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300

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The three studies assembled here deal with certain classical or at least familiar notions of historical linguistics the formal nature of which is unmistakable while their explicit formulation has lagged – a state of affairs which carries dangers of misunderstanding.
The first study concerns the positing of intermediate stages in sound change processes with known starting and end points. This is of interest with regard to other questions of relative chronology in language history and to the synchronic ordering of phonological rules. The second is an analysis of the analogies between some aspects of manuscript stemmata as constructed by textual critics in the recovery of archetypes and of the family trees claimed as a result or by-product of the so-called comparative method in linguistics. In particular, there is a discussion of the role of error and in innovation and of the Quentin intermediary. The third study is aimed at the language family trees which would express a correlation between the extent of language change, however measured, and the lapse of time; at some of their formal properties; and at the discovery procedures that follow as different factors are kept constant. Both the second and the third essays ascribe fundamental importance to the non-rooted or ancestorless shape of the tree.

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217

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MARGA REIS

PATCHING UP WITH COUNTERPARTS*

0. Sentences involving change of identity ("CI") such as (1)

(1)a. I dreamed that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I kissed me.
b. If I were Brigitte Bardot, I'd kiss me.

have two apparent flaws: (i) Not all first-person pronouns refer to the same individual, the speaker of the utterance, as they usually do; (ii) the consequent clauses of (1)ab, **I kissed me*, **I'd kiss me*, are ungrammatical in isolation. Yet, (1)ab are fully acceptable sentences. George Lakoff, in his well-known analysis of (1)[1], resolved the conflict by appealing to counterpart relations: On the assumption that individuals figuring in the world of the speaker (W_s) of (1)ab may have individual-counterparts as well as body-counterparts in the world created by *dream*, *if* (W_d), *I*, the subject of *kiss*, can be said to represent the body-counterpart of Brigitte Bardot, but the individual-counterpart of the speaker; *me* to represent the body-counterpart of the speaker. Given this, (i)/(ii) can be disposed of by stipulating, first, that the rule of person agreement in English marks any counterpart of the first-person with the first-person morpheme, whether it is an individual-counterpart or a body-counterpart; second, that for the anaphoric processes in question it is coreference with respect to W_d rather than with respect to W_s that is crucial: Hence, since individual-counterpart and body-counterpart are different individuals in terms of W_d, the referents of *I* and *me* are not in the coreference relation necessary and sufficient for triggering reflexivization.

On first sight, Lakoff's counterpart analysis is plausible enough; and, as far as I know, it has never been challenged. In this paper, I shall attempt to show that some second sights and thoughts, concerning the data as well as the descriptive framework, are in order.

1. Let me first take up the anaphoric part of the problem. By Lakoff's analysis, all CI sentences reflexivizing under W_s coreference only are ruled out, all CI sentences pronominalizing under the same circumstances are ruled in. Nothing in his solution need pertain specifically to CI sentences in

* I should like to thank the members of the 1972 Syntax Workshop at M.I.T. as well as Gretchen Bence (Munich) for discussing with me the English data presented in the paper.
[1] Cf. Lakoff (1968), and the more succinct version of this analysis in Lakoff (1972, p. 639ff.) which I shall be referring to throughout. 1. Ex. 117/2

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the first-person singular; hence, one would expect that it generalizes freely to the many CI sentences containing other than first-person subjects. But only sentences with first-person plural subjects live up to this expectation, cf. (2).

(2) If we were the bosses of the firm, we wouldn't hire us either.

Concerning sentences with second-person subjects acceptability judgments are divided, cf. (3);

(3)a. %If you were John, you wouldn't hire you either.
b. %If you guys were the bosses of the firm, you wouldn't hire you either.

in exactly analogous sentences containing third-person subjects, the interpretation corresponding to the only possible reading of (1), (2) – *he/him, she/her, they/them* being interpreted as the noncoreferential body-counterparts of the antecedent NP's (as indicated by the subscripts) – normally does not get through at all[2] cf. (4), the more so if the CI antecedent is not fully explicit, cf. (5).

(4)a. ?*If Ann_i were $John_j$, she_j'd hire her_i.
b. ?*If $John_i$ were Ann_j, he_j'd hire him_i.
c. *If Ann_i were $Ruth_j$, she_j'd hire her $_i$.
d. *If $John_i$ were $Bill_j$, he_j'd hire him_i.
e. *If $[Ann\ and\ Bill]_i$ were the $[bosses\ of\ the\ firm]_j$, $they_j$'d hire $them_i$.
f. *If $[Ann\ and\ Sally]_i$ were the $[widowers\ in\ question]_j$, $they_j$'d hire $them_i$.

(5) (What would you_ido, if you_i were in my_j place, Fred?)
a. $Fred_i$ replied: "I_j'd hire me_i".
b. *$Fred_i$ replied that he_j would hire him_i.

(4)a–e and (5)b are fully acceptable only if the object pronouns of *hire* refer to counterparts of some individual(s) other than those mentioned in the antecedent clause.

To be sure, speakers asked to form third-person sentences comparable in form and meaning to (1), (2) may oblige; but if they do, recourse is had to

[2] When testing the data, the only exception occurred in the following context: "Rose... went to the mirror and stared at herself. ——, she thought". (Goldman: *Boys and Girls Together*, Bantam Book Q3751, 1972, p. 96). Native speakers asked to fill in the indirect discourse version of "I wouldn't kiss me either" responded with a pronominal rather than a reflexive version; the sentence "she wouldn't be nice to her either" used in the same context was "correctly" interpreted, apparently because the object pronoun could be understood to refer to the mirror image of the subject.

reflexive pronouns, cf. (6), and the equivalent German CI sentences in (7):

(6)a. If Ann_i were $John_j$, she_j'd hire $herself_i$.
b. If $John_i$ were $Bill_j$, he_j'd hire $himself_i$.
c. If $[Ann\ and\ Bill]_i$ were $[the\ bosses\ of\ the\ firm]_j$, $they_j$'d hire $themselves_i$.

(7)a. Wenn $Erna_i$ an $Georgs_j$ Stelle wäre, würde sie_j $sich_i$ nicht nach London begleiten.
b. An $Georgs_j$ Stelle würde $Hans_j$ $sich_i$ nicht blindlings gehorchen.

The same escape route is taken by speakers that are uncomfortable with second-person sentences such as (3), cf. (8).

(8)a. If you were John, you wouldn't hire yourself either.
b. If you guys were the bosses of the firm, you wouldn't hire yourselves either.

Sentences such as (6)–(8) seem to occur spontaneously only in the rarest of cases; informant reactions as to their ultimate acceptability remain mixed[3]. They are, however, uniformly rated better than reflexivized first-person sentences, cf. (9)

(9) *If I were you, I'd hire myself.

Recourse to reflexivization, however, is limited to CI sentences containing irreflexive verbs such as *hire, visit, follow, accompany, einstellen, besuchen, folgen, begleiten* etc. In all other cases the second- and third-person object pronouns are interpreted as W_d-coreferential to the consequent subject, cf. (10):

(10)a. If Ann_i were $John_j$, she_j wouldn't perjure $herself_{j/*i}$.
b. If $Bill_i$ were $John_j$, he_j'd kill $himself_{j/*i}$ right away.
c. An $Georgs_j$ Stelle würde $Hans_j$ versuchen $sich_{j/?*i}$ zu retten.

Third-person CI sentences, then, just as second-person CI sentences for at least some speakers, seem to behave exactly the way they should not according to Lakoff's analysis: Pronominalized versions are starred, reflexivized versions are half way acceptable. In explaining the difference in

[3] It is my impression that third person reflexivized CI sentences are more acceptable in German than in English. This may be related to the greater phonological uniformity of personal and reflexive pronouns in German. Recall also that in German there are no reflexive pronouns distinct from personal pronouns in the first- and second-person. This might exert a certain 'pattern pressure' on the third-person cases (*ich*:*mich* = *du*:*dich* = *er*:*sich* instead of *er*:*ihn* etc.).

behavior, anti-ambiguity, clearly, plays an important role: As a rule, the reference relations characteristic of CI sentences such as (1)/(2) can only be expressed if no ambiguity results. Thus, confining ourselves to the idiosyncrasies of the third-person sentences, the failure of (4), (5b), (10) vs. the acceptability of (6)/(7) corresponds exactly to the existence vs. nonexistence of a competing interpretation. Moreover, first- and second-person pronouns differ from third-person pronouns in that only the former are unambiguous, only the latter may refer to (the counterparts of) different individuals; the speakability of the corresponding CI sentences such as (1) varies accordingly, at least for those speakers that accept (3). But adding an anti-ambiguity condition to Lakoff's analysis will do only half the job: Even if the partial rejection of unambiguous second-person sentences were already accounted for in some other way, it would only dispose of the problems posed by (4), (5), (9), (10); the problem of the reflexivized sentences, however, would remain, and this necessarily so: Any attempt of stretching the ordinary reflexivization rule to account for the W_d reflexivizations in (6)–(8) will end up being inconsistent with Lakoff's counterpart analysis of (1)–(3). Hence, either the acceptable first-person (plus second-person) CI specimens or the acceptable third-person (plus second-person) CI specimens will remain unexplained.

2. Let me now examine some problems surrounding person agreement in CI sentences. Lakoff's formulation of this rule, if properly generalized to account for other than first-person singular morphemes, cf. (11),

(11)a. b. c. d. e. f. If $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{you}\\ \text{he}\\ \text{Bill}\\ \text{she}\\ \text{we}\\ \text{they}\end{array}\right\}$ were John/in John's place, $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{you}\\ \text{he}\\ \text{he}\\ \text{she}\\ \text{we}\\ \text{they}\end{array}\right\}$'d fire Dick, too.

says in effect two things: (i) All counterparts of the subject of antecedent CI clauses formally agree with that subject in person, gender, and number; (ii) the target of identification (for example, 'Brigitte Bardot' in (1)/(2), 'John' in (3)) contributes only to the reference of the pronouns in question, whereas none of its formal features is reflected by them. Since person, gender, and number are formal as well as referential categories, (i)/(ii) predict, in particular, that corresponding discrepancies – pronouns in the consequent clause being, for instance, formally singular, but referentially plural, or vice versa – play no role.

This prediction is, to a certain extent, correct, cf. the grammatical CI

sentences (12), where *he* is subject to at least one such discrepancy in every case.

(12)a. b. c. d. e. f. g. If John were $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{me}\\ \text{you}\\ \text{Sheila}\\ \text{one of us}\\ \text{in our place}\\ \text{in their position}\\ \text{still a baby}\end{array}\right\}$ he wouldn't perjure himself.

Problems arise, however, once such discrepant pronouns are forced to appear as subjects or objects of predicates like the following:

(13)a. *husband, son, bachelor, monk, actor, (to) father*;
b. *wife, daughter, spinster, nun, sister, mistress, pregnant*;
c. *separate, meet, get together, disperse, sit around the table, collect, count, reunite, gather*;
d. *differ, similar, distinct, have in common, friends, apart, get married, agree, kill/hate/stroke each other*;

The predicates listed in (13)a demand a [+male] subject, those listed in (13)b a [+female] subject; those in (13)cd are selectionally compatible with [+plural] subjects or objects only[4]. These restrictions, as McCawley has pointed out, are semantic (referential) rather than syntactic (formal)[5], cf. his sample sentences (14),

(14)a. I counted the boys/*the boy/the crowd.
b. *These scissors [=this pair of scissors] are similar.

where *the crowd* meets the [+plural] restriction of its predicate, although it is formally singular, and *these scissors*, although formally plural, violates it by being referentially singular. Judging from real world semantics, then, one would expect that discrepant pronouns in W_d may acceptably figure as subjects/objects of (13)a-, (13)b-, (13)c-type predicates as long as they are referentially +male, +female, or +plural respectively. This, however, is

[4] No attention is paid to the *with/to/from* paraphrases of some of the predicates in (13) cd, for which singular subjects and objects are possible.

[5] S. McCawley (1968, p. 134ff.). Some qualification of McCawley's statement is in order, however. Note that only the predicates listed in (13) are insensitive to the formal [±plural] categorization; the predicates listed in (13)d seem to invariably demand a referentially plural subject that is formally plural (or a conjoined structure) as well, cf. Wandruszka (1973, p. 8f.). Further counterexamples concerning number selection – predicates that demand plural but nonconjoined subjects – have been cited in Perlmutter (1972, p. 244, fn. 2).

usually not the case, cf. (15)–(17):

(15)a. *If Sue were Fred, she'd certainly become a monk.
b. *If Sue were Fred, she'd certainly leave her wife.
c. *If Sue were in Fred's position, she'd father one or two children and then scram.

(16)a. *If Fred were Sue, he'd become an actress/ a nun.
b. *If Fred were Sue, he'd certainly leave his husband.
c. *If Fred were Sue, he'd want to become the mother-in-law of Bill.

(17)a. *Fred said, if he were them/in their position, he'd get together and talk about his problems.
b. *I dreamed I was reborn as three people and that I met in Chicago.
c. *I dreamed I was reborn as three people: Joe Louis, Jack Dempsey, Gene Tunney, and that I sat peacefully around a large family table having dinner together.

Totally out, too – this time in better accordance with real world semantics, cf. fn. 5 – are CI sentences pairing discrepant pronouns with predicates from (13)d, cf. (18):

(18)a. *Fred said about Ann and Bill: If I were them/in their position, I'd kill each other.
b. *If I were to be reborn as two people, may be I'd be similar.
c. *If I were to be reborn as two people, may be I'd have nothing in common.

Matters are not getting much better, if the available *to/with/from* versions are used, cf. (19), unless a somewhat epistemic interpretation is possible, cf. (20).

(19)a. ?*I dreamed I was reborn as two people and that I met (with) me in Chicago.
b. *If I were to be reborn as two people, may be I'd differ from me as to height and intelligence.

(20)a. ?If I were reborn as two people, I could certainly confer with me, likewise meet with me.
b. ?If I were to be reborn as two people, I could be friends with me, why not?

At any rate, the intermediate stages required by a conjunction reduction or conjunct movement derivation for (19)/(20) are ungrammatical in every case, cf. for example (20)a′:

(20)a′. *If I were to be reborn as two people, I and I could certainly confer, likewise meet.

How can sentences such as (15)–(20) be handled? Following Lakoff's example, one might propose to accommodate them by making the selectional rules of grammar sensitive towards possible world contingencies. Two possible extensions suggest themselves: Either (a) selectional restrictions do not pertain to body-counterparts but to individual-counterparts, or (b) selectional restrictions pertain to all the referents of the required subject/object NP's in the world in question. Both extensions would leave real world semantics unchanged, but sentences such as (15)–(20) would be ruled out as desired. Neither (a) nor (b), however, can ultimately be correct: (a) is refuted by sentences such as (21)/(22) that are ungrammatical, although the individual-counterparts meet the respective [+female], [+plural] restrictions;

(21) *If Sue were Fred, she'd certainly become a nun.

(22) *Sue, Bill, and Harry unanimously declared: If they were Fred/in Fred's place, they'd meet in Chicago.

(b) says, incorrectly, that sentences like (15)–(22) are out for 'deep', that is referential, reasons, whereas a comparison of (15) and (23) shows that it is superficial rather than referential discrepancy that matters – in (15) pronouns marked for gender make the discrepancy glaringly explicit, in (23) the neutrality of *I, they* as to gender allows a successful cover up:

(23)a. John and Bill said that, if they were the Kessler sisters, they wouldn't like to become old spinsters either.
b. Sheila said: If I were you, dear Bill, I'd find myself a wife, father a child, and get settled.

Furthermore, the sentences in question cannot be ruled out on pragmatic grounds: The dreams, wishes, and thoughts underlying (15)–(22) are certainly not inconceivable, just hard to grammatically express by means of the CI sentence pattern. This is also borne out by the fact that speakers bent on putting such ideas into words, sometimes just switch, wherever possible of course, to selectionally acceptable pronouns rather than give up, cf. (24) vs. (18)c:

(24) ?If I were to be reborn as two people, may be $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{these two people}\\ \text{they}\\ \text{we}\end{array}\right\}$ would have nothing in common.

Moreover, obviously, trying to account for sentences like (24) within regular

grammar would again give rise to a dilemma: They could be accommodated by the person agreement rule only if Lakoff's counterpart extension of this rule were given up, and vice versa. Thus, either the consequent subject pronouns of (24) or those of all other sentences will have to remain unexplained.

From this I conclude that the unspeakability of sentences (15)–(22) cannot be handled by regular grammar or its Lakovian counterpart extension. In this situation it is hardly comforting that, occasionally, CI sentences containing predicates subcategorized for specific number and gender, do go through with discrepant pronouns, cf. (25), (26):

(25) Sue said to Bill and Mary: If I were you/in your position, I'd get married right away[6].

(26)a. If Sue were Fred, she'd certainly become an actor[7].
b. ?If Fred were a woman, he'd love to get married, become pregnant and quit his job[8].

3. The data presented in Sections 1, 2 have proved to be unamenable to Lakoff's counterpart analysis, or any of its consistent extensions. What are we, then, to do with them?

My suggestion is that we handle them by utilizing the distinction between "core grammar" and "patch-up grammar" implicit in Morgan (1972) in a perhaps novel way. The evidence that such a distinction is generally needed comes from data like the following:

(27)a. John and Mary are coming. Either John or Mary is coming.
b. (Either) Pete or his two brothers ? coming.
c. (Either) Pete and Jim or their little brother ? coming.
d. John and/or Mary ? coming.
[?: is/are]

[6] The acceptability of (25) with the group reading is hard to explain: Note that *get married* belongs to the symmetric predicates requiring a subject NP that is referentially as well as syntactically plural, or, if it is a collective noun that it is marked for duality such as *couple, pair, the two*. Perhaps, the ability of *get married* to acceptably figure with singular subjects, cf. *I'd love to get married* vs. **I'd love to meet/be similar* etc. plays the decisive role. This would be in keeping with the 'superficial' explanation provided for (23). Attempting to incorporate this explanation into regular grammar would involve transderivational means, but it is by no means obvious that such an attempt should be made, cf. Section 3.

[7] Note that although *actress* presupposes its subject to be [+female], and males occupied in the profession in question invariably are called *actors*, *actor*, by itself, does not necessarily carry a [+male] presupposition concerning its referent, cf. *After the play, all the actors, among them even Miss Highnose, went to a party*. Thus, since *actor* seems to denote the profession in its predominant sense, sentences such as (26)a are indeed less objectionable than (16)a.

[8] In (26)b *he* and *pregnant* are not directly juxtaposed. Thus, sentences like (26)b might be amenable to the explanation provided for (23).

(28)a. Entweder keiner oder alle ?.
b. Entweder alle oder keiner ?.
c. Entweder ? keiner oder alle.
d. Entweder ? alle oder keiner.
[?: geht/gehen]

(29)a. There are at least two, at most five cases where this solution will work.
b. There ? at least one, at most two ?? where this solution will work.
c. There ? at most three, at least one ?? where this solution will work.
[?: is/are; ??: case/cases]

(30)a. Das Beweismaterial ? drei Tonbänder.
b. Drei Tonbänder als Beweismaterial ? zu wenig.
*[?: ist/sind]

(31)a. The committee ? quarreling. [?: is/are]
b. Der Ausschuß ist/*sind sich nicht einig.

(32)a. stilistische und logische Untersuchung ? des Textes zeigen...
b. stilistische und logische Untersuchung des Textes zeig ?? ...
[?: ø/-en; ??: -en/-t][9]

(33)a. I, who am an anarchist, will doubtless be here.
b. I, who the FBI thinks ? an anarchist...
[?: am/is; cf. Morgan (1972, p. 284)]

(34)a. Wir, die wir an die Reform glauben...
a'. Wir, die an die Reform glauben...
b. Wir glauben, daß wir Reformen durchsetzen können...
c. Wir, die glauben, daß ? Reformen durchsetzen können...
[?: wir/sie]

(35)a. I saw somebody come along York Street, and when he came closer, I realized he was wall-eyed/a linguist doing field work.
b. I saw somebody come along York Street, and when he came closer, I realized ? was pregnant/a woman in her forties.
[?: he/she]

(36)a. Der Mann verschwand in der Ferne. ~Er verschwand in der Ferne.
b. Der/das Mannequin trug ein Kleid aus Tüll. ~? trug ein Kleid aus Tüll.
[?: er/sie/es]

[9] I owe the examples (31), (32) to Hedwig Kraus (Würzburg).

(37)a. John and Mary are fascinated by Tom. ~Who is fascinated?
b. John and Mary are going to meet in Chicago. ~Who is going to meet in Chicago?
c. John and Mary are similar. ~Who ? similar?
[?: is/are]

In all these cases[10], the speaker equipped with the standard versions of the rules in question – in our examples primarily agreement rules – faces a critical situation: Either the correlation of relevant linguistic features he or his standard rules take for granted does not hold, cf. examples (27)b–d, (28), (31), (32), where the usual coincidences between formal singular and individual reference, formal plural/conjoined NP and set reference/interpretation does not hold; or the rules he wants to simultaneously employ lead to conflicting structural changes, cf. for example (37)c, where ordinary question formation demands a *wh*-subject that is referentially unspecified for number but syntactically marked "singular", thus clashing with the selection rules of *similar* that call for a syntactically as well as semantically plural subject. In either case, the standard rules do not tell the speaker what to do; unless he escapes into an innocuous paraphrase, he will have to patch up the holes left by his core grammar. He may do so in various ways: He may either admit all available options as grammatical, or rule them all out, or establish ad hoc priorities by specifying one of the usually correlative features as more essential for agreement than the others, by devising or invoking subsidiary principles such as the "closest conjunct" principle[11], etc.

Are such patch up devices of the same linguistic status as core rules? Morgan, in trying to explain some of the intricacies of verb agreement in English, seems to imply that they are (1972:285); the differences in importance, generality, and idiolectal variability are apparently accounted for by assuming a hierarchical ordering with core rules high up in the list, patch up devices way down. While the existence of quite a few intermediate cases might lend support to this view – for example the principles by which the plural option is allowed in English and strictly ruled out in German[12], cf. (31), (32) – the opposite view (38) seems to be equally well supported, if not better:

(38) Only core rules are rules of grammar.

[10] Further examples may be found in Morgan (1972); Green (1971); the phenomena discussed in Eisenberg (1973) seem to be of the same order.
[11] S. Morgan (1972, p. 281).
[12] These principles seem to be quite complex: Thus, in English the plural option seems to be confined to sentences having a [+ countable], [+ human] subject; moreover, singular and plural option are not always in free variation, but used for expressing a semantic opposition, cf. *The audience was large* vs. *the audience were large*, etc. (s. Kraus, in preparation, for further discussion).

The main reason for adopting (38) is this: If patch up rules were just like any other rule of grammar, known to the native speaker in the same way, we should expect that a speaker, once he has learned them, employs them with equal ease and without hesitation. But this is not true: All the speaker seems to know for sure concerning sentences like (27)–(37) is that his grammar is somehow leaving him in the lurch. Even if he goes on to using a patch up device, he knows that a linguistic decision is forced on him that for the sake of grammaticality he would prefer to avoid. Moreover, the speaker may not behave consistently in these situations, whereas core rules usually are employed with idiolectal uniformity. These facts would be strange, given Morgan's position; on the basis of (38), however, they can easily be accounted for. Further support for (38) might derive from the fact that bonafide patch up devices, unlike core rules, apparently may not experience analogical spread, nor figure as targets of linguistic change. Furthermore, there seems to be a remarkable difference between core rules and patch up rules with respect to formalism: In core grammar, global and transderivational rules are rare, possibly even dispensable; patch up devices, however, are quite frequently of that order, telling examples being, for example, the patch up conditions on English verb agreement discussed by Morgan. On the basis of (38) this is not implausible: If one is tripped up by ordinary regular grammar, one will have to resort to extra-ordinary, "irregular" means. Another difference between core and patch up grammar concerning the role of ambiguity will be noted below. These last-mentioned data seem to indicate that a possible consequence of (38) does indeed hold: Formal means and concepts relevant to the patch up component need not necessarily play a role/the same role in core grammar, and vice versa.

If (38) is accepted, the grammar of a language must be conceived of as an incomplete system in the following sense: Its rules x, y, z are defined not on all linguistic situations they might conceivably appear in, but only on subclasses C_x, C_y, C_z with a comparatively simple structure. In all situations $\bar{C}_x$, $\bar{C}_y$, $\bar{C}_z$ not so simply structured problems are bound to arise in the ways already noted above. C_x, C_y, C_z should, of course, not be considered to be situations of the simplest imaginable kind: For many of the complexities arising from the divergence of usually correlative features or the interaction of rules, a modus procedendi, a rule, is provided within core grammar itself. Every grammar, for example, seems to specify, partly in a universal, partly in a language particular way, what to do about *and*-conjoined NPs or collective nouns with respect to number agreement as well as number selection rules; accordingly, children that may have abstracted their first versions of these rules from the simplest possible $[\text{NP V X}]_S$ case where NP is a simplex, and a one:one correspondence between formal and referential singular/plural

obtains, upon encountering items such as *committee*, *Ausschuß*, *Paul and/ und Robert* in subject position, *meet*, *similar*, etc. in predicate position, will just refine their core grammar by incorporating the appropriate distinctions and conditions and live by them ever after with ease and uniformity. But, sensibly enough, there seems to be no language that bothers to specify solutions to *all* potential crises in advance. Thus, while the English/German core rule of verb agreement certainly is sensitive to the distinctions "formal vs. referential singular/plural", or "initial NP vs. nominativizable NP (subject NP)" that in the simplest possible cases are also neutralized, cf. (39), (40) vs. (39′), (40′),

(39)a. Die Kuh weidet auf der Alm.
d′. Die Kühe weiden auf der Alm.
b. The cow is grazing outside.
b′. The cows are grazing outside.

(40)a. Die Kinder wurden gerufen.
b. The kids were called inside.

(39′)a. Das Vieh weidet/*weiden auf der Alm.
b. The cattle is/*are grazing outside.
a′. Die Hosen, die du heute anhast, sind/*ist zu kurz!
b′. The slacks you are wearing today are/*is too short.

(40′)a. Den Kindern wurde/*wurden gerufen.
a′. Am Abend wird/*werden hier gesungen.
b. Themselves was/*were all they could see. (Morgan, 1972, p. 282)

it is not sensitive to others: Judging from examples (27)–(34) the core rule of verb agreement apparently is defined on linguistic contexts C_{VA} where the head NP remains clausemate of the verb it is to agree with on the surface, usually remains left of the verb, is the only one to potentially appear in nominative case, the only one laying claim on subject status, never contains *or*-conjuncts that are mixed with respect to gender and number, etc.; accordingly, the agreement rule the native speaker may be said to know contains a term corresponding to "head-NP" that is unanalyzed with respect to the cooccurring properties; the rule as such will be indeterminate as to whether it obeys an additional surface constraint ruling out distant agreement, or not, etc., thus causing, "defining", the blind spots to be either avoided or to be covered by patch up grammar.

This is not to say that for the linguist patch up grammar is uninteresting, just a bunch of ad-hoc devices about which nothing further can be said. On the contrary, looking at some of the patch up principles already known – such as the "closest conjunct" principle, the principle operative in patching sentences like (33): "the further the verb gets away from the head [*I*] of the relative clause, the worse *am* gets and the better *is* gets" (Morgan, 1972, p. 284), the phonological identity condition under which the German version of Conjunction Reduction may 'forget' about non-identical syntactic features of the conjoined constituents (s. Eisenberg, 1973), the observation that superficial compliance with selectional rules may compensate for referential incompatibility (cf. sentences (23), (26)) – future generalizations along the lines of (40) do not seem inconceivable:

(40) (A subclass of?) patch up operations are cover up operations:
a. Speakers will let patch up candidates pass, if the surface appearance of a well-formed utterance is preserved or can be attained (cf. Eisenberg's examples; (23), (26), (30))
b. If the conflict cannot be completely covered up, the following "closeness principle" obtains: surface appearance of a well-formed derivation in smaller contexts takes precedence over larger contexts. (cf. (27), (28), (33), (34), etc.)
c. Sentences where (a)/(b) will not work (as for example, in (29), (35)), or where ambiguity with a core derivation would result (s. (34) and below) will remain unspeakable.

Right now, it is of course an open question to what extent (40) is correct. It should be noted, however, that the question of generalized patch up principles can arise only if, on the basis of (38), the various patch up devices are viewed as instances of one, independent phenomenon. Without (38), they would have to appear as idiosyncratic subconditions on quite different rules; any similarities between them would have to be considered as accidental. Hence, if generalizations like (40) were indeed to be confirmed, this would constitute additional strong evidence for the separation of core and patch up grammar.

4. Let me leave the many theoretical and heuristic problems raised by (38) to themselves and return to the CI data.

There can be no doubt as to what the source of the trouble is: In talking about CI worlds the speaker is faced with a situation that is unusual on at least two counts: First, diversity of reference may obtain with respect to one and the same real world individual; second, referentially used NP's such as the subject pronouns in the consequent clauses of (1)–(26) may have double reference without being ambiguous in the way *bank* is in real world grammar: they do not denote either meaning, but must always simultaneously denote both. As a consequence, the ordinary concept of coreference breaks down,

and the possibility of discrepant pronouns arises. These oddities, naturally, affect the rules involving reference such as reflexivization, pronominalization, agreement and selection rules, causing linguistic conflicts in the ways discussed above. These conflicts, moreover, will occur rather frequently, since selection and agreement rules have to be used in virtually every sentence, anaphoric rules in all CI sentences.

The question to be asked is whether these conflicts are handled in core grammar or in patch up grammar. Since the referential oddities of CI worlds are only rarely relevant in normal discourse, one would expect that the ordinary rules of grammar are not sensitive to them, and, hence, that the CI sentences in question would have to be taken care of by patch up devices.

At least for the selectional CI data it is quite obvious that this is indeed the case, and I shall not bother to prove it in any detail. All the data are perfectly in accord with what has been observed to be characteristic for patch up cases in general. Note also how quickly Lakoff's amendment of the ordinary person agreement rule is abandoned, if it stands in the way of complying with (40)a. This seems to indicate that the purported counterpart extension of this rule is a patch up device only; bona fide core rules usually do not so easily yield to such pressures.

Matters seem less clear regarding the anaphoric data. In fact, reconstructing Lakoff's position in terms of core vs. patch up grammar, he seems to maintain that CI data are handled by core rules explicitly providing for counterpart phenomena; otherwise, his claim that "the notion 'counterpart' ... play(s) a role in English grammar" would not have any force to begin with.

Looking only at first person CI sentences, Lakoff's position seems unobjectionable. The speaker seems to employ them with ease; the grammaticality judgments concerning reflexive vs. personal pronouns in object position are clear-cut; moreover, with respect to the consequent clauses **I kissed me* etc. the patch up principles (40)a and (40)b do not apply.

Putting all the data together, however, major inconsistencies arise. Moreover, any attempt to get around them, while simultaneously claiming that counterpart phenomena are covered by the regular anaphoric rules, seems doomed to failure. Hence, Lakoff's core grammar position cannot be upheld. Rather, the situation seems to call for a patch up solution along the following lines: The speaker experiences propositions involving CI as a linguistic conflict. That is, when trying to decide on whether to use pronominalization or reflexivization, it is not the body-counterpart: individual-counterpart distinction providing clear-cut reference relations that he perceives as crucial (if he perceives it at all), but the bewildering fact that the objects in question are in some sense coreferential and non-coreferential with their subjects at

the same time. The speaker will have to conclude then that pronouns and reflexives are equally (il)legitimate means of expressing the relation. Hence, his decision as to which option to take when, and when to give up altogether, will turn on other criteria. By these criteria, the differences between first-, second-, and third-person sentences will also have to be accounted for.

The most likely criterion, as has already been shown, is ambiguity with core derivations. This factor, in general, will rule out the reflexive option; for, using this option, the communicatively important difference between, for example, P_i identifying with P_j bent on committing suicide ($\rightarrow$ bona fide coreference in every world) vs. identifying with P_j bent on murdering P_i ($\rightarrow$ fishy coreference in CI worlds) could not be expressed in CI, cf. (41).

(41)a. If I were Oscar, I'd want to kill myself, too.
b. If I were Oscar, I'd want to kill me, too.
(vs. b′: *If I were Oscar, I'd want to kill myself, too.)

But the pronominal option is not always available either. In all third person cases, ambiguity with a reading involving bona-fide diversity of reference is inevitable. Hence, unless the reflexive option is accidentally free, because the verbs in question are irreflexive, third-person versions of sentences such as (1), (2), will, in general, be unspeakable.

In second-person cases, such ambiguity is, of course, impossible; yet, at least for some speakers, the pronominal option is not acceptable nevertheless. Looking at the equally unambiguous first-person cases, the only possible reason is the homophony of subject and object pronouns. This is not implausible: In ordinary discourse the cooccurrence of identical NP's always implies diversity of reference, cf. (42), and usually juxtaposition of identical elements expressing different meanings or functions is avoided altogether, cf. (43):

(42)a. John [=J. Smith] shaved John [=J. Miller].
b. You (, Peter,) will go with you (,Paul,) and get the big blackboard for me, said the teacher.

(43)a. *He didn't go to the bank, but to the bank.
b. *Die Behandlung des Arztes [gen. subj.] und des Patienten [gen. obj.] kam teuer.

But whatever the explanation is, non-homophony is obviously sufficient reason to make some speakers turn to the reflexive option, wherever it is unambiguously available. If it is not, as it is in the majority of cases, second person versions of the CI pattern in question will be unspeakable.

Only in the first-person then, conditions adverse to the pronominal option are lacking: The use of *me*, *us* is referentially unambiguous; they are,

moreover, phonologically different from the subject pronouns *I*, *we*. Hence it is by fortunate patch up circumstances, not by rule of grammar, that first-person CI sentences go through so well.

Note that, in real world grammar, ambiguity does not crucially interfere with anaphoric rules: First, these rules are thus that personal and reflexive pronouns appear in near-perfect complementary distribution, occasional overlaps being determined by structural factors or secondary 'aspectual' differences, never by ambiguity. Second, the rules of pronominalization and reflexivization apply wherever their structural description is met, no matter whether ambiguity results or not, cf. (44):

(44)a. Bob_i thought Melvin_j would hit $\text{him}_{i/k}$.
b. Bob_i talked to Melvin_j about $\text{himself}_{i/j}$ and his $_{i/j}$ problems.
c. Why is Bob_i letting Melvin_j work for $\text{him}_{i/k}$?
d. Warum läßt Hermann_i seinen Bruder_j für $\text{sich}_{i/j}$ arbeiten?
e. Warum läßt Hermann_i seinen Bruder_j für $\text{ihn}_{i/k}$ arbeiten?

This difference is easy to explain once the patch up analysis of the CI data is accepted: The ambiguities in (44) are produced by the regular application of core rules; hence, the hearer can, in principle, retrieve both readings by consulting his internalized grammar. Once, however, a hearer has hit upon all the core derivations compatible with a given utterance, under normal circumstances the interpretation process will stop; hence, an additional reading resulting from patch up principles would not get through. It stands to reason, then, that patching up can only be successful, if ambiguity with core derivations is avoided.

As far as I can see, there is no alternative explanation for this difference. In particular, any attempt to account for it within the Lakovian core grammar position seems hopeless. Thus, the different role ambiguity plays in bona fide normal and prima facie patch up cases seems to lend further support to the distinction of core grammar vs. patch up grammar as spelled out in (38).

5. If the foregoing analysis of CI sentences is accepted, then there are two conclusions to be drawn:

(a) Lakoff used the CI sentences for supporting his claim that the notion 'counterpart', via the subrelations 'individual-counterpart', 'body-counterpart', play an essential role in English grammar. The latter pair, it turned out, plays no role in the analysis of CI sentences; 'counterpart' itself, inasmuch as this notion is descriptively relevant at all, is confined to patch up grammar. It has been pointed out above that patch up concepts need not necessarily be relevant in core grammar and vice versa; hence, Lakoff's claim must be rejected. Likewise, his criticism of Lewis' notion of 'counterpart' (Lakoff, 1972, p. 641f.) loses its force, since it hinges on CI sentences that are basically like (1), (2).

I am aware that the CI data are only part of the evidence by which Lakoff tried to support his claim. But the other data – sentence pairs designed to show that Equi-NP-Deletion is contingent on the participant-counterpart (vs. observer-counterpart) status of the embedded subject, cf. (45)ab –

(45)a. I wanted ? to be president. (participant reading)
b. I wanted myself to be president. (observer reading)

hardly save the day for counterparts: Even if the purported relevance of the participant: observer interpretation for explaining the use of Equi-NP-Deletion vs. Subject-to-Object Raising were granted[13], invoking the notion 'counterpart' seems self-defeating: If taken seriously, the subject and object of (45)b, by being in the observer-counterpart relation, would qualify as different individuals; if taken a bit more metaphorically, the observer-counterpart relation creates more 'distance' than the participant relation; in either case, given the option of pronouns vs. reflexives, one would expect pronominalization of the object rather than reflexivization, which in fact, however, is present[14]. Moreover it is hard to see that (45)b should differ from reflexive cases like (46),

(46)a. I could hate myself for doing that over and over again.
b. He thinks the world of himself.
c. He saw himself in the mirror.
d. He persuaded himself to consult a doctor.
e. He got himself arrested.

where the issue of participant- vs. observer-counterpart status, Equi-NP-Deletion vs. Subject-to-Object Raising never arises. From this, I conclude that in explaining (45)b just as in explaining (46) no more is involved than

[13] As it probably should not, cf. Postal (to appear, p. 166), Bresnan (1972, p. 161ff.) as to the marginal grammaticality of (45)b. Moreover, apart from the few cases where Subject-to-Object-Raising is optional and minimal pairs such as (45) are possible, the raising cases with *believe*, *know*, *think*, etc. do not readily allow for an observer interpretation, thus showing the two rules in question in a semantically arbitrary distribution. Note also that *but* sentences such as *I wanted to be president, but I didn't want myself to be president* (Lakoff, 1972, p. 641) do not prove that the semantic distinction Lakoff claims to exist usually does exist (the usual case being that the conjuncts are used in isolation): Any cooperative hearer faced with such a *but*-sentence and trying to make sense of it, will seize upon the only visible difference – *myself* vs. ϕ – and wring a contrastive interpretation out of it he might not think of otherwise at all.

[14] The notion of 'distance' has been occasionally invoked to explain the use of reflexive vs. personal pronouns (→less distance vs. more distance from the coreferent subject) in English prepositional phrases, cf. *She*$_i$ *kept it near herself*$_i$ vs. *She*$_i$ *kept it near her*$_i$. It plays a much more important role in languages like Latin, the distribution, however, always being that the reflexive pronoun is used for expressing the closer relationship to the coreferent subject.

ordinary coreference, and hence, that convincing evidence for the relevance of 'counterparts' in grammar has yet to be found.

(b) My account of the CI data, clearly, would have been impossible without distinguishing between core and patch up grammar. This distinction as I have tried to show in Section 3, is not ad hoc. Yet, considering the evidence so far available, it does seem to pertain to rather insignificant, superficial, and, moreover, obvious cases only. Hence, although the distinction has to be included into linguistic theory, its theoretical and heuristic importance appears to be marginal.

I should like to suggest, however, that this is not true: The area of linguistic conflicts unresolved by language itself or imperfectly solved, hence the domain of patch up grammar, seems to be much larger than hitherto recognized. The case of CI data was a first nonobvious case in point[15] in that the competing core analysis seemed at first sight plausible. But there seem to be even less obvious ones, including, for example, cases like the conditioning of root transformations, or of reflexivization in German 'A.c.J.' complements, or of Middle High German lengthening and shortening, etc. It is characteristic for all of these cases that the factors most likely to be decisive usually cooccur, and that the evidence from the rare situations where they do not, is apparently inconsistent. These problems have been approached in practically all standard treatments by asking either-or questions such as "Is it 'assertion' or 'main clause' status that permits root transformations to occur?", "Are Middle High German vowels lengthened in open (vs. closed) syllables or before voiced (vs. voiceless) consonants?", etc., and taking the single factor cases as crucial. The resulting sic-et-non answers have invariably remained controversial; yet, within the usual frameworks of grammar, there is no other approach. But, given the distinction between core and patch up grammar, an alternative immediately suggests itself: It is the correlative cases that are crucial in that the rules/conditions in questions are defined on them, the single factor cases then being, by definition, patch up cases. And this does seem to come closer to the truth; the speaker seems to be (have been) totally at ease only in the former cases, whereas the latter are either – inconsistently – patched up, tend to be avoided and/or eliminated by linguistic change[16].

[15] Although a borderline case, so to speak, since it has never been extensively studied before.

[16] In neither of these cases has a detailed patch up solution been worked out so far; first steps towards such a description are made with respect to reflexivization in *zu*-less infinitival structures in Reis (1974), with respect to Middle High German Lengthening and Shortening in King (1973). Possibly, Langacker's explanation for marked, unnatural vs. unmarked, natural cases of pronominalization (1969, p. 170) can also be reinterpreted in the light of the core grammar vs. patch up grammar distinction, thus providing an additional case in point.

The distinction between core grammar and patch up grammar thus might turn out to be of considerable value to linguistics. It follows then, that it should be more systematically taken into account. Of course, it will not be helpful in tackling every unsolved linguistic problem or controversial solution, the vast collection of which defines linguistics today (s. Postal, 1972, p. 160ff.). But it might serve to eliminate at least some of the either-or questions that are too simply put and some of the unified solutions that are merely ingenious. No doubt the alternative patch up solutions will usually look less neat; but given the bewildering, frequently inconsistent array of linguistic data, countenancing the core grammar: patch up grammar distinction (properly delimited with respect to the partially competing concept of analogy) might be a step towards linguistic realism: The goal of linguistics is, after all, to describe what the speaker/hearer knows and does when communicating, not to know or do better.

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GEACH AND KATZ ON PRESUPPOSITION*

1. Over twenty years ago, Geach and Strawson independently launched attacks against Russell's theory of description. Since then the notion of presupposition has been widely discussed among logicians. Recently it seems also to have attained a wide acceptance among linguists in the transformationalist school in a broad sense of the term. It is quite natural that the presuppositionalist trend in logic should have drawn the linguist's attention, as its development is based on its proclaimed interest in logic of ordinary language.

Comparing the original articles of Geach and Strawson[1] that started the presuppositionalist movement, Strawson might be said to be engaged in broadly logical arguments and his position would have to be subjected to examination primarily from the logical point of view. In fact, it has widely been discussed among logicians. On the other hand, Geach's article, in the first half, presents what appears to be a simple and straightforward argument for presupposition based on the linguistic "common sense" of "a plain man" in a way that would easily arouse the linguist's interest directly. It might then be profitable for the linguist to examine it critically.

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[1] P. T. Geach, 'Russell's Theory of Description', *Analysis* **10** (1950), 84–88. P. F. Strawson, 'On Referring,' *Mind* **59** (1950), 320–344. O. Ducrot's *Dire et ne pas dire*, Hermann, Paris, 1972, which came to my attention after the draft of this paper was completed, contains a clear criticism against Strawsonian arguments for presuppositional logic. Thus, the present work, which deals with Geach's and Katz's arguments for the same position as Strawson, complements Ducrot's work in the critical aspect. The following quote from Ducrot represents the same position as the present work:

> "Nous n'avons pas, dans cette longue discussion, *prouvé* que la fausseté des présupposés d'existence entraîne la fausseté des énoncés. Nous voudrions seulement avoir montré que la thèse inverse (selon laquelle les énoncés deviendraient logiquement inévaluables) ne s'appuie sur aucune évidence linguistique ni sur aucune «sentiment naturel»: si un logicien choisit de l'adopter, et de n'attribuer de valeur de vérité (vraie ou fausse) qu'aux énoncés dont les présupposés sont vrais, c'est en tant que logicien, par une libre décision. Ce faisant, il construit un concept de fausseté, beaucoup plus qu'il ne décrit un concept préexistent.... la spécificité du présupposé par rapport au posé n'a certainement pas pour fondement le fait que les présupposés seraient des conditions d'évaluation logique, mais leur spécificité est tout à fait indépendante de cette décision." (p. 40f.)

Ducrot further attempts to explicate presuppositional phenomena with reference to the theory of speech act.

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