

John Benjamins Publishing Company



This is a contribution from *Pejoration*.

Edited by Rita Finkbeiner, Jörg Meibauer and Heike Wiese.

© 2016. John Benjamins Publishing Company

This electronic file may not be altered in any way.

The author(s) of this article is/are permitted to use this PDF file to generate printed copies to be used by way of offprints, for their personal use only.

Permission is granted by the publishers to post this file on a closed server which is accessible to members (students and staff) only of the author's/s' institute, it is not permitted to post this PDF on the open internet.

For any other use of this material prior written permission should be obtained from the publishers or through the Copyright Clearance Center (for USA: www.copyright.com).

Please contact rights@benjamins.nl or consult our website: www.benjamins.com

Tables of Contents, abstracts and guidelines are available at www.benjamins.com

Demonstrative pejoratives

Maria Averintseva-Klisch*

Universität Tübingen

Cross-linguistically an affinity to pejoration has been repeatedly observed for demonstrative reference to human beings. Concentrating on German demonstratives I propose to conceive the pejoration effect here as an interplay of semantic and pragmatic factors. These factors are (i) the core demonstrative meaning of directing attention to referents physically or mentally accessible to both the speaker and the hearer, (ii) an expressive meaning component (in the sense of Potts 2007) of the speaker's claim of cognitive proximity between him and the hearer, as well as (iii) general pragmatic politeness principles. In this context a pragmatic analysis of pejoration crucially involving speakers and their intentions as well as relations between speakers and hearers is argued for.

Keywords: German; pejoration; demonstratives; politeness

1. Introduction

German style manuals caution against using demonstratives for reference to human beings, as the following quotation shows:

Emotionalen Charakter hat die Verwendung des Demonstrativpronomens anstelle des Personalpronomens; damit verbunden ist meist subjektive Bewertung durch den Sprechenden – Ausdruck der Nichtachtung, Herabsetzung, der feindlichen Ablehnung.¹ (Riesel 1959: 454)

Could demonstratives in German (or maybe even cross-linguistically) then be linguistic means of pejoration? And if that be so, what does it exactly mean? These are the questions this paper tries to answer. To that end I first briefly name German

* I would like to thank the editors of this volume for inviting me to contribute as well as the two reviewers for their very helpful and inspiring comments on the first draft of this paper.

1. "The use of a demonstrative instead of a personal pronoun has an emotional touch; most often, a subjective evaluation by the speaker is the reason for it, an expression of disrespect, of depreciation, of hostile rejection" (translation mine).

demonstrative forms and their functions (Section 2). Demonstratives are uniformly seen as establishing joint attention of the speaker and the hearer on some referent not yet in the centre of attention; besides they can have an “affective reading” of “emotional closeness” (Lakoff 1974); hereby some (alleged) intriguing differences between German and English demonstratives are observed. In Section 3 I consider the concept of pejoration and argue for a multi-dimensionality of this concept necessarily involving the speaker with his intentions towards the hearer and the referents spoken about. Seeing pejoration as an instance of “near” relations between speakers, hearers and what is spoken about, I introduce the concept of cognitive proximity (Averintseva-Klisch & Consten 2007, Consten & Averintseva-Klisch 2010) and argue that demonstratives cross-linguistically can mark cognitive proximity (Section 4). Finally in Section 5 I show why demonstratives being means of marking cognitive proximity are predestined for pejorative use: they can simultaneously express speaker’s emotion towards a referent and his appeal to the hearer to share this emotion, both aspects being important for pejoration; besides, with human reference they induce negative face threatening acts in terms of Brown & Levinson (1987). The paper concentrates on German demonstratives. However, believing that general semantic and pragmatic strategies are at work here, I suppose that similar observations could be made for other languages; in Section 5 German data are briefly compared to English and Russian ones.

2. German demonstratives: State of the art

2.1 Demonstrative paradigms in German

German has two paradigms of demonstrative lexical items, which are usually referred to as ‘weak’ vs. ‘strong’ (e.g. Averintseva-Klisch & Consten 2007; the terms go back to Brugmann 1904) or ‘simple’ vs. ‘compound’ demonstratives, these terms alluding to the origin of *dies-* forms out of the elder simplex *der-* forms via composition, cf. (1):

- (1) a. weak demonstratives: *der/die/das* (‘this one’)
- b. strong demonstratives:
 - (i) proximal: *dieser/-e/-es*; *dies- N* (‘this; this one’)
 - (ii) distal: *jener/-e/-es*; *jen- N* (‘that; that one’)

The latter have both determiner and pronoun functions and are (allegedly) differentiated with respect to deictic proximity. The former are usually analyzed as being demonstrative only in pronominal forms; since Brugmann (1904) it is assumed that the determiner *der/die/das* has been lexicalized as the definite article, one argument for a lexicalization process coming from the differences in case flexives for pronoun and determiner *der/die/das*. For reasons of space I can only consider strong demonstratives in this paper. However, as weak demonstratives share the relevant

(prima facie) pejorative use with strong demonstratives, I believe that my analysis can be extended to them. This holds at least for stressed weak forms that are (both pronoun and determiner) often assumed to be more or less equivalent to strong *dies*-forms (e.g. Himmelmann 1997: 50; Erben 1980: 225), emphatic stress being “a specific kind of a pointing gesture” (Rauh 2003: 410) here.

2.2 Re-direction of attention and affectivity as demonstrativity functions

German demonstratives can be used both deictically and anaphorically, cf. (2):²

- (2) a. *Dies Bildnis* ist bezaubernd schön.
 ‘This image is enchantingly lovely’ (prince Tamino in “The magic flute”,
 looking at a portrait of princess Pamina)
- b. Im Jahre 1808 malte er ein Portrait des Kaisers Napoleon, und *dieses Bild*, obwohl sicher nicht sein bestes, brachte dem Künstler einigen Ruhm.
 ‘In 1808 he painted [a portrait of the emperor Napoleon]₁, and *this picture*₁, although certainly not his best one, brought him a certain reputation.’

For both uses the following assumptions are commonly shared in the literature:

- i. Demonstratives are used to re-direct the joint attention of the speaker and the hearer attracting it to a referent that has not yet been in the centre of attention (e.g. Zifonun, Hoffmann & Stecker 1997; Diessel 2012). For anaphoric use this means that demonstratives are strongly dispreferred for reference to discourse topics, i.e. the referents the corresponding discourse segment “is about”;³ reference to topics is the domain of personal pronouns (e.g. Comrie 2000; Bosch & Umbach 2007 for

2. This holds for *dies*-demonstratives; *jen*-demonstratives cannot be used deictically in contemporary German; cf. Section 5.2.

3. The concept of the discourse topic is not uncontroversial, see e.g. a short summary of the current discussion in Averintseva-Klisch (2009: 86–98). The literature on demonstratives, however, seems to agree upon a rather informal understanding of discourse topic in the sense of the discourse referent a discourse segment “is about”, i.e. the discourse referent that is in the centre of attention during a discourse segment. Hereby it is tacitly assumed that the discourse topic referent is the currently most prominent or salient one in the Common Ground in the sense of Stalnaker (2002). In other words, the speaker and the hearer are assumed to share this centre of attention allowing that a particular discourse segment has an unequivocal discourse topic; but see Consten (2013) for problematic cases where conversation participants have diverging discourse topics.

weak demonstratives vs. personal pronouns; Consten & Averintseva-Klisch 2007; 2010 for *dies-*); cf. (3):

- (3) Hast Du das Neueste von Paul₁ gehört? Er₁ hat sich mit seinem Nachbar₂ total zerstritten: *Er*_{1/2}/*Dieser*_{2/*1} hat sich tatsächlich beklagt, weil sonntags immer so laut Musik spiele.
 ‘Have you heard the news about Paul₁? He had a big quarrel with his neighbour₂: *He*_{1/2}/*This.one*_{2/*1} complained that on sundays the music was too loud.’

Here, the introductory question marks Paul as the referent the discourse segment is going to be about; when another discourse referent, Pauls neighbour, is introduced, the anaphoric reference to the latter is preferably possible with the demonstrative.⁴

- ii. Demonstratives have an affective function in that they can be used to mark the speaker’s close emphatic attitude towards the referent, e.g. Lakoff (1974); Potts & Schwarz (2010) mainly for English; Bisle-Müller (1991) for German; Levinson (2004: 108) for a general overview. The affectivity is an additional trait that can be combined with other demonstrativity functions; however, it is stronger when “the demonstrative is morphosyntactically unnecessary for the purposes of securing reference” (Acton & Potts 2014: 5).

Interestingly, there is an important difference in the literature on English vs. German demonstratives concerning their affective function: for English demonstratives, Lakoff (1974: 347), followed by Bowdle & Ward (1995), Potts & Schwarz (2010) and Acton & Potts (2014), to name but a few, assume a rather positively connoted function of “speaker’s emotional involvement in the subject-matter of his utterance”, “emotional closeness”, creating “in the hearer a sense of participation” (Lakoff 1974: 347). Hereby not only proximal *this*, but also “the distance marker *that* seems to establish emotional closeness between speaker and addressee” (Lakoff 1974: 351), cf. (4):

- (4) a. *These IBM ThinkPads* are amazing! (Bowdle & Ward 1995: 33)
 b. How’s *that throat*? (a sympathetic nurse to a patient) (Lakoff 1974: 351)

On the contrary, in the literature on German the emotional attitude marked via demonstratives is more or less explicitly understood to be a pejorative one, e.g. Bisle-Müller (1991: 70): the demonstrative is assumed to mark the distancing of the speaker from the referent. The quotation from Riesel (1959: 454) in the introduction

4. Bosch and Umbach (2007: 48) argue convincingly that it is the discourse topicality and neither the syntactic role of the antecedent nor the linear order that are decisive here. Their arguments can be applied to strong demonstratives too.

is a prime example for this often adopted equation of emotion and pejoration with demonstrative reference. Nearly sixty years later the influential reference work Duden 9 titled *Correct and good German* (2011: 231) blames anaphoric use of demonstratives referring to human beings⁵ as “impolite or colloquial”; Duden grammar (2005: 294) observes more cautiously that “it is often perceived as being derogatory”. Erben (1980: 228) confines the derogatory meaning of “personal distancing from a not very respected individual” to *dies-/jen-* with proper names “and nouns that are similar to these”. He uses the following quotation from Thomas Mann’s novel *Der Zauberberg* to illustrate the point:

- (5) Da hat nun *dieser Herr Naphta* – ich sage “dieser Herr”, um anzudeuten, daß ich durchaus nicht unbedingt mit ihm sympatisiere, sondern mich im Gegenteil innerlich höchst reserviert verhalte [...]
 ‘Then *this Mr. Naphta* – and I’m saying “this mister” to suggest that I am not absolutely sympathetic with him, but that on the contrary I am conducting myself in an innerly very reserved manner [...].’⁶

The assumption of a special aptitude of demonstratives for pejoration (at least when used for reference to humans) might be prompted by the observation that negative evaluation seems to be possible via mere demonstrativity, i.e. without an explicit lexical marking within the NP, as in (6):

- (6) a. *Diese Politiker* sind (doch) alle korrupt/#fleißig!
 ‘All *those politicians* are corrupt/#hardworking, aren’t they?’
 b. *Die Politiker* sind (doch) alle korrupt/fleißig.
 ‘All *the politicians* are corrupt/hardworking, aren’t they?’

Here the demonstrative alone seems to convey the speaker’s negative attitude towards the referent of the NP whilst the noun itself is neutral: with a demonstrative NP, a pejoratively marked predication is more suitable than a clearly ameliorative one; this effect vanishes with a definite article.

5. Note that whilst in the literature on English no differentiation is made with respect to person, object or event reference, “emotional deixis” being possible irrespective of the referent properties, for German observations on pejorative traits of reference via demonstratives are confined to referring to human beings. I will return to this point in 5.

6. Interestingly, in this particular case the protagonist Hans Castorp is explicitly commenting upon his use of the demonstrative reference; one might question whether it would be necessary if this use be intuitively clear. Besides, the utterance is part of a dialogue between Castorp and an elder mentor-like character Settembrini, who is warning Castorp against Naphta, another influential elder character; Castorp actually wishes to stand up for one against another, as both men impress him strongly.

Looking at other languages, interesting evidence comes from Russian, where a combination of the particle *ещё* ('else; yet; once more') and the distal demonstrative *тот/та/то* ('that.one') is a rather colloquial idiom meaning 'no good':

- (7) Хозяйка *ещё та*: пришли голодные — кружки воды не дала
 landlady *yet that.one* came hungry mug of.water not gave
 'Our landlady is no good: we came home hungry, and she even didn't give
 us a mug of water.' [⟨http://phraseology.academic.ru⟩](http://phraseology.academic.ru)

Similarly, for English Potts and Schwarz (2010: 23) introduce corpus data on *that* suggesting that its uses are "almost uniformly negative", contrary to the assumptions in Lakoff (1974). Thus at first glance there is certain cross-linguistic evidence for an affinity of demonstratives to pejorative reference.

To sum up: For German demonstratives as well as for demonstratives cross-linguistically two important functions have been identified: first, the re-directing of attention to a referent that has not been in the focus of attention before and second, affectivity. Especially for German demonstratives, this affective function has been often equated with a pejorative flavour. So, the question whether – and if yes, how – demonstratives induce pejoration is the topic of the rest of this paper.

3. What is pejoration?

The majority of the literature concerned with pejoration that I am familiar with concentrates on inherently pejorative linguistic units, primarily lexemes or morphemes (e.g. Havryliv 2003; Dammel 2011; Meibauer 2013; Koo & Rhee, this volume). Hereby it is sometimes differentiated between derogatory units as such and speaker's intention to abuse or at least to convey his negative emotion. Thus, Havryliv (2003) distinguishes terminologically between "pejorative lexemes" and "swear words": the latter are only one of the uses of the former. Havryliv confines swear words to use in speech acts destined to abuse, cf. *You are an idiot!* vs. *She called him an idiot*. (pejorative lexeme not used as a swear word). In this sense pejoration is taken to be grammatically or lexically anchored whereas insulting is clearly pragmatic.

In my paper I take a more pragmatic view on pejoration, in that the speaker (S) and the hearer (H) are given crucial roles. In particular, I propose to differentiate between the following aspects of what generally falls under the label of pejoration:

- i. inherent negative emotional connotations of a linguistic unit U;
- ii. S's marking of his negative emotion towards the referent X in uttering U or U+, some larger linguistic unit including U; thereby U/U+ is used in relation to X;⁷

7. U / U+ either refers to X or to some part or property of X, or is predicated of X.

- iii. S's appeal to the hearer H to share this emotion towards X. This particular aspect is not restricted to pejoration, but a general feature of speech acts expressing S's emotions, negative as well as positive ones.⁸
- iv. if X is a human being: S's intention to abuse the person X, either present as a hearer or absent, by using U or U+. Abusing might be understood in terms of Brown and Levinson (1987) as threatening X's positive face by trying to present X or objects and properties standing in relation to X as being no good; see Section 5 below for details on the face threatening concept.⁹

To illustrate the different aspects of pejoration consider the following attested example with an unambiguous case of lexically encoded pejoration, the derogatory lexeme *idiot*:

- (8) "You are *an idiot*," DA MP David Maynier told Deputy Defence Minister Kebby Maphatsoe on Tuesday. [...] At this point, he was stopped from speaking by Deputy Speaker Lechesa Tsenoli, who wanted to know who in the opposition benches had used *the word idiot*.
 "Who shouted: 'You're *an idiot*'?" he enquired, adding that this was "out of order".
 Maynier admitted using the term.
 "Speaker, I shouted *idiot* because the honourable deputy minister of defence is *an idiot* for saying what he said," he explained.
 <www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/You-are-an-idiot-MP-tells-Maphatsoe-20140909>

In this example, with the first use of the NP *an idiot*, at least the aspects (i), (ii) and (iv) are present: the speaker Maynier addresses Maphatsoe (X) to offend him; this offence is to be achieved in that S marks his negative emotional attitude towards X with the inherently negatively connoted lexeme *idiot*. One could plausibly assume that in a parliament debate situation involving numerous participants, S additionally appeals to other deputies to share his emotion towards Maphatsoe (aspect (iii)). In the second, third and fourth uses, *the word idiot* and *an idiot/idiot* as a quotation, however, only the aspect (i), the inherent negative connotation, is present. In the fifth use, the aspects (i)–(iii) are present, whilst the aspect of direct insult (iv) is not immediately relevant: S insists on his negative emotion towards Maphatsoe and invites the other deputies to

8. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue to me. In a similar way Staffeldt (2011) argues that with a prototypical declaration of love (*I love you*) S not only asserts his love towards H, but also claims an existence of a love relation between S and H and appeals to H to ratify this love relation.

9. The last issue, how the intention to abuse can be linguistically realized and, vice versa, why some (partly very common) linguistic expressions are actually insulting for certain population groups, has been recently investigated in Meibauer (ed. 2013).

share his emotion. The last point is made clear in that S gives an explanation for his use of the lexeme and for the emotion that caused it: the referent X said something which, in S's opinion which he wants to share with his Hs, qualified him as deserving derogation.

The first two aspects of pejoration (cf. the first use of *an idiot* in the example (8)) have recently been considered together as a prototypical case of 'expressive meaning', i.e. truth-conditionally non-relevant meaning component, cf. Potts (2005, 2007):

- (9) That bastard Kresge is famous.
 at-issue, descriptive meaning: Kresge is famous.
 at-issue, expressive meaning: Kresge is a bastard/bad in speaker's opinion.
 (Potts 2007: 168)

According to this analysis, when uttering (9) S on the one hand addresses the current question under discussion and asserts about the referent Kresge that he is famous; this assertion is true iff Kresge is famous. On the other hand, by using the pejorative lexeme *bastard* S conveys his bad opinion on Kresge; it is tacitly assumed that this particular expressive meaning originates in the pejorative character of the lexeme used: non-pejorative items induce other kinds of expressive meaning. Expressive meaning as such can be seen as a separate speech act that has the performative feature of being true by virtue of being uttered (Potts 2007).

However, the example (8) above gives reason to divide the aspects 'inherent pejorative connotations of the lexeme' and 'S's marking of his negative emotion' in a more principled way (cf. also Havryliv (2003)'s proposal; she also considers quotational uses of pejorative lexemes), confining expressive meaning to the latter aspect only, as quotational uses of pejoratively connoted words are possible without marking a speaker's emotion, cf. (10):

- (10) [...] who in the opposition benches had used *the word idiot*.

Here, as argued above, neither the NP *the word idiot* nor its head, the lexeme *idiot*, introduce expressive meaning of the kind in (9). Importantly, the absence of negative emotion is not restricted to cases of quotation, cf. (11):

- (11) *my beloved idiot that I call a husband*, I love you (twitter.com)

Here, the use of per se inherently pejorative *idiot* serves in combination with the possessive *my* and the attribute *beloved* rather to enhance the strong positive emotion towards the husband referent that the S wants to convey, the word serving rather as a term of endearment than of abuse.¹⁰

10. Havryliv (2009: 145f) observes for the German variety of Vienna, Austria, the tendency to use primarily pejorative lexemes as terms of endearment in highly intimate relations.

Besides, this division of inherent lexeme connotations vs. emotion marking can account for the possibility of emotional-expressive use of per se neutral linguistic items as in (12), with or without demonstratives:

- (12) a. *Ihr Politiker* wollt Krieg – wir wollen keinen!
 ‘You politicians want war – we do not!’ (a song line)
- b. How’s *that* “*hope*” and “*change*” working out for you?
 (Ex. (15b) in Potts & Schwarz 2010)

In both examples the speaker conveys his negative emotion towards the referents of the italicized NPs.¹¹ In (12a) via using a second person pronoun necessarily excluding the speaker (and explicitly contrasting it with the inclusive first person *we*), the speaker not only distances himself from the politicians, but also implicates (in the Gricean sense) that his opinion of the politicians in question is low: as the politicians are elected to represent the opinions of the populace, it is clearly bad when their wishes are contrary to the wishes of the populace including S; the politicians in question obviously do not fulfil their task in an adequate way.¹² In other words, the marking of a negative emotion as an aspect of pejoration might arise in different ways in an actual communication situation and is neither necessarily bound to lexically pejorative items nor do lexically pejorative items necessarily have this meaning aspect in any actual use.

In the following I argue that demonstratives on the basis of their primary function of attracting the joint attention of S and H to some referent X (cf. 2.2) are predestined for the pejoration aspects (ii) and (iii), i.e. S’s marking of his negative emotion towards the referent X and S’s appealing to H to share this emotion towards X. This does not mean that demonstratives necessarily have an affinity to pejoration: to be more exact, demonstratives are predestined for signalling S’s emotion towards X and appealing to H to share it; whether this emotion is a positive or a negative one is a matter of context (including general politeness principles). Pejoration is thus crucially related to ‘cognitive proximity’ (Consten & Averintseva-Klisch 2007, 2010), which is introduced in the next section.

11. (12b) is a rather intricate case; in this internet comment on Obama’s politics coming from Obama’s opponents, the referent of the demonstrative NP is some (allegedly) real negative social developments that Obama (again, allegedly) labelled *hope* and *change*.

12. Rauh (2004) argues that *ihr* + N (‘you + noun’) is not necessarily pejoratively (or even emotionally) connoted. However, the contrast between a group labelled with *ihr* + N and an explicitly or implicitly introduced group including S is often pragmatically reanalyzed as involving positive emotion towards S’s own group and consequently either its absence or even some negative emotion towards the others. D’Avis and Meibauer (2013:211) show that the (negative) evaluative effect here can be best accounted for as a conversational implicature in the Gricean sense.

4. Cognitive proximity

In Averintseva-Klisch & Consten (2007) and Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2010) we propose an interaction of different functions of demonstrative reference in form of a hierarchy of demonstrative features *proximity* and *non-topicality*. In this context we develop a concept of *cognitive proximity* that subsumes different instances of “near” mental relationships between speakers, hearers and referents they talk about. Cognitive proximity has at least the following shapes:

- i. emotive marking, i.e. the marking of positive or negative emotions S has towards the referent of the demonstrative, cf. (13) from Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2010: 12):

- (13) a. Ach *dieser Wein*, so lieblich und so fein [...]

‘Oh this wine, it is so sweet and so tasty’

b. Sein Bruder, *dieser Idiot*, hat wieder die ganze Feier versaut.

‘His brother, that idiot, he spoils the whole party again.’

We consider S’s emotional involvement with a referent (and S’s choice to explicitly verbalize it) as an instance of cognitive proximity, as the corresponding referent has to be strongly mentally activated with the S, and is in this sense near to him.¹³

- ii. Anamnestic or recognitional use, i.e. using demonstratives to refer to objects or persons not yet mentioned in the current discourse, but known to both S and H from some further communication situations, as in (14); cf. Auer (1981); Himmelmann (1996); Diessel (1999):

- (14) Was ist eigentlich mit *diesem Telefon* passiert, das in deinem Zimmer war?

‘What has actually happened to *this phone* which used to be in your room?’

In Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2012: 259) we argue that with anamnestic demonstratives speakers use “the possibility to make a tentative reference act, i.e. to refer with insufficient linguistic means leaving open if the reference is really resolvable for the hearer and appealing to accept this deficient reference”. Accordingly, we do not distinguish between anamnestic demonstratives and the so-called indefinite *this/dies-* like in (15):

- (15) Da ist *dieses Mädchen* in meiner Klasse, sie hat ...

‘There is *this girl* in my class, she ...’

13. Koch & Oesterreicher (1985) consider affection and emotionality as typical properties of what they label “the language of immediacy” as opposed to “the language of distance”.

The usual assumption is that the demonstrative here is indefinite, being interchangeable with an indefinite article; see Prince (1981) and Ionin (2006) for a general analysis focussing on English, Heusinger et al. (2010) for German. We show with attested examples that first, the interchangeability is not really given, the demonstrative always having a component of appealing to the hearer to accept the reference, which an indefinite (or a definite) article lacks, and that second, actual examples often have traits of both ‘indefinite’ and anamnestic *dies-*. That is why we subsume both under the function of marking an “as-if”-identifiability.

iii. Reference to temporally or epistemically “near” referents, i.e. referents that are presented by S as actually taking place now or as being present in the real world with real modality; cf. (16) for temporal proximity:

- (16) An *diesem Nachmittag* ist Helmut Kohl am Ziel seiner Wünsche.
 “Herr Präsident, ich nehme die Wahl an.” Beifall brandet auf im Deutschen Bundestag. Man schreibt den 1. Oktober 1982.
 (<http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/1997/1001/none/0046/index.html>)
 ‘*This afternoon* Helmut Kohl has achieved what he most strongly desired.
 “Mr. President, I accept the vote.” The German Bundestag is loudly acclaiming. It is the first of October 1982.’

In (16), the events of a day that lies 15 years before the utterance time are presented as actually taking place before reader’s eyes; to achieve this effect, narrative present tense together with the proximal demonstrative determiner are used.

We argue that *dies-* tends to refer to physically near objects (in the sense of physical or textual proximity) as long as these are not discourse topics; as soon as they get established as topics, personal pronouns are preferred, cf. (17). Demonstrative reference to the discourse topics, dispreferred as such, gets perfectly acceptable and even preferred if the corresponding referent is marked as cognitively near, cf. (18) (both examples are attested examples used in Averintseva-Klisch & Consten (2007)):

- (17) (Text explaining a picture)
Dieser Kater ist am 07.05.2006 in Jülich-Stetternich an der Grillhütte zugelaufen. *Er* ist ca. 1 Jahr alt, grau-braun getigert und nicht kastriert. [...] Vermutlich wurde *er* Samstagabend oder Sonntagmorgen ausgesetzt [...] ‘*This tomcat* was found on May, 7th, 2006 at Jülich-Stetterheim near the barbecue hut. *He* is approximately one year old, grey-brown tabbed and not caponised. Presumably *he* was abandoned there on Saturday evening or Sunday morning [...].’

- (18) Unser \Freund\ alpa ist ein ganz widerlicher Kerl, Bah! Möge *ihn* der Blitz beim Scheißen treffen. [...] Soviel Geld kann *der* im ganzen Leben nicht verdienen, wie *er* als Entschädigung zu zahlen hat, *dieser Blödmann*. Statt etwas ordentliches auf die Beine zu stellen, müllt *er* die Postfächer zu wie eine Horde Tauben ein frisch gewaschenes Auto. *Dieser Dreckskerl*. [...] ‘Our ‘friend’ Alpa is a most disgusting guy, uuh! May the lightning strike *him* while (he’s) shitting. [...] *Weak.dem* won’t earn as much money in (his) whole life as *he* has to pay for compensation, *this dumbass*. Instead of getting something useful going, *he* spams the mailboxes like a horde of pigeons [pollutes] a newly-washed car. *This dirty louse*. [...]’ (S in a chat complains about someone who flooded the chat participants with spam)

In (17) a new, and thus trivially non-topical, referent is introduced deictically (referring to a picture coming along with the text) with a demonstrative NP. Further on, the reference to the cat who clearly becomes the discourse topic here (again trivially, as no other discourse referent is introduced) is maintained with the personal pronoun *er* (‘he’). That is, the non-discourse-topic constraint on anaphoric demonstratives overrides physical proximity, a near referent being re-addressed with non-demonstrative reference means as soon as it becomes topical. In (18), however, in spite of a similar situation with one clear discourse topic referent Alpa, the reference maintaining alternates between personal pronoun *er* (four uses), weak demonstrative *der* (used once) and lexically derogatory NPs with a strong demonstrative determiner *dieser* (twice). Using demonstratives, S gives an additional emotional emphasis to his (already lexically pejoratively marked) statement about the discourse referent. This means that the non-discourse-topic constraint can be overridden by cognitive proximity.

In Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2010) we present empirical data on demonstrative determiners in German NP right dislocation, a construction consisting of a clause-internal pro-form and a coreferent NP at the right periphery like in (19).

- (19) Ahnungslos kam *er* dahergeschwommen, *der Karpfen Cyprinus*.
‘He came swimming along suspecting nothing, *the carp Cyprinus*.’

As shown in Averintseva-Klisch (2009), right dislocation in German serves to mark the discourse topic for the following segment; see also the observations in Altmann (1981:130) or Zifonun, Hoffmann & Stecker (1997:548). More specifically, right dislocation can either promote a discourse-old referent to the new discourse topic or overtly signal the maintenance of the old discourse topic. The latter case was the interesting one: according to general assumptions on demonstratives they should be excluded in such cases, as they are restricted to non-topical referents. Following our analysis we expected that demonstrative determiners are only possible in right dislocated NPs marking a maintained topic if the NP is presented as cognitively near.

We tested this assumption in a questionnaire study using pejorative marking as an instance of cognitive proximity. The test persons (216 students of German studies) were presented with items like (20); their task was to cross out all those expressions in the blue highlighted fields that did not sound good for them:¹⁴

(20) Schulhof-Gespräch:

A: “Und, gibt’s was Neues bei euch?”

B: “Ja, wir haben ‘nen neuen Lehrer. Er ist Spezialist für mongolische Sprachen. Aber didaktisch ist er eine Niete, **dieser/der** Lehrer. Im Unterricht ist er einfach unmöglich.”

‘At the schoolyard. A.: “Any news”? B.: “Well, we’ve got a new teacher. He is specialized in Mongolian languages. But when it comes to didactics, he is a duffer, **this/the** teacher. In class, he is utterly impossible.”

The items varied with respect to (i) neutral context vs. context implying speaker’s negative emotion towards the referent as in (20), and (ii) neutral head nouns (like *teacher* in (20)) vs. derogatory head nouns like *Trottel* (‘idiot’). We labelled the cases where negative emotion was only contextually induced as “weak emotive marking”, whilst the cases with negative emotion expressed both contextually and lexically were called “strong emotive marking” (neutral context with neutral noun corresponded to “no emotive marking”).

Interestingly, the results show not only a highly significant effect of emotive marking on the preference as well as the acceptance of demonstrative determiners, but also (unexpectedly) “weak emotive marking” turns out to be a better feature for licensing demonstrativity than “strong emotive marking”: “strong emotive marking” taken alone has no significant effect on demonstrativity, while “weak emotive marking” still has; for exact results and more details, see Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2010).

Our study seems to confirm the assumption presented in 2.2 that mere demonstrativity may be pejorative: we explained our result assuming that if the speaker’s attitude is already expressed by the lexical content of the head noun, there is no need for marking it doubly by demonstrativity. However, given a pejorative context and the lack of pejorative marking within the target NP, speakers may tend to mark the intended pejoration with a demonstrative (or at least our subjects did).

In the following I present a slightly different explanation of the interplay of demonstrativity and pejoration, thus trying to reconstruct what exactly makes demonstratives predestined for conveying cognitive proximity.

14. Illustrating examples like: “**these / the** books = You consider “books” the best version.; **these/the** books = You consider “these books” and “the books” equally good” were given at the beginning of the questionnaire; the fillers were contextually embedded generic sentences like “**These/the** parrots are birds.”

5. Demonstratives and pejoration revisited

This paper claims that demonstratives do not per se involve a pejorative component, neither at the at-issue nor at the not-at-issue, expressive level. The meaning component they have on their own is first and foremost *demonstrating* in the sense of direct showing X to H. S showing X to H pre-requires that S who is showing as well as H whom S shows something share the same location and that in this location X can be identified. The location can be a physical space (in the prototypical case of deictic pointing), but also something which I pre-theoretically label “mental space”, i.e. that part of the private world knowledge of S and H respectively that is relevant for the current discourse. Assuming for the time being that shared physical space is a proper part of the shared mental space, one can conclude that:

- (i) Using demonstratives is a linguistic means by which S attracts H’s attention to X that is in their shared mental space.

In attracting attention to something in the shared mental space, S as a by-product stresses the existence of such shared space. Exactly this leads to the “emotional closeness” effect observed in Lakoff (1974): in attracting H’s attention to X, S automatically enhances the feeling of closeness between S and H, as they both share the possibility to look at or to think of X. Importantly, cognitive proximity as introduced in 4 above actually subsumes both emotional (or, more neutrally, mental) closeness holding between S and H as well as different proximity relations between S (and maybe H) and the referent of the demonstrative NP.¹⁵ In the following I will use the term cognitive proximity in a more narrow sense to refer only to the mental closeness between S and H actively produced by S via using certain linguistic means. This meaning component is clearly not-at-issue and automatically true as soon as a demonstrative is uttered, so that it can be analyzed as a separate performative speech act in the sense of Potts (2007).

Now, the reasons for S to attract H’s attention to X may be manifold; one is that S holds a strong positive or negative emotion towards X and attracts H’s attention to X as he wishes H to share this emotion. Urging H to share his emotion both requires a certain degree of mental closeness between S and H and serves to enhance it even further.

In the following I consider German strong demonstratives *dies-* and *jen-* with respect to pejoration under this analysis. I show that they behave differently with

15. Recall example (5) from Thomas Mann above, where S, the protagonist Castorp, has complex emotions towards the referent Naphta he refers to with a demonstrative NP. Now we can precisely retrace how this complexity is mirrored by choosing a demonstrative: S both suggests mutual closeness to H (Settembrini) and at the same time both distances himself overtly from Naphta and at least partly invalidates this distancing by drawing Naphta in the mental space he shares with H, so that at the end all three are quasi reconciled in one mutual mental space.

respect to possible emotion marking and resulting pejorative flavour, whilst *this* and *that* in English have been shown to behave in a similar way. In particular, semantically neutral *dies*-NPs referring to human beings tend to have a pejorative flavour *jen*-NPs lack. I show that the pejoration effect with *dies*- arises due to its core demonstrativity, because of the face threatening character of a direct pointing at a human being (in terms of Brown & Levinson 1987); *jen*- lacks this effect, as it cannot be used for direct pointing in contemporary German. The dissimilarity between German and English in this respect can be explained by both languages having different concepts of distance underlying the distinction in proximal vs. distal demonstratives.

5.1 German proximal demonstrative *dies*- and pejoration

Under the analysis of the demonstrative *dies*- as involving demonstrating X to H by S as an at-issue meaning component and marking of “cognitive proximity” between S and H as a not-at-issue component proposed above, for the special case of emotive demonstrating following three instances can be distinguished: First, if S’s emotion is explicitly marked as a positive one, e.g. via the lexical meaning of the head noun in a demonstrative NP as in (21), we expect demonstratives to serve to focus the attention of S and H on the corresponding referent enhancing the emotional closeness effect, but not to have any pejorative colouring:

- (21) a. Ach *dieser Wein*, so lieblich und so fein [...]

‘Oh *this wine*, it is so sweet and so tasty’
- b. Mit *diesem gutaussiehenden Mann da* war ich mal zusammen.

‘I used to be romantically involved with *this handsome man over there*.’

Second, if the emotion is lexically marked as a negative one, trivially the NP sounds pejorative; there is no reason to assume demonstratives to be responsible for the emotion, as the adjective and the noun already bring it in. A pejorative flavour remains with a definite NP, cf. (22); demonstratives are not necessary here, but they particularly suit emotional reference, as has been argued above:

- (22) Mit *diesem fetten Typen da/dem fetten Typen in der Ecke links* war ich mal zusammen.

‘I used to be romantically involved with *this fat guy over there/the fat guy in the left corner*.’

The really interesting case is the third one, where lexical material bringing pejoration in is absent, as in (23) (recall also the politician example (6) above):

- (23) a. Mit *diesem Typen/dém da* war ich mal zusammen.

‘I used to be romantically involved with *this guy/this one [stressed weak dem.] over there*.’
- b. Warum steht *dieser Typ* einfach so da?

‘Why is *this guy* standing there like this?’

Such examples, as already mentioned above, tend to be interpreted pejoratively. I propose a general pragmatic explanation for this case: pointing at a human being (recall that derogatory meaning is explicitly assumed to be the case with demonstratives referring to humans) is an act that as such threatens the negative face of this human being in the sense of Brown & Levinson (1987).¹⁶ Brown and Levinson (1987) develop a pragmatic politeness theory that is crucially based on distinguishing between two aspects of the self-image of the communication partners that are negotiated in any communication situation: ‘positive face’, i.e. “the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire, that this self-image be appreciated and approved of)” and ‘negative face’, i.e. “the basic claim [...] to freedom of action and freedom from imposition” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 61). Communication acts can be designed to threaten or to save the face of the communication partner, the latter being polite. Thus, negative politeness of one communication partner consists in strategies of negative face saving of the other partner (e.g. not imposing one’s goals), and positive politeness is directed onto positive face saving of the other one (e.g. praising him).

Given that using demonstratives referring to humans is via their primary pointing function a face threatening act – in attracting H’s attention to X, S clearly imposes upon X’s freedom – we expect demonstrative human reference to be impolite, unless this effect is compensated by a positive face saving act; this is the case in (21b) above, where the positive face saving effect of the ameliorative lexical material justifies the linguistic pointing at the referent.

In other words, in that S in (23) shows H a human referent X in their shared physical or mental space, he both induces cognitive proximity between him and H in stressing the fact that they have a shared mental space and threatens X’s negative face in bringing X “into the spotlight” of their shared attention without giving a clear face saving reason for it. This is how mere demonstrativity simultaneously achieves closeness and distancing: the closeness concerns S and H, whilst the distancing concerns S (appealing to H to agree with him in this attitude) and X.

I expect both aspects to be valid cross-linguistically. My explanation of the at first glance contradictory observation of “emotional closeness” with English demonstratives vs. “hostile rejection” with German ones is thus rather simple: in both languages demonstratives function in a similar way; however, analyses on English concentrate on the first aspect, the producing of cognitive proximity between S and H, whilst analyses on German highlight the face threatening hostility of S towards a human referent X.

16. Recall that it is considered impolite in many countries and cultures including Germany to point at human beings with a finger, i.e. to use the typical gesture for pointing at inanimate objects with human beings.

It follows from the assumptions above that for non-human referents nothing changes in overtly ameliorative or pejorative cases as (21a) above or (24a):

- (24) a. Unmöglich, *dieser saure Wein* mit ekligem Beigeschmack!
 ‘It’s just impossible, *this sour wine* with a squirmy aftertaste!’
 b. Warum steht *dieser Tisch* einfach so da?
 ‘Why is *this table* standing there just like this?’

In neutral cases like (24b) the analysis predicts no pejorative effects, as the face threatening issue is not applicable to inanimate objects. To my intuition (24b) is in fact emotionally neutral and can only be used deictically to point at a particular table. Recall that for English Lakoff (1974) does not differentiate between human and non-human referents. That is exactly what follows if the relation of proximity described by Lakoff holds between S and H and X does not play any role in it.

5.2 German distal *jen-* and ‘cognitive distance’

As mentioned in 2.1, for German strong demonstratives traditionally a proximity contrast is assumed, with proximal *dies-* and distal *jen-* forms. However, it has been repeatedly argued in the literature (e.g. Hauenschild 1982: 183; Rauh 2003: 407; Gunkel 2007: 215; and Consten & Averintseva-Klisch 2010: 5) that *jen-* is not used for marking deictic or anaphoric distance in contemporary German. Still, it can be used with a temporal reference, cf. (25):

- (25) Die Ruine der vor 104 Jahren erbauten prächtigen Mannheimer Synagoge wird abgetragen. Nichts ist geblieben von dem Glanz *jener Zeit*, als 6600 jüdische Mitbürger ihren Mittelpunkt in F2 hatten. (periodical *Mannheimer Morgen*, 2005)¹⁷
 ‘The ruins of the grand synagoge of Mannheim that has been built 104 ago are being removed. Nothing has remained of the glamour of *that time*, as 6600 jewish fellow citizens were living in F2.’

Here, the reference time is not only actually considerably before the utterance time; it is *overtly presented* as being far away and gone beyond recall: “nothing has remained”. In Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2010: 9–11) we suggested that such explicit marking of a temporal distance is the only use for *jen-* in the present German, in which *jen-* contrasts with *dies-* marking temporal proximity (as a subkind of cognitive proximity).

This asymmetry between *dies-* and *jen-* suggests that there might be no need of a concept of ‘cognitive distance’, that maybe what speakers consider worth of explicit

17. Found with IDS Cosmas Corpus (<https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2-web>).

marking is only cognitive proximity, not distance.¹⁸ This corresponds with the intriguing finding of Lakoff (1974) quoted in Section 2.2 above, that *this* and *that* in English are both used in a similar way to express what I conceived above as cognitive proximity between the speaker and the hearer, induced via their respective mental proximity to the referent of the demonstrative NP.

However, at the second glance, for German a slightly different picture emerges. In Averintseva-Klisch (2016) I argue with corpus data from the periodical *Mannheimer Morgen* (MM) and from wikipedia discussions that using *jen-* allows S to present the referent as being ‘cognitively distant’ in the sense of *not being* in the physical or mental space that the speaker and the hearer are sharing. The following example illustrates this idea:

- (26) ... kann es nicht schaden, den Blick auch einmal nach Timbuktu, *jener sagenumwobenen Stadt aus Lehm am mächtigen Nigerfluss in Mali, Afrika*, zu richten. Der Publizist Roger Willemsen hat [...] uns wissen lassen, dass Bundespräsident Heinrich Lübke dort im Jahre 1956 eine Bronzeplakette eingeweiht habe. (MM 2012)

‘It wouldn’t do any harm to have a look at Timbuktu, *jen- city of clay shrouded in legend lying on the river Niger in Mali, Africa*. The publicist Roger Willemsen lets us know that the federal president Heinrich Lübke has inaugurated a bronze tag there in the year 1956.’

Here, the whole situation described is presented as far away and long ago; the distance to the situation and its location, the city referred to with a *jen*-NP, is enhanced as the situation was not witnessed by the writer, but is only reported second-hand. In addition to being far away, the city is attested to be legendary. That is, S and H not only cannot physically see the city, but one can plausibly assume that they do not share any private knowledge about it – and this is exactly what the use of *jen-* here is explicitly marking.

Given this analysis and the considerations about the interplay of establishing joint attention with pejorative demonstrative use above, one expects that only proximal *dies-* is suitable for pragmatically evolving pejorative uses, and not *jen-* marking ‘cognitive distance’: per definition *jen-* cannot serve to establish joint attention in the sense above, as the referent is not perceivable for S and H. This expectation seems to be true: whilst *dieser Idiot* is a very plausible form of ranting, as a simple Google search confirms, cf. (27), *jener Idiot* would sound very odd in these contexts:

18. In Averintseva-Klisch & Consten (2007) and Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2010, 2012) we compare the proximal strong demonstrative *dies-* as a cognitive proximity marker with the personal pronoun *er/sie/es* and the definite article *der* which both are neutral with respect to proximity. We explicitly neither consider weak *der* nor strong *jen-* demonstratives.

- (27) a. Will *dieser Idiot* mich verarschen?
 ‘Is *this idiot* going to muck around with me?’
 (<http://forum.gofeminin.de>)
- b. Die Stimme des spanischen TV-Kommentators überschlug sich
 mehrmals, [...] “Schau dir das an. Roberto Carlos – *dieser Idiot!*”
 ‘The voice of the Spanish football commentator cracked repeatedly:
 “Just look at it! Roberto Carlos, *this idiot!*”’
 (<http://www.spox.com/de/sport/fussball/championsleague>)

(28) is only seemingly a counterevidence to this claim:

- (28) “Böse Leute, diese Roten”, kommentierte Signora Cristina.
 “Diese Roten, die gesiegt haben, sind wir”, fuhr Spicio fort.
 “Trotzdem böse Leute”, beharrte Signora Cristina. “Im Jahre 1901 wollte
jener Idiot von deinem Vater, dass ich das Kruzifix aus der Schule entferne.”
 “Alte Zeiten”, sagte Spicio. “Jetzt ist es anders!”
 (G. Guareschi, Don Camillo and Peppone,
www.deutschunddeutsch.de/contentLD/GD/GT83b)
 ““They are bad ones, these communists”, signora Christina commented. –
 “These communists who’ve won, that’s us”, Spicio continued. – “Still, they
 are bad ones”, signora Christina insisted. “Why, 1901 *that idiot of your father*
 wanted me to take the crucifix out of the school”. – “That was in the past”,
 Spicio said. “Now everything is different””

Here, although *jen-* is used exactly like *dies-* in (27) as a determiner with an explicitly negative head noun *idiot*, the effect is quite different (and also quite different from that of *dies-* in the first utterance of signora Christina): it is not the case that the speaker wants to attract the attention of the hearers to Spicio’s father or appeals to them to share her actual negative emotion. Instead, she refers to something that happened years ago; at that time she certainly was angry about Spicio’s father, which justifies her use of the noun *idiot*, but the emotion is not of immediate concern any more.

I have argued that strong negative emotion towards a referent and a wish to bring the hearer to share one’s emotion are both important for pejoration; in combination they are a plausible reason for S wishing to attract H’s attention to a referent. However, a pre-requisite for attracting attention is that the referent is in the shared physical or mental space of S and H, i.e. physical or cognitive proximity between S, H and the referent. That is why *jen-* as a reference means is not suitable in this case, as its presumed main function is to mark the absence of the referent in the shared mental space.

In other words, German and English seem to differ with respect to what “proximal” and “distal” with demonstratives actually mean: for English *that*, distal means that there are two comparable reference objects in the shared physical or mental space of S

and H, and the referent of the *that*-NP is the less near one.¹⁹ Accordingly, both *this* and *that* can be used deictically, and both can have a similar “affective use” (Lakoff 1974) in the sense of a cognitive proximity marking: cognitive proximity requires that S, H and the NP-referent X share the same mental space, and this requirement is fulfilled. The similar situation presumably holds for Russian: Berger (1991:32) argues that Russian distal demonstrative *mom* is deictically used to refer to “the other one” in the shared physical or mental space of the speaker and the hearer. Thus, “distal” again is far-away in the shared space, which explains the possibility of “affective use” (see e.g. Averintseva-Klisch & Consten 2007:235) and of lexicalized pejoration as in example (7) above in Russian.

On the contrary, for German *jen-*, “distal” means that the referent of the *jen*-NP is not present in the shared mental space of S and H. Accordingly, neither a deictic use of *jen-* nor a cognitive proximity marking via *jen-* is possible. It follows that a pragmatically impolite pointing inducing a pejorative effect is not expected with *jen-*, as *jen-* is not suitable for pointing at all. Indeed, in my data all uses of *jen-* (pronouns or full NPs) with reference to human beings are cases of anaphoric reference, and they do not have any pejorative flavour.

6. Summing up

This paper proposes a pragmatic account of the fact that demonstrative pejorative expressions are rather common in German (and cross-linguistically). I argue that linguistic pejoration subsumes marking of both the speaker’s negative emotion and the speaker’s appeal to the hearer to share his emotion with linguistic means. Accordingly, the main function of demonstratives, i.e. to “provide the primary linguistic device [...] to establish joint attention” (Diessel 2012:2417) of the speaker and the hearer towards a referent X, makes them predestined for encoding these pejoration aspects, as long as the context does not supply explicitly meliorating information. Additionally, with reference to human beings, establishing joint attention on the referent threatens the ‘negative face’ of this referent, which produces or enhances the pejorative effect.

References

- Acton, Eric K. & Potts, Christopher. 2014. That straight talk: Sarah Palin and the sociolinguistics of demonstratives. *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 18(1): 3–31. doi:10.1111/josl.12062

19. This also captures the intuition that *that* only has distal character in explicit contrast with *this*, cf. Levinson (2004:110).

- Altmann, Hans. 1981. *Formen der Herausstellung im Deutschen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
doi:10.1515/9783111635286
- Auer, Peter. 1981. Zur indexikalitätsmarkierenden Funktion der demonstrativen Artikelform in deutschen Konversationen. In *Sprache: Verstehen und Handeln*, Götz Hindelang & Werner Zillig (eds), 301–310. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Averintseva-Klisch, Maria. 2009. *Rechte Satzperipherie im Diskurs. NP-Rechtsversetzung im Deutschen*. Tübingen: Stauffenburg.
- Averintseva-Klisch, Maria. 2016. Definite or still demonstrative? Some ideas on the semantics of German distal demonstrative *jen-*. In *The Impact of Pronominal Form on Interpretation*, Patrick Grosz & Pritty Patel-Grosz (eds), 253–288. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Averintseva-Klisch, Maria & Consten, Manfred. 2007. The role of discourse topic and proximity for demonstratives in German and Russian. *Languages in Contrast* 7(2): 221–240.
doi:10.1075/lic.7.2.08ave
- Berger, Tilman. 1991. Überlegungen zur Deixis im Russischen. In *Slavistische Linguistik 1990. Referate des XVI. Konstanzer Slavistischen Arbeitstreffens*, Klaus Hartenstein (ed.), 9–35. Munich: Sagner.
- Bisle-Müller, Hansjörg. 1991. *Artikelwörter im Deutschen. Semantische und pragmatische Aspekte ihrer Verwendung*. Tübingen: Niemeyer. doi:10.1515/9783111677590
- Bosch, Peter & Umbach, Carla. 2007. Reference determination for demonstrative pronouns. In *Intersentential Pronominal Reference in Child and Adult Language*, Natalia Gagarina & Dagmar Bittner (eds), 39–51. Berlin: ZAS.
- Bowdle, Brian & Ward, Gregory. 1995. Generic demonstratives. In *Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*: 32–43.
- Brown, Penelope & Levinson, Stephen. 1987. *Politeness*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Brugmann, Karl. 1904. *Die Demonstrativpronomina der indogermanischen Sprachen*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Comrie, Bernard. 2000. Pragmatic binding: Demonstratives as anaphors in Dutch. In *Pragmatics and Grammatical Structure. Proceedings of the 23d annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society 1997*, Matthew L. Juge & Jeri L. Moxley (eds), 50–61. Berkeley CA: BLS.
- Consten, Manfred & Averintseva-Klisch, Maria. 2010. ‘Nahe Referenten’ – ein integrativer Ansatz zur Funktion demonstrativer Referenz. *Sprachtheorie und germanistische Linguistik* 20(1): 1–34.
- Consten, Manfred & Averintseva-Klisch, Maria. 2012. Tentative reference acts? Recognitional demonstratives as means of suggesting mutual knowledge – or overriding a lack of it. *Research in Language* 10(3): 257–277. doi:10.2478/v10015-011-0033-x
- Consten, Manfred. 2013. Streiten, worüber gesprochen wird – Diskurstopiks am Beispiel der TV-Serie Dr. House. A talk at the Leipzig University, 28.05.2013.
- Dammel, Antje. 2011. Wie kommt es zu *rumstudierenden Hinterbänklern* und anderen *Sonderlingen*? Pfade zu pejorativen Wortbildungsbedeutungen im Deutschen. In *Jahrbuch für germanistische Sprachgeschichte, 2: Historische Semantik*, Jörg Riecke (ed.), 326–343. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- d’Avis, Franz & Meibauer, Jörg. 2013. ‘Du Idiot’/‘Din Idiot!’ Pseudo-vocative constructions and insults in German (and Swedish). In *Vocative! Addressing between System and Performance*, Patrizia Noel Aziz Hanna & Barbara Sonnenhauser (eds), 113–140. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Diessel, Holger. 1999. *Demonstratives: Form, Function, and Grammaticalization* [Typological Studies in Language 42]. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/tsl.42

- Diessel, Holger. 2012. Deixis and demonstratives. In *Semantics. An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning*, Vol. 3, Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger & Paul Portner (eds), 2407–2431. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Duden. ⁷2005. *Die Grammatik*, Vol. 4. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.
- Duden. 2011. *Richtiges und gutes Deutsch*, Vol. 9. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.
- Erben, Johannes. 1980. *Deutsche Grammatik. Ein Abriss*. Munich: Max Hueber.
- Gunkel, Lutz. 2007. Demonstrativa als Antezedentien von Relativsätzen. *Deutsche Sprache* 35: 213–238.
- Hauenschild, Christa. 1982. Demonstrative pronouns in Russian and Czech – deixis and anaphora. In *Here and There: Cross-linguistic Studies on Deixis and Demonstration* [Pragmatics & Beyond III: 2–3], Jürgen Weissenborn & Wolfgang Klein (eds), 167–186. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pb.iii.2-3.09hau
- Havryliv, Oksana. 2003. *Pejorative Lexik*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Havryliv, Oksana. 2009. *Verbale Aggression*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- von Heusinger, Klaus, Chiriacescu, Sofiana & Deichsel, Annika. 2010. Two specific indefinite articles in German. Handout, invited lecture at the University of Santa Cruz, California, <people.ucsc.edu/~abrsvn/handout_11.pdf> (30 September 2014)
- Himmelman, Nikolaus P. 1996. Demonstratives in narrative discourse: A taxonomy of universal uses. In *Studies in Anaphora* [Typological Studies in Language 33], Barbara Fox (ed.), 205–254. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/tsl.33.08him
- Himmelman, Nikolaus P. 1997. *Deiktikon, Artikel, Nominalphrase. Zur Emergenz syntaktischer Struktur*. Tübingen: Niemeyer. doi:10.1515/9783110929621
- Ionin, Tanya. 2006. *This* is definitely specific: Specificity and definiteness in article systems. *Natural Language Semantics* 14: 175–234. doi:10.1007/s11050-005-5255-9
- Koch, Peter & Oesterreicher, Wulf. 1985. Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz. *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 36: 15–43.
- Lakoff, Robin. 1974. Remarks on *this* and *that*. *Chicago Linguistic Society* 10: 345–356.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 2004. Deixis. In *The Handbook of Pragmatics*. Laurence Horn (ed.), 97–121. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Meibauer, Jörg. 2013. Expressive compounds in German. *Word Structure* 6(1): 21–42. doi:10.3366/word.2013.0034
- Meibauer, Jörg (ed.). 2013. Hassrede/Hate speech. <<http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2013/9251>> (30 September 2014)
- Potts, Christopher. 2005. *The Logics of Conventional Implicatures*. Oxford: OUP.
- Potts, Christopher. 2007. The expressive dimension. *Theoretical Linguistics* 33(2): 165–197.
- Potts, Christopher & Schwarz, Florian. 2010. Affective ‘this’. *Linguistic Issues in Language Technology* 3(5): 1–30.
- Prince, Ellen. 1981. On the inferencing of indefinite-*this* NPs. In *Elements of Discourse Understanding*, Aravind Joshi, Bonnie Webber & Ivan Sag (eds), 231–250. Cambridge: CUP.
- Rauh, Gisa. 2003. Warum wir Linguisten “euch Linguisten”, aber nicht “sie Linguisten” akzeptieren können. Eine personendeiktische Erklärung. *Linguistische Berichte* 196: 389–424.
- Rauh, Gisa. 2004. Warum “Linguist” in “ich/du Linguist” kein Schimpfwort sein muß. Eine konversationstheoretische Erklärung. *Linguistische Berichte* 197: 77–105.
- Riesel, Elise. 1959. *Stilistik der deutschen Sprache*. Moskau: Verlag für fremdsprachige Literatur.

- Staffeldt, Sven. 2011. "Ich liebe Dich" sprechakttheoretisch. In *Äußern und Bedeuten. Festschrift für Eckard Rolf*, Jan Claas Freienstein, Jörg Hagemann & Sven Staffeldt (eds), 179–196. Tübingen: Stauffenburg.
- Stalnaker, Robert. 2002. Common ground. *Linguistics & Philosophy* 25: 701–721.
doi:10.1023/A:1020867916902
- Zifonun, Gisela, Hoffmann, Ludger & Strecker, Bruno. 1997. *Grammatik der deutschen Sprache*, Vol. 1. Berlin: De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110872163