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ISLAMIZATION IN PAKISTAN 1977 -1985

THE ULAMA AND THEIR PLACES OF LEARNING

S. JAMAL MALIK

INTRODUCTION

As a dependent country Pakistan has been developing its policies and implementing its development strategies in pursuance of the aspirations raised by the metropolises reflected in the demands of the worldmarket as defined by the world system theory¹. The process of determination had started before the creation of Pakistan.

Not only was the economic and administrative set-up of British India developed on colonial perceptions but also the educational system rendering it to a 'dependent education'². At the same time the traditional education as represented in the *dīnī madāris* (schools for religious education) was neglected by State authorities and thus became marginalized³. This tradition was further pursued by the rulers of Pakistan. The theologians ('Ulamā')—since the majority of them was not directly part of the strategies implemented by the representatives of metropolitan interests and demands—became more conservative and individualistic, leaving the secular functional approach to the formal education sector. The dysfunctional education of the Ulamā', the policy-makers thought, could hardly contribute anything to their conception of national process and progress. Accordingly the *dīnī madāris* and the 'Ulamā' were considered outdated; outdatedness had no place in modernizing Pakistan. However, both, the *dīnī madāris* as well as the formal education display particular functions in a dependent system. The *dīnī madāris* have been serving the purpose of absorbing a large part of the society that is not able to afford formal education. In this regard one may mention the high ratio of 'drop outs' from the formal sector going into religious schools. Thus the marginalized sector of education fulfilled certain functions. But it also inherited a high degree of potential which could be mobilized by the State by introducing certain measures, if needed, in political as well as in economic crises.

In contemporary Pakistan these measures can be understood as part of the Islamization process under General Zia ul Haq which itself reflected the high degree of dependence in

economic as well as in normatic terms. Even if the Islamization might seem to be something very indigenous, it was reducible to symbolisms on the one hand and the State's desire to control autochthonous and autonomous institutions on the other; both in order to trickle down its ideology.

The paper is mainly based on empirical data which will display the theorems given above.

It is divided into three periods:

1. the Ayubian Era (1958-1969)
2. the Bhutto Era (1971-1977) and
3. the Zia Era (1977-1985).

The measures undertaken by the three regimes are highlighted while those of the last one are dealt with at length. Accordingly, the proposals of a National Committee on *Dīnī Madāris* (NCDEM), the curricular developments, the equivalence of the *dīnī madāris* certificates with those of the formal sector of education, the *Zakāt* issue and the reactions of the 'Ulamā' vis à vis these measures are elaborated. It has been assumed that the *dīnī madāris* and the 'Ulamā' are realizing new functions and are displaying new developments in the wake of the massive State intervention. However, the approaches of all the different regimes are characterized by State intervention and the tendency towards centralization and unification thus reflecting a continuity of State interests.

THE AYUBIAN ERA (1958-1969)

The Ulama of Pakistan seem not to have felt the need to organize themselves and their places of learning vis à vis the Pakistani state until 1959 although a few minor attempts were made in the 1950s.

In 1959 the Government had promulgated the 'West Pakistan Waqf Property Ordinance 1959' not only to "improve the quality of Waqf properties"⁴ but also to curb the Ulama's position and to establish Government rule over these autonomous institutions. However, since there was no monolithic block of 'Ulamā' to face the official threat from a common platform, groups of religious scholars formed according to different schools of thought, schools that had emerged mostly in 19th century British India⁵.

In Pakistan four main organizations of *dīnī madāris* emerged:

The Deobandīs founded the "*Wafāq al-madāris al-'arabiyyah*" in Multan in 1959.

The Brelwīs the "*Tanzīm al-madāris al-'arabiyyah*" in Dera Ghazi Khan in 1959.

The Ahl-i-Ḥadīth founded the "*Markazī jam'iyat Ahl-i-Ḥadīth*" in Lyallpur (Now Fayṣal Abād) in 1955.

The Shī'ah dīnī madāris came together under the "*Maḥlis-i nazārat-i shī'ah madāris-i 'arabiyyah*" in Lahore in 1958.

The Jamā'at-i Islami has been organizing its religious schools since 1982 under the "*Rābitat al-madāris al-islāmiyyah*" with its centre in Lahore. One may assume that the incentives of the Jamā'at display the politics of the "*Rābitat al-'ālam al-islāmiyyah*", the Muslim World League.

These newly formed organizations of the dīnī madāris have affiliations to political parties which recruit their members mostly from the students of their respective school of thought.

The main tasks of these organizations were to update the curricula, to organize the dīnī madāris and to unify the examination systems. All the four organizations did not succeed in enacting their demands and programmes. Rather, the failures of these madāris organizations show the incapability of the religious schools and the 'Ulamā' to tackle the 'challenges' as were felt by the Islamic avantgarde. This avantgarde is a product of colonial traditions and pursues integrationist interests, i.e. integrating the Islamic value-system into colonial structures. A considerable part of the 'Ulamā' on the other hand seem to pursue an isolationist approach rejecting the integration of colonial norms⁶.

In the curricular field these developments implied that the Ulama had adopted the perception of their being backward, a perception being cultivated since the colonial penetration especially among the 'Islamic avantgarde'.

Analogous to the formation phase of the dīnī madāris not only the Auqaf Ordinance 1961 was promulgated but also a strategy elaborated to modify and to modernize the religious schools attempting to convert the 'Ulamā' into 'modern mullas'. This strategy was further pursued by the setting up of the 'Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology' and the 'Islamic Research Institute' in 1960 and 1962 respectively. The intention was to make Islam compatible with the "challenges of time".

Regarding the reconstruction of the dīnī madāris curriculum a National Committee was set up to elaborate a new syllabus. According to the report of this committee the 'Ulamā' were to take "full part as citizens..." while the task was to "... widen the outlook of the Dār al-'Ulūm students and to increase their mental horizon". This was, however, only possible if "unnecessary non-religious subjects" were reduced from the current syllabi.⁷ The secondary level (classes 6 to 12) included subjects i.e. Mathematics, English, Social Sciences, Modern Arabic Grammar, Modern Arabic Rehtorics, more Ḥadīth and Qur'ān (at the cost of

Philosophy, Logic) and certain books on Islamic Law. The highest level (classes 13 to 15) included Modern Philosophy, English and Hadith.

This approach implied a different notion of Islam by the bureaucracy, a notion aiming at implementing modernity and development strategies. Thus, religious education was not only confined to Qur'ān Ḥadīth and Fiqh but implied the teaching of modern subjects. The underlying policies of these attempts were not only to curtail the 'Ulamā's influence through State agencies like the Awqaf Departments, but also to integrate them to a certain degree. They should modernize the nation "help(ing) the Government and the society by selling fertilizers, opening poultry farms, distributing high yield seeds to farmers" etc.⁸, indicating the overall strategy of the time, that was the "Green Revolution". These strategies aimed i.a. at reaching at least 45 thousand students and teachers in more than 400 dīnī madāris.

THE BHUTTO ERA (1971-1977)

While Ayub's approach towards the Ulama was a more aggressive one⁹ Bhutto preferred to propagate the obscure Islamic Socialism pursuing rather a pacifying strategy towards the Maulanas and Muftis. The Bhutto constitution being an outcome of mutual consensus of nearly all segments of the society gave a handsome portion of power to the 'Ulamā' through the 'Islamic Provisions'. Accordingly the composition of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was changed: While there had been very few Ulama in this institution during the Ayub regime their share under Bhutto increased up to 5 in relation to 8 'seculars' (laymen, non-'ulamā').

In fact, the CII was to produce yearly reports of its activities and had to submit a final report after seven years of its appointment. On the basis of that report the Parliament and the Assemblies were to bring the laws of the Republic in accordance with the Sharī'ah within two years. Thus Pakistan was supposed to be islamized by 1981¹⁰.

Regarding the religious schools, the certificates of these institutions were proposed to be recognized as equivalent to B.A. for the purpose of the dīnī madāris graduates to teach Islamic Studies and Islamic Ideology in colleges. In order to have access to other institutions and positions English was made compulsory for the young maulānās¹¹. This compulsion, however, was rejected by the Ulama while the universities mostly did not appreciate the equivalence scheme.

The proposals of the CII in 1975/76 reaffirmed these suggestions: There should be total integration of the dīnī madāris with the formal system while the overall problem of lack of schools was to be tackled through the mobilization of the dīnī madāris as

centres of learning. This displayed a pragmatic rather than a religious approach. By the end of the Bhutto era the Government felt the desire to revise the *dīnī madāris* curricula which could not materialize due to internal pressures the regime had to face. However, an attempt was made to introduce i.a. "the new scientific and economic sciences" to the *Imāms* and *Khaṭīb*s under the auspices of the Auqaf Department via the newly established Ulama Academy.

THE ZIA ERA (1977-1985)

With the promulgation of the Islamic system by General Zia ul Haq the Ulama and the *dīnī madāris* underwent certain changes.

The military regime seemed to have capitalized from the fact that the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), vindicated by a considerable part of the society was demanding '*niẓām-e muṣṭafā*', (the Muhammadan order); hence the Islamization was proclaimed as the only way to adopt. Islamization thus being the policy for the next years to come, it was a basic requirement for the regime to bring the Ulama and the religious schools in line with its policy and to secure their support as constituency of the islamizing junta. Moreover, the regime had been organizing 'Ulama- and Mashaikh-Conventions' from time to time. The CII was to be one more catalyst in this regard: In fact, the number of Ulama increased from five in 1974 to eight in 1977 compared with 8 and 6 'seculars' respectively. This tendency became even more vigorous in the composition of the CII in 1981: 11 Ulama vis a vis 8 'seculars'.

National Education Policy 1979 (NEP)

Just in the light of the National Education Conference 1977 which had stressed ideology and pragmatism as the fountainheads of the education policies, the NEP and Implementation Programme 1979 stated to be "recognizing the great potentials of our indigenous institutions and patronizing them". Once more integrative steps were proposed by the State functionaries and a whole chapter was dedicated to the *dīnī madāris* system. Realizing that the religious schools "are doing all this (i.e. free education, boarding and lodging) on self-financing basis by raising donations and through other measures without costing anything to the national exchequer" the concerned policy makers set up a five years 'budget for the *dīnī madāris*, heavily underestimating the financial needs of these religious institutions representing only 9% of the *madāris*' income in 1979.

The National Committee on *Dīnī Madāris* and its aftermath

Consequently a committee was set up in order to conduct a survey. Its proposals once more aimed at bringing the 'madrassahs in consonance with the requirements of modern age on the one

hand and the basic tenets and spirit of Islam on the other"¹² implying a different notion of Islam and what ought to be taught in the religious institutions.

Accordingly a modernized curriculum was produced granting at least one third of the teaching time to modern subjects and enlarging the time frame. The modern subjects were Islamic History, General Science, Economics, Political Sciences, Comparative Religion, Urdu, Persian while the books for most of the new subjects were to be prescribed by the Department of Education (see also Appendix: Different Curricula).

Concerning the administrative set-up a 'National Organization of Dīnī Madāris' was proposed which was partially to be supervised by the Government while financially the dīnī madāris were to be sponsored by the Central Government and the Auqaf Departments. However, it was stated clearly that the Government had no intention to intervene in the internal affairs of the dīnī madāris¹³.

This approach meant not only to unify the dīnī madāris and to streamline them with the concept of 'basic needs' but was also to produce material desires among the Ulama and their disciples¹⁴. These material desires were to be fulfilled through 'Islamic technics' like the implementation of the Zakat system (Islamic taxes; a divine duty).

The Islam propagated by the State—the official or State Islam—has always had the tendency to curb autonomous and autochthonous developments. As can be seen from the conception of State-Islam stated above, it is quite different from that being prevalent at the grassroots level, be it the "Ṭarīqah-Islam" as represented by the vast majority of Pakistanis or be it the "Sharī'ah-Islam" as represented by the religious authorities, the fuqahā' and 'ulamā'. In order to stabilize the power of the State and its defenders and thus to cement the status quo the official Islam—in contrast to Sharī'ah—and Tariqah-Islam—is used in a way to overrun all autonomous movements.

The need for reform (iṣlāḥ) was felt by different segments of the society, except a part of the 'Ulamā' from the Deobandi school of thought (the Shia will not be considered here). They rejected the proposals of the National Committee on Dīnī Madāris by launching a nation-wide campaign calling the Government 'secular' (lā dīnī; lit. without religion) and expressing their fear of becoming its toys and thus be controlled and subjected. The campaign succeeded partially because of a well planned organization of the Wafāq al-Madāris al-'arabiyyah having an elaborate network of religious schools.

Table 1: Maslak-wise Dīnī Madāris and their affiliations in Pakistan

	1960	1971	1979	1983/84	Jan. 1984
Deobandi	233	292	354(158)	(945)	(1097)
Brelwi	98	123	267(189)	(557)	
Ahle Hadith	55	47	126(67)	(56)	(76)
Shi'ah	18	15	41(16)	(116)	
Jamā'at Islāmī	(13)	(41)	(57)	(107)	
not available	55	390	900		

Sources: *Ahmad I* Pp. 705-708; *Ahmad II* pp. 691; *Halepota Report* pp. 194-197; different lists and registers of the respective schools of thought as well as personal talks in Jan./Feb. 1986 in Lahore and Multan with the concerned authorities.

Figures in parantheses display the affiliated dīnī madāris only.

Table 1 indicates the popularity of the different schools of thought (popularity is quantified according to the numbers of dīnī madāris). The Deobandi school of thought is the most popular in Pakistan followed by the Brelwi and the Ahle Hadith. These are followed by the Shia and the Jama'at-e Islami madaris. All schools of thought except the Deobandis manifest their concentration in the Punjab and display very little dissemination through dīnī madāris in other provinces, at least upto 1979.

Besides this elaborate network there is the possibility of influencing through family ties: It is argued that the main dīnī madāris that led the campaign are the property of one or two families being descendants of the famous Maulānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānawī. (d. 1941) Finally the campaign received momentum by the non-conformist approach of Mufti Mahmud (d. 1980) the leader of the PNA against Bhutto and the president of the Wafaq al-Madāris. Accordingly the Draft Ordinance for the dīnī madāris, elaborated by the concerned Ministry and resembling very much the Ordinance of the Islamic University 1980 had to be given up.

Equivalence and Curricula

With the new announcement of the equivalence of the dīnī madāris certificates with the formal school certificates in 1982 a new dimension emerged. This equivalence was to be granted only if the dīnī madāris were to produce a 16 years curriculum with a considerable part of 'modern subjects'²⁵, just in conformity with

the demands of the Halepota Report. The Wafaq as well as the Brelwi Tanzim produced modified syllabi, nevertheless not changing much of their subjects. Both schools of thought were able to stretch their curricula from 8 to 9 years to 16 years thus claiming the entitlement of equivalence (subjects like Diniyat, Urdu and Persian were prerequisites for the Dars-i Nizami anyway (compare Appendix: different Curricula))¹⁶. Once more the *dīnī madāris* organizations succeeded in preserving parts of their autonomy at least for the time being.

As can be seen from Table 1 the number of affiliated *dīnī madāris* of each school of thought increased considerably during the last years. This is due to the equivalence of the *dīnī madāris* certificates on the one hand and the financial support through the Zakat system on the other. In fact, the affiliation is being undertaken with the view towards being recognized by official norms. An interesting development, however, is—what can be called a formative phase—among the different *dīnī madāris* and the Wafaqs/Tanzims as can be seen from Table 1; the Deobandis have been able to disseminate their cause even in other provinces, especially in Sindh. Similar tendencies can be disclosed for some other schools of thought. While the majority of the Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith is still confined to the Punjab the Shia have been developing the Northern Areas to be their stronghold. The *Jama'at-e Islami* on the other hand have preferred to propagate their cause in the NWFP.

With the equivalence scheme we not only witness a sharp increase in the number of *dīnī madāris* but also in the number of graduates which has been spectacular. While the production of Ulama was 5,611 during 1960 to 1980 it increased during 1981 to 1985 to 6,230 (see: The boom of graduates).

These developments imply a considerable potential and mobility among the *dīnī madāris* and their leaders, in fact of all schools of thought. However, they have been developing this eagerness of dissemination and institutionalization only in reaction to the attempts of intervention made by the State, that is to say that the motivational incentive was produced by the officials. Moreover, one may see a tendency towards regionalization among different schools of thought and thus a concentration of different Islams in different regions.

Zakat

The main measure introduced by the Government was, however, the Zakat system that was implemented in 1980 and which brought about a considerable change in the financial matters and pattern of the *dīnī madāris*. The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 1980 (ZUO) once more is an example for a religious matter elaborated upon not by religious scholars but basically by a secular body and implemented in its most pragmatic form. The ZUO had been a target

of severe criticism, both from the Ulama as well as from the 'seculars'. However, in order to pacify the theologians—who, however, mostly considered and still consider the ZUO not to be in accordance with Shari'ah—a Zakat scheme was installed according to which a considerable part of the society was to benefit, i.a. the Ulama and their disciples. In accordance with the pattern of disbursement prescribed by the Central Zakat Administration (CZA) the Provincial Zakat Administrations (PZAs) have to disburse the total amount of Zakat received from the former in compliance with a fixed scheme providing i.a. 10% for the dīnī madāris and their students annually from the Provincial Zakat Funds (PZ Funds). But in the years 1980–84 merely Rs 98,303,700 were transferred to the dīnī madāris representing 3.5% of the total Zakat money disbursed. The following year, however 9.4% was transferred to the dīnī madāris alone. This meant a remarkable increase in the money disbursed to the Ulama and their students.

Zakat money is the right of the poor and as such had to be disbursed accordingly. Thus it should be assumed that Zakat from the PZ Funds was to be disbursed among those dīnī madāris which have low incomes and could not look after their students properly. One main finding of the Halepota Report was that the dīnī madāris had lower incomes than expenditures. Accordingly, it was one of the main demands of the Committee on Dīnī Madāris to support the dīnī madāris financially. The policy-makers, however, tended to sponsor the 'prominent' madaris and their students. In fact, those receiving Zakat at least during the first disbursements were well established dīnī madāris and hence had considerable budgets¹⁷.

The start of disbursement was made by giving Zakat to 825 dīnī madāris through PZAs making only 47% of the 1,745 dīnī madāris surveyed in the Report of 1979. In the subsequent years we see a steady increase of dīnī madāris as well as beneficiaries except in 1983/84. The number of 825 dīnī madāris increased to 1,373 in 1982/83 and reached 2,273 in 1984/85, a nearly three fold increase. Simultaneously, the number of benefiting students increased from 67,201 in the first year to 111,050 in 1984/85 implying that nearly twice as many students benefited in 1984/85¹⁸.

In order to benefit from the Zakat scheme the dīnī madāris have to be registered and hence are subject to scrutiny. This scrutiny also implies an exposure of the privacy and autonomy of the dīnī madāris, a fact that produced problems as we will see later.

A PZ Ulama Committee, consisting of Ulama of different schools of thought of equal members—at least in Punjab—looks after the dīnī madāris affairs. This committee has framed a scheme according to which the dīnī madāris were to be sponsored. The first scheme which only provided funds ranging from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 20,000 annually/dīnī madāris was too limited to bring about a change in the dīnī madāris pattern and was therefore enhanced.

While the first scheme had categorised the *dīnī madāris* into three levels, the scheme of 1981/82 provided ten categories, ranging from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 70,000 annually/*dīnī madāris*. Moreover, the criteria to receive a certain Zakat amount were no more confined to the number of students only but were enlarged to the curricula also. Now the first three categories of *dīnī madāris* had to offer the highest standards of learning (*dawrah ḥadīth*; since in the equivalence scheme this stage is equal to M.A.). These three categories are followed by two 'secondary' categories (*mawqūf 'alayh*; now equal to B.A.) and two *dars-i niẓāmī* categories (the classical religious course in the Subcontinent, usually six years of study). These seven categories are followed by three categories of memorization and reading of the holy Qur'ān (*ḥifẓ* and *nāẓirah*). The scheme in 1982/83 enhanced the funds for the *dīnī madāris* reaching its peak in 1983/84: now the highest amount for those institutions having more than 200 boarders and offering *dawrah ḥadīth* as well as *dars-i niẓāmī* and spending more than Rs. 300,000 on construction costs annually, received Rs. 300,000 from the PZ Council. This amount meant an increase of 300% for the higher levels during the years 1981-84 while the middle categories (secondary=*mawqūf*) display a somewhat modest increase. The categories from 'mawqūf' downwards to the tenth category (*ḥifẓ* and *nāẓirah*) however suffer from a policy neglecting them.

In fact, we witness relatively little increase in these categories ranging from 33% to 50% during the same period¹⁹. This implies a particular policy towards the *dīnī madāris* displaying the intention to support the larger *dīnī madāris* which are mainly to be found in urbanized areas at the cost of smaller ones which are prevalent in rural areas. Notwithstanding the increase of the number of beneficiaries—which is primarily because of the tremendous increase of small and new established *maktabs* (small *dīnī madāris*)—there seems to be further urban hegemony at the cost of what is called "ruralization of education".

It has been estimated that the Zakat, being disbursed by the Government among the *dīnī madāris*, bears a significant impact. The overall increase in the budgets of the *dīnī madāris* is mainly because of the Zakat money pouring in from the PZ Councils. Admittedly, there are some differences among the *dīnī madāris* concerning Zakat share in their budgets. It can, however, roughly be said that this share amounts to one third of the total income of a *madrasah* per year. At the same time the PZA's donations are equal to 50% of the traditional Zakat income received by *dīnī madāris* through private channels. The PZ fund amount has been increasing steadily—as we have seen—thus bearing a momentum of dependence. However, at the same time, it is calculated that the traditional sources of income for the *dīnī madāris* were not affected by the ZUO.

The reluctance of the CZA towards smaller *dīnī madāris* poses the question as to how indigenous institutions can eradicate

illiteracy if they are not sponsored properly. The decline of Zakat payments to the smaller and remote dīnī madāris was probably to stop the 'mushroom-growth' of the dīnī madāris (see also: Equivalence and Curricula).

MUSHROOM-GROWTH

Table 2 'Registered institutions in Punjab, 1974-1985' shows the tremendous increase of the dīnī madāris in Punjab from 1974 to 1985. Other provinces display similar tendencies.

Table 2: Registered institutions in Punjab, 1974-1985(+)

Year of registration	Total number of regd. instit.	(%)	dini madaris	(%)	Private Schools	(%)
1974	117	(100)	21	(17,9)	-	-
1975	444	(100)	38	(8,6)	-	-
1978	815	(100)	175	(21,5)	17	(2,1)
1983	966	(100)	389	(40,3)	199	(20,6)
1984	2222	(100)	588	(26,5)	354	(15,9)
1985	1793	(100)	481	(26,8)	110	(6,1)

Source: Investigations in the *Punjab Stock Company* (Punch House, Lahore, 16./17./23. Feb. 1986)

(+) = For the years 1984 and 1985 Sargodha and Gujranwala Divisions have not been subject to investigations.

In fact, the increase of these institutions has outnumbered all other kinds of institutions registered during this period for educational and religious purposes under the Societies Act 1860. This is especially true for the more remote areas where formal education—here represented through private schools—is restricted due to different problems. In the rural areas, we witness the substratum for the mushroom-growth of the dīnī madāris being mostly confined to the teaching of Qur'ān, some degree of primary education and being located in mosques. Accordingly, the percentage of dīnī madāris in relation to the total number of registered institutions in urbanized divisions like Rawalpindi and Lahore is much lower than that in rural divisions like Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur. While the former two display 58 and 140 dīnī madāris (both 17% of their total number of registered institutions)

respectively in 1984, the corresponding figures for Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur divisions are 85 dīnī madāris (58%) and 134 dīnī madāris (60%) respectively. The data on the 'private schools', however, reflect a different but corresponding picture: here the divisions of Rawalpindi and Lahore show many more private schools than the other two divisions.

The peak of both, the dīnī madāris and the private schools was in 1983/84 while both declined in 1984/85. Concerning the private schools this might indicate the saturation of the market in the more urbanized areas. The dīnī madāris, however, seemed to have responded to the Zakat disbursement policy indicating a commercial character of the new established dīnī madāris. Moreover, it has been possible for the State to channel and control the dīnī madāris via Zakat.

THE BOOM OF GRADUATES

As hinted at earlier there has been a significant increase among the maulanās in general and among different schools of thought in particular. From Chart 1 we may derive the following statements: From 1960 to 1985 (26 years) a total number of 11,841 'registered' maulanās were produced in Pakistan. Out of these 11,841 maulanās 69% were produced only between 1978 and 1985 while in the 18 years, from 1960 to 1977 it had been merely 3,643 or 31%.

Since 1981, which was the year of the implementation of the Equivalence scheme as well as the consolidation of the Zakat scheme, the number of graduates increased spectacularly. While there were only 1,968 graduates during the early period of General Zia (1978-80), their number became 2,629 during 1981-83. In the following two years the production of the maulanās reached its culminating point with 3,601 or 30% of all graduates (this tendency might go on for the next years to come).

As can further be seen from the chart we may witness a very sharp increase of the number of graduates of the Ahle Hadith, who have been organizing its graduates from 1978 onwards. Their relative share is but only 11%.

The Brelwis, who have been organizing their graduates more comprehensively since 1974 have been producing 30% of all 'registered' maulanās (3,557). A constant number of graduates can be seen from 1978 onwards.

The Deobandis once more display the most popular stand. The Wafāq has been producing 57% of all the 11,841 maulanās during the years under scrutiny. As can be seen, the Wafāq is active since 1960. The sharpest increase, however, is during 1984 and 1985. The Shia have been starting to produce graduates under the

auspices of their Wafāq since 1984 and have been able to produce at least 299 graduates or 2.56% of the total number of the graduated maulanās.

It can further be elaborated that the Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith seem to have reacted much earlier to the official measures implemented by the Government than the Deobandis and the Shī'ah. While we can see a sharp increase of the first two schools of thought since 1978, we witness an equivalent increase for the latter two only from 1984 onwards.

There is no doubt that the Shī'ah and parts of the Deobandis are not conformists; this might be a reason of their delayed positive reaction to the official policies. The Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith who have heavily been profiting from the Zakat scheme seem to reflect a more conformist character even if there are some exceptions among their 'Ulamā'.

We may conclude that the number of graduates has been increasing significantly just—as it seems to be—in conformity with the Zia regime's policies. The problem, however, will arise when these officially recognized maulanās will not be integrated properly, i.e. if they become a mismatch. Then there is the possibility of their becoming a boomerang for the government.

Identifying the graduates

While identifying the graduates of the dīnī madāris regarding their places of origin as well as places of graduation one may acquire insight into the geographical and social background of the 'clergy' in Pakistan. This has been done here paradigmatically for the students and maulanās of the Brelwi school of thought. These students have been candidates in the examinations conducted under the guidelines of the 'Tanẓīm al Madāris al-'arabiyyah' in dawrah ḥadīth, the highest degree of religious learning.

According to Table 3, 'Province and year-wise dissemination of Brelwi graduates' the majority of the Brelwi candidates belong to the Punjab province (73%) followed by Azad Kashmir (A.K.), NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan.

Table 3: Province and year-wise dissemination of Brelwi graduates

Province of origin	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	total	%	Population in 1981
PUNJAB	110	89	82	61	107	316	765	73.0	47,292,441
SIND	10	7	4	10	13	37	81	7.7	19,028,666
NWFP	14	17	9	6	4	38	88	8.4	11,061,328
BALUCH.	1	1	4	2	2	10	20	1.9	4,332,376
A.K.	10	11	10	5	14	36	86	8.2	
OTHERS	-	-	-	1	-	7	8	0.8	
TOTAL	145	125	109	85	140	444	1048	100.0	84,253,644

Source: Registers of the graduates of the Tanzīm al-Madāris al-‘arabiyyah for the years 1974-1979, Lahore (cyclostyled), calculations thereof and 1981 *Census Report of Pakistan* (Islamabad, 1984).

The main centers of origin are Sahiwal (143=13.6%) and Multan districts (86=8.2%) while Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh districts together comprise 91 graduates (8.7%). It may be noted that very few graduates come from Lahore, Rawalpindi and Faisalabad districts (total 66 graduates=6.3%), implying a rural rather than urban background of the maulanas of the Brelwi school of thought. In fact, most of the graduates originate from remote areas around the respective dīni madāris usually staying there upto graduation. Their family background is that of small landholders and/or landless peasants while only 214 graduates (20.4%) could claim to descend from traditional religious families²⁰.

Concerning the places of graduation 840 graduates (80.2%) who have graduated in Punjab have been analysed in the Table 4:

Table 4: Places of graduation of Brelwi Ulama in Punjab, 1974-79

District/Town	Number of graduates
MULTAN	183
SAHIWAL/OKARA	169
LAHORE	162
FAISALABAD	158
RAWALPINDI	64
OTHERS	104
TOTAL	840

Source: Registers of the graduates of the Tanzīm al Madāris al-‘arabiyyah for the years 1974-1979, Lahore (cyclostyled), calculations thereof.

Once more Multan and Sahiwal districts turn out to be the main centres while Lahore and Faisalabad have been gaining students because of their having traditional Brelwi centres of learning. Rawalpindi attracts merely 64 graduates. The total number of Ulama having been graduated in Sindh is 180 while 144 graduated in the dīnī madāris of Karachi. The NWFP represents 20 graduates mainly in Peshawar, Mardan and Bannu. Baluchistan comprises only 0.8% of the students.

These findings display the areas of recruitment as well as settlement of the Brelwi Ulama. It has been argued that before partition the Brelwi school of thought was not very popular in the present Pakistan and was confined to what is now India. With the migration (hijrah) in 1947 lots of East-Punjabi refugees became residents of those areas which are called canal colonies. From here the Hindu citizens had migrated to India and thus a place of living was provided for the Muslim migrants. Moreover, the predominance of veneration of holy men in the Punjab—especially in and around Multan, Sahiwal and Dera Ghazi Khan districts—gave room for the dissemination of the popular, peasant oriented Brelwi school of thought.

The Deobandi graduates have different ideological centres, their stronghold being the NWFP and Afghanistan while Dār al-‘Ulūm Ḥaqqāniyyah, Akora Khattak (Peshawar district) is the centre of the production of the Deobandi ‘Ulamā’, at least up to 1980. Once more the graduates originate from rural areas, few of them coming

from religious families. The centres of recruitment are Mansehra, Afghanistan, Mardan, Peshawar, Bannu, Dir and Dera Ismail Khan districts (according to predominance) while the only outstanding districts of a province other than the NWFP are Multan and Muzaffargarh. It may be pointed out that 1/3 of the Deobandi Ulama are produced in the Dār al-'Ulūm Ḥaqqāniyyah while about 22% of these graduates originate from Afghanistan. Indeed, the ties to Afghanistan are very old and date from the days of the beginning of the Dār al-'Ulūm Deoband in India²¹.

The Ahle Hadith graduates display a different picture, being confinable mainly to a few districts of the Punjab which can be called the commercial centres of this province like Faisalabad, Okara, Qasur, Sahiwal and Gujranwala, while only 7.1% could claim to descend from religious background.

It may be concluded that the majority of the dīnī madāris graduates—and thus the 'ulamā'—originate from areas not having been directly targets of development strategies on the one hand and displaying a relatively high number of tenants on the other²². This can be traced for the Brelwis as well as for the Deobandis as well as for the Ahle Hadith schools of thought. One may say that the migration even in this sector of education towards urban centres can be seen as a result of regional disparities brought about by tendentious planning. This is very striking since there has been a large shift from the graduate producing areas like Peshawar and Multan to Karachi during the last few years. The emerging conflict potential in Karachi can also be seen on that background.

Jihad, Islamization and the Ulama

In order to mobilize the masses for the defence of the geographical borders, old traditions and perceptions of 'Ghāzī', 'Shahīd', 'Jihād' and 'Mujāhid' have been revived from time to time as has been for example the case during the Ayub regime. The 'Soviet Threat' to ideological Pakistan has been a nightmare for the regimes; the reasons for which may be varied and numerous. Being determined externally, the Pakistan/Islam ideology is to build a buffer against the communist chimare. In fact, the Ulama of Pakistan felt tantalized by socialism, even if it was an 'Islamic Socialism' (whatever it may be). With the prelude of 'nizām-e muṣṭafā' and the Zia regime the maulanas, muftis and their students seem to have gained ground fighting against the irreligiousness (lā dīniyyat) of communist ideology. The CII on the other hand has always been proposing to suspend all agnostic and socialist tendencies and the removal especially of teachers and professors from their posts if they were known to hold such views. These proposals have been put into practice by the Zia regime.

The Jama'at-i Islāmī, one of the political parties in Pakistan, which is known for its close cooperation with the Zia Government

seems to have a clear-cut approach towards socialism. It is assumed, that the Jama'at is heavily engaged in the Afghanistan Jihad. This is not only indicated by its contribution to the Jihad by material it publishes but also by the fact that the Jama'at has been constantly building up religious schools in the NWFP. It is striking that 19 out of 20 dīnī madāris in these areas were established after the Soviet intervention 1979 and 13 out of these 20 were established in Dir district and Bajor Agency²³, both areas directly linked to the Afghanistan territory.

This is only one branch of the dīnī madāris and Ulama engaged in Jihad. The Deobandi school of thought for its part claims to be the actual leader in the Jihad being fought in Afghanistan. Especially the Dār al-'Ulūm Ḥaqqāniyyah in Akora Khattak (which has been producing 1/3 of the Pakistani Deobandi Ulama) is of the view that the leading mujāhidīn have studied in this Dār al-'Ulūm. Consequently the Afghan issue is dealt with exhaustively in its monthly magazine 'al-Ḥaqq'²⁴. Although any evidence of direct military training in this madrasah could not be located, there is no doubt that Jihād is disseminated at least morally; in fact, about 40% of the 600 boarders there are from Afghanistan and a lot of them reportedly go for Jihad and "this does not disturb the classes during the year". This indicates the support of Jihad in Afghanistan by this Dār al-'Ulūm. The latest official survey on dīnī madāris conducted by the Ministry of Education displays a keen interest in the religious educational institutions of the NWFP which were surveyed exhaustively while all other provinces were neglected. One reason for this tendency might be the consideration to mobilize the dīnī madāris as centres of resistance to the Soviet threat in one way or the other. According to the information from the concerned Ministry there were 7002 Afghan students in the dīnī madāris of the NWFP in 1982 representing 9% of the students of that province. Accepting ethnic links among the Pakhtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan a mobilization of dīnī madāris students for the Jihad seems to be very easy.

RESISTANCE

The *Morning News* from Karachi stated: "Since the introduction of the Zakat system, the Deeni Madaris have voiced complaints that their source of private donations have dried" while according to our calculations this is not the case and cannot be verified. However, a considerable resistance among the dīnī madāris and the 'Ulamā' during the Islamization period under General Zia ul Haq cannot be denied. Zakat, therein proves to be one of the main pegs of criticism and political resistance.

While the CZA was of the view that the dīnī madāris should be subject to bookkeeping and auditing and should be supervised in order to guarantee a proper Zakatflow, this bureaucratization of

religious education was rejected by a large number of 'Ulamā'. They argued that this meant a supervision of the internal affairs of the dīnī madāris and an usurpation of the Ulama's status not only by the State but also by the students. Moreover, since the dīnī madāris were affiliated to one political party or the other, this intervention implied a political supervision and control of the parties by the state.

The CZA cited the daily Urdu *Jasarat* according to which the Sindhi dīnī madāris were not accepting the Zakat amounts disbursed by the PZA. Formally it was because the Zakat system was not according to the Shari'ah and the muftis had not agreed upon it yet²⁵, basically this approach had political implications.

Once more this was a campaign launched by the Deoband organization *Wafaq al-Madāris al-'arabiyyah* which had proclaimed the boycott of the Zakat system in June 1981. According to the 'education director' of the Wafaq the Zakat is held to be a political bribe (*siyāsī rishwat*) and could not be accepted. This was in line with the fatwa given by Mufti Mahmud in 1980, the leader of the PNA. It has been said that nearly all Sindhi dīnī madāris affiliated with the Wafaq were not taking Zakat "because of the particular situation of Sindh"²⁶. This can be verified by the fact that neither the PZA Sindh has yet (autumn 1986) chalked out a scheme for the disbursement of Zakat among the dīnī madāris nor was the amount distributed among the religious schools worth mentioning. In fact, during the first three years of the Zakat system the Sindhi dīnī madāris received merely 1.8% out of the total amount disbursed among them from the PZAs. Similarly there were only 45 dīnī madāris (1.3% of all benefiting religious schools in the three years) profiting from the scheme in Sindh. Admittedly the numbers of both, the dīnī madāris and the students as well as the amounts disbursed increased rapidly since 1984. But this was mainly because of the recipients belonging to schools of thought other than the Deobandi one.

As has been said earlier the Deobandi dīnī madāris were increasing in number in the province of Sindh and at the same time do not receive Zakat. Simultaneously there is a heavy resistance in Sindh, forcing the State to intervene even more radically. On the other hand those schools of thought that are not very popular in Sindh (vide page 9 and 10) are being supported heavily by the State. Thus the State might have the opportunity to intervene in provincial upheavals through conformist Ulama and their places of learning.

We may state that the Zakat has been trickling down to the dīnī madāris especially among the Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith even in Sindh. A fraction of the Deobandis continue the tradition of political resistance that was reflected also in the 16 year curriculum dealt with earlier (Table 5. Different Curricula). Moreover, since every school of thought and Wafaq/Tanzīm

affiliated with a political party in one way or the other the resistance of the *dīnī madāris* might be reflected in the political parties which have been legalized lately. One may say that some *dīnī madāris* represent vehicles of regional nationalism.

CONCLUSION

The issues of Zakat and curricula only constitute a fraction of the Islamization policy and the resistance which is voiced by heavy criticism not only among the Ulama.

The basic idea underlying the reformist approach of the Zia regime towards the Ulama was to reintegrate them into given structures—only up to a certain degree—and mobilize them for its interests. Pakistan has been displaying a high degree of dependency on external and alien pressures enacted mostly by a small ruling elite in Pakistan. This segment being part of the international system and being integrated into the internal circles of the world culture aims at subjecting all other segments of the society—as defined by world system theory, one of them being the Ulama and the *dīnī madāris*. In fact, the victims are not only integrated partially into the establishment but are also given new tasks. Jihad and the defence of the ideological borders is only one of the facets. The other—the more far-reaching one—is to disseminate the official policy through media and students of the *dīnī madāris* themselves, mainly in order to pave the way for the establishment of new markets even in remote areas and to consolidate areas which have not directly been subjected to modernizing development strategies. How far this approach through the media has been successful is yet to be seen. But considering the increase in the number of *dīnī madāris* and the students as well as the increase in the budgets of these religious schools one might expect some results.

The *dīnī madāris* themselves have been pragmatic—by receiving financial remunerations from the companies (mostly joint ventures with foreign enterprises) advertising in their magazines on the one hand and appreciating Zakat on the other. The price they pay is their submission under the imperatives of the world-market which is inherent in the Islamization policy.

The new formation phase among the *dīnī madāris* and the Ulama, as a result of State intervention, may furthermore facilitate a total taking over of the *dīnī madāris* by the Government that would finally mean the internationalization of the internal markets.

The patronism that the *dīnī madāris* and the Ulama experienced from the Zia regime is not just an altruistic approach but an attempt to get the official ideology trickled down to the grass-roots. In this regard we may conclude that the Islamization of the Ulama and the religious schools as it was pursued by the

Table 5: Different Curricula

Subjectmatter	1a	1b	1c	2	3	4
Qur'ān, reading, memorizing		x	x	x	x	x
Morphology	x	x	x	x	x	x
Syntax	x	x	x	x	x	x
Arabic		x	x	x	x	x
Biography of the Prophet (Sīrat)			x	x	x	x
Arithmetic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Pakistan Studies			x			
General Sciences			x			
English			x			x
Islamic Law/Tradition			x			
Natural Sciences			x			
Social Sciences			x	x	x	x
Islamic Law	x	x	x	x	x	x
Methods of Islamic Law	x	x	x	x	x	x
Logic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Arabic Literature	x	x	x			x
Tradition or Literature			x			
Rhetorics	x		x	x	x	x
Qur'ān interpretation	x	x	x	x	x	x
Tradition	x	x	x	x	x	x
Methods of Tradition	x	x	x	x	x	x
Principles and Scholastic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Philosophy	x	x	x	x	x	x
Islamic History		x	x	x	#	x
Economics			x	x	#	
Political Science			x	x	#	
Cultural Sciences			x	x	#	
Methods of Qur'ān interpretation	x		x			x
Law of Tradition			x			
Comparative Religion			x	x	#	
Discussions (Munāẓarah)	x					x
Prosody	x					
Religious studies (Dīniyāt)				x	x	x
Urdu			x	x	x	x
Persian			x	x	x	x()
Exercises (Tamrīn)				x	x	
Morals (Akhlaqīyyāt)		x		x	x	x
Law of Inheritance (Farā'id)		x		x	x	x
Dictation		x				x

= These subjects are supposed to be taught after graduation (*farāghat*) in a special course (*darjah-i takhassus*); compare 3 pp. 7, 21 and 39).

() = Persian is prerequisite for the Tanzīm courses.

1a = Dars-i nizami; see *Halepota Report* pp. 122, 135 and 147-155.

1b = Eight years curriculum of the Wafāq al-Madāris al-'arabiyyah see *Halepota Report* *ibid*.

1c = Proposal by the National Committee on Dīnī Madāris 1979; see *Halepota Report* *ibid*.

- 2 = Wafāq proposal only partially implemented in 1983; see *Sōlah Sālah Niṣāb-i ta'ālīm (tafwiz)*, (Multan: Wafāq al-Madāris, 1983).
- 3 = Wafāq proposal implemented in 1984; see *Sōlah Sālah Niṣāb-i ta'ālīm (manzūr)* (Multan: Wafāq al-Madāris, 1984)
- 4 = Tanzīm proposal implemented in 1983; see *Sōlah Sālah Niṣāb-i ta'ālīm (manzūr)*, (Lahore; Tanzīm al Madāris, 1984) and own elaborations.

State is running successfully, however if not with dubious means then at least with a clear integrationist approach. Moreover, the Islamization has proved to be more what can be called a strategy of continuity and pragmatism rather than a 'nativistic' approach even if there are some instances of indigenization by using 'Islamic techniques' and idioms.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See D. Senghaas, (ed.): *Peripherer Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt a.M. 1981:3); D. Senghaas: *Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik; Plädoyer für Dissoziation*, (Frankfurt a.M., 1987:2); and K.Cough/H.P. Sharma, (eds.): *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia* (New York, 1973); H. Gardezi/J. Rashid, (eds.): *Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship - the political economy of a praetorian State* (London: Zed Press 1982); H. Alavi/T. Shanin, (eds.): *Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing Societies'* (London, 1982).
2. Compare D. Goldschmidt, et al. (eds.): "Die Dritte Welt als Gegenstand erziehungswissenschaftlicher forschung", in: *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik*, (Weinheim, 1981) who give a good account on these developments.
3. Literature on religious or traditional education is very scarce especially for the period after the creation of Pakistan. One may mention S. Muh. Salim: *Hind o Pakistan mēn musulmānōn kā nizām-e ta'ālīm-o-tarbiyyat* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1980), (Urdu), and Ziaul Haque: "Muslim Religious Education in Indo-Pakistan", *Islamic Studies* (IS) Vol. 14/1, Islamabad 1975, pp. 271-292. Besides these two comprehensive works one finds a couple of surveys: N. Ahmad: *Jā'izah madāris-i 'arabiyyah islāmiyyah maghrabī Pakistān* (Lahore: Anjuman-e Himayat-e Islam Press, 1960), (Urdu) (Ahmad I); N. Ahmad I: *Jā'iah madāris-i 'arabiyyah maghrabī Pakistān* (Lahore: Himayat-e Islam Press, 1972), (Urdu) (Ahmad II); Government of Pakistan (GoP), Ministry of Religious Affairs: *Report Qawmī kamīti bara-i dīni madāris Pakistan*, (Islamabad, 1979), (Urdu) (Halepota Report); Government of Pakistan Ministry of education, Islamic education Research Cell: *Pakistan kē dīni madāris kī fihrist* (Islamabad, 1984, Urdu).
4. Waqf, pl. Auqaf are religions endowments.
5. See B.D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*, (Princeton University Press, 1982).

6. For the development of Islam as a theology towards ideology see R. Schulze: "Die Politisierung des Islam im 19. Jahrhundert", in *Die Welt des Islam*. Vol. XXII (1982) pp. 103-116. For the concept of integrationist and isolationist see R. Schulze: "Islamische Kultur und soziale Bewegung", in *Peripherie* Nr. 18/19 (1985) pp. 60-84.
7. See: Report of the Committee set up by the Governor of West Pakistan for Recommending improved Syllabus for the various Darul Uloom and Arabic Madrasas in West Pakistan, Lahore, 1962, pp. 1 and 9.
It may be noted here that the first survey on dīnī madāris in 1960 was mainly financed by the American based Asia Foundation.
8. *Pakistan Observer*, Decca 13.3.1968.
9. Ayub Khan, *Friends not masters*, (Oxford University Press, 1967) specially pp. 194.
10. See *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973*, Part IX, Para 230(4).
11. *Qūtas 'amli/Pishnāmāh bara-e kamīl ma'adālāh isnād dīnī wa jāmi'ī*, 25.8.1982 UGC, (Islamabad, 1982) (Urdu); see also UGC: *A Guide to the Equivalences of Degrees and Diplomas in Pakistan*, (Islamabad, 1978), pp. 84.
12. *Halepota Report*, pp. 115.
13. *Halepota Report*, p. 89 and pp. 102-109; similar demands had been raised by the CII in 1978: Consolidated Recommendations etc. pp. 34.
14. It had been categorically rejected by the founder-member of the Dār al-'Ulūm Deoband Maulānā Qāsim Nānōtawī (1832-1880) to receive any kind of official and/or Government aid; compare *Ahmad I* pp. 732-734, *Ahmad II*, pp. 684-686 and *Haque* p. 282; see also *Z.H. Faruqī: The Deoband school and the Demand for Pakistan* (Lahore: n.d.), p. 26.
15. UGC (Publ.): *Higher Education News*, Vol. II/10, Islamabad October 1982, pp. 1 and 8, see also: *Notification: Equivalence of Dīnī Asnad with the University degree*, UGC 17.11.1982 (mimeo).
16. The Ahle Hadith are still in the process to produce an enlarged syllabus while the Jama'at-e Islami is in its embryonic phase concerning curriculum development and is accordingly not recognized by the Ministry of Education.
17. F.e. the twelve largest dīnī madāris in NWFP that received at least 40,000 Rs (highest amounts) from the PZ Council in the first year's disbursement were running well and had surplus budgets in 1970; compare also *Ahmad II* pp. 404-449.
18. Calculations on the basis of data provided by the CZA, Islamabad.
19. Compare *Az-Zakat*, Vol. I/I, Islamabad 1981, p. 22; the calculations have been made on the basis of data provided by the PZA Punjab.
20. Calculations are based on the registers. For the religious background the titles of the father (maulānā, hāfīz, qārī etc.) have been assumed to be the criteria.
21. See also S. Mahbub Rizvi: *Tārīkh Dār al-'Ulūm Deoband*, (Dehli, 1977) Vol. I pp. 295 et passim (Urdu) and Metcalf, *op. cit.* p. 134.
The Deobandis had always had a good connection to Afghanistan via Lahore and Peshawar.
22. For the land patterns see Mahmood H. Khan: *Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd. 1981).

23. See *Ta'aruf; Rabitatu-l madaris il islamiyyah Pakistan*, (Lahore, 1984), see also *Harald*, July 1986: Interview with Ataullah Mengal, p. 56 and *The Muslim*, 4.2.1986.
24. This Dār al-'Ulūm is easily accessible being located on the Grand Trunk Road about 50 km from Peshawar next to the military compound of Nowshera.
For the Jihad propaganda see *al-Haqq*, Vol. 19/3 pp. 6-9; Vol. 20/12 pp. 9-15; Vol. 21/1 pp. 5-13 et passim.
25. CZA, *Proceedings*, Vol. II (Islamabad 1983), pp. 249 and p. 303 (Urdu)
26. The information on the Sindhi situation was provided by the concerned officer of the Wafaq in Multan on 2.2.1986.
The Sindhi situation is characterized by the increasing ratio of criminality on the one hand and by a strong nationalistic stand on the other. Both, however, can be seen as outcomes of deprivation; compare also *Harald*, especially Sept.—Dec. 1986.



ABBREVIATIONS

A.K.	Azad Kashmir
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
CZA	Central Zakat Administration
CZ Fund	Central Zakat Fund
J.I.	Jama'at-e Islami
NCDM	National Committee on Dini Madaris
NEP	National Education Policy 1979
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PZA	Provincial Zakat Administration
PZ Fund	Provincial Zakat Fund
PZC	Provincial Zakat Council
ZUO	Zakat and Ushr Ordinance

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