

## **Willing and able?!**

A self regulatory approach to the effects of internal motivation to  
behave unprejudiced

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**A self regulatory approach to the effects of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced**

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## Chapter 1      **General Introduction**

Tolerant attitudes and behavior towards stigmatized groups, especially racial minorities, have become increasingly valued in most societies. This is for example reflected in the Racial Equality Directive adopted by the council of the European Union in 2000, which implements the principle of equal treatment between persons, irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin (Council Directive 2000/43/EC). At the same time, most individuals nowadays are aware of the fact that stereotypes and prejudiced behavior have negative and long-lasting harmful effects on stereotyped groups (e.g., Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Hansen & Sassenberg, 2006; for an overview, see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). As a result, a majority of individuals has the goal to behave unprejudiced. But nonetheless stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are pervasive influences in everyday life. The reason for this is that many of the mental processes leading to prejudiced behavior are automatic in nature and people are to a large degree unable to adequately detect and correct for these processes (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).

Hence, the question arises under which conditions the standard “behaving unprejudiced” becomes more or less attainable, and why. In this dissertation I will focus on one factor that appears to be relevant with respect to answering this question: The (internal) motivation to behave unprejudiced. More specifically, the current work applies a self-regulation perspective to prejudiced behavior in order to improve the understanding of the motivated regulation of prejudice. The present chapter embarks upon discussing the automatic processes leading to prejudiced behavior. Afterwards, potential strategies how to resolve the problem of automatic prejudice are discussed. Finally, I will conclude by focusing on the central role of internal motivation among these strategies and integrate internal motivation into the process of prejudice control.

### ***The automaticity of prejudiced behavior***

The basic building block for stereotypes and prejudice<sup>1</sup> is social categorization and the processes initiated by it. Social categorization refers to “the process of identifying individual people as members of a social group, because they share certain features that are typical of the group” (Smith & Mackie, 2000, p. 160). Common attributes that we use to categorize people are for example gender or ethnicity. Importantly, initial categorization occurs automatically and outside perceivers’ awareness (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994a). Already Allport (1954) argued that categorization is a necessary and adaptive

process which individuals need to extract meaning from a complex world. But social categorization has a Janus face. Although it helps to generate information efficiently, the interpretation of information according to the initial categorization can also result in the activation of stereotypes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Automatic stereotype activation is a precursor of spontaneous stereotype application in person perception and impulsive prejudiced behavior (Bargh, 1999; Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 2002; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Wheeler & Petty, 2001).

This means even if people do not intend to stereotype others or to act prejudiced against them, this process is initiated automatically and without awareness. Seminal evidence for automatic stereotype activation has been provided by Devine (1989). In an effort to understand the seemingly paradox why prejudiced behavior prevails in spite of the fact that a majority of individuals explicitly denies stereotypes, Devine suggested in her dissociation model that stereotypes are inevitably triggered whenever individuals are confronted with a group member, which triggers social categorization. The model distinguishes between stereotypes (i.e., the knowledge of stereotypes) on the one hand, which are automatic in nature, and personal controlled beliefs (i.e., the endorsement of stereotypes) on the other. The central idea is that basically all individuals, high and low prejudiced alike, have knowledge of socially shared stereotypes and are thus equally susceptible to prejudiced behavior, as stereotype activation occurs automatically. However, if the situation permits the control of the activated stereotype, low prejudiced individuals will engage in processes that inhibit the application of the stereotype. The dissociation implies that high and low prejudiced individuals will not differ in their behavior as long as it is uncontrollable, but there will be a difference when behavior becomes more deliberate.

The awareness for the dissociation of controlled and automatic components of prejudice fueled the interest in developing measures that could assess the automatic associations leading to prejudiced behavior. Consequently, measures were developed that did not measure stereotypes and prejudice explicitly, but implicitly. The rationale behind it is that the more implicit a measurement technique, the less intentional control can be exerted, which in turn allows for the assessment of unconscious biases. Although implicit and explicit measures have often been referred to as if measuring two different categories of prejudice (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001), the different measures can also be arranged along a continuum from implicit and unconscious to explicit and conscious

(Maass, Castelli, & Arcuri, 2000). With the development of implicit measurement techniques in social cognition the essential automaticity of stereotypes and prejudice has been supported repeatedly (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Bargh, 1999; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). In contrast, the controllability of stereotype application becomes manifest in the explicit measures. The relation of implicit to explicit measurement techniques reflects the described dissociation of automatic and controlled components of prejudice. In other words, implicit measures reveal stereotype activation and explicit measures their application.

The powerful impact of automatic processes on stereotyping is also apparent from research on the ironic effects of stereotype suppression. Numerous studies (Förster & Liberman, 2001; Liberman & Förster, 2000; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994b; Sherman, Stroessner, Loftus, & Deguzman, 1997) demonstrated that the intentional suppression of stereotypes will increase their accessibility in subsequent situations. That is, although individuals may first succeed in avoiding the expression of a stereotype (when explicitly instructed to do so), as soon as the inhibitory intentions are relaxed, there will be an even stronger tendency to stereotype others (compared to before the suppression period), because the intentional suppression of the stereotype (application) actually increases its activation. This phenomenon, called stereotype rebound effect (Macrae et al., 1994b), points once more to the automaticity of stereotypes and their limited controllability through conscious control.

Although the findings demonstrate that individuals have an automatic propensity for prejudice, it does not imply that prejudice is universal or inevitable. In the last decades researchers have specified conditions that help the individual to overturn the automaticity of prejudice. In what follows, I will first turn to interventions that are meant to reduce prejudiced behavior either by impeding social categorization or by preventing stereotype activation. Afterwards, I will consider the possibilities of controlling prejudice once social categorization and stereotype activation occurred. In doing so, I will focus on the role of the individual in the willful and conscious control of prejudiced behavior by means of preventing the application of activated stereotypes.

### ***Prejudice reducing interventions***

Given that stereotypes and prejudice are caught in a crossfire of unconscious and controlled processes, their change and malleability remains one of the biggest challenges.

In the last decades a body of social psychological research has accumulated suggesting different strategies how prejudice can be reduced. The strategies differ in their theoretical foundations and resulting foci. The focus of intergroup research was mainly on creating social conditions that will lead to a mental representation of social groups with blurred lines, in other words, to prevent prejudice from happening by impeding social categorization. Social cognition research has mainly focused on strategies that help the individual to overcome their biased perception leading to prejudice by preventing stereotype activation.

## **Intergroup Interventions**

Among the intergroup strategies aimed at reducing prejudice, intergroup contact is considered a key strategy. Based on Allports' (1954) influential assumptions in *The Nature of Prejudice*, extensive research on intergroup contact theory has confirmed that intergroup contact promotes reductions in intergroup prejudice, particularly when the contact situation is structured to allow for equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and is supported by authorities (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Recently it has been argued that the reduction of threat and intergroup anxiety is partly responsible for the reduction of prejudice through contact (e.g., Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004).

The underlying processes responsible for the effects of intergroup contact have been elaborated based on social categorization research. The common in-group identity model (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989) assumes that the positive effects of intergroup contact result from a change in the cognitive representation of the groups from several different groups towards a more inclusive group - a superordinate group. Furthermore, the Dual Identity Model (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) postulates that the effects will be especially positive, if the development of a superordinate group is not accompanied by individuals abandoning their original group (but see the Ingroup Project Model for constraints, Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

Although strategies emphasizing intergroup contact have proven to be important and relevant, they are not the only way to combat prejudice. Hence, in the current dissertation I adopt an alternative approach: the individual approach to the reduction and control of prejudice.



## Individual Interventions

As aforementioned, stereotype activation is assumed to follow automatically from social categorization. Due to the crucial role of stereotype activation as a precursor of prejudiced behavior, social cognition has had an unbroken interest in research concerned with the question, if stereotype activation is as automatic and uncontrollable as initially assumed (for an overview, see Blair, 2002). In the following paragraph I deal with the question if and how stereotype activation can be circumvented, even if the social categorization is salient. With the thriving of implicit measurement techniques (e.g., Implicit Association Test, Greenwald et al., 1998; Lexical Decision Task, Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; Sequential Priming Task, Fazio et al., 1995), a lot of attention was dedicated to the question if the automatic activation of the stereotype can be controlled and thereby prevent prejudiced behavior. One of the first demonstrations of conditional automaticity of stereotyping came from Gilbert and Hixon (1991), who demonstrated reduced stereotype activation for individuals under cognitive load.

Recent research has shown that diverse factors help to reduce stereotype activation and its influence on information processing and subsequent behavior. One way to prevent prejudiced associations is to make use of context manipulations: Such as a diversity training (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001) or activating evaluative positive information which render (negative) stereotypic associations less accessible (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001).

Another possibility is not to focus on the context, but the individual. Manipulating individuals' mental images by making counter-stereotypic exemplars accessible (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001), forming counter-stereotypical intentions (Blair & Banaji, 1996), or activating a "think different" mindset (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005) have proven effective in the reduction of stereotype activation.

Furthermore, stereotype activation seems to be controllable by changing the content of the associations from stereotypic to non-stereotypic: being trained to respond "no" when a counter-stereotypical exemplar is shown (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000) reduced participants' level of implicit prejudice. Similarly, Olson and Fazio (2006) showed that automatically activated attitudes can be changed by means of a nonconscious learning process like evaluative conditioning.

Moreover, Macrae and colleagues (for an overview, see Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) have repeatedly contested the unconditional automaticity of stereotyping. They found that processing objectives moderate stereotype activation during the perception of a person.

In other words, if an individual is not interested in the social meaning of a target, stereotypes will not be activated in the first place (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). In a similar way people can prevent stereotypes from being activated through volition. Research focusing on the preconscious control through individuals' goals (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Moskowitz, Salomon, & Taylor, 2000; Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004) and motivation (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Legault, Green-Demers, Grant, & Chung, 2007) demonstrated that individuals with chronic egalitarian goals or strong internal motivation show reduced stereotype activation compared to individuals without chronic egalitarian goals or internal motivation. In other words, unconscious volitional control can either be implemented by internal motivation or through the goal to behave in an egalitarian manner which becomes chronic with sufficient practice and prevents stereotype activation.

In sum, a vast number of studies have demonstrated the malleability of automatically activated stereotypes. However, given that the ultimate concern is the controllability of prejudiced behavior, the presented evidence brings up two problems. First, many of the findings demonstrate that for the individual stereotype reduction either requires extensive training (e.g., Kawakami et al., 2000) or is at least dependent on purposeful external intervention (e.g., Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). Second, once a target is processed for its meaning in a holistic manner, the stereotype will become activated irrespective of the individual's preconscious goals (e.g., Macrae et al., 1997; Moskowitz et al., 1999). In other words, although stereotypes seem to be only conditionally automatic, this will only help in the control of prejudiced behavior as long as they are not activated. But is the control of prejudiced behavior actually doomed to fail once stereotypes are activated? Having dealt with the prevention of prejudice at the stage of stereotype activation, in what follows I deal with the question how individuals can willingly engage in the control of prejudiced behavior after the activation of stereotypes has taken place.

### ***Self-Control of prejudiced behavior***

Previous research has shown that when social categorization has taken place and stereotypes have been activated, individuals still have the possibility to control prejudice by deliberately avoiding the application of stereotypes. This self-control of prejudiced behavior is a reactive form of control that, compared to the proactive control (Moskowitz,

2005) of prejudiced behavior described above, aims at reducing the influence of stereotype activation. More precisely, the question in this case is *how* the unwanted influences of automatically activated stereotypes on subsequent behavior can be reduced. Dual process models (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fazio, 1990; Fiske 1989; Devine & Monteith, 1999) posit that there are two routes to behavior: an automatic and a controlled path. The purpose of dual process models is to specify the conditions under which individuals will stop effortless, automatic processing and engage in controlled processing. For example the MODE model (Fazio, 1990) assumes that whether behavior occurs spontaneous or deliberately is determined by motivation and opportunity. Spontaneous and automatic processes will be more influential as long as motivation and opportunity are not given, whereas behavioral responses will be deliberate if individuals possess sufficient resources and motivation. Having elaborated on the automatic processes above, I will now turn to the conscious processes involved in the self-control of prejudiced behavior.

First of all, the different dual process models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) agree that correcting for an automatic process requires conscious intent. But to make the intention work and successfully overcome the stereotypic influences on behavior, individuals need sufficient awareness, resources, and motivation (for an overview, see Moskowitz, 2005). I will now discuss in greater detail those aspects that are especially relevant with regard to the current research.

### **Awareness for prejudiced responses**

Only if individuals become aware of their prejudiced behavior, they can consciously intend to control stereotypic influences. In line with this assumption Monteith and colleagues (Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993, Monteith & Voils, 2001) suggest that making people aware of their prejudiced responses is the first, important step in the purposeful control of prejudiced behavior. Elaborating further on the role of awareness in the process of prejudice reduction, they focus in their model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses (Monteith, 1993) on the crucial role of discrepancies for subsequent reactions (for an overview, see Monteith & Mark, 2005). First, the awareness for a discrepancy that exists between a prejudiced response and the belief how one ought to respond, leads to negative self-directed affect. This state initiates conscious control attempts to reduce the discrepancy and the associated negative tension. In the model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses it is suggested that the mechanism producing the conscious control is the association of cues that serve as a warning. For example, the

situation in which a person behaved prejudiced will be associated with negative affect, thereby establishing an association between the environmental stimuli, the negative affect, and the response itself. Once established, these cues can activate the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) to slow down the automatic response and allow for conscious control (Gray, 1982). The next time the person encounters a similar situation the cues will activate the BIS and thereby allow for control.

Several studies have provided empirical evidence for the model. It was confirmed that the awareness for prejudiced responses is triggered by perceivers' detecting a discrepancy between their egalitarian standards and their prejudiced response (Monteith & Voils, 2001). The role of negative affect in this process has also been complemented by several studies (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith et al., 1993). Specifically, it was shown that when people become aware of a discrepancy, those who have violated a personal standard (i.e., low prejudiced) exhibit negative self-directed affect such as guilt and compunction, which in turn motivates the control of subsequent stereotypical responses. In contrast, those individuals who have not violated their personal standards (i.e., high prejudiced) will not experience negative self-directed affect. Finally, there is evidence for the successful operation of the cues for control, leading to behavioral inhibition and less prejudice (Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002).

As with any correction process, people must not only be aware of a bias, but have the cognitive resources to engage in the process that will overrun these unwanted influences. Payne (2001, 2005) demonstrated that cognitive control processes play an important role in the successful regulation of prejudice. He found evidence that prejudiced behavior will decrease with higher cognitive control. Cognitive control can be exerted in situations that allow making use of objective information (e.g., a situation with sufficient time). Similar results have been obtained when manipulating cognitive control by means of alcohol, which subsequently impaired the control of race bias (Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006).

In spite of the importance of cognitive resources in the regulation of prejudice, the findings of Payne (2001, 2005) also suggest that control alone might not suffice, but that the effectiveness of cognitive resources in the control of prejudiced behavior hinges on motivation to behave unprejudiced (Payne, 2001, 2005; for similar findings, see Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2004). In sum, it is safe to say that awareness and cognitive resources are important factors in the process of prejudice reduction (Monteith, 1993). Nevertheless, neither awareness nor cognitive resources will

lead to an elimination of bias, if individuals are not motivated to overcome the unwanted influences of activated stereotypes. Therefore, next I turn to the role of motivation to behave unprejudiced for the self-control of prejudiced behavior.

### **Motivation to behave unprejudiced**

As most dual process models (e.g., Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990) posit, the self-control of prejudiced behavior depends on the possession of motivation (to behave unprejudiced). Although the models agree on the positive influence of motivation on the implementation of controlled processes, they have not been very precise about the underlying reasons. Moreover, in previous research attitude measures have often been used as a surrogate for motivation, assuming that individuals reporting low prejudiced attitudes are also highly motivated, because they personally believe that prejudice is wrong (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith 1993). However, when factoring in the increasing societal pressure to behave unprejudiced, it is obvious that individuals might behave unprejudiced because of their personal beliefs, but also because of the societal norm to behave unprejudiced. Recent research by and large agrees that attitude measures are not sufficient to represent the diversity of reasons underlying the motivation to behave unprejudiced (e.g., Amodio et al., 2008; Devine, Plant, & Blair, 2001).

In an effort to disentangle individuals' motivation, Dunton and Fazio (1997) developed a scale to measure the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions (MCPR). In spite of their intention to distinguish between internal and external sources of motivation their items loaded on the same factor, which was labeled as the Concern with Acting Prejudiced factor and was distinct from the second Restraint to Avoid Dispute factor. Research incorporating the MCPR has demonstrated its influence on controllable (i.e., explicit) as well as less controllable (i.e., implicit) measures of prejudice. For example, with increasing motivation to control prejudiced reactions, individuals display more willingness to interact with a Black person (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2006), inhibit automatic negative responses towards Blacks (Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 2005), and show less biased attitudes towards Blacks (Olson & Fazio, 2004).

Plant and Devine (1998) consequently suggested and demonstrated two sources of motivation to respond without prejudice: internal and external motivation. The idea behind it was that disentangling the sources of motivation to behave unprejudiced would help to identify those individuals who are primary motivated by personal concerns (i.e., internal motivation) in contrast to those individuals who are primary motivated by societal pressure

(i.e., external motivation) to behave unprejudiced. They developed and validated separate scales assessing the level of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (IMS) and external motivation to behave unprejudiced (EMS). Whereas internal motivation arises from internalized, personally important unprejudiced beliefs and values, external motivation reflects the desire to behave unprejudiced in order to avoid negative reactions from others, should one behave prejudiced. Internal motivation is for example measured by items like “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me”, a sample item from external motivation includes “I attempt to appear nonprejudiced towards Black people because of pressure from others” (for the complete scales and their German and Dutch translation, see Appendix I). In their initial study on IMS and EMS, Plant and Devine (1998) showed that IMS correlated negatively with Modern Racism (McConahay, 1986) and the Anti-Black Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988) but positively with the Attitude Towards Blacks Scale (ATB, Brigham, 1993) and the Pro-Black Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988). In sum, higher levels of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced led to less expression of prejudice. In contrast, the relationship between external motivation to behave unprejudiced and those explicit prejudice measures was rather small. Moreover, it was demonstrated that high internally motivated individuals show less stereotype endorsement, in public as well as privately (see also Plant, Devine, & Braizy, 2003).

Following the development of the scales and its validation, the relevance of internal and external motivation was established across numerous studies. In a study on responses to other-imposed pro-black pressure, Plant and Devine (2001) showed that (societal) pressure to behave unprejudiced will have different effects on individuals depending on their internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced. More precisely, it was demonstrated that high internally motivated individuals compared to low internally motivated individuals were not bothered by pressure to behave unprejudiced, as their personal beliefs are consistent with the norm to behave unprejudiced. In contrast, individuals who were primarily externally motivated responded with reactance against other-imposed pro-black pressure, which led to negative affect, such as threat and anger. Hence, primarily externally motivated compared to primarily internally motivated individuals experienced more threat and anger, which subsequently resulted in an attitudinal and behavioral backlash.

Similarly, research has demonstrated a moderating effect of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on stereotype rebound. Stereotype rebound refers to the increased

accessibility and use of stereotypes after the intentional suppression of the stereotype (Macrae et al., 1994b). Compared to individuals who do not try to suppress a stereotype those individuals who try to suppress a stereotype will show increased accessibility and use of the stereotypes after their suppression. However, Gordijn et al. (2004) found evidence that high internally motivated individuals, compared to low internally motivated individuals, will show no stereotype rebound effect, because they do not experience a conflict between the situational demand to suppress the stereotype and their motivation.

Moreover, high internally motivated individuals have proven to be more sensitive to a bias reducing training. In a reaction time task participants' bias in relation to athleticism was assessed as the tendency to misidentify neutral objects as sport equipment when paired with a Black face compared to a White face. After a training (i.e., an initial training phase on the same task), high compared to low internally motivated individuals exhibited a greater reduction in bias, whereas external motivation was not related to the reduction of bias (Peruche & Plant, 2006).

The concept of internal and external motivation was also extended to the target group of women (as compared to Blacks), and new scales were developed measuring the internal and external motivation to respond without sexism. It turned out that the explanation of gender bias benefits equally well from the differentiation of the two sources of motivation to behave unprejudiced as the explanation of race bias (Klonis, Plant & Devine, 2005).

As already mentioned in the paragraph on preconscious control of prejudice through goals and motivation, Devine and colleagues (Amodio et al., 2003; Devine et al., 2002) extended the concept to the domain of implicit race bias. They demonstrated that stereotype activation was reduced by high internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (as opposed to external motivation).

In sum, there is broad evidence for the importance of the concept of internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced in the context of stereotype activation and application, stereotype rebound, and stereotype trainings as well as for the generalization across different target groups of prejudice. To conclude, it has been one of the most influential concepts in the context of stereotyping and prejudice in the last decade and especially internal motivation has proven as a powerful source of motivation in the control of prejudiced behavior.

## ***The present research***

As aforementioned, research on awareness for one's prejudiced responses (Monteith 1993; Monteith et al., 1993; Monteith & Voils 2001; for an overview see Monteith & Mark, 2005) has highlighted the role of discrepancies between one's own behavior and one's standards, for the control of prejudice. However, it is unclear whether the correction efforts when becoming aware of these discrepancies, as demonstrated in the research of Monteith (e.g., Monteith & Mark, 2005), arise from personal standards and are actually meant to overcome prejudice (i.e., are internally motivated) or only to conceal it from others (i.e., are externally motivated). This is because so far, the knowledge that awareness of one's discrepant responses as well as internal motivation is important for the effortful control of prejudice has not been tested in combination with each other. In other words, up to now the question of if *and* how internal motivation to behave unprejudiced moderates awareness of a discrepant response has not yet been addressed. To answer this question, the current research integrates internal motivation to behave unprejudiced into the model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses. Knowing how internal motivation moderates reactions to failure should clarify the learning history of becoming unprejudiced and thereby permit drawing specific conclusions about the sustained regulation of prejudice. In the first part of the present research I therefore address the *impact of internal motivation on reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced*.

In large part, research on motivation to behave unprejudiced has focused on the intention to *avoid* prejudiced behavior and neglected the relationship of motivation and intentions to *approach* potential targets of prejudice in a positive manner. Yet, one study by Plant (2004) has shown that high internally motivated individuals approach members of stigmatized groups in a more positive way. Compared to low internally motivated they report more positive previous contact, have more positive expectations about future interactions, and less anxiety. So far, this has been the only research on the role of internal motivation and positive intentions in the context of prejudiced behavior. An open question is whether the intention to show positive behavior has always clearly positive consequences in the context of prejudiced behavior. A form of prejudiced behavior that requires a positive intention is benevolent discrimination. For this reason, in the second part of the present research I elaborate on *the role of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced in the context of benevolent discrimination*.

A vast number of studies have shown that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced improves the conscious control of prejudice. Moreover, internal motivation



(Amodio et al., 2003; Devine et al., 2002) and egalitarian goals (Moskowitz et al., 1999, 2000) also moderate automatic stereotyping effects. In spite of the fact that stereotype activation is undermined by internal motivation or egalitarian goals, there are situations where a category and its stereotypic content are simultaneously activated (for example by external sources). Therefore the question arises, whether internal motivation also improves the control of stereotypes, once they have been activated. In acknowledging the process of prejudice reduction as one with multiple steps, I consider this so far disregarded possibility for internal motivation to circumvent prejudiced behavior. That is why the third part of the present research addresses *the impact of internal motivation and the goal to behave unprejudiced on the control of activated stereotypes*.

### **The impact of internal motivation on reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced**

So far, little is known about the learning history of internally motivated individuals. To contribute to the understanding of long term determinants of (un)prejudiced behavior, Chapter 2 addresses the question how individual differences in internal motivation to behave unprejudiced affect individuals' reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced (i.e., based on them becoming aware of a discrepant response). I expect that how individuals react to failure in behaving unprejudiced (i.e., whether individuals become aware of a discrepancy) depends on their internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. In a series of three studies it is demonstrated that failure in behaving unprejudiced impacts differently on individuals' affect, effort to behave unprejudiced, and levels of prejudice depending on their internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. In sum, the studies provide insight into the sustained regulation of prejudice.

### **Internal motivation to behave unprejudiced in the context of benevolent discrimination**

By focusing on the relationship of internal motivation and the intention to approach targets of prejudice in a positive manner, Chapter 3 extends the findings of Chapter 2 to the domain of benevolent discrimination. Besides this, the research was mainly concerned with the question if the awareness for one's own failure differs depending on the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. In other words, if high, compared to low internally motivated individuals react more self-critical to information that indicates failure in behaving unprejudiced. Therefore, it was examined how internal motivation to behave

unprejudiced influences benevolent discrimination as well as subsequent self-criticism of the displayed behavior. The studies demonstrate that internal motivation increases benevolent discrimination as long as individuals are not aware of the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination. However, once the negative consequences have been made salient, internal motivation facilitates self-criticism of own benevolently discriminating behavior, which is reflected in a more critical reappraisal of previous, benevolently discriminating behavior.

### **The impact of internal motivation and the goal to behave unprejudiced on the control of activated stereotypes**

Chapter 4 focuses on a so far disregarded possibility for internal motivation to prevent prejudiced behavior by means of stereotype control. The primary goal of this chapter is to show that increased commitment to the goal of behaving unprejudiced facilitates the rejection of activated stereotypes. It is demonstrated that increased internal motivation to behave unprejudiced improves stereotype control. Finally, an attempt is made to activate the goal to behave unprejudiced by means of a priming paradigm. The results indicate that the increased activation of the goal to behave unprejudiced has equally positive effects on the control of stereotypes as high internal motivation.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Often researchers make a distinction between prejudice and stereotypes. Stereotypes refer to the semantic associations individuals have and prejudice to the evaluative component of these associations. For the current dissertation this distinction is less important as both, stereotypes and prejudice have been shown to operate automatically and lead to prejudiced behavior.

## **Chapter 2    The impact of internal motivation on reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced<sup>1</sup>**

Concerning the issue of discrimination and tolerance, individuals and with them societies have changed drastically in the last decades. Legislation, court decisions and public debate demonstrate that behaving unprejudiced has gained importance over the years. Nowadays, the majority of individuals endorses egalitarian standards and condemns those who endorse prejudiced attitudes. They strive to behave unprejudiced either because they do not want to infringe established behavioral norms (so called externally motivated) or because it is personally important to them (so called internally motivated). But even those fair-minded individuals fall prey to stereotyping and prejudice. Especially externally motivated individuals are barely successful in behaving unprejudiced. In contrast, high internally motivated individuals are more successful (compared to low internally motivated individuals) in avoiding, difficult as well as easily controllable, prejudiced behavior (e.g., implicit and explicit measures; Devine et al., 2002; Plant & Devine, 2001). The neurophysiological correlates of this motivational key to circumvent prejudice have been revealed recently (Amodio et al., 2004; Amodio et al., 2008). However, the self-regulatory mechanisms have not been fully understood yet. The present work aims at contributing to the understanding of these motivational processes by studying how failure in behaving unprejudiced influences individuals differently depending on their internal motivation to behave unprejudiced.

### ***Failure in behaving unprejudiced***

The failure to behave unprejudiced has negative and long-lasting harmful effects on stereotyped groups (e.g., Blascovich et al., 2001; Hansen & Sassenberg, 2006; for an overview, see Major et al., 2002). But negative consequences of social discrimination are not only restricted to targets of discrimination, they also occur for a substantial number of individuals showing prejudiced behavior. As Monteith (1993) states in her model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses, the awareness of the discrepancy between unprejudiced standards and prejudiced responses, occurring for low prejudiced people, leads to an increase in negative affect (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002). Providing evidence for this assumption, Monteith and colleagues (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001) found that confronting individuals with the difficulty of controlling their automatic prejudiced responses on a race IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) led to feelings of guilt, if

individuals attributed their IAT scores to racial biases. In sum, according to Monteith, the awareness of racial biases, which only occurs for the low prejudiced, leads to negative self-directed affect, which is a crucial step in regulating one's own prejudiced responses.

Intuitively one would ask why people should show prejudiced behavior in the first place, if it makes them feel guilty or miserable. The answer is straightforward: Because prejudiced behavior is not always controllable. Knowledge about stereotypes prevailing in society and in people's minds leads to automatic activation of stereotypes in the face of category members and in turn, more likely, to prejudiced behavior (Devine, 1989). Numerous studies over the last decade have supported the notion that prejudice partly relies on the automatic activation of stereotypes and that individuals show prejudice notwithstanding their unprejudiced intentions to bypass or ignore it (for overviews, see Bargh, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

### **The Role of Motivation**

Although stereotypes and prejudice have been shown to rely on automatic processes, individuals can control stereotyping and prejudice, at least to some extent, by means of goals and motivation (for an overview, see Blair, 2002). The idea that, depending on how motivated individuals are, prejudiced behavior may be circumvented has first been proposed by Fazio (1990), who established the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions scale (MCPR). The higher the individual's MCPR the less does she/he express controlled as well as automatic race bias (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Maddux et al., 2005; Olson & Fazio, 2004; Payne, 2005). But when looking at people's motivation to be unprejudiced it is – as indicated in the introductory paragraph – not only important to ask if they are motivated to be unprejudiced, but also what the source of this motivation is. Previous research by Plant and Devine (1998) has shown that individuals can be motivated for internal (personal) or external (normative) reasons to behave unprejudiced. Whereas internal motivation to behave unprejudiced stems from internalized, personal unprejudiced beliefs, external motivation to behave unprejudiced reflects the desire to behave unprejudiced to avoid negative evaluations by others, in case one would behave prejudiced. In line with the Self Determination Theory (SDT, Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000), which highlights the importance of the internalization of goals and values for successful self-regulation, the crucial role of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, when regulating prejudice, has been consistently demonstrated. Specifically, there is evidence that (a) individuals high in internal motivation and low in external motivation to behave unprejudiced show lower levels of implicit race bias (Devine et al., 2002; for a similar argument based on chronic

egalitarian goals, see Moskowitz et al., 1999), and that (b) on the contrary, low internal motivation to behave unprejudiced can lead to attitudinal and behavioral backlash if pressure to respond unprejudiced was imposed (Gordijn et al., 2004) and that (c) high internally motivated individuals show more reduction of racial bias during a training (Peruche & Plant, 2006).

In sum, it has been shown consistently and throughout different social categories that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced reduces explicit and implicit forms of prejudice (see also Peruche & Plant, 2006; Klonis et al., 2005; Plant & Devine, 2001). In other words, internal motivation seems to be a very powerful source of motivation (compared to external motivation) when trying to behave unprejudiced.

Because automatic tendencies fuel potential failure in behaving unprejudiced, it seems crucial to include failure as well as how people deal with it in any model that tries to uncover the mechanisms of the regulation of prejudice. Unfortunately, up to now the question of how internal motivation to behave unprejudiced moderates reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced has not yet been addressed. In other words, the distinction between these two types of motivation has so far not been integrated in Monteith's model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses. Therefore, the current research tested how failure in behaving unprejudiced influences affect and prejudice in future situations, depending on how much the individual was internally and externally motivated to behave unprejudiced.

### **Motivated Reactions to Failure**

Failure constitutes a source of threat to a positive self image (Weiner, 1972). The Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) predicts that social discrimination is motivated by the individual desire to achieve and maintain a positive self image. Building on these ideas, Fein and colleagues (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) suggest that failure-induced self image threat elicits prejudice as one possible strategy to restore a threatened self image by devaluating others and thereby affirming the self.

Applying this reasoning to failure in behaving unprejudiced would suggest that a person that fails in behaving unprejudiced should become even more prejudiced afterwards. However, when it comes to failure in behaving unprejudiced, this reaction does not seem to be functional anymore. In this case the motivation to protect or enhance the self clashes with the motivation to behave unprejudiced.

A more likely, alternative prediction can be derived by combining insights from the model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses (Monteith, 1993) and self completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). The model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses (Monteith, 1993) suggests that failure in behaving unprejudiced (i.e., showing prejudiced behavior) needs to be distinguished from an inner state resulting from this behavior: the awareness of the discrepancy between one's standards and one's behavior. According to Monteith (1993), this subjective experience elicits the self-regulation of prejudiced behavior. The self completion theory allows deriving which standards lead from the failure in behaving unprejudiced to the awareness of a discrepancy. The theory suggests that individuals who experience failure relevant to an identity goal (i.e., an internally motivated standard such as the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced) will experience a sense of incompleteness (or in Monteith's terminology: the awareness of a discrepancy). This sense of incompleteness in turn motivates self-symbolizing efforts, meaning that individuals will strive harder on following goal-relevant tasks to compensate for the failure (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Maier, 1999). If no possibility to increase goal-directed efforts on a further relevant task is given, an individual who failed on an identity-relevant task is caught in the aversive state of incompleteness and will therefore ruminate about the event (Brunstein, 2000; Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). For external standards, such as the external motivation to behave unprejudiced, no such effects are expected and found in the studies testing this theory, because failure does not result in a sense of incompleteness in this case.

In sum, this suggests that responses to failure in behaving unprejudiced will depend on the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, but not on external motivation to behave unprejudiced. Therefore, I predict that only after failure (i.e., the incidence of prejudice), individuals with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (for whom being unprejudiced is an identity goal) will show more negative self-directed affect (but no increase of negative other-directed affect). This is due to the aversive state they are caught in after failure related to an identity goal, in case they do not have an option to compensate. If another goal-relevant task (i.e., prejudice-related behavior) provides the opportunity for compensation, higher levels of internal motivation will lead to more goal-striving after failure in behaving unprejudiced but not without failure. In other words, increased effort to behave unprejudiced and less prejudice is expected after failure the more individuals are internally motivated to behave unprejudiced.

## *Overview of studies*

The primary goal of the present research is to investigate how internal motivation to behave unprejudiced influences the self-regulation of prejudiced responses. I predict that, following failure in behaving unprejudiced, internal motivation to behave unprejudiced elicits discomfort, effort to avoid prejudice and leads to less prejudice, but not in a control condition. No such effect is expected for external motivation to behave unprejudiced. I conducted three experiments to test these predictions. In all three studies internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced were measured in the beginning. Study 2.1 provides a demonstration of the specificity of confronting participants with failure pertaining to prejudice. To this end a prejudice failure condition was compared to a no failure condition and, more importantly, a control failure condition, where participants received a negative feedback irrelevant to the goal of behaving unprejudiced. Moreover, Study 2.1 examined if participants in the prejudice failure condition experience more discomfort with increasing internal motivation compared to the other two conditions. I expected an effect only on a self-directed negative affect, as discomfort, but not on an other-directed negative affect. In Study 2.2 I investigated whether higher internally motivated participants show more effort in terms of a more deliberate processing on a stereotype rejection paradigm after failure in behaving unprejudiced. Finally, in Study 2.3, I seek to demonstrate that failure subsequently changes participants' level of prejudice, depending on the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced.

### *Study 2.1*

#### **Method**

##### *Design and participants*

An experiment with three conditions (prejudice failure vs. control failure vs. no failure) was conducted. Internal motivation to behave unprejudiced was measured as continuous independent variable. Participants were 118 students (66 female, 52 male) from the University of Jena with a mean age of 23 years (range: 18-31).

##### *Procedure*

Upon arrival to the laboratory participants were informed that they would participate in several unrelated studies and received the first questionnaire assessing internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced. Other items were added to conceal



the purpose of this questionnaire. To separate the assessment of the motivation to behave unprejudiced from the manipulation, the second questionnaire requested self ratings. Due to the high involvement resulting from the reference to the self, this task should distract from the topic of prejudice.

After the participants had completed the second questionnaire, they took part in a categorization task similar to the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) with Arabs and Germans (as the in-group) being the relevant categories. They were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (prejudice failure vs. control failure vs. no failure). In all three conditions the task consisted of five blocks (three practice blocks and two critical blocks) with 140 trials in total. The practice blocks consisted of 20 trials each and the critical blocks of 40 trials. In the first practice block participants were asked to categorize attributes as positive or negative (e.g., happy, love vs. mean, murder) and in the second practice block pictures of faces as either Arabic or German. The second practice block was followed by a critical block. In the critical blocks words and faces were paired and participants had to categorize both stimuli simultaneously. The first critical block was a consistent block, where German + positive and Arab + negative shared the same key. In contrast, in the inconsistent block German + negative and Arab + positive shared the same key. Before the inconsistent block, participants worked on the third practice block where the concept discrimination was reversed.

The task slightly differed depending on the experimental condition. Participants in the *prejudice failure condition* had to work through the blocks as described above. Afterwards, participants in this condition received the feedback that they had a more negative attitude towards Arabs than towards Germans to amplify the failure experience usually made during an IAT (Monteith et al., 2001). In both, the *control failure condition* and the *no failure condition* the inconsistent block of the categorization task was replaced by an additional consistent block, because participants were not meant to experience any failure in controlling prejudice. Participants in the *no failure condition* did not receive any feedback. In the *control failure condition* the categorization task was described as a task measuring cognitive flexibility. All participants in that condition received a negative feedback pertaining to their cognitive flexibility. Thus, only participants in the *prejudice failure condition* experienced the difficulty of controlling their prejudice during the task and received feedback accordingly.

Following the IAT, all participants completed a questionnaire measuring discomfort and perceived difficulty of the IAT. Afterwards they were asked for their sociodemographic

data, including ethnicity (no participant was of Arabic background). Finally, they were thanked, thoroughly debriefed and received 5 Euros as compensation.

### *Measures*

*Manipulation checks.* In all three studies perceived difficulty of the IAT was measured on a 7-point scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*) with a single item (“The task was difficult”).

The *internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced* was assessed by a German translation of the scales introduced by Plant and Devine (1998). All items were rephrased to ask for internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced towards Arabs (e.g., internal motivation: “I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards Arabs because it is personally important to me”, external motivation: “I try to hide any negative thoughts about Arabs in order to avoid negative reactions from others”). The items had to be rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (*does not apply*) to 7 (*does fully apply*). Internal consistency for the two scales was good (internal and external motivation  $\alpha = .82$  and  $\alpha = .81$ , respectively).

*Discomfort* was assessed by a German translation of the items used by Monteith et al. (1993). The scale consisted of six items (uneasy, tense, fearful, threatened, bothered, and embarrassed). Subjects had to indicate how well each of the six items described their actual feelings on a 7-point scale from 1 (*does not apply*) to 7 (*does fully apply*). Internal consistency for the scale was good ( $\alpha = .75$ ).

*Negative affect towards others* was assessed by a German translation of the items used by Monteith et al. (1993). The scale consisted of three items (angry at others, irritated at others, and disgusted with others). Subjects had to indicate how well each of the three items described their actual feelings on a 7-point scale from 1 (*does not apply*) to 7 (*does fully apply*). Internal consistency for the scale was good ( $\alpha = .78$ ).

## **Results**

### *Manipulation checks*

The perceived difficulty of the categorization task differed between conditions,  $F(2,115) = 3.81$ ,  $p = .025$ ,  $\eta^2 = .062$ . To test whether task difficulty was higher in the prejudice failure condition ( $M = 2.10$ ,  $SD = 1.64$ ) and the control failure condition ( $M = 1.84$ ,  $SD = 1.91$ ) than in the no failure condition ( $M = 1.12$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ ) two orthogonal contrasts (focal contrast: 1 1 -2; residual contrast: -1 1 0) were computed. The focal contrast revealed a significant effect,  $F(1,115) = 7.11$ ,  $p = .009$ ,  $\eta^2 = .058$ . The residual contrast was

not significant  $F(1,115) < 1$ . Hence, both failure conditions led to a similar experience. Before analyzing the IAT data from the prejudice failure condition, erroneous responses (7%) and outliers (3%), that is response time data that were two standard deviations above the mean response time ( $>2,460$  ms) or below 150 ms, were excluded. For participants in the prejudice failure condition the classical IAT-effect was found  $t(39) = 6.77, p < .001$  ( $M = 186, SD = 174$ ), indicating a more positive attitude towards Germans than towards Arabs.

### *Discomfort*

I predicted that higher internal motivation but not external motivation to behave unprejudiced would lead to more discomfort in the prejudice failure condition, but not in the other two conditions. Moreover, I expected an effect for discomfort being a self-directed negative affect but not for other-directed negative affect. To test these hypotheses, regression analyses were computed with failure, internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced and the failure x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced and failure x external motivation to behave unprejudiced interactions as predictors (see Table 2.1). Following Aiken and West (1991), the interaction terms were computed by a multiplication of the z-standardized internal motivation score with two unweighted effect codes of the failure variable (contrast 1: -1 prejudice failure, 0 control failure, and 1 no failure; contrast 2: 0 prejudice failure, -1 control failure, and 1 no failure). Unweighted contrast coding was used so that the betas from the interaction can be interpreted, and no  $\Delta R^2$  test has to be computed (Aiken & West, 1991).

**Table 2.1:** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Discomfort on Failure and Internal and External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced (N = 118).


	Discomfort
Failure1	-.04
Failure2	.08
Internal Motivation	.09
External Motivation	.18
Failure1 x External Motivation	.14
Failure2 x External Motivation	-.05
Failure1 x Internal Motivation	-.26*
Failure2 x Internal Motivation	.18

*Note.* Failure1 contrast: prejudice failure -1, control failure 0, no failure 1; Failure2 contrast: prejudice failure 0, control failure -1, no failure 1.

\*  $p < .05$ .

There were no main effects of external or internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .18, p = .059$  and  $\beta = .09, p = .365$ , respectively) and failure (contrast 1:  $\beta = -.04, p = .722$ ; contrast 2:  $\beta = .08, p = .481$ ). In line with my expectation the failure x external motivation to behave unprejudiced interactions had no impact on participants discomfort (contrast 1:  $\beta = .14, p = .223$ ; contrast 2:  $\beta = -.05, p = .678$ ), whereas the failure x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction had (contrast 1:  $\beta = -.26, p = .027$ ; contrast 2:  $\beta = .18, p = .127$ ). As predicted, simple slope analysis following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) revealed that internal motivation led to more discomfort in the prejudice failure condition ( $\beta = .40, p = .023$ ) but no such effect was found in the no failure condition ( $\beta = -.01, p = .947$ ) and the control failure condition ( $\beta = -.13, p = .469$ , see Figure 2.1).

A multiple regression with negative affect towards others as criterion variable and the same set of predictors as above neither led to a failure x internal motivation interaction (contrast 1:  $\beta = -.04, p = .766$ ; contrast 2:  $\beta = -.14, p = .266$ ), nor to a failure x external motivation interaction (contrast 1:  $\beta = -.01, p = .916$ ; contrast 2:  $\beta = -.15, p = .226$ ). No main effects were found (all  $|\beta_s| < .12$ ; all  $p_s > .50$ ).



Note. \*  $p < .05$ .

**Figure 2.1.** Discomfort as a function of internal motivation and failure condition ( $N = 118$ ).

## Discussion

The results support the hypothesis that the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, the stronger is the participants' feeling of discomfort after prejudice failure compared to situations without failure or failure irrelevant to the goal of behaving unprejudiced. This effect was restricted to the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced and did not generalize to the external motivation to behave unprejudiced. Thus, the current findings are in line with earlier findings, showing that failure in behaving unprejudiced leads to discomfort for low but not for high prejudiced individuals (e.g., Monteith et al., 1993). Moreover, they extend the previous research in two ways: First, by explicitly specifying the source of motivation underlying the low level of prejudice (i.e., internal rather than external motivation) and second, by comparing the prejudice failure condition not only to a no failure condition, but also to a control failure condition. As expected, higher internal motivation only led to stronger feelings of discomfort in the prejudice failure condition. It thereby supports the notion that the results are not due to general negative feedback, but that the increase in discomfort resulting from higher internal motivation is an effect of prejudice related failure most likely pertaining to the awareness of discrepancies. Moreover, a multiple regression with negative affect towards others as criterion did not reveal any effects, thereby indicating that participants attribute the discrepancy internally.

## *Study 2.2*

Study 2.2 sought to provide evidence for the prediction that with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced individuals will strive to compensate for failure in behaving unprejudiced, if they are provided with an opportunity. More precisely, Study 2.2 aimed to extend Study 2.1 by showing that failure in behaving unprejudiced will lead to more effort on subsequent goal relevant tasks with increasing internal motivation. In addition, it should demonstrate that the effects of failure and internal motivation are not specific to the category of Arabs. Therefore, some alterations were made from Study 2.1 to Study 2.2. First, the task used to provide participants with feedback did not pertain specifically to the categories Germans and Arabs, but to a wide range of social categories. Second, the affect measure was replaced by an effort measure. Following the feedback, participants this time worked on a stereotype rejection paradigm, where they had to reject stereotypes as fast as possible. Moreover, due to the non-existing difference between the no failure condition and the control failure condition in Study 2.1, Study 2.2 did not include a control failure condition.

Considering participants' performance on the stereotype rejection paradigm, I expected that with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced participants would show more effort to behave unprejudiced after failure in behaving unprejudiced, but not in a control condition. Increased effort in the stereotype rejection paradigm should result in increased response times required for the self-monitoring but also lead to fewer errors. Similarly, Gray (1982) argues that the inhibition of discrepant responses involves the activation of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS). The activation of the BIS entails thoughtful and deliberate processing and inhibits the more automatic responses. Based upon this idea, studies concerning the regulation of prejudice (Monteith et al., 2002) have shown that the control of prejudiced responses involves behavioral inhibition and a slowdown of responses. Hence, I expected that failure in behaving unprejudiced results in an increased effort (i.e., greater response times and less errors) to avoid the expression of prejudice on the stereotype rejection paradigm for higher internally motivated participants.

## **Method**

### *Design and participants*

An experiment with two conditions (prejudice failure vs. no failure) was conducted. Again, internal motivation to behave unprejudiced was assessed as an independent variable.

Participants were 60 students (31 female, 29 male) from the University of Jena with a mean age of 24 years (range: 19-41).

### *Procedure*

As in Study 2.1, participants first filled out a questionnaire with measures for internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced, which was followed by a self-related distractor task. Afterwards, participants took part in a categorization task similar to the one in Study 2.1. It differed from Study 2.1 in the following respects: (1) Instead of Arabs and Germans, the relevant categories were “Me” and “Others”. Thus, instead of categorizing Arabs and Germans, participants were asked to categorize whether or not they are part of a presented social category (e.g. smoker, student, man, woman). In the consistent blocks me + positive words and others + negative words shared the same key and in inconsistent blocks me + negative words and others + positive words. (2) Participants in the prejudice failure condition received the feedback that they had more negative attitudes towards others (out-groups) than towards their in-group. Participants in the no failure condition as before did not experience the difficulty of controlling their prejudice, because they did neither receive inconsistent trials during the task nor any direct feedback conforming this experience. As in Study 2.1, perceived difficulty of the task was measured with a single item.

After having finished this task, participants worked on the stereotype rejection paradigm. In several trials they had to respond as fast as possible to sentences that appeared in random order on the computer screen. There were three different types of sentences: stereotypic sentences (e.g. “Muslims are fanatic”), correct control sentences (e.g. “Pianists are musicians”) and incorrect control sentences (e.g. “Lemons are sweet”). Participants were asked to respond to all stereotypic sentences, irrespective of valence, with “no”, to correct control sentences with “yes” and to incorrect control sentences with “no”. By including social categories in the control sentences it was avoided that participants could respond negatively to all sentences starting with a social category without processing them completely. In each trial, first a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms in the center of the screen. Before the target appeared, the screen turned blank for 100 ms. The target was shown in 24 pt. letters and participants were asked to respond with “yes” or “no” according to the instructions. The next trial started 250 ms after the participants’ response. After 10 practice trials, participants had to work through 120 trials including 20 critical trials, 60 correct control trials, and 40 incorrect control trials, resulting in an equal amount of targets

to be answered with “yes” or “no”. After having finished the stereotype rejection paradigm, participants were asked for their sociodemographic data. Finally, they were thanked, thoroughly debriefed and received 5 Euros as compensation.

### *Measures*

In contrast to Study 2.1, in Study 2.2 *internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced* was measured in a generalized manner (in the sense of not specifically being geared towards one social category). Internal consistency for the two subscales was good (internal and external motivation  $\alpha = .92$  and  $\alpha = .82$ , respectively).

*Effort to avoid stereotyping* was measured with the stereotype rejection paradigm. The critical response was the response to stereotypic sentences. The response latencies and error rates towards the other sentences served as controls. Outliers were eliminated from the response time data before the latencies were averaged separately for the three types of sentences. More precisely, all responses that were more than two standard deviations above the mean response time were excluded from the analysis reported below (5 %). Another 14 % of the trials were excluded from the response time analysis because of wrong answers. The mean response times for stereotypic targets was 1,572 ms ( $SD = 783$ ), for correct control trials 1,832 ms ( $SD = 918$ ), and for incorrect control trials 1,857 ms ( $SD = 986$ ). The mean error rates for stereotypic trials were 4.68 ( $SD = 4.38$ ), 23 %, for correct control trials 6.73 ( $SD = 5.41$ ), 11 %, and for incorrect control trials 4.90 ( $SD = 2.33$ ), 12 %. Response times and error rates are known to be equally good indicators of the same process (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). When the stimuli themselves become rather difficult to judge, which according to the mean response time seems to be the case in the current paradigm, effects are more likely to appear on error rates than on response times (MacLeod, 1991). At the same time, the predicted effortful processing is likely to lead to longer response times where any effects of automatic processes are concealed by other effects, leading to null effects for the response time measure, but to a significant effect on response errors (Schubert, 2005). Given that increased effort will lead to fewer errors but higher response times for stereotypic sentences, both measures were z-standardized and summarized accordingly. Hence, higher values indicate greater effort.



## Results

### *Manipulation checks*

Participants in the prejudice failure condition ( $M = 2.33$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ) rated the categorization task more difficult compared to participants in the no failure condition ( $M = 1.27$ ,  $SD = 1.46$ ),  $t(58) = 2.82$ ,  $p = .007$ .

### *Effort to avoid stereotyping*

It was predicted that higher internal motivation (but not higher external motivation) to behave unprejudiced leads to more effort to avoid behaving prejudiced<sup>2</sup> only after prejudice failure feedback. To test this hypothesis, a regression analysis was conducted with failure, internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced, the failure x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced and the failure x external motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction as predictors, and the effort index from stereotypic trial as criterion (see Table 2.2).

**Table 2.2.** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Effort to Avoid Stereotyping on Failure and Internal and External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced (N = 60).


	Effort to avoid stereotyping
Failure	-.09
Internal Motivation	-.01
External Motivation	.04
Failure x External Motivation	.10
Failure x Internal Motivation	.23*

*Note.* \*  $p < .05$ .

The effort index from incorrect control trials was included as covariate in order to control for the interindividual differences in effort ( $\beta = .68$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The multiple regression neither revealed a main effect for internal or external motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = -.01$ ,  $p = .910$  and  $\beta = .04$ ,  $p = .655$ , respectively) nor for failure ( $\beta = -.09$ ,  $p = .360$ ). As expected, the failure x external motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction had no impact on participants' effort to avoid behaving prejudiced ( $\beta = -.09$ ,  $p = .325$ ), but

the failure x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction had a significant impact on effort to avoid behaving prejudiced ( $\beta = .23, p = .022$ ).

Simple slope analyses following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) insinuate that internal motivation led to more effortful processing in the prejudice failure condition which is reflected in less errors at the expense of increased response times on stereotypic sentences ( $\beta = .22, p = .082$ ). The opposite tendency was found in the no failure condition ( $\beta = -.24, p = .116$ , see Figure 2.2).



*Note.* To avoid negative values the covariates from the multiple regression were not included in the computation of the graph.

<sup>+</sup>  $p < .09$ .

**Figure 2.2.** Effort to avoid stereotyping as a function of internal motivation and failure condition (N = 60).

## Discussion

Study 2.2 supports the prediction that after failing in behaving unprejudiced higher internal motivation to behave unprejudiced elicits more effort to avoid prejudiced behavior. For participants in the no failure condition, internal motivation did not influence the effort to avoid prejudice. In other words, with increasing internal motivation after failure in behaving unprejudiced participants spent more effort on responding to stereotypic sentences. In line with existing research (Schubert, 2005), the predicted increase in effortful processing led to null effects for the response times, but a significant effect on response errors ( $\beta = -.23, p = .050$ ), mirroring the interaction pattern reported above.

Study 2.2 extends the results found in Study 2.1 by showing that prejudice related failure causes, apart from affective reactions (in case no option for compensatory behavior is given), more effort to behave unprejudiced with increasing internal motivation (in case an option for compensatory behavior is given). The results indicate that after failure high internally motivated individuals exert greater self-control (i.e., assert more intentional effort). Hence, especially the controlled components of unprejudiced behavior help the internally motivated to overcome prejudice. Although the multiple regressions revealed the expected interaction pattern, the results of the simple slope analysis call for further affirmation. The relatively weak effects found in Study 2.2 might be due to characteristics of the used paradigm. Compared to established paradigms (as for example the IAT) that mostly measure prejudice geared towards a certain social categorization (e.g. Black vs. White), in the current paradigm the salience of a certain social categorization was comparably low due to the multitude of categories used.

### ***Study 2.3***

Study 2.3 sought to provide further support for the hypothesis that failure in behaving unprejudiced will elicit compensatory behavior (i.e., change individual prejudice), depending on the level of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. To that end two alterations were made from Study 2.2 to Study 2.3. To enhance the salience of categorization, I now again used the categories Arabs vs. Germans. Furthermore, instead of effort to behave unprejudiced, the paradigm used in Study 2.3 tried to tap more into prejudiced behavior (as compared to effort). I predicted that with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (but not external motivation) failure in behaving unprejudiced would lead to less prejudice in a subsequent situation. This effect was not expected without experiencing failure.

## **Method**

### *Design and participants*

An experiment with two conditions (prejudice failure vs. no failure) was conducted. Internal motivation to behave unprejudiced was measured as continuous independent variable. Participants were 93 undergraduate students (68 female, 25 male) from the University of Jena with a mean age of 21 years (range: 18-27).

### *Procedure*

Apart from the dependent measure, the procedure and materials in Study 2.3 were the same as in Study 2.1. As in Study 2.1, participants worked on a categorization task similar to the IAT with the relevant categories Arab and German. After the categorization task all participants went on to complete a questionnaire which measured prejudice toward Arabs, the dependent variable. They read six different stories about a person with either a German or an Arabic name and were asked to judge the person's behavior on different adjectives. Afterwards participants were asked for their sociodemographic data, including ethnicity (no participant was of Arabic background). Finally, they were thanked, thoroughly debriefed, and received 5 Euros as compensation.

### *Measures*

The *internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced* was assessed as in Study 2.1. Internal consistency for the two subscales was good (internal and external motivation  $\alpha = .77$  and  $\alpha = .81$ , respectively).

*Prejudice towards Arabs* was assessed through a person judgment task adapted from the Donald paradigm (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; and Kawakami, Spears, & Dovidio, 2002). Six ambiguous descriptions of men including a number of activities were presented. Participants were asked to form an impression of each person while reading the paragraph and to subsequently rate the extent to which several adjectives (aggressive, amiable, clever, stupid, unpleasant, pleasant, friendly, unfriendly, likeable, dislikeable) applied to the person using a 9-point scale from 1 (*does not apply*) to 9 (*applies very much*). In three of the six stories the person described had a typical German name and in three stories the person had a typical Arabic name resulting in two subscales *Prejudice towards Arabs* ( $\alpha = .91$ ) and *Attitude towards Germans* ( $\alpha = .85$ ). Through pilot testing two parallel sets were constructed that did not differ in perceived valence. The order of the target paragraphs, whether participants received the description of a German or an Arabic target person first, was counterbalanced across participants. For data analysis all positive adjectives were recoded and a mean score was computed, so that higher values would indicate a more negative description of the person.

## Results

### *IAT data*

Before analyzing the IAT data from the prejudice failure condition erroneous responses (6%) and outliers (6%), that is, response time data that were two standard deviations above ( $> 1,632$  ms) or below ( $< 50$  ms) the mean response time, were excluded. As in Study 2.1, there was an IAT-effect in the prejudice failure condition,  $t(47) = 8.22, p < .001$  ( $M = 129, SD = 109$ ). The perceived difficulty of the IAT in the prejudice failure condition was  $M = 2.5$  ( $SD = 1.40$ ).

### *Prejudice towards Arabs*

It was hypothesized that higher internal motivation (but not external motivation) to behave unprejudiced results in less prejudice towards Arabs after prejudice failure (but not in the control condition). To test this prediction a regression analysis with prejudice towards Arabs on failure, internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced, the failure x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, and the failure x external motivation to behave unprejudiced interactions was conducted (see Table 2.3). The attitude towards Germans was included as a covariate in order to control for the interindividual differences in scale usage ( $\beta = .40, p < .001$ ).


**Table 2.3.** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Prejudice towards Arabs and Attitude towards Germans on Failure and Internal and External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced ( $N = 93$ ).

	Prejudice towards Arabs	Attitude towards Germans
Failure	<.01	-.05
Internal Motivation	-.22*	.12
External Motivation	.09	-.18 <sup>+</sup>
Failure x External Motivation	.09	-.04
Failure x Internal Motivation	-.23*	.18 <sup>+</sup>

*Note.* \*  $p < .05$ , +  $p < .10$ .

The regression revealed that higher levels of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced lead to less prejudice towards Arabs ( $\beta = -.22, p = .028$ ). Neither external

motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .09, p = .345$ ) nor failure ( $\beta < .01, p = .969$ ) or the failure x external motivation interaction ( $\beta = .09, p = .346$ ) had an impact on the prejudice towards Arabs. As predicted the failure x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction had a significant impact on prejudice towards Arabs ( $\beta = -.23, p = .021$ ). Simple slope analysis following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) revealed that internal motivation led to less negative evaluations of Arabs in the prejudice failure condition ( $\beta = -.40, p = .001$ ) but no such effect was found in the no failure condition ( $\beta = .05, p = .727$ , see Figure 2.3). The results support the hypothesis that the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, the less prejudice individuals will show after failure in behaving unprejudiced compared to situations without failure.



Note. \*\*\*  $p = .001$ .

**Figure 2.3.** Prejudice towards Arabs as a function of internal motivation and failure condition (N = 93).

An analogous multiple regressions with attitude towards Germans as criterion variable, using prejudice towards Arabs respectively as a covariate ( $\beta = .40, p < .001$ ), did not lead to main effects of internal or external motivation or failure, all  $\beta$ s  $< .18$ , all  $p$ s  $> .06$ . Neither the failure x external motivation ( $\beta = -.04, p = .684$ ) nor the failure x internal motivation interaction ( $\beta = .18, p = .07$ ) were significant. Simple slope analysis revealed that internal motivation led to more negative evaluations of Germans in the prejudice failure condition ( $\beta = .28, p = .035$ ), but no effect was found in the no failure condition ( $\beta = -.09, p = .551$ ).

## **Discussion**

The results of this study are in line with the preceding results. They demonstrate that failure in behaving unprejudiced actually leads to less prejudice in a subsequent task for high but not for low internally motivated individuals. Given the nature of the dependent measure, I had the possibility to control for the evaluation of the in-group (Germans) while measuring the evaluation of the out-group, in this case prejudice towards Arabs. With increasing internal motivation failure led to less negative attitudes towards Arabs, but not towards Germans, indicating that the effect is not due to a general carefulness in evaluating others, but is a specific compensatory behavior after failure concerning the goal to behave unprejudiced. This finding is in line with the self completion theory's assumption that the compensation for failure on identity related standards is restricted to tasks in the domain (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). However, for the attitude towards Germans there was a trend for the failure x internal motivation interaction. After failure higher internal motivation resulted in less positive attitudes towards Germans. If anything, this trend can be interpreted as complementary to the more positive evaluation of Arabs after failure with increasing internal motivation. Given that the feedback used Germans as a reference group, a bidirectional adjustment seems to be a functional compensation for the failure experience.

### ***Discussion Chapter 2***

The goal of the present research was to examine the role of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced in the self-regulation of prejudiced responses. The present work specifically aimed at contributing to the process underlying the positive effect of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. Based upon the findings of the model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses (Monteith, 1993) and self completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), I expected that failure plays a central role in this process. It was hypothesized that responses to failure in behaving unprejudiced will differ depending on internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. More specifically, it was expected that after prejudice related failure (but not after failure unrelated to prejudice or situations without failure) higher levels of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced will lead to more discomfort, more effort to compensate, and less prejudice. Study 2.1 showed that after failure in behaving unprejudiced higher internally motivated individuals are feeling more discomfort compared to individuals who did not fail in behaving unprejudiced. Most interestingly, this pattern was only found in response to failure in behaving unprejudiced and not in response to prejudice unrelated failure. Because Study 2.1 did not provide

participants with a possibility to compensate for their failure on future, goal relevant tasks, I conducted a second study, in which participants were provided with an opportunity for compensation. Study 2.2 demonstrated that after failure in behaving unprejudiced increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced leads to more effort on a stereotype rejection paradigm. Moreover, it broadened the results by showing that the predicted effect emerges irrespectively of the target category. The motivation was likewise assessed without reference to a specific social category. This implies that also a category-unspecific, prejudice-related negative feedback will lead to a general effort to behave unprejudiced with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. Study 2.3 went one step further by measuring actual levels of prejudice instead of effort. It showed that internal motivation after failure in behaving unprejudiced reduced actual prejudice. The same was not true for individuals who did not experience failure before. In sum, the three studies consistently provided support for the contribution of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced to the self-regulation of prejudiced responses. At the same time, no evidence for the impact of external motivation was found. These findings fit with the predictions derived from the self completion theory (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), which states that failure in identity-relevant domains, such as high internal motivation, will elicit a stronger striving to achieve that goal in future tasks, or rumination and discomfort if no option to behaviorally compensate the failure is given.

Although the pattern of results is supporting the hypothesis that the positive impact of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced can be explained by the individual reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced, some potential limitations are worth considering. First, the most important simple slope in Study 2.2 merely displayed a tendency. However, the interaction pattern was clearly significant and the (behavioral) effects were clearly replicated in Study 2.3. A second potential limitation is that affective and behavioral reactions were not assessed in a single but rather in consecutive studies. But giving participants the possibility to express their negative affective state after failure can already be considered as a form of compensation that will decrease the need for a “goal related coping” (Kidd, 1976). Previous research on the self completion theory therefore only found evidence for negative affect and compensatory actions in separate conditions (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996). For this reason, affective and behavioral reactions were measured separately. In other words, because both, the expression of negative affect and the behavioral reaction, can serve as a compensatory reaction, a mediation of the failure - compensatory behavior-relationship by affect is not feasible.



Previous research (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002) has demonstrated the central role of negative affect in the self-regulation of prejudiced responses, which will ultimately increase the likelihood of low prejudiced responses. The present research extends these findings by highlighting the crucial role of internal rather than external motivation in this process. Considering internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, the results of the present study are in line with recent research that demonstrates more successful regulation of explicit and implicit forms of prejudice for highly self-determined individuals compared to less self-determined individuals (Legault et al., 2007).

A recent study by Amodio and colleagues (Amodio et al., 2008) focuses on the role of neurophysiological measures in the context of motivation to behave unprejudiced. They demonstrate that the regulation of racial responses leads to enhanced error related negativity (ERN) for high internally motivated individuals. ERNs are a component of event related potentials (ERPs), reflecting neural sensitivity for conflict (e.g., Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The results indicate that especially high internally motivated individuals are better in regulating conflict between consciously held egalitarian beliefs and automatic race bias. More generally, Amodio et al. (2008) provide evidence for the information process enabling the control of prejudice among high internally motivated. The current studies also focus on the effect of internal motivation but use a broader time perspective. Whereas the presented data illustrate the important role of failure in the self-regulation of (un)prejudiced behavior by studying the reoccurrence of (un)prejudiced behavior, future research might investigate which self-regulatory competencies are exactly built up following failure and how they are automated on the long run.

Compared to previous research (Devine et al., 2002) the present findings do not suggest an influence of external motivation to behave unprejudiced. Throughout all studies I neither found a main effect nor an interaction of external motivation and failure (for a similar pattern of results, see Peruche & Plant, 2006). The fact that participants always received feedback not directly from the experimenter but relatively anonymously via the computer might have reduced the fear of social disapproval. Combined with a heightened private self-awareness when using a computer (Sassenberg, Boos, & Rabung, 2005), this might have reduced the potential influence of external motivation which should be especially strong in public situations. Taking previous results by Brunstein and Gollwitzer (1996) into account, the missing influence of external motivation is less surprising. They demonstrate that failure unrelated to an identity goal does not influence subsequent

performance. In other words, external motivation does not seem to play a role in compensatory reactions to failure.

Whereas previous research has already shown that conscious processes can eliminate behavioral bias (Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006), the present elaborates on the conscious control processes. My findings suggest that conscious control processes are activated precisely when individuals who are high internally motivated to behave unprejudiced realize that they failed in behaving unprejudiced (for similar results concerning low prejudiced individuals, see Monteith et al., 2002). It thus seems that high internally motivated individuals are not per se better in behaving unprejudiced, but that they have the ability to take advantage of the negative event of failure on the long run. Referring once more to the model of the self-regulation of prejudiced responses (Monteith, 1993), the present research suggests who becomes aware of prejudice related discrepancies in case of prejudiced behavior. The internal motivation to behave unprejudiced instigates individuals' awareness of discrepancies and thereby promotes subsequent compensatory actions, aimed at reducing the aversive state by reaching the identity relevant goal. Whereas my research showed that individuals react differently to failure depending on their internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, I did not investigate whether the actual awareness for the objective event of failure differed depending on the internal motivation. Further research should test more directly whether the coherence of objective failure and the subjective awareness of discrepancies changes depending on individuals' motivation.

A potential drawback of the proposed mechanism is that a series of successes might have a paradoxical effect on the regulation of prejudice. Being self completed, conscious control eventually will decrease opening the door for automatic prejudice for high internally motivated (cf., Monin & Miller, 2001). This should however reinstate the process proposed above.

## **Conclusion**

Individuals who try to behave unprejudiced will at times be confronted with the fact that they failed in behaving unprejudiced due to the impact of automatic processes. The present studies show that with increasing internal motivation the inherently negative experience of failure helps to overcome prejudice. That is, with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced individuals show more discomfort, more effort to avoid stereotyping and less prejudice if they failed in behaving unprejudiced before. Taken together, the results suggest that failure might play a key role for high internally motivated individuals in the successful regulation of prejudice.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> This, as well as the following two chapters are organized in a way that allows reading each chapter independently. Nonetheless, in sum they represent a cohesive research program.

<sup>2</sup> I am aware of the fact that stereotypes refer to cognitive representation of a social category and prejudice to the positive or negative evaluation of a social group (e.g., Smith & Mackie, 2000). However, in the context of the current study I treat the terms effort to behave unprejudiced and effort to avoid stereotyping interchangeably, as the effort to say “no” to a presented stereotype, can be seen as an indicator of the effort to behave unprejudiced.

## **Chapter 3      Internal motivation to behave unprejudiced in the context of benevolent discrimination**

Is speaking slowly and using simple wording to an obviously foreign person an act of helping, or social discrimination and prejudiced behavior? Behavior resulting from a good intention might nonetheless be experienced as an act of discrimination if the person targeted is, for example fluent in the language. Individuals have become aware of hostile forms of social discrimination and those who are motivated to avoid behaving prejudiced are often successful in doing so (Maddux et al., 2005; Olson & Fazio, 2004; Payne, 2005; for an overview see, Blair, 2002). Especially internal motivation to behave unprejudiced has proven beneficial in the control of (un)prejudiced behavior (e.g., Devine et al., 2002; Klonis et al., 2005; Peruche & Plant, 2006). Benevolent forms of discrimination, as described in the example above, have received much less attention in the public debate as well as in the scientific work about discrimination. Consequently, individuals have a hard time recognizing in the first place that even this well intended behavior might also be an act of discrimination (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005; Glick & Fiske, 1996). The purpose of the current research is to investigate the impact of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on the recognition of own benevolent discrimination and further acts of benevolent discrimination.

### ***Benevolent discrimination***

In research on social discrimination, benevolent forms of discrimination have mostly been studied within the context of benevolent sexism towards women. By definition, benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997) expresses itself in seemingly positive but patronizing beliefs about women, which lead for example to behaviors like carrying a woman's luggage or paying for her meal. One might be tempted to ask, whether benevolent discrimination is a problem at all, if it results in positive treatment. Previous research has consistently demonstrated negative consequences of benevolent sexism. It has been shown that benevolent discrimination impairs the cognitive performance of those treated in a benevolent manner (Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007). In a cross cultural study Glick and colleagues (Glick et al., 2000) have pointed at the positive relationship between benevolent sexism and indicators of gender inequality, such as participation in economy and politics. Moreover, benevolent sexism serves to increase system justification (Jost & Kay, 2005). Therefore, it seems justified to conclude that benevolent sexism,

although qualitatively different from hostile sexism, also has negative consequences for the targeted individuals.

I define benevolent discrimination in line with benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1997) as an allegedly *positive* behavior from the point of view of the actor that, as it relies on the prevailing stereotypes (e.g., “people of other color are less educated and do not speak my language properly”), maintains unequal intergroup-relations. As with benevolent sexism individuals are not aware of their prejudiced assumptions implicit in their actions. For example, secondary baby talk (Ruscher, 2001) towards foreigners might be based on a good intention and be helpful in the first instance, but on the long run, or if the interaction partner does speak the language well, it constitutes a negative behavior, because the condescendence linked to it gets in the way of a successful integration.

Beyond based on gender, benevolent discrimination has received little attention so far. More subtle forms of prejudice (cf., modern racism, McConahay, 1986; subtle prejudice, Pettigrew & Mertens, 1995; symbolic racism, Sears, 1988; aversive racism, Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) do share some features with benevolent discrimination but do not totally overlap. Among the subtle forms of discrimination aversive racism is probably closest to benevolent discrimination. But while benevolent discrimination focuses on discriminating behavior, aversive racism describes a mental state. Aversive racism captures the conflict between fair treatment and uneasy feelings towards foreigners. It is defined as conscious endorsement of egalitarian values and unconscious negative feelings towards out-group members at the same time. As a result aversive racists tend to avoid interracial interactions, because they want to avoid wrongdoing. If discrimination should occur nevertheless (e.g., in situations with weak normative structure) it consists of a more negative treatment. Individuals who show subtle forms of prejudice prefer to think about themselves as unprejudiced individuals, however in comparison with those who discriminate benevolently they lack the intention to treat the discriminated group positively, as implied by benevolence.

### **Motivation to behave unprejudiced**

Paradoxically, benevolent discrimination will only occur if individuals are motivated to show positive behavior towards stigmatized individuals. In other words, individuals who are not motivated to behave unprejudiced will most likely not show benevolent discrimination, because they lack the intention to behave positively towards the respective target group. Benevolent discrimination is thus a result of individuals'

unawareness of the stereotypes implicit in their actions and their motivation to behave unprejudiced.

Previous research by Plant and Devine (1998) has shown that individuals might be motivated for internal or external reasons to behave unprejudiced. Internal motivation to behave unprejudiced stems from internalized, personal unprejudiced beliefs and from the desire to approach egalitarianism. External motivation to behave unprejudiced reflects the desire to behave unprejudiced to avoid negative evaluations by others, if one should behave prejudiced. Research on the role of motivation in the context of prejudiced behavior (e.g., Amodio et al., 2008; Legault et al., 2007) has shown a correlation of internal motivation with the ATB scale (Brigham, 1993) as well as with symbolic or subtle prejudice (Henry & Sears, 2002), indicating a more positive attitude towards Blacks with increasing internal motivation. In contrast, external motivation did not correlate significantly with either construct. Moreover, external but not internal motivation to behave unprejudiced correlates positively with interaction anxiousness (Plant & Devine, 1998). These findings suggest that as long as individuals are not aware of the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination, a seemingly positive behavior like benevolent discrimination will most likely not be prompted by external motivation but by internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. This is because internally motivated individuals seem to be more likely to act in favor of the target group.

### **Recognizing benevolent discrimination**

Compared to hostile discrimination, it is much harder for individuals to notice that there is something wrong with benevolent discrimination. Research by Barreto and Ellemers (2005) on the perception of benevolent sexism has shown that benevolent sexism is less likely to be recognized as a discriminating act by those who are confronted with it, and it therefore often remains unchallenged. Because victims are less likely to recognize benevolent discrimination as discrimination (even though it clearly has negative consequences), perpetrators are not made aware of their wrongdoings. Thus, benevolent discrimination remains prevalent due to the fact that it is socially less condemned and because individuals do not recognize the negative side-effects and consequences of benevolent discrimination.

However, from research focusing on the actors of prejudice it is known that in order to reduce prejudice, awareness of one's prejudiced responses is a crucial step in the self-regulation of prejudiced responses (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002).

Furthermore, research on motivated information processing hints at the important role of self-evaluation (Rothermund, Bak, & Brandstätter, 2005). Rothermund and colleagues (2005) have shown that individuals who want to self-improve personal deficits are sensitive to respective information. These findings suggest that individuals who are motivated to change a behavioral deficit will need to evaluate relevant information self-critically, because only this will allow for personal improvement. Hence, to initiate actions that reduce behavioral deficits, such as benevolent discrimination, in future situations, it is essential that individuals (not only victims, but also perpetrators) become aware of its negative character and acknowledge the personal deficit in the present instance.

But what helps to recognize the negative character of benevolent discrimination? Recent research suggests that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced might play a crucial role. Positive effects of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on the recognition of subtle forms of prejudice have been demonstrated (i.e., implicit prejudice; Amodio et al., 2008; Devine et al., 2002; Gordijn et al., 2004; Plant & Devine, 2001). The main reason for this seems to be that high internally motivated individuals are better in regulating conflict between consciously held egalitarian beliefs and automatic race bias (Amodio et al., 2008). Moreover, recent studies by Sherman and colleagues (Sherman et al., 2008) have demonstrated that high internally motivated individuals are better in detecting the appropriate in contrast to the inappropriate response.

In a similar vein I am interested not in the online detection of appropriate responses, but in the self-critical (re)appraisal of a previous inappropriate response. Derived from the findings on internal motivation and subtle prejudice as well as self-evaluation, I predict that with increasing internal motivation, individuals will be more self-critical of their previous benevolently discriminating behavior, if they are provided with information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination.

### ***Overview of studies***

The primary goal of the present research is to investigate how internal motivation to behave unprejudiced influences self-critical evaluations of one's own benevolently discriminating behavior. I predict that the tendency to benevolently discriminate as well as subsequent self-criticism depends on the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. More specifically, I expect that with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced individuals will show more benevolent discrimination, but if made aware of the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination higher internal motivation to behave

unprejudiced will lead to a more critical evaluation of one's own benevolent discrimination. Moreover, I expect that information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination will disrupt the tendency to show more benevolently discriminating behavior to the extent that individuals are higher internally motivated.

I conducted three experiments to test these predictions. In all three studies internal motivation to behave unprejudiced was measured. Study 3.1 showed that with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced individuals evaluate their own, previously shown benevolently discriminating behavior more critical, if provided with information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination, but not if they did not receive such information. Study 3.2 investigated whether the self-criticism effect found in Study 3.1 is moderated by individuals' self-esteem. Moreover, Study 3.2 demonstrated that higher internally motivated individuals are more prone to show benevolent discrimination as long as not provided with information about benevolent discrimination. Finally, in Study 3.3 the same effects emerged within a culture with heightened awareness for discrimination and with motivation to behave unprejudiced measured in a pre-test several weeks before the manipulation and the dependent measures.

### *Study 3.1*

#### **Method**

##### *Design and participants*

An experiment with two conditions (information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination vs. no information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination) was conducted. Internal motivation to behave unprejudiced was measured as a continuous independent variable. Participants were 116 students from the University of Jena (Germany). Prior to analysis, 3 participants were excluded because they indicated that they were not German and thus potential targets of benevolent discrimination. Another 16 participants were excluded because they did not show any behavior that indicated benevolent discrimination (for details see below). Of the remaining 97 participants, 56 were female and 41 male. They had a mean age of 21 years (range: 18-29).



*Procedure*

When arriving to the laboratory participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination vs. no information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination). They first received the questionnaire assessing internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced. After having completed the questionnaire, all participants read a scenario that involved an obviously foreign woman who seemed to be lost. The scenario was designed with the intention that the majority of participants would show benevolently discriminating behavior, irrespective of their individual differences in internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. This was somewhat challenging because I expected that internal motivation would increase the likelihood of benevolent discrimination as long as no awareness about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination is given. Therefore, I aimed at a high proportion of responses indicating benevolent discrimination. Apart from the woman's ethnicity the described situation did not include any information from which participants could infer that the person needed special help. Thus, the category membership was the most salient characteristic on which participants could base their decision. After they had read the scenario, participants were given seven options how to behave towards the woman. For each option they had to indicate with "yes" or "no" whether they would show this behavior. The options ranged from neutral behavior (e.g., "I notice the person") to hostile behavior (e.g., "I mock the woman"). Among the seven options there was one option classified as an incidence of benevolent discrimination. The described reaction paraphrased attributes of secondary baby talk which is a typical example of benevolent discrimination towards foreigners (e.g., slower speech rate, exaggerated intonation, or shorter sentences). All participants who answered this option with "yes" ( $N = 97$ ) were included in the analysis. Due to the demand characteristics of the scenario, only 16 participants did not show benevolent discrimination. The participants' response most likely did not correlate with their level of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $r = -.065$ ,  $p = .489$ ) because of the low proportion of "no" responses. In other words, the exclusion of the participants did not lead to a restricted range of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced in the analysis reported below, which in turn would have violated the validity of the tested predictions.

Afterwards, participants in the information about benevolent discrimination condition read a faked newspaper article. The article included information about benevolent discrimination, mainly by highlighting the negative experiences from the point of view of

the discriminated individuals (e.g., that special treatment or speech leads to feelings of exclusion and precludes autonomy). Participants in the no information condition did not receive such an article. All participants then received a questionnaire measuring the reappraisal of their own behavior. Afterwards, all participants were asked for their sociodemographic data, including ethnicity. Finally, they were thanked, thoroughly debriefed, and received 2 Euros as compensation.

### *Measures*

The *internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced* was assessed by a German translation of the scales introduced by Plant and Devine (1998). All items were rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (*does not apply*) to 7 (*does fully apply*). Internal consistency for the two subscales was good (internal and external motivation  $\alpha = .84$  and  $\alpha = .87$ , respectively).

*Reappraisal of own behavior* was assessed by two subscales. Each scale consisted of three items. Subjects had to indicate how well each of the three items described their reappraisal of their previous behavior on a 6-point scale from 1 (*does not apply*) to 6 (*does fully apply*). The first subscale measured the positive reappraisal of the own behavior (e.g., “Looking back I would say that my behavior had positive consequences for the woman”) and the second subscale asked for the critical reappraisal of their previous shown behavior (e.g., “Looking back I would say the woman might have felt bad due to what I did”). The two scales were not significantly correlated ( $r = -.14$ ,  $p = .171$ ) and therefore not combined. Their internal consistency was satisfactory ( $\alpha = .76$  and  $\alpha = .62$  respectively).

## **Results**


I predicted that higher levels of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced would lead to a more positive reappraisal in the no information condition, whereas information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination should lead to a more critical reappraisal of previous benevolent discrimination compared to the control condition. To test these hypotheses two regression analyses were conducted with information, internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced as well as the information x internal motivation and information x external motivation to behave unprejudiced, interactions as predictors and positive reappraisal or critical reappraisal as criteria, respectively (see Table 3.1).

**Table 3.1.** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Positive and Critical Reappraisal on Information and Internal and External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced (N = 97).

	Positive Reappraisal	Critical Reappraisal
Information	.06	-.26*
Internal Motivation	.10	.11
External Motivation	-.11	.02
Information x Internal Motivation	.22*	-.22*
Information x External Motivation	.01	-.05

Note. \*  $p < .05$ .


The multiple regression with positive reappraisal as criterion variable revealed no main effects of information ( $\beta = .06$ ,  $p = .538$ ) and external or internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = -.11$ ,  $p = .314$  and  $\beta = .10$ ,  $p = .340$  respectively). As expected, the information x external motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction had no impact on participants' positive reappraisal ( $\beta = .01$ ,  $p = .919$ ), but the interaction of information x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .22$ ,  $p = .036$ ) had a significant effect on participants positive reappraisal of their previous behavior. Simple slope analysis following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) revealed that internal motivation led to a more positive reappraisal of the own behavior if no information was provided ( $\beta = .32$ ,  $p = .042$ ), but the same was not true in the information about benevolent discrimination condition ( $\beta = -.12$ ,  $p = .384$ , see Figure 3.1a).



Note. \*  $p < .05$ .

**Figure 3.1a.** Positive reappraisal as a function of internal motivation and information condition ( $N = 97$ ).

For the multiple regression with critical reappraisal as criterion variable there were no effects of external or internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .02, p = .878$  and  $\beta = .11, p = .262$ , respectively). However, information had an effect on participants' critical reappraisal ( $\beta = -.26, p = .010$ ), in that information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination led to a more critical reappraisal. The information  $\times$  external motivation to behave unprejudiced interactions had no impact on participants' critical reappraisal of their previous benevolently discriminating behavior ( $\beta = -.05, p = .606$ ), but as expected the interaction of information  $\times$  internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = -.22, p = .029$ ) had. In line with my prediction, simple slope analysis revealed that internal motivation led to a more critical evaluation of the own behavior if information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination was provided ( $\beta = .34, p = .014$ ), but not when no information was provided ( $\beta = -.11, p = .467$  see Figure 3.1b).



Note. \*  $p < .05$ .

**Figure 3.1b.** Critical reappraisal as a function of internal motivation and information condition (N = 97).

## Discussion

The results support the hypothesis that the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, the more critical individuals evaluate their previous benevolently discriminating behavior, if they received information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination. However, as long as they are not aware of the harmful effects, higher internal motivation does not promote a more critical reappraisal. In contrast, individuals judged their own benevolent behavior towards foreigners more positively with increasing internal motivation as long as they were not aware about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination. This is consistent with the assumption that not being aware of the negative consequences leads to higher levels of benevolent discrimination among those high in internal motivation.

Knowing that self-esteem is highly relevant whenever individuals anticipate or experience failure (Brown & Dutton, 1995), which should follow from the confession of the own wrongdoing, I wanted to explore the role of self-esteem in the current context. Self-esteem reflects a person's beliefs about his or her own characteristics. People with a high self-esteem have a positive feeling about themselves and believe that they are valued by others; the opposite is true for people with low self-esteem (Leary & MacDonald, 2003). Having to cope with reality, people are on the one hand motivated to feel good about themselves, on the other to perceive themselves accurately (Swann, Stein-Seroussi, &

Giesler, 1992; Trope, 1986). As a result, high self-esteem individuals who generally have a better feeling about themselves, are mainly accuracy motivated. In contrast, for individuals with low self-esteem the self-protection motivation is stronger. From this it follows that reactions to failure differ depending on individuals' level of self-esteem (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Bernichon, Cook, & Brown, 2003). Thus, high and low self-esteem individuals might also cope differently with information that subtly indicates their own wrongdoing (and failure).

I therefore conducted Study 3.2 to check whether differences in self-criticism following information, as found in the first study, are moderated by individual differences in self-esteem.

### ***Study 3.2***

Study 3.2 tested whether the interaction effect of information and internal motivation found in the first Study, is dependent on individual differences in self-esteem. Further, a potential weakness of Study 3.1 was that participants in the control condition did not receive any information at all. For this reason, in the information about benevolent discrimination condition, due to the information participants received, there was time between the behavior participants indicated and the reappraisal of the same behavior. To exclude the possibility that the differences in reappraisal are simply due to a longer period of time between the behavior and its reappraisal, in Study 3.2 participants in the control condition also received information. To serve the purpose of a control condition, this information was completely neutral and irrelevant to the topic of prejudice. Moreover, in Study 3.2 I sought to provide evidence for the relationship between internal motivation to behave unprejudiced and benevolently discriminating behavior. To this end, I tested the hypothesis that with increasing internal motivation individuals show more benevolently discriminating behavior. This tendency should disappear if they are provided with information about benevolent discrimination.

## **Method**

### *Design and participants*

The design of Study 3.2 was the same as in Study 3.1. Participants were 115 students from the University of Jena (Germany). 17 participants had to be excluded because they did not show any signs of benevolent discrimination in the first part of the study. As in Study 3.1 there was, as desired, no significant relationship between the level of internal

motivation and the exclusion of participants ( $r = .003$ ,  $p = .973$ ). Of the remaining 98 participants, 48 were female and 49 male (one participant did not indicate his or her gender) with a mean age of 22 years (range: 19-35).

### *Procedure*

The procedure in Study 3.2 differed in three respects from the one in Study 3.1. First, in the beginning of the experiment participants received a questionnaire measuring self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). Second, at the end of the study, following the critical reappraisal participants received an additional questionnaire with scenarios to assess the second dependent measure, benevolent discrimination. Third, participants received either neutral information (control information) or information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination (relevant information).

### *Measures*

*Global self-esteem* was assessed by a German translation of the scale introduced by Rosenberg (1965). All items had to be rated on a 4-point scale from 1 (*does not apply*) to 4 (*does fully apply*). Internal consistency was good ( $\alpha = .78$ ).

The *internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced* was assessed as in Study 3.1. Internal consistency for the two subscales was good (internal and external motivation  $\alpha = .78$  and  $\alpha = .79$ , respectively).

*Critical reappraisal of own behavior* was assessed as in Study 3.1 ( $\alpha = .69$ ).

To assess *benevolent discrimination* participants received a second questionnaire at the end of the experiment. This questionnaire included three scenarios, each describing a situation with a potential for benevolent discrimination. Compared to the scenario in the beginning of the study, these scenarios aimed at high variances in the responses to allow for the impact of interindividual differences in internal motivation on benevolent discrimination. Participants were asked to imagine being in this situation while reading the paragraph. After each scenario they were given three response options. One option described a rather neutral behavior, one a rather hostile behavior and one an incidence of benevolent discrimination. They were asked for each option to rate the probability on a 7-point scale from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 7 (*very likely*) that they would behave in the given manner. Internal consistency for the three items measuring benevolent discrimination was rather weak ( $\alpha = .52$ ). This is most likely due to the fact that the items stem from different scenarios. They were nonetheless summarized because of their joint underlying concept

(i.e., benevolent discrimination), which admittedly does not make up a high proportion of the variance of this index.

## Results

To test whether the interaction of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced and information on critical reappraisal is driven by self-esteem, a multiple regression with critical reappraisal as criterion variable and information, internal and external motivation, self-esteem, the three two-way interactions of information x internal motivation, information x external motivation and information x self-esteem, as well as the two three-way interactions of information x self-esteem x internal motivation and information x self-esteem x external motivation as predictors was conducted (see Table 3.2). The multiple regression revealed that information on average had an effect on participants' reappraisal ( $\beta = -.28, p = .006$ ). Neither motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .09, p = .406$  for internal motivation;  $\beta = .07, p = .507$  for external motivation, respectively) nor self-esteem ( $\beta = -.08, p = .454$ ) individually had an impact on participants' critical reappraisal. The interaction of information and external motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .04, p = .704$ ) as well as the information x self-esteem interaction ( $\beta = -.07, p = .510$ ) had no impact on participants' critical reappraisal.



**Table 3.2.** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Critical Reappraisal on Information, Self-Esteem, and Internal and External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced (N = 98).


	Critical Reappraisal
Information	-.28**
Internal Motivation	.09
External Motivation	.07
Self-Esteem	-.08
Information x Internal Motivation	-.19 <sup>+</sup>
Information x External Motivation	.04
Information x Self-Esteem	-.07
Information x Self-Esteem x Internal Motivation	.02
Information x Self-Esteem x External Motivation	-.29*

*Note.* +  $p < .09$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ .

As expected, I found again the interaction effect of information and internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = -.19$ ,  $p = .083$ ). Simple slope analyses following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) suggest that internal motivation led to a more critical reappraisal of own behavior if relevant information was provided ( $\beta = .28$ ,  $p = .080$ ), but the same was not true in the control information condition ( $\beta = -.09$ ,  $p = .505$ ).

Moreover, the three-way interaction of information, self-esteem and external motivation to behave unprejudiced on critical reappraisal revealed a significant effect ( $\beta = -.29$ ,  $p = .021$ ). Simple slope analyses suggest that for participants who received no information about benevolent discrimination external motivation did not have an impact on the critical reappraisal, neither for high nor for low self-esteem participants ( $\beta = .06$ ,  $p = .782$  and  $\beta = .17$ ,  $p = .344$ , respectively). If, however, participants received information about benevolent discrimination, increasing external motivation led to less critical reappraisal for participants with low self-esteem ( $\beta = -.48$ ,  $p = .092$ , see Figure 3.2). The opposite tendency was found for participants with high self-esteem, here increasing external motivation led to a more critical reappraisal of their own behavior. ( $\beta = .54$ ,  $p = .014$ , see Figure 3.2). Most importantly, the three-way interaction of information, self-


esteem and internal motivation to behave unprejudiced had no impact on participants' critical reappraisal ( $\beta = .02, p = .912$ ).



Note.  $+ p < .09$ ,  $* p < .05$ .

**Figure 3.2.** Critical reappraisal as a function of external motivation and information condition for low self-esteem (left). Critical reappraisal as a function of external motivation and information condition for high self-esteem (right) ( $N = 98$ ).

I predicted that individuals are more prone to show benevolent discrimination if behaving unprejudiced is personally important to them (i.e., if they are internally motivated). However, as soon as individuals receive information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination, internal motivation to behave unprejudiced should not increase the propensity for benevolent discrimination anymore. To test this prediction a regression analysis was conducted with information, internal motivation to behave unprejudiced and the information  $\times$  internal motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction as predictors. The simple regression revealed that information on average had an effect on participants' probability for benevolent discrimination ( $\beta = .22, p = .029$ ), whereas no such effect was found for internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .09, p = .382$ ). As expected the information  $\times$  internal motivation to behave unprejudiced interaction had a significant impact on the probability for benevolent discrimination ( $\beta = .21, p = .037$ ). Simple slope analyses following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) display that internal motivation led to a higher probability of benevolent discrimination in the control information condition ( $\beta = .30, p = .020$ ) but this tendency disappeared in the relevant information condition ( $\beta = -.12, p = .424$ , see Figure 3.3).



Note. \*  $p < .05$ .

**Figure 3.3.** Probability of benevolent discrimination as a function of internal motivation and information condition (N = 98).

## Discussion

The results of Study 3.2 indicate that self-esteem moderates the reappraisal of benevolent discrimination among individuals who received information about its harming effects, depending on the individuals' level of external motivation to behave unprejudiced. Specifically, when receiving information about benevolent discrimination, individuals with low self-esteem show less critical reappraisal with increasing external motivation, whereas individuals with high self-esteem show more critical reappraisal with increasing external motivation to be unprejudiced. No such effect was found for internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. Importantly, the result pattern found in Study 3.1 could, also with the inclusion of self-esteem, be replicated: Providing individuals with information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination will lead them to evaluate their previous benevolently discriminating behavior towards foreigners more critically, the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced.

Moreover, Study 3.2 showed that, the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, the more individuals are prone to show benevolent discrimination, if they are not aware of its negative consequences. If participants received information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination, this effect disappeared.

### *Study 3.3*

The third study was not conducted in Germany but in The Netherlands. As stated in the beginning, awareness for discrimination is molded by public debate which among other things is reflected in migration policies. When comparing the migration policies of Germany and The Netherlands, some differences are worth stating. The political claims of migrants in The Netherlands are more publicly visible (De Wit & Koopmans, 2005), which results in greater cultural pluralism and awareness for those issues in The Netherlands compared to Germany. I therefore wondered, whether the heightened societal awareness for discrimination in The Netherlands will influence the effect of information and internal motivation on self-criticism. Thus, Study 3.3 sought to provide support for the validity of the hypothesis that increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced facilitates the critical reappraisal of one's own benevolently discriminating behavior if provided with information about its negative consequences, even in a society that is more aware of discrimination issues.

Moreover, a weakness of the first two studies is that motivation to behave unprejudiced was measured shortly before the manipulation and assessment of the critical reappraisal and one might wonder whether the activation of the motivation to behave unprejudiced in temporal proximity to the other critical measures influenced participants' decision in the scenario and their sensitivity on the reappraisal scale. To rule out such doubts, in Study 3.3 motivation to behave unprejudiced was measured in a mass-testing session several weeks before the rest of the experiment. Apart from this difference, the procedure in Study 3.3 was the same as in Study 3.1, using Dutch rather than German material.

## **Method**

### *Design and participants*

Participants were 123 undergraduate students from the University of Groningen. Of the 123 participants 30 were excluded because they did not show benevolent discrimination. As before, there was no significant relationship between exclusion of participants and internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $r = .151, p = .101$ ). Another case was excluded from further analysis because it was an obvious outlier with a studentized deleted residual greater than  $|2.66|$  ( $\alpha < .005$ ) in multiple criteria outlier analysis (Neter, Kutner, Nachtschiem, & Wasserman, 1996)<sup>1</sup>. Of the remaining 92 participants, 80 were female and 12 male. They had a mean age of 20 years (range: 18 – 44).

### *Procedure*

*Assessment of motivation to respond without prejudice.* Participants' internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced was assessed at mass-testing sessions in the beginning of the semester.

*Scenario study.* Several weeks after the mass-testing session the scenario study was administered via the University's online study system. Only participants who had participated in the mass-testing session were allowed to participate in the scenario study. They participated in return for course credits.

### *Measures*

The *internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced* was measured as before. Internal consistency for the two subscales was good (internal and external motivation  $\alpha = .73$  and  $\alpha = .75$ , respectively).

*Critical reappraisal of own behavior* was assessed with four items. Internal consistency was rather weak ( $\alpha = .49$ ). Because of the low internal consistency, analyses for this dependent measure were conducted for the whole scale as well as for single items (see footnote 2).

## **Results**


To test the hypothesis that higher internal motivation to behave unprejudiced facilitates the critical reappraisal of one's own benevolently discriminating behavior if provided with information about its negative consequences, a regression analysis was conducted with information, internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced, and the information x internal motivation and information x external motivation to behave unprejudiced interactions as predictors (see Table 3.3).

**Table 3.3.** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Critical Reappraisal on Information and Internal and External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced (N = 92).

	Critical Reappraisal
Information	-.16
Internal Motivation	.10
External Motivation	.13
Information x Internal Motivation	-.28*
Information x External Motivation	.03

Note. \*  $p < .05$

The multiple regression with critical reappraisal as criterion variable revealed no main effects (all  $|\beta_s| < .17$ ; all  $p_s > .13$ ). As predicted the information x external motivation interaction ( $\beta = .03$ ,  $p = .817$ ) had no impact on critical reappraisal, but the interaction of information x internal motivation to behave unprejudiced had a significant effect on critical reappraisal of own benevolently discriminating behavior ( $\beta = -.28$ ,  $p = .011$ ). Similar results were obtained when computing a GLM for each single item<sup>2</sup>. Simple slope analysis following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) revealed that higher internal motivation led to a more critical reappraisal in the relevant information condition ( $\beta = .38$ ,  $p = .018$ ), whereas in the no information condition higher internal motivation did not influence participants' critical reappraisal ( $\beta = -.18$ ,  $p = .217$ , see Figure 3.4).



Note. \*  $p < .05$ .

**Figure 3.4.** Critical reappraisal as a function of internal motivation and information condition (N = 92).

## Discussion

The results of this study are in line with the preceding results. They indicate that the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, the more self-critical individuals evaluate their own previous benevolently discriminating behavior, after having received information about its negative consequences. But if they do not receive information about benevolent discrimination, higher internal motivation will not lead to a more critical reappraisal. Because of the conceptual and contextual differences of Study 3.3, I can infer that the interaction of information and internal motivation on self-criticism is neither dependent on the situational activation of internal motivation nor on the chronic heightened awareness for egalitarian treatment of foreigners. In other words, the described effect is general and independent of the context and its sensitivity to discrimination issues.

### *Discussion Chapter 3*

The goal of the present research was to examine the role of motivation to behave unprejudiced in the context of benevolent discrimination. More specifically, the present work aimed at understanding the circumstances that foster self-criticism after benevolent discrimination. It was postulated that with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced individuals are more likely to self-criticize their own benevolently discriminating behavior once they are aware of the negative consequences. Study 3.1

showed that information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination disrupts the tendency to evaluate previous benevolent behavior more positively and increases the negative evaluation of previous benevolently discriminating behavior, the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. In Study 3.2 I investigated whether self-criticism and future behavior is moderated by individuals' level of self-esteem. It turned out that self-esteem influenced self-criticism depending on external motivation to behave unprejudiced, but did not moderate the effect of internal motivation. The interaction effect of internal motivation and information on self-criticism persisted. Interestingly, after receiving information about the harmful effects of benevolent discrimination, benevolently discriminating behavior was not influenced by self-esteem, but only by internal motivation. That is, as long as individuals are not aware of the negative impact of benevolent discrimination, higher internal motivation to behave unprejudiced will increase benevolently discriminating behavior. Once aware of the negative consequences, this trend will disappear.

Study 3.3 finally demonstrated the stability of the impact of internal motivation on self-criticism after benevolent discrimination. The effect appeared also without internal motivation measured directly in the beginning of the experiment and in a different societal context where awareness for discrimination is more pronounced. In sum, the present research suggests that raising the awareness for the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination will increase self-critical reappraisal of previous benevolently discriminating behavior the more, the higher internally motivated individuals are. The downside is that as long as individuals are not aware of the negative consequences, they tend to see the positive aspects of benevolent discrimination more with increasing internal motivation and are more prone to show benevolent discrimination.

The current studies are the first to examine the reactions of actors of benevolent discrimination. Although the results shed light on the process of self-criticism, they are premature in some sense. For instance, the suggestion that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced increases the liability to benevolent discrimination is based on the assessment of benevolent discrimination at the end of the study with an additionally modestly reliable scale. The low reliability might be due to the fact that benevolent discrimination was measured through three different scenarios, describing different target groups, different situations, and consequently different forms of benevolent discrimination. However, the inferences made for the relationship of internal motivation and benevolently discriminating behavior are plausible as they are in line with the result pattern for positive reappraisal. As



long as individuals receive no information about benevolent discrimination, increasing internal motivation leads to a more positive reappraisal which is consistent with an increased propensity for benevolent discrimination.

Throughout all three studies, the scenario, as desired, provoked benevolent discrimination in the majority of participants, irrespective of their level of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. This might call doubt upon the conclusion that internal motivation increases the liability for benevolent discrimination. However, the actual measurement of benevolent discrimination in Study 3.2, that was designed to be more sensitive to the impact of individual differences in internal motivation, demonstrated the desired effect: Higher internal motivation led to more benevolent discrimination as long as individuals were not aware of the negative consequences. Once aware of the negative consequences, this trend disappeared. These results are in line with the results from Study 3.1 where increasing internal motivation led to a more positive reappraisal as long as individuals were not aware of the harmful effects of benevolent discrimination. Nonetheless, future studies should find a more compelling way to measure benevolent discrimination, preferably not by means of a scenario, but in terms of actual behavior.

Given the consistently positive impact of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on the reduction of prejudiced behavior in previous research, compared to the rather disrupting influence of external motivation to behave unprejudiced (e.g., Devine et al., 2002; Hausmann & Ryan, 2004; Plant & Devine, 2001), the present results may seem rather puzzling. Taking a closer look at the motives underlying internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced, the seemingly contradictory findings become more intelligible. Internal motivation to behave unprejudiced mainly reflects the desire to behave unprejudiced to approach egalitarianism, whereas external motivation is primarily related to the desire to avoid wrongdoing and sanctions by others. In other words, internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced seem to be linked to different strategies in intergroup interactions; internal motivation to approach related strategies and external motivation to avoidance related strategies (for reviews see Elliot, 1999; Higgins, 1997). Looking at behaviors that constitute benevolent discrimination it is obvious that most of them are rather approach oriented behaviors. Thus, in the context of benevolent discrimination not external but internal motivation to behave unprejudiced seems to be the driving force.

When developing the construct of benevolent sexism, Glick and Fiske (1997) argued that the mutual interdependency of men and women renders benevolent

discrimination especially likely. Interdependency is less relevant for interracial relationships. However, I think that the wish to avoid hostile discrimination (for whatever reason) is sufficient for the emergence of benevolent discrimination. In other words, benevolent sexism is a special and, until now, the best researched type of benevolent discrimination. Although I did not test this hypothesis, I therefore assume that with increasing internal motivation individuals should be as self-critical about benevolent sexism as about benevolent discrimination.

When putting benevolent discrimination in the broader context of prejudiced behavior, it is in some way just another manifestation of individuals' explicit wish to behave unprejudiced, and their inability to overcome implicit stereotypes. Previous research by Czopp and Monteith (2003) has looked at the effectiveness of directly confronting individuals with their prejudiced behaviors. The present research suggests that already a very subtle confrontation with one's prejudiced responses by means of information is enough to influence individuals' way of thinking about their own behavior. Concerning the methodology, the strength of the current paradigm is that I confronted participants about their actual own, and not purely imagined behavior. Moreover, the present studies extend previous work to the domain of benevolent discrimination, by testing the potential of raising individuals' awareness for the reduction of benevolent discrimination. Whereas the current data illustrate the effectiveness of self-criticism for the reduction of benevolent discrimination, future studies might want to compare more directly the potential differences in self-criticism between hostile and benevolent discrimination.

When speculating about the consequences of the present research in a broader context, one might start to wonder whether the results implicate that any positive or preferential treatment of stigmatized individuals, as for example in the case of affirmative action policies, implies discrimination. I think that there are some important differences between affirmative action and benevolent discrimination. Affirmative action is not about treating people nicely or patronizing them (as benevolent discrimination does), but giving them a chance to make use of and freely develop their competencies. Affirmative action policies make up for a disadvantage rather than granting special treatment and thereby increase diversity in the workplace (for an overview, see Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, 2006). In contrast, benevolent discrimination focuses on assumed incompetency and will rather lead to decreased workplace diversity, at least for higher status positions. The present studies investigated individuals' willingness to self-criticize their own behavior, even if it was well intended, when they receive information about its negative consequences.

Therefore, I think that the implementation of affirmative action programs can benefit from the present findings by keeping in mind that only high internally motivated individuals are willing to self-criticize their previous actions, even if they were well intended. This means that caretakers of affirmative action policies should foster internal motivation in those responsible for the implementation of affirmative actions. Otherwise possible criticism will fall on deaf ears.

## **Conclusion**

When providing individuals with information about the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination, higher internal motivation facilitates self-criticism of the own behavior and disrupts the tendency to show more benevolent discrimination with increasing internal motivation. This is good and bad news at the same time: It means on the one hand that awareness for the harmful effects of benevolent discrimination will lead to more self-criticism and less benevolent discrimination with increasing internal motivation, but on the other hand this awareness seems to be crucial as otherwise internal motivation increases the proneness for benevolent discrimination. In this way the presented work differs from previous research on internal motivation, as I did not find only positive, but also negative effects of internal motivation on unprejudiced behavior. This is because of the positive intention inherent in benevolent discrimination. In this case, as long as there is no awareness for the negative consequences at the same time, internal motivation will also have detrimental effects.

Moreover, the presented research adds to the understanding of the self-regulation of unprejudiced behavior by highlighting the role of internal motivation for self-criticism as a necessary precondition for the control of prejudiced behavior.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The inclusion of the case did not change the results reported below substantially.

<sup>2</sup> Because of the low reliability of the reappraisal scale, a GLM with single items as repeated measure factor and information, internal as well as external motivation to behave unprejudiced as factors was computed. As in the regression analyses, there was a significant interaction of information and internal motivation  $F(1,86) = 6.84, p = .011, \eta_{\text{part}}^2 = .074$ .

## **Chapter 4      The impact of internal motivation and the goal to behave unprejudiced on stereotype control**

The knowledge of stereotypes looms over us, and in daily life there are many situations that lead to the activation of stereotypes and, resulting from this, to prejudiced behavior. As a matter of fact, even those individuals who want to behave unprejudiced have knowledge about culturally shared stereotypes (Devine, 1989) and might therefore also show prejudiced behavior.

Meanwhile substantial evidence has shown that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (e.g., Devine et al., 2002) or egalitarian goals (e.g., Moskowitz et al., 1999) can serve to undermine stereotype activation. However, a higher personal commitment to the goal of behaving unprejudiced does not necessarily prevent the activation of all stereotypic associations with a category (e.g., Devine et al., 2002; Legault et al., 2007). Moreover, although the process of stereotype activation is undermined by internal motivation or egalitarian goals there might be situations where a category and its stereotypic content are simultaneously activated by external sources (for example, by stereotypical depiction in movies, like the portraying of foreigners as naïve and stupid as carried to the extremes in the recent movie “Borat”). Therefore, the question arises if a higher personal commitment to the goal of behaving unprejudiced will also help to control a stereotype, once it has been activated despite the intention to behave unprejudiced. The current research addresses this question by examining whether, once a social category and a stereotype are activated, internal motivation or the goal to behave unprejudiced serve to improve the (spontaneous) control of activated stereotypes.

### **Prevention of stereotype activation**

Research on automatic stereotype activation (e.g., Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Spencer et al., 1998) has shown that the preconscious activation of stereotypes is part of the perceptual process that makes social cognition efficient (Macrae et al., 1994a; Sherman, 2001). Due to the crucial role of automatic stereotype activation as a precursor of spontaneous stereotype application, resulting in biased person perception and impulsive prejudiced behavior (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2000; Dovidio et al., 2002; McConnell & Leibold, 2001), a lot of attention was dedicated to the question how these automatic processes can be circumvented. Previous research suggests that the effects of automatic stereotype activation and its influence on

information processing and behavior are not as invariant as initially assumed (e.g., Blair et al., 2001; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Kawakami et al., 2000; Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005; Wittenbrink et al., 2001; for an overview, see Blair, 2002). It has for example been demonstrated that motivation to behave unprejudiced serves this purpose. Individuals with a strong internal motivation to behave unprejudiced or chronic egalitarian goals show less automatic activation of stereotypes (e.g., Devine et al., 2002; Moskowitz et al., 1999) and thereby prevent that stereotypes impact on their behavior.

Devine et al. (2002) demonstrated that individuals high in internal motivation and low in external motivation to behave unprejudiced show lower scores on the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; see also Amodio et al., 2008; Hausmann & Ryan, 2004)<sup>1</sup>. Legault et al. (2007) added that not only the most self-determined form of motivation (i.e., intrinsic motivation implying that being unprejudiced is enjoyed), but also integrated motivation (implying that people define themselves as unprejudiced) as well as identified motivation (implying that people freely chose to be unprejudiced) reduces automatic stereotype activation. Similar results have been found by Payne (2005), based on the MCPR scale developed by Dunton and Fazio (1997). The MCPR captures the motivation to behave unprejudiced not focusing on a specific group as the aforementioned studies (except for Legault et al., 2007), but across all kinds of potential targets of stereotypic attitudes.

Similarly, Moskowitz and colleagues (Moskowitz et al., 1999; Moskowitz et al., 2000) demonstrated that chronic commitment to egalitarian goals works against the process of automatic stereotype activation and thereby prevents that stereotypes become activated in the first place. They found that individuals with a chronic egalitarian goal towards African Americans automatically activate the concept of egalitarianism when this social category is primed, which can be seen as evidence that the respective goal is activated. Hence, the activation of the category activates the goal of egalitarianism and the striving toward it, which in turn reduces or prevents the automatic activation of the stereotype. A similar process will most likely operate among individuals high in internal motivation to behave unprejudiced, as chronic egalitarian goals and the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced are conceptually closely related (see also Legault et al., 2007). In sum, it can be concluded that the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced as well as chronic egalitarian goals reduce automatic stereotype activation.

Although personally committed individuals are more successful in preventing stereotype activation when confronted with a social category, they do not fully succeed because the activation of stereotypic associations cannot be completely circumvented

(Devine et al., 2002 report a substantial IAT score among high internally motivated,  $M = 206$ ; and Legault et al., 2007 a significant IAT effect among high self-determined individuals,  $t(33) = 5.14$ ,  $p < .0001$ ; but see Moskowitz et al., 1999, 2000). Moreover, as already mentioned above, there are situations where even individuals committed to the goal of behaving unprejudiced will activate a stereotype and a social category at the same time, for example due to external influences (such as movies promoting stereotypes or sexist jokes). The question that remains is whether after the activation of a stereotype, individuals who are generally motivated to behave unprejudiced will still be more successful in preventing prejudiced behavior by controlling the stereotype once it has been activated.

### **Stereotype control**

If a social category and a stereotype are once activated the intention to behave unprejudiced requires control efforts (i.e., stereotype control). Previous research dealing with the control of undesired thoughts by means of suppression however suggests that the more individuals try to control their thoughts, the more these will come to their minds (Wegner, 1994). Applying this to the context of stereotype control, Macrae and colleagues (1994b) have shown that the attempts to suppress stereotypic thoughts will backfire once conscious control has been relaxed and lead to a stereotype rebound effect. This implies that the control of stereotypes will not have the intended effect of less prejudiced behavior but on the contrary will even lead to an increased activation of stereotypes and hence to more prejudiced behavior.

However, there is evidence that a high personal commitment to the goal of behaving unprejudiced does not only help to reduce stereotype activation, but it can also help in the case of stereotype control. More precisely, Monteith, Sherman, and Devine (1998a) suggested that for example the level of prejudice as well as individuals' goals and motivations have moderating influence on stereotype suppression. Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (1998b) demonstrated that less stereotype rebound occurred for low-prejudiced individuals. They speculated that the reduced stereotype rebound among low prejudiced individuals might be due either to less activation or more skilled stereotype control resulting from more practice in suppression, but did not test these two options directly. Gordijn and colleagues (2004) tested the moderating influence of internal motivation, which is often assumed to underlie lower levels of prejudice, on stereotype rebound. To this end, participants were asked not to think in a stereotype-based manner about a particular person (e.g., a skinhead) while describing this fictitious person. After the suppression task the accessibility of the skinhead stereotype as well as the use of stereotypes was measured

in a second task. They found that individuals who were high internally motivated to behave unprejudiced did not show the usual stereotype rebound effects, as indicated by the missing increase in stereotype activation and use after suppression (see also Wyer, 2007). As already suggested by Monteith et al. (1998b), there are at least two possible reasons for reduced stereotype rebound. One reason for the impact of internal motivation on stereotype rebound might be that stereotypes are less activated in the first place. Alternatively, stereotypes might also be more successfully controlled among the high internally motivated. In other words, so far it is not known whether high internally motivated individuals only activate the stereotype less to begin with, or whether internal motivation to behave unprejudiced also improves the control of already activated stereotypes.

Therefore, the aim of the current research is to provide a more direct test of the impact of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on stereotype control. That is, I want to investigate whether the motivation to behave unprejudiced enables individuals to control stereotypes once they are activated. Providing evidence for this assumption would suggest that the internal motivation or the goal to behave unprejudiced can, once the social category and the stereotype have been activated, put the brakes on them.

### *Overview of studies*

The current research aims to provide a direct test of the hypothesis that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced as well as an enhanced activation of the goal to behave unprejudiced will help to control activated social stereotypes. This is done by means of a stereotype rejection paradigm (similar to Kawakami et al., 2000) which served to test participants' ability to control activated stereotypes.

In the stereotype rejection paradigm participants were instructed to categorize sentences as fast as possible as either correct or incorrect. Most importantly, they had to indicate that a sentence was incorrect when it was expressing a stereotype, no matter whether they believed it to be right or wrong (e.g., "Women are caring"). Pre-tested stereotypes about a variety of groups were used. All sentences were constructed in the same way. They started with a social category followed by the verb "are" and a characteristic describing the stereotype content. Hence, the task was to reject an activated stereotype. The time required for these responses served as dependent measure. Shorter response latencies indicate better stereotype rejection.

Two studies were conducted; both of them used the same paradigm to measure stereotype rejection. Study 4.1 aimed to demonstrate that internal motivation to behave



unprejudiced improves the control of activated stereotypes which should be reflected in increased response speed on the stereotypic trials in the stereotype rejection paradigm. Study 4.2 tested the prediction that the subconsciously activated goal of behaving unprejudiced would improve individuals' ability to control activated stereotypes.

## *Study 4.1*

### **Method**

#### *Design and participants*

A correlational study with internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced as predictors and stereotype rejection as criterion was conducted. Out of the 47 participating German undergraduate students one had to be excluded from the analyses because s/he did not follow the instructions. Two other participants were excluded because they indicated during the experimental session that they did not understand the instructions. Of the remaining participants, 27 were female and 17 male. They had a mean age of 22 years (range: 19-27). Participants received 7 Euros as compensation.

#### *Procedure*

After giving informed consent participants received a questionnaire assessing internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced. All following instructions were given on a computer screen. The first computer task served to cover the relation between the questionnaire and the stereotype rejection paradigm. Participants navigated a resource consuming 3-D maze. After having finished this task participants worked on the stereotype rejection task. The instructions introduced this task as a tolerance-training. Participants had to respond as fast as possible to sentences that appeared in random order on a computer screen. There were three different types of sentences: stereotypic sentences (e.g., "Muslims are fanatic"), correct control sentences (e.g., "Pianists are musicians"), and incorrect control sentences (e.g., "Lemons are sweet"). Participants were asked to respond to correct control sentences with "yes", to incorrect control sentences with "no", and to all stereotypic sentences, irrespective of valence, with "no". In each trial, first a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms in the center of the screen followed by a subliminal neutral prime (*ZWEI*, German for two) that was presented for 35 ms. The prime was followed by a backward letter-mask of 100 ms. Two participants indicated during the debriefing to have seen a word before the target appeared, but did not recall the correct word and were therefore not excluded from

the analyses. The prime had no function in the current study, but it was included in the procedure, because it was required in Study 4.2 and I aimed to keep the procedure as much parallel as possible.

Before the target appeared, the screen turned blank for 100 ms. The prime, the mask, and the target sentences were shown in 24 pt. letters. The next trial started 250 ms after participants' response. After 10 practice trials, participants had to work through 120 trials including 20 stereotypic trials (see Appendix II), 60 correct control trials, and 40 incorrect control trials, resulting in an equal amount of targets to be answered with "yes" or "no". Response times within each type of trial block were averaged. After having finished the reaction time task, participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and compensated.

### *Measures*

*The internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced* was assessed by a generalized (in the sense of not specifically being geared towards one social category) German translation of the scales introduced by Plant and Devine (1998). There is evidence that non-group specific measures have very similar effects as the original group specific measure (Legault et al., 2007; Maddux et al., 2005; Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2006). Five internal motivation items (e.g., "I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards people because it is personally important to me") and five external motivation items (e.g., "I try to hide any negative thoughts about people in order to avoid negative reactions from others") had to be rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 "does not apply" to 7 "does fully apply". Internal consistency for the two subscales was satisfactory (internal and external motivation  $\alpha = .69$  and  $\alpha = .82$ , respectively).

## **Results and Discussion**

All response times faster than 300 ms and slower than 5,000 ms as well as latencies from wrong answers were excluded from the analyses reported below on an a priori basis (for a similar treatment of response latencies see Smith & Henry, 1996). Across all trials the mean error rate for all participants was 11 %. The error rate did neither correlate with the internal nor with the external motivation to behave unprejudiced nor with the interaction among the two (all  $\beta$ s < .30, all  $p$ s > .09). The mean response time for stereotypic targets was 1,750 ms ( $SD = 410$ ), for correct control trials 1,954 ms ( $SD = 459$ ), and for incorrect control trials 1,906 ms ( $SD = 366$ ).

To test the hypothesis that higher internal motivation to behave unprejudiced increases the ability to control activated stereotypes, a regression analysis was conducted with internal and external motivation to behave unprejudiced and the internal x external motivation interaction as predictors and the response latency to stereotypic sentences as criterion. The interaction term was computed by multiplying the standardized values of internal and external motivation (Aiken & West, 1991). The response time in the incorrect control trials was included as a covariate in order to control for the interindividual differences in response speed ( $\beta = .85, p < .001$ ). In line with the prediction, the regression revealed a main effect of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = -.20, p = .037$ ). Neither external motivation to behave unprejudiced ( $\beta = .07, p = .458$ ) nor the internal x external motivation interaction ( $\beta < .01, p = .983$ ) had an impact on the response time for stereotypic sentences,  $\text{adj. } R^2 = .70, F(4, 39) = 25.80, p < .001$  (see Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1.** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Response Time for Stereotypic Sentences ( $RT_{\text{stereotypic}}$ ) on Internal and External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced ( $N = 44$ ).

	$RT_{\text{stereotypic}}$
Internal motivation	-.20*
External motivation	.07
Internal motivation x External motivation	.00
Response time <small>incorrect sentences</small>	.85***

Note. \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Multiple regressions with response time for correct and incorrect control sentences as criterion variable and the same set of predictors, using response time for incorrect and correct control sentences respectively as a covariate, did neither lead to a main effect of internal motivation, both  $\beta s < .11$ , both  $p s > .25$ , nor to a main effect of external motivation or an interaction effect of internal x external motivation, all  $\beta s < .13$ , all  $p s > .15$ .

The main effect of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on the response time for stereotypic sentences indicates that higher internal motivation to behave unprejudiced improves the ability to control activated stereotypes. The question remained whether a situational activation of the goal to behave unprejudiced, similar to the activation of the goal to behave in an egalitarian manner (Moskowitz, 2002) would have the same effects on

stereotype control as chronic internal motivation to behave unprejudiced. Study 4.2 addressed this question.

### *Study 4.2*

Goal systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002) proposes process assumptions and paradigms that help to increase the activation of a goal and will therefore be applied in what follows. It argues that goals and means are stored in the cognitive network just as other cognitive representations. Therefore, goals can be automatically activated and inhibited by other goals as well as by cues associated to them. Whether the activation of an alternative goal fosters or hinders goal striving depends on the perceived relation between the two goals. Priming an alternative goal fosters goal striving in relation to the focal goal if the two goals are perceived to be positively interrelated, whereas it hinders goal striving in any other case by dragging self-regulatory resources away from the focal goal. In line with these assumptions, Shah and Kruglanski (2002) demonstrated that the priming of an alternative goal increased persistence and performance when the alternative goal was positively related to the focal goal, but it undermined both when the goals were unrelated. This implies that a goal (in the current case the goal to behave unprejudiced) can be influenced by priming a related goal. If this related goal is perceived to be positively related to the focal goal, it will foster goal striving, otherwise it will hinder the striving towards the focal goal. Thus, priming a second goal that is perceived to be positively interrelated should increase the activation of the focal goal.

The present research applies the paradigm of Shah and Kruglanski (2002) to subconsciously increase the activation of the goal to behave unprejudiced during the stereotype rejection task. Two different priming conditions were realized. The control condition replicated the procedure applied in Study 4.1. In the goal prime condition an alternative goal was subliminally primed by displaying the name of a task that participants believed they had to work on after the stereotype rejection paradigm. The priming of the alternative goal served the purpose to activate or inhibit the focal goal to behave unprejudiced, depending on the perceived interrelatedness between both tasks (i.e., the goals underlying them), which was assessed beforehand. First, the stereotype rejection paradigm should activate the goal to behave unprejudiced. If during the pursuit of the goal to behave unprejudiced an alternative goal that is perceived as positively related to the focal goal becomes cognitively accessible through (environmental) priming, the cognitive accessibility will increase the activation of the focal goal. In other words, priming an

alternative goal should subconsciously increase the activation of the goal to behave unprejudiced to the extent that the focal and the alternative goal are positively related.

Specifically, I predict that priming an alternative goal will speed up the rejection of an activated stereotype, the more the alternative goal is perceived to be positively related to the goal of behaving unprejudiced. This effect should not be found if no alternative goal is primed.

## **Method**

### *Design and Participants*

The experiment had two conditions (goal prime vs. neutral prime). Additionally, the interrelatedness between the goal to behave unprejudiced and the alternative goal was assessed as independent variable. The response speed to stereotypic sentences in the stereotype rejection paradigm served as main dependent variable. 45 German undergraduate students participated in the experiment. One participant had to be excluded from the analyses because s/he did not follow the instructions. Of the remaining participants, 28 were female and 16 were male. Their mean age was 22 years (range: 18-29). Participants received 5 Euros as compensation.

### *Procedure*

Upon arrival to the laboratory participants were seated in front of a computer. All instructions were given on the screen. Participants received the information that they would work on two separate tasks one after the other. The instructions described the first task, the stereotype rejection paradigm, as a tolerance-training. To introduce the alternative goal serving later in the goal prime condition as prime, participants learnt that after having finished the tolerance-training they would participate in a second task to assess their information search skills. This task referred to as the picture-task would involve identifying inconsistent objects on pictures and categorizing these pictures as either consistent or inconsistent. Participants were informed that they would complete the picture-task right after the tolerance-training. No direct information about the interrelation of the two tasks was provided to allow that participants assume some relation between the two tasks, as both involve categorizing given stimuli but at the same time provoke some variance concerning their perceptions.

After the participants had rated the perceived interrelatedness between the two tasks, they worked on the stereotype rejection task. The procedure was the same as in Study

4.1 except for the fact that Study 4.2 realized two different priming conditions. In the *experimental* condition the goal prime *BILD* (German for picture) followed the fixation cross in each trial to activate the alternative goal, whereas in the *control* condition the neutral prime *ZWEI* (German for two) followed the fixation cross. Priming was again subliminal. The operationalization of the goals and the goal priming followed the procedure applied by Shah and Kruglanski (2002, Exp. 1) closely. Two participants indicated to have seen a word before the target appeared, but were not able to recall the prime correctly. Hence, they were not excluded from the analyses. After having finished the stereotype rejection task, participants were debriefed, thanked, and compensated.

### *Measures*

*Perceived interrelatedness* of the two goals was measured with one item on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*extremely*): “How much are the tolerance-training and the picture-task related to each other?” The item was adapted from Shah and Kruglanski (2002). The ratings varied as intended across the entire range of the scale, with a median score of 8.

## **Results and Discussion**

All response times below 300 ms and above 5,000 ms were excluded on an a priori basis as in Study 4.1. The mean response time for stereotypic targets was 1,706 ms ( $SD = 350$ ), for correct control trials 2,107 ms ( $SD = 471$ ), and for incorrect control trials 1,976 ms ( $SD = 340$ ). Across all trials the mean error rate for all participants was 12 %. The two independent variables of the current design did neither in terms of a main effect nor in terms of an interaction impact on the total amount of participants’ errors, all  $\beta$ s  $< .10$ ,  $ps > .50$ .

It was predicted that higher positive interrelatedness of the two goals would lead to faster responses (better rejection of activated stereotypes) in the goal prime condition but not in the neutral prime condition. To test this prediction a multiple regression analysis was conducted with prime (goal prime -1, neutral prime 1), perceived interrelatedness and the prime x perceived interrelatedness interaction as predictors. The interaction term was computed by multiplying the standardized perceived interrelatedness with the prime contrast. The response time to stereotypic sentences served as criterion. The response time in the incorrect control trials was included as a covariate in order to control for the interindividual differences in response speed ( $\beta = .73$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The regression revealed


neither a main effect of perceived interrelatedness ( $\beta = -.12, p = .225$ ) nor of prime ( $\beta = .05, p = .629$ ). Most importantly, as expected, the perceived interrelatedness x prime interaction had a significant impact on the response time for stereotypic sentences ( $\beta = .21, p = .044$ ),  $\text{adj. } R^2 = .62, F(4, 39) = 18.51, p < .001$  (see Table 4.2).

**Table 4.2.** Standardized Regression Weights from Multiple Regression of Response Time for Stereotypic Sentences ( $RT_{\text{stereotypic}}$ ) on Perceived Interrelatedness and Prime (N = 44).

	$RT_{\text{stereotypic}}$
Perceived interrelatedness	-.12
Prime	.05
Perceived interrelatedness x prime	.21*
Response time <small>incorrect sentences</small>	.73***

Note. \*  $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Simple slope analysis following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West (1991) revealed that higher perceived positive interrelatedness led in line with the expectation to a decrease in response times for stereotypic sentences in the goal prime condition ( $\beta = -.34, p = .049$ ) but no such effect was found in the neutral prime condition ( $\beta = .09, p = .445$ , see Figure 4.1).



Note. \*  $p < .05$ .

**Figure 4.1.** Response time for stereotypic sentences as a function of perceived interrelatedness and priming condition ( $N = 44$ ).

Multiple regressions with response time for correct and incorrect control sentences as criterion variable on the same predictors, using response time for incorrect and correct control sentences respectively as a covariate, did neither lead to main effects of perceived interrelatedness or prime, all  $\beta$ s  $< .10$ ,  $p$ s  $> .35$ , nor to perceived interrelatedness  $\times$  prime interactions, both  $\beta$ s  $< .15$ ,  $p$ s  $> .20$ .

Thus, the perceived relation between the two goals determined the effect of priming participants with the second goal: the more the goals were perceived to be positively related, the more did the priming increase the activation of the focal goal which in turn led to increased stereotype control. The perceived relation between the goals had no effect on performance, when the goal was not primed. In line with the expectation, the effect of the goal priming was restricted to trials with stereotypic sentences as targets. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that activating the goal to behave unprejudiced improves the control of activated stereotypes, whereas inhibiting the goal to behave unprejudiced by priming an unrelated goal impedes stereotype control.

### *Discussion Chapter 4*

The current research aimed to contribute to the understanding of the motivational influences on stereotype control. Previous research has provided evidence for the impact of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (Devine et al., 2002) as well as egalitarian goals



on stereotype activation (Moskowitz et al., 1999). In spite of this, there is evidence (e.g., Devine et al., 2002; Legault et al., 2007) that also individuals who are highly committed to the goal of behaving unprejudiced happen to have a social category and its stereotype activated at the same time. For that reason, the question whether egalitarian goals and internal motivation are equally effective in the control of stereotypes once they are activated was addressed in the current research.

A stereotype rejection paradigm was developed for this purpose. An advantage of the paradigm was that it did not exclusively address one specific stereotype as most research on stereotyping (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005), but several stereotypes at the same time. Study 4.1 demonstrated that the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced was negatively related to the response latencies when rejecting sentences with stereotypic content (i.e., efficiency in stereotype control), but not when responding to other sentences. Hence, the higher the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced the faster activated stereotypes are rejected. Individuals with high internal motivation to behave unprejudiced can be considered as individuals who have a chronic commitment to the goal of behaving unprejudiced. In other words, Study 4.1 demonstrated that a higher chronic commitment to the goal of behaving unprejudiced enables individuals to reject activated stereotypes faster, compared to individuals with a lower commitment.

Study 4.2 tested the impact of the activated goal to behave unprejudiced on stereotype control. The goal activation was varied by priming another (more or less) related goal. Earlier evidence (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002) has indicated that priming a positively interrelated goal further activates the focal goal and thereby enhances the striving towards it, whereas activating an unrelated goal hinders the striving towards the focal goal. Study 4.2 demonstrated that the more the primed goal was seen as positively related to the goal to behave unprejudiced, the faster were activated stereotypes rejected. The goal activation was realized by subconscious priming. Hence, the goal to behave unprejudiced was subconsciously activated and therefore operated also without conscious awareness. Overall, this study provides evidence that activating the goal to behave unprejudiced improves individuals' ability to control stereotypes also once they are activated.

Thereby, the current work closes a gap left behind by earlier research on the impact of the internal motivation as well as the goal to behave unprejudiced on stereotype control. Research with a self-regulation perspective on stereotype rebound has addressed the question whether motivation helps to reduce stereotype rebound (Gordijn et al., 2004) and speculated about the different underlying reasons, such as reduced activation or improved

control (Monteith et al., 1998b). So far it was not apparent if improved control of activated stereotypes might be responsible for a reduced stereotype rebound effect. The current research provides a clear answer to the question whether internal motivation and the goal to behave unprejudiced help with the control of activated stereotypes. Future studies might want to test more directly whether stereotype rebound is mediated by reduced activation of stereotypes or improved control of stereotypes among high internally motivated individuals.

A potential objection about the procedure applied here is that one might argue that the task instruction to reject stereotypes leads to the formation of a superimposed goal that might have similar effects as external motivation, whereas a self-chosen goal would have more likely raised internal motivation (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2002). However, research by Harackiewicz and Sansone (1991) indicates that external goal setting does not necessarily counteract internal motivation, or can even have positive effects on internal motivation as long as the task demands offer optimal challenge. This means that even if the goal to behave unprejudiced was not only activated by the challenge provided by the stereotype rejection paradigm itself, but also by the instruction, this should not have detrimental effects for the internal motivation. The results from Study 4.1 suggest that external motivators such as the instruction did not have detrimental consequences, as I did not find any main effects of external motivation or interaction effects of external and internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on stereotype control.

Moreover, the current findings allow us to deduce possible interventions on how to improve the regulation of prejudice when internal motivation cannot be taken for granted. So far, it has been shown that internal motivation, which is according to SDT (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000) only acquired through a process of internalization of goals and values, results in the most successful regulation of prejudiced behavior. Now, the manipulation of the goal to behave unprejudiced in Study 4.2 also provides evidence for the effectiveness of induced motivation in the context of unprejudiced behavior. Individual motivation was raised by subconsciously raising awareness for the multifinality (Kruglanski et al., 2002) of the goal and the respective mean. Thereby the current findings suggest that also “hybrid” motivations (e.g., identified motivation) that are slightly less self-determined than internal motivation have positive effects on the regulation of prejudice (for similar effects, see Legault et al., 2007). This is a promising avenue for the reduction of prejudice, as it adumbrates the possibility of manipulating motivation to behave unprejudiced (for example, by making transparent that equal opportunities employment is a mean to

successful recruitment as well as to tolerance), which may ultimately decrease prejudiced behavior.

In the studies conducted, I have looked at the effect of internal motivation as well as at the effect of the goal to behave unprejudiced. These two constructs differ to the extent that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced is a chronic motivational state and the goal to behave unprejudiced is temporarily activated. The two studies I conducted provide evidence that both constructs, although theoretically distinct, are equally important moderators of stereotype control. In other words, differences in chronically accessible motives as well as in temporary goals will have an (subconscious) impact on the control of activated stereotypes. Further research should test the relationship of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced and egalitarian goals more directly.

The present work has demonstrated that a higher commitment to the goal of behaving unprejudiced improves the control of activated stereotypes. For this process to function effectively, the individual needs to be aware of the contents' stereotypic connotation associated with the category (Bargh, 1999; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). If an individual does not consider certain information about a social category as stereotypic, the goal to behave unprejudiced will most likely have no influence on the control of the activated stereotype. This suggests that also individuals with a high commitment to the goal to behave unprejudiced are vulnerable to have activated stereotypes influencing their behavior towards members of a social category, if they never considered the content as stereotypic of the category (which might be especially likely for positive stereotypes). Further research needs to explore the role of awareness in the motivated control of stereotyping (see also Monteith & Mark, 2005).

To conclude, internal motivation to behave unprejudiced as well as the goal to behave unprejudiced helps to control activated stereotypes. This means even if, for whatever reason, stereotypes become activated, individuals who have a high internal motivation or the goal to behave unprejudiced will be able to control the activated stereotype and prevent its influence on their behavior.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>The IAT is not a measure of stereotype activation but rather a measure of prejudice. However, the effect of the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced should not differ for semantic and affective associations (stereotypes and prejudices respectively). Moreover, Amodio et al. (2008) found similar results as Devine et al. (2002) using a paradigm that is based on stereotypes rather than on prejudice.

## **Chapter 5      General Discussion and Conclusions**

In the present dissertation three issues have been raised concerning the impact of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced on the self-regulation of prejudiced behavior. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) sought to contribute to the understanding of the long term determinants of (un)prejudiced behavior. It therefore addressed the question how internal motivation moderates the reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced (i.e., the awareness of a discrepant response). It was demonstrated that failure plays a central role in the sustained regulation of prejudice for the internally motivated. Specifically, with increasing internal motivation individuals “profit” from failure because it facilitates reaching their goal to behave unprejudiced as it increases effort to behave unprejudiced and decreases prejudiced attitudes.

Research until now has mainly focused on the intention to avoid prejudice as opposed to the intention to approach potential targets of prejudice in a positive way. The subsequent chapter (Chapter 3) examined internal motivation in the context of benevolent discrimination. More specifically, Chapter 3 aimed at understanding the circumstances that foster self-criticism after benevolent discrimination. In this way, the studies presented in Chapter 3 extend the research reported in Chapter 2 in two ways: First, by focusing on benevolent as opposed to hostile discrimination and second, by examining, if high internally motivated individuals are more sensitive to information that indicates the negative consequences of their behavior (i.e., their failure). To this end, the question if information that points to the negative consequences of previously shown benevolently discriminating behavior, elicited more self-criticism with increasing internal motivation was addressed. In spite of the intention to display positive behavior towards foreigners, raising the awareness for the harmful effects of benevolent discrimination led to more self-criticism with increasing internal motivation. Raising the awareness for the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination, proved to be crucial as internal motivation otherwise increased the proneness for benevolent discrimination.

The last empirical chapter (Chapter 4) focused on a so far disregarded possibility for internal motivation (as well as the goal to behave unprejudiced) to prevent prejudice by means of rejecting stereotypes once they have been activated (i.e., stereotype control). Research has demonstrated that internal motivation and egalitarian goals reduce stereotype activation. Until now it has not been clear whether the same is true once stereotypes have been activated. Given the fact, internal motivation and egalitarian goals do not eliminate

stereotype activation completely, answering the question if internal motivation also helps to control activated stereotypes is of high importance, as it indicates another possibility how to control prejudiced behavior. The obtained results demonstrate that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced as well as the goal to behave unprejudiced improves the control of activated stereotypes.

### **From reactive to proactive control and beyond**

The present research rests on the assumption that prejudiced behavior arises in spite of the intention to behave unprejudiced, because many of the processes leading to prejudiced behavior are automatic in nature and therefore hard to control. Nonetheless, there exist several possibilities how to overcome the automaticity of prejudice. Basically, prejudiced behavior can be prevented at each stage that might potentially lead to prejudiced behavior, which is social categorization, stereotype activation, and stereotype application. Of central importance is the prevention of stereotype activation that results from social categorization as well as the prevention of the application of activated stereotypes. As outlined in the beginning, the prevention of stereotype activation occurs at a preconscious stage where willful control on part of the individual is not involved. In contrast, preventing prejudiced behavior by avoiding stereotype application is a conscious process that requires the individuals' intent. To make the intention work and to successfully overcome stereotypic influences on behavior, individuals need sufficient awareness, cognitive resources and motivation.

The aim of the present dissertation was to improve the understanding of the motivated regulation of prejudice. It therefore focused on the importance of motivation and awareness, as opposed to cognitive control for the self-control of prejudice. This does not imply that cognitive control is considered as irrelevant. In line with Payne and colleagues, (Payne, Jacoby, & Lambert, 2005) I think that prejudice can be reduced in different ways. The current research elaborated on the control of prejudice by motivation and awareness. An alternative approach would be to overcome bias by maximizing control. The different approaches come with different advantages and disadvantages. Payne et al. (2005) reason that to reduce prejudice by maximizing control individuals do not need to be aware of their bias. Maximizing control requires situations where individuals can make use of objective information. This is for example the case if individuals have enough time to process all stimuli in a given situation. However, there are many situations that do not meet these criteria. Especially in those situations, which are actually quite common in everyday life,

awareness of failure and the motivation to behave unprejudiced might be crucial to behave unprejudiced.

According to Moskowitz (2005) the strategies to overcome the influences of stereotyping and prejudice can broadly be distinguished as proactive and reactive strategies. That is, strategies that either prevent stereotype activation in the first place or that allow for correction after a stereotype has been activated. Similarly, the prevention of prejudice might be considered along a time axis from stereotype activation to stereotype application. With regard to the current results, it must be taken into account that none of the measures employed in this dissertation directly addresses stereotype activation. In this sense, the dissertation does not permit drawing any conclusions about reactive strategies for the control of prejudice. Nonetheless, the empirical chapters differ to the extent that they focus on the time-wise late strategy of stereotype application (as opposed to stereotype activation). Particularly, Chapter 2 and 3 focus on measures that are rather concerned with stereotype application, whereas Chapter 4, although not concerned with avoiding stereotype activation, is time-wise much closer to this stage.

However, the research described in Chapter 2 and 3 does not simply analyze the successful prevention of stereotype application. While considering individuals' discomfort, effort to behave unprejudiced, and their judgments of others in Chapter 2 as well as self-criticism and the proclivity for benevolent discrimination in Chapter 3 it focuses on the *reoccurrence* of prejudiced behavior and its antecedents in the context of failure. In other words, individuals' (successful) prevention of prejudiced behavior, once prejudice has taken place, is analyzed. This approach adds a new perspective to the regulation of prejudiced behavior. Therefore, although stereotype activation is not measured, the findings might point to proactive strategies in the sense that they are concerned with the question how awareness of one's failure helps to prevent prejudice on the long run. The current work relates to the work by Monteith et al. (2002) on the establishment of cues for control for the reduction of prejudice. Both lines of research are concerned with the question how individuals learn to put brakes on prejudice. The current research however goes beyond this by underlining the role of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (as opposed to an attitude) and by extending the range of effects (as opposed to a focus on inhibition) of failure depending on internal motivation in subsequent situations.

This focus on the regulation of prejudice as a process that starts anew after every failure has not received very much attention so far and provides valuable insight into the learning history of (un)prejudiced behavior, depending on the internal motivation to behave

unprejudiced. The results also suggest that internally motivated are not per se better in behaving unprejudiced but that they are more self-critical of their own failure and have the ability to take advantage of it on the long run.

Furthermore, the current research extends the research on the regulation of prejudiced by not only examining prejudiced behavior that arises in spite of the intention to behave unprejudiced, but Chapter 3 examines prejudiced behavior that arises even in spite of the intention to show positive behavior towards potential targets of prejudice. Here it is especially striking that internally motivated individuals are not per se better in behaving unprejudiced, but that they need to be aware of the negative consequences of their doing for regulating their behavior more successfully.

Due to the approach I used in Chapter 2 and 3, I cannot claim that the awareness for failure actually prevents stereotype activation in the next situation. From the studies conducted, it can only be concluded for sure that individuals, when aware of the negative consequences, show less prejudiced behavior with increasing internal motivation; which seems to be a conscious correction process. In spite of this, there is reason to assume that this correction process might also operate on a preconscious level (see for example egalitarian goals, which are also conscious in the first place). For future studies it would be interesting to examine more closely which strategies are exactly initiated for the high internally motivated after failure and whether they become automated and already start operating at the stage of stereotype activation.

Apart from qualifying as reactive because they address stereotype application, Chapter 2 and 3 are also reactive in the sense that they focus on *reactions* to failure. Chapter 4 is clearly not reactive in this sense. Thus, in contrast to Chapter 2 and 3, Chapter 4 takes another approach to the control of prejudice, as it is occupied with the prevention of prejudiced behavior before failure takes place. The studies focus on the control of activated stereotypes, a strategy that comes rather early in the control of prejudice and concerns the question how to prevent failure in the first place. Specifically, it was examined how internal motivation as well as the goal to behave unprejudiced helps to prevent prejudiced behavior by controlling activated stereotypes. It was shown that the ability to control stereotypes is enhanced with increasing internal motivation and through the activation of goal to behave unprejudiced. Strictly speaking the control of activated stereotypes is not a proactive strategy, as the stereotype is already activated. Nonetheless it differs from reactive strategies where individuals are consciously trying to avoid prejudiced behavior. This is also evident in the fact that the control is improved by subconsciously activating the goal to



behave unprejudiced. If individuals succeed to bypass the impact of activated stereotypes on behavior at this stage, they will not enter a stage where they consciously need to prevent prejudiced behavior from happening, as the early rejection of the stereotype will prevent its application.

According to the definition of proactive and reactive control of prejudice, the current research clearly investigated reactive processes. However, it was shown that the prejudiced behavior that has taken place will influence subsequent (un)prejudiced behavior and in this sense can proactively help to reduce prejudiced behavior. What might appear reactive on the first look might actually be proactive in the sense that the reaction prevents prejudiced behavior in the future. In addition, a so far disregarded possibility to prevent prejudiced behavior, the control of activated stereotypes, was identified.

The current dissertation aims to improve the understanding of the sustained regulation of prejudiced behavior. In spite of this, so far the persistence of the effects of internal motivation has not been examined. Further research needs to investigate the regulation of prejudice in longitudinal studies to improve our understanding of whether the effects of internal motivation on the reduction of prejudiced behavior persist on the long run. Also, it would be desirable to measure prejudiced behavior more directly. Especially in experimental settings this tends to be a problem. Recent research by Blascovich and colleagues (Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2003; Blascovich et al., 2002) hints at new ways how to measure (prejudiced) behavior in virtual environments by means of interpersonal distance from or posture towards another virtual human. This gives researchers the possibility to measure prejudiced behavior for example in terms of approach and avoidance behavior from virtual humans that are potential targets of prejudice. To the extent that the simulated environments mirror real life, this might be a promising way to gain better insight into real world (prejudiced) behavior.

### **(What) do individuals need to be internally motivated?**

Generally speaking, the current dissertation supports the view that internal motivation is a powerful source of motivation for the reduction of prejudiced behavior. It was demonstrated that with increasing internal motivation individuals will show less prejudice after failure, they will become more self-critical about previous benevolent discrimination and they will be more successful in controlling stereotypes. Although these results are promising considering the reduction of prejudice, some limitations should be taken into account:

First, internal motivation will only lead to a reduction of prejudice if certain conditions are fulfilled. Otherwise, as apparent from the studies in the context of benevolent discrimination, internal motivation might as well have negative consequences for the regulation of prejudice. Specifically, I found that as long as individuals were not aware of the negative consequences of their behavior, internal motivation actually increased benevolent discrimination. Similar effects have to be expected for the control of activated stereotypes. If an individual is not aware of the fact that the association in his or her mind is actually a stereotypic one, increasing internal motivation will most likely not improve the control of the stereotype. Further research might want to investigate whether the control of stereotypes is equally effective with increasing internal motivation for negative and positive stereotypes alike. Given the results for internal motivation in the context of benevolent discrimination, there is reason to assume that the control of positive stereotypes might only profit from internal motivation if individuals are aware of the negative consequences that the application of the stereotype might have.

Second, although high internal motivation has positive consequences for the reduction of prejudice, it does not provide us with many promising instructions how to cope with low internally motivated. From Chapter 2 it can be concluded that confronting low internally motivated with their failure can be harmful, as it even increased prejudice and reduced the effort to behave unprejudiced compared low internally motivated who were not confronted with their failure.

The question what to do with the low internally motivated individuals then more or less relates to the question how internal motivation can be promoted. Although the current work did not investigate the developmental premises of internal motivation, it might be worth considering them for a while. According to SDT (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000), also externally provided norms as “behaving unprejudiced” can become internally motivated. To internalize a primarily external value, individuals need to identify with the norm and integrate it into their self-concept. For this to take place, individuals need to experience the norms as meaningful and connected with positive consequences. Furthermore, perceiving legislative processes that enact laws like the Racial Equality Directive (Council Directive 2000/43/EC) as necessary, transparent, democratic, and consensual will foster the internalization of externally provided norms.

In contrast to these rather long-term requirements that need to be fulfilled for internal motivation to develop, from the last study reported in the current dissertation we can infer possibilities how to improve the regulation of prejudice when internal motivation

cannot be taken for granted. The results provide evidence that the control of stereotypes is equally effective when inducing motivation by activating the goal to behave unprejudiced (which does not necessarily mean that all participants were internally motivated to behave unprejudiced). Motivation was raised when a positively related goal became cognitively accessible. By making the relationship of the goal to behave unprejudiced with other relevant goals salient, the goal to behave unprejudiced becomes connected with more positive consequences. One of the assumptions of SDT is that internalization is facilitated if norms are connected with positive consequences. This gives reason to assume that on the long run, making the relationship of behaving unprejudiced with other relevant goals salient fosters the internalization. For example, a waiter or a waitress might behave prejudiced towards customers and treat those that appear to be richer and might tip more, more favorably. If it becomes apparent that treating every customer alike, irrespective of their appearance, actually increases the total amount of tips, behaving unprejudiced will become connected with more positive consequences. Then, making the goal “increase tip” salient should foster the goal to behave unprejudiced and might on the long run promote its internalization.

In spite of the effects of subconscious goal activation on stereotype control, the current findings remain inconclusive with regard to the question, if the activation of the goal to behave unprejudiced is as effective as internally motivated regulation, as they were not compared directly. Moreover, Chapter 4 exclusively focused on the differences in stereotype control. Further research needs to investigate more directly whether differences in the extent to which the regulation of prejudice is internally motivated yields similar effectiveness in the control of activated stereotypes; but also in earlier stages of stereotype activation and later stages of stereotype application (for first evidence, see Legault et al., 2007).

Compared to previous studies (e.g., Devine et al., 2002), the present research does not support the view that external motivation to behave unprejudiced will have negative consequences for the regulation of prejudice. Throughout all studies internal as well as external motivation was measured, but neither substantial main- nor interaction-effects of external motivation were found. When looking at the existing research on internal and external motivation it seems that detrimental effects of external motivation are most often found in relation to implicit measures of prejudice (Amodio et al., 2008; Devine et al., 2002; Hausmann & Ryan, 2004), whereas the relation of explicit measures of prejudice and external motivation to behave unprejudiced is rather weak (Peruche & Plant, 2006; Plant &

Devine, 1998). Considering the fact that this dissertation mainly focused on the conscious regulation of prejudice, it is not surprising that there was no influence of external motivation.

### **Validity of internal motivation**

Having measured internal motivation to behave unprejudiced in all but one studies reported above, the validity of our conclusions of course is crucially dependent on the validity of the motivation scale. Recent research by Crandall and colleagues (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002) applying a group based approach to the reduction of prejudice has contested the idea that internal motivation reflects personally important values. They suggest that the report of motivation to behave unprejudiced more likely reflects peoples' awareness of group norms and their desire to follow the norm than their motivation. In this sense they argue that internal motivation rather reflects social desirability.

From my point of view, high internal motivation to behave unprejudiced requires the awareness for issues of prejudice and victims of prejudiced treatments, which probably requires awareness for the current norms but does not necessarily reflect the desire to follow them. I therefore doubt that motivation to behave unprejudiced purely reflects the desire to follow the norm. I do agree however that the environment and in this way the group and its norms, are relevant for the development of motivation to behave unprejudiced.

Empirical evidence for the validity of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced comes from recent research by Glaser and Knowles (2008). They succeeded to measure motivation to behave unprejudiced implicitly and demonstrated a positive relationship between implicit motivation to behave unprejudiced and internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (Glaser, 2008). This precludes any assumption that the report of motivation to behave unprejudiced actually reflects social desirability, as implied by Crandall et al. (2002).

Moreover, as mentioned above the current dissertation examined not only the effect of internal motivation but also the effect of the goal to behave unprejudiced on stereotype control. In contrast to internal motivation, which was measured, the goal to behave unprejudiced was activated by subliminal priming. Both studies yielded similar results. This speaks once more to the validity of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced as an individual motive in contrast to compliance with norms.

Furthermore, although race, religion, gender, age, social status, and cultural background are important dividing lines in many societies, prejudice is a social phenomenon that differs across cultures. So far, the motivation to behave unprejudiced has mainly been studied as the motivation to behave unprejudiced towards Blacks (but see Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005). In the current research the focus was on the motivation to behave unprejudiced towards Arabs or it was measured in a generalized way as the motivation to behave unprejudiced towards foreigners. Thereby, the current research has extended the concept to other targets of prejudice.

## **Conclusion**

In sum, the current dissertation highlights the important role of internal motivation to behave unprejudiced in the self-regulation of prejudiced behavior. It extends previous research by specifying conditions that contribute to early as well as the long term determinants of (un)prejudiced behavior in relation to internal motivation. At an early stage in the process of regulation of prejudice, internally motivated individuals are more successful in the control of activated stereotypes. Considering the sustained regulation of prejudiced, the reactions to failure and the awareness for the negative consequences of prejudiced behavior, which promotes self-criticism, are responsible for the fact that internal motivation renders individuals not only willing but also able to behave unprejudiced.

## Summary

For individuals, who want to behave unprejudiced, the regulation of prejudice is a challenging process. Often, prejudiced behavior arises in spite of the intention to behave unprejudiced, because many of the processes leading to prejudiced behavior are automatic in nature and therefore hard to control. However, research over the last decades has identified ways how to overcome these automatic tendencies. Generally speaking, there are two ways how to control prejudice: by preventing stereotype activation or by avoiding the application of stereotypes. Prevention of stereotype activation occurs at a preconscious stage where willful control on part of the individual is not involved. In contrast, preventing prejudiced behavior by avoiding stereotype application is a conscious process. For the conscious control of prejudice, awareness of one's prejudiced response and motivation are crucial to overcome prejudice. Considering the role of motivation in the process of prejudice reduction more closely, especially internal motivation to behave unprejudiced (as opposed to external motivation to behave unprejudiced) has proven as a powerful and positive source of motivation. The current dissertation applies a self-regulation perspective to prejudiced behavior to improve the understanding of internal motivation in the (sustained) regulation of prejudice. Specifically three gaps in the existing research are addressed.

So far, the knowledge that awareness of one's discrepant responses as well as internal motivation is important for the effortful control of prejudice has not been tested in combination with each other. Therefore, the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) addresses the question of if *and* how internal motivation to behave unprejudiced moderates reactions to failure in behaving unprejudiced. It was expected that only individuals who experience failure relevant to an identity goal (i.e., an internally motivated standard such as the internal motivation to behave unprejudiced) will experience a sense of incompleteness (or in Monteith's terminology: the awareness of a discrepancy). In line with the expectations, it was demonstrated that with increasing internal motivation to behave unprejudiced individuals show more discomfort, more effort to behave unprejudiced, and less prejudice after failure in behaving unprejudiced (compared to a no failure condition). Taken together, the findings in Chapter 2 suggest that failure in behaving unprejudiced might play a key role for highly internally motivated individuals in learning to regulate prejudice successfully.

In large part, research on motivation to behave unprejudiced has focused on the intention to *avoid* prejudiced behavior and neglected the relationship of motivation and intentions to *approach* potential targets of prejudice in a positive manner. By focusing on the relationship of internal motivation and the intention to approach targets of prejudice in a positive manner, Chapter 3 extends the research on the regulation of prejudice to the domain of benevolent discrimination. Because of the positive intention required to show benevolent discrimination, it was expected that internal motivation does not reduce, but rather increases benevolent discrimination as long as individuals are not aware of its negative consequences. However, once the negative consequences have been made salient, internal motivation facilitates self-criticism of one's own benevolently discriminating behavior, which is reflected in a more critical reappraisal of benevolent discrimination. The findings of Chapter 3 underline the importance of being aware of the negative consequences of benevolent discrimination to make internal motivation work. Moreover, they highlight the role of self-criticism in the regulation of prejudiced behavior.

A vast number of studies have shown that internal motivation to behave unprejudiced improves the conscious control of prejudice. Moreover, internal motivation and egalitarian goals also moderate automatic stereotyping effects. In spite of the fact that stereotype activation is undermined by internal motivation or egalitarian goals, there are still situations where a category and its stereotypic content are simultaneously activated (for example by external sources). In acknowledging the process of prejudice reduction as one with multiple steps, a so far disregarded possibility for internal motivation to circumvent prejudiced behavior, by means of rejecting activated stereotypes, is considered in Chapter 4. It was demonstrated that even if stereotypes become activated, individuals who have a high internal motivation or the goal to behave unprejudiced, will be able to control the activated stereotype and prevent its influence on their behavior.

Finally, the findings are discussed in terms of their meaning for the reduction and prevention of prejudice, and suggestions are made how to increase (internal) motivation in everyday life.

# Deutsche Zusammenfassung (Summary in German)

## Kapitel 1: Allgemeine Einleitung

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Einfluss internaler Motivation auf die Selbstregulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens. Der Einfluss automatischer Prozesse auf vorurteilsfreies Verhalten führt dazu, dass Individuen häufig entgegen ihrer Intention vorurteilsbehaftetes Verhalten zeigen. Bestehende Forschung hat gezeigt, dass motivationale Faktoren die Kontrolle vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens verbessern. Als besonderen Zugewinn hat sich die Konzeptualisierung nach Plant und Devine (1998) in interne und externe Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten erwiesen. Internale Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten entsteht aus der internalisierten, persönlichen Überzeugung, dass vorurteilsfreies Verhalten wichtig ist. Externale Motivation dagegen reflektiert das Bedürfnis, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, um unangenehme Reaktionen von anderen zu vermeiden.

Insbesondere die internale Motivation hat sich als effektiv in der Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens erwiesen. Bisher wurde jedoch noch nicht eingehend untersucht, welche Faktoren langfristig dazu beitragen, dass internal motivierte Individuen erfolgreicher in der Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens sind. Außerdem besteht keine gesicherte Erkenntnis darüber, ob internale Motivation vorurteilsfreies Verhalten in allen Bereichen begünstigt. Des Weiteren stellt sich die Frage, ob internale Motivation präventiv allein die Aktivierung von Stereotypen hemmen kann oder auch die Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype verbessert. Die empirischen Kapitel beschäftigen sich daher mit folgenden Fragen:

1. Wie beeinflusst internale Motivation die Reaktion auf Misserfolg im Bereich vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens und damit die langfristige Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens?
2. Häufig entsteht vorurteilsbehaftetes Verhalten nicht nur entgegen der Intention, es nicht zu tun, sondern sogar entgegen der Intention, sich gegenüber potentiellen Opfern von Diskriminierung positiv zu verhalten. Welchen Einfluss übt die internale Motivation in diesem Zusammenhang aus?
3. Es ist bekannt, dass internale Motivation die Stereotypaktivierung hemmen kann. Hilft sie jedoch ebenso bei der Kontrolle bereits aktivierter Stereotype?



## **Kapitel 2: Die Reaktionen auf Misserfolg im Bereich vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens in Abhängigkeit von der internalen Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten.**

Für ein besseres Verständnis der Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens, ist eine Analyse der zu Grunde liegenden Prozesse der internalen Motivation von großer Relevanz. Aktuelle Studien von Amodio und Kollegen (Amodio, Devine & Harmon-Jones, 2008) haben die neurophysiologischen Korrelate internaler Motivation untersucht und sind zu der Erkenntnis gelangt, dass hoch internal motivierte Individuen bessere Konfliktregulierung betreiben und daher erfolgreicher bei der Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens sind. Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert sich hingegen mehr auf die Frage, welche selbstregulativen (im Gegensatz zu neurophysiologischen) Prozesse *langfristig* zu dem größeren Erfolg hoch internal motivierter Individuen beitragen. Basierend auf dem Modell der Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens (Monteith, 1993) gehe ich davon aus, dass ein zentraler Aspekt in der Selbstregulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens die Reaktion auf Misserfolg in eben diesem Bereich ist. Bislang besteht noch keine Erkenntnis darüber, ob und wie Individuen auf Misserfolg bei vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten in Abhängigkeit von ihrer internalen Motivation reagieren. Kapitel 2 beschäftigt sich daher mit dieser Frage. Auf Grundlage der Theorie der symbolischen Selbstergänzung (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982) erwarte ich, dass Misserfolg bei der Verfolgung des Ziels, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, mit zunehmender unterliegender internaler Motivation, sollte es keine Kompensationsmöglichkeit geben, zu stärkerem negativen Affekt führt. Besteht durch weitere zielrelevante Aufgaben die Möglichkeit zur Kompensation, sollte erhöhte interne Motivation zu mehr Kompensationsstreben und weniger vorurteilsbehaftetem Verhalten führen. In drei Studien konnte ich diese Vorhersagen bestätigen. Zusammenfassend lässt sich daher festhalten, dass Misserfolg bei der Verfolgung des Ziels, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die internal motivierte Selbstregulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens besitzt.

## **Kapitel 3: Internale Motivation im Kontext benevolenter Diskriminierung**

Im vorangegangenen Kapitel konnte gezeigt werden, dass durch direktes Feedback induzierter Misserfolg, bei hoch internal motivierten Individuen ein Kompensationsstreben auslöst. Das dritte Kapitel baut auf diesen Erkenntnissen auf und beschäftigt sich dabei mit folgenden Problemen. Ein Misserfolgserleben im täglichen Leben beruht selten auf einem direkten Feedback, sondern ist häufig viel subtiler. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob die eigentliche Kompetenz hoch internal motivierter Individuen bereits darin besteht, auf Basis

von Informationen (und ohne direktes Feedback) eigenes Versagen zu erkennen. Darüber hinaus beschäftige ich mich in diesem Kapitel nicht mit hostiler, sondern benevolenter Diskriminierung. In Anlehnung an benevolenten Sexismus wird unter benevolenter Diskriminierung positives aber bestehende Intergruppenrelationen aufrecht erhaltendes Verhalten gegenüber anderen verstanden, das auf Grundlage der bestehenden Stereotype angebracht erscheint (z.B. vereinfachte Sprache im Kontakt mit Ausländern). Das Problem im Zusammenhang mit benevolenter Diskriminierung besteht häufig darin, dass die negativen Konsequenzen vielen Menschen zunächst nicht bewusst sind. Daher entsteht benevolente Diskriminierung im Gegensatz zu hostiler Diskriminierung trotz, bzw. gerade wegen der Intention, positives Verhalten gegenüber potentiellen Zielpersonen von Diskriminierung zu zeigen. Das führt dazu, dass die internale Motivation, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, benevolente Diskriminierung begünstigen kann, so lange sich Personen nicht der negativen Konsequenzen ihres Verhaltens bewusst sind. Sind jedoch Informationen verfügbar, die auf die negativen Konsequenzen benevolenter Diskriminierung hinweisen, sollte mit steigender internaler Motivation das Bewusstsein bzw. die Einsicht zunehmen, dass vorhergehend gezeigtes, benevolent diskriminierendes Verhalten negative Konsequenzen für die betroffenen hat. Im dritten Kapitel beschäftige ich mich daher mit den Fragen, wie internale Motivation die Selbstkritik vorangegangenen benevolent diskriminierenden Verhaltens, und anschließenden benevolent diskriminierenden Verhaltens beeinflusst. In drei Szenario-Studien wurden die Hypothesen getestet, dass vorangehendes benevolent diskriminierendes Verhalten mit steigender internaler Motivation selbstkritischer bewertet wird, sobald die negativen Konsequenzen benevolenter Diskriminierung über Informationen transparent gemacht werden. Erhalten Personen hingegen keine Informationen über die negativen Konsequenzen benevolenter Diskriminierung, führt höhere internale Motivation zu einer positiveren Bewertung dieses Verhaltens und einer erhöhten Anfälligkeit dafür, benevolente Diskriminierung auch in folgenden Situationen zu zeigen. Die Hypothesen konnten bestätigt werden.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass internale Motivation die Anfälligkeit für eigenes benevolent diskriminierendes Verhalten verstärkt, solange sich Individuen nicht über die negativen Konsequenzen benevolenter Diskriminierung bewusst sind. Auf der anderen Seite wird die Selbstkritik an vorangegangenem benevolent diskriminierendem Verhalten mit steigender internaler Motivation größer, sobald ein Bewusstsein für die negativen Konsequenzen benevolenter Diskriminierung erzeugt wurde. Diese Studien sind meines Wissens die ersten ihrer Art, die internale Motivation und benevolente

Diskriminierung aus der Täterperspektive untersuchen. Sie legen nahe, dass insbesondere hoch internal motivierte Personen, die anfällig für eine gut gemeinte aber dennoch mit negativen Konsequenzen verbundene Art der Diskriminierung sind, diese überwinden können, wenn Aufklärung durch Informationen betrieben wird.

Generell kann auf Basis dieser Befunde davon ausgegangen werden, dass interne Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten die Selbstkritik von vorangegangenem benevolenten Verhalten verstärkt, sobald Individuen über die negativen Konsequenzen informiert werden. Bezüglich der Selbstregulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens unterstreichen die Befunde den positiven Einfluss interner Motivation auf Selbstkritik als eine notwendige Voraussetzung der Kontrolle vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens.

#### **Kapitel 4: Der Einfluss interner Motivation sowie des Ziels zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten auf die Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype**

Die in Kapitel 2 und 3 berichteten Studien beschäftigen sich schwerpunktmäßig mit dem Einfluss interner Motivation auf die Selbstregulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens, wenn vorurteilsbehaftetes Verhalten bereits stattgefunden hat. Es liegen jedoch auch Befunde vor, die besagen, dass interne Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten nicht nur positive Auswirkungen auf die bewusste Kontrolle von Vorurteilen hat, sondern auch die Stereotypaktivierung verringert. Es ist allerdings noch nicht geklärt, ob interne Motivation auch die Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype verbessert. Aus der Forschung zum Stereotype Rebound ist bekannt, dass mit steigender interner Motivation, die Rebound Effekte, d.h. die erhöhte Aktivierung von Stereotypen nach ihrer vorhergehenden Unterdrückung, abnehmen. Dies deutet auf eine bessere Kontrolle von Stereotypen hin. Es ist jedoch aufgrund des in der Stereotype Rebound Forschung verwendeten Paradigmas nicht eindeutig, ob dies an der verminderten Aktivierung von Stereotypen bei internal motivierten liegt oder an der besseren Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype. In Kapitel 4 wird daher der Frage nachgegangen, ob ein erhöhtes Commitment zum Ziel, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, die Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype verbessert. Es wurde gezeigt, dass sich mit steigender interner Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten die Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype verbessert. In einer anschließenden Untersuchung wurde das Commitment zum Ziel nicht über die Skala zur internalen Motivation erfasst, sondern anhand eines subliminalen Primings manipuliert. Hier konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Aktivierung des Ziels, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten (mittels Priming eines alternativen Ziels), die

Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype verbesserte. Diese Befunde sprechen dafür, dass sowohl chronisch verfügbare internale Motivation als auch das situativ aktivierte Ziel, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, die vergleichsweise schwere Kontrolle von aktivierten Stereotypen verbessert.

## **Kapitel 5: Abschließende Diskussion**

Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der (langfristigen) Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens bei internal motivierten Personen zu leisten. Um dies zu erreichen, wurden insbesondere drei Fragen untersucht: Erstens, wie internale Motivation die Reaktionen auf Misserfolg moderiert, zweitens, wie internale Motivation im Kontext benevolenter Diskriminierung wirkt, und drittens, ob internale Motivation (sowie das Ziel, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten) die Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype verbessert. Das Besondere an den beschriebenen Untersuchungen liegt darin, dass sie bisher in der Forschung vernachlässigte Phasen in der Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens betrachten. Kapitel 2 und 3 beschäftigen sich vor allem mit der Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens nach vorangegangenem Misserfolg. Es wurde gezeigt, dass Misserfolg bei der Verfolgung des Ziels, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, in Abhängigkeit von der internalen Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten, nachfolgende affektive Reaktionen sowie Anstrengung und Verhalten beeinflusst. Das Analysieren des Wiederauftretens vorurteilsbehafteten Verhaltens nach vorangegangenem Misserfolg in Abhängigkeit von der internalen Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten, erweitert die Perspektive auf die Regulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens. Es gibt Auskunft darüber, wie internal motivierte Personen lernen, vorurteilsbehaftetes Verhalten langfristig zu vermeiden. Mit anderen Worten stellt Misserfolg für hoch internal motivierte Individuen ein zentrales Element auf dem Weg zu erfolgreicher Selbstregulation vorurteilsfreien Verhaltens dar.

Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich hingegen mit einer Möglichkeit, vorurteilsbehaftetes Verhalten präventiv zu vermeiden, und zwar durch die Kontrolle aktivierter Stereotype. Damit konnte gezeigt werden, dass internale Motivation (bzw. das Ziel, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten) nicht nur die Aktivierung von Stereotypen hemmt, sondern auch das Umgehen bereits mental aktivierter Stereotype. Somit konnte eine weitere Möglichkeit, vorurteilsbehaftetes Verhalten zu vermeiden, identifiziert werden.

In allen Untersuchungen wurde sowohl die internale als auch die externale Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten gemessen. Effekte der externalen Motivation blieben, wie erwartet, weitestgehend aus. Darüber hinaus können aus dieser Dissertation

Möglichkeiten abgeleitet werden, wie zur Internalisierung des Ziels, sich vorurteilsfrei zu verhalten, beigetragen werden kann: Es ließ sich zeigen, dass durch eine Aktivierung positiv interdependenter Ziele die gleichen Effekte hervorgerufen werden können wie durch eine (gemessene) hohe interne Motivation. Dieser Befund ist ein vielsprechender Schritt in Richtung gezielter Interventionen zur Steigerung der (internen) Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten.

Zusammenfassend liefert die vorliegende Arbeit einen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis interner Motivation, ihrer Stärken und Schwächen, sowie eine Möglichkeit interne Motivation zu vorurteilsfreiem Verhalten zu aktivieren mit der Zielsetzung vorurteilsbehaftetes Verhalten zu reduzieren.

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## **Appendices**

Appendix I: External and internal motivation to behave unprejudiced scales and their German and Dutch translation

Appendix II: Stereotypic German sentences and English Translation used in the stereotype rejection paradigm

Appendix III: List of abbreviations

## Appendix I

IMS/EMS Scale (Plant & Devine, 1998)

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### External motivation

Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people.

I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative reactions from others.

If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would be angry with me.

I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid disapproval from others.

I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others.

### Internal motivation

I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.

According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK.

I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black people.

Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black people is wrong.

Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.

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German Translation

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### External motivation

Aufgrund der gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen versuche ich, nicht vorurteilshaft gegenüber Minderheiten zu erscheinen.

Ich versuche negative Gefühle gegenüber Minderheiten zu verstecken, um negative Reaktionen von anderen zu vermeiden.

Wenn ich vorurteilshaft gegenüber Minderheiten handeln würde, hätte ich Bedenken, dass andere wütend auf mich sind.

Ich versuche vorurteilsfrei gegenüber Minderheiten zu erscheinen, um Missbilligungen von anderen zu vermeiden.

Aufgrund von Druck von anderen versuche ich, vorurteilsfrei gegenüber Minderheiten zu handeln.

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### **Internal motivation**

Ich versuche Minderheiten gegenüber ohne Vorurteile zu handeln, weil es mir persönlich wichtig ist.

Nach meinen persönlichen Werten ist es in Ordnung, Vorurteile gegenüber Minderheiten zu haben.

Meine Überzeugungen motivieren mich, Minderheiten gegenüber nicht vorurteilshaft zu handeln.

Aufgrund meiner persönlichen Überzeugungen glaube ich, dass es falsch ist, gegenüber Minderheiten Vorurteile zu verwenden.

Vorurteilsfrei gegenüber Minderheiten zu sein, ist wichtig für mein Selbstverständnis.

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### Dutch Translation

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### **External motivation**

In het licht van de huidige politiek correcte normen probeer ik onbevooroordeeld tegen minderheden over te komen.

Ik probeer negatieve gedachten ten aanzien van bepaalde groepen (tegen minderheden) te verbergen om negatieve reacties van anderen te voorkomen.

Als ik mij bevooroordeeld tegen minderheden zou gedragen, zou ik bang zijn dat anderen boos op mij zouden worden.

Ik probeer onbevooroordeeld tegen minderheden te lijken om afkeuring door anderen te voorkomen.

Ik probeer mij onbevooroordeeld tegen minderheden te gedragen onder druk van anderen.

### **Internal motivation**

Ik probeer mij onbevooroordeeld tegen minderheden te gedragen omdat dit voor mij persoonlijk belangrijk is.

Volgens mijn persoonlijke waarden is het acceptabel vooroordeelen tegen minderheden te hebben.

Ik word door mijn persoonlijke opvattingen gemotiveerd om onbevooroordeeld tegen minderheden te zijn.

Op grond van mijn persoonlijke waarden vind ik het verkeerd tegen minderheden vooroordeelen te hebben.

Onbevooroordeeld tegen minderheden te zijn is belangrijk voor mijn zelfbeeld.

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## Appendix II

Stereotypic German sentences and English translation used in the stereotype rejection paradigm.

Arbeitslose sind faul.

Unemployed are lazy.

Penner sind asozial.

Bummers are antisocial.

Bauarbeiter sind ungebildet.

Construction workers are illiterate.

Moslems sind fanatisch.

Muslims are fanatic.

Fußballfans sind aggressiv.

Soccer fans are aggressive.

Ökos sind ungepflegt.

Greenies are unkempt.

Polen sind Diebe.

Poles are thieves.

Blonde Frauen sind dumm.

Blond women are stupid.

Beamte sind faul.

Clerks are lazy.

Einzelkinder sind verwöhnt.

Only children are spoiled.

Südländer sind temperamentvoll.

Southerners are bubbly.

Frauen sind fürsorglich.

Women are caring.

Alte Menschen sind weise.

Old people are sage.

Männer sind rational.

Men are rational.

Richter sind gerecht.

Judges are just.

Polizisten sind hilfsbereit.

Policemen are helpful.

Engländer sind höflich.

English are courteous.

Künstler sind kreativ.

Artists are creative.

Türsteher sind stark.

Bouncers are strong.

Beamte sind korrekt.

Clerks are accurate.



### **Appendix III**

ATB	Attitude Towards Black Scale
BIS	Behavioral Inhibition System
EMS	External Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced Scale
ERN	Error Related Negativity
ERP	Event Related Potentials
IAT	Implicit Association Test
IMS	Internal Motivation to Behave Unprejudiced Scale
MCPR	Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale
MODE	Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants
SDT	Self Determination Theory

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