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The Political Geography of Religious Radicalism

A compendium of selected case studies from around the globe

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Herausgeber GSWP

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Prologue

Religion has neither gone away nor remained irrelevant in our world today. There is no day that we do not hear news about religion in the media. The news we hear about religion and violence, however, appears to dominate the headlines. Although the history of religions and violence is not a new one, since September 11, 2001 there has been a growing concern about religious extremism and terrorism. At the same time, there is a corresponding interest in the subject of religion and violence among many disciplines. In the course GEO-83 “Political Geography of Religious Radicalism”, we offered students an excursion into the ambivalent world of religion and conflict through an exploration of different theoretical perspectives and approaches, case studies, seminal and class discussions and extensive literature review. The unique angle of interrogation that political geography offers in terms of the spatial dimensions and the power relations between different actors as well as the discursive aspects of inter-religious conflicts and extremism has proved very valuable in generating insights on this subject matter.

This volume is an attempt by students of the M.A. “Human Geography – Global Studies” programme of the University of Tübingen to demonstrate acquaintance with the approach of political geography to the study of religious violence and extremism. The students took on some of the most challenging conflicts and religious insurgencies confronting the world and offered insights using diverse theoretical and analytical frameworks. The analysis contained in each chapter was based on secondary data. Thus, limitations are set based on the availability of and access to data. Given the contested nature of religious conflicts and extremism, the reader is invited to consider all the articles in this volume as primarily an academic exercise with no intention to promote a certain narrative or to take sides. Knowledge is always incremental. Therefore, what is presented here is intended to increase our understanding of the phenomenon and to stimulate further research and efforts at finding solutions to the various conflicts.

No doubt, this exercise has exposed the students to the rigour of scientific writing. This experience will remain invaluable to them in their continuing academic pursuit as well as in their future endeavours. The lecturers also found this experience to be highly rewarding. The process was quite daunting, but the commitment and the dedication of the students paid off. Congratulations to all the authors for their hard work and special thanks to the student assistants Birgit Hoinle and Katherina Mayser for laying out and proof-reading the text!

Tübingen, October 2013

Rainer Rothfuß & Yakubu Joseph

Global Restrictions on Religion: Religious Freedom as a Human Right in Global Perspective

Marc Seemann

Abstract


The right to religious freedom is a fundamental human right which is, at least legally, acknowledged by almost all countries around the world. But nearly unrestricted freedom of religion is extremely rare. Globally, restrictions on the exercise of religion increased in recent years. There is always in some way a form of favouritism for a particular religion, even in the most liberal countries of the world, be it in political or legal terms. Religious freedom is a commonly accepted, desirable goal in today's globalised and liberal Western philosophy. But is total religious freedom feasible at all and is it an aim which governments should pursue? How far should a society or a government go with the demands on religious freedom for each individual religious system? What is a "religion" and what are religious beliefs and practices for the purpose of protecting the freedom of religion and who has to decide these questions? What role should religion play in society? Should societies not have the right to self-determination concerning these issues? This chapter attempts to give answers to those questions concerning the normative goal of absolute religious freedom, while taking other critical factors into consideration such as the historical and cultural heritage of a society.

1. Introduction: Religious freedom in the global context

“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948, clearly sets out that it is the right of every person to exercise his or her religion freely and without any restrictions. But this central human right is not generally accepted in the modern era. Already 2.500 years ago, Cyrus the Great of Persia, had established a broad regime of religious tolerance (Hertzke 2011: 109). But until now mankind has not been able to enforce this freedom right globally. This right has in fact been established in most national law systems and exists at least formally in most countries of the world. But legal practice often is different. More and more people worldwide live with tough restrictions on their religious freedom and often contradicting legal provisions; political practices and social values prevail. The increasing global restrictions on religious freedom are illustrated by figure 1. Restrictions concerning religious freedom are rising almost worldwide; so does the percentage of the global population living in countries where the level of restrictions is high, respectively very high (Pew Forum 2013: 10).



Source: Pew Forum 2013: 10


Fig. 1 Global Restrictions on Religion

As already indicated, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constantly faces debates concerning its claim for “universality”. Lundquist (2011: 75) points out that widely differing cultural and religious traditions and beliefs have inhibited a commonly accepted agreement on the definition of human rights and how they should be upheld. Whatever the reason might be, it is quite clear that among adherents of different religious systems it is apparently not possible to reach an agreement on such fundamental issues. In this context an interesting question is: if religions already fail on this fundamental level, how could they coexist in complete freedom? The above mentioned fact illustrates how difficult the way to a genuine religious freedom is. All in all, and in reference to the topic of this chapter, the core research question is: Considering the cultural and historical background, as well as the self-determination of a community, how far should the demands for religious freedom go? This chapter is devoted to this question, among other relevant aspects. For this reason it is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the role religion plays in a society and in policy. Unconditional freedom of religion or a genuine religious pluralisation is correspondingly rare. Rather, it can be seen that nearly in every society the hegemony of a particular religion is ostensibly desired by the majority of the population. So, is it not more desirable to grant any population this right of self-determination rather than strive for a goal that the majority usually does not seem to support? The chapter also takes another look at the role of the historical and cultural background of various religious systems.

The second part will throw a critical view on religious freedom. It deals with the fact that it is extremely difficult to implement genuine religious freedom because there are a large numbers of religious movements and splinter religions, besides the five world religions, of which all would interfere themselves by unrestricted exercise and which claim to be foundational, and thus encompassing and universal. How far should the demand for religious freedom go when a belief prevents the other from free exercise? To what extent is religious radicalism to be regarded as free exercise of religion, or at what point should it be restricted? Finally, everything leads to the question: Is a genuine religious freedom possible at all?

2. The role of religion in society and politics

In reference to the topic of this chapter, it is important to investigate what role religion plays in a society and what impact faith has on an adherent. How great is the influence of religion on his attitudes and decisions? From this view angle, it is interesting to scrutinize if and how a certain religious background may affect the decision makers of a country in terms of political and legal decisions. But first of all it is interesting to analyse the percentage of world population that is religious at all to clarify the role of religion in today's society. In figure 2 it can be seen that there was a dramatic change that has taken place over 100 years. In 1910 nearly the entire world was religious. By 2010 religious adherence had declined in many parts of the world (Johnson and Ross 2010: 6).



Source: Johnson and Ross 2010: 6

Fig. 2 Percentage of the world that is religious

Especially in the western society a move away from religious values is recognized, particularly concerning partnership affairs (divorce, homosexual couples, sex before marriage, etc.). Despite this decline, religion is still very important for a community. It represents an important source of identity for many individuals in the world, especially when they live in a pluralistic society. In such a society a religious system can be strengthened when a sense of religious identity is shared by a certain number of adherents but it has social effects as well. An individual feels some sort of affiliation to a specific group of like-minded individuals (Stump 2008: 15). And naturally an individual will tend to take over the views of the own faith group and integrate them into everyday life. This automatism becomes crucial if an individual holds a leading role in politics or in society. There is a hypothesis that legal systems tend to reinforce the hegemony of a certain religious system, using this certain religious system as an implicit model of what constitutes a religion, and thereby maintaining the marginalisation and restricting the freedom of other religions. Issues of religious freedom therefore frequently end up being the subject of legal judgement and political disputes (Beyer 2003: 333). Any politicians, judges and other public servants within the legal system will, of course, be always influenced to some extent by their religious background and related normative values. If so, is liberal politics possible at all? According to Vallier (2012: 149) it is a commonplace that liberalism and religious belief be in conflict. A politician, a judge or another incumbent on a political or legal level is supposed to suppress his faith to the exercise

of his profession, but is this genuine liberal politics? This question is very philosophical and complex, therefore a general answer cannot be given. What can be said is that the most important political commonality in an enlightened society, the legal basis, founds in joint liabilities, including civil rights and liberties, including freedom of religion as a condition of mutual recognition (Höffe 2011: 57).


In this context Hittinger (2011: 45 f.) says that the “care of the right of religious liberty belongs to the whole citizenry, social groups, the Church and other religious communities in the manner appropriate to each. Beyond the immediate issues of law and public order the ‘usages of society’ are presumed to be uses of freedom in their full range” and “society does not ‘belong’ to either the state or a religious system.” In summary it can be said that on the one hand religious freedom is crucial to societies and peace (Hertzke 2011: 108), but on the other hand some religious values are outdated and do not fit the image of a modern enlightened society and a secular and liberal state.

2.1 Religion in a cultural and historical setting

This chapter illustrates at the one hand that different regions with a different historical and cultural background tend to favour a particular religion. This is mainly due to the specific cultural and historical development that a region or a society underwent. Therefore, it is quite normal that a particular religion is preferred. The spatial distributions of a religious system and their development through diverse processes and over hundreds of years have fostered a specific religious environment in specific world regions. Which religious system has developed in which region mainly depended on the cultural development from which these processes were taking place. Thus, as an expression of culture, a religion’s worldview is socially produced and maintained. The fundamental aspects of every religion affect various aspects of cultural life in various forms (Stump 2008: 8 ff). Stump (2008: 11) shows that cultural variations within a community of believers can lead to conflict as specific individuals or groups contest the meanings of specific elements of their religious system or if they challenge the meanings of specific elements, respectively the whole believe of another group. According to Stump (2008: 11) such conflicts grow, the more a community becomes diverse. So, referring to Stump, it can be concluded that from a historical and cultural point of view a single religious system will provoke less conflicts within a community than a variety of religious systems.

On the other hand, although the most religious systems claim to be encompassing and universal, foundational of all human existence, including “nonreligious” social structures, the parallel claims of other religions and the greater power of other social modalities qualify those claims both in principle and in practice. In such a context it can be seen from a historical point of view that neither the hegemony of one single religious system nor a variety of religious systems is an advantage (Beyer 2003: 337). A good example for that point is India. In 2012 the population was 1.259 billion people (Stiftung Weltbevölkerung 2012: 12), there were five main faiths, namely Hinduism (which includes Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists), Islam, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Judaism, besides there are several sects and sub-sects living

in rather peaceful co-existence (Pal 2011: 233). This wide religious diversity is grounded in the history of the country, so is the traditional right of every religion to exercise their faith freely. The Indian state is expressly prohibited to discriminate any citizens on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth (ibid: 236). Yet, in stark contrast to this observation, there were and there are still today violent conflicts between several religious groups. Figure 3 shows that India appears to be one of the countries worldwide with the strongest “social hostilities” between different religious groups.



Source: Pew Forum 2013: 39

Fig. 3 Restrictions on Religion among the 25 Most Populous Countries

Nevertheless, India is a rather positive example concerning religious freedom as the government at least seems to contend a new wave of anti-conversion laws which favour the traditionally dominant religions and discriminate those individuals wanting to change their religion. The world in general, not just India, is becoming more and more pluralistic, so sooner or later people in general will be forced to live in more or less pluralistic societies. This shall not conceal the fact that some countries in recent years have increasingly tried to encounter those trends by rigidly persecuting and expelling specific religious minorities, trying to establish national, container like territories with a homogeneous religious composition of the citizenship.

At the global level, no religion has a majority position. In the past it could be said that ethnicity and religion are often linked. But today this correlation is becoming less and less relevant. Many minority religions in today’s world are not ethnically based (Durham Jr. 2011: 363). To come back to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter, if a plurality of many religious groups living in freedom next to each other is possible, the answer is yes, in the future they have to. How long the process may take until a society is “ready” to accept the


diversity of religions is hard to say and not even the trend towards increasing tolerance can be considered as natural and global.

3. Critical view on religious freedom

To summarize the first part of this chapter it can be said that genuine religious freedom is difficult to implement in political and social life and considering the history of the world, a genuine religious freedom had never been there. This raises the question of the feasibility of a absolute religious freedom, which is to be answered at this point.

The right of religious freedom can be considered from two perspectives. On the one hand, there are groups that are limited to some extent in the exercise of their faith. On the other hand, there are minorities or certain faith groups and extreme currents of a particular religion which are responsible for such restrictions by exercising their faith in a radical way, using religion as an excuse for violence. From this observation, a kind of paradox can be derived and it shows the main problem statement of this work. If there is a restriction for some radical movements of a certain faith then it can be stated that there is no genuine religious freedom in the respective country. But if there were no restrictions at all, the radical groups would impede other religious movements to exercise their faith freely. Thus a certain point must be found, a balance between religious freedom and restriction of religious freedom, if it becomes necessary to avoid greater conflicts. Finding and constantly adjusting the right balance is the main challenge here. The question whether genuine religious freedom is possible is to be answered with no, considering the above statement. It is not possible to admit all religious systems the same liberties without hindering any of them in their free exercise.

So what is the solution for this paradox? Looking at the world today and according to Beyer (2003: 333) the maintenance of some kind of religious hegemony is the rule all across global society. Furthermore, Beyer (2003: 333) says that "(...) limitations, frequently expressed in legal judgments and political decisions, are more or less to be expected because they flow from the peculiar way that religion has been constructed in the modern and global era as both a privileged and privatized, as both an encompassing and marginalized social domain." In general, it seems that some nations of this world tend to overtly control and restrict religious freedom, reinforcing the local hegemony of one religion or an atheistic or other national ideology (Beyer 2003: 333). In fact there are very strong contrasts between different nations and their way to handle religious freedom.



Source: Pew Forum 2013: 35

Fig. 4 Government restrictions around the world

Referring to Figure 4 and the Pew Forum (2013: 13, 39), 40 % of the world's countries have high or even very high levels of restriction. Furthermore it can be observed that most of the nations where the restrictions of the freedom of religion are high or very high are predominantly Muslim-dominated, whereas Christian countries are in average much more liberal. In order to implement genuine religious freedom it is necessary to answer the following questions: To what extent does a belief system behave as a spiritual religion and where is the limit where the secular state and other faith group's freedom rights are being hampered? To answer this question it is important to clarify how "religion" is defined. This is quite complex. There is an extensive scholarly and theological debate about that subject. Stringer (2008: 1) emphasizes that "there are almost as many different definitions of religion as there are people who try to define it." Stump (2008: 7), however, defines a religion "(...)" as a cultural system, an integrated complex of meanings, symbols, and behaviours articulated by a community of adherents." So it is very hard to say what counts as religious system and what not. According to the definition of Stump nearly every little community of members with a certain faith has to be considered as a religious system. The next question which arises is whose adherents can effectively claim to exercise their religion freely and which not and who decides that? To decide this it would be necessary to have clearly distinguishable patterns or specifications to assess what does and does not belong to a religion or what does and does not constitute religion (Beyer 2003: 334). Since it is difficult, as shown above, to define at all what can be considered as a religion and what cannot, these two questions are hard to answer. It is impossible to give an ultimate and all-encompassing answer to these two questions because they are very ethical and philosophical. The following chapter will attempt to give some kind of a response to these two questions.

3.1 Religious freedom in context of respect, tolerance and moral

If, as described in the previous paragraph, no absolute religious freedom is feasible or reasonable, how can a peaceful co-existence between adherents of different religious systems be accomplished? Unfortunately, there is no ultimate global standard for the handling of a state or a society with a diversity of different religions. This question is more about individual respect, tolerance and morality. Hittinger (2011: 39) reiterates this point by saying that “religious freedom is seen first and foremost from an anthropological and moral perspective”. Hertzke (2011: 111) emphasizes this fact by saying that “variations of the golden rule – to treat others as we would wish to be treated – are found in virtually every major religion and many philosophical traditions (such as Confucianism). This trait of common humanity – potentially recognizable by people of all faiths or no faith – can provide a justification for religious liberty understood as the freedom to live in accord with one’s conscience or belief.” Or to say it with the words of Mahatma Gandhi: “I have come to the conclusion that, if it is proper and necessary to discover an underlying unity among all religions, a master key is needed. The master key is that of truth and non-violence” (Pal 2011: 245).

4. Conclusion

The questions if religious hegemony is per se worse and if the freedom of religion is an aim that should have a high priority are in fact quite complex to answer when regarded in a global context. The fact that religious freedom must prevail in a modern secular state is undeniable. Furthermore, it can ultimately be noted that absolute religious freedom is not met in any country in the world but that in each state a particular religion, whether consciously or unconsciously, is preferred to some extent. In this sense full religious freedom is apparently not feasible and not desirable as it would neglect the cultural rootedness of societies. The “freedom of religion(s)” always will be subject to a certain degree of limitation. Therefore in my opinion it would be logical, realistic and more important, instead of striving for the seemingly unattainable goal of absolute religious freedom, to pursue the goal of a comprehensive "religious tolerance". By that I mean that there may well be a prevailing religious system supported by the majority of the society but beyond that other religions are fully tolerated by the whole society. The toleration of the diversity of religions or creeds is a must in a modern society. To answer the question from the beginning of this chapter, whether a genuine religious freedom seems really desirable or possible and how far should the demands for religious freedom go: In my opinion an absolute religious freedom is not possible, since certain belief systems and religious groups are too radical and must be limited in their rights, in order not to endanger the free secular state as well as other values and human rights, as set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN. Every religion, religious community or movement should have the right to exercise their faith freely at any time and at any place on earth within the given UN statutory framework. Additional fittings for a peaceful co-existence of different systems of belief ought to be possible. For me, this is ultimately a question of social and cultural development. Tolerance towards difference

and plurality must be the aim. Hence, at the core stands no longer the sole question of the degree of limitation of freedom of religion but the question of the degree of tolerance.

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Religious Extremism and Slavery in the Sahel: Historical and Present Structures

Sabine Stefanie Bösl

Abstract

Slavery has existed for centuries and is still an integral part of many societies in several forms all over the world. The following paper tries to uncover the structures of historical and contemporary slavery in the Sahel and to explain in detail this condition of inhumanity, which "denies a human being worth, dignity and freedom" (Turaki 2010: 76). Furthermore, a connection to religious extremism is revealed to help understand the emergence of the current structures in this region. By using Sudan as a case study, a more detailed explanation will be given on how suppression can be justified by one religion over another, and what impact this can have both on the oppressed religion and on the entire social fabric. The Sudanese example shows how the ancient structures of slavery are still anchored in the Sudanese society today and how they could expand again in the past decades, especially during the second civil war between the largely Muslim North and the non-Muslim South.

1. Introduction

Slavery is mostly considered as the transatlantic slave trade, which emerged approximately in 1450 and had reached its zenith in the first half of the 19th century, as Europeans sold Africans to North America (Flaig 2011: 160f). But what role has slavery played before the transatlantic slave trade in Africa, what role has the sale of slaves to other countries played and what role does it play today even within societies? Slavery has not been effectively abolished till today; it is an explosive and very present topic, which sometimes also relates to religious extremism. The following paper will deal with slavery and religious extremism in the Sahel in past and present. The Sahel is defined as the belt south of the Sahara, which reaches from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. The countries belonging to the Sahel zone, are Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia (Haack 2008: 168).

This working paper is based on the slavery definition of Paul Lovejoy: "Slavery was one form of exploitation. Its special characteristics included the idea that slaves were property; that they were outsiders who were alien by origin or who had been denied their heritage through judicial or other sanction; that coercion could be used at will; that their labour power was at the complete disposal of a master; that they did not have the right to their own sexuality and, by extension, to their own reproductive capacities; and that the slave status was inherited [...]" (Lovejoy 1983: 1).

2. The connection between religious radicalism and slavery

There is a very important link between slavery and religious radicalism when people of different religious background are involved in the exploitation relationships. Religion is a factor that underlies many conflicts, wars, devaluation and discrimination.

Slavery is also linked to these factors and can be employed as an instrument to suppress people from another religion. Inter-religious enslavement is strongly associated with the superiority thinking of one religion over another which serves as justification of the exploitation of the 'other'. Slavery is a form of sanction which has been performed by almost all human societies and religious groups at some point of time during the historical past. Religion is often baseline for the justification of slavery and oppression. (Turaki 2010: 76)

Religious extremism is a phenomenon which is elusive and difficult to define, since it is constituted on the basis of a "normal behaviour". The deviation of religious extremism of this "normal behaviour" is difficult to measure. Thus, this deviation, which is characterised by institutionalised expectations, is interpreted differently depending on the culture. Extremism is embedded between terrorism, as the most extreme form, and radicalism. Extremists believe in a homogenous community, targeting society as a whole, with the consequence of coercion and suppression of minorities (Bötticher/Mareš 2012: 51f). Religious extremism is committed to faith-based values which cannot be brought into line with human rights standards. It is characterised by intolerance against other faith groups and atheists as well as stigmatisation and devaluation. Religious extremists try to enforce their religion in society at large and in public space. Violence is a typical but an obligatory feature of religious extremism. Main forms of violence are religious wars, religious terrorism and repression against members of marginalised religious communities (Bötticher/Mareš 2012: 275ff).

The Jihad, an expression of Islamic extremism, played an important role during the enslavement of Africa. Jihad is understood as a religious duty of all Muslim believers and has been employed by conquerors as a strategic instrument of warfare to pursue geopolitical goals. This religious duty comprised fighting a war that leads to the subjugation of non-Muslim peoples. It is often referred to as a 'holy war', which is prescribed, legitimized and is performed for and also rewarded by God (Flaig 2011: 83; Bötticher/Mareš 2012: 255). Turaki (2010: 50) defines the worldwide spatial dichotomy in the Islamic worldview as follows: "Islam divides the world into two spheres, Dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (house of war, or areas belonging to unbelievers). Through jihad the Dar al-Harb becomes the Dar al-Islam." Slavery and the enslavement are justified by the fact that the Islamic warriors solely act in the sense of their God and serve him. In this case the religion acts very radical to force other people to convert to Islam or, alternatively, live in total subjugation as stipulated in Sharia laws. No other religion besides Islam is tolerated; this is why the enslavement of other Muslims is forbidden (Flaig 2001: 112; Fisher/Fisher 1970: 17). In general, any 'unbeliever' who got captured during a Jihad had the chance to be enslaved or had to die. Jihads have been the common instrument to enslave people and to meet the increasing

demand for new slaves. Those Jihads, almost without exception, had to be regarded as regular wars with the purpose of conquest. In the conquered areas many tribes had already been converted to Islam but against the very logic of Jihad still were considered as slave reservoirs (Flaig 2011: 121f). According to Flaig (2011: 145) the purpose of Jihad had changed over time: Originally serving to force unbelievers to convert to Islam, Jihad has been increasingly used to constantly obtain new slaves for all kinds of domestic, administrative, productive and military tasks. Slavery in the trans-Saharan context apparently has had a strong relationship with religious oppression and suppression.

Jihads did not lead only to the enslavement of Africans but also involved genocides. Genocides are characterised by the special purpose to destroy, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Genocides are referred to as “crime of crimes”. There were literal hunts on African slaves during which genocides in the strictest sense could occur as many of the affected tribes have been completely obliterated. All prisoners, which could be used as slaves, were forced to go with the hunters. Usually, all of the others, such as old or ill people, children etc., were killed (Flaig 2011: 145). Genocide can be seen as the worst expression of violent religious extremism. In general, the measure of enslavement does not pursue the goal to completely exterminate tribes but rather to aggregate labour force or to increase military power. Nevertheless, the subjugation of people and their deliberate devaluation is a warning signal and can get visible in many different forms, like enslavement, genocides, racism, among others (Barth 2006: 183f).

3. Historical structures of slavery

3.1 The beginning and origin of slavery and the link to religious radicalism

There is a difficulty marking the exact beginning of slavery. But a clear fact is that slavery was pervasive in all the ancient societies, like in the Orient, Egypt, Greece and Rome. The oldest evidences that slavery existed were found in the Orient and are dated to the early 3rd millennium before Christ. In Pharaonic Egypt, there have been already several types of slaves and forced labour, so that there was a differentiation for example between a purchased slave or a state slave (Flaig 2011: 33f). Already during the Jewish slave-history a strict distinction between Jewish bondages or slaves and slaves of foreign origin was made (Flaig 2011: 34).

Slavery in the Sahel reached its highest level in the first half of the 19th century, as the export of rubber became an important economic factor. The demand of commodities such as rubber, ivory, ostrich feathers, salt, livestock, grain etc. in Europe and also in the savannah increased. The production in the Sahel was heavily dependent on the labour of slaves. Therefore, the number of slaves rose considerably in those years, especially from the 1830ies to the 1850ies and donated this area prosperity. The slaves were used for all kinds of labour but especially for heavy physical work. They collected manure for fires, minded and watered the herds, loaded and unloaded camels for the trade, did constructing, prepared food and did a lot of other work for their masters, so that slavery itself was an essential building block within the

whole economic and social system (Lovejoy 1983: 210ff). But not only export trade was an important factor in increasing the number of slaves, the other factor was the expansion of the regional economies (ibid: 184).

The procurement of the increasing demand of slaves took place through the transformation process in this area. Since 1804 series of jihads took place in the whole region and religiously transformed large parts from Senegambia in the west to the Red Sea in the east. The transformation ended with the enslavement of millions of people (Lovejoy 1983: 184). The example of Sudan shows to which extent slavery has been adopted in some parts of the Sahel: in the end of the 19th century, the quote of slaves at the total population reached from 30 to 50 per cent and also up to 80 per cent in some commercial and production centres (ibid: 184f).

Enslavement in the Sahel in the 19th century is characterised by two main phases: the first phase occurred due to far-reaching restructuring of the old systems, such as political economy, which led to an expansion of the plantation system. Most of the slaves concentrated in Senegambia, Niger and Sudan. The second phase lasted from 1850 to 1900 when the slave concentration mostly rose in the southern parts of the Sahel (Lovejoy 1983: 188).

Slavery is a phenomenon which historically often occurred when one religion tried to suppress another. This "superiority" of one religion over another which is symbolically reflected in the form of slavery has often occurred between different religions. In the case of the transatlantic slave trade the European Christians have been enslavers over the Africans. The Portuguese gave the impetus with regard to the transatlantic slave trade. They started with large-scale oceanic exploration in the 15th century and subsequently began with the import of slaves from Senegambia (Flaig 2011: 161). In the same century the transatlantic slave trade began and many of the European countries were involved. In this case the Africans have been the sellers of humans, the Europeans the purchasers, who resold the slaves to the transatlantic colonies (ibid: 171ff). The largest export regions were Gabon, Congo and Angola. (ibid: 172) The transatlantic slave trade existed from about 1450 until 1900. During this period nearly 11,700,000 Africans were deported (Lovejoy 1983: 19).

3.2 Forms of slavery

There are five main differentiations within the African slavery: chattel slavery, household slavery, service-provider slavery, permanent indenture and child slavery. The *chattel slavery* rose after the collapse of the transatlantic slave trade. It benefitted from the conditions given in the Sahel because of several factors such as good conditions for large-scale crop cultivation due to abundance of water, governments which did not oppose slavery through anti-slavery legislation. Another type of slavery is the *household slavery*. This type is characterised by the fact that most of the slaves remain in the same household for lifetime and their children are supposed to do the same work. Often, these slaves are closely linked to the master's family, because of the long-term durability of the exploitation relationship and were often found in the rural parts of the Sahel. The *service provider slavery* has its roots in building up a military

system with slaves serving as soldiers; in many cases slaves took over administrative functions. The slaves received some power within the exploitation system and in return they secured their total loyalty towards their masters. The *indentured slavery* has a strong correlation with the Sahelian Quran schools and is a kind of contractual relationship between children and their masters, the Quran teachers. The children have the duty to beg for coins in cities. This form of slavery expanded after World War I as a reaction to the attempt of the colonial powers to abolish all other forms of slavery. *Child slavery* is the last category which is generally related to child labour as a form of economic exploitation. This type of slavery has gained more importance until today than the other forms of slavery in the Sahel (Brynn 2008).

3.3 The Arabian impact on slavery and religious radicalism

Arab Muslims began to occupy the north of Africa in the late seventh century after Christ. Soon afterwards the trans-Saharan slave trade began whereby the Arabs acted as buyers and merchants. For people who were captured in wars against Muslims the justification for becoming enslaved was the status of 'unbeliever' and not the racial criterion (Hunwick 2006: 75f). The Prophet Muhammad is quoted like: "White has no preference over black, nor black over white except through devoutness" (ibid: 76). "Devoutness" again shows the religious aspect in the issue of slavery. As long as you are devout, you are permitted to suppress other people independently of their skin colour. The prevailing attitudes are not caused primarily by preachers and traditional aspects, but also by warriors and slave owners who have shaped this attitude in Islamic society and built several stereotypes about slaves as a "lazy, stupid, evil-smelling and lecherous slave" (ibid: 77). In general, Arabs saw all black Africans as "weak-minded savages" and as "inferior human beings whom they could claim as slaves" (ibid: 89). The fact that the Arabs saw black Africans as "inferior human beings" shows the attitude of superiority-thinking which served as justification to force other people into the worst form of oppression: slavery. The first Africans who had been enslaved by the Arabs were Ethiopians. Later the Arabs expanded "their territory" and enslaved black Africans who became their main slave reservoir until the 20th century (ibid: 89).

4. Present structures of slavery

4.1 Status quo

Although the religiously motivated terror attacks declined in worldwide average to the lowest level of a five-year observation period in 2011, the violent occurrences in parts of Africa and also in Latin America have risen to the highest level (Nicoll 2012: 1f). As Nicoll (2012: 1) states, "in Mali, Mauretania, Niger and Nigeria, Islamist militants have filled power vacuums created by ineffectual national governments, and tapped into religious and socio-economic grievances". Furthermore, these activities show a so called spill-over effect influencing other

countries of the Sahel as well, becoming more and more destabilised by militant insurgencies. Also the AQIM, the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is currently operating in the Sahel with support from Islamist radicals and from outside the region. Their conservative aim is the return of the rule of 'original' Islam in this area (Nicoll 2012: 1f).

Considering the distribution of religions in the Sahel, Islam today is increasingly dominating the picture. The whole North part of Africa is dominated by Islam with a decreasing religious diversity over the past century. (Johnson 2009) This development is partly the result of the discriminatory effects of religious extremism, of historical Jihads and slavery. The only areas that are still significantly influenced by other religions are Nigeria and Ethiopia with a share of Christians as well as Sudan and Chad with a proportion of animists (Haack 2008: 170). Africa as a whole is separated in two parts: nearly the whole North is dominated by Muslims, the South mainly by Christians. This is a development which has occurred in the last century. In 1910 the majority religion in Africa was Ethnoreligion with about 58%, followed by the Islam with 32% and only 9% of the whole African population were Christians. In 2010 the percentage was completely different: the majority religion in Africa was Christianity with 48% almost exclusively in the South of the continent, followed by the Islam with 40% of the whole African population (Johnson 2009).

Religious extremism today is nearly back on the highest level in history and even slavery did not fully disappear in the last century. It has survived and returned in renewed strength. Under colonial influence, slavery was pushed back and was considered abolished (Lobban 2001). There are several factors which have sustained or even strengthened slavery until today. One reason is the embryonic development stage and sometimes even collapse of secular state-funded education systems, especially in the rural parts of the Sahel, allowing child slavery to flourish in this area. Another factor is the reinforcement of religious extremism and fundamentalism in the region. The increasing poverty particularly in rural parts of the Sahel as well as the weaker presence of central governments in marginal areas contributes to this development (Brynn 2008).

4.2 Current forms of slavery

Since a few years several parts of the developing world witness the *globalization of child slavery*. Four factors influence and give rise to this new type: one factor is the critical poverty level in most parts of the Sahel which forces parents to give their children away to a master, to ensure food provision for the family. Another reason are the recently emerging new plantation systems where children are used for harvesting cocoa, bananas, cotton, etc. Another aspect is the enhanced transportation system, allowing children to work at distant locations (Brynn 2008). But also governments have an impact on the expansion of children slavery because the "effective governance by central authorities in certain West African states" declines or is simply not given (Brynn 2008). There are several other forms and variations of slavery which exist today, such as: *bonded labour, forced labour, early and forced marriage, slavery by*

descent, meaning that the respective individuals were born into slavery, and also *human trafficking* as the commercial core activity of the enslavement process (Anti-Slavery International n.d.).

4.3 Case study: Civil war in Sudan

The civil wars between the southern and northern part of Sudan which started just before independence of Sudan from the British in 1956, led to a resurgence of slavery. Especially after the beginning of the second civil war in 1983 enslavement became a widespread strategy of terroristic warfare when Dinka women and children from southern Sudan were captured, abducted and sold. The captured persons were Christian or animist black African Sudanese from the south who were enslaved by Arab Muslims from the north. The Sudanese government equipped Arab Muslim nomads from the region bordering with the south as paramilitaries against the rebels of the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) and to commit atrocities against the civil population. The government indirectly supported and, at the same time, denied the existence of slavery, calling it instead "kidnapping" by usual criminals. In the course of enslavement through the North up to 300 000 people were forcibly abducted and taken out of the South for decades since the beginning of the civil wars. Until today there still live and work many slaves from the South in mostly rural areas of the North, especially in the households of their Muslim masters. (Rothfuss 2013: 121)

"Slavery in Sudan is initiated through violent raiding, which reduces the status of an abducted person from a condition of freedom and citizenship to one of slavery, cheap labourer, and a liability, when physically unfit. Most important is that citizenship and entitlement to legal protection are undermined, whether through lack of laws or violation of existing laws, leaving the state unable to protect individual rights" (Jok 2001: 4).

There are several factors that influence slavery in Sudan. Of course, the civil war and the government play important roles in the enslavement processes, but also the religious norms and the long-lasting tradition of slavery in this region is a major aspect: Large parts of the population 'tolerated' slavery because it had been practised against non-Muslim populations for centuries.

The religion and in the following the religious extremism are important factors in the Sudanese civil wars. The Islam arrived in Sudan in the 7th century A.D. (Ousman 2004: 90) The North is marked by a mainly Muslim Arab speaking population whereas southern Sudan was subject to some extent to Western and Christian influence and shows a stronger indigenous African self-identification and awareness:

"Many northern Sudanese had the notion that there were a bunch of uncivilized tribes in the South, and very condescendingly, Northerners regarded themselves as guardians of these, their backward brethren. [...] Northern Sudanese politicians and administrators sought to replace the colonial regime in the South with their own. Arabic was naturally to replace English and what better religion than Islam could replace Christianity" (Observation of a unknown South Sudanese/ ObDeng 2001).

But there was always a strong southern Sudanese resistance against the northern suppression and humiliation: "The more the South grows, the more Northerners feel threatened and the stronger their attachment to Arab Islamic identity becomes" (ibid).

Just as the self-identification of the northern Sudanese with Islam gets stronger, also the the South Sudanese adhere more strongly to their religion which is increasingly Christianity (Rothfuss 2013). For Southerners Christianity is not only a religion, it is also a "political weapon against Islamization and Arabization" (Deng 2001). This way it is not only a religious belief but also a political statement. In January 2005, the second civil war between the North and South Sudan ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This agreement foresaw a durable ceasefire and a semi-autonomous government for South Sudan. In addition, it regulated the southern Sudan referendum on independence which took place six years later in 2011 and led to the splitting up of the conflict-torn country. According to international NGOs, the government of South Sudan and other local sources many Southerners still remain enslaved under very cruel conditions in Sudan until today (BBC 2013; Rothfuss 2013).

4.4 Conclusion and outlook

"Human rights have their origin in the fight against slavery. They exist, as long as this worst form of personal privation is outlawed, and they fall, when slavery returns. [By the human rights] there could be calculated the chances of a political universalism, which is able to unite humanity." (Flaig 2011: 11)

Unfortunately, slavery is still quite often a part of societies worldwide. This "tainted legacy" (Turaki 2010) has often been erased from historical consciousness and narratives. In the last decades, slavery has even recovered and regained importance in connection with religious radicalisation and global linkages of economic exploitation also involving the West. In the case study of Sudan it could be shown that religious extremism can drive slavery. As long as certain groups adhere to superiority-thinking, justifying oppression, slavery will remain a part of our world. In addition, states must also intervene themselves instead of indirectly using slavery as a weapon to weaken specific religious or cultural groups within their societies. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underlined in 2012:

"Today governments, civil society and the private sector must unite to eradicate all contemporary forms of slavery. Together, let us do our utmost for the millions of victims throughout the world who are held in slavery and deprived of their human rights and dignity" (UN 2012).

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‘Othering’ in the Postcolonial World: The Reproduction of Colonial Structures in African Societies (Malawi)

Jana Mauthner

Abstract

Western attitudes towards Middle Eastern and Far Eastern states have often been criticized to be imperialistic, led by prejudices and arbitrary conceptions of other cultures and religions. In the following the conception of this Orientalist world view has been reflected critically by many scholars (Craiutu 2010: 265). Edward Said is one of the most popular authors who promoted this criticism. Said states that, in producing differences between the Self and the Other, the Orientalist discourse, reinforces the bias and conflicts between the West and the Orient. Orientalism is also closely related to colonial policies (Ghazoul 2004: 124). In colonial states the western powers imposed their own system of knowledge and values on indigenous people. This ‘Othering’ is often transferred, not at least promoted by the Protestant church, to a post-colonial era, how the case of the African state Malawi shows (Jones and Manda 2006: 197). Thus, the paper deals with the reproduction of colonial structures in postcolonial African states via discourses, like Foucault and Said describe them. The argument offered here, is that we need to follow Said’s assumptions to understand, that it is necessary to overcome the essentialisation of people in order to reduce the possibility of religious conflicts, and the reproduction of constructions of the colonial age. Thus, difference should no longer be seen as a threat but a chance. Nonetheless, the perception of Said and other scholars who endorsed the criticism on Orientalism should not be overemphasised.

1. Introduction

Said’s book called ‘Orientalism’ is viewed as remarkably powerful in opening the field for postcolonial thinking in literacy (Mellor 2004: 99). Identifying the failures in human representations and realities, Said strives to show, that the representation of Eastern and Middle Eastern history is clearly led by prejudices, misconceptions and imperial interests of colonial powers (Mellor 2004: 99; Craiutu 2010: 265). In Said’s view the Orient is created in Western knowledge as irrational, staying in sharp contrast to the rational, mature Occident (Mellor 2004: 101). Hence, Orientalism is associated with imperialism, colonialism and racism (Gardaz 2003: 93; Go 2013: 29). Furthermore, he emphasizes that the knowledge of the Other is used to characterize groups as inferior and to create a negative image of the Orient. Thus, the Self is constructed through the knowledge about the Other (Meghana and Malone 2009: 255). In this view, Orientalism always has an ideological underpinning tied to political and economic interests (Ghazoul 2004: 123-124; Bowman 2003: 500).

‘Othering’ of the non-Western and the Western world is also closely linked to Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis. In this regard he argues that cultural identities are the main sources of conflicts in the post-cold war world. In consequence, the terror acts of September 11th and the following war on terror are claimed to be the result of cultural and religious

conflicts (Meghana and Malone 2009: 253-254). Beck speaks in this context of new global risks (Beck 2011: 1346). Orientalist assumptions are reinforced since 9/11. Likewise, Foucault sheds critical light on the fact that the construction of identities is related to religious beliefs. According to Foucault, all societal groups are culturally represented and classified by discourses (Mellor 2004: 107). Said's considerations are mainly influenced by Foucault's description of discourse analysis. Referring to Foucault and Said it can be assumed that identities are constructed via discourses (Meghana and Malone 2009: 255-255; King 2001: 113-115).

In many African states, as Malawi, it can be observed that authoritarian leaders reproduce colonial structures and the differentiation between various ethnic, religious or cultural groups. Cultural differences seem to be a source of conflicts in, as well as among states (Posner 2004: 529). In some of the African states authoritarian leadership is closely linked to religious radicalism (Mellor 2004: 99). Religious groups instrumentalise cultural binarizations established in colonial times to realise their particular interests in various national states. Thus, Religious groups, seen as imagined communities, like Andersons defines them, can reinforce violent actions by referring to a violent Other (ib.: 104). In the same way, the culturalistic anthropology hinders the development of new identities (Bowman 2003: 500).

Nevertheless, especially the contemporary discourses about Islamic terrorism shed critical light on Said's arguments. By the same degree, Said sees Islamic fundamentalism as the result of Western injustices. But authors like Mellor highlight, in referring to Islam, the possibility of an 'Othering' in reverse (Mellor 2004: 100). Mellor stresses that "Robbing Muslims of agency in this manner also robs them of responsibility for their actions for everything is the West's fault (...)" (Mellor 2004: 107). In this context he emphasizes that Said's work is full of contradictions. Thus, Said's assumptions have been questioned by many authors who come to diametrically opposed conclusions, like Michael Curtis. In arguing that the Orient isn't only the victim of Western imperialism, he strives to show that the harsh conflict between the democratic Western and the authoritarian Muslim world does not exist. Moreover, the depiction of the latter can be considered, as said by Curtis, as diverse (Craiutu 2010: 265).

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 'Othering' and the Construction of Identities

Postcolonial theory is clearly linked to the criteria history, agency, representation, identity and discourse (Kumar 2000: 82).

"Postcolonialism was traditionally seen as a period of history initialising the 'handing over' of colonised states by what were classified as supreme powers to rulers born and bred in the colonies themselves" (ib.: 82).

Postcolonial theory was mainly advocated through the work of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha (Go 2013: 25). Said's analysis of the Orientalist discourse starts in the late

18th century striving to describe the European colonial involvement and to reveal the link between knowledge and power interests (Haldrup et al. 2006: 175). Postcolonial theorists strive to dismantle definitions of power balances and discursive practices discriminating particular groups (Kumar 2000: 83). The underlying concept referred to by many scholars, is the construction of similarity and alterity, namely ‘Othering’.

‘Othering’ relies on the construction of dichotomies between categories such as race, colour, religion, development and modernity (Jones and Manda 2006: 197). The construction of the Other is also interrelated with hierarchy and racism. Said is one of the most popular scholars who has engaged in the reflection of ‘Othering’. Said differentiates between the Occident and the Orient in his work. In Said’s view, the latter is associated with a certain kind of discourse, which he names the Orientalist discourse, transmitting Western knowledge of the Oriental world. The knowledge about the Other is, as said by Said, used to characterize certain groups as inferior. European thinking, as well as the academic European discourse are seen as imperialist and hegemonic in Islamic view. Especially the fear of the Other centred in the medieval Christian religion proves to be racist, imperialist and ethnocentric in Said’s understanding (Mellor 2004: 100; Gardaz 2003: 94)

Said shows that Western scholars try to exercise power over the Orient, and identities are constructed through narratives and monographs published by those scholars (Meghana and Malone 2009: 264; Haldrup et al. 2006: 174). Hence, negative images about the Orient, the Islam and the Arab world, are created. Furthermore, Said highlights that Islam is misrepresented in an Orientalist view (Mellor 2004: 100). In the spotlight is the collective essentialisation of the Middle East in processes of ‘Othering’ (Meghana and Malone 2009: 253). This goes hand in hand with the construction of cultural and religious stereotypes (Haldrup et al. 2006: 176). This means that the heterogeneity of the Oriental culture is not acknowledged (Bowman 2003: 500).

The natural predominance of the Western world is legitimized not only by education, but by genetics (ib.: 124). Repeatedly imperial missions, in disseminating disinformation about the Islamic world, were justified by ‘Othering’ (ib.: 123). More often, these operations have an ideological underpinning and serve the interests of the imperial powers (Meghana and Malone 2009: 256). Colonial policies are largely influenced by the knowledge of the Other, which often has a negative connotation (Ghazoul 2004: 124). The non-Western world is identified as a danger for the Western world. This justifies Western imperialism. Accordingly, Orientalism can be defined in Said’s understanding as a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said 1979: 12). In this process the Other is permanently devaluated. Hence, Orientalism is for Said a discursive system of dominance (Haldrup et al. 2006: 175).

This understanding is closely linked to what Anderson explains in his book *Imagined Communities*. Benedict Anderson describes nationalism and patriotism in his study *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, which was published first in 1983, as imagined communities that are cultural features, embedded in

history and structures. Especially religious groups can be identified as imagined communities based on a shared language (Anderson 2006: 3 ff).

Huntington's findings are also related to Said's assumptions. In his 1993 published book 'Clash of Civilizations' Samuel Huntington argues that cultural and religious identities are the main sources of conflicts in the post-cold war world. Edward Said picks out the distinction between collective identities of the West and the Orient as a central theme (Meghana and Malone 2009: 253).

To sum up, Bhaba, Spivak, Said and other postcolonial theorists plead for the demystification, decentralisation and the destigmatisation of the colonial discourses in order to reach to a discourse of cultural hybridity (Kumar 2000: 86; Ghazoul 2004: 124). This interpretation is displayed in Said's conception of culture, which he defines as "a matter of (...) appropriations, common experiences and interdependencies of all kinds among different cultures" (Said 1993: 262-263, cited in Jones and Manda 2006: 198).

Said speaks of cultural hybridity rather than cultural essentialisation. Referring to the latter assumption of Said, Bhabha establishes the concept of a hybrid space of enunciation, in which the role of culture can be reorganized and the antagonism between different cultures and religions can be overcome (Jones and Manda 2006: 198-199). In this understanding, one can differentiate between acculturation and transculturation. While transculturation means that different cultures are treated as equal actors, it is significant for acculturation that other cultures are subordinated and disempowered by the dominant culture (ib: 199). Nonetheless, it is necessary to take into account, that this postcolonial view has been criticised by many scholars. As Mellor says:

"Said can be praised for his illumination of the fact, that many forms of Western scholarship have been nowhere nearly so 'objective' as they have claimed to be, and for alerting us to the dangers of perpetuating images of non-Western cultures that represent them in damaging ways" (Mellor 2004: 100).

Even so, one main problem is that Said denies the influence of Islam in the Middle Eastern world, while emphasizing the strong impact of Christianity on Western patterns. Thus, he relies on the same mistakes made by the Orientalist scholars he aims to criticize (ib.: 100). Said condemns that the Orientalist view does not take into account the heterogeneity of Middle Eastern society, but simultaneously represents the Western view on Islam himself (ib.: 104). Mellor emphasizes that Said misunderstood that Islamic developments are not only the reaction on Western influences (ib.: 100). In the same manner, Curtis advances the opinion that the Islam is not the constant victim of the Western world by stressing that the depiction of the Orient by Western scholars was heterogeneous (Craiutu 2010: 265).

2.2 The Discourse-Analysis of Foucault

The suppositions depicted in the section above are closely linked to the social constructivism of Foucault (Mellor 2004: 99). Said relies on the foucauldian assumptions in view of

discourse theory (Mellor 2004: 100; King 2001: 115; Go 2013: 30). According to Said, the knowledge and understanding of the Orient has the intention to justify power interests via discourses. So, differences between societal entities are reinforced discursively (Meghana and Malone 2009: 254).

Foucault states in 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' that a "discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be assigned particular modalities of existence" (Foucault 1972: 107). He emphasizes that discourses can influence the reality transmitted via language (Keller et al. 2008: 11).

These ideas also rely on the sociology of knowledge introduced by Berger and Luckmann in their publication 'The Social Construction of Reality'. They analyse the relationship of discourses and the power of knowledge as well as how particular actors influence the construction of reality through their resources (Keller 2008: 205; Weber 2013: 43-46, Glasze et al. 2005: 42-43). They state that identities are formed discursively (Meghana and Malone 2009: 275). Dichotomies and differences are transmitted via language daily. Haldrup et al. name this banal Orientalism (Haldrup et al. 2006: 175). In the same manner, Foucault highlights that the depiction of issues in discourses can influence the social reality (Weber 2013: 45; Keller 2008: 204-205).

Hegemonic discourses are a very relevant element of discourse analysis (Nonhoff 2008: 308; Weber 2013: 58). According to Gramsci, hegemony is associated with the domination of one class by another, and often implies the enforcement of political interests (Mellor 2004: 103). Hegemonic discourses structure everyday life (Haldrup et al. 2006: 177). An interesting point, which is embraced by Haldrup et al., is the concept of practical Orientalism relying on the assumption that geography and history are performed, practised and negotiated continuously in everyday life. Thus, history and geography are produced actively (Haldrup et al. 2006: 175-176; Kumar 2011: 83).

Durkheim establishes an important sociological approach reflecting the way in which representation of other groups influences the organization of the same groups. Durkheim and Mauss further refer to the fact that societies are structured by classifications. Thus, societies are organized as collective entities:

"Collective representations express a unity of knowledge and the emotional dynamics and affinities of the group represented through collective concepts, symbols and values" (Mellor 2004: 101).

Referring to Durkheim, Moscovici developed the idea of 'social representations', informing the members of a community of habitual actions and duties. In establishing the distinction between Orient and Occident Said relies on the previously illustrated understanding of classifications.

Said's assumptions concerning 'Othering' can be related to Foucault's description of the discourse analysis in so far, that Western power politics are interrelated with the representation of the Orient. In analogy to the social constructivist theory, Said emphasizes that reality is defined through representations (ib.: 101-102). The construction of the Self is

necessarily influenced by the knowledge of the Other (Meghana and Malone 2009: 256; Hart 2001: 351). This means that individuals form themselves by distinguishing their identities and characteristics in view of other persons. Hence, identities are constructed in relation to other identities in the process of ‘Othering’ (Meghana and Malone 2009: 262). Thus, Said describes the construction of the Orient as associated with categories like childishness, irrationality and difference and contrasts these with commonly prescribed western attitudes like rationality, virtuosity, maturity and normality (Mellor 2004: 101; King 2001: 116).

Also speaking of Gramsci’s definition of hegemony, Said shows that the domination of one class by another is often promoted by intellectual ideology (Mellor 2004: 103). For Foucault as well as for Said the discourse about the Orient is not representing the reality, because according to Foucault every representation is influenced by the specific knowledge about the Other (Mellor 2004: 102; Meghana and Malone 2009: 256). Differences which can promote conflicts and power struggles are the results of the practical construction of imagined spatialities via discourses (Haldrup et al. 2006: 178). This is congruent with the presumption of postcolonial theory where a discourse is understood as a system of domination (Jansen 2008: 108).

3. Orientalism in the Postcolonial World

3.1 The Reproduction of Postcolonial Structures in African Societies (Malawi)

From the mid-fifteenth century on a discourse of civilization on the part of European powers was developed envisaging a colonial expansion. In this relation a harsh contrast between Christendom and Islam was formed. This contrast was embedded in the perception of Europe as the pioneer in rationality and science in contrast to a savage Other, as we have seen in the previous chapters (Haldrup et al. 2006: 174).

The trend of ‘Othering’ is often transferred to a postcolonial era (Jones and Manda 2006: 197). There’s a reification of cultural cleavages as the result of the experiences made in colonial times (Posner 2004: 530). The territorialisation of space and the characterization of certain groups and places as superior and inferior in the colonial understanding is closely linked to the practices of ‘Othering’ (Jones and Manda 2006: 198).

Cultural nationalism is likely to reproduce imperialist structures, namely cultural binarizations (ib.: 198). Thus, cultural nationalism can be identified as a way to exercise power in the postcolonial world. Cultural nationalist societies can be characterized as imagined communities in the way Anderson defines them. Hence, the violence exercised in colonialism disfigures the postcolonial landscape.

Following Jones and Manda, postcolonial African states led by a dictator can be characterized as accultured. Exclusion is promoted through postcolonial policies, which often involve the relocation of ethnic or religious groups within a certain national territory and the colonization of culture intending to structure space in the interests of the authoritarian leaders (ib.: 199).

Postcolonial violence is fundamentally influenced by the reproduction of colonial patterns. It can be seen as the result of the self-alienation experienced in colonial times. Thus, violence in the postcolonial age is one of the pathologies deriving from colonial leadership (ib.: 199). Ngũgĩ and Sáyinká state that the hatred of the Other reinforced in colonial times is transformed into self-hatred and the identification of a violent Other on the same national space. An example for this trend is the creation of binarizations in the genocide of Rwanda (ib.: 200). Mandani 2000 has this to say about binarization:

“The political world set into motion by the modern state and modern colonialism generates subaltern identities endlessly, in binary pairs. For every sergeant, there is a subaltern, for every cat a rat, and for every settler a native (...). To change the world, we need to break out of the worldview of not only the cat, but also the rat, not only the settler but also the native. Unless we can break out of the worldview of the rat, postcolonialism will remain a purgatory punctuated by non-revolutionary violence.” (Jones and Manda 2006: 200).

The above quotation shows that there are clear analogies between postcolonial states and their colonial forebears. This can be seen in the regime of Malawi under the leadership of Banda, who used the enacted structures of the colonial British regime to reinforce his power. Jones and Manda call that accultured hybridity (Jones and Manda 2000: 200). Malawi was declared a British protectorate in 1891 (Moyo 2012: 10). In the following years, British rule was established as the cadre of law (Jones and Manda 2006: 201). In this law corpse the alienation of the African farmers was promoted. Their land was replaced and occupied by settlers. They were also used as cheap labourers. The colonial self interest in the case of Malawi was the reinforcement of cultural binaries, which was for example promoted by bad educational institutions (ib.: 201-202). The British colonial power strove to ensure the civilisation of the Malawian society through the English language (Moyo 2012: 11).

Malawi has attained its independence on 6. July 1964 (ib.: 10). The process of gaining independence from colonial statutes in Malawi was mainly led by Hastings Kamuzu Banda, while the vast majority of Malawians was excluded. Even if the nationalist movement, the Malawi Congress Party, grew as the response to colonialism, their leader, Banda, rapidly transformed the party in his personal system of power. Banda controlled all state systems and outlawed the opposition (Cammack and Kelsall 2011: 89). Jones and Manda state that ‘Banda combined paradoxical qualities of ardent nationalism and populism on the one hand, with being more British than the British on the other’ (Jones and Manda 2006: 203). Thus, there was a clear analogy between the implementation of policies by Banda and European ruling class. The power in Malawi was also concentrated in the hands of Banda. Consequently, postcolonial Malawi became a one-man-state. Through the control of the media the ‘Othering’ was supported. Colonial laws and statutes are preserved. The identification of the Self and the Other was also used to enact state-led violence against the Malawian people. This was executed by paramilitary organisations, namely the Malawi Young Pioneers, attacking persons who have links with dissidents (ib.: 204-207). Furthermore, the Censorship and Control of Entertainment Act of 1968 regulated the freedom of speech and entertainment to reinforce Banda’s power. He also controlled Malawi’s only radio station. Hence, Banda had a

large influence on religious, political and economic discourses and could reinforce the ‘Othering’ of the rural society, as well as reproducing colonial thinking via this channel (ib.: 204).

These developments are closely related to the realization of personal interests by Banda’s regime through the ‘Othering’ of large parts of Malawian society. In this context he instrumentalised colonial modes of governance to ensure his power. He constructed a climate of fear, in which the Malawian population was not able to question the governmental actions. Thus, the trend of acculturation promoted in colonial times is transmitted to the postcolonial society of Malawi (Jones and Manda 2006: 208). Malawi was mainly influenced by Christian religion since colonial times. Hence the Muslim population is relatively small. Banda, the first president of Malawi was also Christian. He mainly influenced the relation between religion and state in implementing particular policies (Forster 1997: 164). Hence, Protestant values had the main influence on state policies, like the handling of HIV discourse shows. ‘Othering’ was, as it is said by Jones and Manda, one of the constitutive elements of the Banda regime in Malawi. British colonial rules were determined in so far by Banda, that Banda saw the elite as civilized and other parts of society as barbaric (Jones and Manda 2006: 208).

With the end of the cold war and the decay of a bipolar world, African one-party regimes were forced to be altered. In the following, the culture of silence induced by the Banda regime in Malawi was broken. In 1994 the first democratic elections took place in Malawi. As a result a multi-party-system was established (Cammack and Kelsall 2011: 91). The Banda regime was replaced by the United Democratic Front. Nonetheless, contemporary changes in Malawian policies indicate a backslide to violent ‘Othering’ by the following Presidents using constitutional rights to strengthen their one-man power (Jones and Manda 2006: 209). Since Joyce Banda, who followed the former president Mutharika in 2012, is the president of Malawi, the criticism regarding the way of Governance institutionalised in Malawi declined (Auswärtiges Amt 2013).

Nonetheless, there are discourses originating in colonial times, which are transferred to the modern Malawian state. For example the institutionalisation of gender inequalities, both promoted by the state and religious actors, has a large influence on the Malawian society. This is especially true for HIV/AIDS discourses, in which the modern, educated parts of the Malawian society are clearly privileged in view of other groups. Thus, the distinction between different groups enforced by colonial leaders and postcolonial actors, like Hastings Banda, is nowadays still virulent. This can be for example seen in the fact that the rural peasantry is ‘othered’ in HIV/AIDS discourses (Lwanda 2003: 113).

This ‘Othering’ is closely linked to the stigmatization of particular societal groups because of their race, sexuality or health (Petros et al. 2006: 68). Petros et al. highlight that the process of ‘Othering’ within the HIV/AIDS discourse has five dimensions, namely race, religion, gender, homophobia and xenophobia. This includes the exploitation of cheap labour, poor education and the discrimination of the rural population and women (ib.: 71). This recent ‘Othering’ can be seen as a result of historical practices in colonial and postcolonial times (ib.: 70-71).

Malawi seems to be on the right way to overcome cultural and religious distinctions reinforced in colonial times. The transition of Malawi from an autocratic regime led by Hastings Banda to a multiparty system, not least promoted by democratic leaders like Joyce Banda, can only be realised when the connection between politics, economy and religion is critically reflected. In this process the conditions enforced by colonial regimes should be overcome.

3.2 The Role of Religion in Postcolonial States in View of ‘Othering’

The relation between religion and state proves to be very problematic in some African states, like Malawi. Religious values are very often instrumentalised to support state ideologies and interests of the post-independence leaders. Since the identity between religious and state interests vanishes because autocratic leaders lost ground, conflicts between religion and state are likely to emerge. Nonetheless, religion is still a major social force influencing main parts of the state. Thus, secularization is considered as far away in African states (Forster 1997: 163). This can be seen in the fact, that there’s a correlation between religious socialization and the use of contraceptives, especially in Malawi (Yeatman and Trinitapoli 2008: 1851).

Religious radicalism is characterized by some authors as one of the pathologies of Islamic religion but is clearly non-reflected in Said’s work (Mellor 2004: 99). Nonetheless, the criticism of Orientalism raises the question, if religious radicalism can be reinforced through Orientalist thinking. Western thinking, especially the Orientalist discourse, is, as said by Said, mainly stimulated by Christianity and the emphasis of differences between Islam and Christianity (Mellor 2004: 104). “Indeed, it is claimed that Orientalism, as a ‘form of paranoia’, arose initially from Christian visions of Mohammed as an impostor seeking to usurp the place of Jesus” (Mellor 2004: 104). Said emphasizes that this view is transferred to a secular world in associating it with Islamic terrorism against the Christian world (Mellor 2004: 104). As for Said, Christianity mainly influenced the development and reinforcement of Orientalism. Additionally religious beliefs largely influence the social construction of reality (Mellor 2004: 105).

Likewise, Foucault emphasizes that there is a linkage between Western Christianity, power and knowledge. The construction of identities is often related to religious beliefs. Thus, Foucault states that besides cultural and political categories, religious arrangements have a great impact on the construction of identities (King 2001: 113-114).

This social constructivist view can be related to Anderson’s concept of imagined communities. The imagining of religious communities, described by Anderson, has a great impact on the construction of space. Radical religious communities can be considered as imagined communities. These communities often seek to influence policy outputs in the name of a certain religion. Especially in postcolonial states interreligious conflicts are likely to emerge. The construction of the Self and the Other leads to the fragmentation in view of

religious, cultural and ethnic criteria. Cultural cleavages can be instrumentalised in order to gain political support (Posner 2004: 529).

The idea of an imagined community can be instrumentalised by certain actors, such as groups relying on religious radicalism. In constructing the image of an imagined community, they seek to realize their interests, striving to neglect multiculturalism and other conceptions of the world. Hence Anderson's 'Imagined Communities' is very suggestive for the issue of religious radicalism. Referring to his main findings we can understand, how conflicts between different religious groups can emerge and how they are reinforced by the politicization of the religious consciousness. Hereafter, Anderson states that "the sacred silent languages were the media through which the great global communities of the past were imagined" (Anderson 2006: 14).

The Arabic language is, conversely to Anderson's assumption, that the decline of religious communities promoted the rise of nationalism, one of the classical languages which survived in history. Religion is still the constituting element of the Arab community. In these communities religion mainly influences policies of the government, language and certain rituals (Mellor 2004: 105). The Islam has as great signification in these societies. This seems to be especially true for the reproduction of colonial structures in postcolonial African states.

In the case of Malawi it is not the Islamic, but the Christian religion leading to conflicts and oppression. It is not mainly religious radicalism, but the influence of religion on all parts of society in Malawi's history which is very important. While 82% of Malawi's population are Christian, only 11% are Muslim and 7% rely on traditional religions (Auswärtiges Amt 2013). There are no such tensions between Christians and Muslims in Malawi, but religion still has a great impact on Malawian politics and even initialised change under Banda's regime in the 1990's (Forster 1997: 174). In this regard, Forster emphasizes that religion mainly influences political issues in Malawi (ib.: 163f).

The influence of the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches can especially be seen in the recent discourse concerning HIV. By claiming for fidelity and abstinence, rather than supporting the distribution of contraceptives, especially condoms, the church is mainly engaged in the aggravation of HIV-infections on the side of African women (Rankin et al. 2005: 13). Yeatman and Trinitapoli highlight, that this is especially true for the rural population in Malawi (Yeatman and Trinitapoli 2008: 1582). The dominance of Protestant church and their discourses in Malawi are closely related to the missions of post-colonial leaders to promote Christianity. Furthermore, the differentiation between rural population and the privileged Malawians is reproduced within the HIV discourse. The formation of identity and in consequence the 'Othering' between different societal groups was mainly influenced by religious understandings and concepts in the postcolonial era. Even nowadays religious discourses support the suppression of women in Malawi. The assumptions depicted above show that there's a clear linkage between colonialism, postcolonial leadership and religion in Malawi. Even if, religious radicalism is no threat in the Malawian society, it is clear, that religion mainly influences the Malawian society. The Protestant church seen as an imagined

community reproduces colonial understandings and distinctions. Thus, inequalities, differences and foremost a violent ‘Othering’ via discourses, like the recent studies on the HIV discourse show, are reinforced (van Dijk 1998: 155-157).

3. Forecast: Cultural Dialogue: A Way to Overcome Conflicts due to ‘Othering’

“But then, what is philosophy today – philosophical activity, I mean – if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?” (Foucault 1992: 8-9).

The view of the world in the process of ‘Othering’ is unilateral. A multilateral portrayal of the world, oriented on cultural dialogue, proves, as the quotation of Foucault shows, to be a chance to understand the multitude of the constructions of social groups (Meghana, Malone 2009: 263).

By identifying the prejudices concerning the Orient it becomes possible to dismantle the discriminating discourses on the Other. The demystification of the Orientalist discourse made it possible, that scholars of the Arab and Islamic world gained influence. Consequently, the way is freed for other discourses of Arab and Islamic scholars (Ghazoul 2004: 125). Colonial Exceptionalism and Orientalism are uncovered as a form of oppression mediated through knowledge (Mellor 2004: 109). This is also true for the reproduction of colonial patterns in postcolonial Africa.

In this paper, I have indicated that colonial ‘Othering’ is transferred via discourses in a postcolonial era. Policies in African states are very often influenced by the inheritance of colonial power-relationships. This goes hand in hand with the alienation of the Other in the name of colonial rules (Jones and Manda 2006: 211). The symmetries of colonialism are still dominant in post-colonial societies. ‘Othering’ can be seen as geopolitical consciousness which is pursued by one-sided narratives (Haldrup et al. 2006: 176). Even religious discourses, like the reflections on the HIV/AIDS discourse show, are influenced by colonial suppositions. In the case of Malawi it becomes clear, that rather than religious radicalism, the influence of Protestant religion is one of the main problems. Thus, it is necessary to move beyond the one-sided identification of cultures and religions in order to go ahead to the concepts of hybridity and multiplicity (Kumar 2000: 82). Following Bhabas point of view we need to overcome the dichotomy between nationalist and anti-nationalist understandings. Transculturation should be promoted rather than enforced acculturation (Jones and Manda 2006: 212). This can be ensured through a shift to cross-cultural comparative studies taking into account the normative character of the western depiction of the Orient but also letting space for indigenous literature studies giving the Arab world a voice (King 2001: 116).

Nonetheless, we need to reflect critically the findings of postcolonial theory, which very often stick to close to the negative influences of the Orientalist discourse and ignore the ‘Othering’ in reverse which is initiated by Islam (Mellor 2004: 107).

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The Churches and the Rwandan Genocide

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Abstract

This article investigates the role of the Christian churches in the Rwandan Genocide. Christian churches have been implicated in the 1994 genocide of ethnic Tutsi in several ways: church buildings were a major site of massacres, a number of church leaders participated in the slaughter, and religious authorities failed to condemn the genocide. Understanding the involvement of Rwanda's churches in the genocide requires a closer look at the relationship between the churches and the state and – even more importantly – the nature of churches as institutions, taking into account the historical context of Christian mission in Rwanda. Churches helped establish structures of class division and actively practiced ethnic discrimination. They worked together closely with the government and played a major role in society in determining the distribution of wealth and opportunities. This article will analyse how churches ultimately helped make the Rwandan genocide possible by making ethnic violence understandable and acceptable to the population.

1. Introduction

Rwanda is one of the most Christianised countries on the African continent, with about 90% of the population claiming membership in a Catholic, Protestant or Seventh-Day Adventist Church, and churches being the largest non-state institutions (Government of Rwanda 1994: 146). Yet, during the genocide of 1994, church buildings and parishes in the small East African state became prime killing fields for brutal ethnic mass slaughter. Faith did not stop Christians from killing their fellow parishioners and, in some cases, even their own pastor or priest (Longman 2001a: 140) – a clear contradiction to love preached in Christianity. How was this possible?

Rwanda had a population of about seven million people, which was divided into three ethnic groups: Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%) and Twa (1%). In the course of the genocide, it is estimated that about 800,000 Tutsi lost their lives (United Human Rights Council 2013). But even though the genocide in Rwanda was primarily ethnically motivated, Christian churches have been accused of complicity in the crime and of collaboration with the executioners. Numerous scholars argue that they played a non-deniable role in making genocide possible (Bizimana 2001; Gushee 2004; Longman 2001a, 2010).

This article will first explore how religion and violent conflict are interrelated from a theoretical perspective, with particular regard to mechanisms that can link religion and religious institutions to genocide. Then, the nature of churches as religious and political institutions in Rwanda will be analysed, focusing on important factors that contributed to their involvement in the genocide, followed by an examination of the behaviour of churches and

church leaders before, during and after the genocide itself. The findings will be summed up in a final conclusion.

2. Theoretical Aspects of Religion and Conflict

The link between religion and violent conflict is highly complex. Quantitative studies have shown that whenever religion is involved in political conflicts, they tend to be longer and more intense (Fox 2004). Religion is a phenomenon that influences people's lives in various dimensions, such as identity, attitude, and behaviour, and by providing leaders, social institutions, and networks (Moix 2006: 595-597; Basedau et al. 2012: 162). Religion provides a framework for people to understand and interpret the world they live in, gives meaning to facts and actions and a sense of what is right and wrong, good and evil, setting standards for behaviour. What sets religion apart from ideologies is the fact that religious ideas and norms are believed to be of divine origin and legitimised in a supernatural way, which essentially makes them non-negotiable (Basedau et al. 2012: 164). Religion has a number of specific characteristics through which it can be related to conflict.

First, *religion can build and demarcate communities*. It can promote a sense of community and solidarity within a group, uniting people of different social and ethnic status. At the same time, this can create boundary lines against outsiders and a potential source for conflict (De Juan and Hasenclever 2011: 225). Second, *religion can motivate people to engage in certain actions and to make sacrifices*. By offering the prospect of divine reward or punishment, religion can encourage people to cross personal and moral limits, increase their ability to overcome fears and push them to make sacrifices for a higher goal (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2003: 121). Third, *religion can legitimise actions and institutions*. This is possible not only for religious issues but also for conflicts and actions that are secularly motivated. Fourth, *religious institutions can have great institutional and mobilisation capacity*. They are well-equipped to facilitate mass mobilisation because they dispose meeting-places, formal and informal networks of people, leaders and activists, access to the media, and often they enjoy relative immunity to government repression or interference (Fox 2004: 22).

All of these characteristics can serve to fight against injustices and discrimination, and mobilise for positive change and peace. However, they can equally enable religion to act as an accelerator of violence. History provides countless examples for both. What is it thus that determines whether religion and religious institutions have a positive or negative impact, whether they promote peace and harmony or fuel hostility and aggression?

The ambivalent effect of religion is still a puzzle for scholars who are challenged to adequately explain the phenomenon. Numerous and diverse theories have been developed. One argues that different religions claiming absoluteness simply cannot co-exist peacefully and that religious borders inevitably bring about conflict (Huntington 1996). A second theory suggests that some religions are more conflict-prone than others; Fox (2002) points out that Islam in particular is commonly viewed in the Western world as more violent than other

religions. However, there is wide consensus among scholars that in fact all religions have tendencies towards and justifications for both violence and peace (Rapoport 1991). Catholicism for instance has a strong pacific tradition yet brought about the Crusades and the Inquisition. A third theory therefore argues that it is not religions themselves but rather the dominant interpretation of religious structures and teachings by religious leaders and clergy that determines the conflict potential of certain religious groups. Yet another one suggests that the course of conflict is essential; in the situation of acute security dilemma people will turn towards their religious traditions for moral support (De Juan and Hasenclever 2011).

So far, all of these theories attempt to explain the conflict potential primarily between groups of different religions. In order to understand the role of religion in the case of Rwanda, where Christianity is involved as the only religion, the following two explanations are useful to comprehend the genocide:

The first one is the importance of *interests, abilities and strategies of influential elites* as determinants of whether religious interpretations will promote peace or stimulate violence (De Juan and Hasenclever 2011: 228). Some scholars argue that the behaviour of religious elites is based on utility maximisation and rational thinking, implying that strategic considerations are dominant, not religious ones (De Juan and Hasenclever 2011: 239). Thus, just like their followers, religious leaders do not “absorb religion as a sponge but adapt it to their own needs” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 388), which might include maintaining power, selfishness, and greed.

The second one is the degree of *autonomy from the state*. Philpott (2007) argues that the level of influence of religious actors depends not only on their political theology but also on their degree of independence from the state. He finds that where religious actors lack institutional autonomy during a time of authoritarianism or civil war or where they are integrated with their state, they tend to acquiesce to crimes and injustices and prove incapable to stand up against or prevent tyranny and genocide. Religious institutions can often be found supporting the status quo, that is, the government, be it in the form of state religions or informal relationships. Fox points out that in some cases, this is due to the fact that in order to retain their legitimacy and relevance, they “must follow what is popular with their congregation” (Fox 2004: 23) in order to avoid becoming marginalised. Thus, religious institutions “will support governments as long as they benefit from this support, but when such support undermines their support within the community they will oppose the government” (Fox 2004: 23).

Thus, if religion is too closely linked to political power and serves nationalist ideologies, and if religious leaders abuse their influence to support these or profit from them, then religion can be turned into a vicious tool to legitimise discriminatory policies, murder and even genocide, while its institutional capacity makes organisation and implementation of large-scale crimes possible (Vorster 2006: 387; Hayward 2009: 107).

Genocide is “by its nature a collective and systematic crime that needs the participation and approval of a large group of people” (Vorster 2006: 380). This is only possible if a “genocidal mentality” can be created, which is based on legitimization, the healing-killing paradox and dehumanisation (Bjornlund et al. 2004). Taking into account the above characteristics of religion, it is evident that religion can significantly support, if not enable, the creation of such a mentality and thus play a decisive role in the preparation and implementation of genocide.

3. The Nature of Churches as Institutions in Rwanda

Rwanda is one of the most Christianised countries of the African continent, with the Catholic Church being the second most powerful institution after the state. The development and nature of Rwandan churches as institutions can be characterised by three decisive factors, which contributed to the involvement and complicity of the churches in the 1994 genocide: First, the establishment and reinforcement of fixed ethnic categories by early missionaries and the subsequent engagement of the churches in ethnic politics; second, the close relationship with the government in power; and third, the massive social, economic, and political influence of the churches on the population (Gushee 2004: 262; Longman 2001b: 168-170).

3.1 Creation of ethnic categories and active engagement in ethnic politics

To understand how the Rwandan Churches came to be engaged in ethnic politics, one needs to look back to the time when the first missionaries arrived in Rwanda at the end of the 19th century. Since then, they have had a large presence and have developed great influence in Rwandan society (Gushee 2004: 259). Christian missionaries started massive conversion programmes in 1931, and the Catholic Church did not tolerate local religious practices. Their strategy was based on converting chiefs and influential local elites first, assuming that their subordinates would follow easily (De Lespinay 2001: 163-165). In order to know whom to focus their conversion efforts on, missionaries developed their own perception of social categories in Rwanda. In pre-colonial times, social categories had been relatively loose and flexible with no strictly separated ethnic groups. The Tutsi were tall, light-skinned and primarily raising cattle, the Hutus were generally shorter and predominantly farmers, and the Twa seemed to make their living by hunting and gathering. All three groups shared a common language and religion, and intermarriage between them was relatively common (Longman 2001a: 145-146). The missionaries hypothesised that Tutsi were not really of African but of Middle Eastern decent and thus the superior race: “Tutsi were regarded as the noble rulers and the Hutu their subservient farmers” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 380). Consequently, they focused their conversion efforts and support on the Tutsi elite. The Belgian colonial administration adopted the missionaries’ concept of ethnicity, and over time ethnic groups were transformed into clearly defined and fixed categories. Ethnic labels gained significance in practice and were assigned on identity cards (Longman 2001a: 145-147).

In the 1950s however, the church switched sides and supported the Hutu revolution which brought the Hutu into power. Favouritism and dominant loyalty shifted from Tutsi to Hutu, but the nature of the ethnic system was not affected by this change (Longman 2001a: 147, 2001b: 171). From the very beginning, the churches supported the ethnic thinking and discrimination by incorporating it in their structures and in their teachings. They thus became the “generator and stabiliser of class structures” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 380) which later became the driving force of the genocide.

3.2 Close relationship with the government

Bizimana (2001) claims that the Church openly compromised with the Hutu regime, which organised and executed the genocide. Following Rwanda’s independence, Habyarimana, president of the Hutu government in power, worked together closely with the Christian churches, preserving a system of power structure which benefited the state and the churches equally and particularly their elites (Longman 2001a: 157). Van Hoyweghen terms this cooperation a “completion of the Church-state symbiosis” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 383) in which the churches were in charge of providing education and health care and thereby financially supporting the state, while the state made the rules which the Church would obey, including discriminatory ethnic quota systems. Many clergy cooperated with officials, maintaining mutually beneficial professional and personal relationships, and some were members of the president’s single political party (Longman 2001a: 148, 2001b: 179). Being an extremely large and unwieldy institution, the church needed a stable, reliable environment to work in and therefore had an economic interest in supporting the status quo (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 383).

3.3 Omnipresence in society

The great influence and social power of the missionaries and the churches in Rwanda is evident in their great success of converting almost the entire population to Christianity, with the Catholic Church becoming the largest non-state organisation (Bizimana 2001). However, church strategies to attract converts did not just rely on the power of their holy message, but also on material and other incentives (Longman 2001b: 169-170). Particularly in rural areas, the population relied on churches not only for spiritual needs, but also for social welfare, healthcare, education, and economic assistance. As the country was hardly industrialised, churches were frequently the most important non-agricultural employer beside the state. Church offices could confer power and high status, and their holders had advantages and opportunities for personal enrichment (Longman 2001a: 149). Churches thus served as a “channel to power, prestige, and wealth” (Van Hoyweghen 1996: 380). As a result, struggles for power and influence within the churches were intense. Churches in Rwanda could be regarded as politically significant institutions not only in the way that they were closely allied with the state but because “they [were] themselves sites of politics, where various individuals

and groups struggle to increase their power” (Longman 1998: 69). And from early on, ethnic divisions played an important part in it (Longman 2001b: 164).

Churches thus had enormous social and economic influence and, through their parishes, access to the population at all levels. Nevertheless, many people became member of the church for the political and economic benefits that came with it (Vorster 2006: 389). The churches, in addition, taught obedience to authority and actively engaged in ethnic politics (Longman 2001b: 166). As a result, Christian message and values were not internalised by the population, creating a superficial Christianity which enabled clergy and church members to eventually participate in genocide (Vorster 2006: 389; Bizimana 2001: 137).

4. The Churches and the Genocide

During the time leading up to the 1994 genocide, the churches faced increasing pressure for reform, coming both from the outside and from within the churches. In the wake of an emerging democracy movement in Rwanda in the early 1990s, partly supported by church activists, power structures within the churches were being put into question. Corruption and bribery had provoked public resentment and frustrations, threatening the spiritual legitimacy of the churches. In addition, international church partners increasingly urged for democratisation, so that serious pressure arose for reform *within* the churches (Longman 2001b: 174-179). Longman suggests that it was “the direct challenges to their own authority within the churches that made church leaders truly sympathetic to the idea of a ‘Tutsi menace’” (Longman 2001b: 179). He argues that where they had obtained their positions by the means of ethnic politics, they would interpret threats to their power from an ethnic angle as well. In this context, it is evident that “many church leaders were ultimately sympathetic to the genocide because it could help bolster their power and preserve their hold on office against this movement for reform” (Longman 2001b: 175). It can be argued that due to the institutional weaknesses and the fragmentation of religious authorities along ethnic and ideological lines, the churches were unable to speak out in a unified voice to counteract the genocide (Longman 2010: 8-9).

During the genocide, places of sanctuary were violated and many church buildings became killing sites. According to some estimates, “more Rwandese citizens died in churches and parishes than anywhere else” (African Rights 1995: 865). Some priests and clergy participated in the slaughter or helped locate and identify Tutsi from their parish and delivered them to the deaths squads (Longman 2010: 5). Some turned away Tutsi who were seeking their protection and refused to help them, and few church leaders were later found guilty for direct or indirect participation in the genocide and convicted (Des Forges 1999: 246).

However, most critics accuse the churches primarily of their silence and inaction, failing to condemn the anti-Tutsi violence publicly. In the years between 1990 and 1993, periodical massacres of Tutsi had never generated any noteworthy protest or denouncement by the churches, even when church personnel or buildings were the centre of attack. This pattern of

silence was supported by continued calls for support of the government and thus was “interpreted by the public as an endorsement of the anti-Tutsi message” (Longman 2001b: 180). By “not issuing a prompt, firm condemnation of the killing campaign, church authorities left the way clear for officials, politicians, and propagandists to assert that the slaughter actually met with God’s favour” (Des Forges 1999: 246). The fact that people “attended mass before going out to kill or that killers paused during the massacres to pray at the altar” (Longman 2001b: 167) clearly demonstrates that the slaughter of Tutsi was not seen as a contradiction to church teachings. Nevertheless, there have also been clergy who did dare to speak out and protect the Tutsi, even at the risk of their own lives (Bizimana 2001: 140).

When the genocide was over, the churches frequently took refuge in denial, refusing to acknowledge the nature of the massacres, and covering priests accused of genocide. Some clergy tried to declare the crimes as a result of spontaneous rage of the Hutu population or brought up the hypothesis of a “double genocide” presumably of Tutsi by Hutu and of Hutu by Tutsi (Bizimana 2001: 49, 63-64). Even today, the possible contribution of the churches to peace building and reconciliation is impaired by the “persistent denial within the Catholic Church and the continuing politicisation of religion” (Clark 2013: 227).

The fact that since the genocide, many Rwandans have turned away from Christianity and converted to Islam – thus doubling the number of Muslims in the country (Wax 2002) – confirms that even though the massacres took place on the basis of ethnicity, the image of Christianity and the reputation of the churches suffered from their complicity in the mass slaughter.

5. Conclusion

The Rwandan genocide illustrates the immense potential of churches as religious institutions to fuel crime and act as an accelerator of radicalism. It demonstrates how the nature of religion in general and of the ecclesiastic hierarchy in Christian churches in particular can under certain circumstances facilitate the spread of ideological thinking and racism.

It was argued that two factors are particularly important to determine whether religion actors and institutions will promote peace or stimulate violence: First, the interests, abilities and strategies of influential elites, and second, the degree of autonomy from the state. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, both factors play together: Churches collaborated closely with the state, supporting the Hutu government that planned and executed the genocide; and church elites chose to use their power and influence to promote racist ideologies and secure their own authority and status, which they felt was under threat.

The nature of churches as institutions played an important role in the way in which they were implicated in the genocide. The responsibility of the churches comprises not only the creation of ethnic categories, active engagement in ethnic politics, and the close cooperation with the government. The omnipresence of the churches in all spheres of people’s lives and their

teaching of obedience to authorities in combination with internal power struggles also lead to Christian values of love and charity being disregarded. The churches hence contributed to the construction of a genocidal mentality in Rwanda by making ethnic violence acceptable to the population.

Today, Rwandans are still waiting for an official apology of the Catholic Church for its silence and for the acts committed by some of its clergy. Yet, acknowledgement of its culpability would constitute an important gesture for the survivors, and facilitate true reconciliation. There is still a long way to go for Rwanda's churches which must now take seriously the role they can play as social institutions in the process of peace-building, to foster caring societies, and refocus on serving the well-being of communities and their entire population.

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Transnational Networks of religiously motivated terrorism

Sascha T. Geißler

Abstract

This paper tries to demonstrate that there is a gap in scientific analysis between single acts of religiously motivated terrorism and transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism. It will show that there are possibilities of radicalising yourself by using information which is provided by the Internet on homepages from radicals in the cyberspace. As well it will show that there are transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism operating on real territories in the background and that there is a connection between all those spaces. This connection between those spaces can be seen as a new strategy of transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism. It will try to demonstrate the connection between transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism and the space they offer on the Internet giving people the chance to radicalise themselves so much that they act as a terrorist, without getting in contact with a person responsible for these networks. These radicalised people act independently in the background in the name of those networks. The Internet has taken the role as an intermediary between two real spaces and functions as a third space.

1. Introduction

In this paper the three space dimensions territorial space, cyberspace and imagined space are looked at and their connection to each other. The main premise is that there are connections between these three spatial dimensions, even if they are not easily recognizable. We have to take cyberspace, as well as an imagined space into consideration if we want to understand the phenomenon of transnational religiously motivated terrorism and find the best opportunities for counterterrorism measures.

At first a short definition of transnational terrorism within the structure of networks will be given, as far as this is possible. Till today no clear definition of terrorism exists. However, terrorism is commonly defined by some main points, such as the existence of a political motivation behind the actions and the use or threat of violence. This violence is used to produce an environment of scare and it is increasingly practiced against civilians. To show what many characteristics go along with the term terrorist, the following definition from Richardson is cited:

“Terrorists are substate actors who violently target noncombatants to communicate a political message to a third party. Terrorists are neither crazy nor amoral. They come from all parts of the world. They come from many walks of life. They fight for a range of different causes. Some have support from the communities from which they come; some do not. They range in size from a handful of Corsican nationalists to thousands of armed Tamils. Some are fighting for the same goals that have motivated wars for centuries, such as control over national territory. Some are trying to overthrow the state system

itself. They come from all religious traditions and from none. One thing they do have in common: they are weaker than those they oppose” (Richardson 2007: 20).

Transnational terrorism in this way can then be characterised by the feature, that the members of transnational terrorism groups or networks are located in different countries and that they work together beyond borders (Florack 2010: 38-40). Transnational terrorism becomes than religiously motivated, when the members are motivated by religious beliefs. These religious beliefs with the aim the terrorist want to achieve are called ideology. These ideologies are often mixed with political issues. The organisation’s form as a network implies that the organisation is structured more horizontally than hierarchically; even though it is possible that there are main characters, which can be identified as leaders. It is possible that there is more than one leader in different groups of the network or that there is no leader at all, too. This brings many advantages; one for example is that it cannot be eliminated through decapitation of its leadership (Sageman 2004: 140). Networks are very robust and adaptable to different circumstances.

2. Methodology

The paper’s methodology composes research from publications on the different topics of the paper and analysis of them. The references mention a selection of sifted sources, which were directly applied in this paper. They mainly describe the general scientific view on terrorism and were identified by researching various scientific search engines, general use of search engines and the local university libraries. The sources are a mixture of papers, articles, books and official reports from governmental departments. As the original plan for this paper was not possible to work out, the paper now, tries to give an introduction into the topic with only secondary resources.

At first it was planned to go into a deep online research of primary sources and to analyse homepages, which can be identified as radical religious websites with connections to transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism. These websites should have been analysed for hints, which can link these to an operating network in the background. As a second it should have been analysed what opportunities these websites offer for interested users. As a last point it should have been analysed if those websites offer structured information for users to accompany them on a process of self-radicalisation. One aim would have been to find connections between self-starters, which will be mentioned further on and transnational networks and to see if they are using a new strategy for recruitment and their fight. These plans went wrong because of the very difficult legal position on research in the field of terrorism and cyberspace and unclear and different statements from the police department, the office for the Protection of the Constitution on federal level and state level, as well from the legal department from the university and the department for data handling from the university. This made it not possible to do research on primary sources, such as original homepages of different groups. A possibility to solve these problems would have been to

contact a lawyer who is specialised on such topics as Internet crime. But this was not possible through the constriction of financial support. For further research I think there are very good possibilities to find connections between these different spaces. Also, it would be appropriate governmental departments to make clear statements. This allows researchers a better possibility to research in the field of religious motivated terrorism and gives them the chance to add something for clarification on this phenomenon as well as offers suggestions for solutions.

3. Research

3.1 The three spatial dimensions

In this section three spatial dimensions, which have been mentioned above will be described. Figure 1 gives a first overview on the topic and shows the frame of this paper. This section also provides a short explanation of the function and the actors in these spaces. The figure shows, how transnational religiously motivated terrorist networks can jump scales and borders without moving themselves and still can exercise terrorism. The main point is, that they have to find people in different spots, who are willing to radicalise themselves and act in their name or for their purpose. Networks in this way are able to jump scales without crossing borders in person and still are able to increase their influence and their membership. This brings a huge advantage in being as long as possible inconspicuous and so being undetected by law enforcement forces.




Figure 1: Space dimensions in transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism.

Source: own figure.

Traditional transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism

Traditional networks of terrorism groups “presume [...] one or more of the following environments:

- Terrorist groups talk to each other.
- Terrorist groups support each other.
- Governments sponsor terrorists.
- The international terrorist environment is basically conspirational“ (Gus 2010: 285).

So, one of the main factors, which can describe traditional networks of terrorism, is the contact of the actors to each other via a direct communication form (in person, per phone or other direct communication forms). This direct communication form also makes it easier for the law enforcement to find the connections between certain actors. We need to take into our consideration that the function of personal contacts was owed to the fact that communication has primarily been developed in the last decades. It is in this way a relatively new development, which has not finished yet. New terrorism organizes itself increasingly as a loose network. The network consists of different actors or groups who are linked to each other by a hub. This hub can be a person or a group. Through these hubs most of the communication between different actors takes place, so this points are vulnerable for counterterrorism measures. The connection between two different groups can be a hub of one or more persons. Furthermore, the connection can be classified in strong ties and weak ties. Strong ties are defined by a deepened connection, whereby a weak tie consists of a loose connection. However, weak ties are very important for bringing new aspects into the network (Sageman 2004; Tucker 2001). This makes the network more flexible, adaptive and resilient and most importantly it cannot be destroyed by decapitation (Tucker 2001: 1). Networks, which operate close to each other possess the possibility to learn from each other. They can observe and learn at first hand from each other. This often leads to copying successful strategies. If there is much space between the actors in one or different networks, these possibilities are not given (Braithwaite and Li 2007). Hence, other ways for spillover-effects need to be looked at to teach other participants for the same purpose. One way to do so is the cyberspace. It can function as an alternative platform, to let people far away take part on learning processes or just to spread information outside of the network and search for new participants.

Cyberspace and the function as a recruiter

Meanwhile, cyberspace has taken a very important role for international networks of terrorism. It has the function to spread the cause for what the different groups are fighting for, and to give information to the public, but also to recruit new participants for the international fight, for the special cause of the groups (Council of Europe 2007: 37-38). It gives the groups the possibilities to cross borders with their information. In this way, cyberspace is like an arena for theatre or a spectacle, by which people should be influenced. It is a propaganda machine by which the intents of terrorists could be spread globally (Minei and Matusitz 2012;

Steinberg 2012). Furthermore, it is a very good space to produce spillover-effects in shape of, for instance, ideas, training techniques, manuals or for example to get in contact with new-recruits. As different studies reveal, nearly every active terrorist group has its own presence on the Internet (Kennedy and Weimann 2011: 203). Also it gives traditional networks the possibility to connect with other persons or networks in terms of weak ties. Weak ties, which were introduced by Granovetter, gave networks a very good input on new ideas, tactics, strategies or other innovations which can be used for the purpose of terrorist networks (Kennedy and Weimann 2011).

The target to reach a broader audience via cyberspace has in this way more than just one advantage for the traditional networks. They can recruit new members for their fight, and also if those recruits don't want to engage directly in active fighting, they can still give new ideas, tactics, strategies or other useful information or just spread the ideas of the different groups. Cyberspace fulfils its role as a recruiter even more, if there are more and more websites, forums, social-networks etc. with the content of religious radicalism. This creates the opportunity for people to find such content unintentionally and thereby getting influenced by such ideas by coincidence. As has been shown in different studies, one possibility to become a terrorist can be in the first steps not a conscious step. The first step is often influenced by coincidence, especially for home grown terrorism. This means for example, that one can encounter the ideas unintentionally and after that choose intentionally to become a terrorist or not. The traditional way is to get in contact with a person from a terrorist group. In this way cyberspace can be seen as an omnipresent person, which enables a very big audience to get in contact with the main ideologies behind religious motivated terrorism. Mullins calls such people "self-starter" (Mullins 2009); they start their behaviour by their own. But also these "self-starters" in some way need a link to a larger group or network above. This connection can come from a different distant link in the circle of friends, also from a distant point in a social media network. Terrorists can aim two recruiting strategies, either top-down or bottom-up, pursued by transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism or other transnational terrorist networks (Hasenclever and Sändig 2011: 209).

Cyberspace fulfils the function as an information platform to spread their propaganda, find new recruits, give training advices, as a communication platform for individual communication and mass communication as well as a space for discussion and planning, finding financial support etc. (Council of Europe 2007:33-46). As it has been shown, cyberspace is able to fulfil a lot of different roles and the development still goes on. It is very important to recognise developments early to find the best countermeasures. Cyberspace (online) can connect different groups on real territories (offline), without getting in personal contact. Cyberspace creates the opportunity to meet different groups or networks from real territories in one (cyber-) space. Cyberspace is in this way an important space; it connects different offline networks and groups with one online space. So online (cyberspace) connects different offline groups to each other (Holtmann 2012b: 122). This is a new chance for transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism to "build" a real-time terrorist, who is influenced and then moves on to act. A motto of cyber jihadist, which says "qaul wa'amal", which means "saying and then deed", shows this assumption (Holtmann 2012b: 122). If

religiously motivated terrorists find a way to improve their possibilities, which is offered by cyberspace and make them more efficient, a very powerful weapon can be created. This weapon consists of people who are influenced by the content on those homepages, forums, videos and other communication forms. These people can appear anywhere, where a connection to the Internet exists. This will make it very hard for the law enforcement forces to find out, where the next terroristic attack may occur. In the following paragraph this new phenomenon will be described and as there is no special term for this phenomenon, I will call it scale jumper, concerning to the ability of crossing different scales without getting noticed.

The scale jumpers

In literature the term “home grown terrorist” has gained acceptance to describe local people, who have been recruited from a terrorist group in a foreign country, to act in their specific region (Hasenclever and Sändig 2011: 204). The act of terrorism is achieved in the same state as the terrorist has been born or raised (Precht 2007: 15; Bhatt and Silber 2007). Home grown terrorist usually describes a person, who has gotten in direct contact with another person from a terrorist network or group. Till now, just a few home grown terrorists have acted on their own, without any contact to another person. An example for this case is Arid Uka, who has performed the attack on American soldiers at the airport in Frankfurt in March 2011. These people are very difficult to find and can appear everywhere. As the development of cyberspace still goes on and many resources can be used there, a possibility exists, that there will be more and more people who will appear as self-starter terrorists. They will act alone, without getting in direct contact with a group or a network.

In this paper, I will call them “scale jumpers”, because they appear somewhere, without giving some good hints before they appear, just as to make a distinction between a home grown terrorist and the scale jumper. Scale jumper refers to the ability that such terrorists move from cyberspace onto real territorial space. They jump from cyberspace as a space with a scale that is not measurable to a scale on real territories which is touchable, but it is very difficult to find out where the point on the map emerge where cyberspace is directly connected to territorial space. At this point the terrorist jumped from cyberspace to territorial space where the terrorist can perform an act on territorial space. Also if the three terms “home grown terrorist”, “self-starter” and “scale jumper” are very close to each other, there are some fine differences. Home grown terrorists become terrorists by getting in contact with persons or ideas from terrorist groups or networks personally or via a medium. See the above given description, too. Home grown terrorists can also summarize people who were directly chosen by terrorist groups or networks. The term self-starter terrorist summarizes people, who start on their own, but then are looking for contact to established terror networks or groups or create a new one. Also in the way of self-starter terrorist there is the possibility of getting influenced by different personal contacts. Now, the term scale jumper describes just such terrorists who get their information on their own through cyberspace and went through a way of radicalisation on their own. The contact to established terror groups or networks exists just in this way, that the scale jumper performs his act in the name of an ideology of such a group or network. The connection can be established firstly afterwards. The scale jumper is a

person, who has been inflicted by the ideas of a terrorist group, without having any personal contact with those groups or networks. This person is now a new dot in the map, and it is not possible to say, where these dots emerge. The only condition is the ability to connect with cyberspace and they usually share the same purpose, also if it will be first after the process of radicalization. These people do not get any support from the traditional networks; they do not receive training or get logistical support or any other form of sponsorship in a traditional way. The only way they get information is via Internet or persons from their surroundings. Internet has then the function to give them the information they need to perform a terroristic act. This information could be training manuals to build an explosive device or using the Internet without being caught etc. (Tucker 2001: 2). They are also amateurs who have not been involved in similar activities. This makes it difficult to spot them, too. They sometimes just act in one action and then disappear from the surface (Tucker 2001: 10-11).

The link to transnational networks arises, if it does anyway, after the terroristic act just then, when the terrorist comments his or her act or if another group or networks claims the act for their own use. Scale jumpers or self-starters start their activities by their own, and after they did so, they maybe look for a connection to the network (Sageman 2004: 142). As the use of cyberspace can be developed, this could be seen as a new strategy of transnational terror networks. They just provide the right information for the right people at the right time to get new members for their fight. Then, they just have to find persons or environments where possible recruits can be found. The Internet is then a virtual guide, which gives a person any help they need for support. This guide is appropriated by the networks and groups which are acting in the background on real space (Holtmann 2012a: 9). This shows the strong connection between internet activism, the independently operating people and the transnational networks and groups in the background. The whole construction shows how the different spaces are connected to each other, and that it is important to take all into consideration to understand the phenomenon in context and find ways to prevent people from getting a terrorist by surfing in the internet.

In sum it can be said, that these three different spaces show different starting points, where networks can find new recruits. It is important to analyse where the starting points are for religious motivated terrorism, where growth and development take place and where the place for the preparation for action is situated. It is important to analyse the lifespan of individuals, to find the connections between “self-starters” and the established transnational networks (Mullins 2009: 149). If it is possible to analyse different lifespans of different self-starters, it may be possible to find points in life, where people are more susceptible towards ideas of radicals. A biography of such persons has to work out. In the next step it will be necessary to find out how such points can be inhibited. The analysis of a lifespan will just be possible subsequently, soonest from that point when a person was identified by law enforcement forces for being a threat. So it will be a very difficult task, but can bring advantages for counter-measures.

3.2 Religion and Terrorism

This paper has not the aim to explain the connection between religions and terrorism, but it will give some words to the topic. It is a very difficult task analysing the connections between terrorism and religion. This is shown in the different debates to this topic in the scientific community. Religions are different, and as well there is no clear definition of terrorism. Each case has its very specifics and need a separate analysis. These differences make it difficult to give a frame or a definition. To make it more harder, religious motivations for terrorism can be mixed, and they nearly always are, with political matters or other relevant topics. After all, religion can give a strong cohesion and an ideology; also it can give security, as it says for example there is a life after this life. Religion can also build the opportunity of serving for something paranormal, like resurgence in a better world. This can make death more valuable than life. However, religious terrorism is often mixed with political issues. For example Islamist terrorists see their jihad as self-defence against western intruders into their countries and a future for one Muslim community. Grievances can be one of many motivations for religious terrorism. Equally, personal based motivations, caused by the circumstances a person was born, raised or lived in should also be considered by explaining terrorism and which role religion plays (Stern 2004; Juergensmeyer 2003; Sookhdeo 2009 and Gabriel 2002).

4. Conclusion

It is important to recognise, that there is a link between transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism on real ground, and the space of information these networks offer online as well as individuals who act in their name. It can be a good strategy for terrorist groups or networks to just offer enough information on the Internet that someone will get influenced by these groups and networks that he or she will perform independently a terroristic act for the purpose of these terrorist groups or networks. Groups and networks do not necessarily need to risk their own lives in terroristic acts, they just need to find someone via the Internet who will do it for them, and it will not be traceable who has “recruited” this new terrorist. Counterterrorism measures need to close this gap and show those people who are willing to radicalise, that they are misused by the people in the background of the internet. One of the best counterterrorism measures was and will be clarification and education. As Hasenclever and Sändig propose, a mixture of hard and soft counterterrorism measures is necessary to make the best progress (Hasenclever and Sändig 2011). A society which incorporates every member of the society and does not produce any marginal groups, will sustain best. As well it is important to note, that the Internet will enhance transnational terrorism and make it much more harder for the law enforcement to find out, where the next terrorist emerge. Cyberspace is an ideal tool to enlarge their networks and make them sounder.

The paper should have shown that a connection between cyberspace, imagined space and territorial space exists. To see these connections is important for analysing and it is important to take them into consideration when we describe such a phenomenon as terrorism in the case

of home grown terrorism, self-starter terrorism or in the term of scale jumper terrorism. Classically the connection between two persons was in one or another way a direct contact. Now we should widen our view and see that this is not necessary anymore. It is sufficient to provide enough information to find new recruits for the fight of the transnational networks of religious motivated terrorism. These new fighters do not need a connection to the network personally any more, they do not need to find a contact to which they can talk to or ask what to do. The network just has to provide the right information in the right space. This could be a new and dangerous strategy by transnational networks of religious motivated terrorists. With the term home grown terrorist there already is a description for terrorists, who were recruited in the country, where they should exercise a terroristic act. However, I think it is very important to make clear differences between home grown terrorists and scale jumpers, because scale jumpers do not have and do not need any contact to another person in contrast to home grown terrorists. But, we should also notice that, if there is not a direct connection to a network, there is a connection that brings these actors together and we should find out, how those networks make it possible to recruit fighters, without getting in direct contact with them.

There are new power relations and power effects between these different scales and spaces. Networks generate new spatial power distributions and with cyberspace a new space is created, which is influencing other spaces and has the power to change scales. Cyberspace is a very mighty space with many spaces in it and connections to each other, also with connections to the real space. Cyberspace for example gives people the chance to identify themselves with a space that is far away. Identity goes along with space, and cyberspace can build new bridges between different spaces and in this way religion can play a very important role (Reuber 2012: 44). To understand these phenomena completely we have to look at it from the bottom and the top and we should start as early as possible, before there is too much (cyber-) space to look at. Hence, I think there are very important fields for further research, bringing political geography in contact with transnational networks of religiously motivated terrorism.

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The Sacral Geography of Islamic Jihad

Tim Hawemann

Abstract

The world, including various religions and based upon complex patterns of conflicts cannot be described using simplistic spatial constructs. Psychological aspects in analysing conflicts are quite important and have to be considered when taking into consideration single individuals as actors in conflicts but also in the construction of spaces and communities. The following paper will give an introduction and thought-provoking impulse on the 'sacral geography' of Islamic Jihad. Questions about the psychological and social constructions of space will be clarified and the spaces of Islamic Jihad will be depicted more closely. What is the fundament the sacral geography is built on, how do Jihadists feel linked to each other through this construct of a sacral space. Finally, an explanation on how Jihadists legitimise their action with arguments and goals rooted in their constructs of sacral geography will be given.

1. Introduction

In the last decade since 9/11 the topics of Islamic Jihad and terrorism have been increasingly covered by international media and debated within politics. The challenge of terrorism has been debated by various authors from different social science disciplines, trying to figure out the beliefs, motives and reasons behind the actions. One approach of research investigates the psychological aspects and illustrates the "creation of space through Islamic Jihad". Sacral geography, which describes religiously created space, is the main focus of this paper.

The subject of religious space construction is embedded within the research field of political geography and geopolitics. Rothfuß (2011: 37) states that geopolitics is defined as striving for influence in spaces beyond the 'own' territory. According to this definition geopolitics can be described as a spatially expansive, goal-focussed action. Geopolitics is not merely a matter of nation states with military and economic objectives. Geopolitical goals can also be developed by other organisations like important religious groups and movements. They can as well establish and pursue geopolitical goals that may strongly influence the international order in the world. The movement of Islamic Jihad, supported by numerous radical Islamist groups throughout the world is one example for such a global geopolitical 'organisation' beyond the nation state. In order to analyse Islamic Jihad as a geopolitical force in the world, further information is necessary. Nations or territories are defined by administrative borders but the sacral space that evolves in the minds of many individuals is quite more difficult to be revealed. Psychological and religious analyses are in this case necessary. In the following paper this space, the sacral geography of Islamic Jihad, will be intensively analysed to get a deeper understanding of the motives of acting and why Jihadists all over the world are linked to each other through common norms and beliefs. Heidenreich (2010: 7) underlines that in

analysing spaces of Islamic terrorists, it is important to address the relation in their acting, thinking and feeling.

2. Definitional basics

In this chapter the terminology of Islamic Jihad and sacral geography will be defined. Whereas a sacral geography can be generally understood as a spatial construct that has been produced by believers in the context of a specific religion, the diverse definitions of Jihad are more complex and contradictory.

2.1 Sacral geography

The concept of ‘sacral geography’ has been most notably described by the sociologist Heidenreich (2010). In summary, it is a kind of mentally constructed geography. Furthermore, it is a cosmogenesis, a world explanation, a second creation and a hegemonic power (ibid: 129). The sacral centre of constructs of sacral geography is based on the location where epiphany in a certain religion took place. Around this centre the sacral space is constituted and it is the point where the cosmic spheres heaven, earth and netherworld are linked through the vertical axis of the world. Moreover, in horizontal direction, the sacral space is constructed and extends in all cardinal directions. Consequently there is a space with one holy centre of the world where the linkage to God and the netherworld is manifested (ibid: 129). Because of this assumption, the permanent linkage between the three cosmic levels in the centre, the constructed space extending from is considered a holy or sacral one (ibid: 130). Sacral geography determines both the material and the mental base of holy war, moreover, it delimitates territories of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ and the ways and devices of this war (ibid: 13). It is essential that sacral geography is never congruent with the territory of a modern nation state. It is a mentally, individually as well as collectively, constructed space that is based upon religious norms and beliefs shared by a certain faith group. Heidenreich (2010: 130) presents the example of Italy for Christianity and of Saudi Arabia for Islam. Holy sites of these religions are within Italy or Saudi Arabia but the respective sacral geographies are not limited to these territories, rather they have a global reach. As religions and sacral geographies are global phenomena which are not limited to national territories delimited by borders they can compete and get into conflict with established secular state orders, should their norms and goals be in stark contrast. Sacral geography draws a map which is embedded in ‘real world’ topography but it is mainly based on cultural, economic, social and religious meanings in space (Heidenreich 2010: 12).

2.2 Islamic Jihad

The second important term for this paper is Islamic Jihad. In the following, some information on the concepts and roots of Jihad will be given as well as a definition of this phenomenon. The Arabian word ‘Jihad’ is translated into English as ‘struggle’ or ‘effort’. Musharbash (2006: 41) supposes that many Muslims only interpret Jihad as a spiritual ‘effort’ and do not

connote with it a violent 'holy war'. In Islam the concept of Jihad is distinguished into two kinds, the 'greater Jihad' and the 'lesser Jihad' (Cook 2005: 35; Heidenreich 2010: 15). In brief definition, the greater Jihad is the fight against oneself and the lesser Jihad is the religious war (Heidenreich 2010: 15), what means "the physical holy war" (Heit 2005: 1). The greater Jihad is the inner struggle which exists in three different types:

"Jihad of the Heart (the struggle for moral reformation and faith), Jihad of the Tongue (the struggle to proclaim God's word abroad; right speech) [and] Jihad of the Hand (doing good works in accord with the will of God)." (ibid: 1)

The lesser Jihad is briefly defined as a way to defend Islam against disbelievers (Kepel 2002: 176; Musharbash 2006: 34). The lesser Jihad is legitimised in some parts of the Quran in a defensive way and it is the highest obligation of every Muslim, as underlined also within the Sharia. They are allowed to react to attacks against the Islam or the Islamic community and world but do not attack without a reason of assault. Lüders (2001: 71) has published an interview with Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader of a Jihad organisation in Pakistan and a friend of Osama bin Laden, about the Islamic Jihad. The main statement may be cited with the words: "Jihad – holy war is only an answer, an answer against the actions of oppressors of Islam". But when you have a closer look to the Quran it can be seen that all disbelievers are potentially "oppressors of Islam" and all violently holy war could legitimised in the eyes of Jihadists through the Quran, e.g. Sura 4:76:

"Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the cause of Taghut. So fight against the allies of Satan. Indeed, the plot of Satan has ever been weak."¹

So violence against all Non-Muslims Jihadists legitimise with verses of the Quran like the one before. Moreover, verses who promote violent directly can be found in the Quran, e.g. in 47:4: "So when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite the necks until [...] you have overcome them" (ibid). A lot of further violent promoting verses can be found in the Quran, the base of Jihadists acting. Moreover, one additional fact of Islamic Jihad is the view of the world as a battlefield where believers fight against disbelievers (Musharbash 2006: 25). Musharbash also notes that abolition of disbelief and implementation of the Islam all over the world is one main target. The supporters of Islamic Jihad want to have one world with only one religion – Islam. About a violently way, if necessary!

3. Islamic Jihad and the construction of a sacral geography

The fundament of today's sacral geography of global Jihad was laid in the middle ages. Sacral geography defines the holy centres and regions that have to be defended or regained and the "spaces of suffering" of Muslims that have to be integrated in a future global Muslim community (Heidenreich 2010: 13, 131). Analysing the Islamic Jihad as psychosocial phenomenon in linkage to sacral geography is quite important (Lüders 2001: 43). The space

¹ Sahih International translation: <http://quran.com/4> (accessed: 12.08.2013).

of Islamic Jihad is a psychological, social and in some cases also a political construction. The construction of sacral space needs a nucleus as a centre of development, Heidenreich (2010: 130) claims. The holy centre that links all cosmic levels and represents the centre of sacral space is mostly symbolised as an elevated point such as a mountain. It is a place where the superiority is implemented by itself because of the exposition and the proximity to heaven (ibid: 131). The 'highest' point on earth in the Islamic tradition is the so called "ka'aba". Around this centre of the world the sacral space of Islam is constituted. The ka'aba in the mosque of Mecca is the centre of the Islamic cosmos. The obvious function as centre of Islam can be shown in the fact that every Muslim adjusts his prayer position towards Mecca, the centre of the Islamic cosmos (ibid: 131). In the sacral geography of Islamic Jihad the ka'aba is the centre, too. This construction of sacral geography of Islamic Jihad occurs by taking into account geopolitical military and cultural power relations in the world (ibid). The sacral geography of Islamic Jihad is not even manifested; it adapts in case of contemporaneous events but is based on the central points of classic sacral geography of Islam. Nonetheless it is to remark that some points of Jihadist's geopolitics remain equal; the imagination of a divine order to create a global Muslim community in one territory (Caliphate) where the sole basis for state laws is the Sharia (Heidenreich 2010: 14; Hellmich 2012: 87).

It is important to mention when analysing the sacral space of Islamic Jihad that it has a global character. This is an important difference of the global Jihadist Islam in comparison with traditional Islamism. In some countries there are or were special Islamism movements, for example in Afghanistan the Taliban or Hamas in Palestine but Islamic Jihad is a global acting movement that crosses borders and cannot be captured in nations or physical territories. There is an ideological and psychological space where Jihadists are linked and act and are not confined to national boundaries (Lüders 2001: 59). Regarding the definition of sacral geography and the fact of a global phenomenon, the following aspect is important. The Jihad as a national movement like the fight of the Taliban in Afghanistan is still limited to a national territory. The sacral geography of Islamic Jihad demands a global outreach and action. This will only be given once the Jihad has crossed borders and develops into a global movement (Heidenreich 2010: 130).

Another important point is the imagination of 'paradise' within the concept of sacral geography because all Islamic Jihadists follow the way to paradise as the ultimate sense of life. For Muslims the paradise is the holiest space of sacral geography of Islamic Jihad (Heidenreich 2010: 147). As a mentally constructed and imagined space it cannot be perceived with regular senses. Jihadists who die as 'martyrs' believe in entering this 'promised land' in the beyond without having to go through the 'final judgement'. Therefore, dying as martyr is supposed to be the safest way to paradise.

The last point of this chapter is dealing with the acting of Islamic Jihadists and how they legitimise it. It follows from the abovementioned question of consequences of sacral geography of Islamic Jihad. In the following, the consequences of sacral geography of Islamic Jihad will be demonstrated. Especially the actions of Jihadists are explainable with the approach of sacral geography and a psychological constructed space. One reason of acting as

Islamic Jihadist is desecrating of holy territory (Heidenreich 2010: 132). The fight against disbelievers and enemies of the Islam that attacks only a small point in the Islamic world can be described with the sacral geography. In sacral geography there is a holy territory. Interventions in one area in this holy territory justify attacks against the 'enemies'. There is a construct of global holy territory and only a simple attack to this territory, wherever it is in topographical definition, legitimises fighting them. Heidenreich (2010: 132) adds the example of a hot-dog stand in the backmost area of a cathedral that would desecrate the total cathedral. In comparison to this example, an attack against one spot of holy Islamic space that is constructed in sacral geography, desecrates the whole Islamic space. It is obligatory for every Muslim to fight against this occurrence. Jihadists call fighting against enemies of Islam as an obligation like directing one's prayers towards Mecca (Heidenreich 2010: 133). Referring to the point of lesser Jihad in the definitional chapter these actions are explainable. Defending the Muslim territory is an obligation for every Muslim – attacks in the sacral space are against Muslim territory and have to be parried. At first it is an obligation for the inhabitants of an attacked area and subsequently also of the global Muslim community to support the 'defensive' fight (Heidenreich 2010: 132). Secular and democratic institutions that are commonly seen as the best way of political organisation are not acceptable for Islamic Jihadists. That is another reason that supports Islamic Jihadists fighting, especially, against the Western world. The system of government with democracy and freedom of opinion is not accepted by Islamic Jihadists based on the fact that people could criticise Islam (Musharbash 2006: 26).

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that the field of analysing sacral geography of Islamic Jihad is a complex task. This sacral construct of the world is the basis for all global Jihadists and the ways and reasons they are acting in. In principle, all members of this community feel linked to each other within this space, independent of all profane restrictions. Based on this affinity and solidarity linkage within a global sacral space problems arise when it comes to finding and fighting Jihadist terrorists by means of modern military. Because of the global network architecture of Jihadists within a shared idea of sacral space, containment of such religiously motivated terrorism is nearly impossible. Spiritual beliefs and religious convictions can hardly be destroyed by weapons. By analysing the sacral geography of Islamic Jihad the global geopolitical influence and agenda can be better understood. This paper may only be seen as an introductory overview about this complex topic, trying to give some basic insights into the approach of analysing Islamic Jihad and its fundamental norms.

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Religious radicalism and territoriality in the Nigerian conflict: Is federalism the answer?

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Abstract

Being the most populous country in Africa and home to huge amounts of natural resources, Nigeria has the potential of becoming an important player in the globalized world. But this potential contradicts to significant inner tensions, especially between the equally distributed religions of Islam and Christianity. The religious issues are repeatedly a reason for violence. In their attempts to hold the state together, Nigerian politicians have developed a model of decentralized federalism, which even allows the co-existence of different jurisprudential systems, including the Shari'a. Meanwhile, the country suffers from exceptionally high rates of poverty and corruption. This paper tries to analyze the effectiveness of the system and its capability of limiting and solving the enormous inner conflicts of Nigeria and poses the question if federalism isn't more of a dividing factor in the absence of badly needed structural reforms.

1. Introduction

Since its independence from British rule in 1960, Nigeria has gone through a series of political crises, ranging from civil war to military coup d'etats and religious extremism. This is not surprising, because the post-colonial Nigerian society comprises strong ethnic, cultural and religious differences, which make the country one of the most complex states on Earth. In addition, the Nigeria's demographic explosion, the poor educational system, as well as the high levels of poverty and corruption produce significant social tensions. All the above-mentioned factors create an atmosphere of political instability, which easily escalates into extremism and violence. The religiously and politically motivated violence has reached alarming levels in the last years; it has evolved into a problem, the successful approach to which is one of the greatest challenges ahead of the political class of Nigeria. The most important question is what means exactly should the country choose and what strategy it should implement in order to accomplish those tasks; which actions can bring long-lasting stability. If Nigeria manages to overcome those challenges, its vast natural resources and essential position in Africa could help the country to become one of the key players in the globalized world of the near future.

Today's Nigeria is a federalist state; it is without doubt, that in order of holding this territory together, which is the home of so many different ethno-cultural groups, a form of federalism as part of the state's structure is needed. It seems, though, that the Nigerian federalism is suffering from severe weaknesses, leading to a contra-productive effect for society and nation-building. The Nigerian model of federalisation is characterised by territorial fragmentation, capsulation and division between the single groups and serving regional group

interests, instead of creating conditions for national cohesion. This is rounded up by an inefficient approach of resource control and lack of rule of law. While some important issues of self-government are neglected or blocked on purpose, issues, which are directly damaging the legitimacy of the state such as the co-existence of multiple jurisprudential systems are tolerated. Such drastic contradictions damage the already weakened authority of the state and emasculate informal leaders and structures, that rely on religion as the instrument of enlarging their influence. The thus arising question, though, is not as much *if*, but *how* federalism should be implemented in the Nigerian political system.

The following study tries to observe this problem and to give some insights of how Nigeria could reform its federal system and what structural reforms it has to enforce in order to provide the "answer" to religious radicalism and territoriality, as set in the title. The author has used a broad variety of literature about Nigeria, concerning federalism, religion, secularism, identity, resource distribution, good governance etc. and by comparing the variety of expressed views will try to come out with a general conclusion on the challenges the country has to face and their possible solutions.

Therefore, the main text is divided into four parts. The first highlights the current structure of the Nigerian state and the interconnections between politics and ethnic and religious identities. It provides the historical and cultural backgrounds of the developments in Nigeria, observes the religious violence and the efforts of the political elite to prevent them through the creation of a demonstrative culture of religious tolerance. It also elucidates factors beyond the formal political system, which nevertheless prove to be very important for securing and legitimizing the power of the political class, such as traditional non-formal forms of political authority. The second part explores how aspects of the Nigerian federalism influence the stability of the country and the life of its citizens. Therefore, it is based on two case studies: the implementation of the sharia law in Northern Nigeria and the concept of resource control, two issues, that provide essential insights on how the system works in reality. The third part focuses on the importance of implementing structural reforms and schematises a concept of good governance for the development of Nigeria, which lies beyond the mechanisms of federalism. The main text closes with a chapter that compares Nigeria to two other federalist states- Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to clarify two different approaches to federalism and underline that the specific concept of federalism in a country assumes different processes emerging from it. Finally, the conclusion systemises the displayed information and summarises the author's point of view towards the challenges and opportunities in front of the Nigerian state.

2. The federalist system of Nigeria and the role of religion and ethnicity

To understand the current developments in Nigeria, a brief overview on the country and its history is necessary. Nigeria can basically be divided into three regions: the Muslim North, the religiously mixed so-called Middle belt and the Christian South. This composition is

determined by the country's pre-colonial and colonial past. Islam widely entered the North of Nigeria in the 19th century with the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1808 under Usman dan Fodio (Adekunle 2009a: 5-6). The Sokoto Caliphate was a theocratic Islamic state, whose southern borders roughly resemble today's Islamic-dominated states in Nigeria (Paden 2008: 7). Since the middle of the 19th century, the British started to expand their colonial empire over Nigeria, beginning with the Atlantic coast and eventually conquering Northern Nigeria and dissolving the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 (Afolayan 2009: 38-39). The British established a Northern and Southern Protectorate, which they amalgamated in 1914 due to administrative and economical reasons, shaping the future borders of independent Nigeria (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 119). Although in the South colonialism and the spread of Christianity went hand in hand, the British prevented the Christianisation of the North in order to secure their model of Indirect rule. This created the territorial dichotomy in Nigeria, which persists till today, with the South being mostly Christian, with Western education and better development, and an Islam-dominated, underdeveloped North (Adekunle 2007a: 6; Nwaiogaidu 2012: 223).

After Nigeria's independence in 1960 and the absence of the stabilizing factor of British rule, the different loosely inter-connected territorial entities quickly drifted apart, which led to the country experiencing a long-lasting period of political turmoil- a devastating civil war from 1967 to 1970 and military dictatorship in the periods 1966-1979 and 1983-1988 (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 121), which tried to stabilize the country by undemocratic and often violent means. In 1999, the military resigned from power, which led to the instalment of the current Fourth Republic.

The history of Nigerian independence is accompanied by events that lead to a strong antagonism and mistrust between the Muslim and the Christian population. Two of the most symbolic are when the country joined the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1986 and when 12 northern states introduced the Islamic law sharia in the criminal domain of their judiciary systems in 1999 (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 139; Paden 2008: 58). These events deepened the conflict potential in Nigerian society and periodically lead to violent outbreaks on ethno-religious basis. Just in the period 1999-2006, the first years after the reintroduction of democracy, 14 000 people were killed and 3 million displaced due to such outbreaks (Paden 2008: 82). It is assumed, that 40% of the cases of violence in Nigeria are politically, religiously or ethnically motivated (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 281). In recent years, a certain Islamist anti-modern insurgency group, called Boko Haram (which means as much as "Western education is a sin") evolved into a threat to national security and is being held responsible for a multitude of killings and bombings all over Northern and Central Nigeria (Leiß 2012: 13).

Today, Nigeria is considered to be one of the most complex countries on Earth. With a total population of 170 million people it is the most populous country in Africa; given its high fertility rate of 5.38 children per woman its population is expected to grow to 400 million people until 2050, thus making Nigeria the fourth most populous nation on Earth (Index Mundi 2013). It is also home to over 250 different ethnic groups and is the largest country on

Earth with an approximate balance of Christian and Muslim population, with the two groups forming roughly 50% of the population each (Paden 2008: 3). The three biggest ethnic groups (Fig. 1) are the Hausa/Fulani in the north (29% of the population Muslim), the Yoruba in the southwest (21%, 50/50 Muslim/Christian) and the Igbo in the southeast (18%, Christian). Despite of English being the official language, the languages of those three ethnic groups are accepted in their regions for certain administrative purposes. Another big ethnic group are the Christian Ijaw from the south with about 10% of the country's population (Paden 2008: 10).

The country experienced an oil boom in the 1970's and 1980's, which made it an important factor in the global economy and determined its economical development in the next decades. Today, Nigeria is the 7th largest oil producer in the world (Paden 2008:3). On the international level, Nigeria holds leading positions in ECOWAS and the African Union and is committed to various peace-keeping and crisis management missions in other African countries, such as Sudan (Paden 2008: 24-25).

Despite of its international significance and its human and economical potential, the dramatic inner tensions Nigeria has to struggle with threaten to disintegrate the country. Trying to overcome the traumatising heritage of civil war and dictatorship and hold the country together, Nigeria has adopted a model of loose federalism that splits the territory more and more over time with the argument to ensure maximal autonomy of the different communities. After the end of the civil war, Nigeria had 12 states; today they are 36 (Fig. 2), not including the federal region of the capital Abuja (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 104). Currently, Nigeria is a presidential republic with a bicameral parliament (Paden 2008: 14). The dominant parties are the People's Democratic Party (holds most of the states, elected all of the three last presidents) and the All Progressives Congress, formed in 2013 by the fusion of the four main opposition parties (Paden 2008: 15; Nigerian Tribune 2013).

The Nigerian political system shows certain specific features that need to be highlighted. At least on the level of the political elite, a strong consensus has been reached, that Nigeria has to remain one state. Thus, Nigeria's model of overcoming differences is based on a stable party center, a constitutional ban of religious and ethnic parties and a demonstrative tolerance, applied by the heads of state. A cornerstone of this approach is the already mentioned federalist system: besides the 36 states, the military administration in the 1990's divided the country in six semi-official geographical regions to overcome ethnic and religious identities and moved the capital from Lagos to Abuja in the geographical centre of Nigeria. Also, each of the 774 local government authorities have a representative function on state level. There also is a general consensus that the president has to be elected on a rotating basis from the Muslim North and the Christian South, which system has established itself in reality (Paden 2008: 19-21). Umbrella organizations such as NIREC (Nigerian Interreligious Council), consisting of an equal number of Muslim and Christian leaders, promote a cross-religious dialogue (Paden 2008: 23).

Despite of those initiatives to prevent ethno-religious violence, the Nigerian political model has severe flaws, which compromise all the above-mentioned efforts. First of all: theory and

practice of the federal structure diverge sharply from each other; below the surface of policies for promoting tolerance, Nigerian political life has another face, which includes heavy corruption, abuse of power and the construction of clientelistic power networks, based on regional origin, on all levels of government. Taking a closer look on the creation of much of the current Nigerian states, one can observe that many of them are established to represent the interest of a certain ethnic group and to mobilise it, instead for national cooperation as intended; thus, often the federal model doesn't prevent ethno-regionalism, but simply restructures it. While some ethnic groups have got states for themselves, some are a minority in a state ruled by a different group and define their status through alienation; this creates political turmoil and competition for splitting up states, which is detrimental for the interethnic relations (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 104-105). This competition between the individual ethno-regional groups hinders national integration and prevents the conduct of politics of "real" issues by determining political process in the orbit of political elites strengthening their own networks of clientelism and patrimonialism. Unfortunately, for the Nigerian political elites it is easier to protect such a status quo than to support structural reforms, because it gives them a secured place in Nigerian politics and an opportunity to increase their influence and wealth (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 107). The policy of establishing certain geo-cultural zones paradoxically institutionalises ethnic and religious division in an attempt to reduce them. Besides that, it further complicates the system and in-tunes the crisis of political rotation among ethnic regions, which are neither clearly explained nor sanctioned by the electorates (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 128). This particularisation leads to the undermining of the federal institutions and their claim of independency and democracy, which compromises the whole idea of a Nigerian nation, because it fails to create a loyalty of the citizen to the country that is stronger than his ethno-regional identity.

Another disturbing aspect of Nigerian federalism is the influence of traditional informal structures and titles, such as the Sultan of Sokoto. Despite of having no formal prerogatives, appointed by the constitution, or any kind of democratic sanction, the holders of such titles have a significant authority amongst the population and are often more effective in conflict resolution than the official governmental institutions (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 134). The formal political class is deeply involved with them in order to legitimize their power; they also play a very important role in electioneering, because the ruler has the potential of influencing his followers to vote for a certain candidate. The prospect of connections and wealth makes the holding of such a title very desired and in many cases they are being sold and traded (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 137). Also, due to the era of colonialism, many of the ethnic groups in Nigeria are represented in the neighbouring countries, which creates further informal interdependencies (Paden 2008: 39-43).

The role of such traditional informal institutions in the conciliation of social and ethno-religious conflicts may sound as a positive aspect on the first look, but in the long-term it is a disservice to democracy. By being dependent on their services in the election process and for increasing their own authority, the Nigerian politicians are creating intermediaries between

themselves and the citizens, which is the basis for disinterest in politics, corruption and opacity. The result is the emerging of a "informal" federalism, which evades the democratic institutions. Thus, in order to strengthen democracy, the Nigerian state has to try to gradually deconstruct the sources of the political influence of the informal rulers.

The provided overview on the Nigerian political model in this chapter shows that it suffers under a lot of flaws. Part 3 will try to provide insights on how deep do the flaws affect the stability of the country and what role the implemented model of Nigerian federalism plays in this process.

3. Issues of federalism: the sharia and resource control

The following section will explore the backgrounds of two specific examples of how Nigerian federalism works. The author has chosen aspects, which are symbolic for the functioning of the system as a whole and are shaping the life of Nigerians in many different aspects. However, instead of preventing violence and enhancing social cohesion, they are achieving the opposite. The first example is the implementation of the sharia in the criminal domain in twelve northern states in 2000; being a religious issue, it has a direct effect on interreligious relations. The second example, the Nigerian system of resource control provides the economical basis of coexistence of the country's regions and determines the general path of development of Nigeria.

3.1. Sharia

In order to be objective, sharia has a past long before the year 2000. First, it was recognised by the British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria; after the country's independence it was substituted by a national system of secular laws in the criminal and corporate domains. Nevertheless, in the Northern states it remained applicable in the civil domain (family issues, marriage, divorce etc.) through a system of parallel lower courts, a peculiarity, which was confirmed by the constitution of 1999 (Paden 2008: 58).

The escalation of the sharia issue occurred in 2000, when the state of Zamfara introduced the law in the criminal domain. Soon, eleven more Northern states followed its example, thus approximately drawing the borders of the old Islamic theocratic state of Sokoto in the northern part of the country (Fig. 3). After initial backlashes from the central government and outbreaks of violence, the system was widely accepted by Nigerian authorities and no further actions were taken to preserve secularism. The implementation of sharia brought with itself the practicing of the harsh punishments it foresees; for example, Nigeria is one of the six countries worldwide, where stoning as a penalty in capital crimes is allowed (Paden 2008: 62).

Although with the establishment of multiple jurisprudential systems on the territory of the affected states it was formally guaranteed, that sharia would be applied to Muslims only and

the Christian population would be treated according to national laws, sharia quickly became a symbol of religious discrimination and oppression of the minority. Since Islam rejects separation of political from religious authority and promotes a unified theocratic system of governance, the Christian minority in the North (counting several million people) feared, that the implementation of sharia is just a step towards assimilation (Nwaogaidu 2012: 282). The advocates of sharia argue that it is a cultural necessity for the Muslims to have sharia law and that it is not something applied to Christians in those regions. This argument does not pass a careful examination, though, because the sharia is not just perceived as a juridical instrument, but also a way of life. Thus, in the sharia-affected states there is a ban on alcohol, cinemas and integration of the sexes, which is affecting everyone, including the Christian population (Adekunle 2009b: 185). Another critical argument is that despite being perceived by the Muslim as a demarcation line of good and evil, the sharia is vulnerable to the vices of the Nigerian political system, too, and has become corrupt and politicised over time. Adekunle (2009b: 183) argues that the law has affected mostly the poor ("talakawa") and represses women. He also states that the implementation of the sharia was used as a political statement to express disenchantment with the government of the Christian Obasanjo and prevent a re-election in 2003 (Adekunle 2009b: 186). Obviously, Islamic law is not capable of dealing with the problems of Nigerian society; corruption and embezzlement of office is not regarded as theft and is subjugated under light punishments, if at all (Paden 2008: 60). Also, there are signs that the sharia is being used by the governing class of the northern states to pursue political opponents and does not conform to the principle of equal treatment. In some states, the creation of neighbourhood squads for the enforcement of Islamic law, the so-called "hisbah", has caused additional controversy and damaged further the rule of law and the capability of the state to ensure the security of its citizens (Paden 2008: 61).

The sharia issue is clearly a problem that has formally been created by the mechanisms of federalism. Today, 13 years after the introduction of the Islamic religious law in the criminal domain, it still represents the mistrust between the two main religions in Nigeria and holds enormous conflict potential. To some researchers it is even the controversy that "polarized the country along religious divides more than had any other issue in Nigeria's history" (Omotola 2009: 88). The introduction of sharia and its aftermath caused deterioration of the interreligious relations, which were already tattered by events in the past, such as the membership in the OIC of 1986, and caused multiple outbreaks of violence, the bloodiest of which took place in Kaduna; over 2000 people lost their lives then (Omotola 2009: 90). There were even proposals to split the mixed state in two; in the Christian part of the country, Cross River State threatened to call itself officially a "Christian State", which would have served as an excuse of others to do the same (Adekunle 2009b: 187).

The implementation of the traditional Islamic law in the North has damaged the idea of the rule of law, which is essential for the functioning of a democratic system. Thus, it has to be seen as an anti-systematic initiative, which provides a simple solution for swift and direct social justice, which is not compromised by the perceived as corrupt institutional mechanisms

of the state. Although after the implementation in 1999 and the subsequent riots in 2000, the state has withdrawn from imposing secular laws in those regions in order not to create any additional turmoil, in the long-run this is the basis for more violence and capsulation. To some, sharia might seem as a good chance for Nigerian Muslims to live their culture, but a system of multiple jurisprudential systems is damaging the core principle of democracy, that the law should apply to everyone, disregarding religion, personal views or social position. Parallel laws also mean parallel societies and this is definitely not helping in the process of national unity, but is leading to alienation of the individual from the state. In addition, the failure of sharia to provide this justice due to its own corruption and inadequacy towards the challenges of the present might lead to further disillusionment and seeking of even more radical means.

3.2. Resource control

The programmed weaknesses of the Nigerian system of federalism manifest itself in the issue of resource control and the federal redistribution of funds. During colonial times it was a common cliché, that the rich South has to subsidise the poor North; this was one of the main arguments for the amalgamation of both regions during British rule (Azaiki 2008: 325).

Since the oil-boom in the 1970's, Nigeria grew attached to the quick oil revenues, which today have risen to more than 90% of the country's exports (Nwaogaidu 2012: 164). Until then, the revenues from oil production had been split evenly between the producing region and the central government, but over time and especially during the military regimes, the central government processed laws, which redirected most of the revenues in its hands and over-centralised the branch (Fig. 4). The first and most important law as such was the Petroleum Decree 51 of 1969, which gave the exclusive ownership to oil resources to the federal government. It was the time of the civil war and the law was justified by the goal to weaken the separatist region of Biafra. Nevertheless, the law hasn't been revoked until today, decades after the end of the war (Azaiki 2008: 318). Today, around 87% of the revenue money is flowing directly from the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta to the central government, from where it is being evenly redistributed to the regions with a slight preponderance of the oil-producing regions (Table 1., Nwaiogaidu 2012: 224). This means, that the oil-producing regions in the south only get a fraction of the money they make, while the North, not having any significant economy, is heavily subsidised by the political elites. With the abolishment of fiscal federalism and implementing a policy of monopolising the oil revenues and redistributing them, the oil economy not only has become the most important branch of Nigerian economy, it is also the key to political power. Since the parliament comprises 182 representatives from the North and only 154 from the South, this status quo is determined by legislative barriers. For example, a proposed bill from a southern representative to revoke the Petroleum Act and re-introduce fiscal federalism in 2001 was clearly blocked by a secure Northern majority (Sagay 2008: 370).

The dependency on oil has had detrimental effects on the other branches of Nigerian economy, especially the agrarian sector. The budgetary expenditures are mainly determined by the price of crude oil on the international market; this makes the Nigerian economy very vulnerable to outer influences. With the greater dependency on oil, the socio-economic development worsened significantly (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 164-165). Thus, the state has become the major employer in the country in the minds of Nigerians (Paden 2008: 66). The oil industry has become an easy way to distribute money to secure the survival of a certain region. The Nigerian political class and is using this factor for securing and expanding their political power over their own regions and are stirring up the fear of conflict between the South and the North, which adds to the atmosphere of antagonism between the regions and religions in Nigeria. Thus, ethnic and religious mobilisation has become strategic means of a struggle for oil-produced financial resources (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 129). Therefore, the political class takes into account a line of confrontation between ethnic and religious groups, violence, the creation of vast corruption and clientelistic networks just in order to sustain their power. The distribution of socio-political or economic resources through employment, administrative positions or political powers based on ethnic identity struggle disregards merit or qualification and affects people by their origin; the aftermath of this process is competence failure, loss of productivity and morale declination (Nwaiogaidu 266-267), which is again mostly affecting the "simple" Nigerians, creating thus a vicious circle of poverty and conflict. While the fear of poverty is causing extremism on both sides, the political class is using it as a distraction for exploiting the huge opportunities for corruption, for example through misdirection of large amounts of raw oil for offshore sale directly by politicians and military personnel (Paden 2008: 68).

Despite of being caused by over-centralisation, the problems of the model of fiscal redistribution are exercised through a dysfunctional federalism. In order to overcome this vicious circle, Nigeria has to turn towards diversification of its economy and a reform of its model of federalism through fiscal federalism. The "curse of oil" over the country has to be stopped; the North has to become more independent from the oil revenues. Although the Nigerian economy was largely driven by oil in the last decades, the country has much more valuable resources in all of its regions, which it could exploit in order to achieve diversification. Before oil, for example, there was a period, when the North was economically important due to its tin production (Azaiki 2008: 322).

A great help in promoting diversification can be fiscal federalism. If a reasonable part of the revenues from a state economy would stay in the state, then this would cultivate a state of responsibility and control in the political class and in the people in general towards their budget. The focus of the local government will shift from redirecting wealth to creating wealth by using its own potential and resources. Fiscal federalism would also limit the networks of corruption and clienteles, which have entangled Nigerian society. It will also limit some of the negative aspects of the federalist model, such as the legislative barriers and the never-ending corruption-driven balance of powers in the parliament and in the relations

between central and local governments. This would open the gates towards a more successful form of nation-building and prevention of ethno-religious conflicts.

Those two examples of important aspects of Nigerian politics uncover the wrong design of the Nigerian federalist model: in reality, federalism not only fails to create a unified nation, which is capable of overcoming political and social challenges, it actually prevents such a process. The Nigerian state retreats from spheres which are amongst its most important prerogatives such as the rule of law and allows the existence of parallel laws in the criminal and civil domain, which are applied only to a certain group of its citizens. This is undermining the very basic aspects of democracy. At the same time, the Nigerian state over-centralises the main source of its profit and redistributes it on mainly political criteria, damaging the economical development of the country, creating corruption and strengthening the existing mistrust between the ethno-religious groups. So, as a summary, the author can point out, that wherever the Nigerian central government has to defend its authority towards the local governments and prove its capacity to defend democracy, it is restrained; wherever the regions need more freedom to develop their strengths and create an effect of synergy for the whole state, the central government prevents those chances by over-regulating and over-centralising. This is a pattern Nigeria has to overcome and the means towards it are structural reforms and good governance.

4. The Urge for Good Governance

Section 3 made clear that federalism is not a solution on its own, when it comes to solving complex problems. Also, federalism does not guarantee good governance according to democratic principles. The latter is something Nigeria has a dramatic deficit of. The basic requirements for good governance are an efficient public service, an independent judicial system, an accountable administration of public funds, respect for the law and human rights on all levels of government, a pluralistic institutional structure as well as a free press (Nwaiogaidu 2012: 306) Certainly, this is a gigantic challenge for Nigeria; the country will need a definite, long-term commitment to those principles, if it wants to implement them. But it is worth it in order to realise the enormous potential the country has. Good governance in Nigeria can be applied in many different aspects, but all of them are connected to the changing political culture and mentality towards a general policy in favour of national interest and unity.

First, important structural reforms have to be implemented in order to secure democratic principles, the rule of law, equal treatment, economical prosperity, human rights, as well as to break through corruption and informal clientelistic structures, based on identity. The two case studies in Part 3, sharia and resource control, are good examples of what is going wrong in those spheres and what has to change. Diversifying the economy and introducing a more efficient model of resource redistribution based on fiscal federalism is an important structural

reform and a way of creating employment and reducing the drastic poverty in Nigeria. Actually, the results of the opposing economical policy in the past are easy to see: with the domination of oil in the Nigerian economy and the demographic explosion, the GDP per capita has fallen dramatically from \$849.87 in 1980 to \$220.22 in 1994. Only since the beginning of the 21st century a significant economical recovery has taken place, with the GDP per capita rising from \$371.77 from 2000 to \$1,501.72 in 2011 (Index Mundi). Nevertheless, Nigeria doesn't manage to quickly improve its Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations- it is currently ranked at place 153 out of 186 countries (Channels TV 2013). In the period 1980-2000, the percentage of the population living in poverty rose from 28% to 70%, 68% of Nigerians are stated to live with less than \$1.25 daily in 2013 (Jega 2000: 198; Channels TV 2013). Poverty is not just a question of the standard of living and consumption of goods for the Nigerian people, as important this aspect may be; poverty is also a threat to national security, because it makes people easy to manipulate on basis of their ethnic and religious identity by the clientelistic networks of the political class and mobilising them in the conflicts for resource control. Thus, applying structural reforms in order to fight poverty must be a high priority for the Nigerian state. The quicker this happens, the better.

To achieve this shift in politics, a new political class must emerge in Nigeria that has the will to implement it. Unfortunately, this usually is a long lasting process and could take many years, until it shows results. The creation of such a political elite, which is committed to unifying the nation, depends on a broader commitment of the Nigerian citizens to the ideals of the constitution and the principles of democracy. A very important factor in this process is civic education (Jega 2007: 159). Civic education could play an important role in forming a class of responsible and self-conscious citizens that have overcome the old structures of power and dependency of ethno-religious communities. Especially for a society like the Nigerian, where the decades of military dictatorship and political instability have significantly weakened the civil society, the presence of such a class, which seeks political representations not based on religious or ethnic identities, but on policy of issues, is essential. Also, education in general is the only way of dealing with the challenges, which emerge from the demographical explosion; a permanently growing mass of poor and uneducated youngsters will certainly lead to more instability. A large and well-funded campaign for improvement of education can turn the demographical situation into a positive aspect by quickly creating a critical mass of educated people, who are motivated to work for the national interest.

Despite the many advantages of implementing a concept of good governance, its realisation could prove quite problematic. The clientelistic networks of the political class don't have an interest of that, because it would shatter the basis for their power. It is highly likely, that it would try to sabotage such initiatives or substitute them by simulating reforms, which in fact preserve the status quo. Thus, a real shift in the mentality of policy-making in Nigeria in a foreseeable time remains uncertain.

5. Other examples of federalism: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Germany

Finally, wishing to point out more arguments on why federalism can have positive as well as negative effects on a state, depending on its philosophy and implementation, the author has decided to present two specific countries as examples of both cases. The first case is that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shows that circumstances strongly resembling the Nigerian can be found in a country in the middle of Europe. After the end of the war in 1995, the Dayton treaty outlined the further coexistence of the ethnic communities as one state. However, the only way the participants saw as a possibility to hold the country together was to establish a stiff federalist model with clearly defined ethnic quotas in governmental sectors. This led to a political process based on further mutual capsulation of the cultural groups and the anchoring of ethnical statism in Bosnia's political culture, which leads to a reproduction of the state of crisis from the war and is preventing the stabilisation of the country through a process of a gradual unification even until today (Dzihic 2009: 401-405).

On the other hand, the author tried to refer to a more positive example of federalism, which could serve as an inspiration or even role model for Nigeria in order to promote reforms in its own federal structure. Germany is such a functioning federalist state. The philosophy of the modern German federalism is the so-called "Verbundmodell" ("unitary model"), in which the single states ("Länder") have the autonomy to determine certain fields of their home policy, but when it comes to the government of the country as a whole, they strongly rely on each other. This system is also called "cooperative federalism", because it is a complex and extensive collective enterprise, which stimulates the cohesion of the state and prevents significant discrepancies between the single entities (Funk 2010: 30-31). In the German case, what helps implementing this model in reality, is on one hand the strong rule of law and on the other hand that, despite the single regions having some cultural or religious differences, there is a strong national identity that is protecting the country from issues of origin.

Although surely it has to be noted, that Germany and Nigeria have a totally different social background, the German model of federalism might serve as an inspiration for implementing certain reforms in order to strengthen the unity of the Nigerian state and reduce the importance of group interests. On the other hand, the parallels between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nigeria show that the weaknesses of the Nigerian system of federalism are structural and implemented elsewhere will have a negative effect, too.

6. Conclusion

Again, at the end of this paper, the question from the beginning arises: Is federalism the solution for Nigeria? The possible answer, based on the information presented above, is: partially. Federalism can provide a reasonable autonomy in internal, administrative and communal issues to the individual ethno-religious communities, which, given the diversity in the country, is easy to understand; but most important of all, it can help to enforce the

economical development of the regions by giving more instruments of economical initiative in the hands of the local governments. Economical decentralization can have a positive spill-over effect for fighting corruption and clientelistic networks. One crucial aspect of achieving this is through fiscal federalism.

Nevertheless, federalism can just be part of solution, not the solution itself. Unfortunately, the model of Nigerian federalism seems to be hardly more than a substitute for urgently needed structural reforms and an efficient political class and administration, committed to the principle of democracy. In the case of Nigeria, a federalist system has to help in nation-building, but in reality it just demonstrates the state's lack of interest in unifying the country and building up democratic civil structures. The demonstrative religious tolerance of the political elites is not a negative aspect, but the author perceives it as the easiest way applied to try to hold latent conflicts between the religious communities. In an environment, dominated by instability, it is essential to fight the non-religious causes of extremism, which are poverty, lack of education and perspectives, as well as corruption. If taken further, the misconceptions in the Nigerian federalist model will continue to produce capsulation of the different regions into ethno-religiosity and reproduction of mistrust and discrimination. The implementation of the sharia as a jurisprudential system and a lifestyle in the North serves as a good example of how decisions on the federal level are marginalising millions of Christians in those regions and are showing the helplessness of the Nigerian state on establishing secular laws. That is why the central government has to set turning towards spheres, from which it has retreated, as a priority. The rule of law for all citizens is not only essential; it is defining a democratic system. In this sense, theoretically, Nigeria shouldn't tolerate multiple jurisprudential courts, especially when they are dividing people on religious criteria. This is a sphere, where federalism cannot work for the good of the people and where the central government should have the courage to show more authority.


The similarities between Nigeria and Bosnia and Herzegovina show that no matter what the background of a federalist system is, constructing political representation solely on identity leads always to negative effects. Nigeria has to turn to politics of issues and commit to a concept of good governance, otherwise extremism and violent outbreaks will be inevitable in the future. Thus, the struggle against patrimonialism, corruption and clienteles has to evolve to one of the top priorities of Nigeria. Ensuring the rule of law and creating effective institutions of security and prosecution is one aspect that has to be enforced. On the level of the political system Nigeria has to move away from the vast traditional networks of informal sources of influence, formulated in the text as "informal federalism". These are a source of opacity and corruption. Surely, they are strongly connected to the Nigerian identity and provide legitimacy to the government, but on the long-term a democracy has to be less dependent on ethno-religious group-interests and informal structures.

A final factor worth mentioning is education. There is a saying, that a democracy needs a critical mass of democrats to survive. If Nigeria invests in civic education in schools and universities, it can turn the vast numbers of young people into active citizens with democratic

views and intolerance to the vices of the state. This will lay the basis for strengthening democracy in the mid-term future.

The aspects of federalism covered in this paper probably are just a fraction of all; covering all would have surpassed its goal. Nevertheless, the author tried to pick out and explore those aspects, which have the greatest value for the topic. Summarising their content, one comes to the certainty, that Nigeria still has a long way to go in order to develop a true democracy. The author can only express his hope that it will manage to overcome all the challenges and emerge as one of the strong countries in the 21st century. Unfortunately, despite of some of the crucial steps in this process being quite obvious, it is uncertain if there is enough political will to implement them in the foreseeable future. The power and influence of the present elites, who have interest of that model to continue existing, is too great. The implementation of the structural reforms is expected to create some social discontent in the beginning, as well. Therefore, it is highly likely that reforms will progress only very slowly and that Nigeria's inner tensions will continue to be a source of instability, despite the relative growth of the country's significance on the national parquet.

Fig. 1: Major ethnic groups in Nigeria




Source: Nwaiogaidu 2012

Fig. 2: The Nigerian states



Source: www.mapsof.net

Fig. 3: The sharia-states in Nigeria (in dark)



Source: Adekunle 2009a

Fig. 4: Federal and state shares of petroleum proceeds 1960-1999

YEARS	PRODUCING STATE (%)	DISTRIBUTABLE POOL AMOUNT OR FEDERATION ACCOUNT(%)
1960-67	50	50
1967-69	50	50
1969-71	45	55
1971-75	45 minus offshore proceeds	55 plus offshore proceeds
1975-79	20 minus offshore proceeds	80 plus offshore proceeds
1979-81	-	100
1982-92	1.5	98.5
1992-99	3	97
1999 -	13	87

Source: Nwaiogaidu 2012

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Arabellion: Geopolitical Proxy Wars and New Constellations of East and West in Syria

Beate Ulmer

Abstract

From the beginning of the protests in March 2011 Syria's primarily peaceful civil uprising became a violent opposition and escalated into a large scale civil war. An increasing militarisation spurred by external sponsors could be observed and was accompanied by a growing confessionalisation. The conflict has taken on the character of a proxy war where many powers – international, regional and subnational – are acting their own interests. All these issues have led to a highly volatile stalemate. On account of military and political risks and a variety of outcomes, military intervention on the principle of "Responsibility to Protect" is still discussed internationally despite the desperate situation of the country's population.

1. Introduction

From Uprising to Civil War

The initial protests in Syria in mid-March 2011 were triggered in Deraa when a group of local teenagers were arrested by the police and allegedly tortured for "defacing" walls with the motto of the Arab Spring: "*Al-sha'b yurid isqat al-nizam*" graffiti – "the people want the downfall of the regime" (De Juan and Bank 2013: 9). The first anti-government demonstrations broke out in Latakia when protestors hurled projectiles at the bronze statue of Hafiz al-Assad, the former President of Syria (Goldsmith 2012: 15). Subsequently, thousands of Syrians took to the streets across the country demanding the regime of President Bashar Assad. What began as a peaceful protest degenerated into a full blown war between the regime's loyal army and a fragmented opposition with thousands killed on both sides. Since July 2012 the increasing militarization and also the increasing confessionalisation – Sunni Muslims versus Alawites – led to a desperate situation for the civil population. However there are also people in Syria and abroad who wanted Assad's regime to stay for the sake of (religious) stability. The sectarian character and the geopolitical networking are quite complex. For example, the influence of Iran, the domestic security of Israel, the interest of Russia and China, and the various positions of USA and Europe led from a civil war to a proxy war where the struggle between East and West is about the dominance in the Near East.

2. A state of politics of sectarian insecurity

The protest movements in Syria – like in the rest of the Arab world – have been motivated almost entirely by domestic issues. The major concerns have been unemployment, poverty, and corruption (Terrill 2011). The successful overthrow of the governments in Tunisia and Egypt was a central trigger for the Syrian uprising. However in contrast to these countries,

Bashar al-Assad still remains in power. In 2000, when Bashar al-Assad assumed power in Syria he inherited an authoritarian state from the former President Hafiz al-Assad – his father. Bashar al Assad’s regime is dominated by the minority group of Alawites, who appears loyal to the government although most of Syrian Alawites remain socially and economically less privileged. Syria’s Alawites are part of a broader Arab Alawite community of some four million people (Goldsmith 2012: 6). They are concentrated in north-western Syria, with major populations in Latakia and Tartous. Some Alawites are also living in Damascus and on the peripheries of Homs and Hama, but the majority remain resident in many small villages in and around the coastal mountains of Jabal Sahiliyah (Goldsmith 2012: 7).

For centuries the Alawites were one of the most oppressed religious minorities in Western Asia.² They belong to Shi’a Islam containing elements of Christianity. Alawites were often considered as an extremist break-away group, as quasi-heretics who are considered to be marginal and enigmatic for shunning most mainstream beliefs and practices. (Goldsmith 2012: 8-9, Noueihed and Warren 2012: 217). Since the beginning of the eleventh century the Alawites underwent political and religious marginalisation which excluded them from urban areas. They were divided between peasants of the coastal and inland plains and the mountain dwellers of the Jabal Sahliyah and also deeply divided by strong loyalties into localised tribal groups. Hence, the community had been fragmented, but the social structure was egalitarian and the sect was overwhelmingly rural and poor. Owing to these aspects their ideological penchant was towards secularism and socialism (Goldsmith 2012: 10).

The Ba’athist revolution of 1963 happened in a country that was created by western powers fragmented on sub- and supra-state identities – a Sunni Arab majority and the mosaic of Arab minorities – ethnic and religious ones that included Alawites, Kurds, Druze, Christians, Turkomen and Ismailis, another branch of Shi’a Islam. The Ba’ath party was formed in 1947 in Damascus around a secular, socialist Arab nationalism that intended to liberate Arab lands from foreign intervention.³ The minority groups were in favour of the secularizing ideas of the Ba’ath party, in fear of being oppressed by the Sunni Muslims (Hinnebusch 2012: 96, Noueihed and Warren 2012: 216).

Syria’s population was also divided between the dominant landed and commercial oligarchy, a rising middle class, and an aggrieved peasantry. Under the Ba’ath regime land reform broke the economic hold of the oligarchy and the party won the support of the peasants. The regime started a revolution from above by creating a public sector through nationalisations where the major segments of the middle and working classes were employed. Investment in rural electrification, public health, and education led to an increase in life expectancy that continued into the 1990s (Hinnebusch 2012: 96).

2 For a detailed overview of the history of Alawites and several names of this community see Goldsmith 2012.

3 Lewis (2011: 53) considered that “for most of the twentieth century, two ideas dominated political debate in the Middle East: nationalism and socialism. [...] Both were of European origin; [...]

In connection with the historical background of the Alawites it seemed a remarkable achievement for the Alawite community when Hafiz al-Assad became President of the Syrian Arab Republic in 1971. Hafiz al-Assad himself was a member of the Alawite community originating from a small village in the mountains. He formed the basis of his power on the military-security complex, the Ba'ath party apparatus and a new Alawite elite (Noueihed and Warren 2012: 216).

Although the Ba'ath party is the sole leader of state and society in Syria since 1963 the rule of Assad's dynasty is connected closely to the Alawite community forming the bedrock of the government. Hafiz al-Assad realized the transformation from an unstable country into a robust nation by a "neo-patrimonial" strategy and concentrated power of large military security apparatus where Alawites lieutenants playing an important part in building the patrimonial core. The support of the society underlies the bureaucratic and party-corporatist institutions that cut across sectarian and urban-rural divides, unifying a constituency that bridged the middle class and the peasantry (Hinnebusch 2012: 96-97).

Despite Alawite urbanisation during the 1970s most maintained a dual existence between the metropolises and their home villages. From the 1990s and after the inauguration of Bashar al-Assad many of Alawite children had a privileged status, grew up in a privileged urban environment or were educated abroad, like Bashar al-Assad himself. He started liberal economic reforms which enlarged the social division within the Alawite community (Goldsmith 2012: 11). Bashar al-Assad forced the overconcentration of power and patronage in the ruling clan. His power rests on an authoritarian, dynastic regime created by a minority Alawite core. In his doctoral thesis Leon T. Goldsmith (2012) demonstrated that sectarian insecurity is the key element of Assad's dynasty to maintain Alawite's support for the regime. The causes of insecurity within the Alawite sect are deeply rooted in its history and its long period of social, economic and religious marginalisation isolated in their mountain refuge for centuries. Goldsmith saw in the Assad regime's struggle with the Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood in 1976-1982 the main cause for the tenacity of Alawite insecurity. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, part of the wider Sunni Islamist organization, founded in Egypt in 1928, launched its "all-out struggle" against the Assad regime in 1976 which finally ended in the tragic battle of Hama in 1982. A massive three-week long bombardment led to the death of around twenty thousand people and almost completely annihilated the city. The origins of violent opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood against the regime can be found in economic dissatisfaction among Sunni merchants, and involvement of the Syrian regime in Lebanon. The political dominant role of the Alawite elite provoked a general resentment among the majority Sunni population. And the Alawites themselves fought for the survival of the Assad regime in the belief that it was the best chance for security and equality in Syrian society (Goldsmith 2012: 169ff.). Although Bashar al-Assad's economic policies for ordinary Alawites were more unpopular, he calculated the support to the regime in perpetuation of insecurity. As the regime came under pressure from the international community, Bashar al-Assad promoted external relations with Iran and Hezbollah. Sectarian chaos in Iraq and Lebanon fuelled Alawite sectarian paranoia. Politics of Sectarian insecurity embraces causes and effects of insecurity between religious communities (Goldsmith 2012: 333). The

continued support of the Assad regime even in its second generation is grounded in the Alawite “group feeling” which depends on collective memories of persecution, discrimination, fears, and prejudices (Goldsmith 2012: 4).

3. Religion and (International) Conflict

Religion and Civil War

There is an increasing realisation that religion plays an important role in many conflicts all over the world (e.g. De Juan and Hasenclever 2010, Toft 2006, Thomas 2000). As a proportion of all civil wars there are also an increasing number of religion civil wars. But why is it that religion has a central issue in some civil wars whereas but not in all of them (Toft 2006: 2)?

Scientific research offers some explanatory models to answer this question.

One model emphasizes the nature of religion itself. Within the abundance of religions worldwide, each presents a value system or set of beliefs and practices of a society or a country which distinguishes them from other systems such as political and economic activity. This makes religion a complex and convoluted concept (Toft 2006: 5). Dissimilarities in religious ideas may hold the potential for conflict or making existing conflicts more persistent. Religion tends to be uncompromising, often defining what is good or bad, creating an absolute and universal truth (Thomas 2000: 1-2).

A different model accentuates the politicisation of religion due to globalisation. Globalisation creates a global culture grounded in western modernity which includes industrialisation, capitalism and urbanisation. These transformed religions and fragmented historic religious communities in the west, and now, through globalisation, are also transforming the Developing World. Scott Thomas (2000: 5) details that

“From this perspective, it is argued that global resurgence of religion is more about increasing the political power of marginalized communities rather than bringing ‘religion’ into politics”

A further model emphasizes the role of influential elites. They have high-ranking positions and thereby influence existing politics and bolstering their survival (De Juan and Hasenclever 2010: 238, Toft 2006: 19).

Islam and Civil War

In addition, in religious civil wars Islam plays a disproportionate role. More than eighty per cent of religious civil wars have their origins in Islam (Toft 2006: 4). Monica Toft’s explanations of this issue are centred on the subsequent development of an industrial system and the timing to the advent of “state” (Toft 2006: 21ff). Islam has never gained courage to separate faith from government. The western “state system” is the result of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after thirty years of religious war and the beginning of the era of an

increasingly secularised system of a government. However, Islam does not know the principle of state or state sovereignty, the system of the caliphate of the Islamic Umma is the only one it recognises.

“Denn der Islam kennt weder die Idee der Nation noch den ihr zugrunde liegenden Nationalstaat. Beide sind Ergebnisse der zunächst in Europa stattgefundenen neuzeitlichen Entwicklung seit der großen französischen Revolution. Die Staatsform, die der Islam in seiner Geschichte kennt und anerkennt, ist das Kalifat der islamischen Umma (Gemeinschaft), die ja universell ist und die gesamte Menschheit in der angestrebten Vereinigung umfassen soll.“ (Bassam Tibi, quoted in Abou-Taam et al. 2011: 51).

The Western industrialisation and colonialism had exported the concept of nationalism and state legitimacy. The establishing of a Jewish state in the territory predominantly populated by Arabs and Muslims led to the West becoming an unintended force for unifying Islam (Toft 2006: 23). In addition, Islam's holy sites are located in a region with the largest petroleum reserves and the importance of petroleum for the industrialised economies moved the Middle East into the focus of many contests. Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism received intensification after the foundation of Israel in 1948 and are linked to the increasing antipathies between Jews, Arabs and Iranians after World War II. Conflicts in this region would be more likely, because of Islam's disproportionately high role (Toft 2006: 24).

Apart from historical and geographical reasons to explain Islam's disproportionate contribution to high role in religious based conflicts is the form of how religion is defining social values and goals and in determining foreign linkages. Religion, Islam in particular, offers the basis to support leaders in Islamic states and at the same time the basis for opposition movements (e.g. Toft 2006: 24; Thomas 2000: 15). Thomas considered the important role of religion in postcolonial societies. Colonial states were created with artificial borders and at independence most of them had no meaningful national identity (Thomas 2000: 14). Thus religion is a source of conflict because it “promotes a transnational ideology that challenges allegiance to the state as the basic political unit of international society” (Thomas 2000: 14).

An important aspect of Islamic conflicts is the mythic imagination of supranational ideal of pan-Islamic unity. However, in fact Islamic community is divided into several movements, for example Shi'a and Sunni Islam (Thomas 2000: 15ff.). The main Sunni Islamic movements are the Muslim Brotherhood based in Egypt, cooperating with the governments in Kuwait and Jordan and part of the armed opposition in Syria. The Gulf Arab states promote a Sunni version of fundamentalist Islam. On the other hand, Iran pushes the Shi'a Islam. The Iranian revolution intensified the split between these Islamic movements. Another aspect is the foundations of organisations such as the Islamic Conference and the World Muslim League (1962) both by Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Islamic Propaganda by Iran and the Arab-Islamic People's Conference by Islamic Sudan (1990). All these organisations are instruments of cultural diplomacy of particular states to weaken their rivals.

4. External Actors and their Interests

Syria's internal fight between regime and opposition forces did not take long for external supporters to become involved. Above and beyond the internal struggle the conflict assumed the character of a proxy war in which regional, subnational and international conflicts are fought out. All external powers whether pro or contra Assad's Regime have their own interests in Syria's civil war. Mainly Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are struggling for influence in the region. A confessional mobilisation – Sunnis versus Shiites – is at work.

Russia and China support the government with trade and protection. China's interests in Syria are primarily economical ones. Chinese products are popular because of their reasonable prices and China's engagement in the mineral oil business is based on its reliance of the Iranian oil for its own energy requirements. Furthermore China and Syria agree in some political questions such as the return of the Golan Heights and the US hegemonial power politics, for example the long-standing Iraq occupation (Helberg 2012: 174).

Russia supports the Assad Regime with arms deliveries. The alliance between Russia and Syria has its roots in the Cold War when the socialistic government of Syria had been the last strategic partner in Western Asia. Therefore, it looks like Russia's real interest in the on-going conflict is its naval base in Syria's Mediterranean harbour Tartous (Helberg 2012: 171). Another aspect of Russia's support for Syria could be the fear of Sunni extremism. Moscow faults Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia – America's allies – for supporting Sunni radicalism in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and recently in the Middle East (Nasr 2013).

In particular, Iran and its regional role is a promoter in Syria's civil war. It strengthens Assad's regime with military advisers, financial transfers and energy supplies. Bashar al-Assad's government is the only ally of Iran in the Arab world, albeit is not even an Arab country. However, some political-strategic aspects are reasons for this alliance. To counteract the loss of the Golan Heights Syria wanted to concentrate all forces against Israel. In addition, Iran itself escaped from the US-Israel influence after the downfall of the Shah-Regime and Ayatollah Khomeini's Revolution. Iran attempts regional domination and Syria is an important link to the pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Helberg 2012: 175 and Gorzewski 2013).

For the Sunni monarchies Saudi Arabia and Qatar the civil war in Syria is a power struggle against Tehran's considerable growth in influence (Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 3). While Qatar backs Syrians opposition with light weapons and money, Saudi Arabia also wants to send heavy weapons and high-tech equipment. The fall of Bashar al-Assad would be a blow to Iran and thereby Saudi Arabia and Qatar could increase their regional domination (Gorzewski 2013). However, Saudi Arabia's interests in Syria's civil war will not lead to democratisation of Syria. This had been demonstrated during the revolt in Bahrain when Saudi Arabia sent troop support to the ruling Sunni minority against the struggle with the Shiite majority (e.g., Gorzewski 2013; Der neue Fischer Weltalmanach 2012).

The strategic alliance between Iran and Hamas was undermined by the Syrian civil war and the move of Hamas' headquarters from Damascus to Doha, the capital of Qatar. Hamas was

founded in 1987 as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Syria's relationship with Hamas is based on a long tradition. In 1948 Syria took in Palestinian refugees displaced during the foundation of the state of Israel and in 1967 during the six-day war. Syria also supported Hamas as well as Hezbollah to add pressure on Israel over the unsolved situation of the Golan Heights. Although Sunni Hamas and Shiite Hezbollah have no common ground, in 2006 they agreed on a common front against the Zionist-American aggression (Helberg 2012: 189).

Syria and Lebanon are connected closely in some aspects of history and society. The Lebanese state specifically was created by officials of the former French colony and Syria did not recognise the sovereignty of Lebanon. For Damascus the Lebanese capital Beirut remains the window to the world for official and unofficial business in the international financial sector (Helberg 2012: 193). The Syrian conflict is splitting the Lebanon society. While Lebanese Hezbollah supports the Syrian government, Alawites in the North of Lebanon are placing their destiny in the hands of the Assad regime with, Sunni politicians and tribes standing by the side of the Syrian opposition. In case of a regime change in Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah would be weakened, since Syria represents its most important transfer route for arms deliveries (Helberg 2012: 198; Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 4). The confessional mobilisation also let the Syrian struggle spill over into the neighbouring Lebanon and Iraq. In October 2012, the high-ranking Sunni intelligence officer Wissam al-Hassan was killed in a car bombing, with some Sunni groups even operating for the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In mid-November 2012 in the southern Lebanese port city of Sidon Sunni Salafist groups and Hezbollah were fighting and in early December violence between Alawites and Sunni quarters reignited when a dozen youths died in northern Tripoli on route to join the opposition forces inside Syria. Iraq, too, supports Assad's regime with combatants and the number of bombings in the unstable state has increased in recent months (Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 4).

Turkey is involved in the conflict from an early stage and in diverse manner. Its border to Syria is the last resort for many Sunni refugees and rebels, and Turkey has been directly affected by fighting along this border. NATO, too, benefits from the border to Syria when it approved the Turkish request to install Patriot antimissile systems on Turkish territory. In addition, there is the Turkey's fear of another autonomous Kurdish region. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat, PYD) and members of the FSA control individual crossings along the Turkish-Syrian border. The PYD emerged from the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in 2003 and is systematically working to establish local structures of self-administration and law and order. In 2003 PYD and Assad's Regime informed a strategic alliance to keep the Kurdish resistance in check. In return, the PYD was allowed to found language schools and cultural centres. The PYD gained more and more control of Kurdish territories. At present, the PYD rejects armed struggle against Syria's government, at the same time it builds an area of retreat and recruitment for PKK fighters

which is seen as a provocation for Ankara (Helberg 2012: 205; Asseburg and Wimmen 2012: 1; 4).

Apart from the Gulf States and Turkey, the opposition in Syria also receives political and logistical support from Western countries such as the United States and France. United States' support is probably based on the hope that the fall of Assad's regime would weaken Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah.

5. The Responsibility to Protect

The situation for the Syrian population in the on-going civil war is becoming increasingly desperate. According to the United Nations almost 100,000 Syrians have died.⁴ More than 1.8 million of Syrian refugees are registered in the neighbouring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.⁵ Some 4.25 million people are internally displaced and 6.8 million civilians need urgent humanitarian help and protection.⁶ The use of chemical weapons as recently as August 2013 could now serve as the basis for a military intervention on the principle of the *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P).

A new principle

At the beginning of the 1990s, with the end of the Cold war, the increasing number of intrastate conflicts became a problem. Consequently, discussions on how the international community respond to situations of massive human rights violations within states arose.

The new era of cooperation between previously opposing parties led to the concept of protecting the civilian population, but at the same time a fierce debate about this concept commenced. The obvious incapacity to act in the case of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the mass murder in Srebrenica in 1995, but also the military intervention during the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999 without the authority of the Security Council of the international community made it clear, that the principle of *Humanitarian Intervention* was not an adequate basis for Interference of the International Community. This issue raised the question of how the protection of human rights can be threatened without the authority of the Security Council of the international community. Since 1999 especially the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan opposed the negative connotation of the "right for intervention" and the "responsibility to protect". He therefore forced the debate of different understanding of national sovereignty

⁴ United Nations Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. [Online] Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13447&LangID=E> (accessed: 17.10.2013).

⁵ UNHCR: Syria Regional Refugee Response. Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. Available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> (accessed: 17.10.2013).

⁶ OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available at: <http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/syria-un-humanitarian-chief-urges-security-council-%E2%80%9Cend-brutal-conflict%E2%80%9D> (accessed: 17.10.2013).

(Debiel 2012: 9). If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on state sovereignty this issue has to be weighed up against individual sovereignty (Evans 2006: 707). In response to the United States and NATO intervention with incomplete authority in Kosovo in 1999, the Canadian government sponsored *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)* and in 2001 presented a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* which established this term and also provided a comprehensive concept. This concept details a new way of understanding state sovereignty which implies rights not strictly based on the Westphalian sense of the term. The redefinition of the term sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as rights: Any state has a primary responsibility to protect the individuals within it (Evans 2006: 708-709). Another part of the report emphasized that R2P is much more than military intervention. It extends also the *responsibility to prevent*, the *responsibility to rebuild* and the *responsibility to react*. The latter could also imply armed reaction (Brzoska 2012: 5 and Evans 2006: 709). However, the most important aspect of these three dimensions was that of prevention (Evans 2006: 709). A major achievement of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in September 2005 was the unanimous embrace of the R2P principle in the paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (UN A/RES/60/1).⁷ The principle rests on three equally weighted pillars: (1) states have the responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; (2) the international community has the responsibility to assist a state to fulfil its R2P and (3) should a state manifestly fail to protect its population from one or more of the four crimes, the international community has the responsibility to take timely and decisive action in accordance with the UN Charter. In this document the responsibility to protect strictly concerns cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity with military intervention only authorised by the Security Council (Brzoska 2012: 5-6).

Although the R2P gained recognition as an obvious progress, there is an on-going controversy about it. Critics argue the failure of the liability under international law and to whom to attribute the responsibility and under what circumstances. Furthermore, it would be an incomplete legal obligation for states to interpret their responsibility (Hasenclever 2012: 163). Other critics argue that

“the R2P is a dangerous and imperialist doctrine that threatens to undermine the national sovereignty and political autonomy of the weak or, quite the reverse, that it is little more than rhetorical posturing that promises little protection to vulnerable populations” (Bellamy 2010: 144).

⁷ International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect. [Online] Available at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=398 (accessed: 17.10.2103).

Syria and the Responsibility to Protect

“The recognition of responsibility to protect as a principle is one thing – its practical implementation, quite another” (Evans 2006: 715).

The desperate situation of Syria’s population, in particular the use of chemical weapons, has demands that the international community should exercise its responsibility to protect. In the case of Syria the debate is considering a military intervention on the principle of R2P. Consequently, the external intervention could only be legitimated with the mandate of the Security Council. However, Russia and China blocked a resolution at this committee. Without the mandate a humanitarian military intervention is contrary to international law. The principle R2P might only increase the pressure for action but there is no legal obligation for it. The use of chemical weapons is considered a war crime by the International Criminal Court, but only in the case of international conflict (Schaller 2013: 4).

Although in Libya the military action was authorised by the Security Council, it actually remains unlikely that the UN Security Council will ever adopt a resolution for a military intervention in Syria. The Arab Spring protests in Libya turned violent very rapidly. Gaddafi threatened the world to execute all rebels in their eastern epicentre of Benghazi together with the civilian population. In March 2011 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 which authorised

“Member States (...) to take all necessary measures (...) to protect the civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (Hasenclever 2012: 165).

While there was no objection to intervention, the problem was its dimension. The initial goal to protect the civilian population was extended to the fall of Gaddafi’s regime. This resulted in an unknown number of deaths and injured individuals, more than 600,000 refugees and an unstable state with countless militias competing for power (Hasenclever 2012: 166).

6. Conclusions

The state of Syria, which together with Lebanon was under French Mandate from 1920 to 1948, is a creation of colonialism. However, for the mosaic of ethnic and religious groups this has not been significant for everyday life or for the protest movements. The latter have been motivated by unemployment, poverty, and corruption. The religiously based civil war in Syria is more related to unstable politics than to specifics of religion or Islam. Thomas (2000) considered religiously based conflicts as conflicts between communities defined on the basis of religious identity rather than on the debate of ideological-religious ideas. However, these conflicts represent challenges for international society and its secular principles (Thomas 2000: 19). Islamic fundamentalist movements want to create new transnational ties among Muslims to weaken the principle of state sovereignty and transnational religion. This is

considered to undermine diplomacy, because religion presents values which are not agreeable to diplomatic bargaining in religious conflicts. (Thomas 2000: 15; 19).⁸

Unfortunately there is no end in sight for the conflict in Syria. Significant military successes of one side led evidently to an intensification of support of the other side. All these issues of external actors showed that there are deeply polarized relations between Sunnis and Shiites in the Arab world. The mobilisation by confessionalisation is a logical consequence in the way Monica Toft reflected upon. Embattled leaders can gain from appeals to religion in particular when the religion has significant extra state constituencies like Islam (Toft 2006: 48).

Because of the geopolitical networking and the logic of war by proxy a military intervention is highly risky and consequences of a military intervention can hardly be calculated. Furthermore, there is currently no legal basis for an external intervention on the principle of R2P. Although military intervention is one of the fundamental requirements of the principle, an effective protection of the civilian population would not be fulfilled. An additional aspect stems from the fragmented opposition groups which also represent – in part – a threat to the civilian population.

So what is the cause of the R2P principle? Firstly, the principle should not be seen as the right for a military intervention. Its core should be the responsibility to prevent by forcing warring parties to the negotiating table. The second point is the responsibility to rebuild, aiding societies destroyed by war to rebuild their state. (Hasenclever 2012: 172; Evans 2006: 709). Military interventions in past years have demonstrated their low chances of success. Intervention cannot be a way to peace. For this reasons the theory of just(ified) war or its new form as the principle of responsibility to protect remains a theory (Hasenclever 2012: 172-173).

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Ethno-Religious Nationalism and the Case of the Alevis in Today's Turkey

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Abstract

At least since the latest protests at the Taksim Square Turkey demonstrated its vulnerability towards societal conflict. Despite the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, governments failed to fully separate state institutions from religious institutions. Finding themselves at need of a new “Turkish identity”, nationalist forces began to persecute the non-Turk population with intent to achieve a homogenous identity in the first half of the 20th century. Paving the way for the rise of the pro-religious Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) to power in 2002, pro-Islamic politics gradually reshaped the political structure of Turkey, which was officially marked by secularism or Kemalism. This paper seeks to address ethno-religious conflicts in Turkey considering the Alevis as an ethno-religious group in the 20th and 21st century. The findings of the case study will be significantly linked to the aversive attitude and the political opening of the AKP towards the Alevis, leading to the result that Sunni Islam is still prevalent and dominant in Turkey, and that ethno-religious conflicts have its origins in the heritage of the Ottoman Empire.

1. Introduction

Turkey has a distinctive position in the Muslim community since it is known as the only secular democratic state inside Muslim majority countries. The first trends of a secular movement appeared in the mid-nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire strived to modernise. Ever since, the existence of heterogenic ethnic and religious groups within Turkey's state borders exposed the governments' deficiencies in relieving ethno-religious tensions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the roots and consequences of ethno-religious nationalism on the one hand and the current government's political attitude towards this issue. However, this paper has its limitations concerning its scope and the availability of information in sensitive cases like in the Alevi case. Since numerous studies focalised on non-Muslim ethnic groups (e.g. Armenians) or multi-religious ethnic-groups (e.g. Kurds), this paper will seek to describe ethno-religious nationalism and its consequences using the example of the Alevis, a religious group composed of multiple identities.

The transition from an empire to a nation-state was a key factor in the identity building process that clearly led into a distinct perception of ethnic groups. Thus, this paper will first historically analyse the measures taken during the period of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. Because Islam, as the prevalent religion then and now, never had been absent in society and state politics, the peculiarity of Turkish secularism or Kemalism will be described. The emergence of new nationalist ideologies and the role of religion in political

agendas will provide the basis to depict the situation of an ethno-religious group, the Alevis, who have a history of permanent persecution and suppression within the borders of today's Turkey. Finally, the current government's positions towards the violent incidents will be described briefly, followed by a prospect for Turkey's future as a state consisting of multiple ethnic and religious groups.

Conceptual framework

With respect to the detailed discussion of ethnicity and religious identity in scientific literature, the following definition of ethno-religious conflicts should be adequate to link arbitrary identity formation to ethno-religious nationalism in the special context of Turkey:

“Ethno-religious conflicts’ refer to those involving groups where religion is an integral part of social and cultural life, and religious institutions are representative, possess moral legitimacy, and mobilisation potential. Where conflicting groups define themselves along ethno-religious lines, religious identity can create sharp distinctions between parties, and increase group mobilisation. (...) Such conflicts are also often intra-state (...)” (Kadayifci-Orellana 2009: 1).

The definition or construction of identity, whether it is national, ethnic or religious therefore plays a major role in societal conflicts.

Considering the applied policies of governments ruling within state borders, it might be contingent to define them as “internal geopolitics”.

There are various definitions of “Geopolitics” in academic literature, which evolved in the course of time. The understanding of the term often depends on the scholar's scientific background, varying between geography and politics. Cohen (2003) describes geopolitics "(...) as the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes. (...) Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction." (Cohen 2003: 12). Cohen's definition considers the crucial dynamic interaction between power and space. Even though “geopolitics” is generally associated with international or external relations – or more exact the strategic foreign policy – of a specific government, it can also occur on different scales.

As Yves Lacoste concludes, geopolitics can be separated into external and internal geopolitics (Lacoste 1990: 29). Internal geopolitics involves e.g. the demands of minorities and suppressed groups for autonomy or the emergence of regions (Lacoste 1990: 30). Due to limitations of this paper, a profound analysis of the internal geopolitics will be absent. Instead, in case of Turkey, the paper will show that the current reigning government chose to consider the internal situations by actively addressing the ethno-religious issues in Turkey.

2. Turkey in Transition

After dominating extended territories of the Middle East, Eastern Europe and North Africa for more than six centuries (1299-1923) with its sovereign prevalence, the Ottoman Empire came to an end not due to external or internal contradictions but in consequence of the age of modernisation in general, especially with the rise of revolutionary European modernisation.

The multi-ethnic and heterogeneous empire contained more than 70 different ethnic groups and large diverse religious populations of Muslims, Christians and Jews, which also differed in language, culture and institutions (Saatci 2002: 552). It based on a *Millet-System* acknowledging these *millets* (various religious communities) as autonomous units and granting them self-administration in specific laws and internal affairs (Özdoğan 2007: 144). Although, when comparing the Ottoman Empire to today, many claim it was owed to this system that peace could be kept within the state borders, the *Millet-System* “applied [...] only to non Muslim minorities” (Andrews 2002: 33), whereas “heterodox Muslims, like the Alevi and Nusairi [or] heretic Muslims [...] had no such liberty, and learned to survive under frequent repression” (Andrews 2002: 33). Even if religious and cultural freedom was allowed to non-Muslim minorities by the state, their members could only hold government offices by converting to Sunni Islam (Özdoğan 2007: 144). This amongst others makes clear that Islamic law was the basis of political rule in the Ottoman Empire.

While the developed powers in Europe improved in science, industry and technology, the Ottomans lost their supremacy as a military power. The first efforts at Westernisation began in the mid-19th century, when the empire underwent large-scale reforms in the *Tanzimat* period beginning in 1839 and ending in 1876. The emphasis was placed on administration, taxes, judicature and the educational system, conceding equal rights to all citizens (Özdoğan 2007: 147). Still those reforms could not prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The ultimate fall took place after World War I when European occupation forces divided its lands among themselves. This resulted in a civil war between nationalists and Ottoman dynasty, leading to the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.

In the late 19th and early 20th century, three central doctrines affected the realignment debate in the Ottoman territory: (Neo-) *Ottomanism*, *Islamism* and *Pan-Turkism* (Özdoğan 2007: 151). These are briefly covered below, since they still play an important role in the today’s ruling party’s agenda. *Ottomanism* describes the conflation of all religious and ethnic communities in the Ottoman Empire in order to stop the political and social disintegration (Özdoğan 2007: 151). Neo-*Osmanists* disapproved a secular judicial practice by instrumentalising Islam in order to gain a religious legal system (Özdoğan 2007: 154). This leads over to the *Islamism* doctrine. While 40 percent of the population within the Ottoman Empire were Christian in the beginning of the 19th century, the share declined to less than 20 percent towards the end of the century (Özdoğan 2007: 156 f.). Considering these circumstances, *Islamism*, unlike *Ottomanism*, primary aimed for the confluence of the Muslim population in the empire (Saatci 2002: 554). *Pan-Turkism* (or Turanism) supported the

conception of unifying all Turkic peoples to single nation state (Özdoğan 2007: 161; Saatci 2002: 554). Saatci concludes:

“The political realities of the time, however, permitted neither the pursuit nor the realisation of these ideals. Instead, the frontiers were limited to the borders of present-day Turkey” (Saatci 2002: 554).

Secularism and Kemalism

Turkish modernisation was realised via political, social, educational and cultural reforms during the presidency period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938). Atatürk’s political philosophy, Kemalism, was dedicated to the secularisation and Westernisation of the nation-state. The first president of Turkey and the so called “state elite” implemented the transition from a fallen empire to a modern nation-state through drastic top-down politics under a tutelary regime (Waxman 2000: 5).

Tab.1: Atatürk’s reforms

1923: Declaration of the Republic.
1924: Abolishment of the Caliphate.
1925: Replacement of the fez; Outlawing of religious sects; Introduction of the Western calendar.
1926: Adoption of the secular governmental system; Introduction of a new civil code; Outlawing of polygamy; Equal rights for women; schools become coeducational.
1928: Constitutional provision is added, declaring that Islam is no longer the state religion; Roman alphabet replaces Arabic alphabet; Establishment of the Turkish Language and History Institute; Adoption of the international numeric system.
1931: Introduction of the metric system.
1934: Prohibition of religious attire in public; the surname law is passed; Abolishment of nicknames and personal titles

Source: Saatci 2002: 562.

Tab. 1 shows the most important reforms of Atatürk in chronological order. It is detectable that Atatürk and the state elite perceived Islam or religion by itself as an obstacle in the secularisation process of Turkey. The government intended to merge religion to the sphere of privacy in order to unify the population through a new kind of national identity (Baran 2010: 23).

The state elite operated as the framers of the Turkish national identity, acting arbitrarily and ignoring the concerns of the mass of society, who had no other choice but remaining passive (Waxman 2000: 6). Therefore most scholars see Turkish national identity as an artificial construction (ibid.). Even if the state elite knew they had to consider the specifics of Turkey’s population, their constructed Turkish national identity was not meant to accommodate the society in its entire diversity (Waxman 2000: 7). In Turkish (and Ottoman) context, Islam always portends Sunni Islam ignoring other streams (Karakas 2007: I).

On closer consideration one realises that Kemalist Nationalism was not free of religious components. The creation of the new identity heavily relied on a nationalised Islam. The

Article 4 Law of Settlement which preferred Muslims ethnicities to permanently settle in Turkey, the foundation of the Department of Religious Affairs, which worked in accordance with secularism, the Capital Tax of 1942 which obliged non-Muslims to pay way more taxes than Muslims or the deportation of non-Muslim minorities during 1941-1943 are just a few examples. (Jung 2008: 122; Waxman 2000: 10 ff.)

However, by searching for, defining and imposing a new absolute and monolithic identity, the heterogenic population in Turkey should be discounted and suppressed.

Re-Islamisation

With the transition to a multiparty system in 1946, religion was instrumentalised from bottom-up and the competition for votes began (Karakas 2007: 13). After two decades of leadership, the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) had to adapt its edict of toleration for religion due to the electoral pressure of the conservative rural population (Karakas 2007: 13). Secularism might have been established politically, but the secularisation of the Turkish society was absent: the secular reforms approved in the centre did not pervade into the periphery (Jung 2008: 123).

Already 24 parties espoused for a stranger consideration of religion during the campaign in 1950 (Karakas 2007: 13). The Democratic Party (DP) played a major role in the Re-Islamisation process in Turkey. Then, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1950-1960), reintroduced the Arabic call for prayer (formerly prohibited by Atatürk) and several new mosques and schools for the education of prayer leaders were built under DP rule (Jung 2008: 123).

With increasing unemployment and hyperinflation as results of strict modernisation, the disagreeability of the Turkish population towards Westernisation grew and entailed the migration into cities (Karakas 2007: 14). This era was characterised by Necmettin Erbakan, head of a new movement whose ideology was based on *Islamism* (Karakas 2007: 14). Recreating the political discourse regarding moral values of religion in the late 1960s, Erbakan challenged the Western-oriented Kemalist policies during his period with the National View Movement (Milli Görüş) (Jung 2008: 123). Following Prime Ministers as Süleyman Demirel and Turgut Özal also supported religious symbols in their agendas, which helped them to gain electoral power of the vast Anatolian periphery (Jung 2008: 123). It should be emphasised that "(...) Sunni Islam has been part and parcel of their identity politics" (Jung 2009: 123).

Another important ideology affected society, especially after the third military coup in 1980. This ideology is known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Secularist military surprisingly made use of Islam in order to fight against leftist movements (Ayoob 2008: 106). The search for homogenisation and depoliticisation of the Turkish society should form an awareness that

Turks played an important role for the propagation of (Sunni) Islam and that Turkishness only exists combined with (Sunni) Islam (Ayoob 2008: 106; Karakas 2007: 17 f.).

The Era of Turgut Özal (1983-1989) significantly reevaluated Islam as a part of Turkish Identity, where *Neo-Ottomanism* way of thinking and market liberalisation encouraged many Islamic lobbies to develop (Karakas 2007: 22). Once again it was Necmettin Erbakan who boosted *Islamism* in Turkey during the 1990s. The leader of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and Prime Minister from 1996-1997 contrived the Islamisation of public space and politicised religion, which aggravated the situation of internal politics (Karakas 2007: 28). Having no success in developing Turkey neither from an economic viewpoint nor from politic aspects, the Welfare Party lost their trust of the electors when becoming exposed to work with militant groups (Karakas 2007: 28). It was closed down by the Constitutional Court on account of its anti-secular activities. Afterwards the Welfare Party was substituted by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), which also was shut down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 4-5).

Finally, the proscription of the Virtue Party led to the formation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AKP won the general elections in 2002, 2007 and 2011, all with impressive results. The founders, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arinc all received their political training in Erbakan's National View Movement and its political parties.⁹ This party stresses its distinction to the former parties, declaring itself as a "conservative democratic" party and dismissing associations with its member's beliefs (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 20).

3. Ethnicities and beliefs in Turkey

According to the study *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey* by Peter Alford Andrews (1989, 2002), 47 different ethnic groups reside in Turkey. The study contains an argument about ethnicity and group identity from both the emic (inside) and etic (outside, distanced) point of view. Ethnicity is determined as "(...) the concepts, sentiments and actions which characterise ethnic groups. They define these in contradistinction to other, comparable groups within a state" (Andrews 1989: 17), while Ethnic groups depict "(...) generally endogamous groups, whose criteria (e.g. family, language and religion) for cultural self-definition are common traditions selected from the past" (Andrews 1989: 17 f.).

Although there is no official state religion in Turkey, the Turkish Constitution challenges the principles of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Article states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship

⁹ For a revealing overview of Erdogans political history before founding the AKP: Baran, Z. 2010, 45-46.

and observance” (UN 1948). According to the Constitution, mandatory religious education in Turkish schools only contains provides the teaching of Sunni Islam (Minority Rights Group International 2007: 5). With a view to the ethno-religious variety in Turkey, this regulation presents a major factor of persecution between the Sunni Muslim majority and minority groups such as Christians, Jews, or Alevis. This particular and exemplary form of denial of religious freedom does not assort well with the main ideas of human rights or liberalism and can be considered a violation of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Almost ninety-nine percent of the Turkish population is considered to be Muslim, of which the majority is Sunni Muslim (United States Department of State 2012: 2). Up to 20 Million people within these ninety-nine percent are Alevis (ibid.). The remaining one percent consists of “approximately 500,000 Shiite Caferi Muslims; 60,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians; 22,000 Jews; 20,000 Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians; 10,000 Baha’is; 5,000 Yezidis; 5,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses; 5,000 members of various other Protestant sects; approximately 3,000 Iraqi Chaldean Christians; and up to 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians” (ibid.). Although all these religious groups besides Sunni Muslims were victims of societal abuse and discrimination (United States Department of State 2012: 1), numbering the cases of religious persecution in order to gain a comparative review of religious freedom in Turkey seems difficult. However, recent outbursts in the Middle East proved that intra-religious difficulties are an important factor for fueling religious conflicts. Today, tensions between Sunnis and Alevis are recognized especially due to the Civil War in Syria, but the fact that tensions of this type were (and are) prevalent in Turkey did not make its way to the international public’s attention.

The main difference between Sunnis and Alevis is that the latter consider *Ali* and his descendants (*the Twelve Imams*¹⁰) as the legal successors of the *Prophet Muhammad*.¹¹ At the present day, notable differences reside in the religious practices of both groups, all referring to the schism after the death of the *Prophet Muhammad*. Alevis speak different languages such as *Turkish*, *Zazaki* or *Kurmanji*, they are often referred to as an “ethnic group”, even though this exceeds the demarcation of Kurdish, Turkish and Zaza (Vorhoff 1995: 33). It can be elaborated that the Alevis constitute an “ethno-religious” community in which Alevi belief defines the borderfunctions of their identity (Kehl-Bodrogi 1989: 503; Vorhoff 1995: 31). Regardless of whether Alevis have their origins in Islam, neither the Sunni majority nor the other Islamic Groups fully treat them as Muslims (Kehl-Bodrogi 1989: 503).

Further, the Alevis are discriminated by all state institutions, especially the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Özdalga 2008: 188). Their main concerns are “obligatory religious education in school; difficulties in getting permission and/or funding for the building of *Cemevis* (Alevi houses of Worship); and lack of representation at state level” (Özdalga 2008:

10 The Twelve Imams consist of Ali, Hasan, Husayn and his nine descendants. Except for Husayn, the brother of Hasan, each Imam was the son of the previous Imam.

11 They are not to be confused with Shias, which follow a way more orthodox codex of Islam.

189). Summarised, the Alevis' concerns rest on the non-existence of those rights which are favourably granted for the Sunni majority in Turkey.

Before depicting the Alevi situation after the transformation, a brief look at the situation during the reigning period (1512-1520) of Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim should give an impression of the Alevis awareness in Anatolia. As the Sunni sovereign, Yavuz Selim persecuted Shia and Alevi people in the Empire; those were massively supported by the Persian leader of the Safaviyya, Sah Ismail, who is a shining light for the Alevis. Besides the battles they had, Yavuz Selim was responsible for countless massacres and humiliations of Alevi people (Vorhoff 1995: 152). Further, Yavuz Selim even got religious legal opinions made, declaring the killing of Alevis as mandatory and indispensable (Vorhoff 1995: 152). This shows that the peaceful coexistence of heterogeneous ethnic groups during the Ottoman Empire has to be questioned when regarding the Alevis. The persecution and injustice extends over the period of transition to secularism until today.

Constituting a sensitive and specific case is the Dersim¹² Massacre from 1937 to 1938. Because this intricate massacre is referred to as an ethnic (Kurdish, Zaza, proper non-Turkish), a religious (Alevi, proper non-Sunni) or an ethno-religious (Kurdish-Alevi, Zaza-Alevi) matter, it will not play an important role in this paper.

The Alevis, however, regarded secularism as a chance to emancipate and made e.g. the Kurdish ones assimilate voluntarily to Turkish culture (van Bruinessen 1996: 8; Vorhoff 1995: 71). The incremental integration of the Alevis into broader society by migration into towns after years of social separation introduced them to a close contact with the Sunni population (van Bruinessen 1996: 8). Within the abovementioned Re-Islamisation period between 1950 and 1980 and the decline of Kemalist secularism, Alevi society passed through a period of discrimination. A certain distinction of the population in the towns, where immigrants inclined to assort together with people of similar descent led to growing tension between Alevis and Sunnis both supported by opposing political formations: the radical left considered the Alevis as its allies whereas the extreme right touted for conservative Sunni Muslims, fueling their anxiety and aversion of the Alevis (van Bruinessen 1996: 8). This collision of the parties led to several Sunni-Alevi conflicts in anti-Alevi persecution in Kahramanmaraş (1978) and Corum (1980), showing the reluctance of the local police concerning the protection of the Alevis (van Bruinessen 1996: 8).

During the Turkish-Islamic-Synthesis period the distinction between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists or Sunnis and Alevis was fostered and the military contributed to the marginalisation of the Kurdish and Alevi identity (Karakas 2007: 19). With the strengthening of the Directorate for Religious Affairs government policies influenced the Alevis by building mosques in their villages, compelling their children to attend Sunni religion classes and the intensive allocation of the police with conservative Sunnis (van Bruinessen 1996: 8).

¹² Today Tunceli and parts of Bingöl, Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Mus, Malatya and Sivas (Sevgen 1999: 12).

The failure of the left movement in Turkey in the late 1980s made many Alevis redefining themselves with their religious identity (Shah 2013: 266). This era is also described as an “Alevi Revival”. The revival was driven by the defensive attitude of the Alevis towards the rise of *Islamism* and entailed the establishment of various Alevi associations all over Turkey (van Bruinessen 1996: 8). Furthermore these associations enabled the public performance of former banned Alevi rituals, the opening of houses of worship and publications of Alevi intellectuals addressing questions of identity, history and doctrine of Alevism (van Bruinessen 1996: 9). As stated, Alevis consisting of multiple origins, started to define Alevism as an alternative ethnicity when they noticed that this plurality may cause nationalist tension within their community (Shah 2013: 266). Thus especially the Kurdish Alevis stressed the religious essentials in public discourse (ibid.).

The most significant public violent persecution of Alevis was the Pogrom of Sivas in 1993. Sivas represents one of the provinces with a high amount of Alevi population in the countryside (Kurdish and Turkish); the towns however are inhabited by most Sunni Muslims (van Bruinessen 1996: 9). Various Alevi intellectuals and artists came together to celebrate the annual “Pir Sultan Abdal Senlikleri”. Among them was the famous writer Aziz Nesin, who caused indignation in the conservative Muslim population with several provocative statements and announced the publication of the Turkish translation of Salman Rushdie’s “Satanic Verses”. A large group of violent demonstrators were obviously minded to attack the hotel “Madimak” where the Alevi participants of the festival and Nesin were accommodated. During the demonstration the violent group was fueled by the mayor of Sivas (member of the right wing of the Muslim Welfare Party) and later they set the hotel on fire (ibid.). In this fire thirty-seven people (including two demonstrators and two workers of the hotel) were killed. As Bruinessen underlines, “the degree of involvement of the police and local authorities was perhaps the most shocking aspect of the Sivas events. The police, although it had advance warning of the demonstrations, had taken insufficient measures to protect the festival (which had been authorised by the provincial governor) and it did not make any serious attempt to disperse the demonstrators or to keep them away from the hotel (apart from a police cordon in front of the hotel). (...) Most of the police simply looked on as the hotel caught fire” (ibid.).

4. The AKP and its attitude towards the Alevis today

The Islamist and centre-right parties which had been introduced above rarely or never strived to address the situation of the Alevis in Turkey. This was due to their dependence on the Sunni electorate, lasting out the support for politics (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 78); Therefore, “(...) their policies towards Alevis varied between benign neglect and efforts of assimilation (i.e. Sunnification)” (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 78). After the parliamentary elections of 2007, the AKP for the first time engaged in a policy which it described as the “Alevi question” or “Alevi Opening” (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 78).

The Alevi community was in agreement about the concerns stated in section 3 of this paper enhanced with demands e.g. making a museum out of the Madimak Hotel in Sivas or the integration of Alevism into the Department of Religious Affairs (Özmen 2011: 86). The initiative started with a series of meetings with Alevi clerics, intellectuals, scholars, journalists et cetera. A vast majority of Alevi associations had not participated in the conferences, reasoning it with an apprehension of assimilation efforts (Hale Özbudun 2011: 78). In those meetings little dialogue took place, instead the government representatives were just listening, but it seemed like the AKP took the concerns of the Alevis seriously (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 79). In spite of it all, apart from these meetings, no specific steps followed (Hale and Özbudun 2011: 79) and “the Alevis have not been satisfied with the results, and most of the Alevi population has found the efforts of the government insincere” (Özmen 2011: 86).

In order to show that the AKP government’s “Alevi Opening” initiative receded in sincerity, few facts will be depicted below.

In March 2012, an Ankara court dropped Sivas massacre case, ruling that the charges against the suspects exceeded, after 19 years, the statue of limitations (Hürriyet 2012a). Apart from the dubiousness of the limitation in such a sensitive case, the most noticeable fact in this case is that the accused were advocated by counsels consisting of delegates, ministers, mayors, city councils and district chairmen, all of them being members of the ruling AKP (ibid.). Prime Minister Erdogan commented the drop with the words “Let it be auspicious for our nation” (“Milletimiz için, ülkemiz için hayırlı olsun”) (Hürriyet 2012b).

In a special interview Erdogan asserted: “There are people who try to make me look like an Alevi enemy. For me, Alevism represents the love to the Saint Ali. When I look at the ones claiming their Alevi identity, I see that I am more Alevi than them. No one of them lives like the Saint Ali, I am trying to live like him” (“*Beni Alevi düşmanı olarak gösterenler var. Ben Aleviliği, Hazreti Ali’yi sevenler olarak biliyorum. Ben bugünkü Aleviyim diyenlere baktığım zaman hepsinden daha Aleviyim. Hiçbiri Hazreti Ali gibi yaşamıyor, ben onun gibi yaşamaya çalışıyorum*”) (Milliyet 2012). Furthermore, he declares that there is only one place of worship for Muslims, the mosques (Milliyet 2012).

The construction of a third bridge spanning the Bosphorus in Istanbul caused another stir in the Alevi community. On May 29th 2013, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gül took part on the groundbreaking ceremony of the bridge, with the latter proclaiming that the bridge’s name will be “Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge” (“Yavuz Sultan Selim köprüsü”) (NTVMSNBC 2013).

Another important topic in the Alevi stances of the AKP is the Syria conflict. Syria is a state where the Sunni Muslim population forms the majority and the Alawi population forms the minority. The AKP supports the Sunni rebels in their conflict with the Alawis, and this may result in a latent spillover of the sectarian conflict from Syria to Turkey. Therefore, it would not be surprising if an emotional driven solidarity of the Alevis with the Alawis occurred, although both groups are not necessarily equal in their religious practices. They both do share

the worship of the Twelve Imams and share a history of persecution by Sunni Muslims (Hermann 2013).

The current protests in Taksim Square, Istanbul, started on May 28th 2013 to contest the urban development plan for Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park but the motive of the protests changed to the expression of disappointments concerning issues like the freedom of the press, expression and assembly, and the government's encroachment on Turkey's secularism. Among the protestors numerous Alevi are present, stressing the abovementioned issues and their discontent with the AKP and Erdogan's government.

5. Conclusion

Ethno-religious nationalism in Turkey has its roots in the history of its population before and after the proclamation of the Republic. Its territory always was settled by numerous varying ethnic and religious groups, but internal tensions increased more apparently during the years of secularism. The formation of a new absolute and monolithic identity had many groups discriminated in their personal identity awareness. With Sunni Islam as the prevalent religion during the Ottoman Empire period and today, despite the secularisation efforts, new nationalist ideologies came up. These ideologies were theoretically deployed towards the end of the Empire but practically fulfilled in the second half of the 20th century. The main reason that parties, who were following these ideologies, had success was the fact that secular reforms never pervaded fully into the peripheral regions of Turkey. The AKP's rise to power is based on this so called "Re-Islamisation" process.

The Alevi exemplify how ethno-religious nationalism in Turkey predominated. Never being fully accepted as an Islamic group, they were violently persecuted by Sunni groups and permanently discriminated by state institutions. Although disengaging from their various ethnic backgrounds (Turkish, Kurdish, Zaza) and defining themselves by their religious essentials during an Alevi-Revival, the suppressions continued.

Even today's ruling party, the AKP, declaring itself as a "conservative democratic" party, failed in finding a solution for the ethno-religious tensions between Sunnis and Alevi. On the contrary, its pro-Sunni politics fostered the schism between both groups. If the AKP insists on its politics towards Alevi, they are preventing the appearance of a unified and uniform ethno-religious nation-state.

Granting Religious freedom for the purpose of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights implies an end of the favouring of Sunni Muslim citizens by the Department of Religious Affairs and the current ruling AKP. This would mean that either all religious groups should benefit from the practices of both these institutions or none of them. Otherwise, tensions will rise and persecution will go on.

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Tunisian Elections after the Arab Spring: A Victory for Democracy or Islamism?

Hannah Kusche

Abstract

In October 2011, a new interim government and a constitutional assembly were elected in Tunisia. The election was preceded by the so-called Arab Spring and the fall of the dictator Ben Ali. Although Islamist groups didn't play influential roles during this process they were the main winners of the elections. The paper deals with the reasons for these results and analyses if the victory of the Islamist Ennahda party should be interpreted as the wish of significant parts of the Tunisian population to live in a theocracy or if the high percentage of votes for the Islamist party can be explained by other factors. The paper identifies historical and political developments, such as the persecution of Islamist groups during the Ben Ali era and the general political insecurity after the fall of the old regime as well as organisational factors, as crucial reasons for the victory of the Islamist Ennahda party, usually portrayed as moderate. Different from most other parties the Ennahda has a strong stance in the Tunisian population and possesses broad networks as well as abundant human and financial resources. The appreciation of religious values may also have been a factor, which has influenced Tunisians to vote for Ennahda but should not be interpreted as the crucial element.

1. Introduction

It's almost two years ago now that the Tunisian people have elected a constitutional assembly and a new interim government. As most observers had expected, the Islamist party Ennahda achieved an impressive victory. The party, which was forbidden and strongly suppressed under the old regime, won more than 40% of the votes and therefore got 89 out of the 217 seats in the constitutional assembly. A strong position of Islamist groups in the new government and especially in the negotiations about the future Tunisian constitution had been feared not only by Western observers but also by significant parts of the Tunisian people. The Tunisian society is often considered to be one of the most secular societies in the Arab world. Far reaching women's rights, religious liberty and protection of minorities have been defined in the Tunisian law since the 1950s. Any Islamist tendencies were strongly suppressed by the authoritarian regime which also supported the secularisation of public life. Though, soon after the resignation of Ben Ali, Islamist groups started to reorganise. Many Islamists were released from prison, others returned from exile and reassembled their supporters around them. In March 2011, Ennahda, a group of 'moderate' Islamists, which were founded by Rachid Ghannouchi in 1981, was allowed to register as a political party for the first time in history. Soon it was recognisable that Ennahda, in spite of the long lasting suppression, would manage to win the elections. Fears rose that the party would introduce the Sharia and limit individual freedom and democratic rights in favour of an Islamic state. Although Ennahda and above all Ennahda's leader Ghannouchi denied promoting such changes, the fears of many secular

forces persisted, and were highly present during the election campaign. Nonetheless, Ennahda became the largest single political power in the elections which were considered to be free and fair. In view of these results some observers prognosticated a repeating of the developments in Iran after the fall of the Shah regime which lead to the installation of the present theocracy. This comparison raises the question whether the political victory of Islamists has to be understood as the peoples wish to live in a state dominated by religion.

Although the motivation of voters was probably highly diverse and influenced by individual expectations, this chapter will try to analyse the general reasons for the success of the Ennahda party. Thereby, I support the thesis that the fact of Ennahda being Islamist wasn't the most relevant for voters to support the party. There were other important reasons which played an influential and possibly even more important role. Therefore at first, the chapter will give a short overview over the political and economic situation in Tunisia prior to the elections. Secondly, the Ennahda position in the Tunisian society and its election programme will be analysed. Thirdly, I will derive possible reasons for Ennahda's victory from the most urgent problems and challenges, the Tunisian society is facing. In a conclusion the results will be summed up and a short outlook on possible future developments will be given.

2. Tunisia during the elections: Economic and political frame conditions

Originally the uprisings, which started in December 2010, were mainly economically motivated. Many young people who suffered from poverty and a lack of opportunities rose against the stagnancy and demanded the improvement of their social situation. One of the crucial factors for this development was the high unemployment. While the average official unemployment rate was 13% in 2008, at the same time the unemployment among young people (15-24 years) exceeded the threshold of 30% (Zeghal 2013). Even higher were the unemployment rates among well-educated young people facing the paradoxical situation that the higher their education was, the lower their chance to find a job. Furthermore there were strong geographical discrepancies. While the unemployment in the capital Tunis and the rest of the coastal area was relatively low, many young people in the interior and the south of Tunisia saw practically no chance to find a job (Noueihed & Warren 2012).

The problems at the job market came along with a growing general discontent about the low level of development. How Noueihed and Warren underline "Tunisians were increasingly unhappy with the state of housing, healthcare and roads, and they complained about bureaucracy"; furthermore "perceptions of corruption, inequalities and a lack of opportunity had dramatically worsened in the last two or three years before the uprising." (2012: 66f.). The self-immolation of a young street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, one of the small towns in the interior of Tunisia was finally the activator for the outburst of demonstrations and riots which finally lead to the fall of Ben Ali.

The primarily economic demands were soon complemented by political requests. Claims for freedom and democracy rose and, while the protests spread from the disadvantaged regions in the middle of Tunisia to the capital, political demands gained more and more weight. Although the claims for an improvement of the economic situation persisted, the later phases of the uprising demands were often overshadowed by the claims for the ending of the regime. These claims constituted the focus of foreign media reports and when Ben Ali fled and his supporters had to give up, this was generally seen as the fulfilment of the central demands of the protests and a victory of the revolution. Nonetheless, the majority of the Tunisian population continued to see economic dissatisfaction as the main reason for the uprisings, which ended the dictatorship (Alexander 2011). Therefore, many were disappointed of the results of the revolution which so far did not improve but rather worsen the economic situation. The tourism sector, which has a large economic impact on Tunisia, declined. Foreign companies cancelled their operations in Tunisia or decided to invest elsewhere. Furthermore, the Tunisian economy in general was affected by a wave of strikes and demands for higher wages.

With regard to political developments many people were disappointed by the outcomes of the revolution as well. During the demonstrations, people were unified by the desire to dispossess the dictator and the ruling party. Soon after the fall of the government huge differences in the imagination of the future organisation of the state became visible (El-Issawi 2012). Especially the gap between Islamist and secularist forces became obvious. While Islamists want religion to play a more important role in politics, the aim of the secularists is a separation of the two realms. The detailed definition of both paths is a matter of broad discussions, internal disagreements as well as mutual accusation and suspicion. Neither Islamists nor secularists are a homogenous group, of course. Although the general controversy between these two blocks plays an important role in politics since the revolution, the respective internal differences are large. The Islamist field reaches from radical Salafis to more moderate groups like Ennahda which clearly dominates the political representation of this block. The secularist block is much more splintered between various groups and political parties. Despite of their shared refusal of an Islamist government, many of them only have very few commonalities (Noueihed & Warren 2012). This leads to a situation where the Islamists, at least the ones acting in the parliamentary area, are a relatively homogenous group while the secularist parties compete not only with the Islamists but also among themselves, weakening each other and indirectly strengthen Ennahda and the Islamist block.

Despite of all economic problems and demands the political competition between secularists and Islamists had clearly dominated the election campaign. While the Islamists accused the secularists to be anti-Islamic and wanting to ban religious expressions and signs not only from public life but also to constrain the private practice of religion, the secularists blamed the Islamists of wanting to establish a theocracy. Especially with regard to Ennahda, secularists stressed that the party would only keep up the appearance of being democratic and respectful towards individual human rights until they have fully established their power. As soon as they

were strong enough they would show their true face and install a new authoritarian, this time Islamic, regime (Zeghal 2013).

3. The Ennahda party

Ennahda has repeatedly rejected the accusation of wanting to limit individual rights in favour of an Islamisation of the state. Quite the contrary emphasises Rachid Ghannouchi again and again, underlining the democratic orientation of his party. The founder of Ennahda who passed many years in exile in Great Britain during the Ben Ali period, until today has a strong influence on the political orientation of his party. Over and over he points out that Islamism and democracy are compatible and promises that Ennahda is going to protect the rights of all groups of society, especially of women and minorities: “Everyone in Ennahda believes that democracy is the only way to reach power and to stay in power. There is no one in Ennahda that does not believe in equality between men and women, and the rights of women. No one in Ennahda believes that jihad is a way to impose Islam on the world.”, cites Marc Lynch (2012b: 46) from an Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi. Critics of the party doubt the truth of such statements. They accuse Ennahda not to dissociate themselves strongly enough from more radical Islamist groups like the Salafi movement or even blame them to secretly support their violence (Zeghal 2013). Within the party there are also voices which nourish doubts if all representatives of Ennahda support the same liberal position as claimed by Ghannouchi. One Ennahda depute claimed that single mothers shouldn't have the same rights as married ones. Although the leadership of the party has expressed its disagreement with this claim immediately, such statements nourish the fears of the critics (Zelin 2012: 42 f.).

Despite of the secularists' doubts concerning Ennahdas true and long-term political direction, the party managed to win strong backing in the Tunisian population. After decades of suppression and persecution the party had been completely smashed. During the revolution, neither the Ennahda nor religious claims played a major role (Mneimneh 2012). But after his return to Tunisia, Ghannouchi quickly succeeded in uniting the Islamist forces (Lynch 2012a). “The long repression“, writes Lynch (2012a: 33), „meant that Ennahda had to start virtually from scratch in reconstituting itself, and did not have deep existing relations with Tunisian youth. But it also meant that it was absolutely uncompromised by any relationship with the hated old regime, and could claim an attractive mantle of principled resistance and clean hands.” Thus, the long lasting persecution became one of the reasons which gave the party credibility within the population. Contrary to many forces which had been politically active under Ben Ali, the Islamists had been persecuted and therefore aren't suspicious to be connected to the old regime and to maintain their structures and networks. Additionally, Ennahda succeeded to strength its popularity and to show its presence in the rural areas due to a large election campaign and the opening of many regional offices (Lynch 2012a).

Although Ennahda never denied or hid its Islamist orientation, the election campaign was focused on liberty, democracy and self-determination. Again and again the party

representatives emphasised that a government dominated by Ennahda will respect and support the right of self-determination of all people and will promote the conciliation of all social and political groups to create a stable and fair democracy (El-Issawi 2012). This approach meant that also radical Islamist forces should be included in the creation of the new state. Some critics interpreted this statement as further proof that Ennahda is in reality more open towards radical-Islamic positions than publicly admitted. The concept of Ennahda nonetheless was perceived positively by large parts of the Tunisian society. In the elections on 23rd of October 2011, Ennahda received 41% of the votes and became the strongest party of the new interim government with 89 out of 217 seats of the constitutional assembly.

4. Reasons for Ennahda's victory

What reasons can explain the success of Ennahda? Does the election result express the wish of many Tunisians, who lived under a relatively secular dictatorship for decades, now to establish a state where politics is dominated by religion? Most observers think that such an interpretation is highly doubtful. Even in the month before the elections the political scientist Andrew Terrill (2011: 9) had predicted that it's "highly doubtful that Tunisia's highly secularized population would seek an Islamist system." Polls among the Tunisian population confirmed this impression. These showed that large parts of the Tunisian population don't want the introduction of Islamic law or the dominance of religion over the state (Robbins & Tessler 2012). Instead, there is a number of other reasons why Ennahda won the first "free and fair" (Robbins & Tessler 2012: 48) elections. Some of these are the ideological distance between the Islamists and the Ben Ali regime, the strong connections to the normal population, the effective election campaign and the general insecurity concerning the political developments. How these factors may have influenced the elections in favour of Ennahda will be shown in the following section.

4.1 The distance to the Ben Ali regime and the closeness to the population

The long period of persecution makes the Tunisian Islamists immune against suspicions to have cooperated with the old regime. How Michael J. Willis (2012) shows the Islamist movement succeeded due to the strong suppression during the dictatorship to establish itself as the only true opposition to the regime. While other groups compromised and arranged with the Ben Ali regime, the Islamists were never given that chance. After the revolution this turned out to be an advantage for Ennahda. A vote for Ennahda was not only seen as "a vote for religious values, but a vote to reject the past and a general expression of new-found political freedom" (Noueihed & Warren 2012: 273). Furthermore "[m]any Tunisians said they voted for the party not because it was Islamic but because it was untainted by the corruption that has sullied politics for so long" (Noueihed & Warren 2012: 93). In addition, the closeness of the Islamists to the population played an important role. This is mainly caused by the long

lasting and continued grass root work of Islamist groups. At many places Islamists did charity and supportive work which gave them, apart from political credibility, also the image of social competence (Traub 2012: 16). Thus many people believed in the Islamists to better understand the problems and needs of normal people than most other groups which were rather associated with the country's elites (El-Issawi 2012: 19).

4.2 Election campaign, availability of resources and general insecurity

Due to a large and effective election campaign, the Ennahda even managed to strengthen this advantage. The opening of regional offices and the realisation of many hustings enabled Ennahda to show its presence also in the rural areas of the country. This way, the Islamists managed to mobilise many followers on the local level (Cammett 2012). The critical question where all the money for the costly campaign had come from didn't prejudice the positive effect. Although the opponents of the Islamists accused Ennahda to be financially supported by foreign Islamist organisations, this didn't affect the positive image of Ennahda seriously (Lynch 2012a).

The opposition didn't succeed in weakening the party with repeated accusations of Islamisation of political and public life. In the insecure situation, the party appeared to many Tunisians as a stabilising factor. Most of the other more than 100 parties which were founded after the revolution were unknown to most people. Also, the aims and political directions of most of the more than 80 parties which finally participated in the elections were not clear to many voters. Therefore, the groups which had existed before the fall of Ben Ali, legally or illegally, were in advantage. People remembered them and their aims rather than those of the new parties. Sean Sweeny (2013: 3) states: "In a time of extreme upheaval, it makes sense that many people would vote for what they know can work and has worked." The election results confirmed this statement. "Those that performed well were opposition parties that had existed, legally or illegally, before the uprising." (Noueihed & Warren 2012: 93). The high profile has to be seen as one of the major reasons for Ennahda's success.

4.3 Religious reasons and the weakness of the other parties

The party wasn't only known to most people from the time before the upheaval but it also managed to be associated with Islam (Mneimneh 2012). This way it could benefit from the virtues which are commonly ascribed to Islam by the Tunisian population. The secular parties, on the contrary, partly failed to make the differences between secularism and the commonly rejected atheism clear. They were not only imputed to keep Islam from making a positive contribution in politics but even to ban religion from public life completely. Fears appeared and were proactively promoted by Islamists that secularists would even restrict the private practice of religion. In a society where most people share the general appraisal of Islam and

its values this was a factor which considerably influenced the elections in favour of Ennahda (Cammett 2012).

The other parties also had weaknesses in other areas which Ennahda used strategically in its campaign. Although secularists are traditionally strong in Tunisia they didn't succeed in becoming the most influential force in the government and the constitutional assembly. Indeed the secular groups together got almost 60% of the votes but in contrary to the Islamists these votes weren't concentrated on a single group but were divided between many parties (Noueihed & Warren 2012: 80). Additionally, many of the new parties had no or very limited political experience and suffered from a lack of networks and financial means. Another problem was that the reasons for founding most of these small new parties were no political visions or programs but the rather unstructured experiences and claims from the revolution. In many cases the political activities and claims of these groups stayed vague and indefinite. During the revolution claims like "more jobs", "better economic conditions", "dignity" or "no corruption" were able to unite large bulks of people but for the elections these slogans were too vague and not appropriate to give the people an impression of the political competence and suitability of actions a party would take. Thus, this strategy which was followed by many of the new parties, was inadequate to mobilise followers and to win the elections (El-Issawi 2013:19).

The election campaigns of the other parties were by far not as large and successful as Ennahda's. Many secular parties remained relatively unknown. Furthermore, some of the older and better-known parties had been legally active during the Ben Ali era. The fact that they had been accepted by the old regime and had arranged with it now weakened their position and caused a lot of mistrust among the population. Many of the new parties were affected by this mistrust, too, because after the upheaval and the prohibition of the former government party RCD, many of its representatives founded new parties or got engaged with existing ones.

Altogether, there are many factors, which gave Ennahda an advantage over the other Tunisian parties. At the one hand these stemmed from the political and historical situation, on the other hand they were caused by a better availability of recourses such as financial means, social networks and political experience. Therefore, beyond the Islamism agenda of Ennahda there were many causes for the election victory. This impression is backed by a poll that was made in October 2011. Although many people expressed the opinion that state laws should not generally be in breach of religious laws, 78.5% of the respondents agreed with the statement "that religion is a private matter that should be separated from social and political life" (Robbins & Tessler 2012: 49).

Summarising, the conclusion can be drawn that the election victory of the Islamist party Ennahda isn't an expression of the wish of the Tunisian population to live in a state which is strongly dominated by religion. The secular and liberal rhetoric of Ennahda clearly shows that there is a huge agreement that Tunisian elections could not have been won by radical

Islamists. A more radical Islamist rhetoric would have alienated many voters from Ennahda and the success in the elections would have been at risk.

5. Conclusion and Preview

It can be concluded that Ennahda's victory in the election of the intermediary government and the constitutional assembly has been the victory of an Islamist party. This shouldn't be understood, however, as a signal that the people wish to live in a state which is dominated by religion. Not Islamism was the main reason why Ennahda won but its independence from the previous regime and its intensive election campaign. It's likely that the reference to religious values had a positive influence on some people's election decision. Nonetheless, financial, political and human resources which were extensively available to Ennahda had a very important impact on the results. These resources enabled Ennahda to perform a professional election campaign, to strengthen its popularity and to gain support and confidence within the population. Additionally the historical and political frames conceded an advantage to Ennahda. Not only the former persecution strengthened Ennahda's credibility but the unsecure political situation after the revolution also lead to a situation in which many people decided to vote for a party which promised to bring continuity and stability to the country. The thesis that the election victory of an Islamist party should not be misunderstood as the wish of a significant part of the Tunisian population to live in a theocracy or a political system which is dominated by religion can therefore be confirmed.

Nonetheless, the country's further development is only partially predictable on the basis of these results. During the times of these first free elections in Tunisian history the country was in a special situation. Only few months after enormous popular upheavals, after the fall of the dictator and of significant parts of the political regime, the country was in a phase which was defined by political insecurity on the one hand and by experimentation and enterprising spirit on the other hand. Most of the numerous new parties which emerged during this time are expected to be short-lived. Thus, the party landscape will probably become clearer in the years to come. Many observers confirm that Tunisia has the necessary preconditions for a successful democratisation process. If this process advances, Ennahda's comparative advantages of the first years after the revolution will decrease and the balance of the parties may be newly negotiated.

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Blurred Future in Egypt after the Fall of Mubarak

Nadia García Sicard

Abstract

In the past years, the Islamization process has not just been an ideology project directed to some specific social groups; it has also been a structural movement with the main purpose of expanding the Islam in the state policy. This article seeks to establish, and by using as an example the Egyptian Case, how due to the unsuccessful patronage package, deliberated by the authoring regime of Hosni Mubarak with the goal, to establishment their legitimacy and exercise their power over the state, has left a generation of young people frustrated and unemployed, a stagnant economy and a corrupt political system safeguarded by the elites and the military forces. The discontent with the regime generated the growth of support toward the Islamist groups, who leveraging the empty of power in the periphery to structured as a political movement until their reach the center of power.

1. Introduction

Since the end of Abdel Nasser's presidency in 1954, Egypt has experienced a political history under authoritarian regimes, thereby, the president had the power with the support of the military forces, controlling all the State branches without greater participation of the institutions, opposition parties and keeping his population excluded from political power.

President Nasser's and his supporters' outcome, also termed as 'an alternative centre of power' by them, was a type of authoritarian system. This was one in which power was highly centralized, pluralism was suspect and where the regime sought to exercise a monopoly over all legitimate political activity (Owen 1992: 27)

Consequently, the authoritarian legacy lasted until Hosni Mubarak's presidency (1981-2011). The stability of an authoritarian regime like Mubarak's was sustained for thirty years due to the coercive control of the state combined with the support of the military forces. Furthermore, the authoritarian regimes legitimate their policies with promises of economic growth and stabilize their regimes through the distribution of patronage (Lust-Okar 2005: 2).

During Mubarak's government, social demands were met under the patronage package, offering public goods and services suited to people's interests and keeping them submissive and relegated. Some of these goods and services were the expansion of education by promoting it actively, a considerable degree of social participation of oppositional groups and the access to new technologies and information highways (Brisson & Lee 2012: 9).

Ironically, these measures contributed to the detonation of its own Arab spring in Egypt, also known as the Tahrir's revolution and subsequently the collapse of Mubarak's regime. At the same time, as Mubarak's power decreased, two other powerful actors in Egypt had started to perform, showing their strong social and economic influence and the effective role in Egypt's political arena.

On one hand the loyalist military forces, which decided to stay “hand in hand” with the protestors and following their economic interest. On the other hand the well-structured Muslim Brotherhoods could finally show their massive share of followers and supporters. They have managed to reach this share, by the distribution of their own patronage package offered through their religious-politic mission.

Concerning these factors, this article deals with the events before and after the demise of Mubarak’s regime and explains the concept of political patronage as a tool to renew and reach the centre of power by the military forces and the elected president in 2011 Mohamed Morsi, within the framework of neo-patrimonialism.

2. Neo-patrimonialism and political patronage in an authoritarian regime

Authoritarian regimes utilize methods, which allow them to maintain power over long periods of time and to count on an apparent acceptance of the people. Normally, the legitimacy of the regimes is confirmed through their electoral success, in spite the partial or total prohibition of political opponents and opposition groups.

To approximate the understanding of authoritarian regimes, it consists “of a core elite which maintains the exclusive right to control the coercive mechanisms of the state – and uses them quite deliberately to influence the majority of the public – but it also creates exclusive opportunities of access to the political arena and the participation of social groups. Thus, authoritarian regimes are permeable and do respond towards their respective societies; and this opens channels for political participation under authoritarianism” (Albrecht 2009: 22).

Although the political participation and the right of association are restricted, the opposition groups tend to congregate and organize themselves in the periphery, where the control of the regime does not have its full capacity to permeate it. An example of this was the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo’s rural areas and low-middle-class neighbourhoods during past regimes. Regardless of the constant and stricter persecution over the Muslim Brotherhood, the account of members has been growing constantly and strongly.

Meanwhile, in the central political institutions in authoritarian regimes have been established with the intention of achieving two core aims that do not at all rule out one another, but rather complement each other: to exert control and, at the same time, to govern and accommodate social demands. The latter, however is not done in a deliberate manner, and does not necessarily trigger a positive outcome for each demand, but nevertheless still works for their very aim, thus being not ineffective at all (Albrecht 2009: 17).

The manner of legitimacy for an authoritarian regime is made through an exchange between the distribution of some goods and services to the public and a support and electoral votes for the regime’s leader. This exchange between benefits and political support is labelled for some scholars as a “social contract”. This term presumes economic distribution, rather than such

factors as charismatic leadership or the indoctrination as a basis of a regime's popularity (Wickham 2003: 23).

In the same context, we can understand the extension of the concept as a Weberian interpretation under the term "patrimonialism" and then applied as neo-patrimonialism as basis of specific political practices in post-colonial Africa (Erdmann 2006: 17). In the specific Egyptian example, Mubarak's authoritarian regime used three manipulated presidential elections to prove their legitimacy and maintain the control of the people giving some subventions especially in energy, agricultural and petrol sectors.

All the attempts to define neo-patrimonialism deal with, and try to tackle one and the same intricate problem: the relationship between patrimonial domination on the one hand and legal-rational bureaucratic domination on the other. Following the basic Weberian concept of patrimonialism, Erdman and Engel explain neo-patrimonialism as a mixture of two partly interwoven types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between the ruler and the ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm (Erdmann 2006: 18).

The difference between patrimonial and neo-patrimonial clientelism is, firstly, that the latter is more complex than the former. It is a reiterating patron-client relation, forming a hierarchy of dominance relations. In neo-patrimonialism there are brokers to mediate the exchange between the "little man" and the "big man", whereas in patrimonialism there is only a direct dyadic exchange relation between the "little and big man". Secondly, the object of exchange is different. The transactions are less about the exchange of private or personal goods and services but more about the transfer of public goods and services by the patron (Erdmann 2006: 20).

For some scholars, neo-patrimonialism has been applied almost synonymously with other terms, such as 'patronage', 'patriarchy', 'clientelism', or 'corruption' (Albrecht 2009: 26) but more specifically for Eisenstadt, Bratton and van de Walle, who conceptualize clientelism together with patronage as an integral part of neo-patrimonialism (Erdmann 2006: 20). In consolidated authoritarian regimes, where the policymaking component of elections is highly circumscribed, elections are best thought of as competitions over access to state resources, or "competitive clientelism" and the candidates and voters likely recognize this (Lust 2009: 124).

As an example, we must take into account the basis on which most Egyptian citizens' vote. Egyptians typically voted for the National Democratic Party (NDP) not out of support for its platform but as a means to secure access to government resources. As an appendage of the state apparatus, the NDP have been an important vehicle for the distribution of patronage (Wickham 2003: 89).

To specify the concept of patronage, it is defined as the politically motivated distribution of "favours" not to individuals but essentially to groups. The difference between clientelism and

patronage is essentially the distinction between “individual” and “collective goods”; clientelism implies an individual benefit (land, office), patronage collective benefits (e.g. roads, schools etc.) (Erdmann 2006: 21).

In relation to our specific case, authoritarian regimes based on political patronage in the Middle East sowed the seeds of their own dissolution, not through failure to deliver, but precisely because they succeeded in delivering the patronage package, albeit with diverse degrees of success. The achievements embedded in the package (from education to other manifestations of modernity) could not be accommodated within a static structure (Elnur 2013: 133).

A clear example of this patronage package in Egypt in relation with the education package provided since the Nasserist government has been the *Lumpen Intelligentsia*¹³ generation as a result of the established *Social Contract* according to which the regime provided goods and services to the public in exchange for their political support. The expansion of higher education, the free access to a *Shahada* (pre-graduate studies) and the promise of a government job were the most representative benefits provided by the Nasserist social contract (Wickham 2003: 24), but at the same time the most unsustainable promise after the economic collapse.

In order to relate the political patronage after the fall of the Mubarak’s regime, two specific issues must be linked. First, the patronage packet¹⁴ provided by Mubarak’s regime had helped to encourage the protestors to demand his fall and a radical change in the political, economic and social scenario. Second, if those changes have been seen during the military transition and after the presidential elections, given that these two rulers have also their own interest to be on power.

3. The fall of Mubarak

On 25th February, the popular uprisings began in Egypt and in just over three weeks, managed to force the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, Egypt started a delicate political transition, after thirty years of centralized Mubarak’s power.

During the decades of his reign, the Mubarak’s authoritarian government was accompanied and protected by a stable army, which was led by the loyal ally Hussein Tantawi as chief commander of the military forces and secretary of defence for almost 20 years. During this

13 Group of educated or cultivated people (al-muta’alimin or al-muthaqqafin). This group is technically not a class but a status group, defined not by occupation, income, or relation to the means of production but by possession of a shahada, or formal education degree. (Wickham 2003: 36)

14 Various forms of distribution of governmental largesse, including salary and pension increases, bonuses, relaxation of mandatory crop deliveries required of producers, appointments to public bodies, the discretionary granting of licenses and permits, and various other inducements offered by the regime specially on the weeks and days prior to elections. (Wickham 2003: 89)

extensive period, the military forces (SCAF) worked together with the government having the objective to enforce and maintain their power and to extend state control supervision over the legal and civil systems, as well as the economy.

Due to the loyalty of the military forces, Mubarak's government was able to maintain its power even when there was some dissatisfaction among the civil society and under the approbation of the international community. Owen exemplifies such aspects and argues that authoritarian presidents presided over a state apparatus that consisted, in the first instance, of its major component institutions: the military, the party, the security services, the bureaucracy and the economic enterprises. All had their own organizational reasons for obtaining resources, influencing policy and preserving as much as possible of their autonomy (Owen 1992: 33).

In such manner Mubarak, in order to maintain his acceptance, started the patron-state in 1983 taking responsibility for the economic recession in Egypt after the collapse of world oil prices. To address the "twin gaps" between investment and savings and between imports and exports, the Mubarak regime increased its borrowing abroad and in addition, accelerated its use of deficit financing, contribution to inflation, which was conservatively estimated at 15 to 25 percent per year. Despite the growing budgetary constraints, the regime continued to channel a large share of the available funds into the "social contract" keeping consumer subsidies at a high level (roughly 20 percent of GDP if implicit subsidies are included). After the informal sector, the state was also the largest source of new domestic employment (Wickham 2003: 41).

In addition, promoting economic policies to accelerate the development of Egypt, the regime focused on guaranteeing and promoting the access to higher-studies for the low-middle class youth. The rapid and massive expansion of Egypt's educational system resulted in serious problems, not only because of the enormous growth of Egypt's labour force but also in a social context regarding the huge amount of young unemployed professionals, waiting in a lengthening queue for a governmental job, or looking for *wasta*¹⁵, or simply taking any job outside their field of specialization and being forced to keep living with their parents.

Around the beginning of 1988, the problem related to unemployment, especially unemployment among educated people in particular, became subject of an intense public debate, used by the Mubarak regime as a discussion for its own purposes, seeking ways to extricate itself from populist commitments inherited from the Nasser past (Wickham 2003: 44). Though some reforms of the higher education policy and together with economic development caused by the growth of the liberalized economy in the 90's, the situation for

¹⁵ In countries with little transparency and a weak rule of law, finding a mediator (or *wasta*) between the citizen and the state is key. Individuals wanting to enter university or to obtain a government licenses, public housing, employment, or a broad range of other state resources know that they must often find someone to help them to accomplish their goals. Navigating such ordinary dealings with the bureaucracy is rarely a simple matter of finding the right office, filling out forms, or paying a standardized fee. (Lust 2009).

some graduates could be handled and solved with marketable skills with *wasta* or for those who emigrated to some more developed and prosperous country in the Arab Gulf.

The people's frustration and the economic grievances were not first and foremost the uprising that brought infamy to Mubarak, but rather a political system that was rigged in a way to benefit Egypt's leader and those most close to him. Political change, which became a mantra of the ruling National Democratic Party during Mubarak's last decade, was a ruse (Cook 2012: 16).

Approximately since 2005, Mubarak had prepared his retirement, not with the intention to hand it over to a more democratic government, but to assign it to his younger son, Gamal Mubarak. As in 2011 the emotion of the "Arab Spring" in Egypt appeared, the citizens felt older and more tired than an 83 years old man. In that moment the failed democracy, the broken economy, a disarrayed educational system, a regrettable health system and the people's frustrations, encouraged the protestors to ask for a real change.

Mubarak's regime provided a patronage packed to the Egyptians that he thought would have aided in maintaining the status quo, but instead had ironically the exact opposite effect. The three areas of policy included the expansion of education, a considerable degree of freedom of expression and assembly, and the promotion of an Egyptian information highway" (Al-sayyid, 2013: 13) were key all aspects of the dissatisfaction of the people, effectively contribution to the fall of Mubarak's regime.

The patronage packet provided from the regime, within a structure that was not built to sustain such a massive increase in these three sectors together with the subsidies, became insufficient for a population of 90 million people where 65% are young and most unemployed professionals who are part of the low-middle class. Besides, Egypt being part of the globalization of information is an inescapable to the influence of the modern world, and it may enhance the abilities of protest, social and opposition groups while increasing the vulnerability of government.

In consequence, Mubarak's patronage package that was offered during 30 years left three results: first, a group of young students and professionals without opportunities to enter the labour market, second, the social and economic grievances that left a gap between the society and the government and third, allow the opportunity for the Islamic groups to convert this grievances into a successful way of political advantage.

4. Military transition and presidential elections: more of the same?

After 18 days calling, claiming and asking for "Bread, Freedom and Social Justice", Mubarak's regime fell and the Egyptians accepted that the SCAF took the power and the supervision of the transition to democracy. During the protests, two actors started to shape the political scenario in Egypt. On the one hand the SCAF and on the other hand the Muslim Brotherhood.

The gains of decades of political patronage in Egypt have a direct relation to these two actors. Respectively, “the ascendancy to power, the preservation and the survival of the authoritarian regime was based on massive security forces and the entire loyalty and support of the military forces. The authoritarian regime together with the SCAF had not just provided the patronage packages characterized by an extended access to basic needs, including education and health. But the same authority also served to build up and maintain a form of crony capitalism that was cultivated carefully through selective interactions with an increasingly globalized world” (Elnur 2013: 131).

The military forces had the control over the industries in Egypt due to globalization of the enterprises and the economic liberalization in Egypt¹⁶. This is one of the reasons why from the moment of Mubarak’s resignation on, it became apparent that the SCAF was no disinterested arbiter of the political transition. “The furore over the obscene wealth of Mubarak’s private-sector cronies presented the military a golden opportunity to eliminate rivals. The SCAF proceeded to shape the electoral field to advantage those politicians who would not infringe upon the military’s economic prerogatives” (Marschal 2012).

These economic interests led the military to oppose against Gamal Mubarak’s presidential aspiration, as well as to his neoliberal project including the privatization of some industries (Abul-Mag 2012: 6). Contrarily, for the perspective of the military the best candidate to support was the Muslim Brotherhood, which does not pay so much attention to the structure of wealth accumulation and capital monopoly.

The day of the “Battle of the Camel” at the Tahrir Square in Cairo “was a microcosm of the struggle to reconfigure the Egyptian society complex: the interests of monopoly battled against the interests of the competitive capital, devoid of any concerns about social questions and consequences, with the military positioned such that it was clear that it would continue to accrue benefits regardless of which social force would emerge victorious. Ultimately, Mubarak resigned, and the reactionary forces of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military emerged as dominant, and the form of the Egyptian state persisted” (McMahon 2013: 159).

For first time after having elected the National Democratic Party (NDP) five¹⁷ times , the polls would be free for the new candidates to participate and to finally elect under the democratic parameters the replacement of Mubarak’s regime. However, the short timeframe to organize a fair and equal campaign to postulate the candidates from the new and inexperienced parties gave a benefit to the well-organized and stronger opposition, especially

¹⁶ The military’s oldest commercial interests are the factories run by the Ministry of Military Production, the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) and the National Service Projects Organization. But the army also oversees numerous subsidiaries of state-owned holding companies and owns shares in public-private ventures. In many cases, these smaller operations are embedded in transnational conglomerates that reach into several economic sectors, from construction and maritime shipping to weapons manufacturing. (Marschal 2012).

¹⁷ In 1981 as a part of the National Democratic Party’s NDP is for first time elected and reelected consecutively in 1987, 1993, 1999 y 2005. In 2005 other parties were allowed to participate for the elections, but Hosni Mubarak won with the 88% of the votes. These elections were demanded for International Organizations as not transparent and fraudulent. (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs 2013)

for the Muslim Brotherhoods now being free of the relenting police presence that followed their campaigns during the rule of the NDP.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood represented by the Freedom and Justice Party, gained the power through elections not just because of the military's interest of monopoly nor because of the Muslim Brotherhood's disinterest in economic reforms, but rather because of the exploitation of the frustration of the unemployed and underemployed youth.

Moreover, since the late 80's the Muslim Brotherhood has been using selective incentives to attract potential recruits and to ease their entry into the movement. This broad movement caused significant change in society and posed the most serious challenge to the Egyptian regime. The Muslim Brothers' commitment to socio-religious change through *da'wa*¹⁸ (call of God) and associational work wrested much of the urban society from state control. (Bayat 2007: 137)

Through material and psychological incentives and initiatives it became attractive to participate in the movement even if the new recruits inherited some risks in the context of the intimidation, continuous arrest and threat by the regime (Wickham 2003). Examples for a material initiative are the construction and creation of clinics, mosques, schools and job opportunities. They complemented these initiatives under the *da'wa* values, concerted through youth associations, women's groups and Islamic activists. Its institutional and social activities, contributing to the general spread of religiosity, aimed the Muslim Brotherhood's to turn into a public policy (Bayat 2007: 137).

The mission of *da'wa* incorporate to the Muslim Brotherhood by their founder, *Hasan Al-Banna*, has seen as an intrinsic part of the political game. In fact, for some, *da'wa* has become politics itself and has little if at all to do with the missionary activity. For Al-Banna, the ultimate mission (*da'wa*) of the organization was the establishment of a universal Islamic state. The movement has had numerous ideologues, which have elaborated upon the essence of *da'wa*. Their basic argument winds down to the understanding that *da'wa* without political underpinning is incomplete and doomed to fail. Moreover, these Muslim activists argue for a highly institutionalized form of *da'wa*, for only through well-structured organization it is possible to achieve the sought goal – establish an Islamic state (Racius 2004: 184).

The Muslim Brother's strategy of societal transformation was expanded beyond the mosques and the *Sha'abi* (popular) neighbourhoods. They dominated the major national professional syndicates and the student unions in the north, ran various NGOs, influenced numerous schools, and constituted the most powerful opposition in Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood, in short had captured a sizable space in civil society and was beginning to

18 “[The concept of missionary activity in Islam is subsumed under the Arabic Word “da`wah,” a noun formed from a root composed of the radicals dal-ain-waw. In its verbal form this word has as its basic meaning “to call,” “to summon,” “to invite.” Da`wah” thus become “a call” or “an invitation,” and, in specialized usage, “missionary activity.” In the Qur`an the concept appears in such passages as Sura 16:125: “Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way”...] (Poston 1992: 3).

permeate state institutions, including the judiciary, universities, and al-Azhar (Bayat 2007: 143).

After that the effectiveness of the deployment of the *da'wa* mission with political purposes, confirmed the result, when the Muslim Brotherhood captured a record eighty-eight seats in the legislative elections of 2005. In addition, for this time, the Muslim Brotherhood changed their conservative and set religious-politic language and ideology. Pushed by the rising popularity of democratic demands, the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to move away from the idea of establishment an Islamic caliphate based on Qur'anic *Shura* (consultation) toward acknowledging the rights of the Coptic minority, behaving like a political party, and speaking the language of citizenship and political equality (Bayat 2007, p. 185).

This strategy was tacked for their political benefits during the Tahrir revolution and the transition period. Taking into account the influence of the Brotherhood in Egypt, the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections were not really surprising. "The dissolution of the Parliament and the issuance of the controversial constitutional annex, along with the long delay in releasing the results and the rampaging rumors of the deployment of military forces and the warnings of Brotherhood's intrigues" (Lync 2012: 24), were not an impediment to take the victory with the leadership of Mohamed Morsi. To some extent it can be observed and argued that the contentions during the electoral periods in Egypt serve as 'window dressing' partly designed by the authoritarian regime to present a reformist image to the outside world (Köhler 2009: 978).

Many revolutionary political forces already have a bill of complaints against the Islamist movement (e.g. supporting the March 2011 constitutional amendments, not joining and neglecting several Tahrir protests, trying to dominate the constitutional assembly, having the nerve to win parliamentary elections, and so on). Additionally, breaking their very public promise not to run a presidential candidate drove a sharp wedge between the Brotherhood and other political forces because it seemed to confirm a prevailing narrative about their hunger for power and non-credible commitments (Lync 2012: 24).

The real issue stems from the fact that over five decades of patronage have produced a massive bulge of well-educated young people to whom the old "package of patronage" is no longer attractive. Under certain conditions injustice and inequality might survive for long periods of time and remain relatively immune to exposure. However, to rule well educated and well connected elite, a totally different patronage package is required. In such new package, those who need to surrender are the former winners, not the emerging social forces (Elnur 2013: 137).

In sum, the election of Mohamed Morsi and the permanent stand of the SCAF led to an unsure political scenario in Egypt. But for the moment, these two actors will be able to continue the increase of their economic gains, while offering certain goods and services to citizens.

5. Conclusions

After the observance of the disturbances in Egypt and the collapse of Mubarak's regime, the incidents are considered as a step forward to the construction of a new more equal and participating governmental system, satisfying the needs of representation of the people who claimed for "Bread, Freedom and Social Justice" in the streets.

However, the exaltation of a revolution has brought more of the same. The self-interests of the new groups, who are actually representing the power, have been enforced whereas in the meanwhile the demands of the people have been ignored. This implies that the elites continue being privileged and the reforms that have been offered does not represent in reality a reconstruction towards new politics that would help to improve the social, political and economic situation in Egypt.

The present two principal actors, respectively the military forces and the Muslim Brotherhoods have become the two principal leaders of a new struggle for the power. The people are in the middle of this. At the beginning of the Tahrir's revolution in 2011 the protestors and the people were linked and shared the same hopes. Although after two years in a fickle transition for a change -without the certainty of which or what may change-, they are divided in two different sides. On one side the military that in fact, let in doubt the capacity to bring a democratic process and on the other side the pro-Muslim Brotherhoods who neither can assuredly a democratic process without the Islamization of politics.

Whoever the new leader will be, needs to offer to the people something else than a patronage package linked to their own convenience, but rather some appropriate measures that determine how to support, to guide and organize them during the process of transformation.

For the moment, Egypt is in a condition of uncertainty about its future transition. The necessary process of transformation has barely started and for the Egyptian people there still remains a long way to go until they'll have accomplished establishment of a new governmental model.

Nevertheless while observing an uncertain scenario; it can be observed that fundamental change that will affect materially the new processes in Egypt: first of all, the people are more attentive and want to express their opinion. Secondly they are now no longer reluctant to protest against a repressive government by having lost their fears and finally there exists a visibility generated by this young generation of the revolution Tahrir that designate without doubt the social and political present and the future of the country.

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How *Urbicide* Turned Sarajevo into a *Fundamentalist City*: The Exploitation of Religious and Anti-Urban Prejudices during the War in Bosnia

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Abstract

While there is a huge abundance of literature on the two concepts of “urbicide” and the “fundamentalist city”, there has so far been no attempt to combine these approaches. In this article I will show that this can be useful when religion comes into play with regard to the war on cities. I will argue that this was the case during the war in Bosnia lasting from 1992 until 1995. By analysing how urbicide was carried out on Sarajevo it will be shown that this was directly linked to the developing of Sarajevo into a fundamentalist city during the siege. Insofar it is necessary to look more closely at the interconnectedness of these two concepts.

1. The modern role of cities in war: Sarajevo as a symbol of heterogeneity

In his article on “New Wars of the City” Martin Shaw writes that cities have lost their military significance in the modern age (Shaw 2004: 142). In contrast to ancient or medieval times, nowadays they ‘merely’ serve as symbols of conquest and not so much for the military defence of a nation. Parallel to this development – that is, the military vulnerability to attacks (e.g. through atomic bombs and Guerrilla wars) – Shaw observes an “anti-urban bias” (ibid: 143) by particular societal groups in modern times. This hostility towards the pluralistic and heterogeneous life in cities can be seen, for example, in Mao’s Cultural Revolution or the anti-urban genocide carried out by the Cambodian Khmer Rouge. Taking this *modern pattern of anti-modernism* into account Martin Coward coined the term *urbicide*, defining it “as the destruction of the urban insofar as it is the arena in which an encounter with difference occurs” (Coward 2004: 158). For Coward difference is the constituting element of cities.

What happened in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995 could perfectly be interpreted from this urbicide-point of view. Dubrovnik, Mostar, Sarajevo and Vukovar – all of these cities were symbols of a religious, ethnic and cultural pluralism and became, due to their heterogeneity, victims of the large-scale military aggression by Serbian nationalists (Vujović 2000: 131 et seq.). What later on achieved unfortunate notoriety as *the siege of Sarajevo*, can be translated into the destruction of a city “in which for centuries four of the five largest world religions have lived in parallel” (ibid: 134; also Shaw 2004: 145). It is especially this aspect,

the heterogeneous landscape of religions with a long history of peaceful coexistence and the attempt to eradicate it that will be of further interest in this paper.¹⁹

While there has been a lot of research on urbicide (among others Vujović 2000; Coward 2004; Graham 2011; Shaw 2004) and the implications of religion in the war in Bosnia (among others Appleby 2000; Maček 2000; Winslow 2002; Mojzes 1999; Vrcan 1999) so far a combination of these two tracks of interpretation is missing. My attempt will be to combine the concept of urbicide with the one of the *fundamentalist city*. Both are rather new theoretical concepts in urban geography. The fundamentalist city is a term coined by Nezar AlSayyad (2011: 15 et seq.) and helps understand how the spatial and social structures of cities contribute themselves to the rise of religious extremism. Though, I believe that urbicide is an adequate concept of analysing what happened *externally* (meaning the Serbian aggression towards Sarajevo), I do not consider it to be sufficient regarding the explanation of *internal* processes (meaning the everyday life within Sarajevo) that were driven by the siege. Therefore, it is a necessity to consult the theory of the fundamentalist city in order to fully understand this causation. Our leading hypothesis will be that the turning of Sarajevo into a fundamentalist city can be understood as the result of the anti-religious and anti-urban resentments that became manifest in the urbicide taking place during the siege of Sarajevo. Thus, the aggression by Serb nationalists, partially driven by fundamentalism, led to the increase of fundamentalism by Sarajevans.

In the following I will go more deeply into the context of the siege of Sarajevo and explain the relevant backgrounds of the war, hereby applying the concept of urbicide. By referring to the concept of the fundamentalist city, I will then talk about the internal consequences that were caused by the siege of Sarajevo. As a result the empirical interconnectedness of the two concepts should be shown. In a last part I will draw up an outlook on the theoretical advantages that have been gained through the merge of urbicide and the fundamentalist city.

2. Urbicide on Sarajevo

In 1992 a referendum was held to determine whether Bosnia-Herzegovina would become an independent state. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted this direct democratic decision making process. They erected barricades at key transit points throughout Sarajevo to show their opposition to Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence (Donia 2006: 277 et seq.). Protests broke out against these curtailments of freedom, the city's population stood up to demonstrate against the impending threat of war. Eventually, Serb paramilitary forces under Karadžić's leadership started shooting at civilians and attacked some of the key institutions in Sarajevo.

¹⁹ Several authors speak of an overlap of ethnic, cultural and religious communities that have been shaped for centuries by Islamic and Christian empires. This makes it hard to clearly distinguish in Bosnia between these features that convey identity. (Appleby 2000: 61ff.; Vrcan 1999: 109ff; Mojzes 1999: 79ff.). In particular it is Mojzes' concept of ethno religiosity, constructed as a "part of a conglomerate of characteristics" (Mojzes 1999: 79 et seq.), which seems most compelling for the understanding of the specific enmeshment.

In the following years the siege of Sarajevo was carried out as a “calculated reign of terror” (ibid: 289) meaning that the Serbian troops did not conquer the city completely, but instead took out shelling on it intermittently. This constant threat of violence should overshadow the life of Sarajevans profoundly.

Coward suggests that the Bosnian war was “constituted by a genocidal violence [...] that comprised the removal or erasure of all heterogeneous identities” (Coward 2004: 155). He assumes that particularly the republic Bosnia-Herzegovina was the major setting of war because it involved the, from a Serbian nationalists perspective, troublesome truth that the coexistence of different religions and ethnicities was possible. It was particularly in this area where the large-scale violence against the civilian population, their cultures and urban manifestations was carried out. Thus, it makes sense to apply the concept of urbicide, because it focuses on the “destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity” (Coward 2004: 166). The Serbian nationalists sought to eradicate exactly this *provocation of otherness* that existed in Bosnia for centuries. Before we go into more detail, let us take a look on how and why the Serbs perceived Bosnia’s and, especially, Sarajevo’s heterogeneity as a threat.

Several authors clearly show the long history of an anti-urban attitude held by Serbian old scholars (Vujović 2000: 127 et seq.; also Mašović 1999: 148 et seq.). Their perception was highly influenced by the fact that a lot of the cities in the Balkan area were shaped during the reign of the Ottoman Empire, e.g. the downtown area, the business district of the city, called *čaršija* – a word of Persian origin (Donia 2006: 13 et seq.). Serbian scholars thought the *čaršija* had a bad influence on people, since it was of foreign origin. Also, it was the place where the “intelligentsia with its petty morals and enormous egoism” (Vujović 2000: 128) lived and perverted Serbian society. In contrast to the city-dwellers, farmers and peasants were thought of as hardworking, uncomplicated and “protected against the bias and abnormality of the town culture that mechanizes life” (ibid: 129).

These negative stereotypes about the city can be seen clearly as well in the Serbian war propaganda that was produced during 1992 and 1995. Sarajevo in particular, stands out as the city that received the most attention by Serbian nationalism since it was a symbol for peaceful coexistence. “For power-holders who wanted to recreate a homogeneous and closed society, Sarajevo was the symbol of an odious, open and pluralistic city” (ibid: 144). To give an example, the former President of the Republika Sprska and convicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić said in an interview: “We have an opportunity to divide the city by the river. [...] it is clear that the Muslims cannot have all of Sarajevo. We will never allow that. Either it is ours or it will be two cities” (ibid: 135).

While a clear rejection of the idea of mixed national communities is observable here, Karadžić still has a moderate position on the *Muslim question*, since he merely speaks of a division of communities. His war-friend Momčilo Krasjišnik found more radical words:

“All assertions that the war can end somewhere outside of Sarajevo are illusory [...]. Sarajevo is of great importance for our fight. Here it is shown that a common state is out of question

[...]. Sarajevo's prospects are to be a united city in the future, but completely Serbian. The Muslims will have to look for their capital outside of Sarajevo, somewhere else." (ibid).

It should be made clear that this rhetoric was not only meant in a spatial but even more in a symbolic sense. Not only was it the mixing of communities in Sarajevo that raised concerns by Serbian nationalists but to some larger extent the memory of this in the city. Hence, it became an obstacle to the intended eradication of this memory of peaceful coexistence in heterogeneity. The Serbian troops "sought to shatter civic pride by wiping out records and physical manifestations of the city's diverse history" (Donia 2006: 314), e.g. the "Olympic Museum", the "Oriental Institute" or the "National and University Library". Because of this Donia also speaks of a "memoricide" taking place during these years in Bosnia. One of these memories consisted of the various religious communities living in Sarajevo. While there are discussions on the exact role of religion in this war, we find clear evidence that Serbian and Croatian soldiers "used religious symbols, artefacts, and songs while committing atrocities and mocked Bosnian Muslims as 'Turks' and 'traitors' to their Slavic Christian heritage. No one denies that agents of genocide invoked religious justifications, including fear of 'rising Islamic fundamentalism' in Bosnia, for their policies of 'ethnic cleansing'" (Appleby 2000: 67).

For the war on Muslim Bosnians religion was exploited, myths established – in short, the process of *othering* was "making their destruction more justifiable" (Winslow 2002: 341). For a lot of Serbian nationalists war was more plausible through equating Bosnian Muslims with Turks, thus, giving it a notion of revenge. It was the chance to expel those who were still perceived as intruders "once and for all, in order to 'fulfil God's will for the national rebirth of the Serbs.'" (ibid) Winslow describes this *process of demonization* as follows: "When Serbian peasants from villages surrounding Sarajevo began to bombard the city they did so confusing in their minds their former Muslim friends, neighbours and even brothers-in law with the old Ottoman Turkish viziers and pashas who had ruled them until 1878" (Winslow 2002: 345).

In this part we have seen how, anti-urban as well as religious resentments were exploited by the Serbian nationalists to pursue their practice of ethnic cleansing. Both, anti-urban and religious stereotypes are inextricably intertwined in the siege of Sarajevo. Their consideration largely contributes to the understanding of what happened during those years. In the following chapter we will analyse what kind of consequences this war on heterogeneity – in particular, on the coexistence of different religious communities – had in Sarajevo. I will bring forward the argument that the Serbian war propaganda and siege turned the city into a place of increased fundamentalism, thus, leading to a reinforcement of religious identity and the rejection of other religious communities. This fundamentalism was clearly visible in the spatial structure of the city. Since the majority in Sarajevo was of Muslim belief, we will mainly talk about how Muslims reacted to this situation in which they found themselves antagonised toward the Bosnian Serbs who fought a war against them.

3. ...when Sarajevo turned into a Fundamentalist City

3.1 Sarajevo before the siege

Sarajevo offered a great variety of religions and nationalities with no clear majorities before the war. While there were about 50% declaring themselves as Muslims, 30% as Serbs and 7% as Croats, there also was a large share of people considering themselves as Yugoslavs, namely 11% (Donia 2006: 266). Compared to other areas in Bosnia we find here the largest share of people who defined themselves as not being part of one of the different nationalities – “those seeking an alternative to the major national identities” (ibid: 3). Also, these nationalities were, according to their share, rather equally distributed over the different districts within the city with very few exceptions like *Stari grad* and *Pale* where Bosnian Muslims or, respectively, Bosnian Serbs were the dominant group (ibid: 267 et seq.). Since nationality was in most cases directly related to religion, we can, therefore, speak in the case of Sarajevo of a mixed and multireligious landscape.

Adding to that, before the 1990s Sarajevans themselves would have never described their city with the term “multi”, since this implied the existence of different ethnic, religious or cultural groups that do not intermingle by necessity. Instead, they used the term “common life (*zajednički život*)” and perceived their diverse city as a “neighbourhood (*komšiluk*)” (ibid: 3). This example should serve as only one among others for the daily practice of tolerance toward other communities.

Another example for the usually high level of tolerance was the quite common phenomenon of interreligious marriages. These “mixed marriages” in Sarajevo were, unsurprisingly, in most cases between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, since they held the majority within the population of Sarajevo. Young couples often saw themselves as “Sarajevans, Yugoslavs, Europeans, and citizens of the world” (Maček 2000: 116). Religion, or rather the existing religious differences, did not play such a great role in their perceptions and lives. If there were any difficulties relating to the religious origin of the spouse this happened on a family basis, but not as much within society at large (ibid).

However, this intermixture and high share of interaction decreased dramatically at the beginning of the 1990s. The “nationalism in neighboring republics posed a growing threat to stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo. Milošević [...] encouraged the intensification of nationalist propaganda attacks against the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the city of Sarajevo. Propagandists derided Bosnian Muslims as Serbs of the Islamic faith who had betrayed the Serb nation and who were conspiring to create an Islamic state with Sarajevo as its capital” (Donia 2006: 254).

Though “many Sarajevans fought back, rising to defend their city and their neighbours against the extreme nationalisms that aimed to eradicate, in whole or in part, certain groups in the city” (ibid: 5 et seq.), the city could not hold firm on its atmosphere of tolerance. Ultimately, it collapsed under the nationalist rhetoric by which Sarajevo was surrounded. This led to a renaissance of ethno-religious argumentation and an urban restructuring along ethno-religious

lines. Thus, “the ethno-religious background had the power to mobilise Sarajevans into reconsidering the significance of their different national ascriptions” (Maček 2000: 154).

To better understand what the consequences of this external threat meant in Sarajevo, we need to have a closer look at what constitutes the fundamentalist city first. Thus, we are able to contextualise the happenings in the theoretical framework provided by AlSayyad/ Massoumi.

3.2 What is the fundamentalist city and how can it be applied to Sarajevo?

The editors’ leading question in the book is: “When do certain religious rituals/ customs turn into exclusionary practices which ultimately lead to fundamentalist positions?” (AlSayyad 2011: Preface IX). Since this is rather vague, the authors, consequently, stress the plurals of both, cities and fundamentalisms. They attempt to “spatialize and territorialize the logic of various types of fundamentalism” (ibid: 12). Although the definition of a fundamentalist city might be seen as diluted – “there are as many different types of fundamentalism as there are categories of cities” (ibid: 16) – the author provides some suggestions to identify a fundamentalist city. A first feature can be seen in the exclusion of people who are adherents of another religion than those of the ruling power or majority population. Second, the minority groups have to conform to the religious rituals that are prescribed by the majority. Finally, a normalisation of the forms of control that are mentioned in the first two characteristics takes place (ibid: 15 et seq.).

While these features hold true for a lot of the articles comprised within the book, it would be misleading to compare each described city to Sarajevo one by one. Since every author connects its chapter to the very specific background of the respective city and intends to conserve the particular patterns, it would not make any sense to disregard this idiosyncrasy in the case of Sarajevo. It is my argument that because of urbicide taking place and the raging war being a constant threat for Sarajevans, one needs to emphasize the very specific context in which the fundamentalist city Sarajevo emerged. Thus, we need to identify these particular historical and contextual reasons that made the emergence possible.

Nevertheless, there are some points mentioned in the book that could be easily applied to the case of Sarajevo. Two examples for this structural similarity are the chapters on the *communalised city* Ahmedabad by Renu Desai and the *postsecular urbanisms* of Delhi by Mrinalini Rajagopalan. In these the authors talk about the restructuring of the respective city by Hindutva politics and the “ways in which the ideology has been embedded in the city and in the lives of its residents” (Desai 2011: 99). The rise of communalism in Ahmedabad developed in tandem with the rise of modern nationalism which is based to some large extent on religion. Hindus perceive the foundation of India as a secular nation-state – meaning the equality of all religions – as an assault on their Hinduness and practice the “militant rejection” (ibid: 103) of this institutionalised right. Hence, since the beginning of the 1960s we can observe recurring acts of violence against Muslims caused, among other reasons, by the

decline of the city's civic institutions, the changing political economy, the demise of working-class solidarities and the *othering* of Muslims.

Several characteristics of this restructuring can be identified besides the proliferation of violence. First, we find a higher concentration of homogenous religious communities living separately, next to each other. This *spatial separation* is clearly marked by borders, be it symbolical (e.g. by rickshaw drivers' routes according to their religion) or material ones (e.g. by built walls). Due to the fear of violence, residents move out of former mixed neighbourhoods into increasingly homogenous ones. This has, for instance, created in Ahmedabad the "Muslim ghetto" Juhapura which is called colloquially by Hindus "mini-Pakistan" (ibid: 112).

Therefore, besides this material reshaping of the city, we see a second feature of the fundamentalist city Ahmedabad that consists in its *discursive reshaping*. By making use of socio-spatial language the area of Juhapura is equated with Pakistan, which is nothing India's long-time enemy. Indian Muslims are being associated with Pakistanis, hereby undergoing a "devaluation". Since they do not show any "inheritance of Hindu blood by birth" (Rajagopalan 2011: 259), they are not considered to be of the same nation. Needless is to say that this rejection lacks any historical accuracy. Also, there are urban localities in Ahmedabad declared on street signboards as part of the "Hindu Rashtra", which literally translates into "Hindu nation" (Desai 2011: 113).

Thirdly, we find the *destruction of religious symbols and/or the insertion of iconography of one's own religion into public space*. This could be observed in the riots taking place in 1992 during which the famous Babri Mosque in northern India was demolished. This demolition of religious sites was carried out even more aggressively in, what later came to be known as, the "Gujarat carnage" – the outbursts taking place in 2002 in and around Ahmedabad during which Muslim graveyards, mosques and Muslim-owned residential and commercial property was systemically destroyed on a large-scale. (ibid: 112 et seq.) Whereas in Ahmedabad the occasional outbreaks of violence are analysed, in Delhi it is the "everyday practices" (Rajagopalan 2011: 266) that are of the author's interest. Rajagopalan describes how in numerous acts of appropriation public spaces, like traffic roundabouts, are decorated with Hindu iconography, e.g. warriors that, allegedly, fought the "invasion" of the Mughals (ibid: 266 et seq.). Hence, in Delhi we find a situation in which everything is being tried to eliminate the Muslim heritage of the country and reclaim the past by erasing any traces of cultural heterogeneity.

Consequently, it is not only the spatial segregation of two religious communities that is visible in the cityscapes, but even more so the construction and fixation of two different identities as antagonistic (ibid: 105). In the following chapter our aim will be to apply the features of the fundamentalist city mentioned above, in this case exemplified by Ahmedabad and Delhi, on Sarajevo.

3.3 The war within: growing fundamentalism in Sarajevo

When we follow the principles of a fundamentalist city, exemplarily described in the last chapter for Ahmedabad and Delhi, we see some quite similar results for what has happened during 1992 and 1995 in Sarajevo.²⁰

In a first step I will analyse how the spatial structures of the city were reshaped. This did not happen at such a large scale as it did in the cities in India. Thus, instead of speaking of spatial segregation, I will argue that *decreased possibilities of interaction between different religious communities* evolved.

One example for this was the mixed marriages that never had been any major problem in Sarajevo's society. However, when war broke out, these "were the ones that were the most difficult to keep intact" – they became an "anomaly". The head of the Muslim community even equated children, born by interreligious couples, as "rotten eggs" (Maček 2000: 115). Additionally, mixed marriages were not "interpreted [by Muslims] as a normal result of the plurireligious and pluricultural nature of the society" (Vrcan 1998: 123), but have been explicitly condemned as a means to reduce their community. Insofar Muslims, for their part, perceived mixed marriages as one strategy among others, how Serb nationalists tried to eradicate their existence in Bosnia.

Another example was neighbourly mistrust. As described above, before the war neighbourliness was of great importance and one of the essential equalizing factors for an existing plurireligious society. However, during war times there was a lot of suspicion between neighbours, especially between those of different religious backgrounds (Maček 2000: 132):

"There was a general mistrust, [...] an amount of fear. You could see that also they were suffering, that they didn't have anything, that they also were threatened, but it was simply irritating that when a shell exploded, and we would unconsciously curse their Chetnik-mothers, these people would just keep silent. Naturally there was mistrust. They were quiet but perhaps they felt fear and shame. But they didn't condemn it [the shelling, Karadžić, and the Serbian cause at large]. They never wanted to say who had injured them. They say that they had hard times, terrible, no food, so who is responsible for there being no food in Sarajevo?"

A third example for the decreased possibilities of interaction between different religious communities was the growing importance of Sarajevoan congregations. Most of the people eventually turned to a religious community, because they needed refuge, food and/or money. Religions, thus, experienced a considerable revitalisation. But since the distribution of humanitarian aid was done along religious lines, it led to a growing separation. Furthermore, "conditions were set for the distribution of aid" (ibid: 189): hence religion forcibly played a bigger role on a day-to-day basis. The example is given by Maček of Catholic priests who were sent to each home for blessing in order to receive help. The Christianisation of homes

20 In the following my observations will be based to a certain extent on the book by Ivana Maček, since this was the only qualitative and in-depth description of the happenings inside Sarajevo that were available.

was, thus, necessary when help by the Caritas was sought for. “The blending of the basic means of existence with spiritual matters and politics caused a lot of indignation, but it still entered the social fabric – survival, religiosity and nationality became hard to separate” (ibid: 191).

A second feature of the Fundamentalist City consisted in a *discursive reshaping* of the city. Also, for this characteristic we find several examples. For instance, SDA members (the Muslim party which dominated politics from 1991 onwards) presented themselves in television going to mosques. Before the conflict had broken out this was clearly part of the private and not public life. In general, television channels showed greater interest in religious matters. Thus, in media controlled by Serbian nationalists Muslims were equated with “Turks”, as the enemies and villains, whereas it was the other way round in Muslim-dominated TV with Serbs being equated with “Chetniks” (ibid: 166 et seq.).

Furthermore, the discursive reshaping could be seen in schools where for most parts Islam was introduced. The responsibility for the organisation and financing of religious studies was given to the respective local religious communities which mostly meant that either Islam was taught or no religious subject at all. “As Islam was becoming the state religion, most people did not want their children to stand out in any way, so they sent them to these classes” (Maček 2000: 173). Also, new textbooks were printed. For the subjects “History” and “Language and Literature” texts and illustrations were changed in favour of Muslims. This also meant that the literature was cleansed of all Bosnian authors of non-Muslim origin. The aim here was the formation of a Bosnian Muslim identity “as the original, and superior, people” (ibid).

When analysing the discursive reshaping of Sarajevo one cannot overlook language itself. Changes in vocabulary and pronunciation were made to distinguish more clearly between the, otherwise, very similar Serbo-Croatian. Hence, “the uniqueness of Bosnian was to be found in its ‘Islamic component’” (ibid: 174). Muslim Sarajevans tried to use Turkisms (or, where non-existent, created Turkisms like introducing the letter “h” in places where, especially, in Serbo-Croatian, it is omitted) and avoided Slavic synonyms (Perry 2005: 224 et seq.). Hereby, language was also an indicator of belonging. Serbian and Croatian became “almost overnight [...] minority languages” in Sarajevo (Maček 2000: 176).

The last feature used for the description of what was described as characteristics of the Fundamentalist City in India is the destruction of religious symbols and/or the introduction by iconography of one’s own religion in public space. It holds also true for this point that the actions taken in Sarajevo were by far not as extreme as they were in the case of Indian cities being shattered by the Hindutva movement. However, we find certain kinds of fundamentalist occurrences that show an increased “*public display of religion*” (ibid: 160) in Sarajevo.

In this sense the colour green can be particularly depicted. Green, as one of the symbols of Islam, could be found more broadly in public than in pre-war times. Whereas street-name plates and police uniforms were beforehand blue, they were changed to green during the war. Also, most plates were in Cyrillic and Latin script, but then gradually removed and replaced

by exclusively Latin ones. Thus, the pre-war equality of Western and Eastern scripts had been erased. Furthermore, the contents of those plates were often changed. Donia describes this practice “as a way of expressing a current state ideology” (ibid: 171). Whereas in pre-war times there still were a lot of partisan and communist heroes depicted by street names, this was transformed to national heroes of, exclusively, Muslim origin.

Another issue was that fallen soldiers of the Army of Bosnia were called *Šehidi*. Though the institution “fallen soldier” already existed in former Yugoslavian times it was a novelty that this became now restricted to soldiers of Muslim belief. This happened because the status, and, consequently, the considerable monetary aid that came with it, was not given by Sarajevan’s own government but by the Muslim organization IGASA (ibid: 170). Besides demanding their beneficiaries to stick to certain Muslim rules, there was another, more obvious, element of public display of religion. There were special graveyards for fallen soldiers of Muslim belief – *Šehidi* – that were reserved for this group of people. Neither civilians nor fallen soldiers that were non-Muslims could be buried in these graveyards. Hence, “non-Muslim soldiers who lost their lives were placed in a somewhat degraded category of ‘fallen soldier’” (ibid: 171). This religious discrimination became, thus, highly evident in the urban fabric.

4. Outlook: on the interdependence of urbicide and the fundamentalist city in Sarajevo

The previous chapter showed some examples of fundamentalist occurrences within the city of Sarajevo. While one does not find any major public outrages, as was exemplified in the cases of India, there are still incidents leading to the assumption that religious extremism played a greater role during war-time. Through analysing the *decreased possibilities of interaction between different religious communities* (1), the *discursive reshaping of Sarajevo* (2) and the *increased public display of religion* (3) we could observe that religion was, indeed, a feature leading to the exclusion of certain groups. In the case of Sarajevo this, by and large, meant the exclusion or discrimination of Bosnian Serbs, since they were equated with the city’s aggressors. Through everyday practices, as was exemplified by street plates, language, school books or graveyard regulations, we see a normalisation and institutionalisation of discrimination and control. However, it also became clear that it is hard to distinguish more adequately between religious and national features, since they were intertwined in the case of Bosnia. Thus, fundamentalism and nationalism should be equally stressed when analysing what happened during the siege of Sarajevo (Mojzes 1999: 79 et seq.).

Maček writes in her book: “the fact remains that religion became an important part of Sarajevan life in a very short time, which would have been impossible without the war life-circumstances.” (Maček 2000: 194) This also holds true for fundamentalism, since there were no signs of such trends before the war in the city. One difference that needs to be highlighted between the fundamentalist cities described in the book by AlSayyad/ Massoumi and Sarajevo

lies, therefore, in the time-factor. One can speak of a relatively rapid development. Without the siege of the city and the more than exceptional war-time situation most citizens probably would not have been tempted to follow exclusionary practices. However, one should not forget that religion was a feature that could easily be used, since resentments against other religious communities were latent and could, evidently, not be erased completely by Tito's "civil religion of brotherhood and unity" (Perica 2002: 89).

Urbicide, the attacks on buildings and communities with the intention to destroy the conditions of heterogeneity (Coward 2004: 166), taking place on a daily basis for about four years in Sarajevo and being, at least partially, driven by fundamentalist motives, the exclusion of other religious communities for being a substantial element of heterogeneity, makes the rise of fundamentalism in the city plausible. It needs to be seen how deep this cut has been in the peaceful coexistence of the diverse Bosnian populations since "bitterness over the war has contributed to mutual suspicion and hatred among members of all three major religious groups" (Winslow 2002: 350). What makes confident though, is that in contrast to other Bosnian cities, there was no religious building destroyed in Sarajevo. Despite the heavy shelling of mosques by Serbian troops, all churches remained untouched. Fortunately, not every sign of the centuries-long peaceful coexistence vanished during the siege of Sarajevo.

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The Sacral Geography of Zionism: Israeli “Homeland” Protection and Geopolitics

Eric Rösner

Abstract

The Middle-East conflict is one of the most intensively discussed political crises in the worldwide media. The following article shall try to clarify some fundamental facts for the understanding of the background and the causes of this conflict. This work shall be seen as a thought-provoking impulse and contribution for the extensive academic discourse on this complex matter. The paper focuses especially on the aspect of Zionism as one conflict component among others. Firstly, a brief definition of Zionism will be given and an overview on the main standpoints of the involved conflict parties. Secondly, with the analysis of a case study, the politics of the state of Israel and the influences concerning the relationship between the different parties will be represented briefly. Finally, some issues and further potentials for conflict mitigation in the peace making process will be outlined.

1. Introduction

The conflict between Israel, the Zionist movement and the Arab community is still one of the most debated political issues in recent history even though it has lasted already for more than one hundred years. The reasons for this astonishing durability of the conflict are to some extent the opposing religious positions with territorial implications which can hardly be debated and negotiated in a normal way (Mardam-Bey 2012: 5). The contested territories play an elementary role in the three monotheistic religions that are rooted in the region. Therefore, Jews, Christians and Muslims feel deeply rooted with the contested space. As Elisabeth Heidenreich (2010: 71-72) underlines, we have to understand the context as religious identities which constitute a sacral geography in overlapping spaces. Jerusalem is the best example to substantiate this theoretical context of sacral geography. The town unified the origin of the Jews, the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and Mohammed’s ascent into heaven. It is a spatial agglomeration of religious sanctuaries with different claims of ownership (Jaeger&Tophoven 2011: 76-77) which creates a great potential for conflicts.

2. Zionism

The Zionist Movement is more than 2000 years old and based on the development of the diaspora²¹. The diaspora means the statelessness, migration and scattering of people away from an established homeland in more than one direction. Amar-Dahl (2012: 10-12) underlines that there were different understandings of the meaning of diaspora already in the

²¹ For further information on Jewish history please refer to Mardam-Bey (2012: 150-157)andJaeger&Tophoven (2011: 257-265).

19th and 20th century. Consensus among the different groups, however, is the hope for a Jewish State in the ‘Promised Land’, which gave rise to what is called Zionism (Amar-Dahl 2012: 13).

One of the most important visionaries of Zionism is Theodor Herzl. He is the author of the book “The Jewish State” and furthermore the initiator of The First Zionist Congress convened in Basle (1897) “Theodor Herzl if not the originator of the concept of Zionism was definitely the visionary, catalyst and leader of political Zionism” (Melnick 2013: 3). The results of the First Zionist Congress give a very good overview about the main goals of Zionism (Melnick 2013: 3):

“Zionism aims at establishing for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine. For the attainment of this purpose, the Congress considers the following means serviceable:

1. The promotion of the settlement of Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and tradesmen in Palestine.
2. The federation of all Jews into local or general groups, according to the laws of the various countries.
3. The strengthening of the Jewish feeling and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps for the attainment of those governmental grants which are necessary to the achievement of the Zionist purpose.”

Different movements of Zionism have evolved over time. The political Zionism was founded by Herzl. The main thesis in Herzl’s “Jewish State” is that a Jewish community does not need definite borders or a specific language. He reckons that anti-Semitism gave origin to and constitutes the urgency for the foundation of a Jewish State. With the intensifying anti-Semitism in the late 19th-century there were only two opportunities for the Jewish community: assimilating in other societies or (re-)establishing the Jewish State (Amar-Dahl 2012: 19-20). Moshe Zuckermann (2010: 14) states that the anti-Semitism and the diaspora served as a justification for a Jewish State granting safety from the Jews’ enemies. Consequently, Zuckermann (2010: 13-15) therefore expresses his opinion that the Jewish State to some extent needs this enemy and has to maintain this construct.

Another interpretation of Zionism is focused on a religious viewpoint. Religious Zionism signifies the foundation of a Jewish State in order to bring together the diaspora through the colonisation of the Promised Land (Amar-Dahl 2012: 15-16). Contrary to this, the Orthodox Jewish community believes that the judgement by God and the awaited Messiah is the only legitimate way to release the Jews from life in exile by joining them in the ‘Promised Land’ (Amar-Dahl 2012: 14). Goldman (2009) describes this internal conflict with the following words: “Only the Messiah, sent by God, could restore the people of Israel to its land. And it was the Messiah who would rebuild the Temple” (Goldman 2009: 5).


Cultural Zionism is focused on the Hebrew identity. Amar-Dahl (2012) explains this position with the help of Achad Haam. It means the possibility to settle a small part of the Jewish community in the Promised Land. The main part of this process is the establishment and territorialisation of a Hebrew culture, language and a classical national character. Afterwards, it should be possible to found a Jewish State (ibid: 20-21). This position is less restrictive but it intended to isolate the Hebrew culture from all other cultural influences. Amar-Dahl (2012:

21) explains these influences as a cosmopolitan project against the Jewish State in the proper sense. He underlines that the main goal of cultural Zionism is the renaissance of a Hebrew culture and people.

Political Zionism is the dominant position in recent history and present. The reason for this victory over the other positions is the Holocaust. Goldman (2009) enunciates this in the following words:

“But this hope was neither political nor military. Jews in the dispersion were powerless, and they did not come to any consensus about the need for a homeland. Rising anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century in Europe, particularly in Russia and Romania, as well as in France and Germany, helped shape a nationalist consensus to which many Jews soon subscribed” (Goldmann 2009: 3).

The result of this rising political Zionism is the foundation of Israel in 1948 after the Holocaust and the end of World War II. Figure 1 shows the composition of the Jewish immigrant community in the region in 2008. At that time, Israel had a population of 5,57 million Jews, whereof 3,04 million were immigrants.



Source: own figure referring to Jaeger; Tophoven 2011: 46

Fig. 1: Composition of the Jewish community in Israel of 3,04 million people with immigration background in 2008

3. The different parties in the Middle East conflict

At this point it is important to outline the different parties in the conflict and the distribution of power among them. The state of Israel is the most powerful conflict party. Since 1948, the year of the establishment of the Jewish state to be known as the State of Israel, it could count with the support of the Western countries in this development. Israel can be seen as the main power in the region also through its great military power. Amar-Dahl (2012: 52-61) shows with quotes from Shimon Peres, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, that there is a widespread conviction among the Jewish that the great Arab resentment against the Jewish community is deeply rooted in Arab societies and therefore justifies to build up and maintain the extensive

military power of the state of Israel to protect itself. Furthermore, Amar-Dahl portrays the point of view that the Arab societies are 'barbaric' with a lower level of civilization. For this reason, the Arabs are determined as an opponent group for the Israeli state against which the Jews have to take measures of self-defence (ibid: 56). Such statements seem to support the hypothesis of Zuckermann (2010) that the state of Israel needs an image of an enemy, nowadays not just regular anti-Semitism but rather the neighbouring Arab societies. Amar-Dahl (2012: 113-115) criticises the development of a strong military force in Israel upon this justification and speaks of a „Military Civilization“. Her main point is that the lines between military and the civil society are blurred and the society is characterised by wide acceptance of the state's military interests²².

In recent decades, the Israeli government switched between right and left parties. Zuckermann (2010: 97-99) claims, however, that a real political left with a pacifist agenda would not be accepted to govern Israel. He mentions the security doctrine of the Israeli State and the permanent fear of the dangerous Arab enemies which are seen as the reason for restrictive political measures. The only differentiation between left and right parties in Israel can be found in the rigour of the discourse on the right security measures.

Provocative statements of some Israelis, like the following, underline to which point the mutual relationships have already been deteriorated: "To stand against Israel is to stand against God" (Carenen 2012: 189). Shahak (1982: 4) points out that


"the idea that all the Arab states should be broken down, by Israel, into small units, occurs again and again in Israeli strategic thinking. For example, Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha'aretz (and probably the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the 'best' that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: 'The dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite state, a Sunni state and the separation of the Kurdish part' (Ha'aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect of the plan is very old".

On the opposite side, also the Arab nations and the Islamic World have developed an enemy stereotype concerning the Jewish State. The demographical changes in the region throughout the past century have aggravated mutual resentments. In the past centuries there was a great majority of Islamic people but with the foundation of Israel and the intense immigration of Jews and the displacement of a great number of Muslims the distribution has changed towards a standoff (Amar-Dahl 2012: 44-45). Jaeger and Tophoven (2011: 65) refer to this transformation as being caused by a "manoeuvrable folk". According to Amar-Dahl (2012: 60-62) the natural consequence is a development of pan-Arab nationalism which has the main goal to unify the Arab countries against Israel and to jointly defeat the enemy, breaking his regional hegemony in military and politics.

22 Amar-Dahl (2012: 113-115) The Military Civilization of the Israeli democracy.

4. The casestudy: Israeli settlement policy

After the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the following first war between Israel and the Arab countries Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq the different parties found a compromise concerning the definition of the borders of Israel. These borders are known as the Green Line. In this case Israel was able to consolidate its power and legitimation in the region. Over time and with persistent conflicts in the region (Six-Day War, Yom Kippur War etc.) the Israeli State has expanded its territory beyond the Green Line and founded Jewish settlements in areas which were originally destined for the Arab or Palestine community. The starting point of this development was the Six-Day War with an Israeli victory including territorial gains and the negation of the Jewish State by the Arab League. As a response to this position, Israel started to build settlements in the conquered territories, especially in the West Jordan region (Deutsche Welle 2013). Figure 2 gives a short overview on the changes in distribution and settlement. Many Palestinians were forced to leave. As a consequence the Palestine community, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) intensified the fight against the Jewish State in the first Intifada and proclaimed the Palestinian State in 1988. This state was indirectly recognized by the UN against the opposition of Israel. A transformation towards a smouldering conflict took place; with an increase of violence during the second Intifada in 2000. Both parties, however, state at least officially that a peaceful further coexistence is the only way (Jaeger&Tophoven 2011: 66-68).



Source: Jaeger; Tophoven 2011: 52

Fig. 2: Historical development in the Middle-East 1947-1993

Gorenberg (2012: 62-65) analyses the legitimization of the Jewish settlement development. He states that the justification of the Jewish settlement, especially in Ofra, which is a part of the West Jordan Land, is ambivalent. The Israeli point of view was that the settlements were legal because the region was stateless in 1967 when the settlement process started. But even the Israeli civil administration confirms that no regular building licences exist. Gorenberg (2012) states that in this region development plans are not available and this is why the settlements built on Palestinian ground are formally illegal and contradict international agreements. Political changes or simply the fact that more than 100,000 people live in this area are seen by some policy analysts as the main reasons for stagnation (Deutsche Welle 2013). In 2002, in the main settlement areas 206,000 Jewish settlers lived beside 2 million Palestinians in the West Jordan area; 1,1 million Palestinians together with 7,000 settlers in the Gaza strip and 200,000 Palestinians with 170,000 Jews in East Jerusalem (Jaeger&Tophoven 2011: 70).

The influences of this policy, together with other measures in the political life of Israel, are logical for both sides. Israel pursues a security doctrine with Israel as the main power in the region. Indirect consequences are the discrimination of the Arabs in Israel and the occupied areas and, finally, the smouldering conflict between the different religions. The mutual enemy construct pokes the hate between the nations and cultures and complements the matrix for PLO, Intifada and recent violent organisations against the Jews. The answer from the Jewish community is similar: it is violence against the terrorists and sometimes also against civilians. Mardam-Bay (2012: 113) notes an interesting quote from Elias Sanbar, who is a Palestine politician with residence in Paris, which shows the real situation in the minds of the Arab community. Concerning the intended Palestine accession to the UN he said that the Palestine society is confident with the principles of the international law but it is difficult to imagine that this law will prevail after years of war. For him it is difficult to imagine that diplomatic negotiations will effectively take place in the actual situation and that Israel does not ignore the international law. Apparently, the mistrust against the Jewish community, especially against the Israeli government is deeply rooted in the minds of Palestinians. If Israel perceived that the foundation of the Jewish State, in the context of the differentiated sacral geographies of the respective territory, was also a great and problematic incision in the history of the Arab community, a consensus could more likely be achieved (Gorenberg 2012: 245). The other essential condition for this process is a secular Palestine state. A radical and terrorist affected state or movement is not able to participate effectively and seriously in a political peace building process.

5. Conclusion

The enemy construct on both sides provokes mutual hatred and suspicion and keeps nourishing rigid military actions and terrorist activity. It is difficult to imagine that a diplomatic solution of the conflict will be possible in the present situation. There is no doubt that Israel has to protect itself because there are dangerous developments in parts of the Arab world and history proved serious threats to be real. The rigid Israeli security doctrine has

surely contributed to the deepening of Arab resentments against Israel. If Israel acknowledged an independent Palestine State, it is possible that relationships could be normalised and conflict mitigation mechanisms could be regulated and institutionalised between both states.

A problem for this process is actually the national identity of both Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries. It could be more productive if a separation from religion and state became the foundation of the national identities on both sides. Israel has strived for the status of the hegemon of the region for own security purposes. Now an effective step could be an increased offer of economic, political and social support in favour of the weaker neighbours. In the society of Israel first movements and developments are visible which follow the goal of reconciliation. The opportunities of secularised politics should be used. But it is also important that the Arabs fight anti-Semitism in their governments and within their societies in order to give peace with Israel a fair chance. Under such circumstances a peace process, as initiated through the Oslo contracts, should be more effective and durable in the future.

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Is the Global Counter-Terrorism a Complex or a Paradox? Inspirations from the ETIM issue in China

Shengjian Wu

Abstract


For China, the issue of East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) does not only concern the national sovereignty, but also the cross-border anti-terrorism cooperation. The Chinese government has labelled the ETIM as a terrorist group since almost 20 years, whilst only after 9/11 the U.S. government had placed the ETIM on its own Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL), however, not on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List (FTO). The U.N. followed in the same way to further internationalise the ETIM issue. The involved complicated scopes revealed a wider range from counter-terrorism campaign to regional security and from nationalism to cultural liberalism. Based on limited accessible literature on the ETIM, on the Uyghur minority and China's political agenda on Muslims, on the potential abuse of human rights and the American diplomatic reactions towards the ETIM, a multidimensional and integrated triangle-approach should have been applied, while the three main prolocutors around the ETIM issue, namely the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the Han-Chinese administration and the globally leading anti-terrorism player – the U.S., have all deliberately ignored the hidden extensional facts that revealed complicity. Rather than to verify the verbal definition on ETIM terrorism, we'll examine the effects of potential ideological interventions from three sides towards the ETIM issue and rethink the subtle role of the U.S. in between. The issue of ETIM is a series of tensions. Through a geopolitical perspective, we want to gain more insight about the psychology of terrorism, the identity politics and the imaginative geography of American global terror threats. Finally, we may also refresh our knowledge on terrorism by examining the multidimensional case of Uyghur terrorists.

1. Estrangement between Han- and Uyghur Chinese

The first essential aspect to be put forward is the geopolitical feature of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which shall be highlighted in an internationalised complex of the ETIM issue. Xinjiang is located far from the capital Beijing, with its central administration of China, while it is much closer to its ethno-religious relatives in central Asia, where several radical Islamic terrorist groups have been sheltered²³. Prior to the 20th century, the non-Turkic speaking Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Huis had originally dominated the Xinjiang region, referred to as the pivot of Asia. Its demographic structure started to change notably both in terms of ethnic composition and spatial distribution after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, resulting in massive Han-Chinese immigration and the Han-dominated

²³ The three most notorious Islamic terrorist organizations in the bordering countries of Xinjiang include al-Qaeda since 1988, the Hizb ut-Tahrir with worldwide affiliations and the O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati. These organisations are involved in terrorism in Uzbekistan, civil war in Afghanistan (1996–2001) and war in Afghanistan (2001-present).

agglomeration (Fig. 1) in northern Xinjiang, which was and is economically more developed and more urbanised. This spatial estrangement also occurred in the Han-dominated urban communities²⁴ and gradually caused an awakening of Uyghur nationalism, leading to a separatism threat for the neighbouring ethnic counterpart – Han Chinese.



Source: edited upon data from the Xinjiang Research Institute of Social Sciences

Fig. 1: The demographic distribution on the basis of the three largest ethnic groups (June, 2009)

1.1 The Han-Uyghur tensions in the contemporary context

On one hand, the Xinjiang region has gained more geopolitical importance due to its rich reserves of gas, fossil oil and minerals which sustained China’s secure access to the strategic resources. In return, the central government has enhanced its military and economic control through the nationalization of mines and oil deposits, nourishing dissatisfaction among the native Uyghurs. On the other hand, the fall of the former Soviet Union, the rise of post-colonial nationalism and the emergence of Muslim radicalism have caused ideological disturbances in central Asia, by which the Xinjiang region was also affected as the intersection of communism and capitalism, of Confucianism and Islam. The socioeconomic and ideological tensions have challenged above all the efficiency of integration policies of the

²⁴ According to official census data from 2000, the Han Chinese constituted the ethnic majority with 75.3% of the population in Ürümqi and 78.1% in Karamay, the two most industrialized cities of the region.

central government and suggested a more localised or flexible development model in case of ethnic movements. The July 2009 Ürümqi riots²⁵ have to some extent expressed the failure of the existing administrative settings and identity politics in Xinjiang. They have strengthened the Han-Uyghur tensions and brought about a consequential reinforcement effect of Uyghurs' ethno-religious adherence to their Turkic Islamic identity. Among these tensions, the ETIM terrorists could easily find their petri dishes for radicalism and mobilise revengeful violent separatist activities. Crime records of detained ETIM members have proved the positive correlation between the Han-Uyghur political tensions and Muslim terrorism.

The central government of China has reformed a series of national integration policies for the Xinjiang Uyghurs since 1976. They include the bilingual education system, financial subsidies for the less developed Uyghur dominated communities, exemption from birth control policy, among others. Their goals were to advance the college admission rate of native Uyghurs, to boost the local infrastructure for better communication, and to balance the demographic structure against the growing number of Han immigrants. However, empirical observations have shown that modified integration policies have not relieved the Uyghurs' discontent about their socio-economic status and endangered identity (Howell & Fan 2011: 120-123). Despite the remaining ethnically based disparity of income, Uyghurs also felt unequally treated in a Han Chinese dominated society. Tensions beyond material goods were, for example, religious intolerance or unofficial ceiling of Uyghurs' careers in administrative systems.

1.2 Identity crisis between nationalism and Ummah

Identity has always been a commonly used instrument of ethno-religious terrorism preachers, such as the ETIM leaders. The keyword of the ETIM concerning identity is “Turkic”, which expressed the Uyghur nationalism with a Turkic national identity. In reality, it's quite hard to define the anthropological term Uyghur as a distinguished ethnic identity. If we retrieve the history of Uyghurs in Xinjiang two basic approaches, the primordialist and constructivist approach, can explain how ethnic identity has been shaped. The primordialist approach sees ethnic identity as naturally inherited characteristics. The Uyghur separatists, however, utilise the terms “Turkic” and “Uyghur” inter-changeably, since Uyghur was actually the miscegenated offspring of a small coalition of Tiele²⁶ tribes from Turkic origin in northern

²⁵ The July 2009 Ürümqi riots have started as peaceful demonstrations. They involved about 1,000 Uyghurs protesting against impartial justice in an interracial criminal case and ended as a series of riots with racial hatred. The riots were considered by the Chinese Communist Party as a severe signal of failed integration policies.

²⁶ The Tiele (Chinese: 鐵勒), also named Chile (Chinese: 敕勒), Gaoche (Chinese: 高車), or Tele (Chinese: 特勒), were a confederation of nine Turkic peoples living to the north of China and in Central Asia, emerging after the disintegration of the Xiongnu confederation in the year 552 AD.

China.²⁷ This Turkic blood tie couldn't unify all oasis inhabitants in Xinjiang, as it had strived for an unrealistic pan-Turkic territory for all non-Han inhabitants there. Instead, the ETIM separatists were inclined to accept a more socially constructed ethnic identity of "East-Turkic" or "Uyghur as Muslim". This constructivist identity strategy by the ETIM separatists has grasped two core elements of "Uyghur" identity, namely the commonly used "Uyghur" language and the shared faith in Ummah al-Islamiyah, a collective nation of Islamic peoples. The repressive ethno-religious policies applied by the local administration have undoubtedly reinforced the Beijing-acentric ethnic awareness of Uyghur Muslim, as the most important marker of the Uyghur identity was their Islamic traditions.

Misgivings about political terrorism by the central government in Beijing couldn't be easily removed in consideration of the Islamist factor in a post 9/11 era. Beijing still worried that the Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic consciousness may be fused together to produce an ethno-religious conflict in Xinjiang. Scholars, such as Abanti Bhattacharya, an associate fellow at the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, have doubted on China's ideological intervention in the light of the Uyghur ETIM terrorism. He reviewed China's nationalism history since the post-war period to suggest that the government's attempt to revive nationalism with high compatibility for all domestic ethnicities was not only relevant for China's national integration but also the security of its border lands. Rather than blurring the distinction between separatism and terrorism, China should adjust its nationalism-oriented²⁸ regional autonomy policies to match the Uyghurs' appeals for more autonomy.

2. Limited cooperation between the U.S. and China

China has declared itself as a victim of terrorist attacks by some Muslim extremists or ethnic Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang since the 1990s. The international emergence of some Uyghur activists was reportedly detected in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in 1997 where they received military training. In January 2002, a Chinese government study reported that the ETIM has received money, weapons, and support from al-Qaeda. Thus, China's concerns about cross-border terrorism appeared to place it in a position to support Washington's global counter-terrorism campaign and share intelligence resources after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Only 17 days after the attacks, China voted with all other attendants in the Security Council for Resolution 1373 that aimed to contain terrorist groups in various ways,

²⁷ The fall of the Uyghur Khaganate in the year 842 has caused Uyghur migration from Mongolia into the Tarim Basin. This migration assimilated and replaced the Indo-Europeans of the region to create a distinct identity, as the language and culture of the Turkic migrants eventually supplanted the original Indo-European influences. This fluid definition of Uyghur and the diverse ancestry of modern Uyghurs are a source of confusion about what constitutes true Uyghur ethnogenesis and ethnography.

²⁸ The Preamble to the 1982 Constitution states, „Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China“.

reaffirming the need to combat terrorism through a wide global cooperation. Simultaneously, Washington has come to realise that the rising authority of China might challenge America's leading role in international geopolitical issues. Central Asia, as the pivot of the Eurasian continent, is essential for America's global geopolitical strategy.

2.1. The paradoxical “Balance of Power” in Eurasia

China has become the world's second largest economy²⁹, strongly increasing its political influence in eastern Asia. To maintain America's geopolitical interests, the U.S. has promoted its alliances with India, Japan, South Korea and Afghanistan with the dual purpose of containment and balance of power (Fig. 2). The containment strategy implied an isolated and encircled situation for China, in which the countries bordering China stretched in a southern arc from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and farther to South and Central Asia. Based on the common concerns over China's emerging power and political ambitions, this “coalition” has been expanded to include countries such as Cambodia, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. But a further shared concern shouldn't be ignored within this topographically and ethno-religiously complicated region, namely the transnational movement of terrorism. In the case of ETIM, both America and its Asian followers have carefully noticed its linkage to the transnational Islamic fundamentalist movement. The largest supporter of the American “balance of power strategy” – India, is also worried about the growth of radical Islamic separatism in Xinjiang because India has not yet to be free from the troublesome Jammu and Kashmir areas³⁰ where a violent fundamentalist movement together with the emergence of nationalism ever occurred. Thus, India, as much as the U.S., would be cautious about the evolution of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in Xinjiang and Central Asia.

The Anxiety of the U.S. about China's rise – especially in military sense, the impendency of China to ensure its energy access and territorial security against civil strife, together with the regional socio-political transformation within Central Asia itself, have formed a “stress triangle”, which changes the power competition between the U.S. and China. While the couplet of counterbalanced American geopolitical policies, namely “regional alliances for the balance of power” and “regional cooperation for the global war on terrorism”, have demonstrated constraints in the extent of Sino-American counter-terrorism cooperation. Especially in fields like information sharing and technicians' dispatching, the two great powers still lack mutual trust to strive for a closer bilateral relationship. The Bush

²⁹ According to the World Economic Outlook Database of International Monetary Fund, which is updated on April 2013, the socialist market economy of China is the world's second largest economy by nominal GDP (8,227.037 Billion U.S. dollars) and by purchasing power parity (12,405.670 Billion U.S. dollars) after the United States in year 2012.

³⁰ Jammu and Kashmir has an international border with PRC in the north and east on the southwestern part of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomy Region, where the most Uyghurs are agglomerated. What's more, Jammu and Kashmir also have a Muslim majority population. Thus, Xinjiang also matters for India's territorial security and political stability.

administration has designated the ETIM as a terrorist organisation in August 2002. Washington has reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002.



Source: Fallon, J.E. 2013. U.S. Geopolitics: Afghanistan and the Containment of China. In Small Wars Journal
Fig. 2: The Army Garrisons and military alliances of U.S. around China (2013)

2.2. Pursuit of domestic stability and the “War on Terror”

Many official counter-terrorism actions, transnational or domestic, have been labelled as humanitarian interventions. However, Edward Snowden’s political asylum in May 2013 rewarmed the debate on counter-terrorism strategies in the light of potential human rights abuse and supposed humanitarianism with unexpected terrorist-like outcomes. Such a pre-emptive logic concerning the “war on terror”³¹ also existed in China’s domestic counter-terrorism strategy. For example, Chinese newspapers published a list of supposed ETIM members (Todd 2010: 162-180), without reliable proof for their linkage to terrorism. Experts from all over the world have reiterated that there is no internationally accepted definition of the term ‘terrorism’. America declared a humanitarian “war on terror” and China vowed to fight with “iron fist against separatist”. The first strategy has largely concentrated its focus on the Islamic World and the latter on the north-western border land of Xinjiang. But will they

³¹ The term ‘War on Terror’ was first used by George W. Bush on 20th September 2001, to signify a global military, political, lawful, and conceptual struggle—targeting both organizations designated as terrorist and regimes accused of supporting them. But the political scientist Francis Fukuyama notes that “terrorism” is not an enemy, but a tactic. Its misemploy obscures differences between anti-occupation insurgents and international mujahideen (Fukuyama, 2006).

evolve to become simply a repressive legislative system against anti-Americanism and an overexerted national security policy against anti-separatism?

A unilateral definition of terrorism is often based on the assumption that the counter-terror force is characterised by positive aspects as humanity, civilisation, security, peace, rationality, legitimacy and so on. Criticism against the warlike counter-terrorism often pointed out that the terminology “War on Terror” in itself relies on violence and to some extent reveals a certain retaliatory mind-set of wiping out in-human violence by means of ‘human’ violence. This problem is also to some extent reflected in the terminological stiffness of China’s “iron fist against terrorism with separatist intentions”. Both Washington and Beijing need an in-depth self-criticism regarding the demarcation of terrorism.

3. Spatial order, identity and imaginative geography

Analysing terrorism is a demanding research task and the respective terminology should be chosen carefully. In the case of ETIM, differentiations become difficult between the actions of Chinese nationalists and Uyghur nationalists, between Muslim fundamentalists and Muslim racists, between terrorist engagement and terrorist involvement. Every individual ETIM member has its own motivation, aim and means of intervention to struggle for a strengthened position of the Uyghurs (Borum 2004). The ‘terrorist’ as a uniform object, however, is vague due to underlying multiple identities and cross-domain movements. Individual approaches to the countering of specific expressions of terrorism are therefore necessary. The leading geopolitical perspective taken by the U.S. concerning the global anti-terror framework – the commonly disseminated media images of terrorism and the cooperation models for counter-terrorism – shall be reviewed. Here we find an imaginative geography behind Washington’s global geopolitical strategies that has been produced to describe the ‘so close yet so distant’ terrorism.

3.1 The landscape narratives of urban regeneration

We have mentioned time and again about the role of religion as an emotion-charged mental agent in terrorism, while we often ignored the role of space as medium, or the socially constructed landscapes within it, which symbolized and reflected the power relations between classes and ethnic groups. Meanwhile, these power-relation-charged landscapes can arouse certain psychoreactions among different ethnic inhabitants. Islam, according to Fischel (1956) and Hassan (1972), shall be an urban religion. Religious practices, especially those relating to authority, emphasized the social gathering. An Islamic city, like Ürümqi, was expected to reflect the rules of Sharia in terms of physical and social relations between neighbors and social groups. While the Han-Immigrants, who were considered to be mostly atheists and pagans, have inevitably changed the traditional Islamic urban pattern into more secularized.

A representative urban regeneration that perceived by Uyghurs as spatial disorder linked to identity crisis was the regeneration plan of Kashgar's old town since July, 2009. This \$488 million project would demolish thousands of traditional mud-brick houses, and relocate 42% of Kashgar's residents, officially for reasons of dangerous overcrowding, poor drainage, and fire hazards. Unlike Ürümqi, the capital city of Xinjiang region, Kashgar has always been a Uyghur-dominant urban region in terms of population with less than 8% registered Han-residents till the end of 2012. The ethnic majority Uyghurs owned a collective cultural inheritance in forms of landscapes ranging from the Id Kah Mosque, the largest mosque in China, and the tomb of Afaq Khoja, the holiest Muslim site in Xinjiang, to the most intimate home spaces, which were mostly two-storey houses with white-washed plaster walls and painted ceilings inside. Both their public and private spaces will be transformed into high-rise apartments, plazas and reproduced "ancient" Islamic architectures. The existing methods of renovation are not "culture-sensitive" enough to show respect for the traditional values, lifestyles and social rules of Uyghurs. The location of Mosques was decentralized and the height of them exceeded by surrounding towers, while the governmental and commercial buildings have set up a new landscape of authority, politically and capitalistically.

3.2 The imaginative geography of 'big players'

By applying the concept of "Imagined Geography" of Edward Said an attempt should be made to rethink the U.S.-centric perception of terrorism at global level. Heavily influenced by Michel Foucault, Said (1994) conceptualised the "Imagined Geography" as a tool of power, of a means of controlling and subordinating geographical constructs with certain characteristics. Following Foucault's critical approach, power is seen as being in the hands of those who have the right to objectify those that they are imagining. Thus, the coined term "Imagined Geography" here is suggested to mean 'perceived'³² and 'constructed'. It refers to the perception of spatial dimensions of terrorism that were created through certain images, texts or discourses, including movement of terrorists, location of terrorist camps, distance of terrorism attacks and spatial relations or integrations of terrorists. Based on the performativity³³ of consummating new non-national frontiers against terrorism, the warfare images of counter-terrorists in Iraq even intruded reality games. By simulating a virtual space where an expected terrorist may exist, the "Imagined Geography" allows the visual receivers or players to be part of the cooperative forces operating against distant terrorism. These media

³² Perception is the core word in Foucault's philosophy. For him the way that knowledge and perception functioned in social hierarchies of power was of special significance. Foucault outgrew structuralism and focused on self-perception and social relations in a manner that tackled juicier real-life issues.

³³ The "arc of crisis" has been used by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1978 as the description of an area stretching from the Indian subcontinent in the east to the Horn of Africa in the west, with the Middle East as its core. This arc holds in its subsoil about three-fourths of the estimated world oil reserves, and it was and still is the locus of one of the most intractable conflicts between Zionism and Arab nationalism. Given the increasing tensions between America and the Islamic world, the term "arc of crisis 2.0" may revitalise its geopolitical sense towards American global counter-terrorism (Rehman 2013).

reflected the imagined geography of the ‘War on Terror’ by utilizing what Deck³⁴ (2004) has seen as “a cult of ultra-patriotic xenophobes whose greatest joy is to destroy, regardless of how racist, imperialistic, and flimsy the rationale” for the simulated battle may be.

Distant terrorism can arouse more fear for its uncertainty, invisible terrorism has the same effect for its obscureness. For this sake Washington recalls its enunciation from late 1970s to reconstruct the ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan. By the eastern end of this arc China is located as an emerging great competitor who is striving to gain more authority in regional security issues. Will the US continue to follow its founders’ tolerance and openness, even towards regimes that do not mirror the American values and geopolitical interests? Will China’s nationalism and the U.S. ultra-patriotism conflate to rebuild a regional or even global imagined geography of terrorism? With the approach of “Imagined Geography”, we want to reemphasise that the cultivated soil for terrorism is also partly a consequence of policies of cultural hegemony.

4. Conclusion

We view terrorism as several couplets of tensions so that we can comprehend better its complexity beyond the mere dimension between terrorism and counter-terrorism. The ETIM issue is a typical example of confused nationalism and separatism, of mixed concern for stability, regional security and global peace. The spatial expressions of terrorism in the sense of geopolitics are not limited to be material; moreover no terrorism is static for our time-lapse perception. We also need to reiterate that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, while ideological prejudice or imaginative prognosis about the existence of terrorism may lead us to a pre-emptive designation of terrorist groups. The two big players U.S. and China, situated in a mutually dependent relationship, instead of returning to a worldwide climate of a new Cold War, should learn to rebuild mutual trust in the face of global terrorist threats.

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34 The quote is cited from an interview with the activist American artist Andy Deck in May 2004.

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Ethno-Nationalism and the Construction of Hindu Identity

Tobias Scheu

Abstract

The violence of Hindu extremism in modern India has increased in the last years. The right-wing Hindutva movement wants to create an Indian state, which consists only of a homogenous hinduistic society and culture. The article examines how the mobilisation of people and the rising of the Hindutva movement could be explained by historical considerations and thus post-colonial identification processes within Indian culture and society. In order to explain this, the organisational structure and the contents of the movement will be examined and connected to the cultural and historical discourse in modern day India. By doing so there will be a relationship established between identification processes in spatial and societal discourse.

1. Introduction

India, with a population of 1.028.737.436 (India 2013) at present, is one of the largest democracies in the world. It consists of different languages, ethnic groups and religious factions. Due to the fact that there are many different religious groups, India is mostly known for the religious group of Hindus and thus could be called as the land of Hinduism. But only few people know that India has the second largest Muslim population (after Indonesia) in the world (Reetz 2007). Despite this enormous population, Muslims in India are a religious minority (see table 1).

Looking at the development in India over the last 30 years, a rising of national chauvinism against Muslim people can be observed. This national chauvinism was started by the Hindu right-wing nationalist movement (Hindutva), which has the aim to create “a Hindu state in which minorities must assimilate to the majority culture and language, revere the Hindu religion, and glorify Hindu race and culture” (Marshall 2008: 119). This movement also leads to violent actions against Muslims places of worship, recent example was the demolition of the the Babri-mosque in Ayodhoa.

Due to the fact that Hindu people represent the majority of religious people in India, one must ask how this violence and the rising of the Hindutva movement can be explained. It seems unlikely that they want to gain special religious rights by attacking Muslim people. Instead, it seems that the movement is rooted in contexts of the post-colonial othering and identity processes against the Muslims and thus violence could be seen as a way of creating a common Indian identity through emphasising the expression of a common ‘Hindu nation’. In this article I want to present some aspects how the Hindutva movement uses an identity concept, which merges spatial and territorial identities to mobilise people by creating the vision of a common Hindu nation (Hindu Rashtra).

2. Theoretical Considerations

Identity could be defined as a social concept, which describes the feelings of an individual towards its own role within a society and thus, this identity is learned by the socialisation within a specific group and culture (Hilman 2007: 355). In this sense it can be argued that in the process of socialisation and self-identification there are processes of classifications towards other people, to segregate oneself by distributing them in groups. But this segregation is influenced by the social status of a person and thus varies between cultures and peoples around the world. In this way every categorisation of people in groups (e. g. castes) could be understood in terms of social ascription by peoples and groups. In conclusion, identity (i. e. religious identity) is less an objective concept to categorise and describe people, it is much more a social construction (Reuber 2012: 45). Identity is always a fluid concept embedded in social contexts and spaces.

Space and territory identification processes also go along with the attributed social differences of groups (e. g. religion, culture, sex) and therefore groups identify themselves both, with space and a special ascription of social difference to these spaces. This means, space also borders between groups. Space is an areal representation of the socially ‘ascribed’ differences between groups and therefore space has specially characteristics (Reuber 2012: 45). These characteristics are connected with the group ascriptions, like Muslim people or Hindu people.

With spatial representation there is also a space-oriented identification and development of a ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006) by each group with relation to space. So due to the imagination of special spatial differences ascribed to groups, the rise of the feeling of a common identity starts, and this imagination leads to a hegemonic concept that influences the social practices and social institutions (e. g. social systems) (Reuber 2012:49) and also the material culture (e. g. the meaning of symbols) of a society. Hence, the process of self-identification merges with the ‘ascribed’ spatial differences. In the case of religious conflicts spatial identification is also merged with religious practices and therefore also with national and ethnic identities (Rinschede 1999: 108).

It must be added, that “identities are always formed in relation to others and that a constitutive link exists between identity and recognition” (Bhargava 2003: 12). Therefore, identity influences how people see their environment and shapes their interactions with other people. In this way identification processes by the Hindutva must consist of territorial concepts and also cultural (religious) practices to help people identify themselves with the Hindutva movement and potentially change their minds to attack Muslim people. To establish such change of mind, one must ask how the Hindutva movement executed this influence over the Indian people and how it connects to Indian discourse about identity, culture and present debate.

3. Influences on the Hindutva movement

3. 1 The Hindu-Identity?

Until India's independence in 1947, achieved through the struggles of prominent activists like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, India was a colony of the British crown. The Indian people were administrated by British officers and bureaucrats. With the aim to administrate the Indian people, they had to measure how many people lived in India and to find a way to describe the people. In this context the term "Hindu" and also "caste" was first established by the British colonial power to describe and categorise the people who lived on the Indian subcontinent. With the establishment of the description of the people as "Hindu", an 'imagined community' (Benedict Anderson) was created. Afterwards, this categorisation ascribed group belongings were internalised by the Indian population. This internalising then, lead to the establishment of 'real' social differences. This eventually resulted in group identities, which differentiated people against other people within a spatial context (Wolf and Schultens 2009: 165).

The categorisation of the Indian people into a Hindu majority and a Muslim minority is therefore a result of the British colonial project (Oza 2007: 155). After the British had left and India had become independent, the groups gained strong self-identification around their ascribed identities (e. g. religion, caste). In this sense, the Hindutva movement carried on the British description process. This meant, instead of a common British enemy, that the Hindutva movement reinterpreted the historical context in a new way. Foreign religions became the new enemy, which had to be destroyed. This leads to a cultural identification with a homogenous religious culture.

3. 2 Cultural Influences

The Hindutva movement was also influenced by the historical concept of the two Indian nations, which consists of the question what India truly defines. These definitions orbit the question whether 'India' is based on a territorial concept or if "India" is more of a cultural concept (Wolf/Schultens 2009: 166). This would have huge implications in reference to cultural and spatial identification processes within and between groups. This debate around the cultural or territorial concept of India also leads to an enhancement of the religious group identity. The groups of Muslim and Hindu people identify themselves mostly within a cultural concept. The tensions between these groups also lead to the post-colonial separation of the Indian state in the "Islamic Republic of India" (Pakistan) and the "Hindu-State India" (Rinschede 1999: 108; Hörig 1999: 126). With the establishment of the two states, also the religious groups moved into the particular state of their religion. However, it could be noticed that a lot of Muslim people stayed in India (Reetz 2007) and don't moved to Pakistan. Even today, this strong religious separation is observable in India and Pakistan (s. tables 1 and 2).

The Hindutva movement connects to cultural and spatial separation, when it proclaims the Muslim minority as an inner enemy. Due to this historical discourse, the Hindu-state India should only consist of Hindu people. Consequently, there is a historical ideal of a homogenous Indian state with one single culture.

This spatial separation and cultural differentiation between the religious groups within India was further supported by western Orientalists, which sought to explore the “deeper India” and therefore differences between the cultures. This ascription in Western culture, lead Indians to ask what differentiates India from other nations and cultures. This question about the “true” India, its history and its culture, lasts till today. Hence, it could be argued that this search of the true India lasted up till today and that the Hindutva movement used this search in its own way. This is organised by emphasising the Hindu culture and Hindu society as the cultural foundation of India. With this cultural concept, which is also embedded within a spatial context, the Hindutva movement is therefore a kind of identity framework for the upper classes of India, which may possibly loosen the power in the context of globalisation and the weakening of national identities and could therefore deny the modernisation of the Indian societal system (Bhargava 11f.).

The Hindutva movement is further successful, because it falls back on the Indian traditions, which are rooted back in the ancient Indian times and shaped Indian society since then (Mahlhotra 1990: 174). These traditions – traditional pluralisms, holism, and a hierarchic social system order (Mahlhotra 1990: 175ff.), play crucial roles within the Indian identity framework. Because on one side they offer an identity framework to conservative people and on the other side, they emphasise Hinduisim as a tolerant religion, which respects individual religious practices. Therefore, Hinduism shouldn't be called an organised religion (e. g. Islam). In this way the Hindutva movement uses this traditional religious insecurity of a non-organised religion to nowadays create something like an organised Hinduisim with a ‘true’ interpretation, which has central gods and a common culture. Further it could be argued that the insecurity of Hinduism also leaves place for multiple possibilities of religious interpretations. So the Hindutva movement gives a framework and orientation within the different religious groups and practices by proclaiming what makes a Hindu a ‘right’ Hindu.

3. 3 Institutional Influences

Despite these historical and cultural influences and discourses, which enable the Hindutva movement to mobilise people by group identification on religious grounds, the conception of different religious groups is also influenced by the Indian constitution.

The Indian constitution defines India as a secular religious state, which guarantees “*all persons (...) equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion*” (India 2008: 13). This secularism also serves as a foundation for the Hindutva movement to act as an religious movement against other religious groups (e. g. Muslims) since the constitution construes the term ‘Hindu’ “as including reference to persons

professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly” (India 2008: 13). That means, the term Hindu is used here in an historical and cultural way, by connecting the religious practices of Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist with their territorial origin in India. Other religions (e. g. Christians or Muslims) therefore cannot be ‘real’ Hindus and therefore the people who lived on the Indian subcontinent are culturally those who belong to Hinduism. In this way it is construed by the Indian constitution. This framework of differentiation between religious groups, especially others (e.g. Muslims) and Hindus is a clear proposition of the othering process.

This framework of emphasising religious and cultural practices also supports the differentiation between “them” (Muslim) and “us” (Hindu). This also happens to some extent in Indian legislation. Since the state is secular and wants to support cultural diversity within, the Indian state also allowed some religious (Muslim) communities to use their own Islamic family law (Hörig 1999: 128). This legislation in favour of minorities is therefore seen by traditionalist groups as a threat to the majority, hence secularism is in this case used to favour minorities (Bhargava 2003: 16). This legislation and the special status of such groups within the Indian identity context, also creates insecurities among the Indian population. It is unlikely that such legislation did not influence the rise of the Hindutva movement by giving the minority special rights, which also stresses the othering process between the groups and hence supports the identity building processes within the groups.

To sum it up, there are a lot of historical and cultural factors that influenced the rising of the Hindutva movement, but the most influences that lead to the rise of the Hindutva movement can be traced back to the post-colonial history of India. The mentioned discourses mostly influence thoughts and actions of individuals, but to explain how the Hindutva movement rises and gains attention we must also look which contents are proclaimed by the movement and how it is organised to enforce its ideology within the Indian population. The next chapter will analyse these questions by looking at some theoretical considerations about the mobilisation of people and how the Hindutva movement reached its goal with its organisational structure and content.

4. What is Hindutva and how does it work?

4.1 Theoretical considerations

To explain how the Hindutva movement uses identification processes to mobilise people, it must first be considered that the role of religion in this context should be seen as an important factor of mobilising people (Hasenclever/Don Juan 2007: 10f.). Especially in India “religion is [...] constitutive of society and the traditional vision of life is holistic” (Madan 1989:116). This mobilisation process is used by the Hindutva movement through a reinterpretation and the creation of a common Indian identity. Hindutva must therefore be seen as some kind of political religion, which is primarily instrumentalised by religious groups and people within a social system (Bötticher/Meres 2012: 24) to gain power.

That means religion as an explanation variable of Hindu extremism is important to reflect the role of religion for establishing the social system of India and the shaping of power relations between the groups within the caste system (for example Dumont 1976). The rise of the Hindutva movement and their clashes with other religious groups, is not only to religious topics, also territorial, political, and ethnical elements play a crucial role in religious conflicts (Rinschede 1999: 126) within the Indian nation. Due to the fact that through globalisation religious identities are put under pressure by reshaping religious meanings and also religious authority (Hefner 1998), anti-modern movements gain power. It must be noted, that the Hindutva movement itself is located within the discourse of minority rights. The conservative members of the movements are afraid of losing their privileges as Hindus (Mahlhotra 1990: 181). Therefore, the movement wants to re-establish the privileges by emphasising the importance of a 'real Hindu culture' to maintain the traditional way of Hindu life (with castes) and create a common culture.

4.2 Contents of Hindutva and societal implications

The thematic contents of the movement are rooted in the Hindutva manifest of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, who wrote about Hindutva as a concept, to create a homogenous society of Hindus (Hindu Sanghatan), with a powerful Hindu state which is dominated by Hindu culture (Hindu Rasthra) (Wolf 2008: 27). This concept merges territorial space identification with cultural societal concept that consists of a homogenous society. This combination also includes some othering process against different religious groups, which are not Hindu. For Savarkar, Hindu is not just a religious practice, it is also a concept of belief, which refers to a spatial identification with India. 'Real' "Hindu are persons who regard this land from the Indus to the sea as their fatherland as well as their holy land" (Bhargava 2003:12). Following this statement from Savarkar, religions other than the "classical Indian ones" are not real Hindu religions. People, who live in the spatial place of India, may practice these religions, but following Savarkar, they aren't Indians, because they don't believe in India as their holy land. Therefore the othering process is much more supported by this belief. By this definition the Hindutva movement gains additional ideological power, which favours only the majority of Indian people. But this belief and view also simplify the religious distribution in India, because most of the Indian Muslims and Christians are converted from lower Hinduism castes (e. g. Dalits, Adivasi) to reach a better social position (Hörig 1999: 126). Since they have their home in spatial India, these people aren't included in Savarkars ideology. They lost their status as Indians, because they have a different belief than the Hindu religion.

Following this argument, the framework of a common identity is created by a common spatial territory and a common belief in the same religious practices. Therefore, this conceptualisation offers an identity framework for conservative people, who are feared of losing the (religious) identity through the social modernisation of India.

The Hindutva movement is therefore best described as an ethno-nationalist movement that defines ethnic groups by a religious spatial ascription. It is further a cultural movement, which wants to create an identification framework for Indians by emphasizing and glorifying the Hindu culture of the past by three main pillars: A common nation (Rashtra), a common race (Jati) and a common civilisation (Sanskrit) (Wolf 2008: 27f.). Additionally, it denies the cultural heritage of the Muslim rulers to the Indian culture in arts and architecture (Ratan 1998: 207). In this position the denial of the Muslim culture today is also assigned to the history and henceforth the Indian history is also reinterpreted in the context of alienation against Muslim groups.

Following Hasenclever and Don Juan (2007: 13), the effectiveness to mobilise people depends on the contextual interpretation and the institutionalisation of these contextual religious interpretations: If a specific interpretation of religion or history becomes an institutionalised ‘moment’ in society (e. g. culture, political parties, television) it influences the discourse about a topic and hence it influences the identity building process of a person and thereby the perception of their own environment. Within long-standing conflicts between groups (e. g. Muslims vs. Hindus) radical religious messages get a basis to be institutionalised within social institutions (e.g. political parties) and lead to violence actions against other groups (Hasenclever and Don Juan 2007: 14).

By emphasising the spatial and ethno-religious separation between different groups, by claiming that only Hindus have the rights to be part of the Indian nation and society, the Hindutva movement also creates an imagination of an India, that doesn’t consist of Muslim people. As a result all Muslim symbols, which are connected with an active Muslim presence (Oza 2007: 154) must be destroyed in public space. By destroying the Babri-Mosque in Ayodha, which was proclaimed by the Hindutva-movement to be the birthplace of the Hindu-god Ram the Hindutva movement reinterpreted the public space. This action has been a turning point of religious conflicts in India, as it symbolised to the Indian people a re-establishment of a common Hindu religion and culture (Wolf 2008:30), which doesn’t just exist in mind but also materialises in manifest culture.

This re-establishment of a Hindu-culture is supported by the organisational structure of the Hindutva movement. The main components of the movement could be summarised under the term of Sangh Parivar (family), which consists of the **RSS** (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), the **VHP** (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and the **BJP** (Bharatiya Janata Party) (Wolf 2008: 28ff) and together they form a nationwide cultural and political network (Bhargava 2003: 11). By using all societal potential and options, the implementations of the Hindutva manifest happens through the usage of “memory, emotion, prejudice, religious difference, and the generalized deprivation to advance their extremist agenda. They are inventing a new anti-Muslim Hinduism” (Bhargava 2003: 14), which is implemented in society by the network of different organisations, within the Sang Parivar to establish the cultural and identification framework for Hindutva (s. Wolf 2008: 28f.):

- The **RSS** was established in 1925 and is a voluntary union with the aim to establish the Hindu national state by focusing on the Hinduistic conception of a societal system and therefore the denying of the democratic system as not suitable for a Hinduistic state.
- The **VHP** is a common organisation that unites the different Hindu groups over the world under one umbrella group. In this group the Sangh Parivar gains influence to the different groups and can change its ideological. It emphasised a pan-Indian Hinduism, which consists of common rituals, feasts and gods and therefore it also emphasised the peaceful character of Hinduism in strong opposition to the violent history of the Muslims rulers. But it also emphasised the inherently violent character of Hinduistic gods (Ratan 1998: 205) to legitimise the use of violence.
- The **BJP** is the political party that wants to implement the framework of Hindutva in political concepts and legislations.

Obviously the social movement Hindutva did not only use the political system in order to create a Hindu state, but also utilised other sources outside the classical political fields to gain power. The Hindutva movement is therefore a modern movement, which uses activities within a societal network (Wolf 2008: 29) to implement ideological ideas within society and thus creates a framework for identity processes by differentiating between different religious groups. Further the different organisations cover the whole Indian society with all cultural and societal aspects. Therefore, the movement reaches almost the whole population of India with its ideology.

5. Final remarks - Hindutva as a Threat to Indian society?

Hindu-nationalism uses the historical Indian discourses to reinterpret Indian history and uses these to create a new common identity framework, which denies the existence of Muslim culture and other religious groups. This framework emphasises some kind of ethno-nationalism within the Indian society, which is used to mobilise “the masses on ethno-religious grounds – through stigmatization and emulation” (Bhargava 2003: 12) on historical terms and cultural discourses, which could be backtracked to India’s colonial times. In this period the term Hindu was used by the colonists to describe the population and therefore group identity processes on this classification were established over history. In this process the differentiation in India between Muslim and Hindu people got stronger and it further led to the rise of the right-wing Hindutva movement.

This movement concentrates on the emphasis on religious difference and uses them to establish a framework based on cultural and spatial factors to create a common Hindu nation by declaring the Muslim population as an inner enemy. Despite the movement spread in all of India, the people critically view it, as it is “becoming concerned about the strategies being employed to propagate the movement’s message – in particular the use of violence” (Ratan

1998: 214). In this sense the movement will be challenged in future judged by their members. The marginalisation and alienation of Muslim groups work within the context of Muslim groups as enemies by identification through the Hindutva movement. Since the attacks of 9/11 the global perception of militant religious extremism by Muslims increased. This fact fits perfectly in the Hindutva framework of Muslims as enemies. They are not envisioned as enemies anymore, but pose as a real threat to the Indian society and nation through their attacks. But this insecurity between imagined enemy and real enemy “suits their purposes [of the Hindutva movement] perfectly, and this is precisely what Indian politics and society now presents to them” (Bhargava 2003: 17). This insecurity is a chance to gain peace at the societal fault lines between these religious groups.

Table 1: Religious Groups in India 2001 (absolute and percent)

	Number	%
Hindu	827.578.868	80,5
Muslim	138.188.240	13,4
Christian	24.080.016	2,3
Sikh	19.215.730	1,9
Buddhist	7.955.207	0,8
Jain	4.225.053	0,4
Other Religious Communities	6.639.626	0,6
Total	1.028.610.328	100,0

Source: Census 2001:
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/religion.aspx (accessed 22.7.2013)

Table 2: Religious Groups in Pakistan 2013 (percent)

Religious Groups in Pakistan 2013		
	Number	%
Muslim	n. a.	96,28
Christian	n. a.	1,59
Hindu (Jati)	n. a.	1,6
Qadiani (Ahmadi)	n. a.	0,22
Scheduled Castes	n. a.	0,25
Others	n. a.	0,07

n. a. = non available
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics:
<http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/population-religion> (accessed 22.7.2013)

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Analysis of the Main Actors and Dimensions of the Northern Ireland Conflict

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Abstract

The conflict in Northern Ireland was one of the most crucial ethno-social conflicts with religious background and is still a critical issue in the British society. Main events as the Bloody Sunday or the Good Friday Agreement influenced the process of “the Troubles” and caused multi-dimensional impacts. It is also important to consider personalities, such as Margaret Thatcher or Bishop Patrick Buckley, in order to understand specific developments in the conflict process. Especially the role of the church and state institutions is significant for the understanding of the conflict roots.

1. Introduction and methodology

The Irish island is divided into two different parts. The first, southern Ireland, which is also called the Republic of Ireland is independent and mainly consists of Roman Catholics. Contrary to this, the northern region namely Northern Ireland belongs to the United Kingdom, with a majority of Protestants (see figure 1). Out bounding from this situation, the conflict in Northern Ireland is based on the differences between the two majority groups on the Irish island. The Nationalists (Republicans) are mainly Catholics and understand the whole island of Ireland as a natural entity which should be independent. In comparison to this, Unionists (Loyalists), who are mostly Protestants, want to remain part of the United Kingdom (Otto 2010: 9ff.).




Fig. 1: Religion in Northern Ireland, 2011

Source: Own chart based on Devenport 2012

A significant phase of the conflict in Northern Ireland was the time between the civil rights march on 5 October 1968 in London Derry and the assignment of the Good Friday Agreement

(Belfast Agreement) on 10 April 1998. This period was the peak during the conflict, which is known as “The Troubles” and characterized by many violent actions, such as terrorist attacks and oppressive governmental interventions. This strife caused about 3.600 fatalities and 50.000 injured victims and still is present in the consciousness of Northern Ireland (BBC 2013a).

Reviewing the scientific debates on the Troubles there are currently two main directions which refer to the roots of the conflict. One direction states that the reason for the conflict is based on socio-economic problems. The other direction asserts that the different fundamental convictions of the Catholics and Protestants are the main factor for the conflict (Kienzle 2003: 7). In order to focus on this scientific debate it is important to analyse the impact of the church and the state, which are the two major actors. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse the religious and governmental dimension of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

In order to illustrate the meaning of the selected events and to define their general influence, the paper develops a detailed characterisation of their multi-dimensional impacts.

This paper describes first the three events of the Northern Ireland Conflict - *Bloody Sunday*, *Good Friday Agreement* and *The Republican Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison*. On this foundation, the two main actors, state and church, will be investigated more closely and linked to important persons and the three case studies. The following chapter deals with the analysis of the political, emotional, religious, peaceful and violent impacts of the three main events. Finally the outlook will show that the Northern Ireland conflict is still a present issue.

The main method in this paper is a secondary and hermeneutical analysis of literature in order to receive consolidated background information with the focus on historical events and important figures. Especially for the whole understanding of the conflict, it is significant to concentrate on the historical context. Referring to the importance of the main events, the aim is to identify their impacts on the society and policy. The method therefore is to form logical categories which are strongly connected to the impacts of the main events.

2. Analysis of the main conflict events and actors

This chapter deals with the role of the main events and figures of the church and the state. The first part is an overview of main events and figures that are chosen by their importance. Through the entire literature analysis, the events Bloody Sunday, Good Friday Agreement and the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison were significantly present and therefore these events can be seen as relevant for the whole conflict. Analogous to this, the main actors for the church namely Bishop Patrick Buckley, Father Patrick Ryan, Kenny McClinton and for the state, Margaret Thatcher, John Hume and Tony Blair were identified as denotative. Finally, the main events and characters will be analysed concerning their influence on the Northern Ireland conflict.

2.1 Main events in the development of the conflict

The Bloody Sunday

The so-called Bloody Sunday was one of the most important events in the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict. On Sunday, 30 January 1972, an organised illegal demonstration by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association took place in Derry. The parade sought to protest against the ban on all marches of 9 August 1971 (Wichert 1994: 201).

In the course of this parade, it was ambushed and demonstrators were attacked with stones. As the situation began to get out of control, soldiers of the first Parachute Regiment were instructed to arrest most of the demonstrators. At the intervention of the Paratroopers, thirteen people were killed and the same number injured. One of the injured died a few months later. The British Army defended this human loss as self-defence of the paratroopers, while most of the people, which were present on that day, saw it as murder (BBC History 2013b). This was mainly the case, because the injured and people killed were attacked from behind (Otto 2010: 101). Lord Widgery, Chief Justice of Great Britain issued a report documenting, that the Army behaved correctly at all times of the intervention. Later, Prime Minister Tony Blair allowed a public inquiry, which determined twelve years later the innocence of the victims and thus the guilt of the army. The next Prime Minister, David Cameron, strongly criticised the happenings of the Bloody Sunday and the role of the military (BBC History 2013b).

The Good Friday Agreement

The Good Friday Agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland on 10 April 1998 is one of the most important agreements during the conflicts in Northern Ireland. This agreement implements consent between all parties and aims at stopping the violence of the Troubles period. The Agreement contains a number of regulations with the aim of demilitarising Northern Ireland and boosting its self-determination. Furthermore, the Republic of Ireland abdicates the reintegration of Northern Ireland with its “six counties” and all people in Northern Ireland have the right of upholding dual citizenship of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Regardless of the smaller violent incidents between the parties after the agreement, the Good Friday Agreement was essential for the whole peace process in the Northern Ireland conflict (Wolff 2003: 14ff.).

The Republican Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison

During the Troubles, large parts of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) were kept in British prison. These prisoners were treated like usual criminals, but they demanded to be seen as prisoners of war. The first hunger strike in 1980 was connected to certain allowances referring to their status in prison. Exclusive rights, such as communicating with other prisoners or refusing the prison work were finally permitted by the British government and led to the end of the first hunger strike. Later they

decided to start a second hunger strike in 1981 as the prisoners still had to wear prison clothes which still marked them as usual criminals. On October 1981 the second hunger strike ended after the death of ten members of the IRA and INLA. The reason for the ending was the stepwise acceptance of the British government of all claims, including the permission to wear civil clothes in prison. The hunger strikes are also associated with the expression “H-Block”, which was the cellblock of the striking prisoners (BBC History 2013c).

2.2 The role of the church

This chapter analyses the church as an important actor in the Northern Ireland conflict. The first part focuses on the three main characters Bishop Patrick Buckley, Father Patrick Ryan and Kenny McClinton and outlines their role in the conflict. The second part focuses on the role of the church referring to the main events described above.

2.2.1 Main church figures

Bishop Patrick Buckley

Patrick Buckley (born 1952) is one of the most controversial clerics who was in constant conflict with other members of the Roman Catholic church. He is a former priest of the Catholic church in Ireland who was excommunicated, due to his bishop ordination to an independent church. Bishop Buckley is often called Maverick because of his unusual and liberal thinking towards celibacy and mixed marriages. Beside this he often criticized the role of the Church during the Troubles. Referring to Buckley, the church often regarded the violence on the streets as a “cruel business” but at the same time they were very contained. Buckley was one of the few clerics in Northern Ireland which had the courage to be active in order to stop the violence. The active role of Bishop Buckley leads to several violent attacks against him. Buckley’s criticism is not just about his own church but also against all churches in Northern Ireland. He believed that the churches are cynical, manipulative, preoccupied with power and controlling their respective communities. The role of Bishop Patrick Buckley during the Troubles shows the modern, liberal and active side of the church, trying to solve the conflict through cleric authority (Dillon 1998: 136ff.).

Father Patrick Ryan

Regarding the Troubles, the catholic priest Patrick Ryan (born 1930) was a Christian missionary and on the other hand he was one of the main financial supporters of the IRA. Father Ryan travelled throughout Europe and collected money for the IRA to provide arms and explosives. This way, Patrick Ryan became one of the leading figures of the Provisional IRA. Furthermore, he was obliquely involved in many IRA bombings, such as the Hyde Park bombing on two Horse Guards in 1982. Therefore in the media he was often named as the

“bombing priest”. Father Ryan was operating through an international terrorist system with a network of secret bank accounts in order to find new financial supply lines for the IRA. Since Scotland Yard realised his important role, Father Ryan sought refuge in alternating places all around Europe. He was arrested and released several times in different countries and finally he was convicted in 1993 in Ireland’s Special Criminal Court. The case of Father Patrick Ryan shows that even religious figures can play a key role in terrorism (Davies 1988 and Clutterbuck 1992: 67ff.).

Kenny McClinton

Kenny McClinton (born 1947) is a protestant pastor and former member of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Due to his military background, he was an active member of the Ulster Freedom Fighters elite squad and was involved in many terrorist attacks. One of his most famous attacks during the Troubles in 1977 was the assassination of Harry Bradshaw, a Protestant bus driver. McClinton had thought that Bradshaw was a Catholic. The whole UDA felt sorry about this terrible mistake and a letter with money was sent to Bradshaw’s the widow. On 27 August 1977 MacClinton was convicted of two killings (including the Bradshaw case) and finally sent to the Maze Prison. During his imprisonment McClinton converted to Baptism and becoming a “born-again Christian”. He was released from prison in 1993 and became a Baptist pastor in Texas where he preached a fundamentalist Protestantism. The case of Kenny McClinton shows, that not only catholic but also some of the Protestant clerics were involved in terrorist attacks during the Troubles (Dillon 1998: 23ff.).

2.2.2 The position of churches in the framework of the main events

The Good Friday Agreement

The Protestant and the Catholic churches welcomed the Good Friday Agreement and for them it was an important step towards peace between Catholics and Protestants. The most important regulation for the church in the Good Friday Agreement was that the government would become “post sectarian” in order to build up a more secular system. This regulation was seen as a part of the peace process by keeping the religion out of political issues. The religious dimension in political debates between Catholics and Protestants was often seen as an obstacle for a peaceful solution. The problem with secularisation of politics was that the Northern Irish community and all parts of social life were closely linked to their faith. The place of birth, schools, sport teams and the district in which people live are strongly linked to religion and church (McVeigh and Rolston 2007: 16ff.). On the one hand, the regulation of the Good Friday Agreement would imply that the churches would lose political and social influence and thereby also power. On the other hand, there would be a lack in people’s daily life, causing a vacuum. One good indicator to evaluate the process of the regulation is the school system of Northern Ireland which is mainly controlled by the churches and the

government. The only schools that had been secularised were the state schools. Besides, in the year 2000 only four per cent of the pupils went to so-called integrated or mixed schools which also shows the limited influence of the regulation (Kienzle 2003: 6ff.). The idea of constructing a “post-sectarian” system in Northern Ireland was well-intentioned. The difficulty is that the religious roots and the relation between church, state and community is still an important factor for the whole consciousness of Northern Ireland people.

The Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison

The hunger strike in Maze prison led to the death of several persons. This fact caused civil commotions, especially the families of the dead hunger strikers were angry about the official definition of “suicide by starvation”, attributed by the government. From the families’ and paramilitaries’ perspective, the ten deaths were considered as murder committed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher or as killings caused by British intransigence. Focusing on the philosophical point of view the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison can be seen from two perspectives. The humanist thesis describes the case of a hunger strike as a right of self-determination one’s own life. From the humanist perspective the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison can be seen as rational choices by the prisoners to commit suicide in order to express their political motives. The religious perspective, in contrast, considers suicide as an evil act. Life is seen more as a gift from God and therefore only God has the right to decide over life and death. In general, from the Christian standpoint the intended suicide through starvation is unmoral and unacceptable. The problematic situation of the Hunger Strike in the Maze prison is that the aim of the prisoners was not primarily to commit suicide but they just wanted to put the British government under pressure for the sake of their community. Furthermore, the religious dimension of the Northern Ireland conflict also had an influence on the perspective of the church referring to the hunger strikes. The Catholic church knew about the beneficial political effect of the hunger strikes on the British government. The hunger strikes were politically exploited from the Catholics and they are still a symbolic act for many in Northern Ireland. Considering this political sensitivity of the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison, there was never a justification from the religious perspective given by the Catholic church (O’Keeffe 2011: 349ff.).

The Bloody Sunday

It is a very impressive and famous picture of Father Edward Daly waving a bloodstained piece of cloth, while escorting a group with a wounded demonstrator through the batch. But it was more than just this action of Father Edward Daly: For the Catholic Church, the Bloody Sunday has a symbolic character, because it shows the evil brutality of British politics. Later on, the event was often metaphorically used by the church and the Northern Ireland civilian rights organisations to describe the violent political attitude of the British government. The more obvious behaviour of the Catholic and the Protestant churches was to disavow and

disidentify with the violent side of the Bloody Sunday event. Through this fact, there is not much information about the role of the church referring to the Bloody Sunday. But current movements show that the Protestant and Catholic churches have begun a peaceful dialogue in order to cope with the conflicts of the past (Conway 2010: 4).

2.3 The role of the government

Besides the churches, the British government played a decisive role in the Northern Ireland Conflict. Firstly, we will analyse the main governmental figures (Margaret Thatcher, John Hume and Tony Blair), who have influenced the conflict and then explore the government's attitude and role in the three decisive events (Bloody Sunday, the Good Friday Agreement and the Hunger Strike) in the Northern Ireland Conflict.

2.3.1 Main government figures

Margaret Thatcher

When the new conservative government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was elected in 1979 its plan adopted a particularly harsh policy course against terrorism and separatism in Northern Ireland (Otto 2010: 113). Especially in times of the big hunger strike, Margaret Thatcher was adamant, leading to the death of the prisoner Bobby Sands in 1981 after 66 days without food. Thatcher's strict attitude was highly controversial and after the funeral, which was attended by more than 100.000 people, many riots occurred (Wolfrum, Arendes 2007: 193).

On 12 October 1984 the IRA committed an attack on Mrs Thatcher. Members of the paramilitary organisation detonated a bomb in the Grand Hotel in Brighton, where the conservatives held their yearly party convention. This bomb attack caused five casualties. The IRA assumed responsibility and only regretted that they missed their primary target: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Mrs Thatcher seemed not to be intimidated continuing to meet with Garret FitzGerald only one month later. On 15 November 1985 they both signed the Anglo-Irish-Agreement in Hillsborough. This included the investiture of a permanent conference of both governments, guided by the British Northern Ireland minister and the Irish foreign minister. This Agreement constituted a schedule for the way to Northern Irish self-administration (Otto 2010: 119f).

John Hume

John Hume, cofounder of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and later also its chairman, for the time played a role in the Northern Ireland Conflict in 1972 when he tried to make contact between the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), which wanted to call for armed truce, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). At that time, PIRA also

wanted to declare armed truce but William Whitelaw, the Northern Ireland minister, didn't want to negotiate with terrorists (Otto 2010: 105).

In 1993, John Hume and Gerry Adams, the president of the Irish-Republican party Sinn Féin, met on excitation of representatives of the Catholic Church several times for talks about the ending of Sinn Féin's political isolation. Both politicians stressed their will to end the conflict and made clear that an agreement only had a chance if all parties on the island accepted it. On 24 April they declared in the so-called Hume-Adams Document that the IRA was ready to give up the armed fight if the British government conceded the right of self-determination. Later, on 16 September, the Prime Minister John Major welcomed John Hume in his official seat Downing Street No. 10 where they formulated the *Downing Street Declaration*, a common peace declaration, binding both the Republicans and the Unionists (Allendörfer, Haase 2004: 109f).

In 1998 the Danish member of the European Parliament, Jens-Peter Bonde, proposed John Hume and David Trimble for the Nobel Peace Prize. In his commemorative speech, the chairman of the Nobel Prize Committee appreciated the efforts of Hume and Trimble for a peaceful solution of the national, religious and social conflict in Ireland. He said that Hume was the one, who always worked most clearly and most emphatically for a peaceful termination among all political leaders. His principles were based on the Good-Friday-Agreement of 1998 (Allendörfer, Haase 2004: 126f).

Tony Blair

For Tony Blair the Northern Ireland conflict wasn't a central or even a personal concern but rather one of many major challenges (Knoll 2002: 132). Tony Blair was the first, who took the negotiations about peace in Northern Ireland one step further. He brought the Irish-Republican Party *Sinn Féin*, known as the political extremist arm of the IRA, to the negotiation table in order to convince them of the necessity of non-violence. He offered the immediate involvement of Sinn Féin into the talks which came along with an armed truce of the IRA (Otto 2010: 132f).

Tony Blair himself called the conflict in Northern Ireland senselessly, complicated and direful time-consuming. Blair's assignment in Northern Ireland was relatively altruistic, as the conflict dominated politics there, but had turned unimportant in British politics. This means that he could have lost, but would not much in the case of success (Blair 2010: 161ff). During further peace talks Tony Blair used a feint to gain time for the election of the Northern Ireland minister: He suspended the Northern Irish autonomy for one day and thereby got another six weeks to fulfil the code of procedure (Otto 2010: 138f). Thus, Tony Blair was significantly involved in the peace negotiations and played a major role in resolving the Northern Ireland conflict.

2.3.2 The government positions in the framework of the main events

The Bloody Sunday

The violence that happened during the Bloody Sunday is always reported differently. In the English media, the violence against the state dominates the narrative. Violence executed by governmental groups in Northern Ireland was always denied or the responsibility was given to the other side. Assassinations, like the ones committed on Bloody Sunday were linguistically trivialized. Torture was often reinterpreted as *physical maltreatment*, disguising its cruelty (Beermann 2004: 70).

As already described above, on 30 of January 1972, 14 Catholics were killed by the British Army. The Commander of the land forces in Northern Ireland, major general Robert Ford wanted to teach those - as he said – *hooligans* a lesson. He delegated, that the paratroopers were set at the end of the demonstration march in order to demonstrate that the British government was the primary target of the violence on Bloody Sunday (Otto 2010: 101). An investigation followed which found the British military not guilty and blamed agent provocateurs blameworthy for the 14 casualties (Moltmann 2008: 261). Only 38 years later, in 2010, the families of the victims received an apology from the current Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron. He admitted that the government was responsible for the violent behaviour of the military. The reason for this excuse was the so-called Saville Inquiry which was the longest and costliest investigation in British history. The report is based on 2500 witness accounts and took twelve years. The Saville Inquiry declares that the 14 victims were totally innocent whereas the soldiers were completely guilty. Few of them lost their self-control and acted without legal cause and in an unjustifiable way (Scarff 2010). After the occurrences in 1972 the British and the Irish government declared in the *Sunningdale Agreement* a tighter cooperation (Beck 2006: 405).

The Good Friday Agreement

The Good Friday Agreement emerged from peace talks between the government of Great Britain, the government of the Republic Ireland and the political parties in Northern Ireland, so it can be said that the state was definitively involved. Tony Blair brought the Irish-Republican party *Sinn Féin* into the negotiations to convince them of the necessity to stop violence. The talks started halting and this is why the US-Senator George Mitchell, who chaired these conversations, declared that all parties had to agree on one document on Thursday before Easter in 1998. Under this time pressure he wanted to raise the awareness of all involved parties that a give-and-take was necessary to be successful. Finally, in the early morning of 10 April 1998, Mitchell submitted a proposal, which was signed on the same day (Otto 2010: 132ff).

The Good Friday Agreement contains three major sections: It regulates the decentralised government in Northern Ireland and it defines the relationship between the Republic Ireland

and Northern Ireland as well as between Great Britain and Ireland. Thereby, this contract has set a foundation stone for a political realignment in Northern Ireland (Beck 2006: 405). Obviously, the Good Friday Agreement was more than a contract: It was the first reliable sign for lasting peace in Northern Ireland and has a strong symbolic meaning.

The Republican Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison

As described above, the hunger strike happened in two steps. Especially in the second part the British government was involved and discredited in the eyes of many observers by its way of handling it. When the prisoner Bobby Sands appealed for a hunger strike for improved prison conditions again, his intention had received the plentiful encouragement by the population on the streets. After Bobby Sands, every week another prisoner began to get on hunger strike. After the death of Frank McGuire for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, re-elections started, where Sands offered himself as a candidate to follow-up. He won a seat, but the House of Commons enacted a law allowing no prisoner to candidate for elections. Bobby Sands died on 5 May 1981 after 66 days without food, leading to worldwide protests against the British government (Liftenegger 2013: 167f). This anger was in particular addressed to Margaret Thatcher, because of her unyielding attitude towards the inmates and the IRA in general (Mulhaupt 1988: 298). Referring to the hunger strikes Thatcher stated that this “is a matter for those who go on hunger strike and those who are encouraging them to do so. I am urging them not to die...It is they [the IRA] who are sentencing their own people to death, not me” (Campbell 2008: 425) and about the death of Bobby Sands: “Mr Sands was a criminal. He chose to take his own life” (Fischer 2012: 14).

The hunger strikes played an important symbolic role in the Northern Ireland conflict: The relationships between the state, the population and actors as the IRA became seriously degraded. Thus, the hunger strike was an important move within a process of strategic interactions between the IRA and the British state (Pettenkofer 2008: 75).

3. Multi-dimensional impacts of the case studies

Reviewing different case studies of ethno-socio-religious conflicts, there are specific dimensions that are often present during the whole strife (see figure 2).




Fig. 2: Dimensions of ethno-socio-religious conflict

Source: own figure

In general, a conflict is often linked to actions that determine terms of violence and peace. Focusing on these, the emotional and symbolic character within conflicts plays an important role and is often responsible for tightening or easing the whole situation. Analysing an ethno-socio-religious conflict, the political and religious dimensions can be defined as counterparts or as an entity. Therefore, the religion and policy can be seen as frame conditions, which are essential to valid further influences, such as violence, peace, emotionality or symbolism. In the following the events of the Bloody Sunday, the Good Friday Agreement and the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison will be analysed in terms of the dimensions highlighted in fig. 2. The results will be summarised below in table 1.

The Bloody Sunday

On the one hand, the Bloody Sunday can be analysed from the perspective of violence because of the violence that has been utilised by the British government against the demonstrators. On the other hand, it has also an intense emotional meaning for the whole community of Northern Ireland through the anger caused by the death of ten unarmed Catholic civilians. The political impact can be seen as a major long-lasting political aftermath. Especially Tony Blair and David Cameron were involved in the subsequent peace process, finally leading to the Good Friday Agreement. The most important impact is the symbolic character of this violent event which was the catalyst and starting point of the Troubles. The

Bloody Sunday often served as a symbol and justification for Catholic paramilitary groups in order to stimulate them for further violent actions. The religious dimension is given by the fact, that Protestant Paratroopers killed Catholics for belonging to the opposed group.

The Good Friday Agreement

The Good Friday Agreement was essential for the peace process in the Northern Ireland conflict. The fact that this peace agreement was made on a high political level shows the strong political dimension of the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, the agreement was a very important political milestone for the following peace negotiations between the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement is not only important for the political dimension but it also has a symbolic meaning: The serious efforts in solving the Northern Ireland conflict in a non-violent way.

The Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison

From the political perspective, the Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison can be seen as a difficult and violent event. The British government was strongly under pressure because of the critical situation and public opinion during the hunger strikes. Many citizens felt solidarity with the striking prisoners and were emotionally touched by the suffering prisoners who fought and died for their goals. This emotional impact was the reason for many citizens to sympathize with the Catholic parliamentarians and become radical. The Hunger Strikes in the Maze prison have also a symbolic dimension for the whole conflict. Particularly the famous “H-Block” is often used as a symbol for many Catholic paramilitaries in order to show that they would go to the extreme to enforce their political and ideological beliefs. Referring to the dimension of violence it can be stated that violence was indirectly triggered by the death of the hunger strikers.

Influence / events	Bloody Sunday	Good Friday	Hunger strike
religious	☆		
political	☆	☆	☆
emotional	☆		☆
symbolic	☆	☆	☆
violent	☆		☆
peaceful		☆	

☆ high impact , ☆ low impact

Table 1: Multidimensional impacts on the case studies

Source: own table

4. Conclusion and outlook

The work in this paper shows, that the two main actors, state and church, had a very strong influence on the whole process of the conflict in Northern Ireland. It has become apparent that for a deeper understanding of the conflict it is important to analyse the church and the state in context. Furthermore, the analysis of the three main incidents suggests that the impact of the state was more significantly, compared to the influence of the church. Most of the impacts that have been investigated in this paper were mostly political or symbolic and the religious dimension played a major role just by determining the belonging to one or the other faith group.

The conflict of Northern Ireland is still an important issue for the present consciousness and politics of the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Sporadic incidents can easily unravel the “old” conflict between Republicans and Unionist. For this, the flag issue in Northern Ireland is an illustrative example. In December 2012, the city council of Belfast decided not to fly the Union Jack flag which stands for the belonging to the United Kingdom. Many Unionists felt offended through this act and started to proclaim their dislike on the streets (Zaschke 2013). This demonstration escalated into a five days riot with Molotov cocktails, stones, burning cars and heavy police interference. This occurrence around a mere symbolic issue like the flag shows that the conflict is still deeply anchored in the awareness of the Northern Irish community (Kielinger 2013). Such disputes may well happen also in the future and therefore a better understanding of the roots of the conflicts is necessary to define

measures that can lead to long-lasting peace through emotional healing between the opposing groups.

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The Growing Security “Threat” in European Cities

Marcel Mondel

Abstract

This article deals with the issue of growing threats for European cities. The “threat” will be discussed from two points of view. On the one side there are the actual terrorist assaults in important urban centres of Europe and on the other side we find the consequences of these attacks in terms of intensifying surveillance policies. Firstly, the increasing amount of terrorist attacks in Europe in the last decade as well as the background of modern terrorism and its main aims will be examined. Often terrorists have been religiously radicalised and resort to violence to express their dissent with the prevailing social and political system in Europe. Secondly, the role of cities as preferred targets for terrorist-assaults will be exposed. After surveying this issue the consequences of the terrorist attacks, and therein especially the political measures, such as growing Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), militarisation of cities, restrictions and architecture, will be discussed. There Terrorism is a threat to the actual Lives of people I will follow the thoughts of the urbanist Stephen Graham by arguing that the increasing security-measures and the restriction of public space in cities can be a dangerous threat to modern urban life, too, but in a different way.

1. Increasing terrorism in European cities

Terrorism in Europe is a threat since the late seventies, when organisations such as the ETA or the RAF tried to enforce their political aims with bombings and through kidnapping. The goal of these, and mainly all other terrorist groups was to spread fear and terror among a group of people as large as possible and to urge the government to follow their political demands. To achieve these aims urban regions with a high density of people were preferred places for terrorist actions. After the turn of the Millennium, European cities faced a growing number of terrorist assassinations again which were increasingly religiously motivated. Even the rampage in Norway committed by Anders Breivik in July 2011 who pretended to protest against the perceived Islamisation of his home country was to some extent religiously motivated. But two of the most drastic assassinations had a fundamentalist Islamist background. One was the bombing in Madrid in March 2004, the assault with the most killed people since WWII. The declared assassins stated that their attacks were coordinated by Al-Qaeda, although no direct linkage could be proven, and that their goal was to fight the western way of life (Sciolino 2004: n.p.). About one year later the Underground in London was hit by another dramatic terrorist attack. Here again the suspected assassins stated that their actions were motivated by the Jihad against the western world (Cowell 2005: n.p.). The importance of the religious background of these terrorists and the specific urban space they attacked will be discussed later in this article. As a consequence of this and other terrorist threats in urban

European centres, many national governments adjusted their security-law by extending the measures of surveillance, saving of data or restricting public space, e.g. with the PATRIOT Act in the USA or the “Anti-Terror Gesetze” (Anti-Terrorism Laws) in Germany, which were recently extended until 2015 (Zeit Online 2013: n.p.). In the following chapters I will briefly define what the term terrorism comprises and what its main aims are. The main part of the paper focuses on the development of the role of urban space in (terrorist) warfare, on cities as symbols for the Western way of modern life, and therein the concept of urbicide. Finally, the political consequences of the terrorist attacks and the threat for modern urban life by intensifying surveillance policies will be debated in the second part of the article.

2. The role of the city in terrorist attacks

Cities have always been primary targets in wars. In former time where nations fought against nations, cities have been important strategical sites which had to be conquered to gain victory over the enemy. But the way conflicts were carried out has changed drastically in the last decades. With globalisation, modern wars become more complex involving also unknown enemies who do not represent territorial nation states. Terrorist organisations like Al-Quaeda are no longer bound to a certain place, making it difficult to counter these groups. On the other hand, many terrorists don't fight against single nations but against a specific way of life. This could be specified as the “Western way of life”. It represents values such as democracy, liberalism, capitalism and human rights which are declined by some radical religious leaders.

2.1. Definition of modern global terrorism

The content of this part comprises terrorist activities and their motivation. At first, terrorism itself has to be defined. The “European Forum for Urban Safety” (2007: 19) declares inter alia following characteristics:

- The common norms and rules how disputes and protests are handled are harmed
- It is designed to create a “climate of extreme fear”
- The victims weren't the actual target, but rather a wider political or religious goal.

As already mentioned, terrorist attacks have been carried out in the 60s and 70s by radical political organisations in Europe. Anti-terror-strategies were introduced for the first time by different nations, gaining more attention through the events of 9/11. Since then the fear of religiously motivated terrorism has been kept high in the Western world, especially in the USA. But also European capitals became targets for terrorist assaults. But why do terrorists

prefer the Western capitals as favourable targets and not the less protected periphery? This has several reasons, which are discussed in the following chapter.³⁵

2.2. The city as a symbol of the Western way of life

This part of the article will analyse the role of the urban centres in Europe as targets for terrorists. First of all, the high density of residents makes the urban space a preferred target. In addition, the concentration of media plays an important role. Terrorists want to maximise the impact of their assaults. To gain this impact media coverage is very important. The two planes that hit the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York for example were timed in a way that the journalists had enough time to focus the WTC until the second plane crashed into the second tower. To kill as many people as possible and to achieve an enormous media impact are two, so to say, “practical” reasons for attacking specifically cities. However, there is a symbolic motivation, too.

The fundamentalist Islamist way of life is in stark contrast to the Western way of life. It is shaped by conservatism, traditionalism and the denial of modern Western norms and behaviour. Capitalism in the West is seen as an enemy or conqueror of their own culture. And the Western way of life corresponds most closely to the urban way of life, which stands for heterogeneity, capitalism and economic progress. Thus places that represent these antagonistic ideals are preferred targets. The destruction of these places is a symbolic demonstration of the rejection of the way of life their citizens practise (Coward 2006. 165 f.).

An important concept in the perception of cities in wars or terrorist attacks is “urbicide”. As Shaw states urbicide can be seen as a component of genocide. The definition of genocide is the destruction of a certain “it”. In this sense “it” refers to a member of a specific ethnical, religious or political group. But genocide also implies the destruction of symbolic urban fabric, referred to as “urbicide”. Buildings with an important meaning for the antagonistic side are ruined to weaken the coherence of the enemy.³⁶ As a conclusion Shaw argues that genocide cannot be separated from “urbicide” and vice versa (Shaw 2006: 149). This concept should help us understand why certain places with a symbolic meaning are favoured targets. European and American cities represent the “western way of life”. By attacking this space terrorists attack the whole system with its particular values represented by them. This explains why terrorist attacks mainly take place in urban centres and not in rural regions. Consequently, measures of counter-terrorism were mainly carried out in cities, too. These measures and their outcomes will be discussed in the following part of the article.

35 More information about the goals of terrorism and other aspects can be found in the article by Sascha Geissler.

36 This is just a very brief overview over the concept “urbicide”. It will be reviewed with more detail in the chapter by Henning Günter.

3. Consequences of terrorism in cities in terms of surveillance

After 9/11 an intense discussion about the security of the Western nations arose. Politicians focused on methods which should facilitate preventing terrorist assaults and detecting terrorists. Some of these measures and their outcomes for today's life will be discussed in this chapter.

3.1 The role of the discourse

An important issue is the developing discourse about the threat emanating from the "Muslim world". Often discrimination is not only about the religious or political ideas of a person but also about their culture and the related way of the people's appearance. There is a great danger in the "othering" and subsequent exclusion of people with other cultural background than the Western one. Especially the Arab-Muslim population was affected by the political discourse and consequences from 9/11 in America (Body-Gendrot 2012: 53). The discourse in politics and the media influences the whole population of a country. Body-Gendrot states that after 9/11 approx. 1.200 men with Muslim background were arrested, most of them just because of the violation of immigration laws, what wouldn't be the cause for an arrest without the terrorist attacks (Body-Gendrot 2012: 54). Another example that can be found in the daily media abundantly is that foreign looking people are checked more often than Westerners (see, for example, Isenberg 2012: n.p.). Later on, I will illustrate this claim taking the example of London. Exclusionary and discriminatory trends can be accelerated by the political discourse about the "enemy" or the "Islamic threat". This should illustrate how politics and public discourses can spread a climate of exclusion, mainly based on the cultural and religious background of people or their appearance. In Europe this debate wasn't as extensive as in the US, nevertheless the increasing number of anti-European, anti-Islamic, nationalist parties also shows the growing fear of "the stranger" in Europe. But modern societies and therein especially urban places in Europe often benefit from the inclusion of other cultures, the mixing of different ways of living and the tolerance between each group. Without tolerance in turn intercultural tension can weaken a city or even make it uninhabitable. Subsequently, the exclusion of foreign citizens in a former tolerant city can divide or weaken a society.

3.2 Growing security-measures in European cities

The main counter-terrorism measures which have been taken were to extend the employment of diverse surveillance technologies with different functions. There are those ones that monitor behaviour and others which identify people (Lyon 2006: 299). Of course both are linked very often and work together. In the following part I will introduce four surveillance technologies and their consequences for the urban life.

3.2.1 *Biometrics and ID-cards*

The first measure is the recording of biometric data of to identify individuals. This includes fingerprints, irises or hand geometry. The Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, for instance, introduced eye scanners after 9/11. In connection with a smart card, travellers can be identified swiftly and precisely (Lyon 2006: 299 ff.). This measure of identification is strongly linked to another surveillance technology, the ID cards. They are a way to be sure if a person is actually the one he pretends to be and if he's got the right to be in this place. This contains several problems if one bears in mind that it always needs to be decided first who has access to certain spaces, e.g. in the case of crossing borders. This can cause an exclusion of people with inadequate documentation. The identifying methods, such as the new fingerprint on ID-cards in Germany, will be extended until the population refuses to allocate their data. At the moment many people just accept these measures as a price of security. But the danger that the gigantic databases could end up in the wrong hands is commonly overseen. Another problem is that, regardless of all surveillance measures, most terrorists will find their way onto certain blacklists not before they have actually committed a crime (Lyon 2006: 301 ff.).

3.2.2 *CCTV and monitoring communication*

Besides these technologies aiming to identify people, the second category includes technologies of monitoring. The most famous is the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). After 9/11 many technologies of CCTV were adjusted with the possibility to recognise faces. They are especially used in airports in the USA to scan travellers and crew members. But also in Europe, e.g. in the Newham district in London with about 300 installed cameras, face recognition technologies were adopted (Lyon 2006: 303). Lyon argues that face recognition is mainly used to detect petty criminals, because there isn't any reliable data or photographs of every possible terrorist. Moreover, the chance of a false alarm is very high, where 9,999 false alarms stack up to one accurate identification (Lyon 2006: 304). This refers to the former point that people are classified and suspected just by their appearance, and this classification could possibly cause restrictions to access a space. Certain groups with similar attributes, e.g. long beards, could be excluded or discriminated by using these technologies.

Another current issue is the surveillance of communication. Interception of conversations via mobiles or telephones or the observation of activities in the World-Wide Web by governments are common these days in the USA as well as in Europe. In the guise of anti-terrorism measures politicians gather plenty of personal data of every person. This data can be used to classify people with similar interests or to search for criminals of all kind. The current discussion on the National Security Agency (NSA) using their program PRISM to monitor the usage of millions of internet-users also in Europe shows how anti-terror laws can lead to a restriction of actions. Checking for key-words in emails, for example, can lead to the inclusion of an innocent person into a terrorism blacklist. This doesn't mean any limitations at first, but one could be checked ever again if the government reckons it as necessary. It could even reject access to particular nations (Lyon 2006: 305 ff.).

3.2.3 *London as a case study for increasing CCTV*

To conclude this chapter I will highlight London as a place with the highest density of surveillance technologies in Europe and the occurred consequences by these measures. London was a target of terrorists' activities in the last decades, starting in the early 1990s with attacks by the IRA. Consequently, London developed very early different measures to protect the city from terrorism. The London Police has four important goals named "high visibility policing, directed intelligence, technology, partnership" (Coaffee 2006: 293). The modern "ring of steel" (ibid: 278) was built to protect the central business district. It consists of armed road checkpoints, parking restrictions, highly developed CCTV (over 15,000 surveillance cameras) and the defending architecture of buildings such as the American embassy or the London's House of Parliament (Body-Gendrot 2001: 95). This helped the City of London to safeguard its inclusion into the economic global market, while excluding itself from the fragmented rest of the urban area. Coaffee calls the present condition as a "global connection and local disconnection" (Coaffee 2006: 294). Furthermore, he remarks that no terrorists were caught by the surveillance systems but mainly petty criminals. As a conclusion the City of London can be seen as a secure place for business life. However, the restriction of social life and the requirement of a certain kind of behaviour exclude specific people from urban life in central London.

Another aspect that was mentioned before is the building of a community of suspects in London, mainly consisting of Muslims. It has been discovered that the number of controlled Muslims rose from over 10,000 in 2002 to nearly a quarter million in 2009 (Body-Gendrot 2011: 94). The controlled people are differentiated by communities and not by ideologies and are discriminated this way. Another example is that CCTV with the task to collect license plates automatically were about to be installed in Birmingham, where predominantly Muslims lived (Body-Gendrot 2011: 94). With the example given I wanted to visualize the problems which can occur if security measures are intensified too much. In the last chapter this issue will be tackled again and will lead to the conclusion of this article.

4. Conclusion

The threat of terrorist assaults in European cities is still considered to be relatively high. As already mentioned in the introduction nearly every year some kind of terrorist attack occurs in the urban regions of Europe. This keeps the fear alive of being a potential victim of such an attack, even if one's own spatial actuation habits were not affected. This causes a high wariness, e.g. towards things like left-alone suitcases at places like airports which may be helpful in a few cases. But it can also create diffuse fears of people with a different cultural background or appearance. Prejudices and reservation towards these can slow down or block the integration and inclusion of foreign people into our modern society. Urban space has always been the fertile soil to practice a peaceful co-existence and the fear of terror means a cessation of this process.

Furthermore, the technological solutions to fight or prevent terrorism in urban spaces are often inadequate to deal with the threat of terrorism and, simultaneously, dangerous for our democracies. Lyon mentions three central points where anti-terror measures can be dangerous for our modern society:

1. The growing influence of surveillance, police and supervision can be seen as a recentralisation of state power. The state decides which behaviour or appearance is accepted and which is suspicious. Who will be scrutinised specifically after having been filmed? This question leads directly to the second statement.
2. Certain algorithmic surveillance programs detect suspects by specific attributes. These can lead to an exclusion of a certain group of people, just by their physical appearance.
3. Finally the lack of accountability for these measures has to be seen critical. Most of the people accept that their fingerprints are taken or their faces are filmed as a “price of security” (Lyon 2006: 310)

To conclude this article I will quote Swanstrom (after Jon Coaffee 2006: 296) with his statement on the growing surveillance measures in cities:

“The main threat to cities comes not from terrorism but from the policy responses to terrorism that could undermine the freedom of thought and movement that are the lifeblood of cities.”

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