chance of finding work (RRR =0.575). Where male immigrants have children between the ages of 0 and 6, this also increases their chance of having a job.

The likelihood of employment for immigrants living in Amsterdam or Utrecht (to a lesser extent) is greater than for immigrants living elsewhere. In addition, a lower percentage of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in a district where immigrants live is connected with higher levels of employment, while a higher percentage is accompanied by a smaller chance of employment.

The lower part of Table 6.1 indicates the likelihood that men will become benefit recipients. Immigrants from virtually all origin countries receive benefits considerably more often than the reference group chosen here (South Africa), with the exception of American, Polish, Chinese and Indian men (see Model I). Corrections for background characteristics such as immigration motive, age and duration of stay do not change this picture. Model III shows that Afghan and Antillean men are forced to live on social security benefits 10 times and 15 times as often, respectively; this outcome has been corrected for age and duration of stay. Moroccan, Surinamese and Turkish men are on benefits approximately 5 times as often as South African immigrants (the reference group). Men from other countries of origin are benefit recipients 2 to 3 times more often.

The position of asylum migrants is salient. They have a three to four times greater chance of becoming benefit recipients than employment migrants have, while the same chance is more than four times as big for family migrants than it is for employment migrants.

The less favourable labour market position of immigrants who are married to partners from the same country of origin as themselves (mono-ethnic marriages) is also clearly evident in their relatively larger chance of becoming benefit recipients. Only divorced and widowed men are on benefits more often than mono-ethnic married men. Having a minor child also results in a greater chance of becoming a benefit recipient.

Relatively more immigrants living in Amsterdam, Rotterdam or The Hague are benefit recipients, as are immigrants living in districts with few individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities (0-5%). This finding is striking, since immigrants in these less segregated districts are more likely to have jobs. These less segregated districts probably attract more privileged immigrants.

The effect of the duration of stay on the chance of employment and benefits amongst men

Figure 6.5 shows the effect of the duration of stay of immigrants in the Netherlands on the chance of employment and benefits. In the uppermost figure, we see that the chance of employment monotonously increases for all countries of origin in the case of a more extended duration of stay in the Netherlands, but

that the rate of this increase varies strongly amongst the different countries of origin.

Polish and South African men start at the highest level of active participation for all of the origin groups studied here and benefit the most from a longer stay. Incidentally, a selection effect cannot entirely be ruled out here. The population may change if labour migrants who do not succeed in the Netherlands return to their origin country. Other groups, such as asylum migrants, are not able to return.

In the first 5 years after their immigration, immigrants from asylum countries (Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan) have limited labour market participation.

In the first one-and-a-half years of their stay in the Netherlands, the chance of employment for people from non-asylum countries (Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean men, etc.) increases, after which this stabilises up to a duration of stay of approximately 4 years. This would appear to be followed by another acceleration.

The lower part of Figure 6.5 shows that the chance that Afghan men will receive benefits increases at an exceptionally high rate. This applies to a lesser extent to Iranian men. Immigrants from other asylum countries also receive benefits more often the longer they live in the Netherlands.

The effect of duration of stay on the chances of other immigrant groups is limited. The fluctuations in the lines applicable for Antillean and Surinamese men could be an indication of shuttle migration between these countries and the Netherlands.

#### 6.4.2 Female newcomers

Table 6.2 shows the results for women. Regardless of their ages and duration of stay, Antillean and Surinamese women are in employment more than four times as often as the reference group chosen here. The chance of employment for immigrants from most asylum countries (Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan) is considerably lower than that applicable for the reference category. American, Moroccan and Indian women are also less likely to have jobs. Just as applies for the men, the chance of employment is understandably the highest for labour migrants. Family formation and family reunification migrants follow labour migrants in this respect, at a large distance. Asylum migrants are relatively seldom in employment.

As regards civil status, it has been found that women with partners from the same origin country have by far the least chance of employment. Divorced and widowed women have the most chance of finding employment, followed by married women with autochtonous Dutch partners.

Contrary to the men, women with one or more children below the age of 6 are relatively seldom in employment, as might be expected due to their care duties. When their children become older, women would seem to be inclined to seek employment: their chance of labour market participation increases considerably (RRR =1.24). Immigrant women living in Amsterdam are relatively often in employment, while, by contrast, immigrant women living in Rotterdam and The Hague are less often in employment in comparison with the rest of the Netherlands. The chance of receiving social security benefits is almost a mirror image of the chance of finding employment. Amongst immigrants of the same age and duration of stay, American women alone receive benefits less often than the reference group (South African women).

The chance of receiving benefits amongst Antillean/Aruban, Afghan, Iraqi and Sudanese women is many times higher (11 to 35 times higher) than for the

reference group. Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese women also receive benefits relatively often.

These results show that the labour market position of women from ethnic minorities varies strongly between the origin groups. Added to this, groups with a similar migration background also display a fluctuating pattern. For example, Iranian and Somalian women are benefit recipients less often than immigrants from other asylum countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. Even if a correction is made for personality characteristics, social characteristics and asylum characteristics (see Model V), these differences continue to exist. Women who are married to autochtonous Dutch partners (mixed marriages) clearly less often receive benefits than women with partners from the same country (mono-ethnic marriages).

In accordance with our earlier finding, i.e. that they have a more limited chance of employment, women with minor children are benefit recipients more often than women without minor children. Immigrant women in Amsterdam and Rotterdam receive benefits more often than women elsewhere in the Netherlands do. We also see a positive connection between the percentage of individuals from an ethnic minority in the district where one lives and a dependence on benefits.

The effect of duration of stay on the chance of receiving benefits and the chance of employment amongst women

Figure 6 indicates the estimated chance of employment and the chance of receiving benefits amongst women. The uppermost part of this figure shows that there is barely any connection between duration of stay and the chance of employment for Iraqi, Afghan, Somalian and Sudanese women.

This connection is greater for women from other asylum countries, Iran and former Yugoslavia. The chance of employment for Surinamese and Polish women increases the strongest with the lengthening of their duration of stay. Their chances particularly show a considerable increase within the first two years of their arrival in the Netherlands and after 4.5 years.

As regards the connection between duration of stay and the chance of receiving benefits, we observe the opposite. Women from Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Somalia stand out with their rapidly increasing chance of receiving benefits just shortly after their arrival in the Netherlands.

The jagged chance line of Antillean women across the years of residence again shows that theirs may be a case of shuttle migration between the Netherlands and the Antilles, each time with a new start in the labour market.

#### 6.5 Effects of the economic climate

After corrections for origin, migration motive and other background characteristics, such as age and duration of stay, the influence of the economic climate on immigration cohorts entering the country become visible. For example, in Table 6.1 we see that the proportion of men in employment in the 2000 and 2001 immigration cohorts is lower than applicable for the 1999 immigration cohort (RRR = 0.926 for the 2000 cohort and RRR = 0.845 for the 2001 cohort). Amongst women, the possible effect of the worsening economic climate only occurs one year later: the chance of employment for the 2001 cohort is lower than for the earlier cohorts, while the chance of employment for the 2000 cohort is slightly higher than for the 1999 cohort. What is more, the chance of receiving benefits is lower for the 2000 and 2001 cohorts, which can possibly be ascribed to stricter labour-market policy in recent years, or to a higher level of *human capital* (education, motivation, etc.) amongst the new immigration

cohorts. Unfortunately, our analyses offer insufficient support for firm (let alone causal) conclusions in this respect.

Table 6.1 Multinomial Logit regressions, chance of employment and receiving benefits, MEN (relative risk ratios)

	LIV (Telutive flox futios)	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
In work	110.4	0.2/5***	0.252***	0.2/***	0.275***	0.257***
Origin country	USA	0,365***	0,352***	0,36***	0,375***	0,357***
	Poland	0,861	0,864	0,943	1,006	1,02
	Former Yugoslavia	0,401***	0,384***	0,373***	0,354***	0,361***
	Turkey	0,945	0,949	0,964	0,856*	0,884
	Marocco	1,163*	1,165*	1,161*	1,099	1,099
	Surinam	1,412***	1,384***	1,343***	1,366***	1,359***
	Antilles and Aruba	2,158***	2,178***	2,320***	2,414***	2,547***
	Afghanistan	1,248***	1,202**	1,207**	1,154*	1,149*
	Iran	0,377***	0,358***	0,360***	0,373***	0,379***
	Iraq	0,493***	0,470***	0,411***	0,415***	0,425***
	Somalia	0,464***	0,470***	0,459***	0,460***	0,471***
	Sudan	0,622***	0,612***	0,604***	0,630***	0,636***
	China	0,457***	0,470***	0,464***	0,468***	0,482***
	Other non-Western	0,567***	0,564***	0,566***	0,590***	0,596***
	India	0,502***	0,507***	0,495***	0,508***	0,514***
	South Africa (reference)					
Migration motiv	eAsylum migration	0,118***	0,127***	0,109***	0,111***	0,115***
	Family formation	0,754***	0,783***	0,712***	0,568***	0,563***
	Family reunification	0,332***	0,362***	0,304***	0,279***	0,281***
	Other migration motive	0,206***	0,215***	0,200***	0,205***	0,207***
	Labour migration (reference)					
Age upon immi	gration		1,010***	1,010***	0,997**	0,997***
Duration of stay	y Duration of stay			3,874***	3,885***	3,900***
	Duration of stay-2			0,678***	0,675***	0,674***
	Duration of stay-3			1,043***	1,044***	1,044***
Immigration	1999 immigration cohort					
cohort	(reference)					
	immigration cohort 2000			0,924***	0,922***	0,926***
	immigration cohort 2001			0,825***	0,834***	0,845***
Civil status	Mixed marriage				1,258***	1,237***
	Other marriage type				0,996	0,983
	Unmarried				0,575***	0,562***
	Divorced/widow				1,093	1,075
	Mono-ethnic marriage					
	(reference)					
Children	0-6 year				1,075***	1,075***
	7-17 year				1,016	1,016
	No children under 18					
City	Amsterdam					1,426***
	Rotterdam					0,974
	The Hague					1,027
	Utrecht					1,155***
	Other Netherlands					
	(Reference)					
Segregation	% non western ethnic minority 0-5					1,103***
	% non western ethnic minority 6-15					
	(Reference)					0.555
	% non western ethnic minority 16-50					0,999
	% non western ethnic minority					0,923***
	50-100	2 00 4***	0.004***	0.007	2.0/4***	1 050***
	Constant	3,984***	2,924***	0,996	2,061***	1,950***

Danafika		Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
Benefits Origin country	1104	0.4/5**	0.200***	0.204***	0.420***	0.410***
Origin country	USA	0,465**	0,388***	0,394***	0,429***	0,419***
	Poland	1,210	1,225	1,314	1,349	1,388
	Former Yugoslavia	3,309***	2,620***	2,535***	2,079***	2,168***
	Turkey	4,470***	4,898***	4,948***	3,958***	4,098***
	Marocco	5,574***	5,936***	5,865***	4,922***	4,927***
	Surinam	5,873***	5,229***	5,026***	4,551***	4,295***
	Antilles and Aruba	13,232***	14,215***	15,126***	14,453***	14,648***
	Afghanistan	12,675***	10,503***	10,466***	9,079***	9,287***
	Iran	4,518***	3,460***	3,455***	3,339***	3,448***
	Iraq	3,524***	2,846***	2,427***	2,308***	2,421***
	Somalia	3,021***	3,541***	3,446***	3,187***	3,374***
	Sudan	3,699***	3,662***	3,581***	3,558***	3,696***
	China	0,987	1,308	1,263	1,221	1,226
	Other non-Western	2,792***	2,823***	2,820***	2,835***	2,885***
	India	0,985	1,005	0,972	0,971	0,997
	South Africa (reference)					
Migration motiv	eAsylum migration	2,679***	3,944***	3,356***	3,466***	3,738***
	Family formation	3,510***	4,486***	4,060***	3,243***	3,265***
	Family reunification	3,168***	5,088***	4,256***	3,796***	3,934***
	Other migration motive	2,191***	2,639***	2,453***	2,570***	2,666***
	Labour migration (reference)					
Age upon immig			1,055***	1,056***	1,045***	1,045***
Duration of stay	/ Duration of stay			3,777***	3,732***	3,705***
	Duration of stay-2			0,716***	0,713***	0,715***
	Duration of stay-3			1,035***	1,036***	1,035***
Immigration	1999 immigration cohort					
cohort	(reference)			0.057	0.04/*	0.052*
	immigration cohort 2000			0,956	0,946*	0,953*
Obell status	immigration cohort 2001			0,938**	0,939*	0,961
Civil status	Mixed marriage				0,592***	0,595***
	Other marriage type				0,718***	0,704***
	Unmarried				0,588***	0,574***
	Divorced/widow				1,217***	1,189**
0	Mono-ethnic marriage (reference)				4 (00+++	
Children	0-6 year				1,600***	1,611***
	7-17 year No children under 18				1,112***	1,125***
	(Reference)					
City	Amsterdam					1,501***
	Rotterdam					1,739***
	The Hague					1,130**
	Utrecht					1,104
	Other Netherlands (Reference)					
Segregation	% non western ethnic minority 0-5 % non western ethnic minority 6-15					1,230***
	(Reference) % non western ethnic minority 16-50 % non western ethnic minority	)				0,975 0,931*
Constant	50-100	0,022***	0,003***	0,001***	0,002***	0,002***
R2	01. *** 001	0.12	0.13	0.17	0.18	0.18
p<0.5; ** p<.0	)1; '" p<.UU1					

 $p{<}0.5;\,^{**}$   $p{<}.01;\,^{***}$   $p{<}.001$  Standard errors have been corrected for repeated observations


Table 6.2 Multinomial Logit regressions, chance of employment and receiving benefits, WOMEN (relative risk ratios)


	FIVELY (Telutive Flox rutio	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V
In work	LICA	0./00***	0 / 02 ***	0.715***	0.707.***	0 /05 ***
Origin country	USA	0,688 ***	0,683 ***	0,715 ***	0,707***	0,695 ***
	Poland	1,492 ***		1,497 ***	1,367 ***	1,362***
	Former Yugoslavia	0,964	0,958	0,936	1,079	1,072
	Turkey	0,962	0,965	0,927	1,215 **	1,209 **
	Marocco	0,715 ***		0,680 ***	0,890	0,871*
	Surinam	3,941 ***		3,959 ***	4,119 ***	4,107 ***
	Antilles and Aruba	4,296 ***	4,288 ***	4,696 ***	5,257 ***	5,312 ***
	Afghanistan	0,944	0,931	0,966	1,149	1,129
	Iran	0,701 ***	0,697 ***	0,690 ***	0,735 ***	0,723 ***
	Iraq	0,342 ***		0,321 ***	0,407 ***	0,399 ***
	Somalia	0,356 ***		0,349 ***	0,426 ***	0,419 ***
	Sudan	0,465 ***	0,468 ***	0,452 ***	0,593 ***	0,584 ***
	China	1,12	1,128*	1,117	1,158*	1,156*
	Other non-Western	1,086	1,087	1,073	1,096	1,088
	India	0,735 ***	0,733 ***	0,715 ***	0,848	0,827
	South Africa (reference)					
Migration motive	Asylum migration	0,051 ***	0,052 ***	0,043 ***	0,042 ***	0,042 ***
mouve	Family formation	0,232 ***	0,233 ***	0,196 ***	0,212***	0,212***
	Family reunification	0,188 ***		0,152 ***	0,153 ***	0,154 ***
	Other migration motive	0,157 ***		0,148 ***	0,135 ***	0,136 ***
	Labour migration	0,137	0,130	0,140	0,133	0,130
	(reference)					
Age upon immi			1,002	1,001	0,992 ***	0,992 ***
	y Duration of stay		1,002	4,960 ***	5,383 ***	5,403 ***
Daration of ota	Duration of stay-2			0,624***	0,615 ***	0,614 ***
	Duration of stay-3			1,051 ***	1,052 ***	1,053 ***
Immigration cohort	immigration cohort 2000			1,056**	1,065 ***	1,065 ***
COTION	immigration cohort 2001	,		0,913***	0,910***	0,911 ***
	1999 immigration cohort (refe	rence)				
Civil status	Mixed marriage				1,777 ***	1,789 ***
	Other marriage type				1,413 ***	1,416 ***
	Unmarried				1,219 ***	1,221 ***
	Divorced/widow				2,143 ***	2,163 ***
	Mono-ethnic marriage (refere	nce)				
Children	0-6 year				0,495 ***	0,494 ***
	7-17 year				1,240 ***	1,241 ***
	No children under 18					
City	Amsterdam					1,101 ***
	Rotterdam					0,778 ***
	The Hague					0,903 ***
	Utrecht					1,007
	Other Netherlands (Reference	۵)				1,007
Segregation	% non western ethnic minority	<b>-</b> )				0,977
	0-5 % non western ethnic minority 6-15					
	(Reference)					4.000
	% non western ethnic minority 16-50	)				1,022
	% non western ethnic minority					1,056*
	50-100	0.404.***	0.004 ***	0 = 10 = 1	0 = 11 = 11 .	0 = 10 = 11
	Constant	2,101 ***	2,006 ***	0,540 ***	0,561 ***	0,569 ***

		Model I N	Model II	Model III N	Model IV	Model V
Benefits						
Origin country	USA	0,491 **	0,386 ***	0,413 ***	0,411 ***	0,406 ***
	Poland	1,838 ***	1,771 **	1,795 **	1,831 **	1,830 **
	Former Yugoslavia	6,735 ***	6,013 ***	6,025 ***	4,859 ***	4,607 ***
	Turkey	8,491 ***	8,959 ***		6,583 ***	5,783 ***
	Marocco	8,486 ***	8,715 ***		6,193 ***	5,357 ***
	Surinam	10,711 ***	9,591 ***		7,022 ***	5,886 ***
	Antilles and Aruba	34,802 ***	33,047 ***	36,609 ***	25,677 ***	22,651 ***
	Afghanistan	28,775 ***	26,358 ***	27,344 ***	20,675 ***	19,685 ***
	Iran	7,967 ***	6,896 ***		5,875 ***	5,507 ***
	Iraq	14,815 ***	12,847 ***		9,647 ***	9,065 ***
	Somalia	7,885 ***	9,187 ***	9,170 ***	6,725 ***	6,254 ***
	Sudan	10,404 ***	11,188 ***	11,109 ***	8,834 ***	8,095 ***
	China	2,143 ***	2,498 ***	2,505 ***	2,278 ***	2,085 ***
	Other non-Western	6,102 ***	5,711 ***		4,841 ***	4,399 ***
	India	2,527 ***	2,314 ***	2,247 ***	1,888 **	1,717 *
	South Africa (reference)					
Migration motive	Asylum migration	2,214 ***	2,386 ***	1,969 ***	1,704 ***	1,791 ***
	Family formation	1,093	1,222	1,031	0,946	0,948
	Family reunification	1,971 ***	2,231 ***	1,778 ***	1,514 ***	1,541 ***
	Other migration motive	2,123 ***	2,270 ***	2,115 ***	2,040 ***	2,064 ***
	Labour migration (reference)					
Age upon immi			1,040 ***	1,040 ***	1,043 ***	1,043 ***
Duration of stay				3,484 ***	3,256 ***	3,230 ***
	Duration of stay-2			0,726 ***	0,740 ***	0,741 ***
	Duration of stay-3			1,034 ***	1,032 ***	1,032 ***
Immigratiecohort	Immigration cohort 1999 (Referer	nce)				
	Immigration cohort 2000			0,943 **	0,935 **	0,929 **
	Immigration cohort 2001			0,875 ***	0,875 ***	0,867 ***
Civil status	Mixed marriage				0,334 ***	0,366 ***
	Other marriage type				1,259 ***	1,267 ***
	Unmarried				1,182 ***	1,158 ***
	Divorced/widow				2,476 ***	2,464 ***
	Mono-ethnic marriage (refe	rence)			,	,
Children	0-6 year	,			2,448 ***	2,427 ***
	7-17 year				1,986 ***	1,995 ***
	No children under 18 (Reference)	)			1,100	.,
City	Amsterdam	,				1,160 ***
	Rotterdam					1,352 ***
	The Hague					0,978
	Utrecht					0,930
	Other Netherlands (Referen	nce)				0,700
Segregation	% non werstern minority 0-5	,				1,016
Segregation	% % non werstern minority 6-15					1,010
	(Reference)	1				1,157 ***
	% % non werstern minority 16-50 % non werstern minority 50-100	•				
Constant	76 HOLL WEISTELLI HIIHOLITY 20-100	0,016 ***	0,005 ***	0,002 ***	0 001 ***	1,368 ***
Constant					0,001***	0,001 ***
R2			0.13	0.17	0.20	0.20
N		268 512	268 512	268 512	268 512	268 512

p<,05; \*\* p<,01; \*\*\* p<,001 Standard errors have been corrected for repeated observations

Figure 6.1 Percentage of individuals in work, by immigration (1999, 2000 and 2001), origin country and sex










Figure 6.1 continued










Figure 6.2 Percentage of individuals in work, by immigration cohort (1999, 2000 and 2001), migration motive and sex










Figure 6.2 continued










Figure 6.3 Percentage of benefit recipients, by immigration cohort (1999, 2000 and 2001), origin country and sex.










Figure 6.3 continued










Figure 6.4 Percentage of benefit recipients, by immigration cohort (1999, 2000 and 2001), migration motive and sex.













Figure 6.4 continued

















# 7 Contacts between ethnic minorities and the autochtonous Dutch population

In addition to political and economic participation, integration also entails sociocultural participation in society. Common to all definitions of socio-cultural integration (Dagevos, 2001, for example) is attention for the extent to which contact exists between individuals from ethnic minorities and the autochtonous Dutch population. To what extent do ethnic minority groups form part of the host society, or to what extent do they remain separate to it? Is there any form of rapprochement between migrants and the autochtonous Dutch population?

On the theme of social contacts, the Annual Report on Integration 2005 looks at the opinions of individuals from ethnic minorities as regards the extent to which they feel that they are Dutch and to the attitude of individuals from ethnic minorities in respect of contacts with individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population. The Report also discusses the ethnic make-up of leisure contacts.

In this chapter, we will not focus on opinions and attitudes, but on actual behaviour in the field of social contacts. We realise that maintaining contact is just one small part of what is referred to as socio-cultural integration, and, what is more, that we still have just several indicators to represent the concept of 'social contacts', which, incidentally, is a broad concept in itself. With these limitations in mind, we will report on the results obtained on the extent to which the origin groups enter into marriages with autochtonous Dutch brides and bridegrooms. Building a relationship with someone of a different ethnic origin and confirming it by means of marriage can be considered a strong form of social contact. We will address the question of whether differences exist between first and second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities in terms of marriage patterns. After all, if this difference is considerable, it can be concluded that integration is progressing well in this respect. A relevant fact in this context is that first-generation individuals were often already married when they arrived in the Netherlands. Thus, they will (often) not marry an individual from the autochtonous Dutch population.

The second indicator is the extent to which individuals from ethnic minorities arrange for marriage partners to join them from their countries of origin. Amongst other things, these two indicators indicate the extent to which individuals from ethnic minorities (still) orientate themselves towards the norms and values of their society of origin, whether or not influenced by family. The more migrants adapt to and become rooted in the society in which they settle, the more their choice of partner ought automatically to become directed at someone from their new country; this is a well-known proposition from migrant studies. If migrants – the second-generation in particular – continue to marry within their own circles, this can be interpreted as a sign that they are continuing to feel different to, or are still being regarded as different by, the dominant group (Sterckx and Bouw, 2005; Hooghiemstra, 2003).

A third indicator that we use to provide an insight into the extent to which there could be contacts between the autochtonous Dutch population and the ethnic-minority population is the ethnic composition of the district in which people

live. In all cases, we show developments over time. The period for which this is possible is still short at this stage (two years), but will increase in the years ahead.

# 7.1 Marriages between individuals from ethnic minorities and the autochtonous Dutch population

In 1999, 15% of males from the non-Western ethnic minorities married autochtonous Dutch brides, while 25% of women from the same non-Western groups married autochtonous Dutch men. Two years later, the percentage applicable for women was still 21%, but had decreased slightly for the non-Western ethnic-minority men (**Table 7.1**). Amongst the four major origin groups (Turks, Moroccans, the Surinamese and Antilleans/Arubans), the Turks and Moroccans in particular very rarely marry Dutch partners. This applies for both the first and second generations. Between 1999 and 2001, a fall of 16% to 11% can be observed amongst second-generation Moroccan men. By contrast, the percentage of second-generation Moroccan women marrying Dutch partners almost doubled (from 4.4% to 8.0%) in this period. However, in comparison with other groups, this percentage is still low.

Amongst the other non-Western ethnic minority origin groups, women from China, Cape Verde, Hong Kong, Ethiopia, India and Vietnam choose autochtonous Dutch partners more often then the men from these groups do. However, the shifts observed for the period 1999-2001 vary considerably for these groups. Amongst the Vietnamese and Cape Verdean women, an increase in interethnic marriages can be observed, while a clear decrease can be observed amongst Ethiopian women. The Philippine women stand out (almost 80% of them marry Dutch men); these women form a popular category of marriage partner for some autochtonous Dutch men, and are brought to the Netherlands specifically for this reason. The reverse is only observed amongst the Eyptians; in this group, the men marry Dutch natives relatively more often than Egyptian women do.

# 7.2 Marriages between individuals from ethnic minorities and partners from the country of origin

**Table 7.2** shows the percentage of marriages, per origin group and generation, in which individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities residing in the Netherlands marry partners from their country of origin.

Almost two-thirds of Turkish and Moroccan marriages are migration marriages. This applies for both men and women. This is slightly lower amongst the second generations, but amongst these individuals too, the percentage applicable ranges from approximately 50% to 60%. Few differences exist between 1999 and 2001. A decrease in the proportion of migrant marriages can only be observed in Moroccan women, to just under 50% in 2001.

High percentages of marriage partners from the country of origin can sometimes also be observed amongst the smaller origin groups – particularly amongst the men. Although we do not have sufficient data on all of the origin groups (insufficient numbers), it would seem that in most origin groups, less women arrange for partners to join them from their countries of origin.

# 7.3 Proportion of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood

The composition of the area in which one lives provides an indication of the extent to which individuals could enter into social contacts with people of different origins. Obviously, a mixed neighbourhood will not necessarily lead to contacts between the different groups, but it can be assumed that it would facilitate contacts in this respect. Incidentally, it is important to identify the perspective from which we are examining the possibility of entering into social contacts. After all, the possibility for individuals from ethnic minorities to have contact with individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population is particularly great in a district with a large number of autochtonous Dutch residents, while, conversely, it is difficult for individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population to establish contact with individuals from ethnic minorities in this situation. Although entering into social contacts is typically a two-way situation, the emphasis is often placed on the extent to which one of the parties – i.e. individuals from ethnic minorities – show themselves to be active in this respect.

On 1 January 2005, there were almost 1.7 million individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (see Section 3). This corresponds with 10.4% of the total population. The largest groups are formed by the Turks (2.2%), the Surinamese (2.0%), the Moroccans (1.9%) and the Antilleans/Arubans (0.8%). Since 1 January 1996, population increase has been very irregular. The number of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities has increased by 45%. The autochtonous Dutch population has increased by slightly more than 1%, the Turkish group by 32%, the Surinamese by 17%, the Moroccans by 40% and the Antilleans/Arubans by 49%. Several smaller, newer origin groups have had even (far) higher growth percentages since 1996. This means that a proportional composition of residential districts reflecting the composition of the population changes continually. In a situation of fully proportional composition, more than 7.5% of the population living in a neighbourhood in 1996 would consist of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities, and now, in 2005, 10.4% of the population living in a neighbourhood would consist of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities, and similarly 2.2% of the population living in a neighbourhood would consists of Turks, and so on.

In many municipalities, proportional distribution is often not the case. More than half of the autochtonous Dutch population lives in a neighbourhood in which less than 5% of inhabitants are individuals from ethnic minorities. Another 32% of the autochtonous Dutch population live in neighbourhoods in which between 5% and 15% of inhabitants are fellow citizens from ethnic minorities. **Table 7.3** shows that the various origin groups live in 'white' or 'black' districts in various degrees, but also that many origin groups are not concentrated in concentration districts in which more than 50% of inhabitants are from ethnic minorities. While a considerable proportion of the smaller origin groups often live in districts consisting predominantly of an autochtonous Dutch population, the Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese are strongly underrepresented in these districts. This could mean that there is more chance of the establishment of social contacts with the autochtonous Dutch population amongst the newer groups than amongst the traditional groups. Naturally, this is an aspect that is unrelated to the establishment of social contacts in other areas, such as at work.

Certain origin groups live primarily in the large cities, where neighbourhoods can be found that consist predominantly of individuals from ethnic minorities. Just 1% of the autochtonous Dutch population live in neighbourhoods with the highest concentration levels of ethnic-minority inhabitants (50-100%).

Table 7.1 Proportion of marriages entered into by individuals from ethnic minorities with autochthonous Dutch brides and bridegrooms; by sex, country of origin and generation\*

	Marriages by et 1999	hnic-minority 2000	y men 2001	Marriages by et 1999	hnic-minority 2000	y women 2001
	as a % of the rel			as a % of the rele		
Ethnic-minority total	36,1	33,4	30,4	43,0	41,2	40,0
1st generation	21,6	19,9	18,0	33,9	33,5	32,9
2nd generation	68,6	65,4	60,8	65,2	61,0	57,7
Western ethnic minority	65,7	62,7	60,7	70,1	68,8	68,8
1st generation	46,4	42,1	40,3	59,1	58,7	58,7
2nd generation	79,0	77,5	76,2	82,6	81,5	81,4
Non-Western ethnic minority	15,2	14,3	12,9	21,4	21,3	20,6
1st generation	13,6	13,0	11,6	21,4	21,4	21,2
2nd generation	28,3	24,7	22,0	21,8	20,7	18,0
incl. Turkey	7,4	6,3	6,5	3,6	3,8	4,2
1st generation	8,2	6,7	6,8	3,4	3,6	4,6
2nd generation	4,3	5,0	5,3	4,4	4,2	3,4
Marocco	7,3	7,6	6,2	6,0	4,9	6,5
1st generation	6,8	7,2	5,8	6,3	4,7	6,2
2nd generation	15,8	14,3	10,7	4,4	5,8	8,0
Surinam	20,9	19,9	21,0	29,3	30,9	30,9
1st generation	15,0	15,8	14,8	26,3	28,2	28,7
2nd generation	55,1	42,9	47,3	45,2	44,0	39,5
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	39,4	40,2	43,0	42,1	46,7	47,0
1st generation	39,4 30,5	40,2 30,0	43,0 33,1	42,1 30,9	46,7 35,6	47,0 34,7
2nd generation	72,5	78,6	75,0	80,7	77,6	79,8
Iron	6,3	11,3	9,6	3,7	6,2	4,7
Iraq 1st generation	6,3	10,6	9,6	1,9	5,8	4,7
2nd generation	x	X	X	x	X	x
Afair and a second	5.0	2.2	4.7	4.0	4.0	4.5
Afghanistan 1st generation	5,3 5,3	3,3 3,3	1,7 1,7	1,2 1,2	1,8 1,8	4,5 4,5
2nd generation	x	X	x	,,_ x	х х	x
011	0.7	4.0		22.7	0.4.7	04.5
China 1st generation	3,7 0,5	4,2 1,9	2,8 1,5	20,7 19,4	24,7 23,0	21,5 19,9
2nd generation	26,9	х	x	X	20,0 X	x
Iran 1st generation	28,0 27,2	14,1 13,7	11,7 11,7	16,4 15,1	18,9 16,0	14,7 12,4
2nd generation	27,2 X	13, <i>1</i>	x X	15,1 X	10,0 X	12,4 X
Somalia 1st generation	4,1 4,1	5,5 5,5	3,4 3,4	7,0 7,0	3,4 3,4	7,1 7.1
1st generation 2nd generation	4,1 X	5,5 X	3,4 X	7,0 X	3,4 X	7,1 x
. 3						
Cape Verde	10,7	6,4	18,0	26,2	32,4	32,7
1st generation 2nd generation	5,9 x	4,4 x	14,3 x	24,1 x	28,8 x	34,0 x
Ghana	27,3	21,9	21,7	28,3	30,1	20,6
1st generation 2nd generation	27,3 x	21,9 x	21,7 x	28,3 X	30,1 x	20,6 x
Egypt	27,5	26,2	24,9	3,2	5,2	6,8
1st generation 2nd generation	26,6 x	25,3 x	23,7 x	2,0 x	2,9 x	4, <u>2</u> x
zna gonoradon	^	^	•	^		
Hongkong	6,5	12,0	6,8	28,1	23,2	27,5
1st generation 2nd generation	3,1 x	1,8 x	5,3 x	22,0 x	14,6 x	26,9 28,6
zna gonoration	^	^	^	^	^	20,0
Philippines	28,6	Х	x	74,5	77,6	77,9
1st generation 2nd generation	23,1 x	x x	x x	74,8 x	77,8 x	78,5 x
Zild generation	*	^	^	*	^	*
Ethiopia	10,5	15,2	9,4	23,1	27,7	15,9
1st generation	10,5	13,8	9,4	23,1	27,7	15,9
2nd generation	х	х	x	х	х	х
India	14,7	15,7	15,2	19,6	21,8	23,9
1st generation	8,9	11,4	12,1	15,7	16,9	21,2
2nd generation	Х	х	x	x	х	х
Pakistan	7,0	8,3	8,9	7,5	5,5	7,3
1st generation	7,1	8,5	8,9	5,4	6,3	8,7
2nd generation	Х	х	x	x	х	х
Vietnam	4,4	6,8	4,6	14,8	20,5	26,1
1st generation	3,6	6,0	4,6	14,8	20,0	26,1
2nd generation	х	х	x	х	х	Х
Other non-Western	35,0	34,3	30,0	54,4	53,4	52,5
1st generation	32,8	32,5	28,3	53,8	52,6	52,0
2nd generation	74,3	65,3	62,1	68,2	69,6	63,8

<sup>\*</sup> percentages for small groups are not very meaningful. For this reason, percentages in groups in which 25 or less marriages have been entered into have been omitted.

Table 7.2 Proportion of individuals from ethnic minorities that are resident in the Netherlands and arrange for partners to join them from their countries of origin; by sex, origin and generation\*

from their countries of origin;	Marriages by ethnic-			Marriages by ethnic-	minority women	
	1999	2000	2001	1999	2000	2001
	as a % of the relevant	group in the popu	lation	as a % of the relevant	group in the popu	ılation
Ethnic-minority total	27,3	30,2	32,3	18,0	18,9	20,6
1st generation	40,4	43,2	45,0	23,4	21,9	24,3
2nd generation	8,6	10,2	12,5	12,1	15,5	16,5
Western ethnic minority	5,3	7,2	7,9	1,5	2,1	2,0
1st generation 2nd generation	14,0 1,4	19,0 1,5	19,8 1,9	3,4 0,4	4,2 0,9	4,0 0,9
Zna generation	1,-	1,0	1,5	0,4	0,5	0,5
Non-Western ethnic minority	47,2	49,1	50,1	35,8	35,2	37,3
1st generation	49,2	51,0	52,8	33,6	31,2	34,6
2nd generation incl.	36,5	39,5	39,2	41,2	44,2	42,6
Turkey	62,5	65,5	64,1	62,8	64,1	62,7
1st generation	63,9	67,7	68,6	66,1	63,4	64,5
2nd generation	59,4	61,1	56,2	59,7	64,6	61,3
	66.7	65.4	CF F	60.7	50.7	50.0
Marocco 1st generation	66,7 68,1	65,1 66,5	65,5 67,5	63,7 65,9	59,7 61,2	58,0 62,1
2nd generation	51,1	51,6	52,1	57,5	56,3	49,5
Surinam	19,8	18,7	20,3	10,6	10,0	8,4
1st generation 2nd generation	22,9 4,7	21,0 8,1	24,1 6,4	11,8 5,6	10,8 7,1	9,4 5,6
zna generation	4,7	0,1	0,4	3,0	7,1	3,0
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	2,8	1,8	1,1	2,5	3,6	3,1
1st generation	3,4	2,5	1,1	3,4	4,2	4,5
2nd generation	1,0	0,0	1,0	0,0	2,2	0,0
raq	53,1	55,8	50,6	29,1	20,9	32,1
1st generation	53,1	56,3	50,6	30,8	21,2	33,3
2nd generation	x	×	x	x	×	x
Afghanistan	61,5	63,0	71,6	X	21,9	23,1
1st generation 2nd generation	61,5	63,0	71,6	x x	21,9	23,1 x
Zilu generation	x	х	x	*	х	^
China	58,7	50,0	62,3	30,7	20,5	34,1
1st generation	66,1	54,6	69,0	33,9	24,5	40,4
2nd generation	23,1	x	x	х	х	х
ran	41,4	60,2	60,3	15,9	7,9	10,1
1st generation	41,4	60,6	60,3	15,8	7,9 9,1	11,1
2nd generation	x	x	x	x	×	x
Somalia	50,0	43,2	53,9	25,0	11,1	17,9
1st generation 2nd generation	50,0 x	43,2 x	53,9 x	25,0 x	11,1 x	17,9 x
Zna generation	^	^	^	^	^	^
Cape Verde	33,3	23,7	16,2	25,6	13,2	26,2
1st generation	38,2	25,0	20,7	27,8	15,9	27,0
2nd generation	х	x	x	х	х	х
Ghana	48,5	50,0	59,6	х	43,3	x
1st generation	48,5	50,0	59,6	x	43,3	x
2nd generation	x	x	x	x	x	х
F	20.0	25.0	20.0			
Egypt 1st generation	62,3 64,7	65,3 66,7	69,3 71,5	x	×	x
2nd generation	04,7 X	x	71,5 X	x x	x x	x x
Hongkong	2,9	1,4	5,0	2,0	2,1	1,4
1st generation	1,8	2,0	4,5	2,9	3,1	2,4
2nd generation	x	х	х	х	х	х
Philippines	х	×	x	5,7	4,7	9,1
1st generation	x	x	x	5,9	4,9	9,7
2nd generation	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ethiopia 1st generation	28,8 28,8	47,3 48,1	41,4 41,4	8,6 8,6	15,6 15,6	x x
2nd generation	20,0 X	x	x	х	x	×
9						
ndia	58,9	55,6	61,0	x	22,2	25,7
1st generation	68,8	62,3	66,0	х	x	23,1
2nd generation	x	х	х	х	x	х
Pakistan	60,0	66,7	47,9	72,7	57,1	х
1st generation	58,8	65,7	47,9	80,0	×	x
2nd generation		x	x	x	×	х
	х					
		20 :	F0 F			
Vietnam	64,4	62,4 63.0	52,5 52.5	10,3 10.3	9,6 9.8	8,7 8.7
		62,4 63,0 x	52,5 52,5 x	10,3 10,3 x	9,6 9,8 x	8,7 8,7 x
Vietnam 1st generation	64,4 65,0	63,0	52,5	10,3	9,8	8,7
Vietnam 1st generation 2nd generation Other non-Western	64,4 65,0 x 34,5	63,0 x 38,4	52,5 x 37,9	10,3 x 6,9	9,8 x 5,5	8,7 x 8,4
Vietnam 1st generation	64,4 65,0 x	63,0 x	52,5 x	10,3 x	9,8 x	8,7 x

<sup>\*</sup> percentages for small groups are not very meaningful. For this reason, percentages in groups in which 25 or less marriages have been entered into have been omitted.

Table 7.3 Distribution of individuals per origin group, by proportion of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in the area in which individuals live (2001 and 2003) as a % of the relevant group in the population

Percentage of individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities in the area 0-5% 5-15% 50-100% 15-50% Total **Autochthonous Dutch** Western ethnic minorities Non-Western ethnic minorities incl. Turkey Marocco 7 14 Surinam Netherlands Antilles and Aruba Iraq . Afghanistan 17 15 36 China Iran Somalia Cape Verde Ghana Egypt Hongkong Philippines Ethiopia India Pakistan Vietnam Other non-Western 

(excluding individuals living in areas consisting of less than 50 inhabitants)

# 8 Crime

Over-representation of individuals from ethnic minorities in crime figures has been a point for the government's attention for many years. Various studies point to this over-representation in the criminal justice system, such as the recently published WODC-publication entitled 'Suspected of crime. A closer look at persons of foreign and Dutch heritage' [Verdacht van criminaliteit. Allochtonen en autochtonen nader bekeken (Blom et al., 2005). The excessive involvement of individuals from ethnic minorities in crime can be regarded as an expression of limited bonding with society and, as such, as an expression of inadequate (sociocultural) integration. A large distance between population groups would seem to result in the violation of prevailing norms (Dominguez Martinez et al., 2002). The over-representation of individuals from ethnic minorities in crime figures may also be an indication of socio-economic integration that is lagging behind (Kromhout and Van San, 2003). Incidentally, the relationship between crime and integration cannot be interpreted very clearly (Bovenkerk, 2003; Driessen et al., 2002). Amongst other things, the relationship that exists between police deployment and the likelihood of being caught may mean that some origin groups become more known to police and the judiciary than others. The extent to which this then says something about the degree of criminal behaviour amongst these origin groups and, as such, could also be an indication for their (non-)integration into society, is difficult to say.

The WODC report 'Suspected of crime. A closer look at persons of foreign and Dutch heritage' (Blom et al., 2005) published in spring 2005 describes the extent to which young people from the traditional migrant groups and from the largest new groups (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, former Yugoslavia and Somalia) are represented in registered crime<sup>21</sup>. In this section, we will reproduce the most recent indicators that have become available since the publication of this report. For more detailed information, see Blom et al. (2005).

## 8.1 Suspected of crime: police registrations

This subsection will describe the suspects of crime registered by the police by origin group, and will separately indicate data for second-generation ethnic-minority suspects. We will compare data between 2002 and 2003, the most recent year for which data are available. Since last year, data from the police Identification Service System<sup>22</sup>, on which this subsection is based, have been

\_

The results of this section are based on registers maintained by the police and the judiciary. As such, this section does not provide a complete picture of actual crime in the Netherlands. Only those offences registered by the police and for which a suspect is found are entered into the registers. In addition, the probability of being caught is related to the priorities set in terms of investigation and prosecution. Self-report research by the WODC – the first results of which are expected in spring 2006 – may supplement the picture described here.

The Identification Service System [Herkenningsdienst System (HKS)] provides national coverage and is managed by the National Police Agency [Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (KLPD)]. It has been used by the police since 1986 to register information on suspects. It contains both information on crimes reported and personal information on the corresponding suspects. This report will be limited to personal information on the suspects. One or more official reports may be made against a single suspect in one year, while an official report may, in turn, involve several offences. The information includes persons who are at least 12 years old and are named as suspects in a police report. Incidentally, an estimated 90% of suspects are offered an out-of-court settlement by the Public Prosecutions Department, or are found guilty in court at a later stage. The Identification Service System contains information on such

linked, annually, to the Social Statistical Database maintained by Statistics Netherlands. In the years ahead, the period on which pronouncements can be made will increase.

**Table 8.1** shows the number of suspects by origin group and sex for 2002 and 2003. These are so-called non-standardised figures. As such, these figures represent the actual number of suspects, with no correction for age, sex or other characteristics.

Besides gaining an insight into the number or percentage of suspects per origin group present in the Netherlands, a next step will be to be able to explain why differences exist. At this stage, it is important to realise that the non-Western ethnic-minority population aged from 12 up to and including 79 consists of proportionally more young people and fewer older people than the autochtonous Dutch population. The percentage suspected of a crime is higher amongst young people than amongst older people. When no allowance is made for differences in composition of the population, this will easily result in incorrect interpretations when mutually comparing specific population groups. The standardised figures (**Table 8.2**) do make allowance for differences in terms of age and sex. As such, a figure is calculated for the ethnic minority groups as if they have the same age and sex distribution as the Netherlands' autochtonous Dutch population.

Of the more than 183,000 suspects in 2003<sup>23</sup>, 115,000 were from the autochtonous Dutch population and 68,000 from ethnic minorities. In absolute numbers, the largest groups amongst the non-Western ethnic minorities were formed by the Moroccans and the Surinamese, each with approximately 12,000 suspects. In 2003, there were more than 8500 suspects amongst the Turks and 7,000 amongst the Antilleans/Arubans.

The number of suspects registered in the Identification Service System has increased by 11% in one year, from 163,000 in 2002, to almost 183,000 in 2003<sup>24</sup>. However, this does not mean that crime has increased (as strongly as this would seem to suggest). Besides the fact that the population has increased (by approximately 0.2%), more suspects have actually been registered in the Identification Service System: registration has been improved and is more comprehensive. In 2003, the official reports produced by the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary [Koninklijke Marechaussee] were also entered in the Identification Service System, which was not previously the case. A comparison of the figures from the Identification Service System with figures from the Public Prosecutions Department also reveals that registration by the Identification Service System is becoming increasingly more comprehensive. In addition, greater investigation efforts have been made by the police. All of the above has meant that the numbers of suspects per 100 inhabitants have increased for virtually all origin groups – autochtonous Dutch and ethnic-minority – in 2003 in comparison with the year before.

matters as the offence, but also personal information on the suspect, such as date of birth, sex, country of birth and nationality. For a detailed explanation of the possibilities and limitations of the Identification Service System, see Blom et al. (2005).

The number of suspects deviates from the numbers published in other publications (see, for example, Van Tilburg et al., 2004; Lammers et al., 2005). The reason for this is that this study was limited to the suspects registered in the Social Statistical Database.

The number of suspects registered in the Identification Service System was 215,100 in 2003. Approximately 85% (182,777 individuals) of these could be linked to the Social Statistical Database. The most important reasons preventing the linking of a suspect are: does not live in the Netherlands, or lives here illegally, a suspect has emigrated or died in the period between 1 January and the end of September of the year in question, registration errors, etc.

The general picture is as follows. The non-standardised suspect percentages for both men and women of ethnic-minority origin are twice to three times as high as those for the autochtonous Dutch population. In 2003, the percentage of suspects amongst ethnic-minority men was 4.6% in comparison with 1.8% of autochtonous Dutch men; 0.9% of ethnic-minority women were registered, in comparison with 0.3% of autochtonous Dutch women.

In 2003, more than 39,000 suspects were registered from amongst the four 'traditional' migrant groups taken together. This corresponds with 77% of all suspects of non-Western origin. As such, these four groups (taken together) are over-represented, as their shares in the non-Western population – in the same 12-79 age category studied here – is 65%. If one looks at the suspect percentages, several smaller origin groups are also salient besides the four groups mentioned above (Table 8.1). The five origin groups with the highest percentages of suspects are the Antilleans (8.0%), Somalians (4.7%), the Surinamese (4.4%), Moroccans (3.9%) and Cape Verdeans (3.5%), respectively. Although the general picture is that of virtually no difference between first and second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities, considerable differences can be observed per origin country.

Where 4.6% of men from ethnic minorities were registered as suspects in 2003, this was 15.3% for second-generation men from the Morocco origin group, 11.1% from Cape Verde, 8.7% from Surinam, 7.9% from Turkey, and, in all these cases, the percentages are higher than those for first-generation individuals from their fellow origin groups. A salient exception is the Antilles/Aruba, where there are more suspects amongst first-generation men than amongst the second generation: 12.5% as opposed to 6.7%. For many other smaller origin groups, the number of suspects amongst the second generations is too small, in an absolute sense, to report on.

# 8.1.1 Suspect determinants

The study sought to ascertain whether background factors other than sex and age play a role in the explanation of criminal behaviour and the fact that someone has been caught and registered by the police. Regression analyses have been used (see Section 6 for an explanation) to ascertain, step-by-step, the extent to which an individual's origin group, sex, age, household type, social security benefits<sup>25</sup>, level of income<sup>26</sup>, and the ethnic composition of the district in which an individual lives<sup>27</sup> predict the chance that he/she will be suspected of a criminal offence. **Table 8.3** shows that if corrections are made for differences in age structure and the boy-girl ratio (Model II in the table), the strong over-representation already observed for Moroccans and Antilleans continues to exist. If, subsequently, the types of household are examined, it is found that people living in an institutional household<sup>28</sup> (odds ratio 3.08) and in single-parent

\_

This concerns individuals with income from assistance benefits, disability benefits, unemployment benefits or another benefit such as retaining pay [Wachtgeld] or benefits pursuant to the Sickness Benefits Act [Ziektewet].

This concerns the taxable salary of people who were registered as employees on 26 September 2003. Taxable salary is the salary on which income tax and national insurance contributions is calculated.

This concerns the percentage of non-Western minority individuals in an area. Areas with less than 50 inhabitants are not included.

The 'institutional household' category consists of modes of living for individuals with sensory handicaps, surrogate family units, juvenile institutions and shelters for adults. Asylum seekers'

families (odds ratio 2.54) have a particularly great chance of being registered as suspects. Of the other factors studied here, high income alone is found to be connected with a smaller chance (odds ratio 0.51) of being registered in the Identification Service System; the other factors have less weight as determinants and contribute less to the prediction of whether or not individuals will become suspects.

#### 8.1.2 Juvenile suspects

By far the most criminal offences are committed by young people and young-adult men. The *overall* figures from the previous section have been broken down for the 12-24 age category in **Table 8.4**. Per origin group, the suspect percentages for 12-17 year olds and 18-24 year olds have been ascertained, broken down into boys and girls. Here too, a comparison has been made between 2002 and 2003.

Young people from ethnic minorities are more likely to be registered as suspects with the police than young autochtonous Dutch people are. Amongst the youngest age category, the percentage of young ethnic-minority boys that were registered as suspects in 2003 is 5.7%; amongst young autochtonous Dutch boys this is 2.3%. Amongst 18-24 year olds, this is higher for all groups: ethnic-minority boys score 8.1% and autochtonous Dutch boys 4.3%. Moroccans and Antilleans score unfavourably amongst both 12-17 year olds and the 18-24 year olds. Whereas the first-generation of Antilleans in particular shows a large number of suspects (approximately 15%) – in both age categories distinguished here, amongst the Moroccans both generations are heavily represented in the suspects register. Peaks amongst this origin group are the young adults. Almost one in five was registered as a suspect by the police in 2003.

Although the percentages applicable for the Surinamese, Cape Verdeans and Somalians are lower, these are still higher than those applicable for autochtonous Dutch young men and, as such, are a matter for concern.

Although suspect percentages are (far) lower for girls across the board than the percentage applicable for boys, there are some groups of non-Western origin from which a relatively large number of girls have been registered by the police, and in which figure no reduction can be observed between 2002 and 2003. First-generation girls from the Netherlands Antilles (4.9% of suspects are aged 18-24 in 2003) stand out, followed by second-generation Moroccan (3.0%), Surinamese (2.5%) and Ghanaian (2.5%) girls. In comparison: the overall percentage of girls aged 18-24 from ethnic minorities and registered in the police Identification Service System (*HKS*) is 1.4%.

#### 8.1.3 Type of criminal offence

There are indications that origin groups sometimes 'specialise' in certain types of criminal offence. On the basis of an overview of Dutch research literature, Driessen et al. (2002) indicate that young Dutch criminals are particularly involved in vandalism and destruction, while young criminals from ethnic minorities are more likely to commit thefts and crimes against property and violent offences. The Identification Service System can be used to identify which category of crime individuals were suspected of in police reports produced in 2003 (**Table 8.5**).

centres do not fall under this category. This category also includes boarding schools and training institutes for police and the army, religious institutions and prisons.

The following categories are distinguished:

- Violent crime, including sexual violent offences and crimes against property with violence:
- Crimes against property without violence, such as theft, embezzlement, currency offences and other forgery offences, deceit and (culpably) handling stolen goods;
- Vandalism or public order offences;
- Traffic offences (no traffic violations), such as driving under the influence;
- Other offences, including drug and weapon offences.

Offences against property are the most prevalent. This applies for virtually all of the origin groups. One in three offences is a crime against property. In comparison with the autochtonous Dutch population, the ethnic minority groups are over-represented for this type of offence. In 30% of cases, the offences committed by the autochtonous Dutch population are crimes against property. For offences involving individuals from ethnic minorities, this figure is 38%. Several origin groups score several percentage points higher than this.

Ethnic minorities show a smaller overrepresentation as regards violent offences (23% as opposed to 20% amongst the autochtonous Dutch population). Few registered violence offences were found for the Chinese (15%). However a relatively large number was found for Egyptians (36% of the offences committed by them) and Iraqis (35%). Less high, but still above average in terms of violent offences, are the percentages applicable for Turks (28%), Iranians (27%) and Afghans (27%).

A varied picture of over-represented and under-represented origin groups applies for the other types of offences. A proportionally large number of traffic offences are committed by people from Hong Kong, Cape Verde, Turkey and China. Many 'other offences' are committed by suspects from China and Hong Kong. It is not possible to indicate which specific type of offence the latter category entails.

#### 8.2 Recidivism

Recidivism can be determined in various registers in the judicial process. Based on the Identification Service System (a police registration system), 'Suspected of crime' (Blom et al., 2005) gave an initial analysis of recidivism amongst individuals from first and second-generation ethnic minorities. Another source is the register of cases referred to the Public Prosecutions Department. This judicial database is used by the Research and Documentation Centre for the so-called Recidivism Monitor [*Recidivemonitor*] (Wartna et al., 2004). This monitor shows how large the proportion is of individuals that reoffend – as evident from the fact that another case involving them is registered with the Public Prosecutions Department —who were involved in criminal proceedings in a certain year. The judicial database only registers the country of birth, as a result of which it is impossible to distinguish between first and second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities. Together with the autochtonous Dutch population, second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities form the 'The Netherlands' category.

Within one year, almost one-third of Antilleans/Arubans and Moroccans who had been involved in criminal cases concluded in 1997 were in trouble with the law again. Within three years, one-third (32.9%) of all individuals registered were

in trouble with the law again. Several countries of origin stand out unfavourably: Antilles/Aruba (55.1%), Morocco (49.9%), Surinam (43.9%), Yugoslavia (41.0%). The Asiatic countries have relatively few repeat offenders.

The Recidivism Monitor also makes it possible to monitor people over a protracted period. Within a period of 8 years, new cases had been registered with the Public Prosecutions Department for almost half of all offenders from 1997. There are several striking peaks. The highest percentage of repeat offenders is encountered amongst first-generation offenders from the Netherlands Antilles (72%), Cape Verde (66%), Morocco (63%) and Surinam (60.2%). After 8 years, recidivism is still relatively minor amongst Asians.

Recidivism figures for juvenile offenders show an even more sombre picture. The majority of young people aged 12-17 whose cases were concluded in 1997 are in trouble with the law again within five years (**Table 8.7**). Amongst Moroccans and Antilleans, this figure is even as high as almost three-quarters. And, after eight years, approximately 80% of Antilleans and Moroccans who had been convicted eight years before have had one or more additional cases settled against them. The Surinamese and Yugoslavs also have a high percentage of repeat offenders: in excess of 70%.

Recidivism figures are lower amongst young adults (18-24 year olds); this is probably connected with their entry into relationships or with the acceptance of work during this stage of life. For this age category too, one-third has reoffended within two years, while almost half have reoffended within five years (**Table 8.8**).

Problematic peaks here are, again, the Antilleans, Moroccans and the Surinamese.

Table 8.1 Non-standardised suspect percentages\* by origin group, generation and sex (12-79 year olds), 2002-2003\*\*

	Male		Female	e	total	
	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003
Total, of which	2,1	2,3	0,4	0,4	1,2	1,4
Autochthonous Dutch	1,6	1,8	0,3	0,3	0,9	1,1
Ethnic minority, of which	4,2	4,6	0,8	0,9	2,5	2,8
1st generation, of which	4,4	4,8	0,9	0,9	2,6	2,9
Afghanistan	3,1	3,5	0,5	0,4	2,1	2,0
China	1,5	1,6	0,7	0,6	1,1	1,1
Egypt	3,3	3,8	0,6	0,2	2,6	2,0
Ethiopia	5,8	5,3	0,8	8,0	3,6	3,1
Philippines	2,1	1,5	0,2	1,1	0,6	1,3
Ghana	4,5	4,9	1,1	1,3	2,8	3,1
Hongkong	1,0	1,0	0,3	0,3	0,7	0,6
Iraq	4,2	4,6	0,8	0,5	2,9	2,6
Iran	5,2	5,2	1,2	0,9	3,5	3,1
(Former) Yugoslavia	4,4	4,6	1,0	1,1	2,7	2,9
Cape Verde	5,4	6,1	1,0	0,8	3,2	3,5
Marocco	6,5	7,0	0,9	8,0	3,9	3,9
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	11,9	12,5	3,2	3,4	7,4	8,0
Somalia	7,9	8,2	1,8	1,2	5,2	4,7
Surinam	6,5	7,2	1,2	1,6	3,6	4,4
Turkey	4,3	4,8	0,4	0,4	2,4	2,6
Other non-Western	4,3	4,7	1,0	0,9	2,8	2,8
Other Western	1,8	2,0	0,5	0,6	1,1	1,3
2nd generation, of which	3,9	4,3	0,7	0,8	2,3	2,6
Afghanistan						
China					0,9	0,9
Egypt	4,0	6,1	1,4	1,5	2,7	3,8
Ethiopia					4,3	3,7
Philippines	2,7		1,3		2,0	1,9
Ghana					3,3	3,4
Hongkong		1,9		0,4	1,1	1,1
Iraq						
Iran					1,9	2,4
(Former) Yugoslavia	6,4	7,6	2,0	2,5	4,2	5,1
Cape Verde	9,7	11,1	1,8	2,2	5,7	6,6
Marocco	14,0	15,3	2,1	2,4	8,1	8,9
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	6,3	6,7	1,5	1,7	3,9	4,2
Somalia						
Surinam	8,0	8,7	1,8	2,0	4,9	5,4
Turkey	7,6	7,9	8,0	0,8	4,3	4,5
Other non-Western	4,4	4,7	0,8	0,9	2,6	2,8
Other Western	2,1	2,3	0,4	0,5	1,3	1,4

<sup>\*</sup> Per 100 inhabitants of the age in question on 26 September 2003.

Source: Identification Service System (HKS), Social Statistical Database (SSB).

<sup>\*\*</sup> Percentages are based on a minimum of 50 inhabitants and a minimum of 10 suspects.

Table 8.2: Standardised suspect percentages\* by origin group, generation and sex (12-79 year olds), 2002-2003\*\*

	Male		Femal	е	total	
	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003
Total, of which	2,0	2,2	0,4	0,4	1,2	1,3
Autochthonous Dutch	1,6	1,8	0,3	0,3	0,9	1,1
Ethnic minority, of which	3,9	4,2	0,7	0,7	2,3	2,5
1st generation, of which	4,2	4,4	0,8	0,8	2,5	2,6
Afghanistan	2,5	2,8	0,5	0,4	1,5	1,6
China	1,4	1,6	0,6	0,4	1,0	1,0
Egypt	3,1	4,4	0,7	0,3	1,9	2,4
Ethiopia	4,9	4,9	0,7	1,0	2,8	2,9
Philippines		1,1		0,3	0,9	0,7
Ghana	3,6	4,6	1,0	0,9	2,3	2,7
Hongkong	1,0	1,0	0,3	0,3	0,6	0,6
Iraq	3,4	3,7	0,6	0,7	2,0	2,2
Iran	4,5	4,6	1,2	1,2	2,8	2,9
(Former) Yugoslavia	3,9	4,2	1,0	1,0	2,4	2,6
Cape Verde	5,6	6,4	1,1	0,8	3,3	3,6
Marocco	5,7	6,3	0,7	0,8	3,2	3,6
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	10,2	10,9	2,7	2,7	6,4	6,8
Somalia	5,8	5,8	0,9	1,8	3,4	3,8
Surinam	6,3	7,0	1,2	1,3	3,7	4,1
Turkey	3,7	4,2	0,4	0,4	2,0	2,3
Other non-Western	4,3	4,0	1,0	0,9	2,7	2,4
Other Western	2,2	2,2	0,5	0,5	1,3	1,3
2nd generation, of which	3,5	3,9	0,5	0,6	2,1	2,3
Afghanistan						
China		1,4		0,4	0,9	0,9
Egypt					1,9	2,7
Ethiopia					7,1	5,9
Philippines					1,8	1,0
Ghana					3,3	5,5
Hongkong					0,7	1,2
Iraq					2,1	1,9
Iran					1,9	1,8
(Former) Yugoslavia	3,8	4,9	1,4	1,2	2,6	3,1
Cape Verde	10,7	9,9	1,5	1,2	6,1	5,6
Marocco	12,6	14,2	2,3	2,6	11,1	12,5
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	4,4	4,6	0,8	1,2	2,6	2,9
Somalia						
Surinam	5,4	5,8	1,0	1,2	3,2	3,5
Turkey	8,6	8,8	0,8	0,8	4,7	4,8
Other non-Western	2,7	3,1	0,5	0,5	1,6	1,8
Other Western  * Per 100 inhabitants of the age in gu	2,1	2,3	0,4	0,5	1,3	1,4

<sup>\*</sup> Per 100 inhabitants of the age in question on 26 September 2003.

Percentages are based on a minimum of 50 inhabitants and a minimum of 10 suspects.

Source: Identification Service System (HKS), Social Statistical Database (SSB).

<sup>\*\*</sup> Standardised by age and sex.

Table 8.3 Individuals suspected of a criminal offence, odds ratios (18-79 year olds)

		1-1.1		4-111		1-1.111		-1.07		1-11/		-137
	Mod Sig.	iei i Exp(B)	Sig.	del II Exp(B)	Sig.	lel III Exp(B)	Sig.	el IV Exp(B)	Mod Sig.	ei v Exp(B)	Mode Sig.	Exp(B)
Autochthonous Dutch	oig.	1,000	oig.	1,000	oig.	1,000	oig.	1,000	oig.	1,000	oig.	1,000
Yugoslavia, 1st gen.	0,000	2,808	0,000	2,423	0,000	2,210	0,000	1,912	0,000	1,619	0,000	1,462
Morocco, 1st gen.	0,000	4,070	0,000	3,344	0,000	3,236	0,000	2,499	0,000	2,176	0,000	1,842
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba, 1st gen.	0,000	7,863	0.000	6,598	0,000	4,839	0,000	4,183	0,000	3,798	0.000	3,317
Surinam, 1st gen.	0,000	3,982	0,000	4,084	0,000	3,272	0,000	2,918	0,000	2,741	0,000	2,338
Turkey, 1st gen.	0,000	2,679	0,000	2,258	0,000	2,280	0,000	1,810	0,000	1,554	0,000	1,313
Other non-Western, 1st gen.	0,000	2,689	0,000	1,940	0,000	1,539	0,000	1,330	0,000	1,093	0,027	0,974
Other Western, 1st gen.	0,000	1,083	0,000	1,249	0,000	1,065	0,000	1,098	0,000	0,942	0,000	0,890
Yugoslavia, 2nd gen.	0,000	4,949	0,000	2,982	0,000	2,700	0,000	2,482	0,000	2,364	0,000	2,149
Morocco, 2nd gen.	0,000	11,491	0,000	5,621	0,000	5,109	0,000	4,627	0,000	4,271	0,000	3,695
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba, 2nd gen.	0,000	4,074	0,000	2,318	0,000	1,939	0,000	1,876	0,000	1,781	0,000	1,628
Surinam, 2nd gen.	0,000	6,051	0,000	3,323	0,000	2,613	0,000	2,452	0,000	2,298	0,000	1,997
Turkey, 2nd gen.	0,000	5,644	0,000	2,716	0,000	2,561	0,000	2,314	0,000	2,142	0,000	1,845
Other non-Western, 2nd gen.	0,000	2,983	0,000	1,581	0,000	1,387	0,000	1,368	0,000	1,262	0,000	1,139
Other Western, 2nd gen.	0,000	1,311	0,000	1,293	0,000	1,213	0,000	1,184	0,000	1,153	0,000	1,114
Female				1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000
Male			0,000	5,677	0,000	5,762	0,000	6,031	0,000	6,933	0,000	6,959
18-20 years old				1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000
21-24 years old			0,000	0,766	0,000	0,738	0,000	0,703	0,000	0,774	0,000	0,770
25-29 years old			0,000	0,573	0,000	0,567	0,000	0,517	0,000	0,664	0,000	0,659
30-34 years old			0,000	0,492	0,000	0,515	0,000	0,453	0,000	0,619	0,000	0,618
35-39 years old			0,000	0,437	0,000	0,473	0,000	0,404	0,000	0,553	0,000	0,556
40-44 years old			0,000	0,393	0,000	0,426	0,000	0,352	0,000	0,486	0,000	0,490
45-49 years old			0,000	0,318	0,000	0,346	0,000	0,273	0,000	0,379	0,000	0,383
50-59 years old			0,000	0,220	0,000	0,248	0,000	0,174	0,000	0,228	0,000	0,233
60-79 years old			0,000	0,096	0,000	0,108	0,000	0,085	0,000	0,074	0,000	0,076
Couple with children						1,000		1,000		1,000		1,000
One-person household					0,000	2,074	0,000	1,860	0,000	1,756	0,000	1,642
Couple without children					0,000	0,922	0,000	0,918	0,000	0,933	0,000	0,906
One-parent household					0,000	2,541	0,000	2,189	0,000	2,083	0,000	1,992
Other household					0,000	1,696	0,000	1,579	0,000	1,458	0,000	1,376
Institutional household					0,000	3,080	0,000	1,691	0,000	1,422	0,000	1,441
Unknown					0,000	2,101	0,000	2,115	0,000	1,736	0,000	1,652
Not receiving benefits								1,000		1,000		1,000
Receiving benefits							0,000	2,834	0,000	1,866	0,000	1,835
Up to €10,000										1,000		1,000
€ 10,000 to € 20,000									0,000	1,212	0,000	1,212
€ 20000 to € 30,000									0,000	0,787	0,000	0,788
€ 30,000 or more									0,000	0,505	0,000	0,506
Unknown									0,000	1,642	0,000	1,644
0 to 5%												1,000
5 to 15%											0,000	1,245
15 to 50%											0,000	1,450
50 to 100%											0,000	1,454
Area with fewer than 50 inhabitants											0,000	1,592
Constant	0,000	0,010	0,000	0,009	0,000	0,006	0,000	0,006	0,000	0,005	0,000	0,004
R <sup>2</sup>	-,	0,033	-,	0,119	-,	0,133	-,	0,149	-,	0,161	-,	0,163
Significance levels: p<0.01;												

Significance levels: p<0.01; 0,01≤p<0,05; p≥0.05. Source: Identification Service System (HKS), Social Statistical Database (SSB).

Table 8.4: Standardised suspect percentages\* by origin group, generation, age and sex, 2002-2003\*\*

Table 0.4. Standardised suspec				17 years						3-24 years	old	
	boy	/		irl		otal	b	oy		irl	tota	al
	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003
Total, of which	2,8	2,9	0,6	0,6	1,8	1,8	5,0	5,0	0,7	0,7	2,9	2,9
Autochthonous Dutch	2,0	2,3	0,5	0,5	1,3	1,4	3,8	4,3	0,5	0,6	2,2	2,5
Ethnic minority, of which	5,7	5,7	1,3	1,3	3,6	3,5	8,6	8,1	1,4	1,4	5,0	4,8
1st generation, of which	6,2	6,6	1,5	1,4	4,0	4,0	8,7	8,7	1,5	1,4	5,0	5,1
Afghanistan		3,1			1,6	1,8		6,1			3,6	3,3
China		1,6			1,1	1,1	1,8	1,5	1,0	0,8	1,4	1,2
Egypt		5,1				3,2		10,9				5,5
Ethiopia		9,7			6,8	6,1		10,7			6,5	6,4
Philippines		4,5				2,6					1,9	1,5
Ghana		5,0			3,0	3,4		9,4		2,5	5,1	6,0
Hongkong		0,9			0,0	0,9						0,2
Iraq	5,6	6,1	0,5	0,9	3,2	3,6	7,9	9,2	1,2	1,1	5,4	5,2
Iran	5,7	5,1	1,1	1,7	3,7	3,4	9,5	9,6	1,6	1,5	5,8	5,6
(Former) Yugoslavia	4,8	5,1	0,9	0,9	2,9	3,0	8,2	7,9	1,7	1,9	5,0	4,9
Cape Verde		9,3		2,1	6,3	5,8	11,2	12,6	2,3	1,2	6,5	7,0
Marocco	11,5	12,9	2,0	2,0	7,0	7,6	16,8	18,2	1,6	1,9	8,4	10,2
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	14,4	14,5	4,7	4,1	9,6	9,4	15,4	15,5	4,6	4,9	9,8	10,3
Somalia	8,6	9,5	3,0	1,9	6,0	5,8	11,2	12,0	1,8	1,9	7,0	7,0
Surinam	7,1	8,0	1,9	1,8	4,5	5,0	11,8	12,2	2,0	2,2	6,6	7,3
Turkey	5,1	6,3	0,6	0,5	3,0	3,5	6,5	6,7	0,5	0,4	3,1	3,6
Other non-Western	5,4	6,2	1,5	1,8	3,7	4,0	6,7	7,4	1,5	1,5	4,6	4,5
Other Western	3,3	3,6	0,8	0,9	2,1	2,3	4,3	4,7	0,9	0,8	2,4	2,8
2nd generation, of which	5,4	4,3	1,3	1,1	3,4	2,7	8,5	7,2	1,3	1,3	5,0	4,3
Afghanistan												
China					1,0						0,9	
Egypt					2,0						4,9	6,4
Ethiopia					3,1							5,3
Philippines					1,3						3,4	
Ghana					3,0							6,4
Hongkong					1,2						1,2	
Iraq												
Iran												
(Former) Yugoslavia	7,3	6,9	4,7	4,3	6,1	5,6	8,5	10,3	1,8	3,0	5,1	6,7
Cape Verde	7,3	9,5	2,3	2,1	4,8	5,9	12,0		1,5		6,7	8,4
Marocco	10,9	11,9	2,0	2,2	6,5	7,2	18,9	20,5	2,6	3,0	10,8	11,9
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	6,5	6,8	1,8	2,1	4,2	4,5	8,4	8,9	1,8	2,3	5,1	5,7
Somalia												
Surinam	6,5	6,6	2,1	2,1	4,3	4,4	10,8	11,9	2,2	2,5	6,5	7,3
Turkey	4,9	5,5	0,7	0,6	2,9	3,1	10,2	10,3	0,9	0,9	5,7	5,7
Other non-Western	3,5	3,8	0,9	1,0	2,2	2,5	6,7	6,9	1,1	1,1	4,0	4,1
Other Western	3,1	3,2	0,7	0,9	1,9	2,0	4,8	5,1	0,8	0,9	2,8	3,1

\* Per 100 inhabitants of the age in question on 26 September 2003.

\*\* Standardised by age and sex.

Percentages are based on a minimum of 50 inhabitants and a minimum of 10 suspects.

Source: Identification Service System (HKS), Social Statistical Database (SSB).

Table 8.5: Standardised offence percentage\* by suspect's origin group and generation, and by type of criminal offence (12-79 year olds), 2003\*

	Violent offence	Offence against property	Vandalism or public order offence	Traffic offence	Other offence
Total, of which	21	33	16	19	11
Autochthonous Dutch	20	30	17	21	10
Ethnic minority, of which	23	38	13	14	11
1st generation, of which	24	39	12	14	11
Afghanistan	27	35	17	16	5
China	15	40	6	21	17
Egypt	36	24	12	15	14
Ethiopia	27	43	16	8	6
Philippines					
Ghana	22	42	12	15	9
Hongkong				26	23
Iraq	35	35	13	10	8
Iran	27	44	13	7	9
(Former) Yugoslavia	21	48	9	16	6
Cape Verde	20	37	11	25	6
Marocco	25	41	12	10	12
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	24	41	10	11	14
Somalia	21	42	26	7	4
Surinam	25	39	11	13	13
Turkey	28	24	11	22	14
Other non-Western	26	37	15	13	8
Other Western	19	42	14	16	9
2nd generation, of which	22	36	15	15	12
Afghanistan China					
Egypt					
Ethiopia					
Philippines					
Ghana					
Hongkong					
Iraq					
Iran					
(Former) Yugoslavia	17	46	10	14	12
Cape Verde	17	42	12	13	17
Marocco	24	38	13	12	12
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	24	35	17	11	13
Somalia					
Surinam	23	39	13	14	12
Turkey	23	33	12	18	14
Other non-Western	28	32	16	15	10
Other Western	21	36	17	17	10

<sup>\*</sup> Per 100 inhabitants of the age in question on 26 September 2003.

Source: Identification Service System (HKS), Social Statistical Database (SSB).

<sup>\*\*</sup> Standardised by age and sex. The total number of offences per origin group is 100%.

Table 8.6 Prevalence of general recidivism amongst adults and juvenile offenders for which at least one case was settled in 1997 (aged 12 and older), by country of birth

Percentage of repeat offenders after Country of birth N 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years The Netherlands, incl. 2nd generation ethnic minorities 109040 18.0 27 1 32 9 37.0 40.2 43.0 45 4 47 8 Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 3842 31,8 47,1 55,1 60.5 64,1 66,8 69,6 71.9 Surinam 7368 25,3 37,3 43,9 48,9 52,5 55,6 57,9 60,2 Marocco 5873 29,5 42,5 49,9 54,2 57,2 59,6 61,4 62,6 4641 47.6 49.8 Turkey 19.0 29.6 36.5 41.0 44.5 51.5 Iraq 358 13 7 19.6 23.2 26.3 28 2 30.2 32.6 36.8 Iran 649 19,6 28,7 35,6 38,5 41,3 44,1 45,4 45.4 Somalia 608 21,2 32,9 39,3 43,3 46,2 48,2 50,0 50,0 Yugoslavia 1704 26,2 36,1 41,0 44,0 46,7 48,3 49,0 51,1 283 32.5 33.6 36.0 37.0 Ethiopia 17.0 26.5 30.7 38.5 Cape Verde 204 16.2 29.4 36.3 46.1 49.5 54.4 59.4 65.8 21,0 Ghana 347 17,3 24,8 27,1 28,8 32,6 33,2 9,8 351 18,8 25,9 31,1 33,9 38,2 39,6 42,1 42,9 Egypt HongKong 167 25.7 27.5 29.9 32.7 32.7 18.0 28.7 31.1 **Philippines** 81 3,7 3,7 4,9 6,2 7.4 8,6 8,6 8.6 China 566 15,7 23,0 27,0 31,8 35,0 36,9 38,0 38,0 India 236 12,7 21,2 24,6 26,3 29,2 31,4 33,2 35,7 Pakistan 271 9,2 18,5 22,5 28,0 30,6 33,6 38,0 40,3 193 37.5 Vietnam 8.8 17.6 22.3 29.5 32.1 34.2 37.5 Afghanistan 110 8.2 18.2 21,8 25.5 28 2 29.1 33.5 33.5 Other Western 11994 10,4 15,0 17,9 19,7 20,9 21,9 22,9 23,9 Other non-Western 4641 20,7 29,1 33,7 36,6 38,8 40,7 42,2 43,5 154451 33,4 37,4 40,4 42,9 45,2 47,4 Total (incl. missing) 18,6 27,7

Source: Justice Documentation Research and Policy Database (OBJD)

Table 8.7 Prevalence of general recidivism amongst juvenile offenders aged 12-17 by country of birth

Percentage of repeat offenders after Country of birth Ν 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years The Netherlands, incl. 2nd generation ethnic minorities 11567 19,8 33,8 42,2 48,3 52,8 56,1 59,3 61,2 Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 301 31,9 53,8 63,8 69,1 72,8 74,4 79,0 80.8 Surinam 289 26.3 42.6 50.9 57,1 60.9 65,7 68,5 70.6 Marocco 713 37,0 55,8 64,5 71,2 73,9 76,6 78,3 78,3 Turkey 190 17,9 34,7 44,7 50,0 52,6 57,9 60,2 62,8 Somalia 85 24,7 41,2 48,2 51,8 54,1 57,6 60,3 60,3 Yugoslavia 85 29.4 47.1 52.9 56.5 60.0 60.0 61.5 71.1 Other Western 532 16 2 23.7 29.3 314 33.5 35.0 35 4 354 Other non-Western 514 23.7 37.7 44.6 48,2 51.8 54.7 55.4 56,0 Total (incl. missing) 14313 21,1 35,3 43,5 49,4 53,6 56,8 59,7 61,6

Source: Justice Documentation Research and Policy Database (OBJD)

Table 8.8 Prevalence of general recidivism amongst juvenile offenders aged 18-24 by country of birth

	percentage recidivisten na								
Country of birth	N	1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years	6 years	7 years	8 years
The Netherlands, incl. 2nd generation ethnic minorities	23025	22.1	32.7	39.4	44.1	47.6	50.3	52.7	54.7
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	843	32,7	48,8	57,5	63,8	69,0	72,8	75,8	78,8
Surinam	1129	24,6	37,6	45,6	52,1	55,5	58,7	62,0	65,9
Marocco	1925	34,6	49,6	58,2	63,2	66,6	69,3	71,0	72,7
Turkey	909	23,7	35,0	41,5	46,1	49,2	52,7	55,1	56,2
Somalia	172	25,0	37,2	43,0	47,1	50,6	51,7	52,4	52,4
Yugoslavia	450	31,3	41,3	46,2	49,8	52,2	53,8	53,8	53,8
Other Western	2778	9,8	13,7	16,1	17,5	18,4	19,0	20,2	20,4
Other non-Western	1711	22,0	30,5	34,9	38,9	41,4	43,4	45,4	46,3
Total (incl. missing)	33101	22,2	32,6	39,0	43,4	46,6	49,2	51,4	53,4

<sup>\*</sup>Countries in which just a limited number of juvenile offenders were born are not distinguished separately. These countries are included in the 'Other non-Western' category.

Source: Justice Documentation Research and Policy Database (OBJD)

<sup>\*</sup>Countries in which just a limited number of juvenile offenders were born are not distinguished separately. These countries are included in the 'Other non-Western' category.

# 9 Conclusions

#### 9.1 Starting points and Integration Monitor approach

The Integration Monitor contains information that provides an insight into the extent to which, and the pace at which, migrants and their descendents are able to gain a position for themselves in Dutch society. Section 2 explains that integration is formed, in essence, by the process of achieving citizenship and participating in society. Integration is a two-way process involving interaction between the migrant and the host society. We have stated several basic principles that might throw some light on the processes and mechanisms underlying migrant integration. In addition to the competencies ('human capital') that individuals possess (language proficiency, level of education, psychological characteristics, social skills, etc.) and which can be tapped, other important concepts are 'social networks' and 'social capital'. Social capital refers to the social relationships and social networks that influence personal interactions and behaviour. The migrant makes efforts and invests – in his social networks, amongst other things – with the object of creating opportunities for himself, which he will utilise to achieve a position for himself in society. The host society offers opportunities to this end, but also formulates a number of requirements and restrictions.

In comparison with the first Integration Monitor in 2004, the Integration Monitor for 2005 presents not only *more recent data*, but also a number of *new integration indicators*. The latter are data in terms of crime, migration marriages and entry into higher education. Another new aspect of the Integration Monitor 2005 is the expansion of the analyses made to cover three *cohorts of newcomers* that came to the Netherlands in 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. The Integration Monitor represents a new approach to the monitoring of integration in the Netherlands in various respects:

- Through the use of the Social Statistical Database (SSB) with its data covering the entire population of the Netherlands, we are, to an increased extent, more able to make a detailed breakdown of the groups according to their different countries of origin. In addition to describing the traditional 'big four' (the Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin groups), we also indicate how small immigrant populations that have arrived in the Netherlands in more recent years participate in this country;
- In addition, due to the availability of longitudinal data, an insight can be provided into the progress of integration for a number of groups over a longer period and in different domains of society. This is done by featuring both *trends* over time and by monitoring *cohorts* of newcomers that settled in the Netherlands in a certain year, in order to see how they have fared. The possibility to link national registers via the Social Statistical Database is of more recent date. In a number of cases, the time scale that we are able to research is still short. However, this is just the beginning. In the years ahead, trend and cohort analyses will be possible over longer time frames. What is more, it will then be possible to monitor cohorts in various social domains simultaneously and, as such, will no longer be limited to the labour market, as it the case in this Integration Monitor;
- The Integration Monitor focuses on actual behaviour and actual social
  positions held by individuals, as opposed to attitudes, perceptions, subjective
  experience and opinions. In order to actually be able to determine the
  integration of various ethnic minority groups, specific social domains must

be distinguished from each other, whereby the level of participation – and the changes in this participation – are *measurable*.

# 9.1.1 Integration indicators

The previous Integration Monitor report (Van Rijn et al., 2004) argued that a definitive list of indicators cannot be given. The indicators chosen to determine the various aspects of integration depend, for instance, on the level of detail required, policy priorities and on the data available. Ideally, we would like to have one or more indicators for each of the domains described in our model. However, the limited availability of quantitative data compels us to be modest. In particular, data that would make it possible to reveal developments over time, or monitor the integration process of migrant/ethnic minority cohorts over the years are absent for many specific areas of research.

On the basis of the integral data available at this point at the level of individuals – in order to be able to reveal trends and developments over time – we have been able to select the following indicators for the present Integration Monitor:

- Performance in education: success rates of secondary-school pupils in final examinations; extent of entry into higher education; choice of course of study in higher education; graduation from higher education;
- Labour market position: level and rate of labour market participation (as an employee or as someone who is self-employed) and the use of social benefits by newcomer cohorts; trends in labour market participation;
- Social contacts: the number of mixed marriages; marriages with partners from the country of origin; composition of residential areas by the proportion of individuals from ethnic minorities within them;
- *Crime*: suspects being questioned by the police; type of offence; recidivism.

The above set of indicators – which will, where possible, distinguish between origin group, generation, length of stay, sex and age – does not (yet) enable us to cover all of the relevant areas in the various domains of society. Furthermore, these data only make it possible to demonstrate the two-sidedness of the integration process to a limited extent.

## 9.1.2 Missing information

Although data that make it possible to monitor integration over time are becoming available in increasingly more areas, this information is still missing for a number of relevant areas:

- the connection between efforts to integrate and (later) successes in the labour market and socio-cultural integration. Do immigrants that invest in the achievement of a social position and who are (extra) active in their acquisition of the Dutch language and their orientation towards Dutch society via an integration programme or by other means find work faster, or work at a higher level, and do they develop a bigger social network than migrants who are less active in this area?
- the reciprocity of integration: the role played by the Dutch host society has not been adequately identified. Possible indicators in this connection are data on the access that migrants have to important facilities, such as primary healthcare and social work. Are migrants equally able to gain access, to an equal extent? Another potential indicator – at macro level – are amendments to legislation and regulations that affect migrants, and how they turn out in practice;

- The consequences of the economic situation and of social perceptions of the position of ethnic minorities can be identified better and more systematically. In this Integration Monitor (Section 6), cohort analyses have been used to take a first step in this direction in terms of the fluctuations in the economic situation. The Annual Report on Integration (SCP/WODC/CBS, 2005) provides relevant information on mutual perceptions of ethnic minority individuals and the autochtonous Dutch population, opinions on ethnic distance, etc. However, for this subject too, we would like to have access to actual (behavioural) data, such as data on reports of discrimination, reports of violence by individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population against individuals from ethnic minorities, and vice versa;
- a difficult subject is the specific identification of social inter-ethnic contacts in day-to-day life and of the extent to which people focus or continue to focus on their countries of origin. However, in this Integration Monitor, we do report on mixed marriages and on marriages in which one partner comes from the country of origin, and on developments in time in this respect. However, data are still missing on developments in time as regards actual contacts at work, in clubs, in the residential area and in other contacts;
- the absence of information about migrants' starting position is a serious deficiency: what is their actual background upon arrival in the Netherlands in terms of level of education, knowledge of the Dutch/Western society, physical and mental health, their social networks if present in the Netherlands and in their countries of origin. This sort of information about migrants' human and social capital is vital for the interpretation of successful and unsuccessful integration processes. This type of information about their parents is also important for second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities. What support, encouragement and socio-economic opportunities have this second generation of young people received from their parents?

In future *editions* of the Integration Monitor, we will examine the integration of origin groups in a number of social domains simultaneously. For local and national integration policy, it is vital to know how social stratification unfolds amongst origin groups; how and in which origin groups educational performance is accompanied by successful performance in the labour market, for example. Or, the extent to which the development of a social network consisting of individuals from ethnic minorities and from the autochtonous Dutch population promotes the extent or rate of social participation. By identifying integration processes in these various domains simultaneously for clearly-defined groups of migrants, we will be able to clarify the mechanisms at play in these processes. This will prove invaluable when developing effective measures aimed at promoting integration.

# 9.2 Results per social area

In this section, we will set out the most important developments, per social area.

#### Education

— In secondary education, the success rates posted by autochtonous Dutch students for final examinations in all types of schools are higher than those posted by non-Western ethnic minority students. The difference observable for pre-university education (VWO) and higher general secondary education (HAVO) is approximately 12%, while the difference for lower general secondary education (MAVO) and pre-vocational education (VBO) hovers at

- around the 8% mark. These differences remained virtually unchanged between 1999 and 2003. The lag in performance evident in the scores of final examination candidates from ethnic minorities relative to the results achieved by autochtonous Dutch students has not yet been eliminated;
- Although it is generally assumed that the performance of older students is influenced less by the socio-economic background of their parents than that of younger students, significant differences still persist between autochtonous Dutch students and non-Western ethnic minority students attending final year secondary-education classes and higher education;
- When non-Western ethnic minority students have achieved a HAVO or VWO diploma, they move directly into higher education relatively more frequently (on a relative scale) than autochtonous Dutch students do;
- Individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities tend, on average, to opt for studies within the economy and law sectors. This would appear to be at the expense of studies in the technology sector in particular;
- Quite a large number of successful ethnic minority students that transfer to higher education still fail. Of all autochtonous Dutch students entering higher education in 1995, it was found that 67% had graduated by 2003. For Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese and Antilleans, these percentages were only 42%, 35% and 36% respectively. The success rate achieved by the group consisting of students from other non-Western ethnic minorities was also significantly lower than the success rate applicable for the autochtonous Dutch group. It would seem that a slow improvement is being achieved in this situation over the course of time.

#### Work and benefits: trends 1999 - 2003

- Labour market participation by various origin groups changed little between 1999 and 2003. The major differences in terms of the percentages of those in work between the different origin groups that existed in 1999 were still visible in 2003;
- Labour market participation amongst Turks and Moroccans is lower than that of the autochtonous Dutch population. By contrast, the Surinamese and Antilleans are almost as well represented in the labour market as the autochtonous Dutch population is;
- In most groups, we observe a relatively large proportion of employees (over 50%) in the second generation. In virtually all of the origin groups, the second generation has a higher level of labour market participation than the first generation does. Particularly as regards migrants from Morocco, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and China, labour market participation is considerably higher amongst the second generation than amongst the first generation. As regards labour market participation, it would appear that social participation is increasing with the emergence of new generations of migrants;
- Although the percentages are low, the proportion of self-employed individuals increased between 1999 and 2003 in most origin groups both in the first and second generations. Amongst the four major migrant groups, the increase in the percentage of self-employed individuals is particularly striking amongst the Turks. The increase amongst the Moroccans is relatively just as large and, as such, no less striking. However, the final figure is lower than that observed for the Turkish group. The number of individuals that are self-employed is by far the highest in the first generations. The greatest number of self-employed individuals can be found amongst the first generations. The highest numbers of self-employed individuals originate from Egypt (19.9%), Hong Kong (17.9%), China (16.6%), India (10.7%), Pakistan (9.5%), Vietnam (7.1%) and Turkey (5.5%). In comparison: 7.7% of

- the autochtonous Dutch population were independent entrepreneurs in 2003;
- Between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of individuals receiving unemployment benefits increased. The figure for the autochtonous Dutch population increased from 1.6% to 1.9%. The increase in individuals receiving unemployment benefits was far more dramatic for individuals from non-Western ethnic minorities, i.e. from 1.9% in 1999 to 2.7% in 2003;
- The highest labour disability percentages are found amongst Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese. Moreover, in the period 1999-2003, the labour disability percentages amongst these groups particularly the first generation increased at a faster rate than amongst the autochtonous Dutch population. Amongst the autochtonous Dutch working population, the labour disability percentage increased from 8.0% in 1999 to 8.4% in 2003; amongst first-generation Turks, the increase was from 14.5% to 16.2%, amongst first-generation Moroccans, the increase recorded was from 9.8% to 11.1%, and amongst first-generation Surinamese, the increase recorded was from 8.8% in 1999 to 10.1% in 2003;
- Far lower labour disability percentages apply for second-generation non-Western groups which can partly be explained by the lower average age but here too an increase has been observed over the last five years. Added to this, the increase observed amongst second-generation non-Western groups is also stronger than that observed amongst the autochtonous Dutch population.

# Labour market position: monitoring three cohorts of newcomers

- By monitoring immigration cohorts from 1999, 2000 and 2001 (consisting of more than 72,000, 79,000 and 87,000 individuals aged from 15 to 60 respectively) until 2004, we were able to produce a more precise analysis of the labour market position of new immigrants;
- More than 40% of Turkish and Moroccan men find work within a year of their arrival in the Netherlands (thus, within one year). In the second year, this percentage increases to over 60%, after which a less dramatic increase can be observed. The percentage of Turkish and Moroccan men in work reaches 70% in the third year following their arrival and for the time being does not increase any further;
- At the same time, the percentage of individuals on benefits is increasing gradually in both groups. In the 1999 cohort, 8% of Moroccan men and 11% of Turkish men were on benefits in their first year in the Netherlands. These percentages increase to 16% and 15% respectively after four years. Subsequent cohorts (2000 and 2001) consistently start their first year in the Netherlands with a relatively lower proportion of benefit recipients;
- In general, female immigrants are less likely to be in paid employment and are more likely to be on benefits than their male counterparts in the same origin groups. This does not vary from one cohort to another;
- In the year of entry, labour market participation by immigrants from *asylum countries* (principally Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan) is very low (up to approximately 10% for men and 2% for women). Although participation does increase in subsequent years, the figure remains low in comparison to other immigrants. The percentage of benefit recipients in this category of immigrants is relatively low during the entry year comparable with the percentage applicable for family formation migrants but grows sharply in subsequent years to 23- 40% amongst men and 38-70% amongst women. The highest percentages by far- can be observed amongst Afghans;

- After correction for country of origin, reason for migration and other background characteristics (such as age and length of stay), it appears that the difficult economic climate has had a negative impact on newcomers. After three years, the percentage of men in work in the 2000 and 2001 immigration cohorts is lower than the number applicable for the 1999 immigration cohort;
- Comparison of the three year-cohorts studied here shows that the labour market careers of migrant groups (by reason for migration) reveal no remarkable differences over the years. In all of the cohorts studied, we see a strong increase in the percentage of family migrants in work in their second year of residence in the Netherlands. The number of immigrants in work stabilises after the second year.

## Social contacts: mixed and migration marriages

- Of the four major origin groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans/Arubans), the Turks and Moroccans in particular rarely marry Dutch partners. This applies to both the first and second generations. Between 1999 and 2001, there was a fall in the number of mixed marriages from 16% to 11% for Moroccan second-generation men. By contrast, the percentage of second-generation Moroccan women marrying Dutch partners almost doubled in the same period (increasing from 4.4% to 8.0%). However, when compared with other groups, this is still a low figure;
- Almost two-thirds of all marriages entered into by Turks and Moroccans are migration marriages. This applies to both men and women. Although these figures are slightly lower for second generations, percentages of between 50% and 60% still apply. The situation between 1999 and 2001 changes very little, and a reduction in the proportion of migration marriages can only be observed amongst Moroccan women, to just below 50% in 2001;
- A high percentage of marriage partners from the country of origin can sometimes also be observed in the smaller origin groups – particularly amongst men.

#### Crime

- Police records have been improved and are now more detailed. The police have also put greater efforts into crime detection. Apart from actual changes in terms of crime rates, the above has also resulted in increases in the percentages of suspects for more or less all groups both autochtonous Dutch and ethnic minorities for 2003 in comparison with the previous year;
- The overall picture is as follows. The percentages for male and female suspects from ethnic minorities are between twice and three times as high as for the autochtonous Dutch population. For ethnic minority men, the suspect percentage was 4.6% in comparison with 1.8% of autochtonous Dutch men; for ethnic minority women, the figure recorded was 0.9%, while the figure for autochtonous Dutch women is 0.3%;
- The five origin groups with the highest suspect percentages are Antilleans (8.0%), Somalians (4.7%), Surinamese (4.4%), Moroccans (3.9%) and Cape Verdeans (3.5%);
- By far the majority of offences are committed by young people and young adult men. This applies both to the autochtonous Dutch population and to ethnic minorities. Moroccans and Antilleans feature badly in both the 12-17 and the 18-24 age brackets. Where, for Antilleans, the first generation in particular includes a large number of suspects (approximately 15%; in both the age categories specified here), both first and second generation

- Moroccans are heavily represented in the suspects register. In this origin group, the peaks were particularly represented by young adults. In 2003, the police registered almost one in five young Turkish adults as suspects. Although the percentages applicable for the Surinamese, Cape Verdeans and Somalians are lower, these are still higher than those applicable for autochtonous Dutch young men and, as such, are a matter for concern;
- Although suspect percentages are (far) lower for girls across the board than the percentage applicable for boys, there are some groups of non-Western origin from which a relatively large number of girls have been registered by the police, and in which figure no reduction has been observed between 2002 and 2003. A remarkably high percentage is observed amongst first-generation girls from the Netherlands Antilles (4.9% of suspects are aged 18-24 in 2003), followed by second-generation Moroccan (3.0%), Surinamese (2.5%) and Ghanaian (2.5%) girls. In comparison: the overall percentage of girls aged 18-24 from ethnic minorities and registered in the police Identification Service System (*HKS*) is 1.4%;
- Crimes against property are the most prevalent. This applies for virtually all of the origin groups. One in three offences is a crime against property. In 30% of cases, the offences committed by the autochtonous Dutch population are crimes against property. For offences involving individuals from ethnic minorities, this figure is 38%. In the case of violent crime, the level of overrepresentation of groups from ethnic minorities was less marked: 23% versus 20% for the autochtonous Dutch population;
- After just one year, almost one-third of Antilleans/Arubans and Moroccans who had been involved in criminal cases concluded in 1997 were in trouble with the law again. After three years, one-third (32.9%) of all individuals registered in relation to offences had committed further offences;
- For almost half (47%) of all 1997 offenders, the Public Prosecutions Department had opened new cases in the eight years following the offence committed in 1997. There are several striking peaks. The highest percentage of repeat offenders is found amongst first-generation migrant perpetrators from the Netherlands Antilles (72%), Cape Verde (66%), Morocco (63%) and Surinam (60%). Asians are unlikely to reoffend.

#### 9.3 Concluding observations

Although some finer distinction can be discerned in some areas within the impression presented by the data from this report on the progress of ethnic minority integration into Dutch society, the impression presented is one that does, in the main, give great cause for ongoing concern. As regards the field of education, a positive development is the fact that significant progress is evident in terms of examination success rates, particularly amongst girls from a number of origin groups. However, since final-examination performance has improved across the board, thus also amongst autochtonous Dutch pupils, and more pupils are passing their final examinations than was the case four years ago, everyone has become more knowledgeable, but the differences in performance between autochtonous Dutch and ethnic-minority pupils in this area have remained the same. An alternative explanation for the poorer final-examination results achieved by ethnic-minority pupils is given by Tesser (2001). He found that secondary-education teachers do not concern themselves so much about mistakes made by ethnic-minority pupils where they ascribed these to language problems. As a result, these pupils score relatively well in the school component of the final examination and fail during the national written examination. This problem has also been observed by the education inspectorate

[onderwijsinspectie]. Some schools in which the discrepancy between the school component and the national written examination was too large have received warnings. It would seem that the situation has not yet changed.

Another point for concern is that ethnic-minority pupils that are successful at secondary school and progress to higher education, are still relatively more often likely to fail. They perform considerably less well than their autochtonous Dutch counterparts.

The latter is striking, since ethnic-minority pupils with a diploma for preuniversity education or higher general secondary education transfer directly to higher education in the following year relatively more often than autochtonous Dutch pupils do. A possible explanation is that these students are finding that young people are not expected or encouraged to continue their education in their own circles. However, support from these pupils' close family and friends is important for a successful school career.

The weaker performance in secondary education outlined above could also impact on higher education and could at least partially explain the unfavourable performance by ethnic-minority students in higher education.

Thus, the positive developments that can also certainly be observed in education – particularly in primary education – in terms of ethnic-minority pupils catching up, also have a down side. Even success at secondary school does not guarantee many ethnic-minority students success in higher education.

The labour market position of ethnic-minority groups also gives cause for concern. On the one hand, it can be observed that the second generation is generally more often likely to have jobs and less often likely to receive socialsecurity benefits than the first generation is. This points to a better social position in successive generations. On the other hand, we see that when the economy deteriorates, the number of individuals from ethnic minorities in employment decreases and also that it becomes more difficult for newcomers to find jobs than it was in the years before. Since the deterioration of the economic situation in 2002, the percentage of ethnic-minority individuals on disability benefits – both from the first and the (younger) second generations – has increased sharply, considerably more so than amongst the autochtonous Dutch working population. This may be due to the ousting of individuals who are less well qualified by individuals with a higher level of education in a time of higher unemployment. It is conceivable that certain ethnic-minority groups, who are less well educated in proportional terms, employed in lower positions and are less resilient in the labour market due to the absence of an effective network, have experienced the consequences of this.

Migrants from the asylum countries have a particularly difficult labour market position. Our results clearly show that some asylum seekers that Dutch legislation and regulations prevent from entering the labour market for some considerable period of time after their arrival in the Netherlands – sometimes even a period of a number of years – would afterwards appear to have fallen behind to such an extent that many of them are prevented from ever entering the labour market at all. On the basis of our data, we are unable to ascertain whether self-selection could perhaps also play a role, and whereby some asylum migrants are less motivated to build up an existence in the Netherlands – in the expectation that, in time, they will be able to return to their country of origin, for example. The number of benefit recipients is very high amongst most origin

groups, even after several years in the Netherlands, when the asylum procedure has already been completed for some of the asylum migrants. Their protracted exclusion may make it more difficult for people to build up the social capital that they will need to find proper work.

One can also have reservations as regards the socio-cultural dimension of integration. In the absence of factual data, we are unable to comment on the extent to which individuals from the autochtonous Dutch and ethnic-minority populations interact in day-to-day life. However, we are able to comment on mixed and migration marriages. Building a relationship with someone of a different ethnic origin and confirming it by means of marriage can be considered a strong form of social contact. Our findings are as follows. The majority of second-generation individuals from ethnic minorities – born in the Netherlands – look for partners in their countries of origin, and there would seem to be little change in this situation. A decrease in the number of migration marriages is only found amongst Moroccan women.

A drawback of the present large-scale nature of family formation migration — which occurs particularly amongst Moroccans and Turks — is that it can impede the integration process in the Netherlands. After all, many ethnic-minority women entering the Netherlands have a low level of education and little knowledge of Dutch society. However, we can also assume that ethnic-minority men who arrange brides from their country of origin are not particularly willing or able to focus on Dutch society. If migrants — the second generation in particular — continue to marry within their own circle, this can be interpreted as a sign that they have continued to feel different, that their female second-generation counterparts have outgrown them and have, in their eyes, become too modern/too Dutch, or that they are still considered as different by the dominant group. Another factor could be that the Dutch culture is experienced as inappropriate or even as a threat to their own identity. The fact that group pressure often plays a role in the marriage partner chosen makes this subject an extremely complex one.

The data on crime by ethnic minorities bear the greatest significance. In this are in particular, it is clear that second generation individuals from ethnic minorities certainly do not automatically do better than their parents in terms of integration.

The recidivism figures also give cause for great concern. Although recidivism is also very high amongst (young) autochtonous Dutch criminals, the figures for various ethnic minority groups stand out. The majority of young people from the 12-17 age category and for whom cases were concluded in 1997 are in trouble with the law again within five years. In fact, this applies for almost three-quarters of Moroccans and Antilleans. After eight years, approximately 80% of Antilleans and Moroccans who were convicted eight years previously have again had one or more cases concluded against them. The Surinamese and Yugoslavs also have a high percentage of repeat offenders in this country (in excess of 70%). Therefore, recidivism is the rule rather than the exception.

As it stands, it would not seem likely that crime figures will become much more favourable in the short term. With a worsening labour market position and, as such, less favourable prospects for the future, it is not inconceivable that crime figures amongst ethnic minority groups will remain at their current high level for the time being.

In 2003, the present Cabinet presented the starting points for a new integration policy. The impact of this policy cannot yet be expressed in firm figures. Much of the policy proposed has been prepared in the last two years, part of which has only recently been implemented. We will be able to establish the impact of this integration policy in several years' time.

# Literature

#### Agers, A., A. Strang

Indicators of integration: final report, London, Home Office, Home Office Development and Practice Report 28, 2004.

#### Alders, M.

*Bevolkingsprognose 2004-2050: veronderstellingen over immigratie.* Bevolkingstrends 53(2),33-38. CBS, Voorburg/Heerlen, 2005.

#### Arts, C.H., E.M.J. Hoogteijling

Het Sociaal Statistisch Bestand 1998 en 1999. Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek, 2002 no. 12 (Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen), pages 13-21.

# Bauböck, R., A. Heller, A.R. Zollberg (eds.)

The challenge of diversity. Integration and pluralism in societies of immigration. Avebury, Aldershot, 1996.

#### Berg, M.N. van den, J. de Boom, W.H.A. Hofman

Studeren in het wetenschappelijk onderwijs. Rotterdam: RISBO, 2001.

# Blom, M., J. Oudhof, R.V. Bijl, B.F.M. Bakker (ed.).

*Verdacht van criminaliteit. Allochtonen en autochtonen nader bekeken.* The Hague, WODC/CBS, 2005.

#### Bovenkerk, F.

Over de oorzaken van allochtone misdaad. In: F. Bovenkerk, M. Komen, Y. Yesilgöz (ed.), *Multiculturaliteit in de strafrechtspleging*. 2003. The Hague, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2003, pages 29-58.

## Boyd, M.

Women and migration: incorporating gender into international migration theory. MPI/Migration Information Source, March 2003 (http://migrationinformation.org).

#### **CBS**

*Allochtonen in Nederland 2003.* Voorburg/Heerlen, Netherlands Statistics, 2003.

#### Chiswick, B.R., Y.L. Lee, P.W. Miller

Immigrants' language skills: the Australian experience in a longitudinal survey. *International Migration Review*, 2004(38)2: 611-654.

## Connor, H., Tyers C., Modood, T. and Hillage, J.

Why the difference? A closer look at higher education minority ethnic students and graduates, Brighton: Institute for Employment Studies, 2004.

#### Crul, M., R. Wolff

Talent gewonnen. Talent verspild? Een kwantitatief onderzoek naar de doorstroom van allochtone studenten in het hoger onderwijs 1997-2001. Utrecht: ECHO, 2002.

## Dagevos, J.

Perspectief op integratie. Over de sociaal-culturele en structurele integratie van ethnische minderheden in Nederland. The Hague, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2001.

## Dominguez Martinez, S., S. Groeneveld, E. Kruisbergen,

Integratiemonitor 2002. Rotterdam, ISEO, 2002.

# Driessen, F.M.H.M., B.G.M. Völker, H.M. Op den Kamp, A.M.C. Roest, R.J.M. Moolenaar

Zeg me wie je vrienden zijn. Allochtone jongeren en criminaliteit. Utrecht, Bureau Driessen/Apeldoorn, Politie en Wetenschap, 2002.

#### Durlauf, S.N. and M. Fafchamps,

Empirical studies of social capital: a critical survey. Madison, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Working Paper no. 12, 2003.

# Entzinger, H., R. Biezeveld

Benchmarking in immigrant integration. Report to the European Commission. Rotterdam, Erasmus University/ERCOMER, 2003.

#### Esser, H.

Does the new immigration require a new theory of intergenerational integration? Working Paper no. 71, 2003. Mannheim, Universität Mannheim/Mannheimer Zenturm für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2003.

#### **European Commission**

Communication by the European Commission on immigration, integration and employment. Brussels, EU, COM(2003)336, 3 June 2003.

#### Flap, H., B. Völker (eds.)

Creation and returns of social capital. A new research program. London/New York, Routledge, 2004.

## Gang, I., F. Zimmermann

Is child like parent? Educational attainment and ethnic origin. Journal of Human Resources, 2000(35):550-569.

#### Gijsberts, M.

*Minderheden in het basisonderwijs*. In: J. Dagevos, M. Gijsberts and C. van Praag (ed.), Rapportage Minderheden 2003 (pages 63-109). The Hague: Social and Cultural Planning Office, 2003.

#### Hagendoorn, L., J. Veenman, W. Volebergh (ed.)

Integrating immigrants in the Netherlands. Cultural versus socio-economic integration. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003.

# **Halt Nederland**

2005, www.halt.nl

#### Hartog, J., Zorlu, A.

Economische effecten van immigratie. Ontwikkeling van een databestand en eerste analyses. Working paper. Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, 2003.

#### Herweijer, L.

Voortgezet onderwijs, beroepsonderwijs en hoger onderwijs. In: J. Dagevos, M. Gijsberts and C. van Praag (ed.). *Rapportage Minderheden 2003* (pages 111-142). The Hague: Social and Cultural Planning Office, 2003.

#### Hooghiemstra, E.

Trouwen over de grens. Achtergronden van partnerkeuze van Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland. The Hague, Social and Cultural Planning Office, 2003.

#### Hop, P., U. de Jong, M. van Leeuwen, I. Overtoom, J. Roeleveld

Deelname aan hoger onderwijs. Deel 3. Studiekeuze en studiemotieven van leerlingen in het voortgezet onderwijs en eerstejaars studenten cohort 1997/98. Amsterdam: SEO/SCO Kohnstamm instituut, 1999.

#### Kralingen, E. van

*Niet-westerse allochtonen in het voltijd hoger onderwijs.* In: *Bevolkingstrends*, 2003(51)2, pages 50-53.

## Kromhout, M., M. van San

Schimmige werelden. Nieuwe etnische groepen en jeugdcriminaliteit. The Hague, WODC, 2003.

# Lammers, J., W. van Tilburg, L. Prins, H. de Miranda, KI. Lakhi

Landelijke criminaliteitskaart 2004; Een analyse van geregistreerde misdrijven en verdachten op basis van HKS-gegevens. Zoetermeer, National Crime Investigation Agency, 2005.

#### Li, P.S.

Social capital and economic outcomes for immigrants. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2004(5)2: 171-190.

#### Lock Kunz, J., P.S. Li

Introduction to Special Issue: The role of social capital in immigrant integration. Journal of International Migration and Integration vol. 5 (2004): 165-169.

# Maagdenberg, V. van den (ed.)

Annual Report on Integration. Rotterdam, ISEO, 2004.

#### Mare, R.D.

Change and stability in educational stratification. In: American Sociological Review, 1981(46)1, p. 72-87.

#### Nicolaas, H., A. Sprangers

Klein deel van asielzoekers ingeschreven in GBA. Maandstatistiek van de bevolking, 2001(49), no. 9.

#### Penninx, R.

Integration policies for Europe's immigrants: performance, conditions and challenges. An expert paper for the Sachverstängenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration. Gouda, 2004.

#### Penninx, R., K. Kraal, M. Martiniello, S. Vertovec

Citizenship in European cities. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004.

## Portes, A., L.E. Guarnizo, P. Landolt

The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1999(22)2: 217-237.

#### Portes, A.

Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 1998, 24:1-24.

## Rijn, A.S. van, A. Zorlu, R.V. Bijl, B.F.M. Bakker

De ontwikkeling van een Integratiekaart, The Hague: WODC/CBS, 2004.

#### SCP/WODC/CBS

Annual Report on Integration 2005. The Hague, SCP/WODC/CBS, 2005.

#### Sprangers, A., A. Zorlu, J. Hartog, H. Nicolaas

*Immigranten op de arbeidsmarkt. Bevolkingstrends*, 52(2). Netherlands Statistics, Voorburg/Heerlen, 2004a.

#### Sprangers, A., A. Zorlu, J. Hartog, H. Nicolaas

Werk en uitkering van Turkse en Marokkaanse immigranten. Bevolkingstrends, 52 (3). Netherlands Statistics, Voorburg/Heerlen, 2004b.

#### Sterckx, L., C. Bouw

*Trouwen van daar. Partnerkeuze van Turkse en marokkaanse Nederlanders.* Amsterdam, SISWO, 2005.

#### Tesser, P.T.M., I.G.F. Merens, C.S. van Praag

Rapportage minderheden 1999. Positie in het onderwijs en op de arbeidsmarkt. The Hague: Social and Cultural Planning Office, 1999.

#### Tesser, P.T.M.

*Vorderingen op school.* In; SCP, *Minderhedenrapportage 2001*. The Hague, SCP, 2001.

# Tilburg, W. van, J. Lammers, K. Lakhi, L. Prins

Landelijke criminaliteitskaart 2003; Een analyse van geregistreerde misdrijven en verdachten op basis van HKS-gegevens. Zoetermeer, National Crime Investigation Agency, 2004.

#### Tillaart, H. van den

Monitor etnisch ondernemerschap 2000. Zelfstandig ondernemerschap van etnische minderheden in Nederland in de period 1990-2000. Nijmegen, ITS, 2001.

# Tubergen, F.A. van

The integration of immigrants in cross-national perspective. Utrecht, doctoral thesis Utrecht University, 2004.

# Waldinger, R., H. Aldricht, R. Ward and Associates

Ethnic entrepreneurs. Immigrant business in industrial societies. Sage Series on Race and Ethnic Relations Volume 1. Sage, Newbury Park/London, 1990.

#### Wang, C.S., H.G. Aten, M. Kruissink, M. Brouwers, M. Blom

Vervolging en berechting. In: W. van der Heide and A. Th. J. Eggen (ed.) Criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving 2001. The Hague, Boom, WODC Onderzoek en Beleid 211, 2003.

#### Wartna, B.S.J., M. Blom, N. Tollenaar

The WODC Recidivism Monitor. The Hague, WODC, 2004. (http://www.wodc.nl/cijfersenprognoses/recidivemonitor)

#### Wennekers, A.R.M., J. Meijaard, P.J.M. Vroonhof, N.S. Bosma

Maatschappelijke urgentie van ondernemerschap. The Hague, SMO, 2005.

#### Woolcock, M.

Social capital and economic development: towards a theoretical synthesis and policy framework. Theory and Society, 1998(27)2:151-208.

#### Zorlu, A., T. Traag

*Opleidingsniveau en taalvaardigheid.* In: Annual Report on Integration 2005. The Hague, SCP/WODC/CBS, 2005.

# Zorlu A., A. van Rijn

*Inburgering*. In: Annual Report on Integration 2005. The Hague, SCP/WODC/CBS, 2005.

# **Appendices**

# 1 Further methodological substantiation: state of affairs, developments in generations, trends and cohorts

A tool that can be used to indicate levels of integration requires a certain type of research. To gain an insight into the effectiveness of integration strategies, information is needed on the level of social integration and on the strategies themselves. This imposes a number of conditions on data and on the study methods used. The possibilities are described briefly below.

Firstly, the level of social integration by ethnic minorities can be described on the basis of data describing the situation at a certain moment in time. All ethnic minorities residing in the Netherlands at that time are then included in the analyses. Using the indicators chosen, and any corresponding standards or valuations, a statement can be made on the extent to which ethnic minorities from various countries of origin have integrated into Dutch society. One disadvantage of this method is that all individuals from ethnic minorities are dealt with in the same manner, whether they have been living in the Netherlands for a short or long period of time, and whether they are first or secondgeneration members of their group. Via a second method, i.e. a comparison of different generations of the same origin group, this disadvantage is compensated to some extent. Using this method, a comparison is made in time, as it were, albeit that the data in question were collected at one single moment in time. These data can, for example, be used to answer the question of how many generations it takes before a certain origin group achieves a position in education or in the labour market that is comparable to that of the autochtonous Dutch population. Incidentally, here too, numerous factors complicate the interpretation of these developments.

One problem encountered when comparing generations is, for example, the continuous renewal of the migrant population, as a consequence of which the first generation consists of migrants with a duration of stay spanning from several months to as long as forty years. It would seem improbable that this first generation forms a homogeneous group consisting of individual members whose level of integration is comparable and achieved via a similar process. Account ought to be taken of a number of factors, including the specific economic situation applicable from the time of a migrant's arrival. Particularly in times of low economic activity, it is difficult for newcomers to the labour market to gain a position for themselves.

In order to achieve an understanding of economic developments, research is needed into developments over a longer period. For this reason, we also identify a third way of describing social integration, i.e. a comparison of the above statuses at different times. An autochtonous Dutch comparison group is vital for the demonstration of developments in the economic situation. For example, research can be used to ascertain whether social integration increases or, instead, decreases over time. This method of research provides some insight into the integration process. However, a number of observations can also be made. If developments in integration are described on the basis of trends, these will partly be determined by the composition of the origin categories. Variables such as age, sex and duration of stay influence chances of social participation, and should therefore be taken into account. Added to this, the level of origin-group entry

and exit is one of the factors that influences changes in time. As a consequence, a comparison of two moments in time will relate in part to different groups of individuals.

Therefore, the methods described above (statuses, statuses specified by generation, trends) provide insufficient information on the integration process. It will only be worthwhile to establish these statuses and trends for this purpose if (a random sample from) the choices made by those individuals who have achieved a certain level of integration at a certain period in time are known.

## Cohorts of newcomers

In order to understand the integration process, we have chosen to adopt the longitudinal method in this report. This entails that a fixed group of individuals (all ethnic-minority individuals residing in the Netherlands in 1998, for example) are monitored over time, on the basis of the indicators described above. For example, it may be found that a certain origin group is increasingly participating in the labour market. With the exception of people that die or (re-)emigrate, the group being monitored consists of the same individuals.

A further concentration of this method on the development of the Integration Monitor is the monitoring of cohorts of *newcomers*. This provides a picture of the integration process of a group that arrived in the Netherlands at more or less the same time. For example, the labour market participation of newcomers to the Netherlands in 1995 is monitored, as was the case in the study conducted by Hartog and Zorlu (2003). In this manner, the integration process is identified from the time at which individuals arrive in the Netherlands, so that the starting positions are comparable in terms of familiarity with the new environment.

By monitoring a cohort of newcomers, it becomes possible to evaluate the integration process. A comparison with the development of average participation in various social domains provides an indication of how quickly the newcomer cohorts approach that average. What is more, if we standardise according to a number of relevant background variables (age and sex, for example), we are able to ascertain whether – and if so, how quickly – a population is being approximated in the Netherlands that is equal in terms of these characteristics.

However, by studying just one newcomer cohort, it will not be possible to determine changes over time. This deficiency can be compensated for if various newcomer cohorts are compared with each other (for example, newcomers that immigrated in 1995 and 1998). This provides an insight into whether the integration process is happening faster or, in contrast, slower for different newcomer cohorts.

All these analyses can be refined even further by controlling the outcomes obtained for a number of relevant background variables. This might, firstly, be age, sex and level of education. These controls provide an insight into the factors relating to differences in integration.

The methods described above impose different requirements on the data required. The status of integration for origin groups can be studied on the basis of research at one measuring moment (cross-sectional study), trends identified on the basis of research on at least two measuring moments, while, for an insight into process-related developments, longitudinal data are needed, whereby data are collected for one category of people at different measuring moments. What is

more, to be able to control background characteristics, the control variables must also be present in the databases. Moreover, in order to be able to make a detailed distinction between countries of origin, for example, a considerable amount of data will be needed in order to guarantee the reliability of the results obtained.

The data sources for ethnic-minority studies often have major limitations. Surveys are predominantly limited to the 'big four' (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans), usually provide a cross-section of the populations and, as such, do not contain any longitudinal information. In addition, surveys are often subject to a relatively high and selective non-response, particularly amongst ethnic minorities, as a result of which results are distorted to a greater or lesser extent. Although the registers used (the personal records database, for example) are large and not subject to selective non-response, they do contain just a limited number of variables that can be controlled for. In this study, we use the Social Statistical Database, a series of linked databases, for which the personal records database forms the basis<sup>29</sup>.

The descriptive statistics discussed in the subsections above merely provide an indication of the socio-economic position achieved by groups. These differences may arise as a result of group composition, under the influence of demographic characteristics such as age, sex, living environment (which is associated with *social capital*) or under the influence of *human capital* accumulation, such as education and experience and duration of stay in the Netherlands, which reveals the transition and adaptation processes. Therefore, we estimate logical regressions in order to be able to explain the risk of receiving benefits and the chance of labour market participation on the basis of the variables available as indicated above.

## 2 Data available: the Social Statistical Database

In the Social Statistical Database, a large number of registers (including those maintained by the tax authorities, benefits agencies and the IB Group [Informatie Beheer Groep (IBG)]) are linked to the personal records database, per individual. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) has given permission to link its Central Aliens Register (CRV) to the Social Statistical Database, which has enabled us to investigate the significance of immigration motives for the integration process. Thanks to these links, the SSB provides individual data on all Dutch inhabitants, including demographic characteristics, employment, benefits, income, education and immigration motives. As such, this also enables us to learn about correlations between these different aspects. Because the different years are also interlinked, possibilities are created for longitudinal monitoring of people in the various registers. In addition to these registrations, personal surveys are linked to the SSB, so that missing data are added on a random test basis. In our analyses, we have drawn from years 1999-2003. The figures depict the situation of individuals forming part of the population of the Netherlands on one specific day in the year in question, i.e. the last Friday in September.

There are advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of register data. Although registers are, in general, integral and, as such, no sampling errors occur, and no problems arise in terms of selective non-response, the quality of

<sup>20</sup> 

For a description of the structure of the Social Statistical Database, see: Aarts, C.H. and E.M.J. Hoogteijling, 2002, Het Sociaal Statistisch Bestand 1998 and 1999. In: *Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek 2002 no. 12* (Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen), pages 13-21.

the administrative information is not always sufficient. In addition, it is not possible to operationalise all variables theoretically required on the basis of register information. The quality of information within the Social Statistical Database is enhanced by confronting data originating from different sources with each other. As a result, errors are detected, which are then corrected. An overview of this method and the adjustments made are described in Arts and Hoogetijling (2002). Therefore, the quality of the variables used from the Social Statistical Database is high, with the exception of the 'level of education' variable, which is linked separately to the Social Statistical Database, and originates from a source that has not yet been included.

#### 3 Data available; the Identification Service System (HKS)

The Identification Service System (HKS) provides national coverage, and has been used by the police since 1986 to register data on suspects. It contains both information on crimes reported and personal information on the corresponding suspects. One or more official reports may be made against a single suspect in one year, while an official report may, in turn, involve several offences. The information includes persons who are at least 12 years old and are named as suspects in a police report. The Identification Service System contains information on such matters as the offence, but also personal information on the suspect, such as date of birth, sex, country of birth and nationality.

Of course, the Identification Service System also has its limitations. Users of information from this System should be aware of this fact. The Identification Service System does not provide a complete description of crime in the Netherlands. Offenders who are not caught, offences for which no police report was produced, or offences of which the police were not informed, are not registered. In addition, the data held pertain to suspects, not individuals that have been convicted of any offences. Some suspects may not actually be offenders, which would distort crime-figure outcomes.

Added to the above, the so-called HALT settlements are absent from the Identification Service System. This is a conditional police dismissal, applied under the responsibility of the Public Prosecutions Department. An investigating officer designated by the Public Prosecutor proposes to a juvenile suspect who confesses that he take part in a HALT project, as an alternative to the submission of the police report to the Public Prosecutor. These situations will apply for relatively minor offences, which have been committed by a suspect for the first time. This concerns a total of approximately 20,000 settlements on an annual basis. In 2002, approximately 18,000 cases were settled via Halt. Of this total, almost 70% concerned criminal offences, and the remaining number of cases were less serious violations (misdemeanours). Youth involved in HALT projects do not form part of a special problem group. They are usually still at school, have a low level of truancy, do not use drugs (or very little) and are still living at home (Wang, Aten, Kruissink, Bouwers and Blom, 2003, pages 136-137; Halt Net, 2004).

Although little data are available in this respect, the suspicion is that individuals from the autochtonous Dutch population are slightly over-represented in HALT settlements and are, in any event, less under-represented than in the police reports produced and registered in the Identification Service System. If this is the case, differences between autochtonous Dutch and ethnic-minority individuals are being overestimated. Approximately the same proportion of autochtonous Dutch individuals would appear to appear in the HALT settlements as in the

population of the Netherlands. Almost half of criminal offences committed by autochtonous Dutch individuals in the 12-17 age category are settled via HALT. However, it must be observed that some HALT settlements do not pertain to criminal offences, but to violations. Virtually all of the ethnic-minority categories distinguished are under-represented or equally represented in the HALT settlements if we compare this against the population of the Netherlands. However, one category is over-represented, i.e. young Moroccans, but this over-representation is smaller than their over-representation amongst suspects from the Identification Service System. The proportion of HALT settlements for criminal offences amongst Moroccans is still no higher than 20% and, as such, is considerably lower than amongst autochtonous Dutch individuals. Amongst the other origin groups, the proportion of HALT settlements is also generally significantly lower than amongst autochtonous Dutch individuals.

# 4 The privacy guarantees of Statistics Netherlands

Statistics Netherlands compiles statistical data from a large number of different registration sources and surveys containing privacy-sensitive material. For this reason, Statistics Netherlands pays considerable attention to the protection of these data. This is, perhaps, even more important in the case of data on vulnerable population groups such as ethnic minorities. The Statistics Netherlands Act [wet op het Centraal bureau voor de statistiek], of 20 November 2003, stipulates that all administrative, technical and logistical measures shall be taken that are necessary for the protection of confidential data. The most important measures are as follows:

- The buildings of Statistics Netherlands are only accessible for authorised individuals. This is arranged by issuing access passes and ensuring the presence of security staff who monitor the proper use of said passes. Visitors to the Statistics Netherlands' building who do not have an access pass will be collected from the entrance by staff and returned to the entrance after their visit;
- The computer network is not accessible by Internet, making it impossible to hack into the Statistics Netherlands' network;
- All staff at Statistics Netherlands who work with individual data have signed a declaration in which they solemnly swear to abstain from violating the confidentiality of these data. However, should they do this, this may result in their immediate dismissal;
- If a statistical-data source reaches Statistics Netherlands, it is first broken down into directly identifying data (such as tax and social security number, A-number, date of birth, sex, postcode, house number) and other statistical data. The employees who are involved in linking the data only have access to the directly identifying data for the purpose of allocating linking keys. These linking keys are meaningless random numbers that are only meant for internal use. Because all sources are provided with this linking key, it is possible to interlink sources.
- The employees who analyse statistical data and compile overviews based on these analyses only have access to the statistical data and then only to the data that is relevant for their own work. This is ensured by a system of authorisations that documents the access rights of employees. This means that employees do not have access to the directly identifying data.
- In order to prevent individual data being sent to third parties via e-mail, employees who work with privacy-sensitive data have no authorisation to attach files to their e-mail messages.

# 5 Documentation for the tables compiled in the framework of the Integration Monitor 2005

When compiling the tables, the following Statistics Netherlands definitions were used to characterise the various population groups:

#### **Autochtonous Dutch population**

Persons of whom both parents were born in the Netherlands.

#### Ethnic minorities

Persons of whom at least one parent was born abroad.

#### First generation ethnic minorities

Persons born abroad with at least one parent born abroad.

#### Second generation ethnic minorities

Persons born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born abroad.

#### Western ethnic minorities

Ethnic minorities originating from Europe (excluding Turkey), North America and Oceania, or from Indonesia or Japan.

#### Non-Western ethnic minorities

Ethnic minorities originating from Turkey, Africa, Latin America and Asia, with the exception of Indonesia and Japan.

## Origin group

The characteristic that indicates which country an individual has an actual connection with, given the country of birth of the parents or the individual in question. The country of birth for ethnic-minority individuals born abroad is considered to be the country of origin. The mother's country of birth is considered the land of origin for ethnic-minority individuals born in the Netherlands if the mother was not born in the Netherlands. If the individual concerned and his/her mother were born in the Netherlands, the father's country of birth will be considered the country of origin.

## Pass rates, secondary education

Pass rates have only been indicated for groups greater than or equal to 50 examination candidates.

#### Pass rates

The percentage of students who passed the examination out of the total number of rejected and successful examination candidates.

#### Pre-university education (VWO)

Three different school types can be distinguished within pre-university education; the 'gymnasium', the 'atheneum' and the 'lyceum'.

The number of candidates for these different school types have not been included separately in this table.

The number of candidates for the final examination for pre-university education does not include the international baccalaureat.

Senior general secondary education (HAVO)

The number of candidates for the final examination for senior general secondary education does not include the English stream.

Junior general secondary education (MAVO) (and pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO)-theoretical and pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO)-combined)

Since the school year 1994/5, it has been possible to attain a combined diploma for junior general secondary education (MAVO) and pre-vocational secondary education (VBO). Combined junior general secondary education/pre-vocational secondary education (MAVO/VBO) is not included separately in this table. Candidates for the combined final examination MAVO/VBO have been included as candidates for the final examination for junior general secondary education (MAVO).

The number of candidates for the final examination for junior general secondary education (MAVO) does not includes the 'free schools' [*vrije school*]. Since school year 2002/3, it has no longer been possible to attain a diploma for junior general secondary education. With effect from this year, the junior general secondary education category is being continued by combining the prevocational secondary education theoretical learning pathway (including learning support [*lwoo*]) and the pre-vocational secondary education combined learning pathway (including learning support).

Pre-vocational education (VBO) (and middle-management vocational programme at pre-vocational secondary education level and basic vocational programme at pre-vocational secondary education level) Including learning support.

Figures for pre-vocational education include learning support. Since school year 1994/5, it has been possible to attain a combined diploma (MAVO/VBO) for junior general secondary education and pre-vocational secondary education. Combined junior general secondary education/pre-vocational secondary education is not included separately in this table. Candidates for the combined final examination (MAVO/VBO) have been included as candidates for the final examination for junior general secondary education.

The number of candidates for the final examination for pre-vocational education does not include the agriculture programmes or nautical education. Since school year 2002/3, it has no longer been possible to attain a diploma for pre-vocational education. With effect from this year, the pre-vocational education category is being continued by combining the middle-management vocational programme at pre-vocational secondary education level (including learning support) and the basic vocational programme at pre-vocational secondary education level.

# TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY Method:

The pass-rate data are based on the examination results register (ERR) maintained by the education inspectorate, collected by the Information Management Group (IB-Groep). This register contains the examination data for approximately 90 percent of the total final-examination-candidate group. Data on the origin group originate from the personal records database (GBA). The data from both registers have been merged and increased to the total final-examination-candidate population.

#### Population:

The secondary education included in the table relates solely to full-time education subsidised by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. Thus, adult general secondary education (VAVO) and education subsidised by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries have not been taken into consideration. Pupils that have withdrawn, and state-examination candidates have not been taken into consideration.

#### Accuracy and reliability:

Given the fact that the data are based on registration encompassing some 90% of the total, the statistical inaccuracy is quite small in general. Systematic deviations may occur given the selective nature of the group that is missing. We expect a possible selectivity by origin group due to selective linking return. The absolute number of ethnic-minority individuals may have been underestimated as a result. Another selectivity is that the number of 15-year olds is underrepresented. The linking percentage for these pupils is lower because the tax and social insurance numbers (*sofi-nummers*) are given less often. This applies chiefly to junior general secondary education and, to a lesser extent, to pre-vocational education.

Data sources used: Personal records database (GBA) Examination results register, education inspectorate

#### Work and benefits

Extra point for attention for tables in Section 5:

There may be some overlap between the various categories. For example, the entrepreneurs group consists of all self-employed individuals and some employees (i.e. managing directors of NVs and BVs and major shareholding directors). All individuals will be included for each of the categories applicable for them. Thus, an employee who is also receiving benefits will be included in both the *employees* and *Receiving benefits* categories.

Percentages have only been indicated for population groups greater than or equal to 100 individuals.

## Duration of stay:

A person's residence in the Netherlands in years from the last known date of settlement of this person in the Netherlands. This variable only applies to first-generation ethnic minorities who, after all, were not born in the Netherlands but only settled there later.

## Entrepreneur:

The individual in question is an entrepreneur (independent and/or major shareholding director (DGA) and/or managing director of an NV or BV (limited liability company).

## Benefits:

The following distinction is made in relation to benefits:

#### ABW:

Persons receiving income from assistance benefits. These benefits are paid pursuant to the National Assistance Act (ABW).

#### AO:

Persons receiving income from disability benefits. These benefits are paid pursuant to the WAO, WAZ or Wajong.

WAO = Invalidity Insurance Act

WAZ = Invalidity Insurance (Self-Employed Persons) Act

Wajong = Disability Benefits (Handicapped Young Persons) Act

#### WW:

Persons receiving income from unemployment benefits. These benefits are paid pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance Act (WW).

#### Other benefits:

Persons receiving income from benefits other than the WAO, WAZ, Wajong, WW and ABW. Other benefits are, for instance, retaining pay and benefits pursuant to the Ziektewet (*Sickness Benefits Act*), IOAW and IOAZ.

IOAW = Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled, Formerly Unemployed Persons.

IOAZ = Act on Income Provisions for Older or Partially Disabled, Formerly Self-Employed Persons.

#### Self-employed:

For financial years 1999 and 2000, the number of individuals who are self-employed was based on final tax assessments. As of financial year 2001, the number of self-employed individuals has been based on tax returns. Since some self-employed individuals had not filed a tax return at the time of observation, the self-employed individuals missing are observed via other registers maintained by the tax authorities.

# TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY Method:

The figures on work and benefits have been compiled on the basis of the Social Statistical Database (SSB). This database contains data on all individuals, jobs and benefits in the Netherlands that can be linked at micro level. To this end, data on individuals from registers and surveys at micro level have been linked and, where necessary, made consistent. An important objective of the Social Statistical Database is to create a database that provides a cohesive, consistent description of a number of aspects of the Netherlands' population.

When determining starting dates and end dates for jobs and benefits, the payment concept has been opted for within the Social Statistical Database. From this point of view, jobs and benefits are included if actual payments have been effected. This may result in differences with statistics that report a benefit or job if this has been entered into the administration (register basis) or when a right exists to payment (transaction basis).

The figures indicated in the tables show the situation of people forming part of the Netherlands' population on a fixed day in the year in question, i.e. the last Friday of September. This reference moment is not subject to day fluctuations and seasonal influences in terms of the number of benefits and jobs, as a result of which the figures over the years are able to be compared efficiently. When determining the ages of individuals, the age as at the last day of September was taken.

#### Population:

The total population registered in the Netherlands, from 15 to 65 years old.

#### Reliability:

The data on which the figures from these tables are based were available integrally.

For a detailed description of the structure of the Social Statistical Database, see: Arts, C.H. and E.M.J. Hoogteijling, 2002, Het Sociaal Statistisch Bestand 1998 en 1999. In: *Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek 2002 no. 12* (Netherlands Statistics, Voorburg/Heerlen), pages 13-21.

#### Marriages

Percentages have only been indicated when 25 marriages or more have been entered into by the population group in question.

# Marriages with an autochtonous Dutch partner:

The study looks at all marriages entered into by people from ethnic minorities in the year in question, and therefore also marriages of people from ethnic minorities who only came to live in the Netherlands at the time of the marriage or after the marriage.

Marriages for which the partner comes to the Netherlands from the country of origin: The study looks at all marriages entered into in the year in question by second generation ethnic minorities and by first generation ethnic minorities who lived in the Netherlands for at least one full year prior to the year of marriage. The marriage is classed as a marriage for which the partner comes to the Netherlands from the country of origin if the partner lived in the Netherlands between one year prior to the year of marriage and two years after the year of marriage.

#### Duration of stay:

A person's residence in the Netherlands in years from the last known date of settlement of this person in the Netherlands. This variable only applies to first-generation ethnic minorities who, after all, were not born in the Netherlands but only settled here later.

# TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY

#### Method:

The figures on marriages are based on information that Statistics Netherlands receives from the personal records database (GBA). This concerns individuals married to each other, living together at one address and who entered into marriage with each other in the year in question. Some time often elapses before ethnic-minority couples (whether or not in a mixed marriage) are able to live together at one address. When someone marries a partner from a non-Western country, it may easily take a year or even longer before this couple can actually live together. For this reason, the figures for 1999 are based on the status of the personal records database on 1 January 2002, the figures for 2000 on the status of the personal records database on 1 January 2003, and the figures for 2001 on the status on 1 January 2004.

In all tables, the data on marriages are indicated separately for men and women. Data source used:

Personal records database (GBA)

## Neighbourhoods

Table 7.3 and, within it, the variable *percentage of non-Western ethnic-minority individuals in the neighbourhood* only contains data on individuals (all ages) living in areas with 50 or more inhabitants.

## Risk of disclosure

Except where indicated otherwise in the explanations to the specific tables, percentages of data pertaining to individuals are not indicated when the cell in question contained fewer than 10 observations or when the complementary cell contained fewer than 10 observations.