

THE HISTORY OF SAINT ANSELM'S THEOLOGY  
OF THE REDEMPTION  
IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to trace the history of St. Anselm's theology of the Redemption in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. St. Anselm's writings contain much about the Redemption, but his great exposition of the problems of why Christ died for man is set forth in the Cur Deus Homo. I have taken this work as the foundation for all the comparative apparatus of the thesis. But at the same time I have tried to look upon Anselm's theology in an historical context, for the Cur Deus Homo looks back upon the writings of Augustine, while the theologians whom Cur Deus Homo influenced were inevitably children of their own times and their own traditions.

When I began work on this thesis, I found that much had already been done in the study of the development of the theology of the Redemption during the Middle Ages. Jean Rivière and D.E. DeClerck are only two figures among the many who have dealt with this subject. But the studies of Rivière and DeClerck are one-dimensional theological undertakings. For them, the ideas are always primary, and history is only a vehicle which carries the ideas. I have tried to put the medieval writers into the context of the traditions to which they belonged, whether twelfth century monastic or scholastic. For the thirteenth century I have concentrated almost exclusively on Paris scholastic theology. I realize that my distinction of monastic from scholastic theology can be at times rather artificial and, indeed, almost arbitrary. But usually I have found that this distinction illuminates the way in which Anselm was received and understood. Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, so deceptively close at first, actually took up Anselm in completely different ways.

In working on the thesis, I have seen that although the theology of the Redemption was a well-researched topic, few writers had actually asked what influence individual figures like Augustine or Anselm had exercised on the development of thought. And so I have concentrated on theologians first and the theology of the Redemption second, for the purpose of this thesis is not



to contribute to the history of doctrine but to shed light on the way medieval theologians looked at their authorities and their sources. By approaching the Cur Deus Homo in this way, I have been able to trace an enigmatic history of initial reception, eventual decline, and finally, a limited acceptance that was so shaky that Duns Scotus found he had to reject the work as a whole. At the moment of fullest acceptance, the Cur Deus Homo was in its greatest danger of being rejected as a useful exposition of the theology of the Redemption.

My method has been very simple and, perhaps, a bit old-fashioned. I have concentrated very strongly on the theological treatises themselves. Line by line, word by word, I have picked them apart and compared and contrasted them with the language and vocabulary of Cur Deus Homo and other early works on the Redemption. This activity has been tedious at times, but I have become convinced that this activity was the only way to expose the Anselmian foundation in much twelfth century work. For the thirteenth century, the task has generally been easier, for writers often cite Anselm by name.

At times, then, sections of my chapters are nothing more than running commentaries on the various theological treatises, but I am certain that this method is the only one possible to set forth the evidence contained in the texts themselves. At times, as with Nicholas of Amiens, I have been able to break out of this pattern and to trace manuscript histories. This has been much more exciting, but most of the time it is not necessary. In dealing with major figures like Hugh of St. Victor and the Franciscans of the thirteenth century, I have found that sufficient work has already been done on manuscripts and historical background to enable me merely to summarize conclusions and then get on with my own exposition. To pretend to criticize all of this work would be hypocrisy.

I have tried to limit my elucidation of the theological treatises to the barest and most essential points, but I realize that even now the thesis is largely boring to read. But without the theological foundation and the constant return to Anselm's own theology, the thesis would collapse, for I have found

that one can only treat such materials historically by first treating them theologically. One must first conquer the nuances and distinctions of the theology before one can compare the backgrounds and prejudices of the various successors of Anselm.

Before entering the core of the thesis, I have tried to show in what ways Anselm differs in his theology of the treatment of the Redemption from Augustine. This introduction is by no means an attempt to explain in depth the entire theology of the Redemption of either writer. I have only tried to contrast Anselm and Augustine on key points.

The first chapter considers the early monastic reception of Anselm. The writings themselves are not very interesting or exciting, for these minor figures usually only reproduced what they found in Anselm. But there are moments of real insight. In the second chapter I have completed the monastic history for the twelfth century, with some attention to the manuscript tradition in monasteries. Here the figures are much more prominent. Bernard is difficult and elusive, but he does seem to have absorbed something of Anselm. With all the monastic figures, I have sought to show how their approach to Anselm is concerned not only with an understanding with the workings of the Redemption but also with a search for a theological system that leads to spiritual uplift. In these writers, everything is jumbled: exegesis, doctrine, and prayer. The result is far different from what we find in the scholastic theologians, for it reflects a total way of life and not just an intellectual discipline.

In looking at twelfth century scholastic reception in chapters three and four, I have begun with the proto-scholastic Leon writers, for their ideas reappear constantly throughout the century, until the time of Alan of Lille. Abelard makes a difficult but fascinating contribution, and I think that I have established with some degree of certainty that he did know the Our Deus Homo. Hugh of St. Victor has already been recognized for his Anselmian content, and so I have also looked at the ways Hugh circumscribes Anselm's contribution. Peter Lombard initiates a period in which Anselm lost even the limited popularity



he had previously. Robert of Melun provides an indication of the obscurity of Cur Deus Homo at Paris after about 1150.

At the opening of the fifth chapter I have tried to provide a general survey of the prospects at Paris for Anselm. Here I have made one of my limited expeditions into the subject of manuscript traditions, but the evidence is inconclusive. Nicholas of Amiens indicates for the continuing influence of Anselm in scattered centres but emerges as a lonely figure. Alexander Nequam is another eccentric, isolated theologian.

The findings of the last two chapters are based on a well-known fact: in the thirteenth century Anselm's Cur Deus Homo became practically a textbook for the theology of the Redemption. I have tried to find out at what point the Cur Deus Homo entered the intellectual life of Paris. Although I do not think it is possible to say exactly when Cur Deus Homo began to be read again, we can be sure that in the 1220s, the works of William of Auxerre, William of Auvergne and especially Alexander of Hales made the Cur Deus Homo into a well-known work. I have also asked why at this time Anselm was revived, and in answering I have made some general remarks on the directions and interests of Paris theology at this time.

The last chapter limits itself exclusively to the Franciscans, for they were the group at both Paris and Oxford who took up Anselm with the most eagerness, probably partially because their great doctor Alexander of Hales had such respect for Anselm. Bonaventure's writings provides us with some warning signals. What at first looked like total acceptance is hedged with so many reservations that we can hardly recognize the mutilated Cur Deus Homo that emerges. Finally Duns Scotus brings the doubts and difficulties out into the open and destroys not only the conclusions of Anselm, but also many of his assumptions. But afterwards Scotus provides his own interpretation of the Redemption, a sophisticated version of Abelard's emphasis on love.

What emerges by the end of the thirteenth century is the story of a central theological work that after many transformations was finally rejected because



its assumptions about man and God clashed too strongly with emerging ideas. In the last few pages of the thesis, I have shown how Scotus revolutionized the understanding of the Redemption and carried further a process that Anselm had already started. This change in view has important implications for our understanding of medieval man.

I am not completely satisfied with this thesis, for by definition it had to be very narrow and limited in scope. I think I have done what is required of me, but I hope that some day I will be able to justify more fully the past years of research by moving out from this history of theology and theologians to a more comprehensive social and psychological understanding of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Ultimately I still believe that the purpose of history is wisdom, not facts, and I have to confess with some agony that this thesis contributes more of the second than the first.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- AHDLMA Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age, Paris, 1926--.
- BFSMA Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi. Quaracchi Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1904--.
- BQPTMA Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und der Theologie des Mittelalters. Münster, 1891--.
- GDH Our Deus Homo.
- DTC Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. A Vacant, et. Paris, 1915--.
- LTK Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, begründet von Michael Buchberger. Freiburg, 1957--.
- MARS Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. H.W. Hunt and R. Klibensky, 1941--.
- MGH, SS Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores, ed. G.H. Pertz, 1826-96.
- NCE New Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. William J. McDonald, etc., Washington D.C., 1967.
- PL J.P. Migne, Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus. Paris, 1844--.
- PM v O. Lottin. Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècles, vol. v, Louvain-Gembloux, 1959.
- RB Revue Bénédictine. Abbaye de St. Benoît de Maredsous, 1890--.
- RTAM Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale. Louvain, 1929--.
- Schmitt F.S. Schmitt, O.S.B. Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, i-vi, 1938-61.

## Introduction

### AUGUSTINE AND ANSELM

When Saint Anselm wrote his Cur Deus Homo in the 1090s, he said that the doctrine of the Redemption had already been treated by the Fathers in a way 'which ought to suffice'.<sup>1</sup> But he excused his own attempt in typical medieval fashion by pointing to those around him who were clamouring for a better understanding of why God had become man. Anselm cautioned his pupil Boso to take what he said and compare it to the teaching of maior auctoritas, the Bible and the Fathers.

Although I may seem to prove something by reason, if greater authority does not confirm it, let it be taken with no other certitude, except that for now it seems true to me, until God reveals it to me in some better way.<sup>2</sup>

Anselm's cautious approach is more than a stylistic device. He had every reason to hesitate and to feel incompetent, for his Cur Deus Homo sought to encounter and resolve the problem of the Incarnation in ways that Augustine had never anticipated. Before we develop the main theme of this thesis, the influence of Cur Deus Homo on twelfth and thirteenth century theologians, we will first consider the originality of Cur Deus Homo by comparing it to the thirteenth book of Augustine's De Trinitate. We limit ourselves to this fragment of Augustine's teaching on the Redemption because it was precisely this book to which medieval theologians looked for an explanation of Augustine's teaching on the Redemption. Medieval theologians, like modern historians, were aware of the vastness of Augustine's corpus and often favoured small areas

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1. 'quod sufficere debeat....' Cur Deus Homo, Book I, Chapter 1. All quotations from this work will be taken from the edition published by F.S. Schmitt in Florilegium Patristicum xviii (Bonn, 1929) and reprinted in the Opera Omnia of Anselm, ii (Edinburgh, 1946). I shall refer to Cur Deus Homo by means of a roman numeral for the book and an arabic number for the chapter. For example, Book II, Chapter 14 becomes II, 14.

2. CDH I, 2: 'Videlicet, ut, si quid dixero, quod maior non confirmet auctoritas, quamvis illud ratione probare videar, non alia certitudine accipiamur, nisi quia interim mihi videtur, donec deus mihi melius aliquomodo revelat.'



within it. The thirteenth book of De Trinitate was for the Middle Ages the prime exemplar of patristic teaching on the Redemption and ranked second only to Paul's Epistle to the Romans as the definitive exposition of Christ's Incarnation and Redemption.

The teaching on the Redemption actually occupies only the second half of this book. The first section considers the human soul and the faith that dwells within it. This faith Augustine defines as the knowledge of beatitude.<sup>1</sup> But beatitude, sought by all men, can only be gained in immortality. Philosophy alone, however, does not guarantee that man can enjoy both beatitude and immortality. Because of the limitations of philosophy, we must turn to the certitudes of faith.<sup>2</sup> Augustine introduces the Redemption as the means God gave us for achieving immortality. Man's possibility for happiness is only completed and realized through the God-made-man. As the son of God became the son of man, so we become sons of God and thus participate in the Son of God's immortality.<sup>3</sup>

But Augustine is troubled by an objection. Could not God have redeemed man in another way, or was he lacking in the ability to liberate man from his misery without sacrificing his Son? It is insufficient to reply that God was being consistent with his own goodness by choosing such a way. Nor can we answer that God, to whose power all things are submitted, could have used another way. Instead we must show that there was not and could not have been a means better adapted to healing our wretchedness.<sup>4</sup> The theologian must indicate how Christ's death aroused our hopes for achieving immortality and demonstrated God's love for us. God in his generosity endows us with his goods without any merit on our part.

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1. Augustine, 13 De Trinitate 1, 3. Printed in PL 42, 1014.

2. 13 De Trin., 9, 12; PL 42, 1023.

3. Ibid., 9, 12; PL 42, 1024.

4. Ibid., 10, 13; PL 42, 1024.



In this framework, however, it is difficult to see the interaction of the members of the Trinity. What does St. Paul mean when he says that we are 'justified in his blood' and 'reconciled through the death of his Son'? How does the Son placate the Father for us? Was the Father so angry that only the Son's death would calm him? Did not the Father also love us before the Son's death and even before the creation of the world? How is it that all the persons of the Trinity act simultaneously, and yet we are justified in Christ's blood and reconciled to God through his Son's death?<sup>1</sup>

Augustine has set for himself two central questions: how is this mode of Redemption the most fitting one for man's needs? How do the different persons of the Trinity interact in the means of Redemption? His answer introduces a third participant in the Redemption, the devil. When Adam sinned, God justly handed over the human race into the devil's power.<sup>2</sup> God did not order that the devil take over man. Rather he only permitted this to be done.

Augustine never implies that the devil has any justice in holding man. But in making the devil man's keeper, Augustine could be interpreted as submitting man to God's will only indirectly, i.e., through the devil's agency. Instead of saying that after the fall man remained directly subject to God, Augustine explains that the devil in holding man was himself still under the power of God: '... quia nec ipse diabolus a potestate Omnipotentis alienus est, sicut neque a bonitate.'<sup>3</sup> This wording, emphasizing the devil's subjection to God, could be interpreted as making man subject to God only through the devil's subjection to God. This is the first of many ambiguities in Augustine's thought and language that Anselm would attempt to clear away.

When Christ came, the forgiveness of sins that he gained for men snatched them away from the devil's power. All this is clear enough, and Anselm would

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1. 13 De Trin., 11, 15; PL 42, 1025.

2. Ibid., 12, 16; PL 42, 1026.

3. Ibid., 12, 16; PL 42, 1026.

have no quarrel with the superficial statement. But Augustine explains Christ's work by making a distinction between God's justice and his power. God could have used his power alone in redeeming man, but he decided to follow the path of justice. The devil was a lover of power, so God wanted to set an example for man by using justice instead.<sup>1</sup> This justice consists in the fact that the devil, finding nothing worthy of death in Christ, still killed him. And so it was just that those whom the devil was holding as debtors be freed, for they believed in the guiltless one whom he had killed.<sup>2</sup> Because of this act, then, we are justified in Christ.<sup>3</sup> Augustine establishes the justice in the Redemption on Christ's defeat of the devil through the devil's abuse of power.

But Augustine adds a second theme, that of the remission of sins: 'Sic quippe in remissionem peccatorum nostrorum innocens sanguis ille effusus est.'<sup>4</sup> It is not clear in Augustine whether this forgiveness of sins is gained solely through man's release from the devil's power or if forgiveness is acquired because of the worth of Christ's offering to the Father. Augustine says that Christ paid what he did not owe and so paid our debt, but he never says to whom Christ paid and for what the debt was owed. The problem is to determine which comes first: the devil's loss of power or forgiveness of sins. Augustine can be interpreted as saying that because the devil lost his hold over man, man's sins were automatically forgiven. The Redemption would then consist only in man's defeat of the devil through the God-man. In such a way Christ as man's offering to the Father becomes secondary and insignificant. The action centres on what happens between Christ and the devil and ignores the interaction between Christ and God the Father.

Augustine asks if Christ with equal right could have conquered the devil

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1. 13 De Trin., 13, 17; PL 42, 1026.

2. Ibid., 14, 18; PL 42, 1028.

3. Rom. v, 9: 'Hoc est quod justificari dicimur in Christi sanguine.'

4. 13 De Trin., 14, 18; PL 42, 1028.



if he had acted out of power instead of justice. He never actually answers this question, for he says that Christ 'delayed what he could, so that he could first do what was necessary': 'Sed postposuit quod potuit, ut prius ageret quod oportuit'.<sup>1</sup> The first half of the answer indicates that Christ could have acted out of power with equal right (aequissimo iure), but the second half could be interpreted as meaning that Christ had to act out of justice. The school of Laon would favour the second understanding. This group, as we shall see, used Augustine as their source for the claim that if Christ had conquered the devil by power alone, he could have complained that he had been unjustly treated.

This reasoning leads Augustine to assert that a God-man is justice's response to man's situation. Unless he were man (nisi homo), he could not be killed; unless he were God (nisi deus), men would not believe that the Saviour did not desire to do what he was able to do. Instead men would think that he could not do what he wished to do.<sup>2</sup> By these awkward statements, Augustine means that only a man would offer a proper target for the devil's abuse of power. But this man would also have to be God because as God he could choose justice over power in conquering the devil. If he were only a man, he would lack power and so would have to go the way of justice. Anselm later presented the nisi Deus ... nisi homo formulation, but his reasons why the Redeemer must be God and man were radically different from those of Augustine. For the latter, everything hinges on setting up the correct conditions for the devil's abuse of power, while for Anselm, the necessity of a God-man was derived from such a creature's ability to make satisfaction for sin to God. In Anselm Christ's justice is derived from his offering of himself to the Father; in Augustine this justice arises from his conquest of the devil.

This theology of the Redemption was doubtlessly balanced in other

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1. 13 De Trin., 14, 18; PL 42, 1026.

2. Ibid., 14, 18; PL 42, 1026.



Augustinian writings by discussions of Christ as the sacrificial victim offered to the Father. Nevertheless, we are not interested in Augustine's theology of the Redemption except insofar as the medieval theologians understood it. Our description of the Laon writers' theology will show how faithful they were to the teaching of De Trinitate that emphasized the devil's role.

This emphasis on the devil Anselm set out to destroy in Cur Deus Homo, not only in the famous chapter I, 7, in which he rejects the devil's abuse of power, but also in the book as a whole. Anselm's purpose in Cur Deus Homo was to direct the teaching of the Redemption towards what God receives from man through Christ. Anselm did not eliminate the devil, but he gave him a much more subordinate role than he held in Augustine's theology.

Anselm replaced the Augustinian defeat of the devil with his doctrine of satisfaction. He included in Cur Deus Homo an explanation of sin that showed that man cannot compensate for what is an infinite offence against God.<sup>1</sup> Anselm reoriented Augustine's concern with divine justice by saying that God, because of justice, does not give man free forgiveness for sin but demands something in payment for sin that is greater than all creation.

Like Augustine, Anselm set out to oppose objections to the actual mode of the Redemption. Like Augustine, he was sure that he could establish that no other means could have been more fitting or suitable for mankind. But Anselm went further. Because of his principle that anything that is fitting in God, if not opposed by a more important reason, becomes necessary,<sup>2</sup> Anselm could build a theology of the Redemption which concluded in the necessity of the actual mode and the impossibility of any other mode. In his proof Anselm used 'necessary reasons'. He tried to prove rationally what was accepted by faith.

Augustine had been much less ambitious. His exposition of the Redemption was meant only as an exegesis of the important Biblical texts concerned with

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1. CDH I, 11-15; I, 19-25.

2. CDH I, 10.

the Redeemer. Augustine still had room for speculation, but his method did not allow any rational assertion of the necessity of the Redemption through a God-man.

Already in the Preface of Cur Deus Homo Anselm set forth what he wished to prove. In the first book, with Christ removed (Christo remoto), he intended to show that no one could be saved without Christ. In the second book, he would establish that man at some time will attain immortality and that this immortality is a necessary accomplishment for man but could only come through a God-man.

The theme of man's immortality through Christ the Redeemer controls both Augustine's and Anselm's teaching on the Redemption, but their developments could hardly be more different. Anselm's God-man is reached not through an understanding of Scriptural passages but by means of a rational investigation into the organization of creation. Anselm's premises for this search are statements that would today be included only within divine revelation, but the archbishop of Canterbury was confident that reason alone could accept these ideas: man was made for beatitude; he cannot have it in this life, nor can he attain it unless his sins are remitted.<sup>1</sup> Anselm moves from here with the help of a philosophical principle that God always carries out his propositum. Otherwise he would do things in vain, but God is always purposeful. This idea is based on Anselm's certitude that a perfect order exists in God's creation and that God's actions are always reasonable. The Creator does all things according to the beauty and good of the whole; nothing can disturb that order.

Man's original sin, a potential flaw in creation's perfection, must be remedied. Otherwise God's plan for man's beatitude would not be realized, and all creation would be left devoid of its purpose.<sup>2</sup> This threat of some-

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1. GDH I, 10.

2. GDH I, 11-15.



inordinatum thing/ provides one of the fundamental precepts by which Anselm is able to proceed calmly and magisterially to the necessity of the God-man.

Another such primal concept is that of God's honour and the debt man owes to that honour. Everything man does must be directed towards preserving God's honour, for God has given man everything he has and is. When man sins, he has nothing to give God, for everything was previously owed to him. Because he sins, man becomes indebted to God in two further ways. First, he has to compensate for the injury he has done to God; second he must restore his own obedience to God. Man is able to fulfil neither of these debts, and so he is left a helpless victim of his own wrongdoing.

The principles of the honour man owes God and the inordinatum are only two examples of the borderline philosophical-theological concepts underpinning Cur Deus Homo. These ideas were never found in Augustine, at least in such advanced form, and their appearance here indicates the vitality and creativity of Anselm's mind. The Cur Deus Homo is one magnificent rational construct which sets forth man's own impotence in the face of his obligations to God and then rescues man with the necessity that a God-man come to restore him to his rightful position in the universe. Anselm's achievement is formidable because of the tightness and the strength of his conceptual framework. Its logic has been criticized and found wanting, but the work still stands as Anselm's most successful attempt to reason out a doctrine given by revelation.

In the Cur Deus Homo Anselm covered territory that Augustine had never approached. Anselm subordinated the devil to Christ in a much more decisive way than Augustine had done and made man's payment of satisfaction to God the essential act in redemption. Anselm tried to show that this happens necessarily without threatening God's own freedom in any way. Some ideas he took from Augustine, such as the explanation that it was right for the Saviour to come from the race of man so that man, who fell through one of his own race, would also rise through a man. But Augustine had said that it was only fitting for the Redemption to take place in such a way, while Anselm said that this



node was necessary.

Anselm's work was original, and it is this quality that created problems for Cur Deus Homo after Anselm's death. The treatise was either attacked or ignored because theologians felt that it attempted to prove too much and ended up by limiting God. Such men returned to Augustine and reasserted the ideas of 13 De Trinitate. But Anselm's refutation of the devil's position exerted a powerful influence on theologians even in the twelfth century. A few theologians adopted some of his ideas on satisfaction. But not until the thirteenth century did the new scholastic theologians see the full worth of Cur Deus Homo and use it to replace Augustine's De Trinitate as their textbook for the theology of the Redemption.

Chapter I

EARLY TWELFTH CENTURY MONASTIC RECEPTION

1. The Immediate Followers of Anselm

Even before Anselm wrote Cur Deus Homo, his ideas on the Redemption were beginning to have a certain influence. While Anselm, still abbot of Bec, was in England in 1092-3, he probably spent some time with Gilbert Crispin, abbot of Westminster.<sup>1</sup> The two abbots exchanged ideas and strengthened their friendship. Some points of canon law Anselm may have learned from Gilbert. Also Anselm shared his thoughts on the Redemption with Gilbert, and the result appears in several passages in Gilbert's Disputatio Iudaei cum Christiano. This work is largely composed of the Biblical exegesis that was popular at the end of the eleventh century in Christian apologetic literature. The Christian proves to the Jew that Christ is indeed the Messiah and the Son of God by using passages from the Old Testament itself. But in dealing with the Incarnation and the Redemption, Gilbert includes rational proofs that would later appear in Anselm's De Incarnatione Verbi and Cur Deus Homo.

One instance in the Disputatio that presents ideas on the Redemption also found in Cur Deus Homo appears when Gilbert says that if man were redeemed by an angel, he would not be restored to the dignity or position that he formerly occupied.<sup>2</sup> This is probably the only long passage in the Disputatio that could be compared fruitfully to any single passage in Anselm by placing the two excerpts alongside each other.

But there are other passages in the Disputatio that clearly show Anselm's influence, even if their wording is not very close to that of Cur Deus Homo.

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1. R.W. Southern, 'St. Anselm and Gilbert Crispin, abbot of Westminster', *MARS* iii (1954), 79-80.

2. Quoted in Southern, *ibid.*, p. 86. The full text of the Disputatio is in B. Blumenkranz, Gisleberti Crispini Disputatio Iudaei cum Christiano (Utrecht/Antwerp, 1956). The passage on the angel occurs on pp. 49-50.



When the Jew earlier objects that God's immutability is threatened because of Christ's activity and rejects the indignity of death for the Son of God, his complaint is the same as that of the infidel in Cur Deus Homo:

Adhuc, si deus est, quo nichil maius sive sufficientius cogitari potest, qua necessitate coactus humane calamitatis particeps et tantorum factus est, consere et patiens malorum?<sup>1</sup>

The phrase qua necessitate is the same as Anselm uses in the Preface of Cur Deus Homo. We also notice that Gilbert adopts Anselm's Proslogion definition of God as a being greater than which nothing can be conceived. The Christian first answers the Jew's objection through Scripture, but eventually turning to reason, he insists on the necessity of the Incarnation in a way that indicates Anselm's influence:

Ut ergo hec sine preiudicio dicta sint, quia scripturarum testimonia loco suo servamus ponenda, necessitas quoque summa et ratio exposcebat, ut deus homo fieret et per humanitatis sue mysterium ad vitam nos restitueret.<sup>2</sup>

This insistence on a necessity that can be shown through reason indicates that Gilbert was benefiting from Anselm's ideas. We could ascribe his arguments concerning the impossibility of an angel as redeemer to the school of Laon, for this group of theologians also said that man would be wrongly subject to an angel-redeemer.<sup>3</sup> But the Laon writers, even if they accepted the necessity of the Redemption through Christ, never emphasized this idea nearly as much as Anselm. A feeling for controversy and for refutation of the infidel is lacking from the placid surface of their theology. Gilbert's tone of unqualified necessity proven by reason aligns him with Anselm's way of looking at the Redemption.

But, once having insisted on this necessity, Gilbert does not follow the same method of proof as Anselm does. He is more concerned with showing how the Son of God could become man than with describing how the Son placates the

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1. Blumenkranz, p. 43.

2. Blumenkranz, p. 46.

3. PM v, no. 232, p. 234.



Father. And when he does deal with the latter subject, he thinks in traditional terms of the devil's abuse of power in wrongly trying to exercise domination over a man not subject to him.<sup>1</sup> Through Gilbert's Disputatio we can glimpse at the way Anselm himself was probably thinking in the years before he wrote Cur Deus Homo. The Redemption by Christ is necessary, but it is not clear what Christ does besides defeating the devil:

Quia ergo per alium plena hominis restitutio fieri non valebat, necesse erat, ut creator creature subveniret, creaturam creator subiret, ut, per ipsum creatorem homo restitutus, soli creatori ad serviendum obnoxius remaneret, et hostis iure ditionem super genus humanum habitam amitteret.<sup>2</sup>

Gilbert's Disputatio gains something through his use of Anselmian necessity, but Anselm's ideas are more an addition to a fully elaborated body of thought than an essential element. Anselm is present, but his theology of satisfaction is not even implied.

In the next few years between 1094 and 1098 Anselm began his Cur Deus Homo in England and finished it in Italy.<sup>3</sup> He had always been loved and respected for his abilities as a teacher, and so it is not surprising to find a group of men around him who were attracted by his ideas. The most important member of this cluster of men who used Cur Deus Homo is Ralph, a monk of Caen who came to England with Lanfranc and became prior of Rochester. From 1107-24 he was abbot of Battle.<sup>4</sup> The two main manuscripts of his works are Oxford Bodleian MS. Laudian Misc. 363 and British Museum MS. Royal 12 C. 1.<sup>5</sup> Both of these manuscripts are from the twelfth century. The first is an uncorrected text, and so it is very repetitive and stylistically awkward at times. The second contains only a few of Ralph's works.

Ralph's Liber de Peccatore contains a dialogue between a sinner on the

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1. Blumenkranz, p. 50.

2. Blumenkranz, p. 50.

3. GDH, 'Praefatio'.

4. R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm and his Biographer (Cambridge, 1966), 206-9.

5. R.W. Southern, 'St. Anselm and his English Pupils', MARS 1 (1941), 28.

brink of despair and reason, who gives comfort and help.<sup>1</sup> This seems hardly a likely place to look for the influence of Anselm's theology of the Redemption. But in fact, Ralph has borrowed much from Anselm's ideas on sin and satisfaction. Moreover, Ralph develops Anselm's theology in a direction that the archbishop of Canterbury did not himself take. Ralph deals with one of the main weaknesses in the argument of Cur Deus Homo. In making man helpless and unable to give any satisfaction at all for sin, Anselm insisted that Christ does everything for us. The repentance and penance of the individual sinner remain unclear in such a scheme. Ralph tried to compensate for this imbalance by connecting the work of Christ with the intentions and acts of the sinner himself.

The sinner in Ralph's dialogues uses the most pessimistic of Anselm's arguments. If a sinner is unable to make satisfaction for even one sin, how can he compensate if his sins are numberless? Ralph is applying Anselm's principle that even one glance against God's will is a greater evil than all of creation is a good.<sup>2</sup> Reason first replies by saying that God wills all men to be saved and that because he is omnipotent he can see that men are saved.<sup>3</sup> But the sinner objects that God in his justice has to condemn the sinner. Reason answers that through God's help the sinner can make satisfaction.<sup>4</sup> God sends his Son, who gives the necessary satisfaction to the Father. But the sinner himself has to participate in Christ's work by humbling himself and by being truly sorry. Ralph thus looks upon forgiveness for sin as gained not solely through Christ's satisfaction but also through the sinner's satisfaction. This point of view modifies the rigidity of the Anselmian system in which man seems helpless to provide any satisfaction at all:

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1. I have followed the text of Oxford Bodleian Library MS. Laud. misc. 363, ff. 3r-27r.

2. CDH I, 21.

3. MS. Laud. misc. 363, ff. 4v-5v.

4. Ibid., f. 8r.



Cum ergo ita peccator clamat ex omnibus medullis cordis ad deum altissimum qui bene fecit ei, deus peccatori penitentiam suscipit et clamorem eius exaudit.<sup>1</sup>

Ralph adds a point that anticipates an important distinction that Paris theologians of the later twelfth century would make. God could have liberated men in another way, but in order to redeem him, this mode of satisfaction was necessary:

Aliter enim nec debuit nec potuit iuste redimi nisi per incarnationem filii dei. Ideo non aliter quia non alio modo tam utiliter nec cum tanto honore hominem liberaret, licet ei sufficienter suppeteret quod cum alio modo liberare potuisset si vellet, sed tamen ut dixi non cum tanto honore nec tam utiliter....<sup>2</sup>

The presence of this distinction in Ralph shows that even among the earliest followers of Anselm, there were those who could not accept Anselm's absolute necessity of the Redemption through a God-man. Ralph accepts Anselm's influence without feeling obliged to follow him on all points.

Another work of Ralph's, the Meditatio cuiusdam Christiani de fide, is also concerned with the Redemption, but only as one doctrine in the unity of Christian faith.<sup>3</sup> Ralph discusses satisfaction, but his approach is much closer to that of Augustine here. He says that because God is omnipotent, an angel could have redeemed man, even though the actual mode was utilius and honestius.<sup>4</sup> He accepts the abuse of power by the devil, and often he interchanges the term sacrificium with satisfactio. It would be interesting to know whether the Meditatio was written before or after the Liber de Peccatore so that we could determine the way Anselm acted upon Ralph's thought. But if we look at his other theological works, such as the Libellus de nesciente et sciente,<sup>5</sup> we see immediately that Augustine is the central influence on Ralph's thinking. When

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1. MS. Laud. misc. 363, f. 12v.

2. Ibid., f. 13r.

3. Ibid., ff. 33v-42r.

4. Ibid., f. 40r.

5. Ibid., ff. 78r-129v.



he wrote the Liber de Peccatore, he was very close to Cur Deus Homo, but at other times his main source of inspiration is Augustine.

In the monastic world at the beginning of the twelfth century, we might expect a priori to find few members of Anselm's immediate circle who used his thoughts in an original way. Monastic theology suggests copying and rewording, not rethinking and criticism. Fragments of a twelfth century manuscript collected together in British Museum MS. Egerton 3323 contain an abbreviation of Cur Deus Homo that bears out these suspicions.<sup>1</sup> The writer simply takes Anselm's work and summarizes it. At times he copies word for word passages from the work; sometimes he only summarizes and rephrases, perhaps a whole chapter of Cur Deus Homo in one sentence. We do not have the entire manuscript. It breaks off while the author is describing the worth of Christ's offering in a passage he is rewording from Cur Deus Homo II, 11. The writer prefers some sections of Cur Deus Homo over others. He devotes much attention to refuting the rights of the devil, following exactly Anselm's text of I, 7.<sup>2</sup> Also he spends a great deal of space in showing how God's honour is not diminished by sin, for the sinner renders God through suffering what he should have given him through willing obedience.<sup>3</sup> The vexed problem of the angels and man's role in making up for their lost numbers is given detailed attention.

After this point, the abbreviator was either too tired to devote as much space proportionately to the later chapters in Book I and all of Book II of Cur Deus Homo, or else he felt that he had sufficiently treated the most essential point. Whatever his reason, the chapters dealing with the workings of sin and satisfaction receive much less attention than they would in the thirteenth century.

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1. The manuscript is listed in 'Hand List of Additions to the Manuscripts in the British Museum, 1946-50'. The abbreviation is on ff. 28v-30v.

2. London British Museum MS. Egerton 3323, f. 28v.

3. Ibid., f. 29v.

An exhaustive search of libraries, especially in England, would probably reveal more manuscripts similar to Egerton 3323. But Anselm's followers at the beginning of the twelfth century were not all abbreviators of his thought. There were some, like Ralph, who enjoyed thinking independently. We also find a considerable amount of original thought mixed with dependence on Anselm in the anonymous author of the treatise entitled Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem.<sup>1</sup> This work, which is found first in a thirteenth century manuscript,<sup>2</sup> also appears in several fourteenth century manuscripts. But there is no twelfth century manuscript. And yet the work clearly belongs to Anselm's immediate circle and is usually found among works like the De Excellentia Beati Virginis of Eadmer and the sermon for the Assumption, 'Intravit Jesus in Castellum', which are themselves included in twelfth century manuscripts. Whatever the reason for our lack of early manuscripts of the Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem, it comes from Anselm's milieu, and its closeness to his thought explains why even the thirteenth century manuscripts ascribed the work to Anselm himself.

The dialogue starts out with the Gentile's objection to the actual mode of the Redemption because of its indignity.<sup>3</sup> Free forgiveness would have been possible, he insists, for God could have taken men away from the devil's power without doing an injustice to anyone. The Christian replies that if this happened, justice and injustice would be the same before God, for he would be treating the unjust man the same as he would the just man.<sup>4</sup> Man must be raised to the level of the angels. But this can happen only if he maintains justice. Having fallen, he is unable to reach that height. In order to

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1. For a list of the manuscripts, see A. Wilmart, 'Les Homélie attribuées à S. Anselme', *ANDELMA* 11 (1927), 11. We will follow the text in Oxford Bodleian Library MS. Laud. Misc. 264, ff. 122rb-125vb.

2. London British Museum MS. Royal 5 E. XIV, ff. 70-73.

3. Oxford, MS. Laud. misc. 264, f. 122rb.

4. Ibid., f. 122va.



achieve equality with the angels, man must render God digna satisfactio for his sin. Thus far everything is from Anselm, but now the writer shows an ability for innovation and development of Anselm's thought by saying that sin itself threatens God's omnipotence:

Sed qui voluntati dei contradicit, quantum in ipso est, omnipotentiam eius destruxit. Non eius est omnipotens, si non voluit adimplere quoscunque voluerit. Qui vero omnipotens non est, deus esse non potest ... (igitur homo) facit ut deus non sit deus.

Anselm never states anything like this. But in saying that sin, by contravening God's plan, makes God unable to carry out his purposes and deprives him of his power, the author of the Disputatio is drawing on two Anselmian ideas. First sin contradicts the divine will; second it opposes the divine order. The writer has merely taken Anselm one step further.

Returning to the Anselmian structure, the author says that man by sinning took away from God what he owed him. So he must render God sufficient compensation. The Gentile sees that in the present situation, this is impossible for man.<sup>2</sup> But the Christian replies with the central Anselmian principle: God completes what he has begun. The conclusion can only be that man, powerless by himself to obtain satisfaction but still obliged to provide it, will be redeemed through a God-man.<sup>3</sup>

Dealing with the God-man, the Christian says that Christ is the best possible way to restore us to the image of God. He himself said that he was the way, the truth, and the life.<sup>4</sup> This addition to the argument that does not come from Anselm detracts nothing from the Anselmian content once the purely rational necessity of the God-man has been established.

An idea not openly stated in Cur Deus Homo but very much implied is that we will never fully understand truth unless we have faith in order to under-

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1. Oxford MS. Laud. misc. 264, ff. 122ra-122vb.

2. Ibid., f. 123ra.

3. Ibid., f. 123ra.

4. Ibid., f. 123va.

stand it. The writer of the dialogue inserts this point when the Gentile complains that the Christian is forced to acknowledge things that are impossible.<sup>1</sup> This statement introduces a constant problem in Anselmian theology: how much is the author actually claiming to prove by reason and how much does he depend on the givens of faith? Anselm is our best guide. Before he starts out on his proof in Cur Deus Homo, he enumerates certain agreed doctrines that have to be accepted.<sup>2</sup> The author of the dialogue is probably following Anselm's inspiration in pointing out that faith cannot be a produce of pure reason. And so the Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem demands the acceptance of certain givens of faith before the truth of the rational necessity of the Redemption can be seen.

The author continues in a similar vein in the rest of the dialogue by following the order of Anselm's chapters in Cur Deus Homo, borrowing from some, leaving aside others, and adding his own reflections. The dialogue is well expressed and indicates the author's ability to think through Anselm's points.

As a final instance of the use of Cur Deus Homo, we can briefly mention the Bamberg Summa, already described by H. Weisweiler.<sup>3</sup> The manuscript, Bamberg Cod. Patr. 47 (Q VI. 30), contains an adaptation of the Marbach Summa 'Deus summe atque ineffabiliter bonus'<sup>4</sup> and a compendium of Anselm's theology of the nature and activity of God.<sup>5</sup> In the first section the writer draws heavily from Anselm's treatment of man's relationship to the fallen angels in I, 16-18. The second part borrows from many of Anselm's works. In this section the author shows skill in choosing passages for his own purposes. He is not concerned with the main argument of Cur Deus Homo but with the

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1. Oxford MS. Laud. misc. 264, f. 123va.

2. CDH I, 10.

3. H. Weisweiler, 'Das Erste Systematische Kompendium aus den Werken Anselms von Canterbury', *HB L* (1938), 206-21.

4. ff. 10r-29v.

5. ff. 30r-69v.



subsidiary chapters that show how God's free will is not limited by the necessity of the Redemption. The writer draws on some of the most difficult passages in Cur Deus Homo, including those in which Anselm distinguishes between posse and non posse in God.<sup>1</sup> We know nothing about the origin of this work, but its approach to Anselm is typical of early twelfth century monastic theology, which was more interested in presenting Anselm's arguments rather than with criticizing them.

This type of easy acceptance was not universal. Ralph and the author of the Disputatio inter Christianum et Gentilem reveal a questioning spirit among Anselm's immediate followers. These men lacked the brilliance of Anselm himself, but they were able to understand the underlying principles of Cur Deus Homo and to put them to good use. At times Ralph and the Disputatio's author brought out aspects of theology at which Anselm had only hinted. Occasionally they did not agree with Anselm.

Such men show us that Cur Deus Homo had a contemporary audience, as Anselm indicated at the opening of the work. He complained that unfinished versions of the work were already circulating without his permission. The followers of Anselm could not wait to read what he had written. The quality and number of the works on the Redemption that followed the writing of Cur Deus Homo indicate that this audience was not only receptive to his ideas but also wanted to express Anselm's thought in their own ways.

## 2. Honorius Augustodunensis

Honorius Augustodunensis lies both inside and outside the immediate circle of Saint Anselm's followers. He probably was at Canterbury during Anselm's lifetime and there came into contact with his thought and

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1. Uses of Anselm in the second section are: (1) f. 45r - I, 8; (2) ff. 45r-47v - I, 9-10; (3) ff. 47r-49r - II, 18-19; (4) f. 63v - II, 19; (5) f. 64r - II, 10.

writings.<sup>1</sup> But his Elucidarium, with its outline of so much theology and its dependence on so many sources, is much more than a reworking of Cur Deus Homo. The first book recalls the pattern that we find in some of the writings attributed to the school of Laon: God, creation, fall, redemption, sacrament. Both the school of Laon and Honorius write theology from the point of view of God's manifestation of himself in Revelation, while Anselm writes his Cur Deus Homo from the point of view of man's discovery of the logical necessity for this manifestation.<sup>2</sup> Laon and Honorius approach the subject in a way that might be called historical-exegetical, while Anselm is more rational-logical. Honorius always follows a time structure. He starts in God's eternity, enters time with the creation, and follows the course of the world through the fall to the events of Christ's life. Along the way, many theoretical problems are discussed, but Honorius keeps to his chronology and does not separate the problems from the time scale. For Anselm historical events only provide a groundwork for theoretical questions. His purpose is to show that the Redemption by a God-man had to happen, while Honorius only shows that the Redemption

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1. Two recent writers on Honorius, Yves Lefèvre, L'Elucidarium et Les Elucidaires (Bibliothèque des Ecoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, clxxx, Paris, 1954), 222 and Valerie Flint, 'The Life and Works of Honorius Augustodunensis with Special Reference to Chronology and Sources' (Oxford University D. Phil. thesis, 1969), pp. 66-67, would date the Elucidarium before 1100. I find their evidence insufficient, especially because the version of Anselm's sermon on the celestial joys in the Elucidarium is very close to Kadmer's report of the sermon as Anselm delivered it at Cluny in 1100. (Flint, p. 186.) Honorius would have had to depend on an oral version of the sermon if he wrote before 1100, but the text as we have it in the Elucidarium is literally close to the Kadmer version and seems founded on it. Also, if Flint is right that Honorius was at Canterbury in 1097, then he would not have had more than a few months to pursue his studies before Anselm left for exile in October that year. But if Honorius came to Canterbury and wrote the Elucidarium after 1100, he would have had not only Anselm nearby but also the completed text of Cur Deus Homo. As we shall see, literal borrowings from CDH are so many that we can be fairly certain that Honorius had the work at hand when he wrote the Elucidarium. The Elucidarium could have been written immediately before or immediately after 1100, but the second date seems more likely.

2. Valerie Flint has already pointed out Honorius's debt to the Laon writers: 'The Life and Works of Honorius ...', pp. 147-9. She claims that Honorius was at Laon before he came to Canterbury. 'The Elucidarium on these points seems to stand at the junction between the Cur Deus Homo and the Sententiae (divinae paginae), between in fact St. Anselm and the school of Laon, and to lean towards St. Anselm.' (p. 154).



did happen. The best indication of the different way in which the two works are written comes from the fact that so much of the Cur Deus Homo is written in the subjunctive mood, indicating conditionality and possibility, while Honorius usually uses past indicative in the manner of a narration.

In order to gain a general view of the places from which Honorius borrows in Anselm, we can outline the first book in the Elucidarium while concentrating on the sections that owe something to Cur Deus Homo:

A.	God and the Trinity	
B.	Creation	
	32-3	the devil's sin <sup>1</sup>
	34	his lack of foreknowledge
	36-41	the devil
	42-44	angels cannot be redeemed
	45-6	the devil
	47	why no new angels for fallen ones
	48-9	angels
	53	fall of bad angels not cause of confirmation of the good
	54-6	angels
	57-82	creation of man
C.	Fall	
	83-92	the devil in paradise
	94-5	graveness of man's sin
	96-7	obedience to God's will
	98-9	obedience
	100-1	Adam's crimes
	102-3	man guilty despite impotence
	104	man must return God's honour and make satisfaction
	105	what man took away from God
	106	how to return honour
	107-8	satisfaction
	109	why man did not perish
	110-11	even sinful man honours God
	112	impossibility of free forgiveness
	113	the fugitive slave
	114	why man can be saved
	115	why not an angel to save him
	116	why not a new man
	117	why not a patriarch or a prophet
	118	summation
D.	The Incarnation	
	119	why the Son and not the Father
	120	why from a virgin
	121-4	why not at other times

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1. I follow the numbering of Lefèvre, L'Elucidarium, which concentrates on individual questions and so is more precise than the standard divisions in PL 172's edition of the Elucidarium.

125	how from sinful substance	I, 16
126-9	circumstances at birth	
130	infant's knowledge	II, 13
131-40	his abilities; miracles at birth; Magi, Egypt, hidden life; baptism of Christ; appearances	
E. Redemption		
141	whether Christ could die	
142-4	he died because of obedience	I, 9
145	why God allowed it	
146	just as the worst being seduced man, so the best saved his	
147-9	circumstances of his death	II, 14
150-3	worth of his death	II, 19
154-5	his merit applies to us	
156-61	circumstances of death	
162-5	resurrection	
166-71	apparitions	
172-6	ascension	
177-8	descent of Holy Spirit; Christ's joy	
F. The Church and the Eucharist.		

This chart shows how free Honorius is in his use of Cur Deus Homo. He does not follow Anselm's ordering of chapters and takes greater interest in themes such as the magnitude of sin than in problems of necessity. We also see how many questions appear that have nothing to do with Cur Deus Homo and which emphasize the popularizing role of Honorius. He is concerned with the small details of Christ's life that having nothing to do with the great doctrines of the Church.

With this outline of the Elucidarium, we can move on to the vocabulary and ideas which owe something to Anselm. Discussing the devil's sin and the angels' fall, Honorius asks why the fallen angels could not be returned to their primal state and why Christ could not redeem them, as he did men. We underline the words which are the same in both writers:

Honorius: Lefèvre 43; PL 172, 1114D  
 ... sicut nullo instigante ceciderunt, ita nullo adjuvante surgere debuerunt, quod eis erat impossibile. Et aliud eis operat: quia sponte sua malum elegerunt, juste ablata est eis voluntas totius boni. Et ideo non volunt et, quia nolunt, numquam redire poterunt.

CDH II, 21

... sicut ceciderunt nullo alio nocente, ut caderent, ita nullo alio adjuvante surgere debent. Quod est illis impossibile.

The first reason that Honorius gives follows Anselm's idea exactly: the angels



fell with no one to plot their destruction except themselves, so they must rise alone. The language of Honorius is very close to that of Anselm. Finally, the development of the thought in the sequence 'sicut ... ita' and the clause 'quod ... impossibile' is identical. But the second reason Honorius provides for the impossibility of the angels' restoration, that the angels' will for good was removed, does not appear anywhere in Anselm. Honorius here and elsewhere collects his ideas from many different sources. He seldom relies exclusively on Anselm.

He moves on to say that Christ could not redeem the angels because, unlike men, they are not all born from one first angel and so the redemption of one angel would not apply to another. His reasoning is very close to that of Anselm, even though he does not specifically say that angels are not all of the same genus, as men are. This term would have clarified what he was trying to express.<sup>1</sup>

There are other instances of borrowings from Anselm's angelology, but they only strengthen our impression that Honorius is very close to Anselm on the subject. Honorius then approaches the fall of man by defining the relationship of rational creatures to the will of God: 'Nihil justius, quam ut omnis creatura rationalis nihil omnino praeponat voluntati creatoris.'<sup>2</sup> Anselm's statement is clearer and more direct but amounts to the same thing: 'Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturae subiecta debet esse voluntati dei.'<sup>3</sup> At this point Honorius takes up one of Saint Anselm's most striking images in order to emphasize the importance of following God's will. We can see how he condenses and summarizes Anselm's teaching:

Honorius: Lefèvre 97-99; PL 172, 1120B

N: Ergo voluntas Dei major est quam totus mundus.

GDH I, 21

Si videres te in conspectu Dei et aliquis tibi diceret: aspice

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1. Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 44; PL 172, 1114D.

2. Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 97; PL 172, 1120B.

3. GDH I, 11.



D: Utique.

M: Si igitur tu stares coram Deo et aliquis diceret: "Respice retro aut totus mundus interibit", Deus autem diceret: "Nolo ut respicias, sed me inspicias", deberes tu Deum contemnere, qui est creator omnium rerum et gaudium angelorum, ut liberares transitorium mundum?

D: Minime

M: Hoc Adam fecit. Coram Deo stetit et, diabolo inclamante, retro respexit et majus peccatum quam mundus esset commisit.

illuc; et deus e contra: nullatenus volo, ut aspicias; quaere tu ipse in corde tuo, quid sit in omnibus, quae sunt, pro quo contra voluntatem dei deberes illum aspectum facere....  
Boso: Fateri me necesse est, quia pro conservanda tota creatura nihil deberem facere contra voluntatem dei.

There is no reproduction of Anselm's vocabulary here, and yet Anselm's ideas are being neatly and faithfully presented. Such passages as this one indicate that at times Honorius may have depended on Anselm's oral teaching for his arguments, but the appearance of other passages which so clearly follow the text of Cur Deus Homo prevent us from concluding that Honorius is providing only a version of Anselm's oral teaching on the Redemption.<sup>1</sup>

Other possible explanations for Honorius's failure to render Anselm in literal reproduction can be found in his brevity and his preference for easy explanations instead of more complicated ones. In his discussion of the honour of God, he uses a number of Anselmian terms, but he summarizes much and neglects a good deal of Anselm's thought on the subject. Honorius is in too much of a hurry to linger over exact points. But the language still betrays his debt to the Cur Deus Homo itself. I underline the words that come from I, 11:

D: Quali modo eum oportuit reverti?

M: Honorem quem Deo abstulit reddere debuit, et pro peccato satisfacere quod fecit. Valde enim justum est ut qui alii sua abstulerit et ablata restituat et pro injuria illata satisfaciat.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Lefèvre concluded that the borrowings of Honorius from Anselm were so partial that the former could not have used Cur Deus Homo. So he claimed that the Elucidarium represents an outline of Anselm's oral teaching at Canterbury (p. 225). A host of objections can be raised to this hypothesis, especially because we do not know in what the oral teaching of Anselm consisted. The content of the Elucidarium clearly follows a method far different from that of Anselm as we know it from his written works. As Valerie Flint has shown, the Elucidarium owes much more to the teaching methods of Laon than to those of Anselm. Most importantly, there are too many literal borrowings from Cur Deus Homo to allow the Elucidarium to be a kind of reportatio.

2. Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 104; PL 172, 1121A.



Honorius says that man must first return the honour of God that he has taken away and then make satisfaction for his sin. He has split up a concept that is unitary in Anselm. The latter looks at satisfaction as part of the return of honour, while Honorius considers satisfaction to be a supplementary act provided after the initial honour has been restored. Anselm says that honour cannot be returned by a simple restoration of obedience. There must be the giving of something extra. Both elements together make up satisfaction: '... debet omnis, qui peccat, honorem deo, quem rapuit, solvere; et haec est satisfactio....'<sup>1</sup>

Even if Honorius's concept of satisfaction is not so inclusive as that of Anselm, he is still close to Anselm on the subject. Man must pay God something greater than the world.<sup>2</sup> But man is unable to do such a thing, as so we reach the same dilemma that Anselm encounters by the end of the first book in Our Deus Homo. Man must pay but he cannot. He does not perish, however, for God's decree cannot be changed,<sup>3</sup> and God had decided to complete the number of the elect from Adam's race. This fact Honorius presents as a given needing no proof, while Anselm leads up to the same statement through a process of reasoning which eventually leads to two alternatives.<sup>4</sup> Either the number of fallen angels has to be completed, or else rational nature will remain incomplete. Anselm eliminates the second possibility, and so only the first remains. He has used his rationes necessariae, while Honorius has made dogmatic statements lacking Anselm's underlying explanations.

But how will fallen man complete the heavenly city? An obvious way seems to be free forgiveness on God's part. To oppose this, Honorius makes a mosaic of several passages from different chapters in Anselm. First he argues

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1. CDH I, 11.

2. Elucidarium 107; PL 172, 1121C - CDH I, 21.

3. Elucidarium 108.

4. CDH I, 16.

that if God did not demand from man what he owed Him, God would be showing a lack of power:

Honorius: Lefèvre 112; PL 172: 1121D

GDH I, 24

D: Cum solvere vellet et non posset, cur Deus, cum misericors sit, non ei dimisit aut talem in gloria sumpsit.  
M: Si Deus ei ideo dimitteret suum honorem, quia habere non posset, impotens esset.

Sed si dimittit, quod sponte reddere debet homo, ideo quia reddere non potest, quid est aliud quam: dimittit deus, quod habere non potest.

The key phrase, leading to the possibility of God's lack of power, is almost the same in both writers: 'habere non potest' and 'habere non posset'.

In the next part of his response, Honorius says that God could not take a sinful man into glory with the angels when for a single thought he had ejected the bad angels. Anselm had argued similarly that man, if sinful, cannot be equal to the angels who never sinned:

Honorius: Lefèvre 112; PL 172: 1121D

GDH I, 19

... si autem hominem peccatorem impunitum in gloriam assumeret, unde angelum pro una cogitatione extrusisset, injustus esset.

Potesne cogitare, quod homo, qui aliquando peccavit nec unquam deo pro peccato satisfecit, sed tantum impunitus dimittitur, aequalis sit angelo, qui nunquam peccavit?

There is a final reason Honorius provides for his opposition to free forgiveness. If God let man remain unpunished, then there would be something inordinatum in creation. But in the kingdom of God there is nothing inordinatum, and so man must be punished. This concept provides one of the foundations for Anselm's thinking in Cur Deus Homo. Anselm frequently makes use of the term inordinatum when he wants to evoke the spectre of creation out of control as opposed to the perfect patterns he sees in God's work:

Honorius: Lefèvre 112; 1121D

GDH I, 12

Porro si peccatum impunitum remaneret, aliquid in regno Dei inordinatum esset; sed in regno ejus nihil relinquitur inordinatum; peccator ergo puniri debuit.

Sic dimittere peccatum non est aliud quam non punire. Et quoniam recte ordinare peccatum sine satisfactione non est nisi punire; si non punitur, inordinatum dimittitur.... Deum vero non decet aliquid inordinatum in suo regno dimittere.... Non ergo decet deum peccatum sic impunitum dimittere.

An unpunished sin would leave something unordered in God's kingdom, but



nothing is left unordered there. So the sin has to be punished. The logic is simple and straightforward, and so Honorius jumps for it.

Granted that free forgiveness is impossible, how can man be saved? Honorius first shows that it would be possible for man to be saved by a being who is not a man.<sup>1</sup> He then excludes either an angel or a new man from this role. We can see the order of his mind unfolding. Salvation by another being for man is possible; certain beings are eliminated. Anselm never proceeded in such a way. He eliminated the angels very early in the first book and only talked about a new man after he had asserted the necessity of a God-man. Honorius has rearranged Anselm's thought on the Redemption by using the outline of the Laon writers on the subject. Before finally positing the God-man, these theologians showed that neither an angel or a new man could carry out man's salvation.<sup>2</sup>

An angel cannot redeem man because he would become its servant and would not be restored to his position of equality with the angels.<sup>3</sup> Honorius adds another reason which recalls the school of Laon. An angel by itself would be incapable of redeeming man; if it became man, it would be even less able. Honorius seems to be saying that an angel united to a weaker nature would sin.<sup>3</sup>

A new man is impossible, for in such a case the Redemption would not pertain to the race of Adam, since the redeemer would be of a different race. In this passage Honorius holds close both to the development of Anselm's thought and to his vocabulary:

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1. Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 114; FL 172: 1122A - CDH II, 21.

2. See, for example, the passages on the Redemption attributed to Anselm and Raoul of Laon in O. Lottin, *PM* v, nos. 47 (p. 44), 54 (p. 51), 234 (p. 188).

3. Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 115; FL 172, 1122A - CDH I, 5.

4. *PM* v, no. 47 (p. 44) and especially no. 54 (p. 51) for the school of Laon: 'Sed nec angelus in homine hoc poterat, quia si in sua simplici et forti natura infirmus inventus est, multo magis infirme huic humane nature scilicet admixtus debilis inveniretur.'

Honorius: Lefèvre, 116; PL 172: 1122B

CDH II, 8

Si novum hominem Deus creasset et misisset, tunc ad genus Adae redemption non pertinere: de suo enim genere debuit esse, qui pro homine satisfaceret.

Sed si novum hominem facit non ex Adae genere, non pertinere ad genus humanum, quod natum est de Adam. Quare non debuit satisfacere pro eo, quia non erit de illo.

Honorius is now prepared to bring forth the God-man. As we might expect, he states the necessity of such a creature in a way that does not parallel that of Anselm. He sees the necessity of the God-man as revealed only in the historical fact that Christ did come and not as the result of any natural necessity to which man might reason:

D: Evolve caetera.

M: Quia igitur angelus redimere non debuit et homo satisfacere non potuit, Dei Filius, per quem omnia ut et redemptio fieret per eum, assumpsit plenum hominem et in duabus naturis factus est una persona. Et in illa natura qua Deus erat vicit diabolus, ut et ipse vicit hominem, et omnibus praedestinatis caelum aperuit et angelis consequavit, quod solus Deus facere potuit. In ea autem natura qua homo fuit pro injuria majus mundo solvit, cum mortem indebitam subit, quod solus homo facere debuit.<sup>1</sup>

This summation clearly does not seek the speculative heights of Anselm.

Honorius's explanation lacks the preciseness and compactness of Anselm's formulation in II, 6. The words of the Elucidarium recall very strongly some of the anonymous Laon writings in their attempt to compromise between Anselm of Laon and Anselm of Canterbury.<sup>2</sup> The theologian accepts the necessity of Christ but sets forth that necessity through the evidence of divine revelation.

When Anselm does come down from his brilliant assertion of the necessity of a God-man and deals with the more obvious question of why the Son should be incarnate rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit, Honorius has no difficulty in following him again.<sup>3</sup> But even here Honorius contents himself with Anselm's conclusions without their rational basis. He says that if the Father or the Holy Spirit became man, there would be two sons in the Trinity, one the son of

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1. Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 116; PL 172, 1122C - CDH I, 6.

2. The best example is in PM v, no. 343 (p. 264).

3. Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 119; PL 172, 1122C-D - CDH II, 9.



the Virgin, the other the son of God. But he does not follow up Anselm and say that such a condition would result in inequality of birth among the different persons, an intolerable situation for the equality of the various persons of the Trinity.

There are many other passages in the Elucidarium that owe much to Cur Deus Homo, but they only reinforce the pattern of use we have already detected. Honorius borrows ideas from Cur Deus Homo but looks elsewhere for his method and approach. The school of Laon provides him with his inspiration by encouraging him to encounter the whole of theology in one work and by giving him an outline of the subjects. Honorius takes Anselm as a convenient source for rational defence of many ideas. The result is not a summary of Anselm's thought but a popularization and simplification of some of Cur Deus Homo's leading ideas. Honorius's approach is individual insofar as his reshaping of Anselm's ideas is his own.

At one and the same time Honorius has done a service and a disservice to Cur Deus Homo. In a sense he has betrayed the spirit of Anselmian theology by reducing sophisticated arguments to unsupported assertions. But in another sense he has put Anselm's ideas on the Redemption into a form that would make them approachable for twelfth century monks. Ultimately Honorius belongs to the monastic tradition of Cur Deus Homo, because as a monk he made Anselm available to other monks. His travels brought him into contact with secular theologians, but his writings like the Elucidarium were meant for monastic circles.<sup>1</sup> The wide manuscript dispersion of the Elucidarium and its early attribution to Anselm are well-known. Such a spread of the Elucidarium made Anselmian arguments and teaching accessible to monks who either lacked copies of Cur Deus Homo or who, even if they had had the work, would never have read it. Honorius brought Anselm to the monasteries of Europe and so contributed to Anselm's influence in the twelfth century.

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1. As Honorius himself indicates in the Preface to the Elucidarium, Lefèvre, 359; PL 172, 1109-10.

### 3. Odo of Cambrai and Herman of Tournai

From Anselm's immediate followers and Honorius to Odo of Cambrai and Herman of Tournai, there is not much distance. Odo's Disputatio contra Iudaeum Leonem Nomine de Adventu Christi Filii Dei lies very much within the monastic tradition of Cur Deus Homo's use.<sup>1</sup> Odo was abbot of the revived monastery of St. Martin at Tournai from 1092 until 1105. Elected bishop of Cambrai in 1105, he had troubles with his deposed predecessor and with the emperor Henry V.<sup>2</sup> He died in 1113 at the abbey of Anchin, near Arras. And so he spent most of his productive life in the area of Northern France and Flanders in which we will find so many evidences of monastic interest in Cur Deus Homo.

In the Prologue of the Disputatio Contra Iudaeum, he tells us about the origin of the work.<sup>3</sup> He had given a conference on the Incarnation to the chapter of the monastery at Femy during Advent in 1105.<sup>4</sup> One of the monks, Acard, asked him to write down what he had said. But before he had a chance to write up his sermon, Odo was called to a council at Poitiers. On his way, at Senlis, he came across a Jew named Leo with whom he discussed the question of the Redemption. When he wrote his account of the sermon for Acard, he decided to put it in the form of a dialogue with the Jew. The dialogue thus follows very closely Anselm's method of question and answer in order to provide a rational defence of the doctrine of the Redemption against the attacks of a non-believer.

Odo's theology is directed by two central ideas. The remission of sin is not tantamount to satisfaction; the heavenly city must be completed. He initially distinguishes between the remission of sin and the gaining of glory.<sup>5</sup>

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1. PL 160: 1103-1112.

2. DKO 11: 932.

3. PL 160: 1105AB.

4. D.E. DeClerck, 'Questions de Sotériologie Médiévale', RTAM, xiii (1946), 160.

5. PL 160: 1104A.



The second only comes after full satisfaction is given, and the Old Law never provides such satisfaction. When the Jew protests the value of good works, Odo brings forward the Anselmian idea that all the good that man renders God he already owes Him.<sup>1</sup> Odo emphasizes the gravity of sin in a way that recalls the archbishop of Canterbury.<sup>2</sup> Anselm had said that one glance contrary to God's will is worse than the destruction of the world.<sup>3</sup> Odo adjusts Anselm slightly by saying that a single thought contrary to God's will is worse than the world's perdition. In any case, the result is the same, and the Jew is forced to admit that one sin has more negative value than the positive value of all creation. 'Non ergo sufficit omnis creatura ad recompensationem minimi peccati.'<sup>4</sup>

In the course of the dialogue, a few arguments appear that are not from Anselm at all and which may have arisen from the context of the actual discussion with the Jew. At one point the Jew suggests that Odo's case for the impossibility of salvation by man's efforts alone does not necessarily lead to the inevitability of Christ. Instead of saving men, God could have placed them in a place of rest and peace for all eternity.<sup>5</sup> The suggestion is foreign to Cur Deus Homo, but Odo's reply comes from Anselm. God's proposal cannot be shaken, so the heavenly city must be completed through the salvation of men.<sup>6</sup> Like Anselm, Odo also asks whether or not more places exist in heaven for men than the number of places vacated by fallen angels:

Odo PL 160, 1107B

Si enim numerus angelorum qui facti sunt sufficeret pro solis his qui

Anselm CDH I, 18

Si quis ergo dixerit quia tantum laetabuntur electi homines de angelorum

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1. PL 160: 1104C - CDH I, 20.

2. PL 160: 1105C.

3. CDH I, 21.

4. PL 160: 1106B.

5. PL 160: 1106C.

6. PL 160: 1107A - CDH II, 6.

cecidissent, homo valeret et de eorum casu gauderet quorum gloriam teneret. Et cum gloriam coelestem nemo nisi justus intret, quomodo justus erit qui de alterius peccato gaudebit?

perditione, quantum gaudebunt de sua assumptione, quoniam absque dubio haec non esset, nisi illa fuisset; quomodo poterunt ab hac perversa gratulatione defendi?

Anselm and Odo approach the problem in the same way: how can one who is just rejoice in the condemnation of another? Both answer by saying that more men will be saved than the number of angels who fell and that man would have been saved even if no angel had fallen.

Because man has to be saved, Odo can conclude, like Anselm, that God could but ought not satisfy, while man ought but could not satisfy, so a God-man was necessary. His conclusion only rephrases Anselm's own summation.<sup>1</sup> He then explains that there must be no confusion of natures in this God-man. Each nature must be whole and perfect. Odo also follows Anselm in dwelling on the worth of Christ's offering. The price which Christ paid was worth more than the sin of the whole world.<sup>2</sup> But Odo does not explain why this offering is so valuable. Anselm had said that Christ's giving of his life was the only thing that the Father did not rightfully demand from him as something owed.<sup>3</sup> Because Christ was sinless, he was the only man who did not owe his life to God. By dying for men, Christ rendered up the very thing not owed and thus was able to provide the essential satisfaction. Odo does not support his statement of the value of Christ's sacrifice by any such considerations.

But in one particularly difficult area, Odo does follow Anselm the full distance. Odo asks why we should be grateful to God for our salvation if Christ is obliged to die for us.<sup>4</sup> The answer is the same as Anselm's: God is obliged to give what it was not necessary for him to promise.<sup>5</sup> God freely

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1. PL 160: 1107C-1108A - GDH II, 6.

2. PL 160: 1108D - GDH I, 14.

3. GDH II, 11.

4. PL 160: 1109C.

5. GDH II, 5.



promised man's salvation, and so he freely accepted the obligation to realize this salvation. The origin of the necessity for our salvation is the unobstructed free will of God.

In general and in most details, Odo faithfully follows the thought and development of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo. There is no area in which Odo conflicts with Anselm. His teaching avoids the most sophisticated aspects of Anselm, such as some problems of necessity and power in God. We can consider the Disputatio as mainly a monastic summary of Cur Deus Homo with a few personal additions from Odo.

Herman of Tournai continued the tradition of monastic acceptance of Cur Deus Homo at St. Martin of Tournai. He entered the abbey in 1095 and was abbot from 1127-37. During that time he wrote his De Incarnatione Christi.<sup>1</sup> In the Preface he claimed to remember Odo's sermons on the Incarnation that he had heard as a young monk. But Herman also ascribed to Anselm most of what he was to say on the subject:

Sciatis tamen me in eo nihil de meo posuisse, sed quod in sanctis doctoribus legeram, et maxime in libro domini Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi, quam de eadem materia compositum, Cur Deus Homo nominavit, velut in uno vasculo congregasse.<sup>2</sup>

Such an introduction would lead us to believe that we are going to find only another summary of Cur Deus Homo, but the work cannot be defined so easily.

Herman begins by considering, as Anselm did, the apparent indignity of a redemption through Christ's death: "... qua ratione vel necessitate carnis nostrae suscepit, passionisque simul opprobria pertulit."<sup>3</sup> He mentions the more specific Anselmian objections that it was unfitting for God to be born of a woman, taste of her milk, and die between robbers. Then Herman takes up the second major objection: God's failure to give a simple command for the redemp-

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1. PL 180: 9-38; LKT 5: 253.

2. PL 180: 11B.

3. PL 180: 11D = CDH I, 1.

tion of man indicates a lack of wisdom on his part.<sup>1</sup>

In the second chapter, Herman introduces the heavenly city and talks of the ejection of the bad angels. He refers his readers to Anselm's book De Casu Diaboli, 'ubi tractat cur Deus ei (diabolo) perseverantiam non dedit'.<sup>2</sup> Treating the completion of the heavenly city by men, Herman does not touch upon the problems Anselm encountered, such as whether men would have been created if angels had not fallen. Herman limits himself to the historical unfolding of events and does not consider hypothetical cases or reasons behind developments. Also he does not think that man's salvation is necessary. Instead of Anselm's necesse fuit, Herman uses placuit. It pleased God to create man to restore the city.<sup>3</sup>

Discussing the devil's position, Herman concedes no rights to him.<sup>4</sup> The devil did not seduce man by violence but by persuasion. And so the devil complains to God: 'Injustum certe erit si eum mihi violenter abstuleris.' Herman concedes that the devil could object in such a way: 'Ista certe posset Deo diabolus objicere.' But man actually owes nothing to the devil: 'Homo enim, si diligenter suspiciatur, nihil debebat diabolo, vel in manu vel in potestate ejus consistebat.' Herman seems to be saying that the devil could have had no grounds for such a complaint.<sup>5</sup> Centering the problem on man's reconciliation with God, Herman says that the devil has no reason to criticize his loss of power once man's sin is forgiven. Like Anselm, Herman only concedes that the devil possesses man.

Nevertheless, by even bringing up the devil's right to lament about a

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1. PL 180: 12B - CDH I, 6.

2. PL 180: 13D.

3. PL 180: 13A.

4. PL 180: 15B-D.

5. DeClerck, in 'Questions de Soteriologie', RTAM 13 (1946), 162, says that Herman either lacks clarity or contradicts himself. I think the passage is difficult but not contradictory.



possible use of force by God, Herman departs from Anselm's procedure. The latter never asked himself what the devil's reaction could be if God snatched men away violenter, for he excluded the possibility by insisting on an initial satisfaction.

Herman now states the necessity of satisfaction for man's reconciliation with God. He shows his understanding of Anselm's all-important idea that satisfaction is more than restitution of what one has taken away. It is a return of something extra to compensate for the injury itself.<sup>1</sup> Herman develops his thinking by a story not found in Anselm. The son of a king who has offended his father first has to give back what he has taken away. Then he has to satisfy for his contumacy and pride. If the king does not insist on this payment, he lets himself be dishonoured.<sup>2</sup> Anselm used the example of the soiled pearl which cannot rightly be replaced in its case until it is cleaned. But in presenting the possibility that the king would not demand the reconciliation because of his lack of power, Herman argues in a way similar to that of Anselm.<sup>3</sup> If God gives up what man ought freely to render, he abandons what he is unable to obtain.

In the fourth chapter of the De Incarnatione, Herman provides the Anselmian arguments for the inability of anyone except God to carry out the work of the Redemption. A sinner cannot justify another sinner.<sup>4</sup> If God made a new man without sin, he would only be able to redeem one other man. This is not from Cur Deus Homo, but the next reason is. Even if this new man could redeem all men, human nature would not be returned to its former dignity.<sup>5</sup>

Herman concludes: only a God-man could and ought to satisfy for the sins

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1. PL 180: 16A - CDH I, 11.

2. PL 180: 16B - CDH I, 19.

3. CDH II, 24.

4. PL 180: 17B-C - CDH I, 23.

5. PL 180: 18A - CDH I, 5.

of the world.<sup>1</sup> Herman partly follows Anselm in asking which member of the Trinity should be incarnate.<sup>2</sup> The latter had said that if the Father or the Holy Spirit became man, there would be two sons in the Trinity. Herman agrees, but he says the result of such a situation would be confusion among the persons, while Anselm had said such a state would lead to an inequality among the persons in the dignity of their births.

Like Odo, Herman does not point out that Christ in his offering of himself gave God the only thing not already owed him. Herman also leaves out the idea that God does nothing in vain. Another difference is that Herman supplements his reasoning with supporting quotations from Scripture. Just after he had concluded that only a God-man is qualified for our Redemption, he quotes Hebrews II, 10. Herman has no desire to follow Anselm rigidly by considering the problem without the help of Scripture. He incorporates elements of Anselmian reasoning, but never the whole framework.

In De Incarnatione V and VI, he explains more fully his interpretation of the Redemption. He divides Christ's work into two portions. First Christ pays back that which man took away from God, the value of all the men who were destined to be united to God. Secondly he satisfies for man's contempt of God. For Herman satisfaction only applies to the second part of the redemptive act. The first is merely repayment. As he says at the opening of the sixth chapter:

Postquam ergo per ipsum Dei et hominum mediatorem Christum Jesus, humana natura reddidit Deo pretium, quod multo plus valebat, quam omnes homines quos ei abstulerat, videamus etiam nunc quomodo de contumacia et contemptu, quo ejus praeceptum transgressurus est, satisfaciat.<sup>3</sup>

Herman tries to show how Christ compensates not only for man's original offence but also for his insult to God. Christ removes the first because as mediator between God and man, his blood pays a price worth more than all men. But the

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1. PL 180: 18D - CDH II, 6.

2. PL 180: 19A-B - CDH II, 9.

3. PL 180: 20C.



satisfaction for man's pride comes through the humility of the Son of God in taking on a human form and dying on the cross.

Herman has thus divided up the redemptive act into 'redemptio humanae naturae' and 'satisfactio pro contumacia hominis'. Christ's death provides both, but the two are looked at separately. Christ's satisfaction only covers the extra debt man owes God because of the insult and not the whole debt of man to God as a result of disobedience. For Anselm, on the other hand, satisfaction means the giving back to God of all that man owes him for his sin. Anselm defines satisfaction as the voluntary payment of the debt due for the sins of the world.<sup>1</sup> Anselm's concept of redemption is unitary: man gives God something that man does not owe to God. Herman's concept is dual. Man offers to God the worth of Christ's blood; Christ gives God his humility.

In the remainder of the De Incarnatione Herman leaves the logic of the Cur Deus Homo and deals with Old Testament prophecies of the Incarnation and with the Virgin Mary. More than half the treatise, then, has nothing to do with Anselm's exposition of the Redemption. But Herman makes an easy transition to the meditative side of Anselm's writings. He speaks of all Mary has done for us and follows one of Anselm's prayers to Mary.<sup>2</sup> When Herman speaks of the way Mary revived the nature that God had created, he rephrases a section of this prayer to Mary. He even tells of an apparition by Mary to a sick man and her mercy on him, a story which he attributes to 'a certain prayer' of Anselm. But I have not found this story in any of the prayers Schmitt ascribes to Anselm.

Through these last passages we can see the tendency of monastic theology to use Anselm's teaching on the Redemption not only for rational enlightenment but also for spiritual uplift. Herman is ultimately much more faithful to the religious emotion of Anselm than to the dialectic of Cur Deus Homo.

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1. CDH I, 19.

2. Schmitt, S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, iii: Oratio 7: 'Oratio ad Sanctum Mariam pro impetrando eius et Christi amore' - esp. p. 22, ll. 97-102. Compare with PL 180: 36D.

He knows the work well, but he is eager to turn aside from the arguments to a more personal consideration of the benefits of the Redemption. He does not grasp the hard simplicity of Anselm's satisfaction theory because he is not interested in a literal reproduction of Anselm's logic. For Odo the idea of disputing with a Jew on purely reational grounds could encourage him to follow Cur Deus Homo faithfully, but Herman works from a closed, secure world in which Anselm is respected mainly for the intensity of his religious emotion.

4. 'Flores Libri Anselmi' (Libellus Cur Deus Homo)

Our best witness to the presence of Anselm's thought in the monastic theology of Northern France and Flanders in the first quarter of the twelfth century appears in Ghent University Library MS. 92 (16), the Liber Floridus.<sup>1</sup> This amazing manuscript, full of lore from almost every discipline known to the West at the time, contains a section entitled 'Flores libri Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi Cur Deus Homo' (ff. 144v-152v). The work that follows is about a third the length of the Cur Deus Homo and summarizes all of Anselm's theology of the Redemption, with passages from Cur Deus Homo, other Anselmian works, and outside sources. The treatise is an abbreviation of Cur Deus Homo only in a highly sophisticated manner, for the man who put the work together only occasionally lifted verbatim passages from Anselm. Usually he digested and rearranged Anselm's thought in a way that made it much less taxing for minds lacking Anselm's intelligence. Almost all the ideas in the 'Flores' can be traced to Anselm's writings, but the abbreviator skilfully brings together disparate passages from Anselm and presents the problems with his own logical structure.

In 1933 when E. Druwé published the abbreviation, he called it the

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1. Initially described in L. Delisle, 'Notice sur les Manuscrits du Liber Floridus, composé en 1120 par Lambert, chanoine de Saint Omer', Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale xxxviii (Paris, 1903), 577-791. A reproduction of the Liber Floridus has been published by A. Derolez, Lamberti Liber Floridus (Ghent, 1968).



Libellus Cur Deus Homo and claimed that it originated from one of Anselm's own early recensions of Cur Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup> This thesis was subsequently attacked and refuted.<sup>2</sup> Druwé rejected the possibility that Lambert, canon of St. Omer, compiler of the Liber Floridus, composed the 'Flores'<sup>3</sup> because of his own idea about Anselm's authorship and because of his understanding of Lambert's Prologue. Also he discovered a few twelfth and thirteenth century manuscripts of the 'Flores' in which the work appeared separately from the other parts of the Liber Floridus. Even when Schmitt rejected Anselm as the anterior source for the 'Flores', he did not deny that the Liber Floridus abbreviation of Cur Deus Homo might have descended from some other anterior source.

I would like to venture the tentative suggestion that there is no need to look for any anterior source, for Lambert of St. Omer himself may well be the author of the 'Flores'. Everything depends on the way we read his Prologue. He says there that his purpose in compiling the Liber Floridus is to present the great works of God and Christ so that the faithful, by dwelling on them, can burn with love for God. The Fathers wrote in many books of the magnificence of God's works, but in Lambert's own time, he felt sacred studies had dried up. Since men were too tired and occupied with other things to read what they should, Lambert had judged it best to excerpt certain things from many works:

Cum igitur diversis temporibus diversis in libris sanctorum patrum  
curiose manus operum eius magnificentiam stilo fideli exaraverit suisque  
posteris ad edificationem anime legenda reliquerit, nos videlicet,

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1. E. Druwé, Libri Sancti Anselmi 'Cur Deus Homo' (Analecta Gregoriana iii, Rome, 1933).

2. J. Rivière, 'Un premier Jet du Cur Deus Homo', Revue Sciences Religieuses xiv (1934), 329-69 and 'La Question du Cur Deus Homo', xvi (1936), 1-32. Druwé's defence appeared as 'La première Rédaction du Cur Deus Homo de Saint Anselme', Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique xxxi (1935), 501-40. Also F.S. Schmitt's authoritative 'Zur Entstehungsgeschichte von Anselms Cur Deus Homo', Theologisches Revue xxxiv (1935), 217-24.

3. Druwé derived his title Libellus Cur Deus Homo from Brussels Bibl. Royale MS. 1384, from St. Mary of Cambron, a Cistercian monastery in Hainaut, a thirteenth century manuscript. No matter who the author is, this late title hardly seems appropriate for the work, and so I have reverted to the title found in the Liber Floridus itself, 'Flores Libri Anselmi'.

quorum temporibus mundus olim sacris florens studiis penitus exaruit, quoniam illa omnia velut tediosi et inertes relegere non possumus, saltem quedam de multis excipere optimum iudicamus, ut de magni regis mensa rara nobis proposita fercula avidius ore cordis sumamus....

The important phrase is the underlined one. Lambert is not saying that he has decided to take out certain books. If so, he would have said quosdam. Instead he indicates he is taking out certain things (quedam) from books, in order to incite the faithful to the love of God. The words would thus allow him to be more than a compiler of pre-written sources and leave room for him to put together the 'Flores' of Anselm himself.

The next passage, however, is more likely to support the traditional interpretation of Lambert as only a compiler. Lambert says that it often happens at a banquet that there are so many different kinds of food that the guests, not knowing which to select, cannot enjoy anything. So it is with the large number of good books that should be read. In order to avoid this situation, Lambert has made his little book from the floribus of various authors:

Cuius rei incommoditatem devitans ego Lambertus filius Onulfi, canonicus Sancti Audomari, libellum istum de diversorum auctorum floribus Deo sanctoque Audomaro pio patrono nostro contexui, ut tanquam de celesti prato flore diverso coadunato fideles apicula ad hunc confluerent saporis que celestis inde dulcedinem haurirent.<sup>2</sup>

When Lambert says 'I have woven together this book from the flowers of different authors', does he mean that these flores were already prepared by previous editors and that he has merely collected these previously-made flores and inserted them in his manuscript? Or does he mean that he is the one who has taken flores himself from the original authors and has acted as the editor, selecting the passages he wants and using the parts which he thinks the faithful will be able to consume without trouble? I think that the second interpretation is the correct one, but I realize that the passage could also be read in the first way.

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1. Liber Floridus, f. 3v. A photograph of this folio appears in Derolez, p. 8, and his transcription is on pp. (3)-(4).

2. Liber Floridus, f. 3v.



The Liber Floridus contains other works on the Redemption which indicate that Lambert edited and abbreviated Cur Deus Homo himself instead of merely using an abbreviation of the Cur Deus Homo done by someone in Anselm's circle. Taking Odo of Cambrai's Disputatio inter Christianum et Judaeum (ff. 5r-10r), Lambert accepts the work with only very few changes, but he does rewrite Odo's Prologue. He leaves out the part concerning Odo's original sermon on the Redemption and only summarizes Odo's account of his meeting with a Jew. With Gilbert Crispin's dispute with a Jew (ff. 10r-10v), he uses only a small part of Gilbert's dialogue. In both cases, Lambert has selected theological treatises on the Redemption and used parts of them while leaving out other parts. Much the same apparently happens when he presents the 'Flores libri Anselmi'. The abbreviator selects the parts of Cur Deus Homo that interest him and which he thinks will be edifying for the faithful to read ('the faithful' being probably synonymous with monks). He reorders chapters and sometimes adopts the more emotional style of Anselm's 'Meditatio humanae redemptionis', instead of the ratiocination of Cur Deus Homo itself. He devotes much more energy and care to restating Cur Deus Homo's flores than he did with Odo or Gilbert, but basically he is still only carrying out the aim of the Prologue: to draw out certain things from various books so that those who cannot read them will be moved to piety and love by reading summaries of these books.

The manuscript tradition of the 'Flores Libri Anselmi' does not threaten this possibility that the Liber Floridus is the original source of the 'Flores' and that Lambert canon of St. Omer is the author or abbreviator. All the manuscripts of the 'Flores' that do not belong to the Liber Floridus tradition because they do not contain other works from the Liber could easily have originated from this tradition.<sup>1</sup> There was nothing to prevent monastic scribes

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1. See Druwé, pp. 2-4, for the nine recensions of Ghent MS. 92. The other recensions of the 'Flores' that Druwé found are: Brussels Bibl. Royale MS. 1384, St. Mary of Cambrai, thirteenth century; Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. MS. 16699, mid-twelfth century, from the Benedictine prior of St. Mary at Rouen. Schmitt, in 'Zur Entstehungsgeschichte ...', lists two more exemplars of 'Flores': Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16350 and Brussels Bibl. Royale 8386-90.

from copying this one work out of the Liber Floridus while ignoring the myriad other works. And as far as I can determine, all the versions of the 'Flores' that we have outside of the Liber Floridus tradition are contained in manuscripts later than 1120, the date at which Lambert stopped adding to the Liber Floridus.<sup>1</sup> So there seems to be no need for a source for the 'Flores' anterior to Ghent Univ. Lib. MS. 92, Liber Floridus, and we can at least set forth the possibility that Lambert canon of St. Omer was not just the collector of the 'Flores' but actually edited and abbreviated Anselm's writings on the Redemption and brought all together in the 'Flores Libri Anselmi'.

As usual, we do not have the space to give a thorough analysis of the work. We will only give an outline with references to Anselm's writings and then review a few of the chapters to see how the author uses Anselm. In our outline we notice how much he depends on passages from Anselmian works other than Cur Deus Homo:

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Source in Anselm</u> <sup>2</sup>
I	Stating the question	I, 1,3,1,6,1,5. II, 8
II	Response a) God acted with wisdom b) <u>propositum dei</u> c) the way it was fitting	I, 3 I, 4 I, 3. II, 8
III	Only the Son ought to have been incarnated	II, 9
IV	He ought to have been born from a virgin	II, 8
V	He ought to be perfect God and perfect man	II, 7
VI	He ought to be of Adam's race and of a virgin	II, 8. I, 5. II, 8; <u>De Con. Vir.</u> 17; II, 8; <u>De Con. Vir.</u> 18; II, 8.
VII	What he took from his mother (no misery or ignorance)	II, 12,13.
VIII	Original Sin - transmission and Christ's exemption	<u>De Con. Vir.</u> 20, 10, 2 23, 11, 13.
IX	The God-man could not sin	<u>De Con. Vir.</u> 21

1. See the Introduction in Dercles vii-viii, for the proofs that Liber Floridus was finished in 1120.

2. Notation from Cur Deus Homo is by book and chapter. Abbreviations for other works are: De Conceptu Virginali - De Con. Vir.; De Concordia Praescientiae - De Con.; De Libertate Arbitrii - De Lib. Arb.; De Veritate - De Ver.; De Incarnatione Verbi - De Inc.; De Casu Diaboli - De Casu.



<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Source in Anselm</u>
X	Outline of the rest - transition from Christ seen through revelation to Christ seen via reason	I, 6
XI	Man made rational by God	II, 1; <u>De Con. (passim)</u> .
XII	Man's free will	<u>De Lib. Arb.</u> 3; <u>De Ver.</u> 12; I, 1.
XIII	Free will not the power of doing good or evil	<u>De Lib. Arb.</u> 1, 2.
XIV	The evil of disobedience to God's will	<u>De Con. Vir.</u> 23; <u>De Inc.</u> 10; I, 11; <u>De Casu</u> 4,6,2; <u>De Ver.</u> 1
XV	All angels made in equal condition	<u>De Casu</u> 3, 6, 18
XVI	Whether the devil foreknew his fall and punishment	<u>De Casu</u> 21, 22, 23
XVII	Not reasonable for good angel to know sin's result	<u>De Casu</u> , 24
XVIII	The angel fell more seriously than man	none
XIX	Impossible that angel be reconciled	II, 21
XX	Angelic nature not to be restored by angel but by man	I, 17, 18, 16
XXI	Heavenly city always from beginning to be composed of men	I, 18, 19
XXII	God created 9 not 10 orders of angels	none
XXIII	There will be more good angels than bad	I, 18
XXIV	God's plan to be completed, but first man to be cleansed	I, 24, 19
XXV	The definition of sin; God's honour	I, 11, 14
XXVI	Adam's sin	I, 22, 23
XXVII	Adam's sin - better than whole world perish	I, 21
XXVIII	Definition of the necessary satisfaction	I, 21; II, 6; I, 21; I, 22; I, 11; I, 23; I, 24; I, 12
XXIX	God's goodness; God-man can-ought	I, 24; II, 6; <u>Medit.</u> 3
XXX	How Christ's offering exceeded our debt	I, 8; II, 11
XXXI	His wisdom in redeeming us	none
XXXII	The evening sacrifice	none
XXXIII	Value of his sacrifice	<u>passim</u> , CDH
XXXIV	Applicability of Christ's merits to all men	II, 16
XXXV	Man alone could not give God something not already owed	I, 20; II, 18
XXXVI	The Father can give the Son nothing for his work	II, 19
XXXVII	But the Son can give man the benefit	II, 19
XXXVIII	We cannot repay God for such a benefit	I, 20
XXXIX	God is greatest good	<u>De Casu</u> , 1
XL	"There are only creator and creature	<u>De Con. Vir.</u> 11

Most of the time we can see that the ideas taken from works outside Cur Deus Homo only contribute to the main ideas of Anselm's theology of the Redemption: sin, satisfaction, free will, the angels, Christ's position in the universe.

We can summarize the parallel directions of the 'Flores' and the Cur

Deus Homo by outlining them in the following way:

Cur Deus Homo

- 1. I, 1-9 God-man as an historical fact.
- 2. I, 10-25 The necessity of a God-man.  
II, 1-6
- 3. II, 7-end God-man's nature and attributes.

Flores Libri Anselmi

- 1'. I-X God-man as an hist. fact; his nature and attributes
- 2'. Necessity of a God-man

In purpose and direction, then, the 'Flores' are equivalent to Cur Deus Homo, except that 1' contains both 1 and 3 of Cur Deus Homo. But 2 and 2' are equivalent, except that the 'Flores' includes materials from other Anselmian works.

The chapters in the 'Flores' that most decisively establish its closeness to Anselmian ideas are XXIV-XXIX. We can take the last two of these to see the author-abbreviator's many ways of borrowing from and simplifying Anselm. In XXVIII the abbreviator is at his best in gathering ideas from all parts of the Cur Deus Homo in order to present a mosaic of Anselm that unifies scattered concepts and provides them with a tighter unity than is found in Anselm himself. The subject is satisfaction. The writer has already established the gravity of sin, so now he shows how man is to extricate himself from his predicament. First man must offer something that is greater than all that is not God and is greater than the obligation which should have restrained him from committing sin. The 'Flores' borrow from two widely separated places in Anselm:

XXVIII in 'Flores'

Satisfactio quippe tanta esse debebat, ut sponte offerret deo aliquid maius, quam omne sit quod deus non est et quam hoc totum pro quo peccare non debuerat.

II, 6 and I, 22 in CDH

... majorem esse necesse est quam omne quod non est Deus.

Non ergo satisfacis, si non reddis aliquid major, quam sit id pro quo peccatum facere non debueras.

But this obligation is only the beginning of man's tasks in making satisfaction to God. Weak and mortal, he must somehow conquer the devil. At the same time he must return to God the honour he has taken away from him. Finally he must give back to God the possibility of carrying out his plan for men:

'Flores' XXVIII

... et infirmus et mortalis, qualem se fecerat, per mortis difficultatem vinceret diabolum, a quo facile victus

CDH

... ita infirmus et mortalis, qualem se fecit ipse, per mortis difficultatem vincat diabolum. (I, 22)



erat, et utrumque deo simul redderet: et honorem dei, quem voluntatem suam superponendo dei voluntati deo abstulerat, et (reddere) compeccionem electorum, quem de humana natura deus facere disposuerat.

hunc honorem debitum, qui deo non reddit, aufert deo, quod suum est. (I, 11)

Nonne abstulit deo, quidquid de humana natura pronosuerat ... (I, 23)

All the components of the satisfaction man must make the abbreviator has collected together: man must give something greater than all that is not God and greater than his previous obligation; he must conquer the devil, provide the honorem debitum, and enable God to go ahead with his purpose for man. These five elements are dispersed throughout the first and second books of Cur Deus Homo. The writer of the 'Flores' is familiar enough with Anselmian ideas to recognize their common bond and to summarize them.

The next point is Anselm's cardinal idea that man's inability to carry out these requirements does not excuse him at all. The 'Flores' summarizes Anselm's story of the servant ordered to complete a task and not to fall into a pit. When he does fall, his inability to carry out his task is his own fault. Man's situation is the same, and his fault is double. The vocabulary is the same in places, but the treatment is somewhat briefer than Anselm's.<sup>1</sup>

In the third part of XXVIII the author gives four arguments against God's free forgiveness of man. Here, as in his treatment of satisfaction, he borrows from more than one part of Cur Deus Homo. If God let man go without payment, he would remit what he could not have:

'Flores' XXVIII

Si hoc deus faceret, quid esset quod dimitteret, nisi quod habere non posset? Talis misericordia deo non adscribatur, quia talis misericordia non est misericordia, sed magis derisio videtur.

CDH I, 24

... Sed si dimittit, quod sponte reddere debet homo, ideo quia reddere non potest, quid est aliud, quam dimittit Deus quod habere non potest? Sed derisio est, ut talis misericordia Deo attribuatur.

The 'Flores' are faithful to Anselm, down to the use of the word derisio to describe the situation that would arise if God forgave man freely. Making use of the very next sentence in the same chapter of Anselm, the 'Flores' goes

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1. CDH I, 24.

on to say that forgiveness would make man happy on account of his sin. Then the author moves back to Cur Deus Homo I, 12 for the idea that injustice makes man subject to no law, and so injustice is like God. The final point preventing free forgiveness is that even if God beatified man, he could not be happy, for man would be either indigent or unjust. We return to I, 24 in Anselm for this point:

'Flores' XXXVIII

Obstat adhuc aliud, quod si deus hominem peccatorem sine satisfactione beatificaret, homo tamen beatus esse non posset. Quod enim solvere debebat, nec poterat, aut vellet reddere, aut non vellet. Si nollet, iniustus esset; si vellet, nec posset, indigens esset; sive indigens, sive iniustus esset, beatus non esset.

CDH I, 24

At quandiu non reddet, aut volet reddere, aut non volet. Sed si volet quod non poterit, indigens erit; si vero non volet, iniustus erit.... Sive autem indigens, sive iniustus beatus autem non erit.

This statement makes way for XXIX, in which the logic of redemption reaches its culmination in Christ. The author starts by presenting Boso's conclusion in I, 24 that because free forgiveness was impossible and man was helpless, the mercy of God seemed to perish. But at this point of despair, the author can seek help from the Anselmian principle that God will not turn aside from his purpose for man. This kind of necessity the 'Flores' draws gladly from Anselm without weakening it at all. The Anselmian climax then arrives, establishing the necessity of a God-man. The words are close to those of Anselm.

'Flores' XXIX

Quod enim non potest nisi deus, nec debet nisi homo, necesse est, ut faciat deus homo.

CDH I, 6

Si ergo sicut constat, necesse est, ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi deus, nec debet nisi homo, necesse est, ut eam faciat deus homo.

In the next point the 'Flores' consider the God-man as a manifestation of God's goodness. The language here strongly recalls that of Anselm's 'Meditatio Redemptionis Humanae', which also emphasizes the goodness of God as the sole cause of the Redemption. The author and Anselm are concerned both with guaranteeing divine freedom and with inciting their readers to grateful-



ness to God for his generosity. The second aim shows how monastic writers often took Anselm's theology of the Redemption not only as a rational explanation but also as a source for spiritual edification:

'Flores' XXIX

Deus tamen, qui nichil facere cogitur, nichil facere prohibetur, nichil facit necessitate, sed omnia facit sua incommutabili bonitate.

'Meditatio redemptionis humanae'  
(Schmitt 3, p. 86)

Sed omnis necessitas et impossibilitas eius subiacet voluntati. Quippe quod vult necesse est esse, et quod non vult impossibile est esse. Sola igitur voluntate, et quoniam voluntas semper bona est, sola hoc fecit bonitate.

The final sentence of the chapter establishes an idea central to Anselm's thought. Christ is worth more than all that is not God. This is one of the main requirements for satisfaction, an offering that outweighs in its value the whole created universe:

'Flores' XXIX

Ipsa enim maior est quam omne, quod deus non est, quia ipse deus idem et homo est.

GDH II, 6

Illum quoque, qui de suo poterit deo dare, aliquid, quod superet omne, quod sub deo est, maiorem necesse est, quam omne, quod non est deus.

Except for the additional passage about God's goodness, this chapter is almost as neat and tight as Anselm's famous II, 6. The author of the libellus has brought together all the points of necessity and has shown how they converge in a man-God.

We can thus see in these two chapters, 28 and 29 of the 'Flores', how the author moves familiarly through Anselm's works, chooses the ideas central to this theme, and fits them into his own order. He does not hold to any one way of using Anselm. He at times uses Anselm's exact language but elsewhere renders Anselmian ideas into his own language.

There are times during the 'Flores', however, when the author apparently does not borrow any Anselmian ideas. But even here, if we look carefully enough, we find indications of an adaptation of Anselm. A single instance will suffice. In chapter XXXII, the author tries to show how Christ's sacrifice is related to us personally. As in Anselm's 'Meditation' on the Redemption, once we understand the meaning of Christ's death, we can rejoice in it and beg

God for the grace that flows from it. The sinner is addressed and is asked why he does not rush to this sight, why he does not hear, see, or consider such a great mystery. The vocabulary of sacrifice and oblation does not come from Anselm, but the use of rhymed prose with repetitions of words and syllables imitates Anselm's own practice. I will underline some of the more obvious words used in such a way:

Exorabat pro nobis patrem gloriosa Iesu Christi mors et passio. Non erat dulcior affectus filii offerentis, quam prompta voluntas patris suscipientis. O quam carum munus patri, quam valens holocaustum quam digna hostia, quam pia oblatio, quam dulce sacrificium, o quam pium, o quam delectabile, quanta devotione plenum spectaculum, cum pius pater, bonus pater, pia mater, bona mater pium, bonum pia intuebatur filium, cum propriis oculis videbat genitor suum proprie proprium et gentitrix suum unigenitum....

We find here repetitions of the same syllable or word. Also there is the manipulation of a single word into many different forms for emphasis. And finally the alternation of words: 'pius ... bonus, pia ... bona ..., pium bonum ...'. The entire chapter witnesses the presentation of language for the sake of arousing an emotion. The 'Flores' is cruder in its use of words than Anselm in his 'Meditatio', but both authors are at this point equally emotional in their expressions of joy, gratitude or grief in the Redemption. The same thing happens on a more elaborate and extended scale in XXXVII. The rhymed prose of Anselm's 'Meditatio' is imitated and contributes to the author's emphasis on man's feeling for Christ's death based on his understanding of the doctrine of the Redemption.

The 'Flores' thus contain more than a dry summary or rewording of the Cur Deus Homo. They are a monastic interpretation of the entire range of Anselm's theology of the Redemption. And yet for the most part this work is solidly based on Cur Deus Homo. The work can be looked upon as a meditation on Cur Deus Homo itself, in which the most significant aspects of Anselm's teaching are drawn forth not for the sake of knowledge but for love of God through knowledge. As such, the work can rightly be called an example of monastic theology, as opposed to the scholastic theology that limits itself to knowledge and understanding of doctrines. Scholastic theology generally



leaves out the affect of that knowledge on the individual who gains it. This distinction, of course, is not absolute, for the Paris teacher, especially in the twelfth century, hoped that knowledge of truth would bring his students to love of God. But his job was not to make his students more religious but more learned.

Lambert of St. Omer lived in a rich area for monastic theology. His neighbour, contemporary, and namesake, Lambert abbot of St. Bertin, had known Anselm well and had offered Anselm his house's hospitality.<sup>1</sup> We know that here in 1097 Anselm preached a sermon on the Redemption to the monks.<sup>2</sup> Schmitt has traced the 'Flores' back to this event.<sup>3</sup> But I think that, even if the author of the 'Flores' did hear this sermon, he did not write the 'Flores' until he had all of Anselm's works before him. And because he at least one time quotes directly from the De Concordia,<sup>4</sup> our author must have written the 'Flores' after Anselm's death in 1109, for the De Concordia was Anselm's final work.<sup>5</sup> No matter who the author was, then, he had to write between 1110 and 1120, by which time the 'Flores' had been included in the Liber Floridus. This timespace leaves little room for anyone to be the author except Lambert of St. Omer himself. There is always the possibility, of course, that it was Lambert abbot of St. Bertin who wrote the 'Flores', or one of the monks there, and this would explain Lambert of St. Omer's immediate reception of the work. But I think there is no need to go beyond Lambert of St. Omer himself.

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1. See MGH SS, xv, pp. 946-53: Tractatus de Moribus Lamberti Abbatis S. Bertini, ed. C. Holder-Egger, esp. p. 948 describing Lambert's intellectual interests: 'Disputabat etiam de libero arbitrio, de prescientia et de predestinatione Dei, et electione sanctorum, de gratia novi testamenti.'

2. Kadner, The Life of St. Anselm, ed. R.W. Southern (Nelson Mediaeval Texts, London, 1962), p. 101, n. 1.

3. 'Zur Entstehungsgeschichte ...', pp. 220-23.

4. 'Flores' XIII (on man's free will) uses almost word for word a sentence from De Concordia 13.

5. P.S. Schmitt, 'Zur Chronologie der Werke des Anselm von Canterbury', RB xlv (1932), 322-50.

Unfortunately the manuscript tradition of Anselm's works at St. Omer does not give us much help. The library of the seculars had no copies of Anselm's works, as far as we can tell from surviving manuscripts. The abbey of S. Bertin did have a twelfth century copy of the De Concordia (St. Omer Bib. mun. MS. 379).<sup>1</sup> But we know of no other works of Anselm there. This prospect, however, should not discourage us, for the survival of Anselm's works in individual places probably only indicates a small fraction of the actual manuscripts of his works available in the twelfth century.

With the 'Flores' we reach a high point for the initial reception of Anselm's ideas on the Redemption. The work witnesses not only to the popularity of the Cur Deus Homo in monastic circles but also to the high quality of monastic theology itself in the first decades of the twelfth century.

#### 5. Rupert of Deutz

Only in the chronological sense does Rupert of Deutz belong among the early followers of St. Anselm's theology of the Redemption. Geographically and psychologically Rupert is far removed from Anselm.<sup>2</sup> The two meet only at rare intervals in Rupert's work. The basic reason for their separation is that Rupert's theology is a highly sophisticated variety of scriptural exegesis which is much more interested in symbols and figures than in rational proofs for doctrine. And yet there are moments when Rupert seems to be drawing on the thought and vocabulary of Cur Deus Homo. But the connexions are so subtle and tenuous that for the most part it would be useless to place passages parallel to quotations from Anselm, as we have done with Honorius and others.

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1. Catalogue Générale des Manuscrits des Bibliothèques Publiques des Départements iii (Paris, 1861), p. 163.

2. For general background on Rupert, I have found the following works helpful: E. Beitz, Rupertus von Deutz. Seine Werke und die Bildendekunst, (Veröffentl. Köln Geschichtsverein 4, Cologne, 1930); R. Haacke, 'Die Überlieferung der Schriften Ruperts von Deutz', Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 16 (1960), 397-436. The same author has edited Rupert's De Divinis Officiis (Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis, vii, Turnholt, 1967). Also F. Séjourné, 'Rupert de Deutz', DIC xiv(1), 169-205.



An excellent example of Rupert's personal way of adapting Anselm appears in his In Evangelium Sancti Joannis Commentarium, written between 1115 and 1116.<sup>1</sup> As in many other commentaries, Rupert analyses his source verse by verse. In John 6, where a crowd tried to make Jesus king, Rupert stops at Christ's words: 'Amen, amen, dico vobis, venistis ad me, non quia vidistis signa, sed quia manducastis ex panibus et saturati estis.' Rupert explains that certain people have interpreted these words in a way harmful to the doctrine of the Eucharist. Rupert proposes to understand the true meaning of Christ's words:

Fidei quaerenti intellectum eorum quae ab hoc Veritas dicere incipit, ante omnia scire convenit (in quantum possibile est) qua intentione ea dixerit, illamque prae oculis habere, ut in luce ejus faciem agnoscat, ejusque verbi qualis sit, et adversus omnem corporis et sanguinis Christi inimicum, haereticum judicare vel discernere queat, indubitanter, qualis non sit.<sup>2</sup>

Rupert's borrowing of Anselm's phrase 'fides quaerens intellectum' could hardly be more obvious. In the opening chapter of Cur Deus Homo, Anselm speaks of 'fides quaerens intellectum' as a way of understanding the ratio or necessitas behind the Incarnation. Anselm's procedure is to penetrate the strata of reason beneath the formulation of doctrine. Rupert is speaking of a different process when he uses the words. His faith seeking understanding is that of the theologian who tries to grasp the meaning of individual passages in Scripture. Anselm uses the words as the outline for a theological programme, while Rupert uses them to introduce his explanation of a difficult passage. Rupert borrows Anselm's words, but he does not incorporate their spirit. He achieves understanding not by speculating on the nature of doctrine in itself but by drawing forth the doctrinal consequences of Christ's words.

With this instance as a guide to Rupert's manner of borrowing from Anselm, we can move on to our chronological examination of his work. His first

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1. My dating of Rupert's works follows the conclusions of M. Magrassi, Teologia e Storia nel Pensiero di Ruperto di Deutz (Studia Urbaniana 2, Rome, 1959). This excellent work repays careful reading.

2. PL 169: 454C.

important treatise, the De Divinis Officiis (1111), concerns the liturgical year. The initial passage of interest asks why God allowed man's fall if he had the power to prevent it: 'Importuna plerumque a nonnullis haec nobis impingitur quaestio: Cur Deus lapsum hominis evenire permiserit, cum utique, ut omnipotens, impedire potuerit....'<sup>1</sup> This hopeful beginning does not lead to Anselm of Canterbury but to Augustine, for Rupert simply explains that in fall and redemption, God draws good from evil and that this is the best way to vanquish the devil.<sup>2</sup>

Rupert again chooses the conservative explanation for the Redemption's usefulness when he takes up the classic fish-hook metaphor of the Redemption. Christ is the fish-hook that caught the devil. He mistook the bait, Christ's humanity, for a man over whom he could exercise his domination. In trying to devour Christ, however, the devil abused his power and was caught.<sup>3</sup>

Not until the sixth book of the De Divinis Officiis do we find any closeness to Anselm. Rupert at first follows the usual language about the devil and good from evil but suddenly turns to debt and satisfaction:

... ut advertamus, quia multo magis Deus, cum faceret, homines, nec voluit, nec ullo modo dixit: "Fiat mala, ut veniant bona"; sed eo nolente, eo prohibente, mortemque comminante, diabolo consentiens homo malum fecit; Deo autem disponente, bonum venit. Et "ubi abundavit peccatum" in tantum "superabundavit gratia" (Rom. 5) ut quia satisfactionem pro culpa nullus debebat, nisi homo, nullus solvere poterat nisi Deus miseratus Deus homo fieret, qui cum pro se nihil morti deberet, moriendo pro nobis debitum nostrum solveret.<sup>4</sup>

In the last three lines Rupert makes a number of theological assertions that could have come from Cur Deus Homo. The God-man paid what he did not owe so that he could pay for us. Rupert has incorporated Anselm's word satisfactio into his explanation. Much more important, he shares Anselm's concern for who owes what to whom. When satisfaction is thought of in terms of the debitum,

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1. PL 170: 71A.

2. PL 170: 73A.

3. PL 170: 79A.

4. PL 170: 155B.



the idea of a simple liberatio from the devil is bypassed, and the nature of man's sin has to be considered. Rupert thinks that Christ's offering has worth towards payment of debt because it was not previously owed. His presentation of this idea practically ensures the presence of Anselm's theology in Rupert.

A second passage in the sixth book gives further evidence for Rupert's acquaintance with Cur Deus Homo, even though this time Rupert is not so close to Anselm. Why could no one in the Old Testament regain paradise for themselves, despite their exemplary lives?<sup>1</sup> Rupert replies that the answer is easy. How can someone redeem himself, 'si nihil addat ad servitium, vel etiam minuat, quod debuerat ante reatum? Aliis enim et minoribus debitis alia majora debita non redimuntur.'<sup>2</sup> Rupert implies here Anselm's assertion that man alone after the fall cannot possibly pay for his debts to God. Indeed, man offers less to God after the fall than he gave previously. Our capacity to pay is diminished, so there is no hope that any individual, no matter how worthy his life, could offer something of sufficient value. This idea goes beyond Anselm's statement that after sin, the sinner has nothing to pay, but Rupert could be enlarging on the inspiration of Cur Deus Homo.

The consequence of man's situation for both Anselm and Rupert is the impossibility of free forgiveness on God's part. In his explanation, Rupert is indebted to Anselm both for the assertion that unclean man cannot be raised to the same position as the angels and that God will not allow anything inordinatum in his kingdom:

Rupert, De Divinis Officiis,  
PL 170, 180A

Non ergo summae Dei justitiae congruebat, qui in hoc terrestri sanctuario suo maculatum quidpiam sibi offerri prohibet, ut in illis coelestibus

CDH I, 19 and I, 12

Potesne cogitare, quod homo, qui aliquando peccavit nec unquam deo pro peccato satisfecit sed tantum impunitur dimittitur, aequalis sit angelo,

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1. PL 170: 179A.

2. PL 170: 179B.

sanctis sanctorum aliquid nisi  
immaculatam susciperet, et inemenda-  
tam humanam creaturam angelicae  
dignitati penitus incorruptae cosequa-  
ret: fieretque injustus, sicut et  
justus, et clarissima coeli respublica  
tali inordinatione confunderetur.

qui nunquam peccavit?

Deum vero non decet aliquid inor-  
dinatum in suo regno dimittere....  
Non ergo decet deum peccatum sic  
impunitum dimittere.

Anselm does not speak of angelica dignitas in this chapter, but he does in an earlier one.<sup>1</sup> What is important, however, is not the similarity of vocabulary but the way both Anselm and Rupert assert man's destined place in the universe as equal to that of the angels, a place that cannot be occupied by sinful man. Furthermore Rupert has responded to Anselm's concept of the inordinatum which would result from sin left unpunished. In a limited way he has grasped some of Anselm's grand idea of an ordered universe in which everything functions according to God's plan. Rupert does not elaborate, but the idea is there in the same context as it is found in Cur Deus Homo. In these few lines Rupert has not only borrowed some of Anselm's ideas. He has also entered for a moment into the spirit of Anselm's speculative efforts, which assumed a logical basis of reason and order which the human mind could search for in God's activity.

Rupert concludes his exposition of man's situation after the fall by speaking of the satisfaction that Christ provides:

Nam quia satisfactionem pro culpa non nisi homo debebat et non nisi  
Deus perficere poterat, Deus homo factus est, quatenus unus idemque  
Christus, et verus Deus ab homine exigeret, et ut verus homo persolveret.<sup>2</sup>

This passage takes up Anselm's 'only God can; only man ought' in order to explain the Incarnation.<sup>3</sup> Rupert has clearly been following the logic of Anselm.

Rupert, however, is forever ambiguous, and just when we are about to categorize him as a faithful disciple of Anselm, he loses interest in Cur Deus Homo. In the ninth book he writes of the devil's tyranny.<sup>4</sup> Anselm's point of

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1. CDH I, 5.

2. FL 170: 182A.

3. CDH II, 6.

4. FL 170: 251.



view is never reconciled with this one. Rupert seems to have taken up Anselm as a momentary object of interest, but he soon reverts to a demonocentric framework for the Redemption.

But fragments of Anselm's vocabulary reappear at times. At the end of the eighteenth chapter in the eleventh book, Rupert uses the word satisfactio to describe Christ's work.<sup>1</sup> The term has become part of Rupert's theology, and there is no explanation here for it.

The first book to follow De Divinis Officiis was the In Job Commentarium. It was written between 1111 and 1114. In the entire length of the book, the only passage of note on the Redemption presents the fish-hook metaphor.<sup>2</sup> This commentary considered Job as a type of Christ, an image which reappears often in other works of Rupert.

At the same time as he was composing his polemical works, De Voluntate Dei and De Omnipotentia Dei, Rupert wrote his In Evangelium Sancti Joannis Commentarium (1115-16). There are a few Anselmian uses here. Commenting on the third chapter of John, Rupert describes the visit of Nicodemus to Christ. At that time Christ spoke of himself as the filius hominis, and Rupert considers the meaning of this title. Christ, he says, wanted to express his closeness to us by using such a name. Rupert then turns to a different interpretation of the name. Because Christ is a son of man, his work of Redemption can apply to men. If God made a novus homo, not of the race of Adam, whatever works he performed could not possibly be applied to mankind, since he would be from another race:

Quod ut indubitanter pateat, operae pretium est respondere his qui quaerere solent: cur Deus ob restorationem generis humani hominem assumens, non de terra plasmavit, quem assumeret, ex qua fecerat Adam, sed ex genere ejusdem Adam, ex passa perdita, veram suscepit hominis naturam...? Ad hoc breviter respondere libet, quia poterat quidem de terra, quem sibi assumeret, plasmare novum hominem, et esse quidem caro et sanguis, sed non nostra caro....<sup>3</sup>

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1. PL 170: 314B.

2. PL 168: 1183-84A.

3. PL 169: 320D.

God could indeed make a novus homo, but he would not be proximus nobis.

'Clearly he would be a man, but not a son of man.' The similar conclusions of Anselm and Rupert are worth comparing:

Rupert, In Ev. S. Joannis Comm.,  
PL 169: 321A

GDH II, 8

Quapropter nec tam justa esset causa nostrae redemptionis, quippe cum non eadem peccatum expiaret caro quae peccatum admisit, nec tam recte nostra reputaretur justitia unius hominis, utpote ignoti et a genere nostro alieni.

Quare non debet satisfacere pro eo quia non erit de illo. Sicut enim rectum est, ut pro culpa hominis homo satisfaciat, ita necesse est, ut satisfaciens idem sit, qui peccator, aut eiusdem generis.

Anselm and Rupert use different language to express the same idea: a novus homo, not being of the same race as a descendent of Adam, could not do anything for that race. He who has sinned must himself pay. Anselm, Rupert, and Honorius Augustoduensis all use the phrase novus homo. When the school of Laon encountered the same problem, they spoke of a homo novus.<sup>1</sup> The significance of this slight difference in wording can easily be exaggerated, but it indicates that both Honorius and Rupert were borrowing from St. Anselm.

Having eliminated a 'new man', Rupert soon asks why God did not send an angel to redeem us.<sup>2</sup> Rupert introduces the problem in a way that recalls Anselm's 'objections of the infidels'.<sup>3</sup> Like the infidels in Cur Deus Homo, the quidam of Rupert suggest that God lowered himself by such undignified suffering and baseness. Rupert says that many replies are possible, but a few are sufficient. The first is that the human race could not be redeemed by anyone except someone of the same nature. This is the same kind of reasoning as Rupert used for the novus homo, but this time it is applied to an angel.<sup>4</sup> Also an angel could not possibly take on human nature because the angelic spirit is not capable of joining with the human spirit.<sup>5</sup> Anselm's main reason why an angel could not

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1. See, for example, in Lottin PM v, nos. 47 (p. 44), 232 (p. 185).

2. PL 169: 330C.

3. GDH I, 3.

4. PL 169: 331A.

5. PL 169: 331B.



redeem mankind was that man would thereby fail to regain his former place in the universe because he would owe subjection to the angel redeemer.<sup>1</sup> Rupert does not say this, but he does point out that an angel would not be of sufficient worth to redeem man:

Præterea nec angelica natura nostri comparatione, qui terra sumus, aurum optimum est, ac proinde quilibet angelus non tanto pretiosior est homine, ut venundatus hæreditatem æquiponderare posset.<sup>2</sup>

This statement recalls, even if only vaguely, Anselm's assertion of the infinite payment necessary for sin.<sup>3</sup>

Between 1114 and 1117 Rupert wrote his most ambitious theological-exegetical work, the De Trinitate et Operibus Eius, which traced the unfolding of the Persons of the Trinity in the Pentateuch, the historical and prophetic books of the Old Testament, the four Gospels, and the works of the Holy Spirit. It is dedicated to Cunon, abbot of Saint Michael of Siegburg, near Cologne. In 1115 Berengarius, the abbot of Saint Lawrence at Liège, on his deathbed recommended his monk Rupert to Cunon. The theologian was already under attack for some of his challenges to authority, and at some time between 1116 and 1119 Rupert came to Siegburg. But during part of this period, he may still have been at Liège.<sup>4</sup> Wherever he was, Rupert shows less than ever the influence of Anselm's theology of the Redemption. Despite the ambition and comprehensiveness of the De Trinitate, its passages on the Redemption contain almost nothing from Anselm. Rupert does ask whether the Son of God would have been incarnate if man had not sinned, and he is one of the earliest theologians to

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1. CDH I, 5.

2. PL 169: 331B-C.

3. CDH II, 14.

4. For the dating of Rupert's arrival at Siegburg, see Valerie Flint, 'The Life and Works of Honorius Augustodunensis with Special Reference to Chronology and Sources' (Oxford Univ. D. Phil. Thesis, 1969), pp. 115-120. She thinks Rupert was still at Liège as late as 1119. Other historians think that he left Liège somewhat earlier. H. Silvestre, 'La Traditione Manuscrite des Œuvres de Rupert de Deutz', Scriptorium 16 (1962), 336-48; J. Semmler, Die Klosterreform von Siegburg. Ihre Ausbreitung und ihr Reformprogramm in 11 und 12 Jahrhunderte (Bonn, 1959), pp. 372-6.

discuss an unconditional Incarnation.<sup>1</sup> These speculations, however, only emphasize his distance from Anselm, who linked closely the Incarnation to man's sin and never even considered the possibility of Christ without sin.

Throughout the De Trinitate Rupert develops an image of weights and scales to illustrate the worth of Christ's sacrifice. There is something here of Anselm's concept of sufficient satisfaction, but Rupert's thought owes much more to his own special exegesis than to Anselmian theology.<sup>2</sup> The devil becomes increasingly more prominent,<sup>3</sup> and the image of the fish-hook is enlarged with many details. Other works of this period before 1120, such as the Commentarium in Apocalypsin (1117-20), also concentrate on the devil's abuse of power.<sup>4</sup>

By the time we reach the De Victoria Verbi Dei (1124), we move away from the constant refrain of the devil's power and are presented with other aspects of Rupert's teaching on the Redemption. But the devil is always in the background, for this work seeks to show the victory of the Word of God over the devil in human history as seen through the historical books of the Bible. The traditional pre-1100 schema of God and the devil locked in combat and man as a passive spectator provides the inspiration of Rupert's work and enables us to see how alien Rupert's theology was to that of Anselm. He no longer uses terms like satisfactio and does not include any of the Anselmian arguments. He gives up any attempt to reason why God sent his Son instead of another being:

Frustra igitur dicit, vel quaerit quia, cur non legatus vel angelum miserit, sed per semetipsum ad salvandum genus humanum non potuit nisi sola natura Dei, unde sicut bonum quia voluit, ita omnipotentem praedicamus, potuit.<sup>5</sup>

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1. PL 167: 1524A, 1610C. The best analysis of Rupert on the unconditional Incarnation is in Magrassi, Teologia e Storia, ch. 2: 'Cristo nel Piano Divino', pp. 219-55.

2. PL 167: 1612B-D.

3. PL 167: 1631C-D.

4. PL 169: 840 B, 1056B.

5. PL 169: 1460A.



God's omnipotence and will are the only answers Rupert cares to give. He has totally abandoned even his limited attempts to grasp the ratio in the doctrine of the Redemption.

There is no need to consider Rupert's writing after the De Victoria, for he continues to deal with questions that have nothing to do with Anselmian theology, such as the devil's power over man and the Incarnation as an inevitable fact of history.<sup>1</sup> Our brief analysis of Rupert has shown that in his earlier writings he was influenced by Anselm to a limited extent, but this influence seems to have worn thin by the time of the De Trinitate.

It is entirely possible that Rupert never actually read the Cur Deus Homo itself but came into contact with Anselm's ideas on the Redemption only through Honorius's Elucidarium. By 1111, the latter work could have reached the monastery of St. Lawrence at Liège. The Elucidarium has all the Anselmian ideas on the Redemption that we also find in Rupert. Valerie Flint discourages us from thinking that there ever was any face-to-face meeting of Honorius and Rupert, even though there is a clear connexion between the Gemma Animae of the first and the De Divinis Officiis of the second.<sup>2</sup> Rupert's use of Honorius's Gemma Animae at least introduces the possibility that he could also have known the Elucidarium. Still, the wide dispersion of manuscripts of Cur Deus Homo in Northern France and Flanders in the twelfth century, which I shall discuss in the next chapter, would have made it possible for Rupert to read Cur Deus Homo itself. Liège was close enough to the centres for Anselmian manuscripts in Flanders to make Cur Deus Homo accessible to a bright and eager young monk.

But it is not of great importance to determine whether Anselm's influence on Rupert's theology of the Redemption is direct or indirect. The very presence

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1. Rupert's clearest formulation of his position on the inconditionality of the Redemption comes in De Gloria et Honore Filii Hominis Super Mattheum, PL 168: 1628A-D.

2. 'The Life and Works of Honorius', p. 115.

of Anselmian ideas in a writer like Rupert manifests the immense initial attraction that Anselm's approach to the Redemption exercised on monastic theologians. Even though the content, methods, and aims of Rupert's theology are so foreign to Anselm, even though Rupert's symbolic exegesis would appear to have nothing to do with Anselm's rational argumentation, Anselm somehow penetrates Rupert and leaves an unmistakable imprint on his language and thinking on the Redemption.

Eventually the old explanations based on the devil won out, and the primitive qualities of Rupert's theological heritage vanquished the Anselmian contribution. There is no sign of open conflict. Rupert was probably initially impressed by the arguments he found in the Cur Deus Homo or in the Elucidarium. Eventually these ways of looking at the Redemption faded from his consciousness. Rupert's writings would not lead anyone back to Anselm. For our purposes he appears to be a dead-end. But in Rupert appearances can be deceptive. Underneath the fabric of metaphorical exegesis, there is something of Anselm. And rising up from Rupert's monastic tradition later in the twelfth century, we find men like Gerhoh of Reichersberg, who definitely did go to the Cur Deus Homo itself and drew much from it.



Chapter II

LATER TWELFTH CENTURY MONASTIC CONTINUITY

1. The Manuscripts in Monasteries

Monastic reception and use of Anselm continued after the early circle of followers died out. The popularity of Anselm can be seen through a brief summary of our evidence for his writings in monasteries on the Continent. By the end of the twelfth century, manuscripts of the Cur Deus Homo were in monasteries all over Europe.<sup>1</sup> In Germany, for example, a library catalogue of 1158 in the monastery of Prüfening near Regensburg listed Anselm among the moderni, along with Bede, Rabanus, Ivo, Honorius, and Anselm of Lucca. This monastery had a manuscript which included many of Anselm's works:

Anselmi liber qui dicitur cur deus homo. Tractatus eius de veritate. Libellus de caus diaboli, libellus de conceptu virginali, de originali peccato. Liber de processione spiritus sancti contra graecos. Epistola eiusdem de dissensionē grecorum in sacrificio, omnia in uno volumine.<sup>2</sup>

St. Mauritius at Naumburg, in a twelfth century catalogue, had Cur Deus Homo, along with the De Concordia and the De Libertate Arbitrii.<sup>3</sup> An abbey at Lisbena near Münster had a manuscript containing only Cur Deus Homo. This manuscript I inspected at the Royal Library in Copenhagen. It differs from Schmitt's critical text on only a very few minor points.<sup>4</sup>

In Austria the Cistercian abbey of Heiligenkreuz, in a catalogue dating between 1134 and 1147, laid claim to Cur Deus Homo in a manuscript that also included a work of Bernard's called the 'Apologia'.<sup>5</sup> Among the thirty-five

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1. The following review is only a sketch and by no means attempts to be exhaustive. I have left out the British Isles completely.

2. G. Becker, Catalogi Bibliothecarum Antiqui (Bonn, 1885), p. 222.

3. Ibid., p. 271.

4. Catalogus Codicum Latinorum Medii Aevi Bibliothecae Regiae Hafniensis, ed. E. Jørgensen, 1 (Copenhagen, 1923), 48.

5. Theodor Gottlieb, Mittelalterlich Bibliothekskataloge Österreichs, 1, (Vienna, 1914), 21.

codices that St. Florian added to its library in the twelfth century, one of them contained Cur Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup> These entries suffice to show how quickly Anselm's work was dispersed to the far corners of Christian Europe.

If we turn to France and Flanders, we have much evidence for the early appearance of Cur Deus Homo in many monasteries. Among the Benedictine abbeys that had manuscripts of Cur Deus Homo in the twelfth century are Saint Amand in Flanders,<sup>2</sup> St. Wasst at Arras,<sup>3</sup> Anchin near Douai,<sup>4</sup> Saint Vanne near Verdun,<sup>5</sup> and Saint Martin at Tournai.<sup>6</sup> In these monasteries, Cur Deus Homo was often found with other works of Anselm, but it is interesting to note that the Monologion and the Prosligion are not nearly as widespread as Cur Deus Homo at this time. The monks seem to have preferred to copy the treatises of Anselm dealing with Christ.

Besides the Benedictines, the Cistercians were attracted by Anselm's Cur Deus Homo. We have three twelfth century manuscripts from Clairvaux, now kept at the municipal library at Troyes, that include Cur Deus Homo. The first, Troyes MS. 421, has a commentary of Bede on Mark, Anselm's De Incarnatione Verbi, and the Cur Deus Homo.<sup>7</sup> Troyes MS. 752 contains Gregory's Pastoral Care, followed by the De Incarnatione and Cur Deus Homo.<sup>8</sup> In Troyes MS. 835, we find the Prosligion, De Incarnatione, Cur Deus Homo, 'Meditatio humane

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1. A. Czerny, Die Bibliothek des Chorberrnstiftes St. Florian (Linz, 1874), 7-8.

2. Leopold Delisle, Le Cabinet des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale, (Histoire Générale de Paris, 1874), ii, 452.

3. Becker, p. 255.

4. Catalogue Général des Manuscrits des Bibliothèques Publiques des Départements, vi (Paris, 1878), 186. The codex is Douai Bibl. Mun. MS. 352.

5. Catalogue Général ... des Départements, v (Paris, 1879), 461. The codex is Verdun Bibl. Mun. MS. 54.

6. Delisle, Le Cabinet, ii, 490.

7. Catalogue Général ... des Départements, ii (Paris, 1855), 188.

8. Catalogue Général, ii, 311.



redemptionis', and the De Processione Spiritus Sancti.<sup>1</sup> In the thirteenth century Clairvaux gained a codex (Troyes MS. 836) that started off with Cur Deus Homo and contained almost the entire works of Anselm, including his letters and the De Similitudinibus.<sup>2</sup> Another thirteenth century Clairvaux manuscript puts Cur Deus Homo together with a work of John Chrysostom, De Reparatione Lapai.<sup>3</sup> The abbey of Cîteaux also had a copy of Cur Deus Homo in the twelfth century. This manuscript, Dijon MS. 182, puts Cur Deus Homo first and is followed by a great number of his other works.<sup>4</sup>

Some monasteries had no copy of Cur Deus Homo in the twelfth century but acquired the work in the thirteenth. Such is the case at Corbie and St. Martial de Limoges. Two twelfth century catalogues for the abbey of Corbie do not mention Cur Deus Homo, but a catalogue from the opening of the thirteenth century includes the work, along with many other Anselmian treatises.<sup>5</sup> Similarly at Saint-Martial of Limoges, the twelfth century catalogue has no entry for any of Anselm's works, but a thirteenth century list contains a codex with 'Anselmus Cur Deus homo, de sacramentis, sermones Bernardi Clarvellenensis, Merlinus, Macer in uno.'<sup>6</sup>

This increasing interest in Anselm during the thirteenth century was made possible through the manuscripts that had been scattered throughout France in the twelfth century. We have an excellent instance of this development in a manuscript of Anselm's works from the abbey of St. Peter at Chartres. Written in the twelfth century, Chartres MS. 194 had many marginal notes added during the thirteenth century.<sup>7</sup> What had been collected in the twelfth century was

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1. Catalogue Général, ii, 346. Anselm is called beatus here.

2. Ibid., ii, 346-7.

3. Ibid., ii, 648; the manuscript is Troyes MS. 1535.

4. Ibid. (new series), v (Paris, 1889), 52-3. Anselm is called sanctus.

5. Delisle, Le Cabinet, ii, 436.

6. Delisle, Le Cabinet (Paris, 1868), i, 395; ii, 493-502, esp. 496.

7. Catalogue Général (new series), xi (Paris, 1890), 100-101.

an object of intellectual interest in the thirteenth.

## 2. Bernard

The presence of so many Cur Deus Homo manuscripts among the Cistercians at Clairvaux encourages us to look carefully in the works of Bernard for possible Anselmian influences. In the Tractatus Contra Quaedam Capitula Errorum Abaelardi,<sup>1</sup> Bernard opposes the teaching of Peter Abelard on both the Trinity and the Redemption. Bernard criticizes Abelard's denial of any right for the devil and rejects his explanation for Christ's death as essentially an act of love that engenders love in our hearts.<sup>2</sup>

In questioning Abelard's reasoning concerning the meaning of the Redemption, Bernard looked at Christ's work in a way that was very close to Anselm's point of view. The passage in which Bernard comes so near deals with the necessity that man himself make satisfaction:

... ut videlicet satisfactio unius omnibus imputetur, sicut omnium peccata unus ille portavit; nec alterjamen inveniat qui forefecit, alter qui satisfecit: quia caput et corpus unus est Christus. Satisfecit ergo caput pro membris.<sup>3</sup>

Rivière noticed this passage and pointed out Bernard's use of the term satisfactio.<sup>4</sup> Of course, the mere use of this word does not automatically mean the author was influenced by St. Anselm. We could dismiss the passage as nothing but an indication that Anselm's characteristic word satisfacere and its noun form had come into such common use among theologians by the 1140s that even a conservative theologian like Bernard could use it without any qualms about adhesion to Anselm's doctrine of the Redemption.

But there is something about this passage which does not allow us to claim

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1. PL 182: 1053-72.

2. See my remarks on Abelard in the next chapter.

3. PL 182: 1065D.

4. J. Rivière, Le Dogme de la Rédemption au Début du Moyen-Âge (Paris, 1934), 216-7.



that Bernard is merely using a word devoid of Anselm's meaning. If we look at the sixth chapter of the Tractatus as a whole, we begin to realize that the passage is adding a new understanding of the Redemption to the traditional abuse of power idea. This change in the way the meaning of the Redemption is set forth indicates Anselm's influence on Bernard.

The purpose of the sixth chapter is to show that man was liberated not only by the mercy of God but also by his justice. Bernard fears that Abelard makes the Redemption nothing more than an act of divine mercy, for if Christ does nothing but give us an example of charity, man's justification is given freely instead of earned through Christ's actions. For Bernard this cannot be: justification implies the response of divine justice to human justice. Already we are dealing in categories similar to those of Anselm: the importance of justice in the Redemption; the participation of man in this justice:

*Iuste igitur homo addictus, sed misericorditer liberatus; sic tamen misericorditer, ut non defuerit iustitia quaedam et in ipsa liberatione: quoniam hoc quoque fuit de misericordia liberantis, ut (quod congruebat remediis liberandi) iustitia magis contra invasorem, quam potentia uteretur.*<sup>1</sup>

Bernard says here that even though God's justice is ultimately based on his mercy, our liberation must contain this justice. And he goes on to identify this justice with its use against the devil. We find ourselves with Augustine's distinction between justice and power in the Redemption. Bernard assumes all that Augustine said on why it was fitting and right that the devil be conquered by justice instead of power: '... quod congruebat remediis liberandi'.<sup>2</sup>

If Bernard stopped here in his addition of justice to the conditions of the Redemption, he would have been firmly Augustinian and nothing else in his correction of Abelard. But Bernard looks upon justice not only as something exercised towards the invader but also as something held by man. It is man who must recover justice. In order for him to do so, an alien justice was assigned

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1. PL 182: 1065B-C.

2. See Augustine, 13 De Trinitate 13, 17 - PL 42: 1026-7.

to him. This is a most unusual way of looking at the abuse of power through Christ's justice:

Quid namque ex se agere poterat, ut semel amissam justitiam recuperaret homo servus peccati, vinctus diaboli? Assignata est ei proinde aliena, qui caruit sua; et ipsa (justitia) sic est.<sup>1</sup>

Slave to sin and bound to the devil, man profits from Christ's justice, which Bernard sees as working when the devil tried to exercise an illicit power over this sinless being:

Venit princeps hujus mundi; et in Salvatore non invenit quidquam: et cum nihilominus innocenti manus injecit, justissime quos tenebat amisit, quando is qui mortis nihil debebat, accepta mortis injuria, jure illum, qui obnoxius erat, et mortis debito, et diaboli solvit dominio.<sup>2</sup>

Augustine himself could not have presented a more adequate summary of the abuse of power.

But Bernard's presentation of justice is not complete. He has only discussed the alien justice with which man was endowed so the devil could be defeated. In order to gain salvation, however, man must have his own justice. It is to this second justice that Bernard now turns: 'Qua enim justitia id secundo homo exigeretur? Homo siquidem qui debuit, homo qui solvit.'<sup>3</sup> Debere and solvere are terms already used in Augustine. Man owes something; he pays something. For Bernard the debt is that of death, the debitum mortis which man himself must pay. Bernard is thus saying that the efficacy of Christ's defeat of the devil depends on the fact that Christ is a man. The justice of Christ's act stems from two causes: he justly defeated the devil; he, as a man, was able to apply his justice to man. The first point comes directly from Augustine; the second is implied in Augustine but is clearer in Anselm.

Despite traditional elements, we are witnessing a quiet revolution in one theologian's understanding of the Redemption. Augustine was content to base Christ's act on his defeat of the devil. Man for Augustine was but a

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1. PL 182: 1065C.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.



passive spectator in a cosmic battle.<sup>1</sup> Now Bernard is insisting that man, although helped by Christ, must in some way himself participate and himself regain justice. Bernard is involving man in the same way Anselm did. Both of them are saying that only man ought to satisfy for sin.

The passage quoted at the beginning of this section confirms our suspicion of a change in attitude. Bernard says that the satisfaction of one is imputed to all. Just as one sinned and his sin was applied to all, so too the satisfaction of one was applied to all. If the head and body are Christ, it is the head that has satisfied for the members. Bernard brings in two passages from Paul in order to show that his ideas are based on Scripture:

Nam "si unus", inquit, "pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt" (II Cor. v, 14); ut videlicet satisfactio unius omnibus imputetur, sicut omnium peccata unus ille portavit; nec alter jam inveniat qui forefecit, alter qui satisfecit: quia caput et corpus unus est Christus. Satisfecit ergo caput pro membris, Christus pro visceribus suis, quando juxta Evangelium Pauli, quo convincitur mendacium Petri (Abaelardi), mortuus pro nobis, "convivificavit nos sibi, donans nobis omnia delicta, delens quod adversus nos erat chirographum decreti, quod erat contrarium nobis, et ipsum tuli de medio affigens illud cruci, exspolians principatus et potestates". (Col. ii, 13-14).<sup>2</sup>

On the surface the entire passage is a simple restatement of St. Paul. But if we look at the whole of this section in the sixth chapter, we find that Bernard has in fact greatly enlarged the traditional conclusion drawn from these words of Paul: the abuse of power. Bernard has said that our liberation from sin and the devil has to come not only from Christ's defeat of him but also from the satisfaction that we ourselves have to make. This satisfaction is never carefully defined, but it can be linked to the debitum mortis that man owes. Man must himself pay this debt: 'Homo ... qui debuit, homo qui solvit.' Once the justice of God comes into play, man's involvement in the workings of his own Redemption becomes essential. Through Christ, we are justified; but only because Christ is one of us does this justification apply

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1. See the Introduction for the differences between Anselm and Augustine on the Redemption.

2. PL 182: 1065D.

to us.

Ultimately the only justice is that of Christ, but Bernard has looked upon this justice in two ways. First, through the justice Christ exercises over the devil. Second, through the justice that we share with Christ when he as one of us satisfies God with the debitum mortis. The satisfactio is never really explained. But it is still there, an addition to the traditional way of explaining the Redemption through the devil's defeat. This addition links Bernard with Anselm. Trying to understand divine justice in the Redemption, Bernard was not content with a mere restatement of the abuse of power. That explained Christ's justice versus the devil. But how is Christ's justice applied to us? Bernard answered by showing Christ's relation to us and the way he pays our debt.

There is no possibility here for an indestructible proof of Anselm's influence. But this new element in an otherwise purely Augustinian exposition points to Anselm. We are not so much surprised at the use of the word satisfactio as at Bernard's insistence that man himself must act, if he himself is to regain his own lost justice. The devil is as evident as ever, but man is more involved than he was in Augustine.

Bernard could call upon Anselmian ideas because he felt that Abelard had neglected to show the source of man's justice. Bernard's critique of Abelard shows how important Bernard considered this explanation for the origin of man's justification:

Haec est justitia hominis in sanguine Redemptoris: quam homo perditionis exsufflans et subearans in tantum evacuare conatur, ut totum quod Dominis gloria semetipsum exinanivit, quod minoratus est ab angelis, quod natus est de femina, quod conversatus est in mundo, quod expertus infima, quod passus indigna, quod demon per mortem crucis in sua reversus: ad id solum putet et disputet redigendum, ut traderet hominibus formam vitae vivendo et docendo, patiando, autem et moriendo charitatis praefigeret. Ergo docuit justitiam et non dedit; ostendit charitatem, sed non fundit.<sup>1</sup>

Bernard's criticism of Abelard's point of view is harsh and devastating. He asks how Abelard can say that Christ did all these things only for the sake

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1. PL 182: 1067A-B.



of teaching and to show justice and charity and not in order to bestow these qualities on man. Bernard assumes that justification means more than edification. The Redemption must bring justice to men. It is this word justitia that finally links Anselm and Bernard. Both of them insisted that Christ gained justice for man because he gave God something that he himself did not owe.

The presence of this single passage in all of Bernard's work is slender evidence that he actually read Cur Deus Homo. But in one way or other, he definitely was in contact with Anselm's theology of the Redemption. Bernard's theological mentor, William of St. Thierry, may have been Bernard's link with Anselm on the Redemption. William's Disputatio Adversus Abaelardum indicates his knowledge of Cur Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup>

Our evidence is much better and more decisive for Bernard's acquaintance with the Prologion and the De Libertate Arbitrii of Anselm. E. Bertola shows how Bernard took Anselm's formula 'Aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari possit' and turned it into 'Id quo nihil maius cogitari potest'.<sup>2</sup> Also S. Vanni Rovighi in his 'Notes sur l'Influence de Saint Anselme au XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle'<sup>3</sup> says that Bernard was aware of Anselm's ideas on free will, borrowed some of them intact, and changed others. These indications that Bernard knew some of Anselm's works increase the likelihood that he read Cur Deus Homo.<sup>4</sup>

In Bernard's attack on Abelard, then, the Cistercian went much further along the road to Anselm's theology of the Redemption than we might have

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1. Disputatio Adversus Abaelardum, PL 180: 274. Such words as inordinatum, debita/indebita, and satisfacere point to Anselm.

2. San Bernardo e la Teologia Speculativa (Publicazioni dell'Institute Universitario di Magliastro di Catania. Serie Filosofica. Padua, 1959), 53-4.

3. Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale viii (1965), 55-6.

4. Further light is being cast on the presence of Anselm in Cistercian writers with the publication of the Sermons of John of Ford, contained in Oxford Balliol College MS. 24 and written at the opening of the thirteenth century. The editor is Edm. Mikkers, and the first volume will be published in July 1970 in the Corpus Christianorum.

expected from the traditional nature of his theology. But it is precisely this traditionalism, holding close to the word of Scripture and explaining Paul's words on our justification, that led Bernard at least part way towards adopting Anselm's concept of satisfaction. Trying to understand the justice Christ gained, Bernard considered both the devil and man. In dealing with man, Bernard came to the Anselmian conclusion that through Christ, man himself should pay his debt to God.

### 3. Richard of St. Victor

Like Bernard, Richard of Saint Victor is one of three or four major mid-century figures whom one could categorize either as scholastic or monastic theologians.<sup>1</sup> Both Bernard and Richard I have placed in the monastic reception of Anselm because their reactions to Cur Deus Homo reflect much more the scriptural, exegetical background of their theology rather than any attempt at statement and resolution of the individual problems and questions of theology. The theology of Richard is essentially the result of meditation on scriptural passages leading to an exposition heavily dependent on allegory. In the De Sacramentis Richard's fellow Victorine Hugh broke away from this form and developed the school of Laon tradition with its emphasis on problem-solving and systematization. But long after Hugh wrote the De Sacramentis, Richard's so-called Liber de Verbo Incarnato reaffirmed the monastic tradition of theology.

The title Liber de Verbo Incarnato leads one to expect a scholastic treatise on the Incarnation. But as J. Ribaillier has already shown,<sup>2</sup> this

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1. See J. Beumer, 'Richard von St. Viktor, Theologe und Mystiker', Scholastik 31 (1956), 213-38. Beumer shows in what ways Richard belongs to monastic theology and how at the same time Richard integrates himself in scholastic theology with its emphasis on a generalized metaphysic instead of an individual psychology. Beumer is judging Richard on the basis of all his works. I only take a few, and in all of them, the monastic bent is more pronounced than the scholastic.

2. Richard of Saint Victor, Opusculas Théologiques, ed. J. Ribaillier (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen-Age xv, Paris, 1967), 221.



title completely misrepresents the author's intention and the content of the work. It is actually a commentary on a few lines of Isaiah:

Ad me clamat ex Seir: "Custos, qui de nocte? Custos, qui de nocte?"  
Dixit custos: "Venit mane et nox. Si quaeritis, quaerite; convertimini, venite." (Is. 21: 11-12)<sup>1</sup>

Richard says that someone has asked him to explain (exponere) these lines. He concedes that there is not only depth in the prophet's words but also an attractiveness that is stimulating. And so he sets out to interpret them, not only superficially but also by setting forth some ideas that these lines suggest to him: 'et hoc ipsum, quod in eis somnio, nescio, si potero, prout oporteret, verbis idoneis explicare.'<sup>2</sup> And so Richard tells us at the beginning that his exegesis will go further than a literal explanation of the words. Still, he never completely leaves exegesis. Ribaillier has given the work a title more appropriate to its genre: 'Ad me clamat ex Seir', and I shall follow his use.<sup>3</sup>

Ribaillier dates the work from the time Richard was prior at St. Victor, after 1162.<sup>4</sup> Richard thus wrote more than two decades after Hugh's De Sacramentis, for the great abbot was dead already in 1141. If we compare the Anselmian content of Hugh's work with that of Richard, we find that there are almost no areas of mutual borrowing. Richard's understanding of the Redemption was completely independent from Hugh's, even though both of them went to Anselm for much of their thought. This fact only emphasizes the different traditions in which Hugh and Richard were using Anselm.

In the first seven chapters of the 'Ad me clamat ex Seir', Richard concentrates on a literal understanding of the Isaiah passage. Then he announces he is ready for 'what (the words) signify according to a mystical under-

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1. FL 196: 995A. Ribaillier has also edited the work.

2. FL 196: 995A.

3. Opuscula Théologiques, pp. 220-21.

4. Ibid., pp. 221-22.

standing'.<sup>1</sup> From this point on in the eighth chapter, Richard reveals the importance of Anselm's contribution to his thinking. He says that not only many Jews but also many Gentiles foreknew Christ's coming and awaited him with great longing. They came only gradually to this knowledge.<sup>2</sup> In the first stage some of them, 'divinitus illuminati et naturali ratione edocti', understood the sad state of the human race, how it had sunk to idolatry and an intolerable burden of captivity. Even those who believed in and cherished one God were in this state.<sup>3</sup>

In the second stage, some men understood our wretchedness better by realising that we had been thrown out from a paradise. So they knew not only the effect of man's situation, but also its cause. But they had no idea how man was to escape from his troubles.<sup>4</sup>

Others were able to see not only the magnitude of the ill but also the means of reparation. But they were still at a disadvantage, for they were not certain of God's will in the matter:

*Alii adhuc altius perscrutantes, et subtilius intuentes gratiae manuductione discreti invenerunt, et inspexerunt multo intuitu non solum magnitudinem damnationis verum etiam modum reparationis. Modum itaque restorationis qui ejusmodi erant intelligebant, sed super hoc ipso divinus beneplacitum nesciebant.*<sup>5</sup>

Finally there were those who to a great extent did know God's intent, his divinum propositum, but their knowledge seems to have been a matter of divine revelation. We notice immediately the appearance of an exclusively Anselmian term, the divinum propositum.<sup>6</sup>

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1. PL 196: 1002A - 'Audiamus adhuc quid ipsa signent juxta mysticam intelligentiam.'

2. PL 196: 1002A-B.

3. PL 196: 1002B.

4. PL 196: 1002B.

5. PL 196: 1002C.

6. CDH II, 16; I, 25.



Richard is only concerned with the third group, those who reasoned to the means of reconciliation but did not know God's desire:

Sed caeteris praetermissis, hic tantum interim intendamus qui modum restaurationis, ut diximus, intelligebant, sed divinam dispositionem in eo ipso non noverant.<sup>1</sup>

In the discussion that follows,<sup>2</sup> Richard of Saint Victor summarizes the rationes necessariae for the Redemption by a God-man, reasons that he claims a group of Gentiles knew. Richard's rationalism actually goes one step further than that of Anselm, for Richard is not concerned with an argument that can counter the objections of the infidels. Rather he is convinced that this process of reasoning actually took place in history in the minds of many infidels. Richard's faith in the possibility of necessary reasons to grasp parts of divine truth shows an attachment to Anselmian theology, but also a reversal of the Anselmian fides quaerens intellectum into something like intellectus quaerens fidem.

The members of the third group could see that man could not be reconciled to God through any free forgiveness.<sup>3</sup> And so satisfaction was the only possible response on man's part.<sup>4</sup> The necessity of satisfaction is based on the rationem iustitiae, which could not be fulfilled through an act of free forgiveness: 'Ut ergo posset homo resurgere juxta rationem iustitiae, opus erat satisfatione.'<sup>5</sup> Anselm came to a similar conclusion by emphasizing the necessity for restoration of God's honour. Richard has used justitia as an all-encompassing term that cryptically expresses in a few lines what it took Anselm many chapters to convey. This is the impression we get from most of

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1. PL 196: 1002D.

2. PL 196: 1002D-1004A.

3. PL 196: 1002D-1003A.

4. As Ribailier points out (p. 244), Richard's necessity of satisfaction lacks the rigour found in Anselm's necessity, even though it appears that Richard is being just as strict as Anselm. We shall see in Richard's summing-up, that he limits Anselmian necessity.

5. PL 196: 1003A.

Richard's thinking that follows Anselm. The Victorine is willing to borrow from Anselm but unwilling to develop the argument in its entirety. Like so many other successors of Anselm, Richard tends to simplify and to delete much.

At this point Richard leaves Anselm, for he discusses the internal restraints that would have plagued man as long as he did not satisfy his fault. Having considered Anselm's ideas on the God-man relationship after sin, Richard concerns himself with man's personal sense of guilt after sin. Even if man had no outside attacker (the devil) to remind him of his plight, he would still have to deal with the attack of a guilty conscience: mordentis conscientiae exactionem. How, indeed, could man have a clear conscience after what Adam and Eve did:

Quomodo ergo post tantae praesumptionis audaciam tranquillam conscientiam obtinerent vel de corde delerent notam confusionis, si in nullo satisfacerent?<sup>1</sup>

In discussing man's dignity or position in creation, Richard once more uses Anselm. Man would not be returned to his former dignity if he were redeemed by another creature. Richard has already mentioned man's dignity in terms of the possibility that he be raised to grace without forgiveness.<sup>2</sup> Now he is concerned with man's position as it would be if he received help from a creature instead of from God. In such a case, mankind would be deprived of its initial dignity held before the fall:

Item si homo per creaturam potius quam per Creatorem recuperare posset et recuperaret justitiam, et mediante justitia futurae beatitudinis gloriam, nonne de caetero contra excellentiam primae dignitatis magis obnoxius esset creaturae quam Creatori, facturae quam factori?<sup>3</sup>

The loss of dignity argument is not stated the same way in Cur Deus Homo,<sup>4</sup> but Richard has extracted the kernel of Anselm's thought: man must regain his former rank, and he cannot do so without God's help. More important, Richard

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1. PL 196: 1003B.

2. PL 196: 1003A.

3. PL 196: 1003C.

4. I, 5.



here follows one of the great themes of Anselm, the concept of order in the universe. Richard's attention to man's position reveals a sense of the universe's completeness and the necessity that things in it be kept in harmony with each other.

The conclusion is easy and obvious: 'Ad plenam itaque hominis restaurationem omnino non sufficeret persona quae Deus non erat.' Only God can restore the ruptured scale of being; only God can provide for man in a way that does not destroy man's position.

But man is also a necessary participant in this act of reparation. If any other being performs the work, then the act could not be applied to man's salvation. This contention is directly from Anselm, and so we can compare the two writers by putting them parallel to each other:

'Ad me clamat', ch. 8,  
PL 196: 1003D

Sed nihilominus constat quia quantum ad rationem justitiae ad hominem nihil attineret quidquid quaevis persona faceret quae homo non esset. Quis autem non videat aequum et plenum juris esse et omnino rationabile ut satisfaciat filius pro patre, fratre pro fratre, si ille non potest, si iste ad haec idoneus non est? Hominis ergo redemptio hominem exigebat, qui pro conditionis debito propriae naturae merito subveniret.

GDH II, 8

Sed si novum hominem facit non ex Adae genere, non pertinebit ad genus humanum, quod natus est de Adam. Quare non debet satisfacere pro eo, quia non erit de illo. Sicut enim rectum est, ut pro culpa hominis homo satisfaciat, ita necesse est, ut satisfaciens idem sit, qui peccator, aut eiusdem generis.

Richard compares the situation to that of a family, while Anselm speaks in terms of genus. Both conclude that a non-human being's act would not apply to the human race: '... non pertinebit ad genus humanum' is equal to '... ad hominem nihil attineret'. Even though his idea is exactly equivalent, however, Richard has at no point followed Anselm's language or development of thought. We do not have the feeling that Richard was simply rephrasing Anselm's statement. Like everything else in Richard's 'Ad me clamat ex Seir' there is an independence which still allows for integration of much of Anselm's thought.

The second reason why a man is necessary is that through his sin, man incurred the debitum mortis, so now an unowed death must be paid for an owed

one: 'Item homo per inobedientiam debitum mortis incurrit et ad ejusdem debiti expiationem obediendo indebitam mortem pro debita solvere oportuit.'<sup>1</sup>

This is one of Richard's typically cryptic sentences, which assumes in a few words many chapters of Anselm. For Richard the debt is simple, an unowed death. Richard thus omits one of Anselm's central ideas: only a God-man could give up something that was worth more than the universe. Richard is mainly concerned with showing how man's gift to God has to be a death not owed to God. Since God cannot die and all other beings have previously been eliminated, then the death must come from a man. Man's debitum to God is assumed and not analysed with the thoroughness of Anselm.

We thus come to the moment of synthesis: the Redeemer must be God; he must be man, so he must be a God-man. This is a long way from Anselm's statement 'only God can; only man ought, so only a God-man can and ought'. But Richard avoids the logical contradiction that R.W. Southern pointed out in Anselm's proof.<sup>2</sup> Southern claimed that Anselm did not attain his necessity of a God-man because the Anselmian formula, in order to eliminate everything except a God-man, actually has to mean that only God can, and ought not; only man ought, but cannot. Southern concluded that once God ought not do something, then there is no possibility for his participation in any way at all, even as a God-man. Man's ought does not cancel out God's ought not.<sup>3</sup>

Richard's process of reasoning is much simpler, for he assumes from the beginning that there must be a redeemer, while Anselm had tried not to make this assumption. The question for Richard is only one of identity - who will the redeemer be? In the preceding sections he has shown that the redeemer has to be God and also has to be man, so in his conclusion he easily adds them

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1. PL 196: 1003D.

2. R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge, 1966), 114-117.

3. A related problem is the two meanings of debere - to ought and to owe. Anselm recognized the problem himself in CDH II, 18. See Southern, Saint Anselm, p. 116.



together and concludes with a God-man. This is much more comfortable logically than Anselm's formula, but it does not attempt Anselm's tight necessity.

Richard's language seems to bear out this point, for he uses oportuit instead of the less equivocal necesse est. We can contrast the two theologians at this crucial point:

'Ad me clamat ex Seir',  
FL 196: 1003D-1004A

Ut itaque humani Redemptoris persona ad debiti satisfactionem idonea foret, oportuit ut esset verus Deus qui ad hoc sufficeret, ut esset verus homo qui pro jure necessitudinis merito exsolveret.

GDH II, 6

Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi deus nec debet nisi homo, necesse est, ut eam faciat deus-homo.

The main weakness in Richard's scheme is his treatment of God. Even if the Redeemer cannot provide satisfaction without being God, God is not bound to give satisfaction. In order to create a real necessity, Richard would have to say that God is bound to provide for man. Anselm tried to do so without limiting God's freedom by emphasising the immutability of God and his desire for the completion of the heavenly city by men. For Richard there is no such necessity. The fact that man will be saved ultimately depends only on the beneplicium of God. If it pleases God, then man is preserved and exalted. Richard never brings this aspect of his theology close to the surface of his writing, but it is still there. Anselm also believes in the divine will, but he spends much of Cur Deus Homo in showing how, once God sets up a situation, he will remain bound to the completion of that situation. Man will be saved as part of the divine scheme, even though man has made the means of his salvation more complicated. Richard's limited necessity does not guarantee man's position in the world. Instead it draws out the rational implications of a previously made divine choice.

This section containing Richard's summarisation and adaptation of Cur Deus Homo is only a small part of the 'Ad me clamat'. Later chapters contain further points that might be ascribed to Anselm, but Richard concentrates mainly on his own original interpretation of the Isaiah text. For a moment

he has come to Anselm, but he soon leaves him. In the fourteenth chapter, Richard moves from the mystical to the moral or tropological sense of the passage. Here he strongly emphasizes our personal response to Christ's death. The 'Ad me clamat' owes something to Anselm, but Richard has taken Anselm in his own special way and adjusted the arguments of Cur Deus Homo to his own highly sophisticated exegetical framework. It takes a great deal of digging to uncover the Anselmian deposit.

Among other works of Richard, very few contain anything at all even distantly related to Anselm's Cur Deus Homo. In the De Emanuele there are a few lines.<sup>1</sup> The concept of dignitas and some of the reasons for the virgin birth could come from Anselm, but only vaguely. There are no references at all to satisfaction. Richard's interpretation of the Redemption here is based almost solely on what we as redeemed creatures gain from it. Richard emphasizes our personal relationship with Christ and does not explore the nature of Christ's offering to the Father. This is a typical example of monastic theology's moralizing tendency.

The sermons in II, 10 of the Liber Exceptionum contain a few passages that faintly recall Anselm's ideas on the debt of sin, but the influence of Anselm is, at best, only miniscule.<sup>2</sup>

The best indications we have of the general direction of Richard's approach to the Redemption appear in his Annotationes Mysticas in Psalmos, in which he releases an emotion that exceeds that of Anselm's response to the Redemption in his Meditation on Redemption:

O quanta humilitas Omnipotentis, o qualis sublimitas hominis! Deum habere hominem patrem, humilitas incomparabilis! Hominem habere Filium Deum, sublimitas inestimabilis! O quam recte diligitur iste tam humilis, tam altus, vere singulari amore dignus iste noster dilectus!<sup>3</sup>

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1. De Emanuele, FL 196: 619-23.

2. Liber Exceptionum, ed. by Jean Chatillon (Textes Philosophiques du Moyen-Age, v, Paris, 1956), 433.

3. FL 196: 298B-C.



Theological content is minimal. Richard casts aside all restraint and speaks ecstasically of the role of Christ.

Richard expresses the intellectual conclusions of this outlook in his In Cantica Canticorum, in which he says that Christ suffered 'in order to show his incomparable charity':

Adeo suos in passione dilexit, et tantus fuit in eo fervor charitatis, ad redimendum eos, ut acerbiter passionis ejus omnino tollere potuerit, sed noluit, et ino acerbiteriorem martyrii dolorem assumpsit et pati voluerit, plus quam nullus hominum unquam passus sit, vel pati potuerit, ut incomparabilem demonstraret charitatem.<sup>1</sup>

The basic motive of the Redemption and the personal sufferings of Christ in Richard becomes not the assumption of an unearned punishment but the exhibition of an unlimited love. Richard goes on to say that in Christ's death man was not such much redeemed by Christ, in the sense of bought back, as given freely by the Father to Christ:

In tantum de ipsorum redemptione exultat, ut non reputaret magnum id quod pro eis pertulit, sed videatur eos quos accepit datos sibi potius in munere quam emptos pretio vel recompensatione.<sup>2</sup>

The ideas of satisfaction, compensation, and debt are dismissed here in favour of God's unlimited mercy. Richard is perfectly satisfied with explaining Christ's act only in terms of his love for us. Richard has left for good the path of Anselm and is very close to the interpretation that we shall soon find in Abelard. But Richard is not making statements of doctrine by such language. He is merely expressing a personal view parenthetical to his exegesis.

And so we cannot oppose Richard of St. Victor's view of the Redemption to that of Anselm, for Richard never met the problem directly. And yet the absence of Anselmian ideas on the Redemption<sup>3</sup> in almost all his work outside

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1. PL 196: 435B.

2. PL 196: 435C.

3. Elsewhere, Richard used Anselm's Monologion to a certain extent. Ribaillier gives citations in his edition of Richard's De Trinitate: (Textes philosophiques du Moyen-Age, vi, Paris, 1956), esp. pp. 29-31 for the editor's comments on Richard's use of Monologion.

the 'Ad me clamat ex Seir' points to the shallowness of Anselm's influence on him. At one point in his intellectual career, Richard absorbed and adopted some of Anselm's ideas on the Redemption. But this was only for a moment. The rest of Richard's work reveals a monastic figure on the fringes of Paris scholasticism who looked at the Redemption primarily in terms of how man responds to Christ's love for us.

#### 4. Nicholas of Bec and Gerhoch of Reichersberg

Richard of St. Victor is an unusual example of the influence of Anselm in twelfth century monastic thought, for Richard is such an original thinker. A far more typical instance of transmission has been discovered at Bec. There in the mid-twelfth century writings of a monk whose name was probably Nicholas, A. Wilmart found an abbreviation of Cur Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup> Wilmart judged Nicholas to be an author only 'of the third rank'.<sup>2</sup> His work is the typical monastic encyclopedia trying to encompass knowledge on many different subjects by borrowing passages from numerous writers. Twenty folios of the manuscript of Nicholas's work contain his summary of Anselm's theology of the Redemption.<sup>3</sup> At the end of his discourse, he encourages his readers who want to know 'most fully' (plenissime) about the subject to 'read the books of the venerable Anselm archbishop which are entitled, one Cur Deus Homo, and the other De partu virginali ...'.<sup>4</sup>

A more prominent witness to Anselm's continuity in monastic theology is the turbulent Gerhoch of Reichersberg, who spent most of his active life engaged in Church-State controversy.<sup>5</sup> As provost of the Austin monastery

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1. A. Wilmart, 'Les Ouvrages d'un Moine de Bec. Un Débat sur la Profession Monastique au XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle', *EB* xliiv (1932), 21-46.

2. Wilmart, p. 27.

3. Paris Bibliothèque Nationale Lat. MS. 2342, ff. 29-47.

4. f. 47: '... legat libros venerabilis Anselmi archiepiscopi, qui intitulantur unus Cur Deus Homo, alter de partu virginali, et ibi plenissime ut puto reperiet.'

5. Peter Classen, Gerhoch von Reichersberg: Eine Biographie. Mit einem Anhang über die Quellen, ihre handschriftliche Überlieferung, und ihre Chronologie (Wiesbaden, 1960), esp. pp. 193-272. Also C.E. Sheedy, 'Gerhoch of Reichersberg', *NCE* 6, 383.



of Reichersberg in the archdiocese of Salzburg, Gerhoh finished one of his major works, De Investigatione Antichristi, in 1162.<sup>1</sup> His quarrel with Frederick I over the antipope Victor IV was at its height. In the second of the De Investigatione's three books, Gerhoh writes of the Redemption in a way that would at first seem to exclude any possibility of Anselm's presence.<sup>2</sup> We find the usual twelfth century monastic exegetical-moral emphasis on the efficacy of Christ's death for us. Images and parallels taken from the Old Testament to illustrate man's sin and Christ's offering are frequent. The Pharaoh of Egypt appears as a type of the devil. But from the third to the thirteenth chapters, Gerhoh makes a serious attempt to show, just as Anselm had, that man could have been saved only through the passion and death of Christ.

He begins by speaking of the satisfaction and penance Christ offered to God the Father for us.<sup>3</sup> As so often in other writers, the theologian does not define the meaning of satisfaction. But he does say that the one who dies for us must be a homo innocens who owes nothing to death. Also the redeemer must be born from the race of man but must somehow still be sinless. This is necessary so that the requirements of justice be fulfilled.<sup>4</sup> It would not be fitting for God to act out of mercy alone with no concern for justice. Anselm's insistence that man pay God back for his fault appears in such language.

Gerhoh also disqualifies the angels from the role of redeemer when he says that they could put on human flesh, but not a human soul. This reason has nothing to do with Anselm, but the next point, that the offering of an

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1. Classen, pp. 421-4. LKT 4, 725.

2. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Opera Hactenus Inedita, ed. F. Scheibelberger, (Linz, 1875), 1, 195-725. Classen (p. 239) rejects Anselm's influence in the De Investigatione 'Eine Einwirkung Anselms von Canterbury ist nicht zu beobachten.' I cannot agree.

3. Scheibelberger, p. 195.

4. Ibid., p. 197.

angel would not be worthy enough to pay for sin, brings us to the centre of Anselm's theology of the Redemption. Gerhoh uses two terms that come from Cur Deus Homo: pretium and pondus. These words underline the gravity of man's sin and the poverty of anything an innocent man or angel might offer in compensation:

Præterea nec hominis nec angeli carne vestiti mori licet innocentia tanti pretii aut ponderis apud Deum justum judicem fuisset, ut totius nocentis mundi peccatis præsponderare valuisset.<sup>1</sup>

Gerhoh continues in an Anselmian vein by pointing out the impossibility of satisfaction for our own sins, to say nothing of the sins of others. He is very close to Anselm's idea that because we cannot satisfy for one sin, we cannot even imagine satisfying for all our sins.

A final reason disqualifies an angel from acting as our redeemer. God proposed that man should be equal to the angels. But man would be the servant of any creature who redeemed him, and so he would not be raised to his proper level in creation:

Esto autem quod fuerit possibile per angelum vel per hominem noviter e terra creatum redemptionem compleri. Sed antiquum Dei consilium de sublimatione seu reparatione hominum ad æqualitatem angelorum per hominem vel angelum compleri valuisset? Quomodo enim in gloria par angelis esset, qui vel hominum purum vel quemlibet angelorum ad Deum mediatorem habet, cujus tanquam servus emptitius esset?<sup>2</sup>

This point comes directly from Cur Deus Homo I, 5, in which Anselm said that because man must worship God alone, salvation through another creature is impossible. Otherwise man would be so indebted to such a creature that he would not give God the honour due him. We notice that Gerhoh has broken through the allegorical surface of monastic theology and has turned what might have been a treatise full of Biblical symbols into a logical exposition of the necessity of Christ.

Gerhoh does not dilute this necessity with any Augustinian statements about convenience. Instead he prefers to go the full distance with Anselm:

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1. Scheibelberger, pp. 197-8. See CDH I, 21.

2. Scheibelberger, p. 198.



Unde procul pellenda est illa suspicio per alium quam per Deum hominem factum redemptionem hominis compleri potuisse.... Nunc autem demonstratum est, quantae alium redemptorem inconvenientiae consequerentur.<sup>1</sup>

The clarity and incisiveness of such passages indicate that a monastic atmosphere does not always lead to the 'third-rate' writing of Bec in the 1150s. Even in the later twelfth century, the high level of Anselm's speculation could still encourage some monks to consider the reasons behind the doctrines of the Church. As the supreme example of monastic theology, Anselm's works had already shown that the relatively isolated monastic thinker could do more than collect and arrange fragments from works of other men. Anselm had implicitly challenged the dominance of labyrinthine spiritual exegesis of Scripture. Gerhoh only followed Anselm's lead. He depends a great deal on Anselm, but he also has his own originality. His finest achievement is his reconciliation of strands of speculation with Biblical imagery.

At times, however, Gerhoh leaves scriptural images completely and excels in rational distinctions. In the ninth chapter for example, he considers what would have happened if God had snatched man away from the devil's power sine satisfactione legitima. Instead of making the classic confusion between man's release from the devil and the satisfaction man gives God, Gerhoh says clearly that even if man were freed from the devil, he would not be able to look upon God. For man would still owe God satisfaction for sin:

Itaque per omnia mors Christi necessaria nostrae saluti comprobatur sine qua etiam homo de potestate diaboli erutus faciem suam ad videndam claritatem Dei nunquam levasset.<sup>2</sup>

In the thirteenth century, Bonaventure and others would make the same distinction. Escape from the devil does not resolve man's situation as far as God is concerned.<sup>3</sup> Gerhoh has anticipated these developments in theology, because he has understood the content of Cur Deus Homo with its emphasis on

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1. Scheibelberger, p. 199.

2. Ibid., p. 205.

3. See my chapter on the Franciscan School.

what man gives God for sin.

The next chapter brings the open statement of a question Gerhoh has been anticipating for many chapters. Why did not God make it impossible for man to sin and thus save him from the devil? With his Biblical orientation Gerhoh says that this question is similar to asking why God did not prevent Israel from entering Egypt and thus preserve her from Pharaoh.<sup>1</sup> The answer can only be that divine power is shown in a fuller and better way when the devil is vanquished through the weakness of human flesh than through God's will alone. Gerhoh claims that it would not have been fitting for God to conquer the devil by force. 'We cannot wholly deny that the possession of the devil over man was just.'<sup>2</sup> Gerhoh appears to mean that man deserved to be held by the devil, but he may also be conceding some justice to the devil. In any case, this line of thinking takes him away from Anselm and may even be his criticism of Anselm's view of the devil's power.

Like Anselm in Cur Deus Homo II, 6 Gerhoh brings together all the threads of argument in his thirteenth chapter and concludes that man could only have been redeemed through Christ.<sup>3</sup> All other ways would only have provided an insufficient satisfaction. The necessity of Christ is based on the inability of any other creature. This type of argument lacks Anselm's dimension of sin and satisfaction. These concepts are not adequately explained. Gerhoh never shows exactly why Christ's offering of himself is of sufficient worth to compensate for all the sins of men. Nevertheless, he has taken much from Anselm by following his method of using reasonable explanations for what man knows by faith. In Gerhoh monastic theology reaches a high level.

And yet this tradition was rapidly becoming of secondary importance. Well into the thirteenth century, there are monastic theologians who borrow bits

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1. Scheibelberger, pp. 205-6.

2. Ibid., p. 206: 'Justum autem diaboli possessionem in homine extitisse non penitus negare possumus.'

3. Ibid., p. 213.



and pieces from Cur Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup> Also the monasteries continued to collect Anselmian manuscripts. But the hard thinking on the Redemption was being done in the schools. Laon and Paris thus become for the next two chapters the focus of our study of Anselm's influence.

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1. For example, John of Ford, whose sermons acknowledge Anselm by name. See Balliol College MS. 24, f. 23rb and also the forthcoming edition (July, 1970), by Edm. Mickers in the Corpus Christianorum series.

Chapter III

EARLY TWELFTH CENTURY SCHOLASTIC RECEPTION (c. 1090-1150)

1. The School of Laon

Leaving behind the monastic use of Cur Deus Homo, we turn first to the group of secular teachers associated with the cathedral school of Laon.<sup>1</sup>

In a number of ways, Anselm of Canterbury and the school of Laon share the same ideas or at least are concerned with the same questions on the Redemption. I shall point out the similarities I have found without minimizing the basic fact that Anselm centres his idea of the Redemption on the satisfaction man makes to God, while the school of Laon founds its interpretation on the devil's abuse of power.

The chronology of Laon writings is an unresolved problem. The two manuscripts that definitely contain writings originating from the oral or written work of Anselm of Laon are probably only later versions (around 1125) of a much earlier theological tradition.<sup>2</sup> We know that the school itself was already well established by the opening years of the twelfth century. As R.W. Southern has pointed out, when Abelard came to Laon in 1112, he found that the great Anselm was already an old man.<sup>3</sup> Two charters refer to Anselm as chancellor of the church of Laon in 1106-12 and 1115. He died in 1117. His brother

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1. For general background on the school of Laon, see especially: J. Rivière, Le Dogme de la Rédemption au Début du Moyen-Age, (Bibliothèque Thomist xix, Paris, 1934), 136-54. J. DeGhellinck, Le Mouvement Théologique du XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle (Museum Lessianum. Section Historique, x, Bruges, etc., 1948), 133-48. A good, but somewhat out of date, bibliography appears in A.M. Landgraf, Einführung in die Geschichte der Theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik (Regensburg, 1948), pp. 55-62. For more recent work, see the Bulletin of RTAM.

2. The two manuscripts, Troyes 425 (Liber Pancrisis) and Avranches 19, O. Lottin originally dated somewhat earlier in Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècles, v: L'École d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux (referred to as PM, v) (Gembloux, Belgium, 1959), 10-14. But Lottin moved the dating of the two manuscripts to 1120-25 after an attack by P.D. Van den Dynde, RTAM xxvi (1959), 60-84. Lottin's reply in RTAM xxvi (1959), 307-14.

3. R.W. Southern, Saint Anselm and his Biographer (Cambridge, 1966), 361. FL 178, 124-5.



Raoul probably took over as chancellor, for in 1129 and 1131 'Radulphus' was signing charters. By 1134 'Radulphus' had been succeeded by Ernardus.<sup>1</sup>

It is entirely possible that both Anselm and Raoul were well established at Laon by the early 1090s and that Anselm of Canterbury, in the course of writing Cur Deus Homo, came into contact with their work and thought. Canterbury and Laon were both participating in the revival of theological studies in monasteries and cathedral schools at the end of the eleventh century. It is thus no surprise to find that a passage of Raoul on the devil's role in the Redemption is reproduced in the decisive seventh chapter of Cur Deus Homo's first book.<sup>2</sup> J. Rivière first discovered the equivalence of the passages and, having thought that Raoul wrote after the 1090s, claimed Raoul was borrowing from Cur Deus Homo.<sup>3</sup> But R.W. Southern has criticized this conclusion on the grounds that Raoul would hardly borrow from Anselm only in a matter in which he disagreed with him and at the same time pay no attention to Anselm when he did agree with him. In other words, Raoul would not look to Anselm for a refutation of the argument for the rights of the devil when Raoul wanted to favour that very argument for the devil's centrality in the Redemption. So Southern concluded that it was Anselm who was borrowing from Raoul:

St. Anselm had no need to borrow from the Laon writer where they agreed, because he had fuller and better arguments for the views they both held; but he borrowed where they disagreed, because he wanted a contemporary expression of the traditional view to hold up for examination.<sup>4</sup>

Southern's reasoning makes better sense than Rivière's, and the loose, undefined chronology of the school of Laon would allow Raoul to be writing in the early 1090s, so that Anselm could have used his view of the devil as an example of the theory of the Redemption that he could not accept.

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1. Southern, Saint Anselm, pp. 360-1.

2. Southern shows the equivalent phrases in his Appendix on Raoul and Anselm in Saint Anselm, pp. 357-9.

3. J. Rivière, 'D'un singulier Emprunt à Saint Anselme chez Raoul de Laon', Revue des Sciences Religieuses, xvi (1936), 344-6.

4. Southern, Saint Anselm, p. 360.



The presence of a Laon argument and its refutation in Anselm should not lead us to conclude that the borrowings and the influence were all one way: Laon to Canterbury. The dating of the various fragments and treatises ascribed to the Laon theologians is so difficult and obscure that we can only say in a few cases which way the influence is working. Also we must not look at Anselm as an enemy of the school of Laon's interpretation of the Redemption. He accepts much of their thinking, and some of their writers apparently take much from him. Normally we will not even try to decide which way the influence flows. Instead we will only show the common ground St. Anselm and the Laon writers occupy in their theology of the Redemption.

A great deal of work has been done in our century on the school of Laon by such historians as O. Lottin, H. Weisweiler, F. Eliemetzrieder, and Beryl Smalley.<sup>1</sup> On the basis of their collections and evaluations of sources that can be ascribed to the school of Laon, I am able to present the following Laon writings that have parts dealing with the Redemption and which show some links with Cur Deus Homo:

1. The Sentences definitely ascribed to Anselm of Laon and to Raoul in Troyes 425 (Liber Pancraxis) and Avranches 19 and reproduced to a greater or lesser extent in other manuscripts. Also anonymous disconnected sentences that can be attributed to the school of Laon. All are contained in Odon Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècles, v: Problèmes d'Histoire Littéraire: L'École d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux (Gembloux, Belgium; 1959). We will refer to this collection as FM v, with the appropriate number and page.
2. The treatises of the school of Laon: Sententia divinae paginae and Principium et causa omnium deus (Sententia Anselmi) in F. Eliemetzrieder, Anselms von Laon Systematische Sentenzen (BGPTMA, xviii, 2-3, 1919). The first will be referred to as SDP.
3. Collections of sentences from various German manuscripts that H. Weisweiler has compiled in his Das Schrifttum der Schule Anselms von Laon und Wilhelms von Champeaux in Deutschen Bibliotheken (BGPTMA, xxxiii, 1-2, 1936). The three collections with which we will deal are:

Augustinus. Semel immolatus est Christus, pp. 281-91.

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1. The works of the first three writers are mentioned below. Beryl Smalley's most helpful contribution is her The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (2nd ed., Oxford 1952), 49-52, 56-77.



Deus hominem fecit perfectum, pp. 292-311.

Dubitatur a quibusdam, quis sit Zacharias ille, pp. 314-58.

4. Sententiae Berolinenses from Berlin Staatsbibliothek, Theol. MS. lat. oct. 40, published by F. Stegmüller in RTAM, xi (1931), 31-61. Abbreviated as SB. Stegmüller has also published the Sententiae Varsavienses in Divus Thomas (1943), but I have been unable to obtain a copy.
5. The collection of sentences entitled Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur, edited by Weisweiler, RTAM v (1933), 252-74. Also its successor, the Klagenfurt Sentences Deus est sine principio, discussed by Weisweiler in 'Die erste Vorlesung aus der Schule Anselms von Laon', Scholastik, xxxvi (1961), 512-49 and xxxvii (1962), 45-84.

To begin with the sentences definitely ascribed to Anselm of Laon, we find some agreement between the two Anselms on the position of the devil in the work of the Redemption. Thus far writers like Rivière and DeClerck have tried to show the vast difference between the two theologians on the devil's role without pointing out an underlying accord.<sup>1</sup> For both Anselm of Laon and Anselm of Canterbury, man must conquer the devil, just as the devil had conquered him. Anselm of Laon says:

Nisi enim homo esset qui diabolum vinceret, non iuste sed violenter ei homo tolleretur. Sed si homo eum vicerit, iure hominem perdidit.<sup>2</sup>

Anselm of Canterbury does not make the Laon distinction between God's justice and his power as seen in the contrast between iuste and violenter. But he does follow in substance Anselm of Laon when he says:

Victoria vero talis debet esse, ut sicut fortis ac potestate immortalis consensit facile diabolo, ut peccaret, unde iuste incurrit poenam mortalitatis, ita infirmus et mortalis, qualem ipse se fecit, per mortis difficultatem vincat diabolum, ut nullo modo peccet.<sup>3</sup>

The last phrase, 'ut nullo modo peccet', is very close to the thinking of Laon, which built its case for the necessity of a God-man around the fact that any other being would sin if it were tempted by the devil.

Anselm thus accepts the power of the devil over mankind, but he does not look upon the Redemption as only a conflict between the God-man and the devil

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1. Rivière, Le Dogme, passim, esp. 139-41. DeClerck, 'Questions' (RTAM 13 (1946), 184).

2. PM v, no. 47, p. 44.

3. CDH I, 22.

in which the latter exercises unjust power over the former in putting him to death. Still, Christ conquers the devil in Anselm's scheme by avoiding sin, even though man's liberation from sin comes not from this victory but through the satisfaction Christ gives the Father. The necessity of Christ's conquest of the devil in Cur Deus Homo provides a link between Canterbury and Laon.

Another point of mutual concern is the sinful substance of man that God had to take on in becoming man. Both Anselms ask how the God-man could do so without violating any of the principles on which the creation functions. As Anselm of Laon says, all human flesh was unclean and subject to the devil. When the God-man took on flesh, he seems to have wronged the devil because he cleansed that amount of flesh which he assumed. Anselm of Laon explains, however, that the flesh taken on by Christ owed the devil no servitude in the first place. By taking it, Christ did no injury to the devil: 'In hoc enim diabolus nullam subiit iniuriam quia illa, quam accipiebat sine peccato, nullam diabolo servitutem debebat.'<sup>1</sup> In this passage the Laon theologian seems to be referring to the traditional explanation that since concupiscence was not involved in the Incarnation, original sin was not transmitted.

Anselm of Laon is primarily concerned with the massa corrupta insofar as God's assumption of it seems to deprive the devil of his rights. But St. Anselm deals with the massa peccatrix without considering the devil at all. Bossio provides the question:

Primum scilicet, qualiter de massa peccatrice, id est de humano genere, quod totum infectum erat peccato, hominem sine peccato quasi asynam de fermentato deus assumpsit. Nam licet ipsa hominis eiusdem conceptio munda sit et absque carnalis dilectationis peccato, virgo tamen ipsa, unde assumptus est, in iniquitatibus concepta est....<sup>2</sup>

Bossio here supplies the answer that satisfied Anselm of Laon: the child was conceived without sin because there was no carnal delight. But he still worries about contamination because of the child's formation inside Mary.

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1. PM v, no. 48, p. 47.

2. CDH II, 16.



Anselm protests that this is a great mystery, but he goes on to say that the Virgin was cleansed from her sins before the birth of Christ.

The two Anselms are at odds here because the archbishop is concerned with the person of Christ and his ability to be truly God and man without taking on man's sinfulness, while the secular master approaches the problem from the devil's viewpoint. As usual, Anselm of Leon tends to be demonocentric in his interpretation of the Redemption, while Saint Anselm concentrates almost exclusively on Christ. Also the procedures of the two are different. The former gives the answer that the latter assumes at the outset, that the Incarnation was a sinless act. Regardless of these differences, we must note that both Anselms are asking the same kind of question.

Another instance in which the two theologians are close can be seen when Anselm of Leon says that man must be brought to eternal glory. Otherwise God's praise would be incomplete:

Inde est quod omnia dicuntur Deum laudare ... propter eum omnia scilicet laudandum et glorificandum et per eum omnia, nichil scilicet superflue.<sup>1</sup>

At the opening of the second book, St. Anselm also says that man's end cannot be frustrated. Both Anselms say that it is necessary for man's purpose to be realised. Saint Anselm generally envisions this end in terms of the completion of the heavenly city, while Anselm of Leon speaks in terms of the completion of the praise of God through rational creatures. The necessity for the carrying out of God's plans helps both writers establish the necessity of Redemption through a God-man.

In leading to this necessity, there is a related necessity that God do nothing in vain. St. Anselm frequently uses the phrase in vanum to express an alternative which leads nowhere and cannot be accepted. For instance if man were not able to take advantage of his power of discernment in order to love God, then that power would have been given him in vain. But of course,

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1. FM v, no. 54, p. 51.

'it was not fitting, that God gave such great power in vain'.<sup>1</sup> God's power cannot be undermined. Anselm of Laon accepts the same idea in his discussion of the necessity that man be led to glory. He presents the situation in which man fails to render God his due glory:

Homo peccato suo perditus est; ergo ad gloriam non ducitur, ergo ipse non laudat, consequenter ergo corporea creatura non laudat; otiose igitur facta est.<sup>2</sup>

Man would become purposeless and irrelevant. The outcome is the same as St. Anselm had seen it. Man's failure demonstrates that God has done something in vain.

Anselm of Laon removes this threat to God's purposefulness by a device also found in St. Anselm. Such a situation is impossible because it is unfitting for God: 'Ut autem omnia hec inconvenientia ab ipso quo procedunt fonte supprimamus, hominem perditum ad gloriam duci constituamus.'<sup>3</sup> By arguing on the basis of inconvenientia, Anselm of Laon adopts in substance Anselm's essential principle: 'ut nullum vel minimum inconveniens in deo a nobis accipiatur'.<sup>4</sup> The two theologians thus base much of their thinking on the principle that God does nothing in vain, for this would be unfitting for him, but nothing unfitting is in God.

Raoul of Laon also asserts a necessity that man come to salvation. Otherwise, 'omnia frustra essent facta'.<sup>5</sup> Anselm of Canterbury's in vanum, Raoul's frustra, and Anselm of Laon's otiose - all express the same necessity. Raoul also refuses to accept anything inconveniens in God. Discussing the necessity that the Son of God be made incarnate, Raoul says that if the Father were made flesh, there would be quaternity instead of trinity. Likewise the same

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1. GDH II, 1.

2. PM v, no. 54, p. 50.

3. PM v, no. 54, p. 50.

4. GDH I, 10.

5. PM v, no. 274, p. 187.



inconveniens situation would come about if the Holy Spirit were made man.<sup>1</sup>

Another shared opinion among all three writers is their insistence on the necessity of the Redemption in its actual mode. But on this point agreement is not complete. Anselm of Laon says that with regard for God's justice, God could have redeemed man in no other way. His reservation is that God could have used his power differently.<sup>2</sup> Despite this reservation, Anselm of Laon generally functions within a necessitarian structure for the Redemption: 'Ex necessitate igitur Deus homo factus est ad redimendum hominem.'<sup>3</sup> In setting up the conditions for such a conclusion, Anselm chooses words that strongly recall St. Anselm's summation of the necessity for a God-man. Anselm of Laon says: 'Oportet ergo ut auctor ille salutis Deus in homine sit, qui ex hoc quod Deus est possit, ex hoc quod homo debeat, congruo multum ordine....'<sup>4</sup> Anselm of Laon does not follow St. Anselm in saying that only God can and only man ought, but the use of posse and debere is an interesting indication of the closeness between the intellectual climate of Canterbury and Laon. For a moment there is contact, but then Anselm of Laon turns to the devil's abuse of power.

Raoul does not follow the posse/debere distinction so closely, but he does set forth a necessity without any of the qualifications of his brother:

Necesse ergo fuit ut Deus homo fieret, ut quia Deus peccare non potest, hominem sibi comitum ita confirmaret ut tentatione et peccato vinci nullo modo posset.<sup>5</sup>

The last phrase in this quotation reveals the difference between the necessity of Laon and that of St. Anselm. For the first, Christ can save man because he will not sin and thus can lead the devil into a wrong exercise of his power

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1. FM v, no. 232, p. 186.

2. FM v, no. 47, p. 44.

3. FM v, no. 47, p. 44.

4. FM v, no. 54, p. 51.

5. FM v, no. 231, p. 185.

over sinful humanity. For St. Anselm, Christ can save man not only because he defeats the devil through his sinlessness but also (and especially) because he gives God something that is not owed.

Another link between the school of Laon and Anselm appears in their mutual concern for the question of the relationship between man's salvation and the fall of the angels. Like St. Anselm, Anselm of Laon says that man's salvation does not depend on the fall of the angels:

Anselm of Laon, PM v, no. 74, p. 51.

Quem ordinem si diligenter attendis,  
videbis hominem debuisse salvari,  
etsi nullus angelus cecidisset.

St. Anselm, CDH I, 8.

Unde palam est quia etiam si angelus  
nullus perisset, homines tamen in  
caelesti civitate suum locum habuissent.

The two theologians accept the worth of mankind as a sufficient reason for its salvation and only deal with man's completion of the heavenly city insofar as it is one more indication of the necessity of salvation.

In the extant fragments, Raoul is silent on this point. But in dealing with the reasons why angels could not save mankind, Raoul presents reasons very similar to those used by Saint Anselm and not found in Anselm of Laon. For the latter, angels were unfit to redeem man because they would inevitably sin: 'Si etiam angelus incarnaretur, non esset aptus tentationi cum etiam per se ceciderit.'<sup>1</sup> Raoul also says that an angel might sin, but then he adds two other reasons for disqualifying it:

Non debuit, quia quare angelica lueret natura quod peccavit humana?  
Item non debuit, quia homo sic a deo factus erat ut esset dignus angelo.  
Quod si ab angelo redimeretur merito deberet ei esse obnoxius qui eum  
liberavit ut a diabolo et ita esset minor subditur ei, quod esset magnus  
inconveniens.<sup>2</sup>

The idea that an angel should not pay for the sin of human nature at least approximates Anselm of Canterbury's contention that since sin was generated through Adam and Eve, they alone, or someone born of them, were obliged to compensate for it. Both Saint Anselm and Raoul look at satisfaction as the

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1. PM v, no. 47, p. 44.

2. PM v, no. 274, p. 88.



exclusive obligation of man. The second part of the quotation is even closer to Anselm. Raoul is saying that man would become the servant of an angel-redeemer. In the Cur Deus Homo Anselm also speaks of the servitude that would result from man's redemption by another creature: '... cum ipse, qui non nisi dei servus et aequalis angelis bonis per omnia futurus erat, servus esset eius, qui deus non esset....' If this happened, 'nullatenus restauratus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non peccasset'.<sup>1</sup> In another passage, Raoul uses the same term, dignitas, to signify man's position that would be threatened in redemption by an angel: 'Sed si creatura creaturam redimeret, utique creatura creatura obnoxia esset, et quodam modo dignitas hominis inferioraretur.'<sup>2</sup> Saint Anselm and Raoul are equally concerned with guaranteeing man's place in the universe, and so they strengthen their arguments for the necessity of redemption through a God-man by emphasizing the preservation of man's dignity.

The sharing of so many ideas shows that Laon and Canterbury were within the same intellectual milieu, but, as we have said before, we cannot determine which way the ideas were flowing. But sometimes with later fragments of the school of Laon, we can see the current's direction. In such cases St. Anselm enters the minds of the Laon writers. Lottin's collection of anonymous sentences from the school of Laon provides us with a reference to Saint Anselm. This passage shows how Anselm's ideas could be incorporated into a foreign but not totally unsympathetic body of teaching:

Fuit et alius modus possibilis Deo, sed nullus nostre miserie convenientior sanande; que possibilitas ad Deum solam, non ad creaturas referenda est. Quod si alibi inveniatur: non potuit aliter fieri, possibilitas non a Deo sed (a) creaturis tantum intelligenda est removeri. Nec enim per angelum neque simpliciter per homines hoc digne fieri poterat, cum utriusque natura corrupta esset, ad hoc digne et convenienter faciendus fuit necessarium divinam et humanam naturam in unitatem persone coniungi: divinam quia sola poterat, humanam, quod sola debebat. Unde Anselmus archiepiscopus: Deus potuit, homo debuit.<sup>3</sup>

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1. CDH I, 5.

2. PH v, no. 232, p. 185.

3. PH v, no. 343, p. 264.

Like the passage already quoted from Anselm of Laon,<sup>1</sup> this one follows the Anselmian posse/debere. But it comes even closer to Our Deus Homo by stating that God alone can and man alone ought. Nevertheless, the writer is still a long way from Anselm, for he distinguishes that which is possible for God from that which is possible for man. He limits the necessity of Christ to man's situation while leaving God free to do what he wants. And so the writer is faithful to Anselm of Laon, who even in his most strongly necessitarian statements would add the words: 'alio modo posset et Deus redimere secundum potentiam ...'.<sup>2</sup> Once the writer had separated divine possibility from human, he could say that the actual mode of the Redemption is the only one possible. In such a context, he quotes Saint Anselm. But he does not follow the full implications of Anselmian necessity, which posits the actual mode of Redemption as the only possible means for either God or man. Though Anselm is acknowledged, he is not fully accepted.

Generally we find among the anonymous fragments fewer links with the thought of St. Anselm than we discovered in Anselm and Raoul of Laon. Passages from Oxford Bodleian MS. Laud. Misc. 277, for example, say that without the Incarnation God could have freed man not only according to his power but also according to his justice.<sup>3</sup> The writer used the Augustinian convenientius to say that the actual means of the Redemption was the best possible. God could have justly saved men without the offering of any victim. Through his mercy God could have forgiven man's sin and calmed his own wrath. Like Anselm and Raoul of Laon, the writer thinks that as far as man is concerned, the passion of Christ was necessary, but he goes beyond the two by seeing the free forgiveness of sin as perfectly consistent with divine justice.

It seems that the further away we go from the florilegia of Troyes 425

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1. PM v, no. 54, p. 51.

2. PM v, no. 47, p. 44.

3. PM v, no. 342, p. 263; no. 346, p. 265.



and Avranches 19, which probably represent the actual teaching of Anselm and Raoul of Laon, the fewer parallels we find with the ideas of Saint Anselm. Lottin's anonymous fragments generally prefer Augustine's convenientia to any necessity at all. Such is the case also in Weisweiler's collection of sentences from German libraries, mainly Munich but also Bamberg and Zülich. Deus hominem fecit perfectum does at one point go the full distance of Anselm. In giving reasons why the Redemption could not be carried out by a man, the collection states: 'Indignum valde vel impossibile erat, ut peccator peccatorem, dampnatus dampnatum redimeret.'<sup>1</sup> Anselm's language is no stronger: 'Sed hoc facere nullatenus potest peccator homo, quia peccator peccatorem iustificare nequit.'<sup>2</sup> But this is an obvious point on which the school of Laon just as much as Anselm himself could hardly fail to be quite firm.

A more significant instance of closeness to Anselm comes in Dubitatur a quibusdam. Of all the passages we have reviewed thus far in the school of Laon, this one goes the furthest in avoiding the devil's centrality in the Redemption and in asserting a necessity that man compensate God for the wrongs he has done him:

Sicut ergo sanguis eius hosti fuit redemptionis pretium, sic patri placationis sacrificium, quia dum precepto patris obediens pius et innocens penas peccati non sui sed nostri pro nobis pertulit, quasi patri iniurias a nobis illatas in se transumpit, in se vindicavit. Sic pro nobis per omnia patri satisfaciens in carne nobis indignis satisfactione sua quantum ad se iuste, quantum ad nos pie patrem ad misericordiam flexit.<sup>3</sup>

The writer has already referred to the rights of the devil in a decidedly school of Laon way,<sup>4</sup> and in this particular passage just quoted the word satisfactio is used without the writer's demonstrating that he understands the complexity of Anselmian satisfaction. Nevertheless, the author of Dubitatur at least

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1. Das Schrifttum, p. 300.

2. GDN I, 23.

3. Das Schrifttum, pp. 341-2.

4. Ibid., p. 339.



joins the traditional rights of the devil to the idea of reparation that man makes to God. We have elements of the two Anselms' thinking in union here.

Turning from Weisweiler's collection to the Sententie divinae paginae, we approach one of the strongest witnesses to the influence of Saint Anselm in the school of Laon.<sup>1</sup> The writer devotes much space to the angels. Consistent with both Anselms, he says that even if the angels had not fallen, man would still have been made.<sup>2</sup> The next problem is whether or not the angels fell immediately at the creation. The author's concern with the problem of numbers of fallen angels and replacing men introduce some similarities to Cur Deus Homo.<sup>3</sup>

In showing why men and not other angels are to restore the fallen angels' places, he refers to St. Anselm and disagrees with him:

Sciet queri, quare non ex angelis restaurandi alii angeli, sed ex hominibus. Et est summa causa beneplacitum dei. Cur autem sic ei placuerit, penes ipsam sit. In libro taken qui intitulatur: Cur Deus homo, habentur inde duo coniecture, quarum prima est talis. Si deus restauraret numerum angelorum ex angelis hoc videretur contrarium priori creationi rerum. Quod nec ipse evidenter explanat, nec nos aliud percipimus, nisi quod deus omnia in perfectione creavit, et ita angelum qui cecidit. Ille autem qui restauraret locum eius, maioris dignitatis videretur esse quam qui cecidit, in hoc scilicet, quod nec caderet sicut et ille.<sup>4</sup> Sed hec coniectura debilis est, cum idem de homine coniectari possit.

The writer is unable to understand how the creation of new angels would be contrary to the perfection of creation. Anselm had not explained himself in I, 17 beyond saying, 'ut taceam, quomodo hoc repugnare videatur primae creationis perfectioni ...'. The writer of the Sententie tries to set forth the reasoning behind that statement:

1. God made all things in perfection, including the angel who fell.
2. But whoever restored the place of that fallen angel would therefore be of greater dignity than the fallen angel because of the very fact that

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1. Elietzrieder originally attributed the work to Anselm of Laon himself. Weisweiler treated them more accurately in their historical milieu in 'Die Arbeitsweise der sogenannten Sententiae Anselmi', Scholastik 34 (1959), 190-232. See also his remarks in Das Schrifttum, p. 223: 'Aber bisher war aus der sonstigen Literatur keine Überarbeitung der Sententie divinae paginae bekannt, wie auch die Quellenlage gerade für dieses Werk noch ganz unbekannt ist.'

2. Elietzrieder, SDP, p. 15.

3. Ibid., p. 16 - CDH I, 18.

4. Ibid., p. 18 - CDH I, 17.



the restorer does not fall.

3. Therefore, because something more perfect appears after the first creation, the perfection of the first creation would be frustrated and false.

But the writer criticizes such reasoning, for he points out that the very same thing happens if a man replaces the fallen angel, for he becomes of greater dignity than the fallen one. And so the result is the same, whether the restorer is angel or man: the perfection and completeness of the first creation is frustrated just as much by a man as by a new angel.

The writer continues his critique by attacking Anselm's central reason why other angels cannot take the place of the fallen ones:

Alia coniectura est talis, quod qui in locum illius restitueretur, deberet esse illius beatitudinis ad quam ille, si stetisset, pervenisset; sed ille, si stetisset, esset beatus sine exemplo vel terrore precedentis casus, et ita non esset eiusdem beatitudinis, et ita non ex angelis debuit restitui locus ille. Sed eadem oppositio fieri de homine potest.<sup>1</sup>

If we break up the preceding paragraph into sections, we have the following exposition of Anselm's ideas in I, 17:

1. Whoever is restored to that place should have that degree of happiness to which the first being, if it had stood, would have come.
2. But the new angel, if it stood, would remain holy partially because of its fear of the fall that preceded it.
3. Thus it would not have the same beatitude as the initial angel would have had, and so that place should not be restored from among the angels.

The writer says that the same line of reasoning could be applied to men. A man replacing a fallen angel could not possibly achieve the same degree of happiness because the man also would persist in obedience out of fear of the fall that he knew had taken place.

The writer of the Sententiae shows a genuine understanding for Anselm's arguments and a real ability for criticizing Anselm by turning his own arguments against him. But this exercise in dialectic is only a secondary resort. The author's main answer to Anselm rests in his insistence on God's benelacitum as the reason for his selection of man, a reason whose explication remains wholly within God. Man cannot penetrate there. Here we find all the con-

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1. Klimentzrieder, SDP, p. 18.

servatism of the school of Laon, which preferred exegesis to dialectic and would rather say of some difficult point that the reason was 'within God' rather than in the power of man's mind to discern.

At times, however, the author of the Sententie divinae paginae uses Anselm and agrees with him. If man were made only for replacement of fallen angels, he would have reason to rejoice wrongly in their fall.<sup>1</sup> Also, since more men will be saved than the number of angels who fall, it appears that men were created not only to restore the angels but also for themselves. Both these points appear in Cur Deus Homo I, 18.

Before the Sententie moves from the angels to the Redemption itself, it looks at a number of other theological questions and frequently refers to Anselm. On free will Augustine's definition is opposed with that of the episcopus cantobriensis, and Augustine is favoured.<sup>2</sup> Concerning the way sin is transmitted, Anselm is classed among those who hold that one soul is transmitted from another. 'Et hic consensit episcopus in cur deus homo.' Anselm never said there or anywhere else that souls are transmitted in such a way. Later on, however, his ideas are correctly represented. But still the writer refers to Cur Deus Homo for a passage actually in the De Concordia of Anselm.<sup>3</sup> The author apparently knows something of Anselm's work but is not intimately familiar with it. The Sententie's exposition of the Redemption is not faithful in any way to Anselm's teaching. The traditional rights of the devil appear. The Augustinian conveniens for the actual mode of the Redemption expressed a limited necessity.<sup>4</sup>

The Sententie Berolinenses are much closer to Anselm than the Sententie divinae paginae. They pose three questions, of which one is Anselm's own:

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1. Blumentarieder, SDP, p. 19 - CDH I, 18.

2. Ibid., p. 28.

3. Ibid., p. 36.

4. Ibid., p. 37.



'In hoc loco tres quaestiones animam pulsent. Quarum una est: Cur Deus factus est homo.'<sup>1</sup> Soon the writer is using the exact language of Anselm: 'Necessarium igitur fuit, ut ille qui forificerat creatori, emendaret. Sed ipse pro se satisfacere non poterat.'<sup>2</sup> The writer does not explain this inability. He goes on to provide an Anselmian conclusion:

Necessario igitur Deus homo factus est, ut qui in sui natura non poterat, quod debebat, esset in persona qui posset. Ecce diximus cur Deus homo factus.<sup>3</sup>

This section of the Sententiae Berolinenses is nothing more than a brief outline of Anselm's theology of the Redemption.

In the Deus de cuius principio et fine tacetur, the devil is mentioned as having only an unjust power over man. In order for the Redemption to take place, a sinless man must conquer the devil. There is no reference to any abuse of power:

Nisi enim homo esset, qui diabolum vinceret, non iuste sed violenter homo illi tolleretur. Sed si homo eum vincit, iure, cum sit victus, hominem perdit.<sup>4</sup>

Excepting the distinction between iuste and violenter, there is nothing here inconsistent with St. Anselm's outlook. Also, the conquest of the devil is only one part of the Redemption. The author also talks about the puram hostiam that is to be offered for sin. There is no reference to satisfaction, but still the conquest of the devil is not looked upon as a complete description of the workings of the Redemption.

A descendant of Deus de cuius principio, the Klagenfurt Sentences Deus est sine principio also contains passages which speak of Christ's conquest of the devil in a way much more typical of Cur Deus Homo than of the works of Anselm and Raoul. Weisweiler has already pointed out these passages.<sup>5</sup> There

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1. Stegmüller, SB, p. 40.

2. Ibid., p. 41.

3. Ibid.

4. Weisweiler, RTAM v (1933), p. 266.

5. Weisweiler, Scholastik, xxxvi (1961), 47-51.

thus seems to be a strand running through the later school of Laon writers that was responsive to Saint Anselm's critique of Anselm and Raoul's teaching on the devil.

Having considered these various manifestations of the school of Laon's teaching on the Redemption, we can say that just as St. Anselm reacted to Laon, so too Laon reacted to Anselm. On many aspects of this theology, they were in close contact. They disagreed often, as when Anselm refuted Raoul or when the writer of the Sententie divinas pagine rejected Anselm's reasons for the inability of new angels to take the place of the fallen. But at times Anselm and the school of Laon are remarkably close, as when Raoul talks about the dignity of the human race threatened in redemption by an angel or when the writers of works like Dubitatur a quibusdam explain the satisfaction man must make to God.

The questions that the Laon writers and Anselm were trying to answer were similar. Why did God become man, when he could apparently have redeemed man so much more easily? Why could not an angel or a simple man have carried out this redemption? Does the necessity of a God-man redemption impose a necessity on God? In addressing themselves to these questions, theologians connected with the school of Laon generally concentrated on the devil's role, while Anselm insisted on the satisfaction man owes God. But often Anselm and the Laon writers came to the same conclusions through similar arguments. Anselm was by no means unknown to the Laon writers. He was someone to be reckoned with, sometimes refuted, and sometimes accepted.

## 2. Abelard and Roscelin

Peter Abelard provides a link between the cathedral schools like Laon and the growing centre of scholastic theology at Paris. Abelard managed to absorb the best learning of his age and attracted attention for his unique way of expressing that learning. We can be certain that he knew of Anselm of Canterbury's work, but we find only a few indications of the influence Anselm



may have had on him.

In a letter written probably before the Council of Soissons (1121), Abelard invoked the name of Anselm. In one letter we have Abelard's defence of himself against Roscelin. In the next letter, Roscelin replies by a brutal attack on Abelard.<sup>1</sup> This exchange took place before 1125, the year of Roscelin's death. Roscelin refers in his letter to the affair with Héloïse and to Abelard's troubles at St. Denis,<sup>2</sup> but he does not mention the condemnation at Soissons. Because Roscelin carefully brings forth every possible charge against Abelard, we can assume that if the letter were post-1121, it would have included the allegations of Soissons. The exchange thus probably belongs to the period immediately before Soissons when Abelard was being attacked for his teaching on the Trinity. Roscelin appears to have been an eager participant in the battle.

These two letters deserve analysis, for Anselm is mentioned and defended by Abelard and attacked by Roscelin. Roscelin's critique of Cur Deus Homo is the twelfth century's most direct and openly unfavourable response to Anselm's treatise. Roscelin recognizes two aspects of Cur Deus Homo which are original and rejects them both.

Abelard's letter is addressed to the bishop of Paris. He says he has heard that the ancient enemy of the Catholic faith, who had said that there were three gods and was convicted at Soissons (1092-3), had brought insults and threats against him.<sup>3</sup> Roscelin has questioned Abelard's orthodoxy in the very area in which the first has shown himself to be heretical, the doctrine of the Trinity. Abelard believes that Roscelin is waiting for the bishop's return in order to show him Abelard's errors. If this is true, Abelard asks that at an appointed time and place, the bishop bring both of them together

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1. Abelard's letter: PL 178: 355-7 (xiv); Roscelin: PL 178: 358-72 (xv).

2. PL 178: 360B, 369B-370C.

3. PL 178: 356D.

so that both may be heard.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, Abelard says he feels honoured to be among the men whom Roscelin attacks, for such people are good, outstanding individuals.<sup>2</sup> Roscelin used such insults against 'that magnificent doctor of the Church, Anselm', that at the order of the English king he was expelled for his contumacy from England and barely escaped with his life:

Hic contra egregium illum praeconem Christi Robertum Arbroscello contumacem ausus est epistolam confingere et contra illum magnificentum Ecclesiae doctorem Anselmum Cantuariensem, archiepiscopum, adeo per contumelias exarsit, ut ad regis Anglici imperium ab Anglia turpiter impudens ejus contumacia sit ejecta, et vix tum cum vita evaserit.<sup>3</sup>

Not surprisingly, Abelard has twisted some of the facts, for he has made it seem as if Roscelin had personally insulted Anselm and had been removed from England only for this reason. Roscelin's reply indicates a different chain of events.

The title Abelard gives to Anselm, 'illum magnificentum Ecclesiae doctorem', suggests that he looks upon the archbishop as a theologian. Ecclesiae doctorem is a far more imposing title than magister would have been. The passage implies that Abelard, at least at this time of attack, admires Anselm's theological writings. The defence of Anselm at least shows that Abelard is aware of Anselm as a formidable orthodox theologian, even though Abelard does not indicate assent to any of his ideas.

Abelard turns from this reference to Anselm to a personal attack on Roscelin.<sup>4</sup> But Abelard's abuse is mild compared to Roscelin's feast of wrath in his reply. Still there is some theological content in between the passages of invective. Roscelin denies Abelard's claim that he persecutes the good. Distinguishing between personal goodness and intellectual competence, Roscelin says that he has criticized both Robert of Arbroscell and Anselm but respects

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1. PL 178: 357A.

2. PL 178: 357B.

3. PL 178: 358A.

4. PL 178: 358A.



their lives:

Non minimum autem doleo quod bonorum persecutorem me dixisti. Licet enim bonum non sim, bonos tamen singulos quo debeo honore semper veneratus sum. Hos autem quos in exemplum trahis, dominum videlicet Anselmum Cantuariensem et Robertum bonae vitae bonique testimonii hominis nunquam persecutus sum, licet quaedam eorum dicta et facta reprehendenda videantur.<sup>1</sup>

Roscelin de-emphasizes the importance of Anselm's theology by referring to him not as a doctor but as lord, referring to his office of archbishop. Cleverly defending himself by an appeal to the Fathers, Roscelin reminds Abelard that Augustine could criticize Cyprian's views on rebaptism of schismatics and heretics and could also look with disapproval on Peter himself when he claimed converts had to be circumcised.<sup>2</sup>

But Roscelin praises Anselm's holiness of life and even his theology. The feeling is that Anselm is a venerable man and a theologian who commands universal respect:

Sed de domino Anselmo archiepiscopo, quem et vitae sanctitas honorat, et doctrinae singularitas ultra communem hominum mensuram extollit, quid dicam?<sup>3</sup>

Unless singularitas has a double meaning here, Roscelin's estimate of Anselm is favourable, but he does not back away from his criticism. Anselm's error comes in Cur Deus Homo when he claims God could only have saved man by the means he actually used, his passion and death. This opinion contradicts the sayings of the Fathers:

Ait enim in libro quem Cur Deus Homo intitulat, aliter Deum non posse homines salvare, nisi sicut fecit, id est nisi homo fieret, et omnia illa quae passus est pateretur. Ejus sententiam sanctorum doctorum, quorum doctrina fulget ecclesia, dicta vehementer impugnant.<sup>4</sup>

Roscelin pays no attention to the way Anselm tries to reconcile the necessity of the actual mode with God's freedom. In Roscelin's mind, agreement

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1. PL 178: 360D.

2. PL 178: 361.

3. PL 178: 361A.

4. PL 178: 361B.

between the two is impossible, for one necessarily excludes the other. Roscelin brings forth the Fathers who said there were other ways possible and lets their words stand alone without any addition or explanation. Saint Leo says that God could have chosen many ways for redeeming the human race but chose this means so that instead of using power God would act according to justice. The inevitable quotation from Augustine's 15 De Trinitate appears. God could not have employed a convenientiorem modum. He also uses Augustine's statement that God could have created a saviour not from Adam's race. Finally the redeemer could have come in a way other than through virgin birth.<sup>1</sup> Roscelin leaves this list as sufficient response to Anselm's idea that only a God-man could carry out the Redemption. He oversimplifies Anselm's ideas, and so his critique of Anselm is superficial and incomplete.

Still, Roscelin has brought forward the major objection that mid-twelfth century thinkers like Hugh of St. Victor would give to any necessitarian scheme of the Redemption by a God-man. Roscelin seeks to guarantee God's absolute freedom to carry out the Redemption in any way he wishes, and so he disregards what Anselm would have called the order in the universe. According to this order, a saviour not from Adam's race could do nothing for man. Roscelin has caught Anselm at his weakest and most essential point in his universal equation for the natural necessity of Christ. He contradicted Anselm by taking various quotations from the Fathers instead of challenging the intrinsic worth of Anselm's arguments. Later thinkers like Bonaventure would hesitate for the same reason, God's freedom, but their refutation of Anselm would be much more refined.

Roscelin soon turns his attention to the much more pressing issue of the Trinity. He defends his own point of view and tries to incriminate Abelard. In these letters, then, Anselm is an object of polemic, not a theologian who is carefully examined.

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1. PL 178: 362D.



In the 1120s, when Abelard was writing his Theologia Christiana,<sup>1</sup> Anselm again came to his attention. He was considering the De Incarnatione Verbi image of the Trinity in terms of different bodies of water.<sup>2</sup> Abelard disagreed with the image and said that it could lead to a heretical opinion. This outright rejection of Anselm, even though it only concerns a small point, indicates that Abelard's initial respect for Anselm had worn off by now.

Abelard's Commentary on Romans (Commentarium Super S. Pauli Epistolam ad Romanos) gives us an opportunity to see if Anselm's theology of the Redemption has any influence at all on Abelard.<sup>3</sup> As with all of Abelard's works, our first task is to establish a text. Victor Cousin's nineteenth century edition of the Commentary merely reproduced the 1616 edition of François d'Amboise.<sup>4</sup> Cousin said that this edition was taken from a manuscript of the abbey of Mont-Saint-Michel. By Cousin's day this manuscript had completely disappeared: '... cujus ne vestigia quidem potuimus reperire'.<sup>5</sup> So Cousin had no way of checking the validity of the Amboise edition. The Amboise-Cousin version was reprinted in Hiene Patrologia Latina 178: 783-978. Cousin never saw Oxford Balliol College MS. 296, which contains the Commentary.<sup>6</sup>

Since the time of Cousin, another manuscript of the Commentary on Romans has been discovered, Vatican Reginensis lat. MS. 242.<sup>7</sup> This manuscript

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1. For dating and background, see P.D. Van den Eynde, 'La Theologia Scholarium de Pierre Abélard', RTAM xviii (1961), p. 241 and especially Van den Eynde's 'Les Rédactions de la Theologia Christiana de Pierre Abélard', Antoniemus xxvii (1961), 273-99.

2. Chapter 13 in the De Incarnatione Verbi. Schmitt, Opera Omnia ii, 31-2.

3. For a complete study of Abelard on the Redemption, R.E. Weingart, 'The Atonement in the Writings of Peter Abailard' (Yale Univ. thesis, 1965).

4. Victor Cousin, Opera Abelardi, ii (Paris, 1859), 152-356.

5. Ibid., p. 152.

6. See D.E. Luscombe, 'Towards a new Edition of Peter Abelard's Ethica or Scito te ipsum. An Introduction to the Manuscripts', Vivarium iii (1965), 124-5. Luscombe disagrees with the assertion of R.A.B. Mynors, Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College Oxford (Oxford, 1963), 314-7, that Cousin had inspected Balliol MS. 296.

7. Codices Reginenses Latini, ed. A. Wilmart (Vatican, 1937), 1, 578-9.



A.M. Landgraf claimed was the one reproduced in Migne.<sup>1</sup> Since we know that Migne used only the Amboise-Cousin version of the Mont-Saint-Michel manuscript, there is no reason to link the Migne edition with the Vatican manuscript. Also Landgraf has been criticized for asserting that the Vatican manuscript is a longer version of the Commentary and Balliol MS. 296 is a shorter version.<sup>2</sup>

In our use of the Commentary, we will take the best readings from Migne and Balliol MS. 296, while noting at the end of each quotation the variant readings. On the whole the Migne edition is grammatically better than the Balliol MS., but since we do not have the Mont-Saint-Michel manuscript, we must leave open the possibility that the Amboise editors of the seventeenth century arbitrarily improved the manuscript text. But even though the Migne edition is not trustworthy, we will keep its readings whenever they make better sense than those of the Balliol MS., which at times is unintelligible.

The dating of the Commentary depends on that of the Theologia Scholarium of Abelard (once called Introductio ad Theologiam). P.D. Van den Eynde has done much work on the redactions of this treatise, but he has not assigned a date to the Commentary on Romans. According to him the Theologia Scholarium went through three redactions in the years between 1133 and 1138.<sup>3</sup> In the Commentary on Romans Abelard refers to the Theologia Scholarium, both to its first two books<sup>4</sup> and to a third book yet to appear.<sup>5</sup> Thus we can assign the Commentary to this period in the mid-1130s when Abelard, probably back at Paris, was amid the different redactions of the Theologia Scholarium. Further

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1. A.M. Landgraf, Einführung in die Geschichte der Theologischen Literatur der Frühcholastik (Regensburg, 1948), 64.

2. D.E. Luscombe, 'Towards a new Edition ...', p. 117.

3. P.D. Van den Eynde, 'La Theologia Scholarium de Pierre Abélard', RTAM xxviii (1961), 241.

4. PL 176: 802D, 804A, 805A, 858D.

5. PL 176: 836D, 907D, 930B, 943D.



work on the chronology of Abelard's writings has been done in the past few years by P.E.M. Buytaert.<sup>1</sup> In an article on Abelard's Collationes (better known as Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum, et Christianum), Buytaert concludes that the Commentary on Romans dates from 1138 at the latest.<sup>2</sup> We can thus look upon the Commentary as a work that Abelard produced during a period of feverish intellectual activity, when the authorities were beginning to harass him again and before the final condemnation of Sens.

Abelard's second book in the Commentary starts with the passage from Romans 3, 19: 'Scimus autem quoniam quaecumque lex loquitur, iis qui in lege sunt loquitur ut omne os obstatur, et subditus fiat omnis mundus Deo.' Abelard deals with the ideas of law, justification, the relationships of Jews and Christians to both, and the importance of faith in Jesus Christ. During almost all this time he is faithful to the text of Paul and says nothing particularly exceptional or different from what one would expect in a commentary on Scripture.

Only at one point does Abelard begin to stray from the Pauline text and to interpret divine justice in a way not immediately evident from Paul's own wording. Abelard indicates that justice and love amount to almost the same activity in God. When Paul speaks of our Redemption in Christ and Christ as a propitiation 'ad ostensionem iustitiae suae propter remissionem praecedentium delictorum' (Rom. 3, 25), Abelard says:

Ad ostensionem suae iustitiae: id est, caritas que nos, ut dictum est, iustificat. Hoc est ad exhibendam nobis suam dilectionem, vel ad insinuandum nobis quantum eum diligere debemus qui proprio filio suo non pepercit pro nobis....<sup>3</sup>

These few lines provide a preview of all that Abelard will say about the meaning of the Redemption later on in his Solutio. Abelard grounded the

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1. Antonianum xxxix-xliv (1964-9).

2. 'Abelard's Collationes', Antonianum xiv (1969), 38. Almost every issue of Antonianum since 1960 has included groundbreaking studies by Van den Eynde and Buytaert on Abelard's works.

3. Balliol MS. 296, f. 100r; PL 178: 833A. a. Sinuandum B.

Redemption in the love that Christ gave us and that we given back to him in our joy and thankfulness. And yet Abelard was still in some ways under Anselm's influence. We have an apparent contradiction: a theologian who writes so much in terms of love is at least the partial intellectual product of Anselm, who was so concerned with abstract and mathematical justice.

The explanation lies in Abelard's Questio. Here we find Anselmian terminology and thought patterns. In the Questio Abelard reveals his awareness of the problem why God became man. But in his Solutio Abelard largely breaks with Anselm and provides his own response, one that ignores the demands of divine justice and concentrates almost exclusively on the generosity of divine love. Only in the questions Abelard asks about the Redemption does he show any immediate links with Anselm.

Abelard's objections to the Redemption evolve from two basic questions. In the first place, from what or whom are we redeemed? Second, why were we redeemed in such a miserable way? Replying to the first question Abelard considers the devil and his rights. Dealing with the second, he looks at the ignominy of Christ's death and the problems of necessity. All these points are only mentioned briefly. Instead of answering each of the questions individually Abelard in the Solutio gives his general formula of love that supposedly annihilates all the objections and makes individual responses superfluous.

At the outset Abelard outlines His procedure:

Questio: Maxima hec questio se ingerit que sit ista videlicet nostra redemptio per mortem Christi, aut quomodo nos in eius sanguine iustificare apostolus dicat, quia maiori supplicio digni videmur quia, id commisimus iniqui servi propter quod innocens dominus occisus sit.<sup>1</sup>

What is this redemption of ours and how can we be justified in the blood of Christ when we seem to have committed an even greater crime by killing Christ than by our original sin in paradise? Abelard could be following the objection

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1. f. 100v; PL 178: 833D.



in Cur Deus Homo that man seems to sin infinitely by killing God and thus could not gain satisfaction through an act which entailed the Son's death in such a way.<sup>1</sup> Becoming more specific, Abelard asks about the necessity by which God became man, secondly the person or thing from whom we are redeemed, and thirdly the justice involved in the act of liberation. The appearance of the phrase qua necessitate provides a striking example of an Anselmian phrase which Abelard could have adopted:

Primo itaque videtur querendum qua necessitate deus hominem assumpsit, ut nos secundum carnem <sup>moriendo</sup> redimeret, vel a quo nos redimerit, qui nos vel iusticia vel potestate captus teneret<sup>a</sup> et quia iusticia nos ab eius potestate liberaverit, qui<sup>b</sup> precium<sup>c</sup> dederit quod<sup>d</sup> ille suscipere vellet ut nos dimitteret.<sup>2</sup>

The problem towards which Abelard is moving is that of the devil and his rights or powers. He mentions the devil in the next sentence. But while Abelard is still speaking in general terms, we can compare him to Anselm on that level. At the opening of Cur Deus Homo Anselm says something very close to Abelard's 'qua necessitate deus hominem assumpsit'. Both infidels and Christians discuss this question, Anselm says: 'qua scilicet ratione vel necessitate deus homo factus sit'.<sup>3</sup> Abelard's question sounds very much like the question which Boso brings forth when he represents the objections of the infidels:

In qua namque, aiunt nobis, captione aut in quo carcere aut in cuius potestate tenebamini, unde vos deus non potuit liberare, nisi vos tot laboribus et ad ultimum sanguine suo redimeret?<sup>4</sup>

The language is sufficiently close to that of Anselm to enable us to say that Abelard may have been rephrasing the Anselmian text when he wrote his Questio. But whether or not he had the text of Cur Deus Homo before him, he is saying almost exactly the same thing as Anselm. It seems likely that at some time Abelard had read Cur Deus Homo and became familiar with the way Anselm phrased

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1. CDH II, 15.

2. f. 100v; PL 178: 833D. a tenet M (Migne edition), b quod B; vere add. B; c praescepta B; d quae M.

3. CDH I, 1.

4. CDH I, 6.

the objections of the infidels.

Abelard now treats the devil's power. First he states the view that he wants to refute. God redeemed us from the devil's power, for man by the first man's disobedience had subjected himself to the devil and had thus given the devil a certain right over man. If we turn to Anselm's discussion of the same subject, we find nothing in Abelard's way of stating this idea that sounds especially Anselmian.<sup>1</sup>

Abelard's first objection to the devil's right is not found in Anselm. If the devil possessed all men, then what about those who are said to be in Abraham's bosom?<sup>2</sup> What power could the devil have had over them, in view of the fact that there is a great division between the elect and the damned, and neither can cross to the other side? The devil's power would have to have been limited to this world alone, and such a limitation immediately subtracts any ius on the devil's part over mankind. This conclusion is only implied, for Abelard is not being very clear here.

Abelard emerges from the obscurity of his particular objection to set forth a general principle:

Quod etiam ius in possidendo hominem diabolus habere poterat nisi forte quia cum domino permittente aut etiam tradente ad torquendum ipsum susceperat?<sup>3</sup>

Rivière took the proviso domino permittente to say that Abelard does leave some room for a devil's ius.<sup>4</sup> It is true that Abelard leaves here a door open to a certain legitimacy for the devil's activity, a door that Anselm definitely shut by the end of I, 7 in Cur Deus Homo. Anselm specifically pointed out that even if man were justly tortured, the devil was not just in doing so. Abelard does not make this distinction, but he does not concede the devil a clear or

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1. f. 100v; PL 178: 834A. See CDH I, 7.

2. f. 101r; PL 178: 834A.

3. f. 101r; PL 178: 834B. a superat B.

4. J. Rivière, *Le Dogme de la Rédemption au Début du Moyen-Âge* (Paris, 1934), 100-101.



unchallenged justice. He is much closer to Anselm of Canterbury than Anselm of Laon and may be dependent on the ideas behind Anselm's seventh chapter.

Elaborating on his point of view, Abelard uses an example not found in Anselm. If a servant deserts his master and puts himself under the power of another, then it is the original master's right to seek the servant's return. The submission of the servant to the second man gives him no right at all to hold on to the servant.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the seducer of the servant is a greater criminal than the disobedient servant himself, and so it would be unjust for him to have any privilege or power over the seduced.

Abelard says clearly now what he only previously implied. The devil has no justice, even if God allows him to have power over man. This illustration eliminates the possible legitimacy for the devil in the earlier passage. Abelard and Anselm are in agreement. When Abelard said, 'nisi forte quia eum domino permittente', he may have only been rephrasing Anselm's words, 'hominem diaboli vexationi iuste subiaccere et deum hoc iuste permittere'.<sup>2</sup>

Abelard reinforces the impossibility of a ius for the devil over man by making a point that proceeds logically from the Anselmian position. Even if the devil had had a right over man before he sinned, once the devil had wrongly seduced man, that right would have disappeared:

Qui etiam si quod prius in eum ius haberet, ex hac ipse seductionis sue nequicia ius illud amitteret meruit.<sup>3</sup>

The old abuse of power has returned, but in a form that is consistent with Anselm's denial of any right for the devil. Abelard indicates that whoever misuses that which is committed to his power deserves to lose his privilege. If either the devil or man is to be preferred, it would be more appropriate that the seduced have power over the seducer:

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1. f. 101r; PL 178: 835B-C.

2. CDH I, 7.

3. f. 101r; PL 178: 835C.

His itaque rationibus convinci videtur quod diabolus hominem quem seduxit nullum ius seducendo acquisierit, nisi forte ut diximus quantum ad permissionem<sup>a</sup> domini pertinebat, qui eum illi quasi carcerario<sup>b</sup> vel tortori suo ad puniendum tradiderat.<sup>1</sup>

Abelard concedes power to the devil only through God's permission. The language resembles Anselm, especially the phrase his itaque rationibus. Every time we see the word ratio we cannot claim Anselm's presence, but Abelard's method of procedure by adducing rationes to support his ideas instead of passages from Scripture is consistent with Anselm's practice.

In the next few lines Abelard draws out the logical results of his conclusion. First of all, if God wants to forgive sin before the passion of Christ, as he did with Mary, he can do so without infringing on any rights of the devil. If God so desired, he could completely take away the devil's power over mankind. In such a case, the devil would have nothing to complain about.<sup>2</sup> Abelard talks about the sinful substance and uses the same phrase massa peccatrix that is found often in Our Deus Homo:

Non fecit dominus iniurias diabolo cum massa peccatrice carnem mundam et hominem ab omni peccato immunem suscepit. Qui quidem homo hoc non hoc meritis optinuit ut sine peccato conciperetur, nasceretur, et perseveraret, sed per gratiam suscipientis eum domini.<sup>3</sup>

Abelard does not enter into Anselm's complex reasonings about the sinful substance but simply says that it was in God's power to deliver man from sin and the contamination of sin. God only had to say the word, and the devil's reign would have been over.

But in avoiding the trap of the devil, Abelard has set up the trap of necessity. If God is so free to liberate man at will from the power of sin and the devil, and if the devil is so restricted, then why did God choose the shame and opprobrium of his Son's death to carry out this Redemption?

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1. f. 101r; PL 178: 834D. a permissionem B; b carcerando B.
  2. f. 101r; PL 178: 835A.
  3. f. 101r; PL 178: 835A.



Numquid eadem gratia si in certis<sup>a</sup> hominibus peccata dimitteret vellet liberare eos a penis potuisset, peccatis quippe dimissis propter que in penis erant nulla superesse ratio videtur ut ipsa amplius punirentur. Qui ergo tantam homini exhibuerit gratiam ut eum sibi unirent, in personam non posset minorem<sup>b</sup> impendere dimittendo scilicet ei peccata.<sup>1</sup>

God's forgiveness was possible. There seems no reason why men should be punished further. And so the magnitude of Christ's sacrifice seems inappropriate. The language becomes particularly Anselmian here:

Que itaque necessitas aut que ratio vel quid opus fuit cum sola iussione sua divina miseratio liberare homines a diabolo potuisset, quid<sup>a</sup> inquam opus fuit<sup>b</sup> propter redemptionem nostram filius dei carne sumpta et tantas inedia, opprobria, flagella sumpta denique ipsa crucis asperissima et ignominiosa morte sustinere, ut etiam cum iniquis patibulum sustineret<sup>c</sup>?<sup>2</sup>

In explaining the question why God became man, Abelard is asking for the same grounding of necessity and reason which Anselm sought. And, like Anselm, he is arguing on the basis of the indignities that Christ seems to have suffered uselessly. Anselm's enumeration of Christ's sufferings differs from Abelard's, but it is interesting that both end by mentioning Christ's death among the wicked:

Obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles, quia deo facimus iniuriam et contumeliam, cum eum asserimus in utero mulieris descendisse, natum esse de femina, lacte et alimentis humanis nutritum crevisse, et, ut multa alia faciam, que deo non videntur convenire, lassitudinem, famem, sitim, verbera, et inter latrones crucem mortemque sustinuisse.<sup>3</sup>

This objection against the indignity in Christ's death Abelard links with a problem we find much later in Anselm. It seems that the death of Christ was a much greater crime than the original transgression of Adam and Eve. How can such a heinous act on the part of men who put Christ to death ever be compensated for, even by the very offering of Christ himself? Our sins seem only to have been multiplied. Anselm is dealing with the same problem when he asks how Christ's death can satisfy for the sins of his crucifiers, but Anselm does not go quite as far as Abelard in saying that the sins of those who crucified Christ

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1. ff. 101r-v; PL 178: 835A. a caeteris M; b minorem B.

2. f. 101v; PL 178: 835B. a quod B; b fuit qm. B; c sustinuerit M.

3. CDH I, 3.



make Christ's sacrifice look useless.<sup>1</sup>

The final question is to whom the price of Christ's blood is given. It seems right that it should be offered to those in whose power we were. But actually it should not go to our torturers but to their lord. In this case, however, the same person who is paying the price is the one demanding it:

*'Quomodo etiam precio hoc captivos dimisit si ipse prius hoc precium exegerit aut instituerit ut captivos dimitteret?'*<sup>2</sup> Anselm does not face this problem because he already makes clear in his chapter on the devil that man is not bound to pay the devil anything.

By now Abelard is listing objections without developing them. It seems crudelis et iniquum that an innocent being be offered up for those who are guilty.<sup>3</sup> Anselm on this theme asked what man, if he damn an innocent person, would not himself be judged worthy of damnation.<sup>4</sup> And so Abelard summarizes with the words:

*hec et hinc similia non mediocrem movere questionem nobis videntur de redemptione, scilicet ut iustificatione nostra per mortem domini nostri Iesu Christi.*<sup>5</sup>

Abelard's Solutio rejects all these problems and objections and says that Christ by his death showed his love for us and so inspires us to love him:

*Solutio: Nobis autem videtur quod in hoc iustificati sumus in sanguine Christi et deo reconciliati, quod per hanc singularem gratiam nobis exhibitam quod Filius suus nostram suscepit naturam et in ipsa nos tam verbo quam exemplo instruendo usque ad mortem perstitit.*<sup>6</sup> Nos sibi amplius per mortem astraxit, ut tanto divine gratie accensi beneficio, nihil iam tollerare propter ipsum vero reformidet caritas.<sup>6</sup>

Abelard could have found inspiration for his exemplarist interpretation in the passages in Anselm which deal with the example of justice that Christ's suffering

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1. f. 101v; PL 178: 835C-D; see CDH II, 15.

2. f. 101v; PL 178: 835D.

3. f. 101v; PL 178: 836A.

4. CDH I, 8.

5. f. 101v; PL 178: 836A.

6. f. 101v; PL 178: 836A. a persistit B.



and death provided mankind.<sup>1</sup> For Abelard, who equated justice with love in God, it would have been easy to move from the exemplum iusticie to the exemplum caritatis. But aside from the possible Anselmian interpretation, the narrowness of the response, leaving aside all the questions of necessity and unfittingness, shows that Abelard had taken only a very little from Anselm and has either ignored or rejected the rest. Basically Abelard has held himself to Anselm's first response to Boso, one which Boso found impossible to accept immediately:

Nos non facimus deo iniuriam ullam aut contumeliam, sed toto corde gratias agentes laudamus et prædicamus ineffabilem altitudinem misericordie illius, quia, quanto nos mirabilius et præter opinionem de tantis et tam debitis malis, in quibus eramus, ad tanta et tam indebita bona, quae perdidimus, restituit, tanto maiorem dilectionem erga nos et pietatem monstravit.<sup>2</sup>

Here Anselm speaks of the infinite benefits of divine love as manifested to us in the Redemption. Abelard accepted this love as the ultimate justification<sup>3</sup> for the Redemption, just as Anselm had, but Abelard swept away all the other justifications. Anselm tried to give secondary and necessary reasons for the Redemption through Christ's death, while Abelard gave up any such attempt.

In determining Anselm's influence on Abelard, we can look at it from two points of view. First, the narrow one. Abelard borrowed only from the places in Cur Deus Homo in which Boso provided objections to the actual mode of the Redemption (except concerning the devil's rights). So most of the passages that sound Anselmian are indebted to the first few chapters of Cur Deus Homo. Abelard did not follow Anselm any further, for, with the exception of the devil's position, Abelard did not take up any of Anselm's answers to the objections. But, in a larger sense, Abelard did follow Anselm's path because he extracted from Anselm the ultimate reason why God became man: the divine love acting through Christ and creating love in us. But this is only the

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1. CDH II, 19: '... exemplum dedit hominibus, quatenus propter nulla incommoda, quae sentire possunt, a iustitia quam deo debent declinent....' See also CDH II, 11.

2. CDH I, 3.

summit of Anselm's thinking, the one part that unaided human reason cannot grasp. Theoretically, all the rest of the Cur Deus Homo is open to unaided reason.

Abelard used Anselm like a student who breaks through the complexity of his teacher's ideas and brings forth one single explanation. In the Commentary on Romans Abelard was too impatient to follow Anselm very far. Elsewhere he discusses the Redemption, but never again with the same concern for explaining why man was saved through Christ's death rather than through any other way. The passage that we have analyzed is short. Abelard's thought is not highly developed. He is obviously not trying to explain the entire doctrine of the Redemption in these few words. But even these sentences enable us to conclude that Abelard was aware of the objectiones infidelium as contained in Cur Deus Homo. He adopted some of them and developed them in his own way. In the end he did not adopt as his own the answers of Cur Deus Homo. There is no single passage or idea in Abelard that is undeniably Anselmian, but there is so much that is close that we have to admit that Abelard had read the Cur Deus Homo at some point in his career before he wrote his Commentary on Romans. Anselm's influence on Abelard was hardly profound, but the Cur Deus Homo still seems to have played a part in the shaping of Abelard's thought on the Redemption.

### 3. Hugh of St. Victor

Like Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor takes his sources and integrates them thoroughly in his own mind.<sup>1</sup> The end result is distinctive. Anselm's presence can be detected only within a context of originality. Our problems in determining Anselmian influence are even greater than those we had with Abelard. Not only does Hugh reform all ideas into his own mould; he also lacks Abelard's use of Anselmian necessity. Hugh manages to be Anselmian in many ways without conceding anything to the necessitarian structure of the Cur Deus Homo.

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1. For a general treatment of Hugh of St. Victor, see J. de Ghellinck, Le Mouvement Théologique du XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle (Museum Lessianum. Section Historique, 10. Bruges, etc., 1948), 185-197.



In the section of the De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei entitled 'De Reparatione Hominis', it is almost impossible to classify Hugh neatly and to oppose him to Anselm or Abelard.<sup>1</sup> Hugh takes the God-man as the natural and inevitable result of the way God, man, and the world co-operate. But he never quite finds his own theological genre through which to express his view of the God-man. Hugh avoids Anselm's mathematical theology. Also he does not limit himself to highly interpretative Scriptural exegesis, so he cannot be numbered among the monastic theologians.<sup>2</sup> When he writes about the Redemption, he is not just moralizing. And yet his statements have a strongly exhortatory tone. What emerges in the De Sacramentis is definitely the theology of the schools, but it is almost impossible to categorize it further. More than any other twelfth century thinker, Hugh recalls Augustine, for both combine all modes of theological writing without limiting themselves to any single one. The result is massive and stimulating, but more eclectic than unifying.

In determining Anselm's influence on Hugh of St. Victor, we will keep in mind this first point, that Hugh defies classification and can be looked upon only as a great theologian of the second quarter of the twelfth century.<sup>3</sup> Looking at the De Sacramentis only for those passages which might yield some hint of Anselm's presence, we are bound to betray the difficult unity of Hugh's thought and to see only what might appear as a poorly digested collection of ideas. In Hugh's defence we must say that he was one of the first theologians to try to gather together all knowledge into one work. It is not surprising that the parts of the treatise are not always consistent with each other. Hugh's ideas are usually simple. It is his inclusion of so many

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1. We will only consider Book I, Part 8 of the De Sacramentis. Bk II, Part 1 contains only vague Anselmian influences.

2. Outside the De Sacramentis, of course, Hugh can be much closer to the monastic tradition in mystical works like the De Arrha Animae.

3. According to P.D. Van den Bynde, Essai sur la Succession et la Date des Ecrits de Hughes de S. Victor (Spicilegium Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, xiii, Rome, 1960), 100-103, the De Sacramentis was written between 1130/1 and 1137.

sources, his organization of their ideas, and his personal reactions that often make for confusion. At times Hugh tries to do too much.<sup>1</sup>

Like Abelard in his Commentary on Romans, Hugh gives his central explanation for the Redemption in one short passage. The fourth chapter of De Sacramentis I, 8 reduces everything else to minor importance by comparison. We will try to understand Hugh through this chapter and to use surrounding chapters to illuminate this core of ideas.

The first chapter in I, 8 introduces man's situation. Having fallen, man is subject to mortality, concupiscence, and ignorance.<sup>2</sup> The divine mercy that preordained man to salvation gave him a time of waiting and a place of repentance, so that eventually he could be judged not only with mercy but also with justice and yet still attain salvation.<sup>3</sup> This emphasis on the agreement of mercy and justice in the judgement of man might be nothing more than a faint echo of Augustine's De Trinitate.<sup>4</sup> The reasoning is not Anselm's, for Hugh indicates God could have freely forgiven man by mercy alone but preferred to delay until his justice could come into operation. But there is something here that is not Augustinian, for De Trinitate only contrasted God's power with his justice in delivering man from the devil by justice alone. The opposition between justice and mercy, instead of justice and power, indicates the manner in which Hugh can take a patristic source and manipulate it delicately for his own purposes.

In this first chapter Hugh considered the possibility of the Redemption only from God's point of view. In the third chapter he turns to man's perspective. Man alone is helpless to attain his own liberation. Placed in the world

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1. D.E. Luscombe has outlined Hugh's relationship to Abelard's theology. The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, New Series, xiv; Cambridge, 1969), 183-97.

2. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 1 - PL 176: 305C.

3. Ibid., 305D.

4. PL 42: 1027.



to correct his evils, he needs advice and aid. Able to supply neither by himself, he needs God. Coming to man's aide, God puts aside his position of judge for a time and becomes counsellor and helper.<sup>1</sup> Man thus acknowledges his ignorance and his need of help. There is nothing of Anselm here, for Hugh implies that divine justice is temporarily suspended so that God can come to man's rescue. For the moment, Hugh's understanding of the Redemption is anthropocentric. Everything is done for man's sake. It is man who responds to a God who himself has become slightly ambivalent in his approaches to man. If Hugh had stopped here, his interpretation of the Redemption would have been extremely one-sided. But he soon moves on to other questions that bring forth the objective aspect of the Redemption, the debt owed God.

God's counsel for man was shown in the basis of satisfaction, and his aid was manifest in the effect of the Redemption: 'Tali igitur ratione consilium erat in ratione satisfactionis; auxilium erat in effectu redemptionis.'<sup>2</sup> In other words, God gave man his advice by showing him how satisfaction was to be achieved and provided aid by effecting the redemption. Hugh uses Anselmian terms like tali ratione and ratione satisfactionis. The meaning is not exactly the same as in Anselm, for Hugh does not hold to the strict process of reasoning found in Cur Deus Homo that underlies the term ratio. But Hugh is aware of man's ability to come to theological truths through the development of the human mind's powers, and it is this use of reasoning added to divine revelation that forms a tenuous link with Anselm here.

Hugh introduces man's causa, which we can translate as his case in a legal sense. By developing the idea of a court of law trying various charges brought forward between God and the devil, man and the devil, and God and man, Hugh draws on the theology of the school of Leon:

Ut ergo rationem satisfactionis quam pro peccato suo homo debet resolvere creatori evidentius cognoscere possimus: causam hominis prius necesse

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1. De Sacramentis I, 8: 3 - PL 176: 307C.

2. Ibid., 307C.

est paulisper attentius consideremus. Causa vero haec inter personas  
tractanda formatur, scilicet Deum, hominem, et diabolum.<sup>1</sup>

The Liber Fancrisis itself talks of the 'causa inter Deum et diabolum vel inter  
Deum et hominem vel inter hominem et diabolum ...'.<sup>2</sup> St. Anselm practically  
rejects the idea of a legal case even between God and man: '... quam causam  
debit agere deus cum suo, deo suo, in suo, nisi ut servum suum puniret...?'<sup>3</sup>  
Anselm's use of the word causa probably emerges from his awareness of the way  
the Leon writers liked to describe the process as a court case. Anselm tried  
to restrict the term to a very narrow sense, but Hugh revives the full force  
of the school of Leon image. He has largely accepted the Leon idea of a  
legal process in which God, the devil, and man all assert their positions and  
claims.

At this point we begin the fourth chapter. The causa is explained in  
detail. First the devil is convicted of having done injury to God, for he  
abducted man fraudulently and held him by violence. Man also wronged God,  
for he spurned his command and subjected himself to the servitude of another  
lord.<sup>4</sup> Finally the devil is convicted of harming man, for he deceived him  
and did evil to him. The language strongly recalls that of the school of Leon.  
But even though this passage seems permeated with Leon terms, the very next  
sentence makes a point which comes from the Cur Deus Homo and excludes any  
possibility for Hugh's acceptance of the Leon abuse of power by the devil.  
We can see how easily Hugh can move from one theological tradition to another:

De Sacramentis I, 8: 4;  
PL 176: 308A.

Iniuste ergo diabolum tenet hominem,  
sed homo iuste tenetur; quia diabolum  
numquam meruit ut hominem sibi  
subjectum premeret, sed homo meruit

GDH I, 7

Quamvis enim homo iuste a diabolo  
torqueretur, ipse tamen illum iniuste  
torquebat. Homo namque meruerat ut  
puniretur, nec ab ullo convenientius

1. De Sacramentis I, 8: 3 - PL 176: 307C.

2. Lottin, PM v, No. 48, p. 46.

3. GDH I, 7.

4. De Sacramentis I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 308A.



per culpam suam ab eo premi  
permitteretur.

quam ab illo, cui consenserat ut  
peccaret. Diaboli vero meritum nullum  
erat, ut puniret; immo tanto hoc  
faciebat iniustius, quanto non ad hoc  
amore iustitiae trahebatur, sed  
instinctu malitiae impellebatur.

Hugh's contrast between the devil's injustice in punishing and the justice in man's punishment is purely Anselmian. Indeed, if we substituted torquere for tenere and reversed the order of the first two clauses in the De Sacramentis passage, we would have an almost literal equivalence with Anselm. As it is, the ideas are in complete agreement. Anselm goes a small distance further by speaking of the devil's motives: he did not hold man because of his love for justice but because of his evil impulse. But both Anselm and Hugh consider the devil's position from the point of view of his potential merit. The conclusion is the same. The devil merited absolutely nothing. This is one of the most obviously Anselmian passages in all the De Sacramentis. Hugh could make such a statement severely limiting the devil and yet later on conceded a great deal to the devil's position. Hugh never tried to make all things agree. For the moment, <sup>he</sup> is in accord with Anselm, but later on he will be at odds.

Having undermined the devil's role, Hugh still insists that man must conquer the devil.<sup>1</sup> This is completely consistent with Anselm of Canterbury.<sup>2</sup> Besides defeating the devil, man must placate God. But it seems as if neither is possible because of God's anger. No advocate will do any good for man except God, but God did not want to take up man's case because he was angered:

Patronus autem nullus talis inveniri poterat nisi solus Deus, sed Deus causam hominis suscipere noluit, quia homini adhuc pro culpa sua iratus fuit.<sup>3</sup>

Anselm does not use such anthropomorphic terms to characterize man's offence against God, but in the very beginning of Cur Deus Homo Bossé does speak of

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1. De Sacramentis I, 8: 4 - FL 176: 308B.

2. GDH I, 22.

3. De Sacramentis I, 8: 4 - FL 176: 308B.

God's anger: '... redemit nos a peccatis, et ab ira sua, et de inferno et de potestate diaboli ...'.<sup>1</sup> But this is only a passing mention, and Anselm does not give the divine wrath the significance that it takes on in Hugh.

In order to placate God, man must first restore the damage that he has caused and second satisfy for his contempt of God: 'Sed Deus rationabiliter placare non poterat, nisi et damnum quod intulerat restauraret et de contemptu satisfaceret.'<sup>2</sup> Although this passage is heavily indebted to Anselm, it also splits up his unitary concept of satisfaction. Anselm says that satisfaction is the honour that the sinner pays back to God: 'Sic ergo debet omnis, qui peccat, honorem deo, quem rapuit, solvere; et haec est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator deo debet facere.'<sup>3</sup> For Anselm man in the very act of repaying God's honour makes satisfaction, while for Hugh man must first pay back the damage he has done and then satisfy God for his contempt to his honour.<sup>4</sup>

Although Hugh's concept of satisfaction and repayment complicates Anselm, the two agree on one essential point: man alone has nothing with which to pay back God. 'Homo vero nihil habuit quod digne Deo pro oblato damno recompensaret.'<sup>5</sup> Hugh fails to develop the underlying Anselmian theme that man already owes God everything he has and so can give nothing extra in order to compensate for his sin. But the more immediate theme, that man is devoid of power or ability to provide something that can make up for his sin, comes from Anselm. The archbishop of Canterbury used Boso to express this idea: 'Si me ipsum, et quidquid possum, etiam quando non pecco, illi debeo, ne peccem,

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1. GDH I, 6.

2. De Sacramentis I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 308B.

3. GDH I, 11.

4. This splitting of the Anselmian concept happens often among twelfth century theologians who adopt the term satisfacere. See E. Korosak, 'Le Principali Teorie Soteriologiche della Scholastica', Antoniarum xxvii (1962), 423-66, esp. 423-6, 466-438. Korosak distinguishes, perhaps too rigidly, between the juridical satisfaction of Anselm and the penitential satisfaction of later theologians like Hugh.

4. De Sacramentis I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 308B.



nihil habeo, quod pro peccato reddam.'<sup>1</sup> The si clause is the one that Hugh leaves out, but the conclusions are identical.

Hugh lists the types of compensation man might give God and shows their inadequacy. No matter what man offers God from irrational creation, it would be insufficient: 'Quia si quid de irrationali creatura redderet, pro rationali sublata, minus esset.'<sup>2</sup> Nor could one man be offered for the sake of mankind, for every man is sinful: 'Sed nec hominem pro homine reddere potuit, quia justum et innocentem abstulerat et neminem nisi peccatorem invenit.'<sup>3</sup> The insufficiency of irrational creation follows Anselm's point that nothing except something greater than all the created universe is sufficient for compensation.<sup>4</sup> The inadequacy of man because of his sinfulness follows Anselm's dictum, 'Peccator peccatorem iustificare nequit.'<sup>5</sup> There is no literal identity between the vocabulary of Anselm and Hugh here, but there is an identity of ideas. And so Hugh can summarize: 'Nihil ergo homo invenit unde Deum sibi placare posset, quia sive sua, sive seipsum daret digna recompensatio non esset.'<sup>6</sup>

Hugh's approach thus far contains both Anselmian and non-Anselmian qualities. We find the second in Hugh's emphasis on the placating of an angry God. But the concept of digna recompensatio is derived from Anselm's idea of satisfaction. For both Anselm and Hugh, man must repay God for what he has taken away from Him. Hugh is by no means as precise in defining the terms of this payment as Anselm is. But there is undeniably a great deal of Anselm in the assertion that sin leaves something wanting in man's relationship to God, and

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1. CDH I, 20.

2. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 308C.

3. Ibid., 308C.

4. CDH I, 21.

5. CDH I, 23.

6. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 308C

this lack can be filled only by an act that is beyond the scope of rational or irrational creation.

Hugh continues to depend on Anselm in the next section, where he says that God extends his mercy so that justice will prevail. Like Anselm he insists on the inviolability of divine justice. At times like this he seems almost amenable to Anselm's statement that God cannot forgive man freely, for such an act would contravene the demands of God's justice. Hugh never goes the entire distance, for such a step would create an unwanted necessity. But he does everything possible to show the ways in which the fulfilment of divine mercy is also the completion of divine justice. Towards the end of Cur Deus Homo, Anselm pointed out that the sending of the God-man was an act of mercy on the Father's part, but an act of mercy that carried out divine justice.<sup>1</sup> Hugh is saying almost the same thing when he says that man's rescue would not have been fully in accord with reason unless it had been just on both sides: for God, who had justice in seeking man; for man, who had justice in escaping the devil:

*Neque enim ereptio hominis perfecte rationabilis esset, nisi ex utraque parte justa fieret, hoc est sicut Deus justitiam habuit hominem requirendi, ita et homo justitiam haberet evadendi. Sed hanc justitiam homo nunquam habere potuisset, nisi Deus illi per misericordiam suam illam tribueret.<sup>2</sup>*

There is a balance and co-ordination between justice and mercy here that recalls Anselm's theology. Man by himself was helpless to avoid the yoke of sin, so God first extended his mercy so that justice would eventually assert itself.

As in Anselm, Hugh's interpretation of the Redemption is built around his concept of justice. Everything must conform to the definition and requirements of divine justice. The difference between Hugh and Anselm here is that the latter does not say that the mercy of God came first and then, through it, justice. But this would fit in with his schema, for God's act of mercy was in

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1. GDH II, 20.

2. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 308C-D.



sending his Son, who made it possible for justice to be carried out. Hugh explicitly says that mercy engenders justice; Anselm implies this but concentrates on justice alone. Anselm speaks about the concord between the two but not the relationship in which one makes the other possible:

Misericordiam vero dei, quae tibi perire videbatur, cum iustitiam dei et peccatum hominis considerabamus, tam magnam tamque concordem iustitiae invenimus, ut nec maior nec iustior cogitari possit. Nempe, quid misericordiae intelligi valet, quam, cum peccatori tormentis aeternis damnato....

Having set up all the necessary conditions for the Redemption, Hugh can now introduce the God-man. There is no logical process leading up to the rational necessity of such a being, such as we find in Cur Deus Homo II, 7. Hugh arrives at the God-man by first giving all the necessary information about man's situation and then simply introducing the fact of the God-man as something we accept as a gift from God uniquely qualified to solve our problems. The God-man comes as the special answer to man's situation, but Hugh always leaves open the possibility of other answers:

Ut ergo Deus ab homine placari posset, dedit Deus gratis homini quod homo ex debito Deo redderet. Dedit igitur homini hominem quem homo pro homine redderet, qui ut digna recompensatio fieret prioris non solum aequalis sed major esset.<sup>1</sup>

In the Anselmian phrase, man renders God what he owes him, ex debito. Through the worth of the God-man, man pays back God what he owes him for his initial offence. Only the God-man is capable of making such restitution. Hugh is just as emphatic as Anselm that man alone is incapable of compensating, but the former never brings forward Anselm's picture of a universe that in all its vastness and splendour cannot even begin to pay back God for man's primal fault. Hugh lacks Anselm's epic dimensions, even though he is equally capable of showing man's helplessness.

The God-man not only has to restore the damage that man has caused but also must satisfy for man's contempt of God and thus enable man to escape his

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1. GDH II, 20.

2. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 308D.

punishment:

Sed adhuc super erat homini, ut sicut restaurando damnum placaverat iram, ita quoque pro contemptu satisfaciendo dignus fieret evadere poenam.<sup>1</sup>

As we have previously pointed out, Anselm saw both these acts, restoring damage and satisfying for contempt, as a single act of satisfaction.

Christ could not do these things unless he assumed a punishment he did not owe and thus made man worthy to be snatched away from the punishment he deserved:

Sed hoc convenientius fieri non poterat, nisi ut poenam quam non debebat, sponte et obedienter suscipere, ut de poena quam per inobedientiam meruerat eripi dignus fieret. Hanc autem poenam homo peccator solvere non poterat, qui quancunque poenam suscipere non nisi digne et juste propter contemptus primi reatum sustineret.<sup>2</sup>

If these two sentences were all that we could find in Hugh to link him to Anselm, they would still be enough. And yet at the same time they show Hugh's distance from Cur Deus Homo. They are close because they speak of what Christ paid and what man owed. Hugh shows that man deserves any punishment God desires to send him and that nothing, no matter how painful, exceeds the debt of man's offence. Like Anselm, Hugh insists that no matter what man does to make up for his sin, he cannot provide sufficient compensation for God. But Hugh is distant from Anselm because he has turned satisfaction into penal expiation or substitution. It is not a question merely of substituting poena for satisfactio but of a concept that makes the Redemption into an act of penance rather than a moral act which redresses the imbalance of the universe.<sup>3</sup>

Comparing this aspect of Hugh's teaching with Anselm, we can distinguish the two by saying that Anselm is concerned with the quality of Christ's death, unique because it is not already owed to God. Hugh emphasizes instead the

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1. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 309A.

2. Ibid., 309A.

3. I borrow J. Rivière's distinction between Anselm's ordre moral and Hugh's ordre pénal (Le Dogme de la Rédemption au Début du Moyen-Âge, Paris, 1934, p. 405), even though the word moral is rather vague. But the implication is that Anselm's concept of satisfaction goes beyond mere payment of a penalty and entails a complete reordering of man's relationship with God.



quantity of Christ's huge penalty. In this sense Hugh is more legalistic than Anselm, for the former looks at Christ's death at least partly as a rendering of an allotted, quantitative penalty. Anselm considers Christ's death as a unified, infinite, single act of satisfaction for the honour of God. We see Hugh's tendency when he says:

Ut ergo homo iuste debitam poenam evaderet, necesse fuit ut talis homo pro homine poenam susciperet qui nihil poenae debuisset.<sup>1</sup>

Hugh chooses to emphasize Christ's punishment as a substitution for man's punishment, and so he leaves Anselm. In Hugh the penalty, when paid fully, gives satisfaction, but not in Anselm. Anselmian satisfaction is more than a simple penalty because man owes far more than an assigned debt. Man has upset the order of the universe, and he can return God's honour only if he somehow puts that order right again.

Having brought together all the elements in Christ's act, Hugh summarizes them in one sweeping sentence:

Christus ergo nascendo debitum hominis patri solvit, et moriendo reatum hominis explavit, ut cum ipse pro homine mortem quam non debebat sustineret, iuste homo propter ipsum mortem quam debebat evaderet, et jam locum calumniandi diabolus non inveniret; quia et ipse homini dominari non debuit, et homo liberari dignus fuit.<sup>2</sup>

First, by being born, Christ paid the debt of man. In other words he had to be a man so that his work would be apportioned to man's benefit and would be great enough to pay for man. Earlier Hugh had explained the debitum hominis more clearly:

In nativitate enim Christi iuste placatus est Deus homini; quia talis homo inventus est pro homine qui non solum, ut dictum est, par, sed etiam major esset homine.<sup>3</sup>

Secondly, by dying, Christ expiated man's crime. Sustaining a death he did not owe, he enabled man to escape the death he owed. For Hugh Christ's death is a punishment that he takes on to substitute for us; for Anselm Christ's

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1. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 4 - PL 176: 309B.

2. Ibid., 309B.

3. Ibid., 309A.

death is an offering of the one thing not already owed to God, the one thing that can provide the extra element of satisfaction for God: the death of an innocent God-man. Although Hugh is a long way from Anselm here, he approaches the statement Anselm made in summarizing the meaning of Christ's act: 'Nullus unquam homo moriendo praeter illum deo dedit, quod aliquando necessitate perditurus non erat, aut solvit, quod non debebat.'<sup>1</sup>

The one aspect of Hugh's summary which is furthest from Anselm concerns the devil. The implication is that if God had exercised his power alone against the devil instead of sending the God-man to carry out justice, the devil would have been able to complain. There is no hint here at any abuse of power, but it is somewhat jarring to find such an archaic concept in the midst of a sentence so close to Anselm in other respects. This passage reminds us that Anselm is mixed in with many other sources on the Redemption, and Hugh has no exclusive loyalty to any of them.

Looking back over the fourth chapter in I, 8 of De Sacramentis, we see a remarkable piece of twelfth century theological writings. These few hundred words concentrate in themselves a complete interpretation of the workings of the Redemption. In general, Hugh follows Anselm concerning the devil and satisfaction but does not include Anselm's detail. He understands Anselm's debitum, but applies it more often to the punishment Christ bore for us than to the unique fact of his death. Finally he pushes Anselm into a more legalistic structure without really tightening his language. Hugh's language is considerably less precise than Anselm's.

We can conclude that Hugh of St. Victor knew the Cur Deus Homo and consciously adopted and adapted some of Anselm's language and concepts. But the end result is clearly Hugh's own, sometimes not completely digested and slightly contradictory. Hugh may have been trying to adjust the Anselmian concept of satisfaction to the more traditional Augustinian idea of expiation. In the

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1. GDH II, 18.



process Anselm's ideas lose much of their clarity. There is less rigidity of outlook. Edges are slightly blurred, but the centre is still Anselmian. Ultimately both Hugh and Anselm build their interpretations of the Redemption around what man owes God and how Christ pays this debt.

The remaining chapters in I, 8 further qualify and limit the Anselmian contribution to Hugh of St. Victor's theology of the Redemption. In the sixth chapter Hugh presents a summarized 'cur Deus homo'. None of the reasons given can be attributed to Anselm, except in the vaguest possible sense.<sup>1</sup> The seventh chapter introduces traditional language of imolation and sacrifice and totally ignores the idea of satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> Leaving Anselm completely, Hugh says God could have damned human nature without injustice. Hugh does not consider Anselm's divinus provocatum and looks at salvation only in relation to God's total freedom.<sup>3</sup> Hugh presents an arbitrary God who could damn those with merit and save those with sin if he so desired:

*Sic igitur quod voluit utrumque justum fuit, ut etiam si aliter voluisset injustum non fuisset, quia potestas est in voluntate ejus, quia sine injustitia facere illi licet quodcumque voluerit.*<sup>4</sup>

In a limited sense, Anselm would have agreed with this interpretation of God's activity and the unchallengeable rightness of his justice, but he always linked God's justice with the order of the universe and said that God would never contradict this order. By comparison with Anselm, Hugh's assertions are somewhat unbridled and unqualified in their scope. The former always saw God as acting in a way consistent with what human beings could determine as just:

*Quod autem dicitur, quia, quod vult, iustum est, et quod non vult, non est iustum, non ita intelligendum est, ut, si deus velit quod libet inconveniens, iustum sit, quia ipse vult....*<sup>5</sup>

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1. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 6 - PL 176: 310B-C.

2. Ibid., I, 8: 7 - PL 176: 310C.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., I, 8: 9 - PL 176: 311C.

5. CEH I, 12.

The difference between Hugh and Anselm is that the second sees God's freedom in relation to the universe in its present, God-instilled order, while Hugh sees God's freedom in terms of the way the universe could be. The major difference between Hugh and Anselm is that the former does not grasp the latter's structure of necessity in the universe, a necessity that makes certain events inevitable results of other events. We cannot be certain if Hugh's defence of God's unbridled freedom in his justice is a conscious reaction to Anselm's necessitarian ideas, but it would not be surprising if it were, for Hugh is so aware of Anselm at other times in the De Sacramentis that he must have been familiar with Anselm's ideas about divine justice in the Cur Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup>

Reaching the climax of the problem of necessity in the tenth chapter, Hugh says that God could have redeemed man in another way if he had wanted: "Propter quod veraciter profiteamur quod redemptionem generis humani etiam alio modo Deus perficere potuisset si voluisset."<sup>2</sup> Hugh has been consistent with himself in excluding any necessity from the actual mode of the Redemption.

Hugh of St. Victor emerges from this section on the Redemption as a careful theologian who is willing to borrow something from Anselm but constantly holds back from full acceptance of Cur Deus Homo. Anselm contributed to the formation of Hugh's thought on the Redemption, but ultimately Hugh seems more comfortable with Augustine and with the Laon tradition of a strictly limited theology than with the ambitious programme of Anselm. Although Hugh never mentioned Anselm by name, his reaction to the teaching of Cur Deus Homo in his own discussion of the Redemption indicates that he felt Anselm had too much confidence in man's ability to use his reason to know the ways of God. Hugh's qualified and limited use of Anselm would make it easier for later theologians

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1. Hugh attacked a similar kind of necessity when he rejected two Abelardian theses: (1) God cannot change his actions without endangering his omniscience and immutability. (2) Nothing can be done better than it is done. See Luscombe, pp. 189-90.

2. De Sacramentis, I, 8: 10 - PL 176: 311D.



like Peter Lombard to ignore Anselm completely.

#### 4. The *Isagoge* in theology

The *Isagoge* in theology is a rich mine of twelfth century theology.<sup>1</sup> It is an extended theological treatise that shows a sophistication and skill that are lacking in earlier works, such as those connected with the school of Laon. Together with this facility in thought and expression, the *Isagoge* manifests eclectic tendencies. As many different authorities as possible are gathered together. We find much of Abelard, even some of his ideas condemned at Sens in 1140.<sup>2</sup> And yet the author also warns against new trends in theology.<sup>3</sup> The writer never mentions Anselm by name, but in his treatments of free will, original sin, and the Redemption he borrows so heavily from Anselm that his writings become at times nothing more than summaries of Anselm. We will limit our analysis to passages directly connected to *Cur Deus Homo*, even though Anselm's concept of man and his need for Redemption by a God-man was expressed and developed in several of his works besides *Cur Deus Homo*. The author of the *Isagoge* was aware of the full panorama of Anselm's teaching on the Redemption and used freely not only *Cur Deus Homo* but also *De Libertate Arbitrii* and *De Conceptu Virginali*.<sup>4</sup>

The question of the authorship of the *Isagoge* centres on the relationship of an initial dedication to the work itself. Both are contained in a single complete manuscript, Trinity College Cambridge MS. B. 14. 33.<sup>5</sup> The editor

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1. The *Isagoge* was edited together with the *Sententiae Parisienses* (which owe nothing to Anselm) by A.M. Landgraf, *Ecrits Théologiques de l'École d'Abélard* (*Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense* 14, Louvain, 1934), pp. 63-285.

2. See D.E. Luscombe, 'The Authorship of the *Isagoge* in theology', *ANQ* xxxv (1968), 7-8. See also Luscombe's *The School of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought. Second Series xiv, Cambridge, 1969), 236-244.

3. In the Prologus, pp. 63-4 in Landgraf's edition.

4. The use of *De Libertate* can be seen especially on pp. 94-99 of the *Isagoge*, the *De Conceptu*, pp. 116-122.

5. *The Western Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College Cambridge*, M.R. James (Cambridge, 1900), 1, 431-4.

of this manuscript, A.M. Landgraf, gave a number of reasons for separating the dedication from the Isagoge text itself,<sup>1</sup> but D.E. Luscombe has examined Landgraf's criteria and found that the dedication may well belong to the Isagoge itself. The hands of the two parts are almost contemporary, contrary to what Landgraf thought. Also the arrangement of quires could allow for the dedication to be an integral part of the Isagoge. Most importantly, both the dedication and the Isagoge appear to have been owned first by the monastery of Cerne in Dorsetshire, then were acquired by the monastery of Belvoir by its prior William. On the basis of this evidence, Luscombe concluded that the Odo of the dedication may well have been announcing the Isagoge and may be considered as the author of the work.<sup>2</sup>

If Luscombe is correct, and I think he is, we can look upon the Isagoge as the work of an English writer who was acquainted with the fashions of the 1130s and 1140s in French scholastic thought. He dedicates his work: 'Magistro Scolarium Patri Cenobitarum G[ilberto] Folioth, suus Odo.' Luscombe thinks that Odo used Foliot's name because he believed Foliot was still known in France. Gilbert Foliot had taught at Paris between c. 1115-1120 and afterwards had been prior at Cluny and at Abbeville. He returned to England to become abbot of Gloucester in 1139. 'It was not, therefore, incongruous that Odo should have invoked Gilbert's name in order to advertise a work of theology.'<sup>3</sup>

Because Gilbert is referred to as a master of scholars and a father of monks, the Isagoge would have been written before Gilbert became bishop of Hereford in 1149. Landgraf claimed the Isagoge had been written in the 1150s because of his dating of one of its sources, the Summa Sententiarum.<sup>4</sup> But the chronological researches of P.D. Van den Eynde have shown that the Summa

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1. Landgraf, Œuvres Théologiques, xliiv-xlvi.

2. Luscombe, 'The Authorship ...', pp. 7-16, esp. 13-14.

3. Luscombe, p. 12.

4. P.D. Van den Eynde, 'Précisions Chronologiques sur quelques Ouvrages Théologiques du XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle', Antonianum xxvi (1951), 223-9.



Sententiarum could have been available in England by 1140. And so Luscombe dates the Ysaogoge from the beginning of Gilbert's abbacy at Gloucester in the early 1140s.<sup>1</sup>

The exact identity of Odo remains a mystery, but for our purposes we have enough information to look at the Ysaogoge as the work of an English theologian associated with Gilbert Foliot.<sup>2</sup> Odo may have been a monk. As we will see, the Ysaogoge at times is nothing more than a florilegium of other writers. But it is always a florilegium of a special kind, for the writer is concerned in setting forth and solving theological problems instead of dealing with Biblical passages. The outlook is much closer to that of the Paris schools of mid-century than to monastic theology. It has been suggested that our Odo may have been a master of theology at the cathedral school of Lincoln.<sup>3</sup> The author of the Ysaogoge thus may have been a secular master eager to absorb the latest fashions from Paris but at the same time careful to hold on to the sturdy thinking of men like Anselm. But whoever Odo was and whatever his role in the intellectual life of the 1140s, he points out a continuing interest among scholastic-type theologians in Anselm's theology of the Redemption.

The first time Odo borrows from Cur Deus Homo, he is discussing the expiation man has to make for sin. He moves back and forth among the chapters between 12 and 19 in the first book of Cur Deus Homo and integrates them into his own scheme, eventually adding to them other parts of Anselm. The central principle is that God's liberty can be coerced by no law. Nothing in the created universe can compel him to do something that he does not wish or which does not befit him. And so it seems likely that he could forgive sins as he so desired. Boso's point of view is summarized in the Ysaogoge:

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1. Luscombe, p. 13.

2. The Ysaogoge seems to have gained some attention in England, for we have two rearrangements of parts of it, British Museum MS. Royal 70 A. XII, ff. 117v-123r, and MS. Harley 3038, ff. 3r-7v. Luscombe, p. 16. See also 'The School of Abelard', pp. 243-4.

3. Luscombe, p. 16, n. 42.

Isagoge, p. 124.

Nulla, inquit, coercetur lege Dei libertas. Iniuriam ergo quascumque dimittere nequaquam impeditur.

Cur Deus Homo, I, 12

Boso: Nam, cum deus sit liber, ut nulli legi nullius subiaceat iudicio, et ita sit benignus, ut nihil benignius cogitari queat, et nihil sit rectum aut decens, nisi quod ipse vult: mirum videtur, si dicimus, quia nullatenus vult autem ei licet suam iniuriam dimittere, a quo etiam de iis, quas aliis facimus, solemus indulgentiam petere.

Another reason for excluding satisfaction is the problem that arises if man does satisfy God. If man has to pay God back, then why does Scripture advise him to ask God to be indulgent? If man does not satisfy God and God cannot be indulgent, then we beseech God's mercy for no good reason at all. Anselm uses the same opposition between what happens if we satisfy or do not satisfy. Instead of the words satisfacere/non satisfacere, he opposes

solvere/non solvere:

Isagoge, pp. 124-5.

Quodsi satisfacit, quare consulit ei Scriptura rogare Deum, ut sibi indulgeat? Iustus namque Deus non iterum exigit quod solivimus. Si vero non satisfacit, in cassum roget Deum veniam, si nequit Deus absque satisfactione indulgere.

Cur Deus Homo, I, 19.

Boso: Si enim solivimus, quod debemus, cur oramus, ut dimittat? Numquid deus iniustus est, ut iterum exigit, quod solutum est? Si autem non solivimus, cur frustra oramus, ut faciat, quod, quia non convenit, facere non potest?

These objections are now answered. God cannot and does not forgive what should not be forgiven. This prohibition by no means challenges the divine freedom, for the impossibility emanates from God himself and is not a limitation imposed on God. Anselm goes into the full development of this question, while the Isagoge only offers a few remarks:

Isagoge, p. 125.

Ad hec dicimus, quia quamvis summe libertatis sit Deus, tamen caret licentia dimittendi, quod non licet dimitti. Nec enim a libertate seiuncta.

Cur Deus Homo, I, 12.

Verum est, quod dicis de libertate et voluntate, et benignitate illius; sed sic eas debemus rationabiliter intelligere, ut dignitati eius non videamur repugnare. Libertas enim non est nisi ad hoc, quod expedit aut quod decet.

The Isagoge distinguishes between liberty and says that God's liberty is not such that he can forgive what ought not to be forgiven. Anselm says liberty has as its object what is right or fitting. The terminology of the two



writers is different, but the idea is identical. God's freedom is not such that he violates the dictates of his own justice. Anselm bases much of his thought on the concept of the ordinatum, the inherent orderliness of the universe, and on the divine dismitas. The Ysaagore does not go into these points. Instead it assumes Anselm's foundation and only presents the completed Anselmian structure.

To the second objection, Odo says that our prayer to God for his mercy is not in vain, even when we give satisfaction, for our prayer forms an integral part of the satisfaction we make. The Ysaagore is following Anselm without any hesitation here. Both authors insist that somehow divine forgiveness is carried out through payment of debt by guilty human beings and that prayer is a component of this forgiveness:

Ysaagore, p. 125.

De postulatione autem venie dicimus, quia non satisfaciendi vel casae est vel parum comoda satisfaciens autem ideo supplicat, quia hoc ad ipsum attinet satisfactionem.

Cur Deus Homo I, 19.

Qui non solvit, frustra dicit; dimitte. Qui autem solvat, supplicat, quoniam hoc ipsum pertinet ad solutionem, ut supplicet.

The author is able now to turn to the offensive and to show a number of reasons why God does not forgive man freely. In the first place, if he justified a sinful man, there would be no distinction between the just and the unjust:

Ysaagore, p. 125.

Penam autem vel satisfactionem nullo interveniente medio culpam sequi irrefragabiles convincunt rationes. Nam si ad gloriam tam reum quam iustus absque satisfactione transferret Deus, non dissimiliter esset apud eum iusto et iniusto.

Cur Deus Homo, I, 12.

Est et aliud, quod sequitur, si peccatum sic impunitum dimittitur: quia similiter erit apud deum peccanti et non peccanti.

The opposition iusto/iniusto is the same as that between peccanti and non peccanti. Both writers realize the danger in similar treatment for those who sin and those who do not sin.

An even more cogent objection is that the sinner would actually be more free than the man who gains merit, for the former would be subject to no law at all. But this is an attribute of divinity alone. Free forgiveness thus

seems to threaten the very definition of God. Man is to be repaid according to the quantity of his merits. But if satisfaction is not necessary, culpa is more free than meritum bonum. So it would be subject to no law.<sup>1</sup>

Having established the impossibility of free forgiveness, the author takes up the great Anselmian theme of God's honour, an idea that is essential in the construction of the Cur Deus Homo's case for the necessity of satisfaction. He shows much independence in developing the idea that man in sinning deprives the creator of the honour he owes him. It is unfitting that God should submit himself to such an act. The creature must repay God's honorem debitum.<sup>2</sup> Not surprisingly, Anselm is much more detailed and careful in setting forth his ideas. But the conclusions are the same: man must render to God the honour of which he has deprived him. The Ysaagoge does not try to follow Anselm sentence by sentence.

The Ysaagoge develops further the theme of God's honour and closes its section 'Quare necessaria expiatio' with a discussion of the necessity that man occupy the place left by the fallen angels.<sup>3</sup> The entire treatment does little more than collate and summarize Anselm's objections and responses to the concept of satisfaction for sin.<sup>4</sup> We can gain some feeling for Odo by realizing his skill at condensing and rephrasing Anselm. We do not find an original mind at work here. The author is too attentive to Anselm's conclusions to challenge the basis from which they come or even to explain that foundation.

Immediately after this section, the second book of the Ysaagoge begins. Here we find Odo's use of original Hebrew to present Old Testament prophecies concerning Christ. The Ysaagoge does not limit itself to Scriptural citations but eventually breaks out into a section of unaided reascoring. The author

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1. Ysaagoge, p. 125; CDH I, 12.

2. Ibid.; CDH I, 11.

3. Ibid., pp. 125-6; CDH I, 19.

4. CDH I, 12, 13, 19.



presents Opositioanes Iudeorum. The first problem is to determine from what God redeemed us. Anselm's teaching on the devil is mingled with that of Abelard in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish the two sources.<sup>1</sup> But at times we can be sure that it is Anselm and not Abelard who is being used. The Jew who argues in this part of the Ysaia for the abuse of power theory turns at one point to the very arguments in Anselm that were supposed to refute that theory. The Jew twists them so that they support his idea:

Ysaia, p. 156.

Sic enim arguit: Meruerat homo penas. Hanc autem a nullo convenientius recipere debuit quam a penarum ministro, qui suadenti peccare con-senserat. Iuste ergo torquebatur homo ab illo. Iuste igitur ille torquebat hominem.

Cur Deus Homo, I, 7.

Quamvis enim homo iuste a diabolo torqueretur, ipse tamen illum iniuste torquebat. Homo namque meruerat, ut puniretur, nec ab ullo convenientius quam ab illo, qui consenserat, ut peccaret.

The Jew has reversed Anselm's conclusion. But the author of the Ysaia here asserts himself. It is true, he says, that man was rightly held and God rightly allowed this. Nevertheless, the devil had no right and no justice.<sup>2</sup>

The next part of the dispute between the Jew and the author integrates Abelardian and Anselmian passages and ideas. Just as in Abelard's Commentary on Romans, the problem of the devil's power is linked to the question of necessity. If Christ does not have to die to free us from the devil and, as far as the devil is concerned, man could have been liberated by God's free forgiveness, then why does Christ die at all? The author follows the parts of Abelard's Quaestio in the Commentary on Romans, but at times he seems to move to Cur Deus Homo I, 7.<sup>3</sup> At one point, Odo says that God seems cruel to have killed the only being who is innocent. The objection is found in both Anselm and Abelard, along with the consequence that the death of an innocent man seems to increase our crimes instead of alleviating them. The similarities in language point to borrowing from Abelard's Commentary by the Ysaia, but the

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1. Ysaia, pp. 155-6; Comm. on Romans, PL 178: 834B-C; CDH I, 7.

2. Ysaia, p. 156.

3. Ysaia, pp. 156-7; Comm. on Romans, PL 178: 835A.

subject and the objection are evident in Anselm also.<sup>1</sup>

These are some of the objections and partial responses included in the section entitled Objectiones Iudeorum, and they are mainly a restatement of Abelard's Questio on the Redemption. In the Ysaacose's Rationes Incarnationis, the author turns from Abelard's problems to Anselm's answers. He claims that he is bringing forth reasons handed down by the Fathers (a patribus traditas),<sup>2</sup> but many of them are directly from Anselm. The section begins with a discussion of the purpose of rational creation. This exposition is patterned after Anselm's consideration of the same topic at the beginning of the Cur Deus Homo's second book. The author follows Anselm in a sentence-by-sentence unfolding of his thought that becomes almost repetitive in its emphasis on one theme: man was made rational by God so that he could choose good and reject evil.<sup>3</sup> From here the author eventually reaches Anselm's idea that God's purposes must be carried out, so man must ultimately gain goodness.<sup>4</sup>

The theme of the necessity of God's design is linked to and contrasted with man's helplessness to carry out that design. Human nature must rise to glory. But first man must make satisfaction. He is incapable of doing so alone:

Non homo in eo statu in quo fuit ante prevaricationem, et in quo magis potuit, tanquam creditori debitor Deo debuit quicquid habuit et potuit. Prevaricatus igitur nil habuit vel potuit, quo digne pro commissa satisfaceret culpa.<sup>5</sup>

Also an angel could not give man any help, for then man would become its servant.<sup>6</sup> But God alone ought not to expiate because it is man who is in debt.<sup>7</sup>

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1. Ysaacose, p. 157; Comm. on Romans PL 178: 835C-D; CDH I, 8.

2. Ysaacose, p. 158.

3. Ibid., pp. 158-9; CDH II, 1.

4. Ibid., p. 159; CDH II, 5.

5. Ibid., p. 160; CDH I, 20.

6. Ibid., p. 161; CDH I, 5.

7. Ibid., CDH II, 6.



So the Ysaagoge is ready for the conclusion: the necessity of a God-man. Like the Cur Deus Homo the Ysaagoge has built up to this point by establishing rational necessities and elimination all other possibilities. But the latter is not quite as forceful in its presentation as Cur Deus Homo. Anselm had said that only God can and only man ought, while Odo states that God alone ought not expiate, and man alone cannot expiate. Anselm's positive approach is much more direct and fruitful in eliminating all other possibilities:

Ysaagoge, p. 161.

Deum igitur et hominem necesse erat esse, qui et posset et deberet malum predictum evacuare. Nam neque solus Deus expiare debuit, nec homo solus potuit. Ideo utramque naturam in expiatis iungi oportuit.

Cur Deus Homo, II, 6.

Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est, ut de hominibus perficiatur illa superna civitas, nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat praedicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi deus nec debet nisi homo, necesse est, ut eam faciat deus homo.

From here our author moves directly into the next chapter in Anselm, concerning the possible combinations of God and man that could compose the God-man. First one could be changed into another. Second the two could be mingled together and make a third being. And third the two could be united so that each persists. This last manner, of course, is the only one that will fulfil all the requirements.<sup>1</sup> The author does not bother to give all the nuances of Anselm's argumentation. He simply enumerates the possibilities and quickly chooses the appropriate one.

The next section of the Ysaagoge moves on to the next chapter of Anselm, II, 8, explaining why the God-man was to be the son of Adam.<sup>2</sup> There is much in the following pages taken directly from the second book of Cur Deus Homo and dealing with the personality and activity of Christ. But as usual we will have to stop our analysis here. We have seen enough to conclude that the Ysaagoge's treatment of the Redemption is very much indebted to Anselm.

We can conclude that our author almost completely adopts the whole of Cur Deus Homo. He makes use of almost every chapter and gives extended attention

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1. Ysaagoge, p. 161.

2. Ibid., pp. 163-4.

to the major Anselmian themes, such as the necessity of satisfaction, the necessity of a God-man, and the necessity that the God-man's merit be applied to man. Odo's outlook is almost as necessitarian as Anselm's, even if at times he does not follow Anselm all the way. There is really no large area within the doctrine of the Redemption in which Odo diverges from or disagrees with Anselm. Odo is permeated with Anselmian thought and language. He is an outstanding witness to the continuing presence of Anselm in the theology of the Redemption in the 1140s.



## Chapter IV

### LATER TWELFTH CENTURY SCHOLASTIC REACTION

#### 1. Peter Lombard and his Followers

Peter Lombard's unique position in medieval theology has long been recognized and appreciated.<sup>1</sup> He summarizes the traditions that precede him and gives to the theologians who follow him a well-ordered outline of the Christian faith. On the doctrine of the Redemption, he is aware of the teachings of Paul, Augustine, Ambrose, Hilary, and others. But as far as Anselm is concerned, Peter Lombard totally ignores the Cur Deus Homo. We cannot be sure if the Lombard consciously avoided everything Anselmian or if he lacked any acquaintance with Anselm. Whatever the case may be, Peter Lombard's position was crucial for his many followers in what we may call the school of Lombard. Although some of these thinkers manifest a great deal of independence in developing the Lombard's ideas, none makes the slightest attempt to incorporate any Anselmian ideas into his exposition of the Redemption. At times we find parallels in ways of expression and faint indirect influences, but these are barely visible. Nevertheless, Peter Lombard and his school deserve our attention, if only because this group epitomizes a tendency in mid- and late twelfth century theology: the disappearance of Anselm's influence on the theology of the Redemption. The Lombard and his followers take up different themes and manifest directions of thought that would have eliminated permanently any possibility that Anselm might be considered an authority on the Redemption. We will briefly look at some of these directions of thought in order to see how they depart from Anselm's ways of thinking about the Redemption.

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1. See, for example, Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911), II, 359-407: 'Eine eingehende Untersuchung und Würdigung der Schriften des Petrus Lombardus wird für die Darstellung der Geschichte der scholastischen Methode schon aus dem Grunde notwendig sein, weil man vielfach den "Magister sententiarum" als den Begründer der scholastischen Theologie, sein Sentenzenwerk als den Triumph der scholastischen Methode bezeichnet hat.' (p. 359).

The earlier thinking of Peter Lombard on the Redemption is contained in his Collectanea in Epistolas D. Pauli. The explications of Romans 5, 8-10 and Hebrews 2, 9-11 treat the two questions which the school of Laon had made the central concern of all theology on the Redemption: the devil's position and the necessity or fitness of the actual mode. The work was finished before 1142-3, when Gerhoh of Reichersberg made his attack on it.<sup>1</sup>

The passage in St. Paul's epistle to the Romans explains how God commends his charity in us because Christ has died for us. We are justified in his blood and saved from his wrath, thus reconciled to God through the death of his Son.<sup>2</sup> Themes of escape from the devil, wrath of God, reconciliation, the worth of Christ's blood, and his unweaved death - all are placed together here without any co-ordination among them.<sup>3</sup> The text is confusing partly because so much of Augustine is tightly condensed. Peter Lombard by no means gives a full treatment even to the question of the fitness of the actual mode. His thought on the Redemption is still in a process of development. The theologian achieves only a limited success in remaining close to the meaning of Paul's epistle to the Romans and in interpreting Paul through Augustine's 13 De Trinitate.

The commentary on the epistle to the Hebrews in the Collectanea provides a fuller treatment of the Redemption. The text is the one that the school of Laon often took as a starting point for expositions of the Redemption: 'Decebat enim eum propter quem omnia, et per quem omnia, et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consummare.'<sup>4</sup> With such a text as the Lombard's point of departure, it is not surprising that among the Augustinian quotes there are evidences of Laon's influence on Peter Lombard.

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1. J. de Ghellinck, 'Pierre Lombard', DTC xii, 1954.

2. PL 192: 1384D.

3. PL 192: 1385A-1386C.



Most of his discussion of the Redemption concentrates not on the payment Christ makes to the Father but on his victory over the devil.<sup>1</sup> Peter Lombard includes a passage from the school of Laon that says that if God had not become man, he would have carried out man's salvation by violence instead of justice. This suggests a strong necessity behind the actual mode, but not an Anselmian one based on what man must render God. The Lombard is speaking in terms of what God must render the devil. This passage is also included in the Sentences, and the Quaracchi edition of the Sentences ascribed it sententialiter to the Gloss on the Bible.<sup>2</sup> Actually the words were taken from the writings of the school of Laon which are brought together in Lottin. We can compare the two passages and see how the Lombard must have had a Laon source and followed it carefully:

Lombard, Collectanea, PL 192: 421D

1) Nisi enim homo esset qui diabolum vinceret, non iuste, sed violenter homo ei tolli videretur, qui se illi sponte subiecit;

2) sed si cum homo vincit, iure hominem perdit: et ut homo vincat, necesse est ut Deus in eo sit, qui faciat eum sine peccatis esse.

3) Si enim per se homo esset vel angelus in homine facile peccaret, cum utraque naturam per se constat cecidisse.

Anselm of Laon, Lottin, PM v, No. 47, p. 44.

1) Nisi enim homo esset qui diabolum vinceret, non iuste sed violenter ei homo tolleretur.

2) Sed si homo eum vincerit, iure hominem perdidit. Ut autem homo vincat, necesse est ut Deus in homine sit qui eum faciat sine peccato esse.

3) Si enim homo purus vel angelus in homine, facile peccaret, cum utraque naturam constat per se occidisse (cecidisse).

We could hardly be closer to the thinking of Laon. Christ has to be a man not because man has to render something to God but because otherwise man would be violently taken away from the devil's power. But being a man, Christ was able to arrange it so that the devil rightly lost man. The iure suggests an initial right of the devil. Also God must be man because such a being would be unable to sin, thus setting up the necessary condition for an abuse of power when the devil tried to exercise dominion over a sinless man. A pure man or an

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1. PL 192: 419D-421D. 'Participavit ergo pueris, id est factus est homo possibilis et mortalis, ut sic vinceret diabolum.' (421D)

2. Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum (Quaracchi, 1916), II, 636, n. 2. (vol. II includes the third and fourth books of the Sentences).

angel are eliminated, not because their work would have no application to the human race, but because they would sin.

Peter Lombard's Quattuor Libri Sententiarum shows us how his thought on the Redemption evolved after he wrote the Collectanea. There is no movement towards Anselm. Although the Lombard's thought on the Redemption has changed in places, there is much in the Sentences that was already in the Collectanea.<sup>1</sup> The eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth distinctions of the third book form the central expression of Peter Lombard's teaching on the Redemption. In the first of these, the most important idea concerns the humility of Christ.<sup>2</sup> Christ's sacrifice is sufficient because he manifested a humility that balanced Adam's pride. This way of stating the basis for the Redemption did not appear in the Collectanea and provides an alternative to Anselm's idea of satisfaction. Humility replaces justice as the central quality in the Redemption. More precisely, the Lombard equates justice with humility: '[Christus] implendo in se omnes justitiam, id est consummatissimam humilitatem, qua maior esse non potest.'<sup>3</sup> Like Anselm, the Lombard seeks balance between the sin of the old man and the work of the new man. Also he is concerned with describing exactly what it is that Christ offers to God. But in Peter Lombard Christ's sacrifice is based on his humility, not on his satisfaction given to the Father for an offended honour. And the equation between justice and humility is one

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1. The dating of the Sentences has not yet been determined with exactitude. According to J. de Ghellinck (DTC, xii, 1963), the Sentences were finished by the end of winter 1151-2. But P.D. Van den Eynde ('Nouvelles Précisions Chronologiques sur Quelques Oeuvres Théologiques du XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle', Franciscan Studies, xiii (1953), 110-118) says that the 'Magister Petrus' referred to in pontifical letters was not the Lombard. Because Gerhoh of Reichersberg was not able to acquire a copy of the Sentences before 1163, Van den Eynde would put the Sentences as late as possible - 1157 or even later. I think Van den Eynde depends too heavily on the evidence from Gerhoh and that the Sentences could belong to the early 1150s. See also P.D. Van den Eynde, 'Essai Chronologique sur l'Oeuvre Littéraire de Pierre Lombard', Miscellanea Lombardiana (Novara, 1957), 45-63. L. Ott, 'Petrus Lombardus. Persönlichkeit und Werk', Münchener Theologischer Zeitschrift, v (1954), 99-113. These last two works I have been unable to obtain.

2. Sentences iii: 18, 5 - Quaracchi, p. 633.

3. Sentences iii: 18, 5 - Quaracchi, p. 633.



Anselm never made.

In the nineteenth distinction Peter Lombard discusses the favourite Augustinian theme, our liberation from the devil. The sole reason why Christ triumphed over the devil is that we were justified in Christ's blood. Our justification in Christ precedes our liberation from the devil.<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary that the devil himself misbehave in order to lose us. He becomes a passive spectator, just as man had been in the abuse of power idea. Later on, the Lombard strengthens this point of view when he says we are redeemed from sin in the blood of Christ, and through this we are redeemed from the devil: 'Itaque in Christi sanguine, qui solvit quae non rapuit, redempti sumus a peccato; et per hoc a diabolo.'<sup>2</sup>

The problem of necessity and fitness is the central concern of the twentieth distinction. The Lombard finds Augustine very much his central authority here and accepts his position that another mode was possible to God but, considering our miserable state, none was more suitable.<sup>3</sup> The final passage that interests us comes at the opening of the fifth chapter in this distinction. The Lombard speaks of Christ as our 'hostia et pretium nostrae reconciliationis'. He was offered not to the devil but to God, 'quantum ad pretii sufficientiam'.<sup>4</sup> These passages reinforce the more extended treatment of Christ as sacrificial victim in the eighteenth distinction. The phrases underline the Lombard's increasing concern with the nature of Christ's offering to the Father rather than with the devil's position in relation to man and Christ.

The shifting attitude towards the devil and the basis for our redemption that we have traced from the Collectanea to the Sentences is ultimately

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1. Sentences, iii: 19, 1 - Quaracchi, p. 534.

2. Sentences, iii: 19, 2 - Quaracchi, p. 635. The Lombard also de-emphasizes the devil by pointing out the example of Christ's love engendering our love (iii: 19, 2 - p. 634). The influence of Abelard is clear. See David Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, pp. 274-5.

3. Sentences, iii: 20, 1 - Quaracchi, p. 640. See Augustine 13 De Trinitate 10, 13 - PL 42: 1024.

4. Sentences, iii: 20, 5 - Quaracchi, p. 642.

indebted to Anselm of Canterbury.<sup>1</sup> The idea of Christ as a sufficient offering to the Father had existed long before Anselm ever provided his own interpretation. But before Anselm the sufficiens hostia was subordinate to the Christ who defeats the devil. Anselm reversed the order of importance and completely eliminated the abuse of power. The Lombard has done the first but not the second, for he still includes Augustinian passages which speak of the abuse.<sup>2</sup> A lack of similarities in language or specific points about the Redemption indicates that Peter Lombard was not consciously indebted to Anselm. His restrictive attitude towards the devil and his emphasis on Christ's merit could have come from Hugh of St. Victor. As we have seen, the De Sacramentis derived many of its ideas on the means of our Redemption from Cur Deus Homo. And so even if there is no direct line of influence from Anselm to Peter Lombard, there is an indirect line via Hugh of St. Victor.

The Lombard's omission of Cur Deus Homo as a source for his teaching on the Redemption may have been due to his aversion for any theology that seemed to limit the power of God.<sup>3</sup> Or Peter Lombard may have felt that Anselm was not ancient enough to be treated like a patristic source but not contemporary enough to be taken into consideration. Whatever the reason behind the Lombard's exclusion of the arguments and language of the Cur Deus Homo, the Sentences start a period in which Anselm's theology of the Redemption is nearly forgotten at Paris. The Lombard's prestige and following were large. Peter Lombard's failure to take into account the Cur Deus Homo probably contributed strongly to the obscurity into which the treatise fell during the later part of the twelfth

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1. Rivière reached the same conclusion: Le Dogme de la Rédemption au Début du Moyen-Âge, pp. 352-4.

2. Sentences iii: 20, 1 - Quaracchi, p. 641. See 13 De Trinitate 74, 18. PL 42: 1028. But later, the Lombard's own commentary modifies the force of Augustine's statement: iii, 20, 4 - p. 642.

3. David Luscombe has shown how the Lombard dealt with the problem of God's power in i, 43 of the Sentences (The School of Peter Abelard, p. 266). Luscombe says that the Lombard was reacting to Abelard, but the Master of the Sentences may also have been rejecting Anselmian-type statements about what is fitting for God to do.



century.

Master Udo was the first theologian whose commentary on the Sentences was more than a resumé.<sup>1</sup> He limited himself to the questions in the Lombard that interested him. Like Peter Lombard, Udo uses Augustine to show that another mode of Redemption was possible, but the actual one was the best. But his development of this idea is his own. Udo says that Augustine's famous 13 De Trinitate statement not only eliminates a better mode for us but also a worse one. If God could redeem us by a lesser good, then he would be dismissing a greater good for a lesser one, and this would be unfitting even in a good man. Nor could God redeem us by an equally good means. The way selected would be based on one reason that was preferred to the reason for another way: '... ratio igitur fuit cur potius hoc modo nos redemit, et sic iste modus rationaliter et per hoc melior fuit.'<sup>2</sup> So God seems unable to redeem us by a lesser good, an equal good, or a greater one.

The answer to this apparent limitation of God is that God could redeem us by a less fitting way because in doing so he would not be dismissing a greater good for a lesser one. Instead he would be using a less fitting way only on account of himself. Also he could act in an equally reasonable manner because all reason is based on his will, and so it is only his will that provides the rationality of the act.<sup>3</sup> Udo's elimination of the arguments restricting God's activity is thus based on a reversion to the primal will of God as the cause and reason for all things that happen. The theologian is trying to remove

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1. For Udo's text, see D.E. DeClerck, 'Droits du Démon et Nécessité de la Rédemption', *RTAM*, xiv (1947), 48-51. For the dating of Udo's Sentences, O. Lottin, 'Le Premier Commentaire Connu des Sentences de Pierre Lombard', *RTAM* xi (1939), 64-71. Lottin put the Sententiae Udonis between 1160-65. See also J.N. Garvin, 'Magister Udo, a Source of Peter of Poitiers' Sentences', *New Scholasticism*, xviii (1954), 286-98.

2. DeClerck, 'Droits du Démon', p. 49.

3. DeClerck, *Ibid.*, p. 49: 'Quae enim causa fuit cur hoc modo redemit, eadem fuisset causa cur alio modo, si voluisset, redimisset, scilicet dispositio et rationalis eius voluntas.'

every shred of necessity in the discussion of the means of the Redemption.<sup>1</sup> And so even Augustine's mild and limited statement about the actual way being the most suitable for us is examined and explained.

Simon of Tournai's teaching on the Redemption puts him among the followers of Lombard.<sup>2</sup> In his Disputationes Simon restates the archaic abuse of power theory and even assigns a justice to the devil in holding man.<sup>3</sup> But he also shows that Christ was not offered to the devil and concentrates on the meaning of Christ's gift of self to God. Christ is offered to the Father as a sacrifice for the reconciliation of the human race. The Redemption is looked upon primarily as an act of reconciliation.

Later Simon asks if there could be a better means of redemption. He quotes Augustine 13 De Trinitate.<sup>4</sup> But he also brings forth a concept of merit which is more elaborate than anything to be found in Peter Lombard. The basic principle is that of the Lombard, which he had taken from Ambrose: pride must be offset by humility. Simon expresses this idea in a way that recalls Anselm's concern for proportion and order:

Si quis diligenter attendat, quia contraria contrariis curantur, et quia primus homo malo opere, ut superbia, meruit mortem, non solum sibi, sed et toti sue posteritate congruebat ergo, ut cum contraria contrariis curentur, quod homo bono opere, ut humilitate, mereretur vitam toti humano generi.<sup>5</sup>

Humility is now connected with merit. One must gain the merit through one's own work, not through someone else's, and one must gain merit through someone

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1. This same argument for unlimited alternate modes of Redemption based on God's inscrutable will appears in Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae, PL 211: 1209A-C.

2. DeClerck, 'Droits du Démon', pp. 51-6, who cites the Institutiones of Simon from Paris Bibliothèque Nationale MS, lat. 14886. For background, see P. Glorieux, 'Simon de Tournai', DTC, xiv, 2128-9. The Institutiones are prior to 1175; the Disputationes comes after. Text of Disputationes in J. Warichez, Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, xii, 1932).

3. Warichez, pp. 129-30.

4. Ibid., p. 131.

5. Ibid., p. 131.



who is greater. But man of himself cannot gain merit for himself, since all merit for good works comes from God. So since no one except he can gain merit of his own doing, only God could merit life:

Homo autem potuit opere suo mereri mortem: peccatum enim quod est meritum mortis in homine est ex homine. Ergo est suum hominis. Sed purus homo non potuit mereri vitam. Bonum enim opus quod est meritum vite est in homine, non ex homine, sed ex Deo. Non est ergo suum hominis. ... Ergo, quia bonum opus meritum vite est opus Dei, et nemo meretur nisi suo opere, ergo solus Deus mereri potuit vitam.<sup>1</sup>

But God alone cannot merit, because then he would not have a greater being with whom he could gain merit. In order that this be so, God was made man.

This argument is expressed more concisely in Alan of Lille's Contra Haereticos.<sup>2</sup> Alan wrote some time after 1165;<sup>3</sup> Simon of Tournai wrote the Disputationes after 1175. Simon thus seems to have been the original source for this argument. The presence of such thinking in Simon of Tournai shows how easily he could depart from the text of the Lombard's Sentences and develop various points.

The argument has a certain closeness to Anselm's thought. Simon is trying to show why the Saviour must be both God and man. Like Anselm he says that he must be God because only he can carry out the necessary work. Also like Anselm, Simon says that this work consists in a necessary merit to be gained. But unlike him, Simon finds the meaning of Christ's work in an equal (not greater) payment for the value of the wrong, and in one which God cannot make, not because man is obliged to pay, but because God must somehow be less than God in order to have someone greater than he to receive the act. Instead of Anselm's 'homo debuit; Deus potuit', we have something like 'homo non potuit, neque Deus potuit'. And so the Anselmian elements here are probably accidental. Simon has a perspective on the Redemption similar to that of Anselm but at no

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1. Warichez, p. 131.

2. PL 210: 414A: '... bonum enim quod fit in homine, a Deo est, non ab homine.'

3. Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, Alain de Lille. Textes Inédits (Études de Philosophie Médiévale, lii, Paris, 1965), pp. 156-62.

time is he in contact with Anselm.

Unlike Simon of Tournai, Peter of Poitiers is a genuine disciple of Peter Lombard in all aspects of doctrine, not just on the Redemption.<sup>1</sup> In 1169 he succeeded to Peter Comestor's place in the teaching of theology at Paris. He became chancellor at Paris but until his death in 1205 kept his chair of theology. He occupies the centre of ecclesiastical and learned life in Paris in the last quarter of the twelfth century. Celestine III and Innocent III both called on him to regulate quarrels among different groups in the Paris area.<sup>2</sup> His work has been called a development of Peter Lombard's. Even more than Simon, Peter took the contents of the Lombard's Sentences and refashioned them into his own mould.

Following Augustine, Peter says that considering our infirmity, the actual mode of Redemption is the best.<sup>3</sup> In the course of his exposition, Peter criticizes the Anselmian point of view. He is considering the charge that God could not have redeemed us in a more competent way if he freely forgave our sins, for then he would have acted against his own justice. This is precisely the argument of Anselm, even though it is in greatly simplified form. For the only time in our study of the Lombard and his school, we come across something that could have been taken directly from Gur Deus Homo. But the lack of detail makes it impossible for us to attribute the passage to any one source. The important point is that Peter of Poitiers is aware of a way of thinking about the Redemption that can be found in Anselm and that Peter rejects this line of thought:

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1. Grabmann (Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, p. 501) calls Peter of Poitiers the Lombard's 'treuester Schüler'. Biographical details in P.S. Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers (Catholic University of America, 1936), pp. 1-24. Also N. Jung, 'Pierre de Poitiers', DTC, xii, 2038-9. Text of Sententiae in PL 211: 1007-1212. Critical edition of first two books of the Sententiae edited by P.S. Moore and Marthe Dulong, Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis (Publications in Mediaeval Studies, the University of Notre Dame), v. i - 1943; v. ii - 1950.

2. DTC, xii, 2038.

3. PL 211: 1209C.



Ergo potuit nos liberare competentiori modo, quod tamen improbat, quia non potuit nos liberare sine remissione peccatorum, quia aliter contra sum justitiam fecisset, et ita liberavit nos. Ergo non potuit nos liberare alio modo. Ad quod dicunt quod non potuit nos liberare modo competentiori, quod ad nos homines, quia nil potuit facere unde magis ad eum diligendus moreremur, quam quod seipsum pro nobis exinanivit, obtulit; potuit tamen nos liberare modo competentiori quantum ad se, si non moreretur.<sup>1</sup>

Peter's answer to the argument for God's justice is that as far as man is concerned, no way is more efficacious for arousing our love. But for God, he would have found a better way if he had not died. Peter does not actually state the answer as his own opinion. The 'ad quod dicunt' leaves him seemingly uncommitted. But the previous tone of his argument for an unrestricted number of ways to Redemption seems to leave him in the number of those who say that God could have acted in another way. Peter is still loyal to Augustine's dictum about the actual mode being the best, but he has developed it to a degree of sophistication not found in any of his predecessors.

Looking upon Peter of Poitiers's work as a whole, we can say that he considerably deepened and strengthened the Lombard's thinking. He limited himself to two questions on the Redemption, the devil and the fitness of the actual mode. He did not speculate on the basis of this mode, except for asserting that through Christ's death, our love is enkindled. Peter never thoroughly treats the problem of what Christ rendered to the Father and why his offering was acceptable.

Peter holds back from showing why Christ was a sufficient victim perhaps because he wants to leave open possibilities for other ways of redemption. Peter's dislike for any necessitarian structures impedes him from providing a rational understanding of the significance of Christ's death, not just for us but also in the objective sense of what the Son renders the Father. Peter of Poitiers, in rejecting any necessity in the actual mode, prevents any links with the satisfaction theology of the Cur Deus Homo. Among the Lombard's followers, Anselm is in full retreat.

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1. PL 211: 1209D-1210A.

## 2. Robert of Melun

Robert of Melun provides further witness to the decline of Anselm in mid-twelfth century theology. In one of his earlier works, the Questiones de Epistolis Pauli, Robert wrongly ascribed to Anselm the abuse of power explanation for the Redemption and thus indicated his ignorance of Cur Deus Homo. Robert's central work, the Sententie, owes something to Anselm. But the ideas of Cur Deus Homo are only present in a limited degree, as if Robert had once read Anselm, absorbed some of his ideas and language, but had forgotten or discarded the main argument. We could read the sections on the Redemption in the Sententie as Robert's conscious refutation of Anselmian necessity. But such an interpretation would give Anselm more prominence than he deserves in Robert's work. Our textual analysis of the Sententie will show the narrow limits of Anselm's contribution to Robert of Melun's thought on the Redemption.

With Robert, chronology is a special problem. His movements and the dating of his works are uncertain.<sup>1</sup> Robert became an arts instructor on Mount Ste. Geneviève in about 1137 and may have been Abelard's successor there. After a few years he went to Melun and learned theology there. In the 1150s Robert probably returned to Paris to teach theology. It is possible that he taught at St. Victor. But this decade of his life is obscure. In 1160 he left for England and died in 1167 as bishop of Hereford.

B.M. Martin edited Robert's Questiones de Epistolis Pauli (QEP), his Questiones de Divina Pagina (QDP), and the first book of the Sententie.<sup>2</sup> Martin dated the QDP between 1143 and 1147<sup>3</sup>, the QEP 1145-55,<sup>4</sup> and the Sententie

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1. In what follows on Robert's life I borrow heavily from Ulrich Horst, Die Trinitäts und Gottelehre des Robert von Melun (Walberger Studien der Albertus Magnus Akademie. Theologische Reihe 1, 1964), pp. 4-9. These pages are an antidote to many misleading statements in M. Gorce's article, 'Robert de Melun', DTC xiii, 2751-3.

2. B.M. Martin, Oeuvres de Robert de Melun, t. 1 - Questiones de Divina Pagina (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, xiii, 1932); t. 2 - Questiones (theologicae) de Epistolis Pauli (Sp. Sac. Lov., xviii, 1938); t. 3, v. i - Sententie (Sp. Sac. Lov., xli, 1947); t. 3, v. ii - Sententie (Sp. Sac. Lov., xxv, 1952).

3. Martin, t. 1, li-lil.

4. Martin, t. 2, lvi-lviii.



1152-60.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently D. Van den Eynde showed that Martin's dating was misleading, for Martin thought the QEP was dependent on Peter Lombard's Sentences, while Van den Eynde showed there was no dependence at all.<sup>2</sup> U. Horst took this task a step further and concluded that the QEP were written approximately between 1147-55, the QEP between 1150-55, and the Sententia 1155/6-1163/4.<sup>3</sup> Horst's conclusions are not radically different from those of Martin, except for his convincing argument that Robert's return to England cannot be used as a terminus ad quem for the Sententia. For our purposes we can accept Horst's dates as approximate indications of the periods during which Robert was writing his three main works.

The QDP have nothing on the Redemption, so we can start with the QEP. At the opening of Robert's treatment of the Redemption, he says that four questions must be answered: why God was incarnate; why he redeemed the world through his death; to whom the price was given; from whose power he redeemed us.<sup>4</sup> From here Robert sets out to explain what he thinks is Anselm of Canterbury's concept of the Redemption. God used the actual mode, says Robert's Anselm, in order to keep himself from using force against the devil. God would have injured the devil if he had violently snatched man away from him. Also, God was not to use an angel, because then man would have ascribed his salvation to the angel. Also, if an angel were the redeemer, then it would have performed a greater work than God himself did at the creation. Man is disqualified because he is in captivity. Since the devil put his hands on a sinless man, he deservedly lost those whom he was holding justly.<sup>5</sup>

This collection of reasons for the actual mode that Robert has attributed

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1. Martin, t. 3, v. 1; vi.

2. D. Van den Eynde, 'Nouvelles Précisions Chronologiques sur Quelques Œuvres Théologiques du XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle', *Franciscan Studies* xiii (1953), 86-100.

3. Horst, pp. 12-23.

4. Martin, t. 2, 60-61.

5. Martin, t. 2, 61-2.

to Anselm of Canterbury either are not in his teaching or are contrary to it. Robert's version of Anselm's argument could only come from a lack of knowledge of the Cur Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup>

Robert says these reasons are not causae or necessariae, quare Deus homo.<sup>2</sup> We must look for other causae, while also remembering that God can do anything because of his omnipotence. Nevertheless, while keeping God's omnipotence in mind, we are trying to show how the actual mode corresponds with the ratio nature, the given order of things:

Hoc tamen predicendum est, quia cum haec questiones in divinitate fiunt, non ideo fiunt quod aliquid Deo impossibile sit - ipse enim potest impossibilia - sed ideo, ut appareat qualiter ea quae facta sunt nature rerum concordent, cum ea sic esse ratio nature rerum non recuset.

Robert's own explanation of the Redemption is founded on St. Augustine's statement that the actual mode was the most fitting for healing our sickness. Robert emphasizes the humility and love Christ showed by dying for us and which he inspires in us: 'Nullus enim erat, qui tantum ad humilitatem nos invitaret, vel ad tantum amorem inflammaret.'<sup>4</sup> He mentions the insults Christ suffered for our sake: 'Nam derisui habitus, potator et vorax vocatus, consputus, alapis cesus, ad ultimam morte turpissima condemnatus est.' All these are indications of his love for us.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Robert refers to Anselm in Martin, t. 2, 61: 'Ad cuius questionis solutionem dicunt quidam, ut Anselmus ille Cantuariensis et ceteri....' The MSS. Martin used are: Paris Bibliothèque Nationale latin 1977; Oxford Bodleian Laud. lat. 105, and (including only Robert's commentary on Paul to the Romans), London British Museum Royal 15 B. IV. The Laudian MS. leaves out ille and et ceteri and so reads on f. 186 rb: 'dicunt quidam, ut Anselmus Cantuariensis...'; the Royal MS., f. 124v: 'ille Anselmus cantuariensis archipresul....' We can thus be certain that Robert really meant our Anselm and not Anselm of Laon.

2. Martin, t. 2, 62.

3. Martin, t. 2, 62.

4. Martin, t. 2, 63.

5. Martin says (p. 63 in note) that the argument from humility and charity Anselm already expressed in his Meditation on the Redemption and in CDH I, 3. This is correct, but there is no connexion between Anselm and Robert here. For Anselm humility and love are secondary themes compared to satisfaction. Robert probably was borrowing from Abelard. See D.E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard, p. 294.



In order to explain Christ's death, Robert also considers Christ's merits, but his discussion of satisfaction in terms of both contempt and damage comes from Hugh of St. Victor and not Anselm. Robert says Christ satisfied for man's contempt of God because he opposed his obedience to man's disobedience. He repaired the damage because he returned the service that had been taken away. This dual satisfaction, so far from Anselm's unitary concept of Christ returning God's honour and thus making satisfaction, can be traced directly to the De Sacramentis.<sup>2</sup>

The remaining two questions return to the devil.<sup>3</sup> The overwhelming concern of the passages on the Redemption in the QEP is the limitation of the role that the devil plays in the Redemption.

Although the Sententie also deal at length with the devil, he no longer occupies a central place in the argument but is relegated to one section. The questions on the Redemption give a more exhaustive treatment of the subject than we have encountered in any other twelfth century writer. Because Martin's edition of the Sententie only covers the first book, we will quote from the transcription by D.E. DeClerck for the section on the Redemption.<sup>4</sup> DeClerck uses Bruges MS. 191 but did not give references to folios after the initial one, f. 275vb. I have used the Bruges text as printed in DeClerck but also give the folio numbers from London British Museum MS. Royal 2 F. 1. This manuscript contains only the second book of the Sententie. Its readings, except for a few slight differences, are equivalent to those of the Bruges MS.

The first indication of Robert's acquaintance with Anselm comes from the frequent recurrence of the phrase 'our Deus homo':

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1. Martin, t. 2, p. 64.

2. PL 176, 308B - I, 8: 4.

3. Martin, t. 2, 64-7.

4. 'Le Dogme de la Rédemption: De Robert de Melun à Guillaume d'Auxerre', *RTAM* xiv (1947), 253-7.

Non autem superfluum aut otiosum quaestum est cur Deus homo....<sup>1</sup> Opus  
 est in quo rationum genere hec questio facta sit cur Deus homo....<sup>2</sup>  
 Si autem quaeritur cur Deus homo et referatur vis questionis ad divinam  
 potentiam, nulla videtur causa posse assignari quare Deus per Deum  
 hominem....<sup>3</sup>  
 Unde quando quaeritur cur Deus homo, videtur respondendum esse: gratuita  
 sua bonitate....<sup>4</sup>  
 Ad diversa enim accomodari potest interrogatio praedicta, scilicet cur  
 Deus homo....<sup>5</sup>

Robert has reproduced the Anselmian formula, 'cur Deus homo'. We are especially  
 tempted to see this as an Anselmian element in the Sententia when we recall that  
 in the QEP Robert asks 'quare Deus homo' instead of 'cur Deus homo'.<sup>6</sup> And even  
 this phrase appears only once in the QEP.

At the beginning of Robert's discussion of the Redemption and its necessity,  
 he uses a phrase that comes from Anselm, even though it is so common by now  
 that it may not indicate a direct influence:

Robert of Melun, Sententia<sup>7</sup>

GDH I, 1

Est autem in magna questione et a  
 multis tractata, qua necessitate  
quaque utilitate Dominus sit homo  
factus.

Quam questionem solent et infideles  
 nobis simplicitatem christianam quasi  
 fatuam deridentes obicere et fideles  
 multi in corde versare: qua scilicet  
ratione vel necessitate deus homo  
factus sit.

Both Robert and Anselm are asking about the necessity by which God became man,  
 but Anselm also is concerned with the rational basis (ratione), while Robert  
 mentions the usefulness (utilitate). This passage, like the use of the phrase  
 'cur Deus homo', if isolated in itself, does not show much, but if added to  
 other small links between Anselm and Robert, becomes evidence for an influence.

In the next sentence Robert explains that although this question has already

1. DeClerck, p. 253; London British Museum MS. Royal 2 F. 1, f. 206rb.
2. Not in DeClerck; MS. Royal, f. 206va.
3. DeClerck, p. 253; MS. Royal, f. 206va.
4. DeClerck, p. 254; MS. Royal, f. 206vb.
5. DeClerck, p. 255; MS. Royal, f. 207ra.
6. Martin, t. 2, 62.
7. London British Museum MS. Royal 2 F. 1, f. 206rb; DeClerck, p. 253.



been treated by the Fathers, his decision to write about it does not indicate any criticism of their ideas. Rather he intends to show briefly what the Fathers set forth. Anselm also mentioned the Fathers and said that their words should be sufficient for us. Still, he would go ahead with the subject while asking God to open the question to him so that he might clarify it to those who were seeking help from him. Anselm is more bold than Robert in this passage, but we must remember that in the next chapter he says that if greater auctoritas does not confirm what he says, then even though he seems to prove his point by reason, there is no certitude in it. This cautious approach in both Robert and Anselm may only be indicative of an age that insisted on repeating and explaining authorities. But the fact that such a statement comes at the outset of both theologian's expositions of the Redemption at least hints that Robert read Cur Deus Homo and remembered Anselm's words when he acknowledged his debt to the Fathers in the Sententie:

Robert of Melun, Sententie<sup>1</sup>

Non autem ideo hanc questionem hoc in loco proponendam puto quia non sit a patribus sufficienter et convenienter pertractata et sine debita certitudine expedita. Sed idcirco eam hic proponere volui ut breviter ostenderem cur a patribus facta sit et quibus rationibus ab eis sit a dubitatione absoluta.

GDH

I, 1: ... quamvis a sanctis patribus inde, quod sufficere debeat, dictum sit, tamen de illa curabo, quod deus mihi dignabitur aperire, petentibus ostendere.

I, 1: ... si quid dixerit, quod maior non confirmet auctoritas, quamvis illud ratione probare videar, non alia certitudine accipiatur....

There is no equivalence of texts here, but there is the same awareness that the authority of the Fathers is to be guaranteed while the theologian investigates the questions himself.

The first problem concerns an alternate mode of Redemption. It seems God could have done alone everything that he did through a God-man. And this way would be even more appropriate and useful for man in liberating him from the yoke of sin and the devil's power.<sup>2</sup> Anselm never said another means would have seemed more appropriate for man. But he did allow Boso, in taking on the

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1. DeClarek, p. 253; MS. Royal, f. 206rb.

2. DeClarek, p. 253; MS. Royal, f. 206rb.

objections of the infidels, to approximate such a statement. Boso objected to the indignity God endured by taking on human flesh and suffering injury and insult.<sup>1</sup>

Robert also finds the actual mode of the Redemption initially repulsive because of the sufferings Christ had to endure. In the QEP he had spoken of these sufferings as a proof of Christ's love for us.<sup>2</sup> But now, considering the problem from the non-believer's point of view, he can see that Christ's passion and death seem to contradict the dignity of God:

Robert of Melun, Sententia<sup>3</sup>

Quis enim illa humilia atque ima que de ipso predicantur celsitudinis divine credit posse convenire, id est quod in presepio positus sit et vilibus pannis involutus et ... matris lacte pastus, et quod tante pauperitatis fuerit quod non habuit ubi caput reclinaret.

Quod denique probra et approbria sustinuerit quae in passione dicitur sustinuisse, id est, sputa, colaphos, velationem illusionis, spinas coronam, et sepulturam.

GDH I, 3

Obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles, quia deo facimus iniuriam et contumeliam, cum eum asserimus in utero mulieris descendisse, natum esse de femina, lacte et alimentis crevisse, et, ut multa alia taceam, verbera et inter latrones crucem mortisque sustinuisse.

The catalogue of indignities is only occasionally the same, but the underlying ideas are equivalent: the sufferings of a God-man do not seem appropriate. They seem to contradict the very nature of God.<sup>4</sup>

Robert and Anselm are in total accord that salvation through a God-man appears upon initial analysis to be an inappropriate means, for it contradicts God's position in the hierarchy of being and so goes against human reason and the natural order of things. As Robert says: 'Supra enim naturam est et omnino etiam naturae et rationi contrarium quod Deus homo sit, et ideo, quantum

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1. GDH I, 3.

2. Martin, t. 2, 63.

3. Not in DeClerck; MS. Royal, f. 206va.

4. Not in DeClerck; MS. Royal, f. 206va: 'Hec quippe omnia a natura divinitatis adeo aliena sunt quod omnino impossibile est ad ipsam divinitatis naturam accessum habere.' See GDH I, 6 for a similar argument: the actual mode of Redemption would seem to make God lack power or to deny his wisdom.



ad rationem naturae, hoc est omnino impossibile.<sup>1</sup>

But after this first section, Robert's treatment of the Redemption owes nothing to Anselm.<sup>2</sup> Like Peter Lombard and his followers, Robert refuses to adopt any necessity that seems to limit God. He says that if the vis quaestionis why God became man is referred to divine power, the question vanishes, for in the very assertion of divine power, we find our answer. God became man because God so willed it, and God can do what he wills: 'Quapropter nihil quaestionis habet cur Deus homo, si vis quaestionis secundum rationem divinae potentiae consideratur....'<sup>3</sup>

If we ask again why God became man and still refer the cause to God, we can only ascribe this event to divine goodness.<sup>4</sup> But if we refer the cause to the effect of the work which the God-man carries out, then we can reply that the redemption of the human race is the reason why God became man. Thus our question 'cur Deus homo' can be answered in different ways.<sup>5</sup>

There follow the traditional explanations for the Redemption from the school of Leon about the inability of the angels and men to carry out such a work.<sup>6</sup> Robert opposes all these arguments by reasserting the all-important

1. DeClerck, p. 253; MS. Royal, f. 206va.

2. There is a passage much earlier in the Sententie (Bruges MS. 191, f. 122r) which Grabmann first noticed (Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode ii, 338) and which F.P. Eliaszrieder said can only be ascribed to the opening chapter in CDH. See 'Robert de Melun und die Schule Anselms von Leon', Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, liii (1934), 165:

Robert  
Nam ad intelligentiam credendo  
pervenitur et non ad fidem intel-  
ligendo.... Hic enim intelligentia  
appellatur prompta et sufficiens  
reddendae rationis creditorum scientia,  
rationem de ea quae in nobis est spe-  
quam per fidem quisque meretur.

Anselm (CDH I, 1)  
Quod petunt, non ut per rationem ad  
fidem accedant, sed ut eorum delectentur,  
et ut sint, quantum possunt, parati  
semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti

3. DeClerck, p. 253; MS. Royal, f. 206vb.

4. DeClerck, p. 254; MS. Royal, f. 206vb.

5. DeClerck, p. 255; MS. Royal, f. 207ra.

6. For the relationship between Robert and Leon, see Eliaszrieder's article (Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, liii, 1934, 117-170).

fact of divine power.<sup>1</sup> No matter what reasons are advanced, if we refer them to divine omnipotence, they are weak and invalid. But if we take into consideration man's fallen nature, these reasons are not only fitting but also necessary.<sup>2</sup>

Robert tries to guarantee God's omnipotence at all costs and yet at the same time establish a certain necessity for our Redemption through Christ. Robert balances all the opposing forces by contrasting God's omnipotence to his justice. According to divine power, any mode was possible; according to justice, it was necessary that God become man in order to carry out the required satisfaction.<sup>3</sup> This treatment of God's justice occupies the final part of Robert's exposition of the Redemption, and there is nothing at all in it which makes it necessary for us to suspect Anselm's influence.<sup>4</sup> The passages that seem to resemble Anselm's teaching on satisfaction usually turn out to be closely tied to Hugh of St. Victor's De Sacramentis I, 8: 4.

We leave Robert of Melun with the impression that he at some time in his career became acquainted with Cur Deus Homo, perhaps when he returned to England and was still working on the Sententie. Robert was sufficiently impressed by the work to incorporate in his Sententie the phrase 'cur Deus homo' and the objections of the infidels. But Anselm's influence was hardly profound, for Robert was more concerned with showing how the Redemption was suitable for man's situation than with proving the necessity of the actual mode. When he read the Cur Deus Homo, Robert may have felt that Anselm had created unnecessary problems by constructing such a rigid exposition of the Redemption. And so when Robert came to write on the Redemption in the Sententie, he felt no

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1. DeClerck, pp. 255-6; MS. Royal, 207ra-b.

2. DeClerck, p. 258; MS. Royal, f. 207va.

3. De Clerck, p. 263; MS. Royal, f. 209ra: 'Quod autem de potentia potuerit superior sermo demonstravit; quod vero de iustitia non potuit mundus aliter redimi quam redemptus est, praesens sermo declarabit.'

4. DeClerck, p. 263; MS. Royal, f. 209ra.



need to refer back to Anselm, whose Cur Deus Homo had by now become for him only a distant memory. Robert was much more careful in setting forth the limitations of theology than Anselm had been. We find in Robert the same cautious theological approach that we already noticed in the Lombard and his followers.

For Anselm theology started with an act of faith, proceeded into the realm of reasoning, and culminated only in prayer, a complete giving of emotion and intellect to God.<sup>1</sup> For Robert of Melun and many other theologians of the mid- and late twelfth century, Anselm's programme had to be cut back to a less exciting and more circumscribed description of what man could assert about God without endangering divine freedom. In Robert we find the elaborate distinctions that will become even more popular in the thirteenth century. No problem can be answered simply. One must differentiate divine justice from power and man's situation from God's position. Anselm's answer to the question 'cur Deus Homo?' had been too unitary, too sweeping. For the theology of the Redemption, the later twelfth century was a time for review of the problems, not for advances into the unknown. There was much questioning, but not the bold, confident quest that had allowed Anselm to present his understanding of the Redemption.

### 3. Alan of Lille

Alan of Lille was a versatile and eclectic thinker of the later twelfth century,<sup>2</sup> and so we might expect him at some point in his writings to use the

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1. The best example of this process is the movement of faith and reason through the Cur Deus Homo, culminating in the prayer of the Meditation on Human Redemption.

2. For general background, see the following works: M. Baumgartner, Die Philosophie der Alanus de Insulis, in Zusammenhang mit den Anschauungen des 12. Jahrhunderts, BGPTWA 11, 4 (Münster, 1896); J. Huizinga, Über die Verknüpfung des Poetischen mit dem Theologischen bei Alanus de Insulis (Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, Deel 74, Serie B, No. 6 - Amsterdam, 1932); G. Raynaud de Lage, Alain de Lille, Poète du XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle (Université de Montréal. Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales, 11, 1951) - contains a good list of manuscripts of Alan's works; Vincenzo Cilento, Alano di Lilla. Poeta e Teologo del Sec. XII (Corso ufficiale di Storia della Filosofia Medievale, Naples, 1953).

Cur Deus Homo in one way or another. But no matter how carefully we review his work, we cannot find any definite indications of Anselm's presence. Alan provides a final indication of the disappearance of the Cur Deus Homo from the twelfth century intellectual milieu.

Born at Lille some time between 1114 and 1120, he taught at Paris, then went on the Montpellier in the last quarter of the century. He may have gone back to Paris for a time but ended his life as a Cistercian lay brother at Cîteaux in about 1202-3.<sup>1</sup> His life thus spans almost the whole century; his mind also encompassed almost everything twelfth century learning could offer him. Alan was familiar with the work of Gilbert de la Porrée.<sup>2</sup> The naturalism and philosophical bent of the Anticlaudianus and the De Planctu Naturae strongly recall some of the writers associated with the school of Chartres. But Alan could also be a pure theologian. The Summa Quoniam homines, ascribed to him during his first stay at Paris, is just as serious an undertaking in pure theology as the Sentences of the Lombard.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately the work is incomplete. The third section, in which Alan had promised to discuss Christ's work in the world, is missing.

When Alan wrote his De Fide Catholica (also known as Contra Haereticos)<sup>4</sup> he paralleled Anselm's method of strengthening the givens of faith by means of necessary reasons. One would think that this similarity of approach would have led Alan to adopt some of Anselm's reasons for the actual mode of the

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1. P. Glorieux, 'Alan of Lille', *NOE* i, 237. For a more detailed investigation of the events of Alan's life, see Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, Alain de Lille. Textes Inédites (Études de Philosophie Médiévale, lli, Paris, 1965), 11-29: 'Vie d'Alain de Lille'.

2. P. Glorieux, 'L'Auteur de la Summa Quoniam homines', *RTAM* xvii (1950), 29-45.

3. P. Glorieux, 'La Summa Quoniam homines d'Alain de Lille', *ANLMA* xx (1953), 113-364.

4. PL 210: 305-430. Cesare Vasoli, 'Il Contra Haereticos di Alano di Lilla', Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo ed Archivio Muratoriano, lxxv (1963), 123-172, dates the work c. 1185-95. M.-T. d'Alverny gives 1185-1200 (Textes Inédites, pp. 156-62). Vasoli claims that the Contra Haereticos gave theology 'una nuova tecnica speculativa' (p. 172). This is too extreme.



Redemption. And yet almost all Alan's ideas on the Redemption can be traced back to the theology set forth in various works ascribed to the school of Laon.

The first book of the Contra Haereticos is directed against the Cathars. In the fourteenth chapter, the adversaries of Alan object that if more angels remained in heaven than fell, man does not seem to have been made for completing the number of angels. This statement presents a dilemma also found in Cur Deus Homo: how does one prove that man was to complete the number of heavenly beings without making man's salvation dependent on the fall of the angels?<sup>1</sup> Alan's answer is the same as St. Anselm's. Even if the angels had not fallen, man would have been created, for more men will be saved than there were angels that fell. Man was created not to supply a loss but to complete the heavenly city:

Ad quod dicimus: Etiam si angelus non cecidisset, tamen homo creatus fuisset, quia plures salvabuntur homines, quam sint angeli qui ceciderunt; et ita, non propter supplendam ruinam tantum, sed potius ad caelestem Hierusalem exornandam, et ex diversorum graduum civibus, quasi, ex diversis parietibus, componendam, homo creatus est.<sup>2</sup>

Anselm says the same thing in I, 18: even if no angel had perished, man still would have been saved. Even more interesting than the equivalence of idea is the parallelism of the language. Anselm also uses clauses beginning with etiam si ... tamen:

Quare pro se ipsa ibi facta est et non solum pro restaurandis individuis alterius naturae. Unde palam est, quia etiam si angelus nullus perisset, homines tamen in caelesti civitate suum locum habuissent.

But our initial discovery is complicated if we turn to the Sententiae Divinae Paginae to find the same sentence construction and same idea:

... dicimus quod non ideo factus est homo principaliter, ut restitueretur numerus angelorum; consecutus est quidem ille effectus, scilicet restauratio, sed etiam si angelus non cecidisset, tamen homo fieret.<sup>3</sup>

Both the Sententiae and the Contra Haereticos use the verb form non cecidisset.

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1. PL 210: 318D.

2. PL 210: 318D-319A.

3. Edited by F.P. Hlienotariöder, Anselm von Laon Systematische Sentenzen, BPTWA xviii, 2-3 (1919), 15.

while Anselm uses perisset. What first appeared as an Anselmian influence is actually closer to the language of a Laon source.

In order to prove that men would have been created regardless of the fall of the angels, Alan said that more men will be saved than the number of angels who fall. He is thus able to show that men are saved for themselves and not for the sake of vacant angels' places. This idea is also found in Anselm: '... videtur necesse esse, ut angeli non sint facti in illo perfectonumero, et plures futuri sint beati homines quam sint miseri angeli.'<sup>1</sup> The last line is very close to the line in the Contra Haereticos already quoted: '... quia plures salvabuntur homines, quam sint angeli qui ceciderunt....'<sup>2</sup> But we can find this very same idea and similar language in the Sententiae Divinae Facinae:

Item, cum plures angeli remanserint quam ceciderint, et tot ascensuri de hominibus quot remanserunt, apparet quod non tantum pro restauratione, quia si tantum pro restauratione, tunc non plures ascenderunt, quam ceciderunt.<sup>2</sup>

This time the language of Alan is closer to that of Anselm than to that of the Sententiae. But the difference is not decisive. Also we know that the Sententiae were themselves dependent on Anselm's Cur Deus Homo,<sup>3</sup> for their author refers to Anselm, if only to disagree with him. It thus seems that the Contra Haereticos borrowed from the Sententiae, which in turn had borrowed from Cur Deus Homo, and this succession explains why Contra Haereticos at times seems so close to Cur Deus Homo. I think Alan was only indirectly indebted to Anselm, via the Sententiae Divinae Facinae. There is no need to posit the Cur Deus Homo as an immediate source for Alan.

Considering the identity of the Redeemer, Alan says that a pure man could not take care of his fellow men because he would be infected with human nature as it was after the fall. So it was necessary that he be God and be pure by

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1. CDM I, 18.

2. Metaphorieder, p. 19.

3. See my section in Chapter III on the school of Laon.



reason of his divinity and thus unable to sin:

Ergo per hominem facta est hominis liberatio; purus autem homo redimere non potuit; si enim purus homo esset, tunc humanae naturae infectus esset. Oportuit ergo ut Deus esset et ratione divinitatis purus esset, et peccare non posset.

This statement agrees with Anselm's contention that a sinful man cannot carry out the necessary work because a sinner cannot justify a sinner.<sup>2</sup> But Alan's emphasis on the sinlessness of the God-man is much more akin to the Laon writers than to St. Anselm. The phrase purus homo appears in the writings of Anselm of Laon himself:

Ut autem homo vincat necesse est ut Deus in homine sit qui eum faciat sine peccato esse. Si enim homo purus vel angelus in homine, facile peccaret.<sup>3</sup>

Alan, in stressing so much the Redeemer's sinlessness, follows a tendency of the Laon writers.

When he sums up his premises, he sounds once again close to St. Anselm but actually turns out in the company of the Laon writers: 'Sic ergo oportuit ut Deus homo fieret, hoc ut modo hominem redimeret.'<sup>4</sup> The necessity that God become man in Alan is based not on the fact that such a being would provide satisfaction for man's sins but because a God-man would necessarily be sinless. Alan's use of oportuit suggests the same mild necessity we find often in Laon writings. It is the necessity of a sinless man, not the necessity of satisfaction. Alan is remarkably faithful to the tradition of the school of Laon. Because so much in Laon is also present in Anselm of Canterbury, we could easily confuse the influences on Alan. But the passages already quoted indicate that Alan was drawing on Laon and, at best, used Anselm only indirectly.

In the third book of the Contra Haereticos, directed against the Jews,

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1. PL 210: 323G.

2. ODH I, 23.

3. Lottin, PH v, No. 47, p. 44.

4. PL 210: 323D.

Alan goes over the same ground in guaranteeing Christ's sinlessness.<sup>1</sup> Still following the Laon design, he takes up the devil's abuse of power.<sup>2</sup> The third book is almost nothing more than an exposition of the type of theology of the Redemption that we find among the Laon writers. According to Marie-Therese d'Alverny, there is a great deal here taken word for word from Gilbert Crispin's Disputatio Iudaei et Christiani.<sup>3</sup> But Alan borrows from the traditional parts of the work and not the few sections which owe something to Anselm. So even when he is using Gilbert Crispin, Alan stays close to a theology which emphasizes the position of the devil in the Incarnation. Always Alan is close to the tradition of the Laon writers, even when he uses a writer who was himself so close to Anselm.<sup>4</sup>

Alan of Lille's way of defending the Redemption from the heretics decisively indicates the strength and tenacity of Laon thought at the very end of the twelfth century. When Alan had to show why Christ came, he turned to the abuse of power by the devil and not to the satisfaction Christ provides. This response is understandable, for somehow the Redemption is more appealing when one can identify the enemy who has to be vanquished instead of concentrating on ignominious and fallen man and what he must render God. Alan chose the superficially easier and more attractive interpretation of the Redemption, but he was one of the last to do so. After the careful study and compilation of the Fathers by Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard, Alan of Lille's forthright exposition of the devil's power seems archaic and regressive. Especially through Hugh of St. Victor, the Anselmian rejection of the devil's abuse of power was slowly transforming the way theologians approached the doctrine of the Redemption, until finally at Paris in the 1220s, Anselm's thought re-emerged.

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1. PL 210: 417D.

2. PL 210: 418C-419B.

3. Textes Inédites, p. 161.

4. For Gilbert Crispin, see my section on Anselm's immediate followers in Chapter I.



Chapter V

THE OPENING OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

1. Paris

From the 1160s, when Peter Lombard's Sentences began their long reign of popularity, until the 1210s, when William of Auxerre wrote his Summa, the influence of Cur Deus Homo on the theology of the Redemption was very limited. We have already shown how the successors of the Lombard, such as Udo, Simon of Tournai, and Peter of Poitiers, completely ignored the work of Anselm. They limited themselves to the elucidation of the patristic and more recent sources that the Master of the Sentences had used.<sup>1</sup>

There were other traditions at Paris, such as that of Peter Cantor. In his Summa de Sacramentis et Anime Consiliis Peter probably did not even treat the Redemption.<sup>2</sup> Peter limited himself mainly to moral topics. There is a single manuscript of his Summa in which one question asks whether God could have found a better way for our restoration. But this section has been looked upon as an appendix to the Summa and not an integral part.<sup>3</sup> This question, along with others in the section, probably represents a disciple's notes that the copyist decided to add to the master's Summa. The single question on the Redemption may reflect the teaching of the Cantor or the disciple's own opinion. In any case, the question of the Redemption for Peter Cantor was a decidedly secondary matter. His main concern, as Grabmann has shown, was to develop a moral-exegetical theology, thus continuing one of the central twelfth

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1. See Chapter IV.

2. Pierre le Chantre, Summa de Sacramentis et Anime Consiliis, Texte Inédite, by Jean-Albert Dugauquier (Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia - iv, Part 1 - 1954; vii, Part 2 - 1957; xi, Part 3(1) - 1961; xvii, xviii - Part 3 (2A) - 1963; xii, Part 3(2B) - 1967.

3. Paris Bibliothèque Nationale MS. lat. 9593, f. 199rb. See Dugauquier, iv (1954), xxxv-xxxvi.

century intellectual traditions.<sup>1</sup>

Also in this stream we find Stephen Langton, with his numerous Biblical commentaries. Unlike Peter Cantor, he did devote some attention to the Redemption. But if we check DeClerck's summary of Stephen's thought, we find that Langton is concerned exclusively with distinguishing redimere from salvare. Langton emphasizes that God could have redeemed us only by his death, but he could have saved us in another way without dying.<sup>2</sup> This is an extremely important distinction. As we shall see, it was taken up by many theologians, for it allowed a certain necessity in the actual mode of redemption while still guaranteeing God's freedom to redeem man in another way.

Within these two traditions, that of the Lombard's followers and that of the moral-exegetical writers, we find hardly anything in debt to Anselm.<sup>3</sup> But there are still a few theologians in the last years of the twelfth century who most probably were influenced by Our Deus Homo. The first is Absalon, abbot of Springerbach, who died in 1203. He was at St. Victor, either as a simple religious or as abbot, probably at the very end of the 1190s.<sup>4</sup> In the Migne collection of Absalon's sermons, we find that he often develops theological points in order to underline moral lessons. The first sermon, 'De Adventu

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1. Grabmann entitled one of his chapters: 'Die von Petrus Cantor ausgehende biblisch-moralische Richtung der Theologie', Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode II, 476.

2. 'Le Dogme de la Rédemption: De Robert de Melun à Guillaume d'Auxerre', REAM xiv (1947), 267-80. A.M. Landgraf's Dogmengeschichte der Frühcholastik, Teil II, Die Lehre von Christus, Band 2, 274-87, gives an excellent account of the development in twelfth and thirteenth century theology towards this distinction.

3. Another member of this group is Robert Courçon, but his Summa deals with moral and legal questions and never touches on the doctrine of the Redemption. Known as the Summa caelestis philosophiae, it is contained in British Museum MS. Royal 9 E. xiv, ff. 5-75.

Yet another intellectual current in Paris theology is that of Prévostin and his followers. But I have found nothing among their works that might be attributed to Anselm. See G. Lacombe, La Vie et les Œuvres de Prévostin (Bibliothèque Thomiste, XI. Section Historique, XI. Kain, Belgium, 1927), esp. pp. 175-6. The copy of Prévostin's Summa Theologica I reviewed is Oxford Bodleian Laud. Misc. 80 (ff. 27-97), esp. ff. 77rb-87rb.

4. DOC I, 133.



Domini', considers the satisfaction Christ provides for us.<sup>1</sup> Although the term satisfactio is taken for granted and not defined, the writer's interpretation of the Redemption through the work that Christ does for us at least hints at an Anselmian influence. Absalon uses Langton's distinction between redimere and liberare in order to show that the necessity of the actual mode is not absolute. Absalon seems to be borrowing from two theological currents, first that of Stephen Langton and the Parisian secular masters, and second that of Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, both of whom knew and used Cur Deus Homo. It seems likely that St. Victor possessed copies of Anselm's work which Hugh and Richard used, and which Absalon also may have known. But Anselm's thinking was by no means fully integrated into Absalon's theology. The archbishop of Canterbury, at best, is utilized only summarily. The climate of theology at the end of the twelfth century had become so alien to Anselm's habits of thought that even the Victorine tradition could hardly sustain him.

Another possible candidate for the continuation of Anselmian thought at Paris is Peter of Corbeil. He became archbishop of Sens and is supposed to have taught Lothar of Segni, who in 1196 became Innocent III. In 1210 he led the provincial synod which limited the reading of the natural philosophy of Aristotle and condemned David of Dinant and Amaury of Bène.<sup>2</sup> As a theologian, Peter of Corbeil is a much more obscure personality than as an archbishop. Almost all his works, including his Commentary on St. Paul, have not yet been found.<sup>3</sup> But contemporary theologians, such as Stephen Langton, William of Auxerre, Hugh of St. Cher, and Herbert of Auxerre often cited him.<sup>4</sup> Peter of Corbeil deserves our attention because he, almost alone among late twelfth century

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1. PL 211: 15-18.

2. LKT viii, 358.

3. Werner Affeldt, Die Weltliche Gewalt in der Paulus Exegese (Forschungen zur Kirchen und Dogmengeschichte, xxiii, Göttingen, 1969), 284. I would like to thank Beryl Smalley for pointing out this work to me.

4. LKT viii, 358.

theologians, seems to have said that man could have been freed (liberari), as well as redeemed (redimi), only through the death of Christ. Stephen Langton mentions this teaching of Peter's in his Glossa in Magnam Glossaturam:

... "quia aliter, scilicet nisi Christus moreretur, homo non redimeretur." Hoc quidem verum est; Corboliensis dicebat etiam quod nec etiam liberaretur nec posset liberari nisi per mortem filii Dei; sed nolimus sic artare potentiam Dei....<sup>1</sup>

Langton would allow no redemption except through Christ's death; but salvation could come through other means. Just as the followers of the Lombard, he was afraid of limiting God's omnipotence. This concern seems to have been almost universal among writers about the Redemption at the end of the twelfth century, and it helps explain why Anselm was so little used at the time. On the surface Anselm does seem to limit God's power, even though at many points in Cur Deus Homo, he tries to show how God's freedom is not impaired by the necessity that God himself imposes on creation.

With such a current of theologians against Peter of Corbeil, it is significant that he stood his ground and insisted on the necessity of Christ's death in all cases. If we had Peter's writings, we would be able to establish whether his position was derived from the Cur Deus Homo. But our evidence is too limited.<sup>2</sup> Still there is hardly any source outside Anselm in which Peter would have been able to find such a teaching on the Redemption.

The confusion and upsets of history make it difficult for us to find out the extent to which Anselmian manuscripts were in Paris at this time. Delisle's list of the manuscripts of the Abbey of St. Victor that were taken to the Bibliothèque Nationale during the Revolution includes no twelfth century manu-

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1. In Hebr. II, 10 (Postillas super Apostolum), Paris Bibl. Nat. MS. lat. 14443, dates from between 1200 and 1203. Cited in DeClerck, 'Le Dogme de la Rédemption', NEAN xiv (1947), 270.

2. The only other mention of Peter of Corbeil I can find comes in the Summa of Godfrey of Poitiers, a disciple of Stephen Langton. Godfrey rejects Peter and tries to show the absurdity of his arguments. See Landgraf, Die Lehre von Christus, p. 276. Taken from the Summa of Godfrey, Bruges Bibl. de la Ville MS. lat. 220, f. 99.



script of Our Deus Homo.<sup>1</sup> The earliest surviving collection of Anselmian works at St. Victor appears in a manuscript of the thirteenth century.<sup>2</sup> We know that the library of St. Victor lost many of its manuscripts over the centuries, and so there may have been copies of Our Deus Homo there in the twelfth century. Our study of Hugh and Richard indicates that they had copies of the work. The library of St. Germain-des-Près did have twelfth century manuscripts of Anselm's works.<sup>3</sup> Also the Colbert collection, which became part of the Bibliothèque Nationale, includes a twelfth century manuscript of Our Deus Homo.<sup>4</sup> The provenance of this work is not known, but it could come from one of the monastic houses at Paris at this time.

Manuscript evidence is useless in telling us how widespread Our Deus Homo was in the twelfth century scholastic milieu at Paris. Delisle's list of the surviving manuscripts from Notre-Dame has nothing,<sup>5</sup> but even if there were entries, they would not tell us if the masters themselves had copies of Anselm. It is almost impossible to gain any coherent idea of Anselm's presence in twelfth century Paris if we depend on manuscripts of the Our Deus Homo.

Our evidence for the thirteenth century is much clearer. What may have been only a trickle turns into a flood. The library of the Sorbonne had many thirteenth century manuscripts of Our Deus Homo.<sup>6</sup> We can add to these other manuscripts from the same library containing works of Anselm that are not listed

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1. L. Delisle, Inventaire des Manuscrits Latins de Saint-Victor (Paris, 1869).

2. Paris Bib. Nat. MS. lat. 14591 - Delisle, Inventaire ... de S. Victor. The Anselmian writings are not listed by title here.

3. Delisle, Inventaire des Manuscrits de Saint-Germain-des-Près (Paris, 1868); Bib. Nat. MS. lat. 12311. Again, Anselmian writings are not listed by title.

4. Bib. Nat. MS. lat. 2479. Listed in Catalogue Général des Manuscrits Latins, II (Paris, 1940).

5. Delisle, Inventaire des Manuscrits Latins de Notre-Dame et d'Autres Fonds (Paris, 1871).

6. Delisle, Inventaire des Manuscrits de la Sorbonne (Paris, 1870): Bib. Nat. MSS. lat. 15687, 15688, 15689.

individually.<sup>1</sup> If we look through the Colbert manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale or the Mazarine collection, we find that Cur Deus Homo became extremely popular not only in thirteenth century Paris, but also in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> The convents of the Grands Augustins and of the Carmelites at the Place Maubert are some of the thirteenth century religious communities which had copies of Cur Deus Homo in their libraries. One manuscript containing Cur Deus Homo together with many other works of Anselm was given to the Paris convent of the Augustinians (Grands-Augustins) in the will of Geoffrey of Bar, cardinal of Ste. Suzanne, who died in August, 1287.<sup>3</sup> Anselm's works became textbooks of thirteenth century theology, and so we find that between 1275 and 1286 the University authorities included his works among those whose price was regulated.<sup>4</sup> After the obscurity of the twelfth century, we find that Cur Deus Homo by the close of the thirteenth century could hardly be more popular.

## 2. Nicholas of Amiens

Amid these indications of Anselm's oblivion at Paris, we still find one writer from the end of the twelfth century who was profoundly dependent on Cur Deus Homo, Nicholas of Amiens. The Ars Fidei Catholicae has long been recognized as a work partially inspired by Anselm. Rivière in 1905 said that the Ars is 'only a resumé of Cur Deus Homo in syllogistic form'.<sup>5</sup> But Rivière

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1. Bib. Nat. MSS. lat. 15682, 15686, 15694, 15829, 16364, 16359, 16360. De-lisle, Inventaire ... de la Sorbonne.

2. See, for example, Bib. Nat. MSS. lat. 1694, 1769, 2155, 2375, 2476, 2570, 2878, 2884, 2885: Catalogue Général des Manuscrits Latins ii (1940); iii (1952). Also Bib. Nat. MSS. lat. 3358, 5367, listed only in Catalogue Codicum Manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Regiae, Part 3 (1744), iii, iv. Also Paris Mazarine MSS. 711, 715: Catalogue Général des Manuscrits des Bibliothèques Publiques de France. Paris: Bibliothèque Mazarine I (1885).

3. Paris Mazarine MS. 738, Catalogue Générale ... Mazarine, i, 345-7.

4. H. Denifle, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1889), i, 530.

5. J. Rivière, Le Dogme de la Rédemption (Paris, 1905), 356: 'La doctrine d'Alain n'est que le résumé sous forme syllogistique du Cur deus homo.'



thought that the Ars had been written by Alan of Lille.

Grabmann in 1911 reviewed all the manuscripts of the work and its mention in library catalogues to conclude that the author was Nicholas of Amiens.<sup>1</sup> Because of conflicting evidence, E. Assauw wrote in 1930 that there may have been two Nicholas of Amiens, separated from each other by fifteen years but whose memory was at an early date confused.<sup>2</sup> The older would be the author of the Ars and of commentaries on the work of Gilbert de La Porrée; the younger would be the author of a Chronicle about events from the creation to the fall of Constantinople in 1204.

Fortunately we no longer have to live with such confusion, for Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny showed in 1965 that the same Nicholas of Amiens is the author of the Chronicle and the Ars.<sup>3</sup> She found that in the preface of the Chronicle Nicholas mentions the Ars as a former work of his.<sup>4</sup>

We will first deal with the content of the Ars itself before considering Nicholas's position among late twelfth century theologians. In the prologue Nicholas dedicates his work to Pope Clement, who would have been Clement III.<sup>5</sup> Nicholas laments the attacks of the heretics in both the west and the east. In the first the church is rent in two; in the east the Moslems not only invade with doctrines but also with arms. Because Nicholas cannot resist these people with arms, he will do so by reasons (rationibus). In the past, miracles or the authorities of the Old and New Testament have sufficed, but no longer, for these modern heretics do not accept authority, and Nicholas is unable to perform miracles. And so Nicholas has adduced probable reasons for faith.

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1. Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, II, 459-65; 471-6.

2. BFC XI, 555-8.

3. Alain de Lille, Textes Inédites (Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale, III, Paris, 1965), 68-9, 319-22.

4. Vatican MS. Regin. lat. 454. A. Wilmart, Codices Reginenses Latini (Vatican, 1937), II, 601-2.

5. We can thus date the work at some time between 1187 and 1191. PL 210: 595A. Migne puts the Ars under the works of Alan of Lille.

These do not suffice for faith, but they lead to the act of belief. If faith could be gained through reason alone, then it would have no merit. Our glory is that now we see through a glass darkly what one day we will see fully.<sup>1</sup>

In Nicholas, unlike Anselm, no article of faith is posited at the beginning. We begin with reason and also end there. The Anselmian movement from faith to understanding is outside Nicholas's stated method. Nicholas seeks a mathematical or geometrical precision. He tries to turn doctrine into propositions proven from previous propositions, ultimately held up by postulates and axioms. Anselm's theology of the Redemption can also be called mathematical, but the rigidity of structure in him is not so much on the surface as in the underlying assumptions about the universe and man's duty to God. In Nicholas this sense of equivalence, subtraction, and addition of theorems and assumptions is very much at the first level of the writing, and Nicholas makes no attempt to hide it.

Nicholas explains this structure after his words about faith and reason. He says he has called his work the Ars Catholicae Fidei because, in the manner of art it is composed and contains definitions, distinctions, and propositions, 'artificiose successu propositum comprobantes'.<sup>2</sup> Nicholas seems to be using ars in its primal sense of a joining-together or a bonding. This linkage has as its goal the proof of various proposita or theorems. Sometimes these theorems are even followed by corollaries, and at such times we can see that the basis of Nicholas's structure could even be Euclidean geometry. By artificiose successu Nicholas means that the propositions are linked in a rational, coherent way.

There are five books, the first concerning the one cause of all things; the second on the world, the creation of angel and man, and on free will; the third on the incarnate Son of God and the redemption; the fourth on the sacraments

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1. PL 210: 596A-597A.

2. PL 210: 597B.



of the Church; the fifth, the resurrection of the dead. The longest book is the first. The second and third books together make almost half the length of the Arg., for the fourth and fifth books are very brief. In fact, the whole work is extremely short and the libri could easily be considered as little more than chapters.

At the end of the prologue, Nicholas introduces three technical terms: descriptio, petitio, and communes animi conceptiones.<sup>1</sup> A descriptio is nothing more than a definition of a term, but it is the definition that Nicholas wants to apply to the term whenever it is used in his work. A petitio is a proposition that one cannot prove by recourse to anything else and that is not evident but still is used in the proof of what follows. We can translate petitio as postulate.<sup>2</sup> Finally, the communes animi conceptiones are statements that are self-evident, or axioms.<sup>3</sup> All three petitiones have to do with cause: the cause of any composition is a component; the cause of no thing ascends to infinity; what we attribute to the causes of created things are not present through the effect but are to be attributed to its cause.<sup>4</sup> These postulates Nicholas needs in his first book in order to prove the existence of God, and they have nothing to do with his theology of the Redemption. But some of the communes conceptiones do provide a philosophical basis for this theology: if anything greater possesses something less than itself, the lesser is obliged to devote itself and whatever is within itself towards the honour and the will of the greater. One who does injury is worthy of greater punishment, according to the greatness of the one injured. Satisfaction ought to be paid according

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1. M.D. Chenu has explained Nicholas's method at greater length in his excellent article, 'Une Théologie Axiomatique au XII<sup>e</sup> Siècle, Alain de Lille', Cîteaux in de Nederlanden ix (1958), 137-42. But Chenu is more interested in the similarities between Alan and Nicholas and so does not draw attention to the sharp differences in their methods.

2. Chenu, p. 139; PL 210: 397B.

3. PL 210: 597C.

4. PL 210: 598B.

to the dignity of him against whom there is sin.<sup>1</sup> These propositions can be looked upon as more direct results of the thinking of Our Deus Homo than any other set of ideas that we have encountered since treating Richard of St. Victor's Anselmian section in the 'Ad me clamat ex Seir'. These axioms express the philosophical underpinnings of Our Deus Homo.

Nicholas never actually copies out statements from Anselm. Instead he extracts the principles behind Our Deus Homo and makes them more explicit. What is obvious for Anselm, who has started from faith, needs to be asserted by Nicholas, who starts from reasons that are supposed to be evident as soon as the mind is presented with them.

Leaving aside the first book, on God, we can soon see the application of these Anselmian axioms in the fifth theorem of the second book. The rational spirit is obliged to fear and serve God and to minister to him with complete obedience. To support this fifth theorem of Book ii, Nicholas refers to the fourth axiom: the lesser must devote itself to the honour and will of the greater:

Si quis quartam communem animi conceptionem attendit, propositionis hujus necessitatem inveniet. Nam cum minor majori teneatur, in omnibus obedire, cum spiritus rationalis, quod vivit, quod sapit, quod potest, a Deo habet, in ipsius gloriam et honorem et laudem se, et quicquid habet, debet sine intermissione convertere.<sup>2</sup>

Having proven the existence of God in the first book, Nicholas is now taking his fourth axiom and considering its application to rational creation in terms of creation's obligation to God. The proof is rigid and holds to an uncompromised necessity. The development is that of Nicholas alone, but the ideas are the same as those stated in Anselm's treatment of man's obligation to

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1. PL 210: 598C. These propositions sound much better in Latin than in my stilted English:

4 - Si aliquis major possidet minorem se, minor se et ea, quae penes ipsum sunt, in honorem et voluntatem majoris tenetur convertere.

5 - Injuriosus tanto majori dignus est poena, quanto major est, cui infertur injuria.

6 - Juxta dignitatem ejus, contra quem peccatum est, debet satisfactio compensari.

2. PL 210: 606A-B.



God.<sup>1</sup>

There follow a number of theorems considering free will, the angels, and their fall. In the midst of this discussion Nicholas sets forth a propositum that provides the most significant link in all his work with Anselm. Man cannot gain merit with God; he only pays a debt, for he already owes God everything he can possibly give him.<sup>2</sup> One is said to merit when he of his own free will gives something to someone which he is not obliged to give. But we can give nothing to God which we are not already obliged to give him. At this point, Nicholas refers back to the fifth theorem about man's obligation to God, and then says in an extremely important line: 'ergo meritum nostrum apud deum non est proprie meritum, sed solutio debiti'.<sup>3</sup> Only a theologian who knew the work of Anselm could have made such a statement, for Nicholas has caught the centre of Anselm's satisfaction theology. Man can pay God nothing for sin because man already owes God everything he has. Anselm never linked the two terms meritum nostrum and solutio debiti, but Nicholas's statement is only a succinct summary of many chapters from Cur Deus Homo. If there is any one idea that keeps re-emerging in that work, it is the powerlessness of man to render God anything at all that can be counted as reparation for his sin.<sup>4</sup> Nicholas has grasped this idea and translated it into his own theological idiom.

The next theorem (19) states starkly that God, because of his justice, has to reward the good and punish the evil. Because his justice must be accounted for, the fall of man demands a remedy and not just an act of free forgiveness. This seems to be the assumption beneath the discussion of man's fall in the next few sections.<sup>5</sup> In the twenty-ninth theorem, Nicholas turns from considering

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1. CDH I, 11.

2. PL 210: 609C-D - Bk. 11, 18.

3. PL 210: 608D.

4. See CDH I, 20, for example.

5. PL 210: 609A.

the damage man has done himself to the injury done to God. He refers to the fifteenth theorem, which is just a summary of the fifth, concerning man's obligation towards God. Man has taken himself away from God and has thus dishonoured him. The ideas, and this time even some of the language, are Anselmian:

Nicholas of Amiens, PL 210: 610B.

Male merens apud Deum Deo injuriosus existit. Quemadmodum decimo quinto comprehensus est, homo se, et quidquid in eo est, in honorem Dei tenetur convertere ex debito, et si se, et quidquid in eo est, subtrahit Deo, Deum inhonorat. Ergo male merens Deo injuriosus existit. Sed se et sua Deo subtrahere est mala mereri: ergo Deo injuriosus existit.

Anselm, CDH I, 11.

Homo honorem debitum qui deo non reddit, aufert Deo, quod suum est, et exhonorat....

CDH I, 15

Cum vero non vult, quod debet, deum, quantum ad illum pertinet, inhonorat, quoniam non se sponte subdit illius dispositioni.

The form exhonorare is the usual one in Cur Deus Homo to describe man's act which deprives God of the honour owed him, but Anselm also uses inhonorare in the same way as Nicholas. The concept of the honour of God does not have the same prominence in Nicholas as in Anselm. But the very fact that Nicholas used this term, much less popular in the twelfth century for the Redemption than satisfactio, shows how much Nicholas owed to Anselm. Nicholas also calls upon man's debitum, one of the central Anselmian ideas by which we can distinguish Anselm from other theologians. Anselm did not go as far as Nicholas in saying that man injures God by sinning. Careful to point out that God's honour is always preserved regardless of man's actions, Anselm made a distinction which Nicholas neglects.<sup>1</sup> And so Nicholas's theology here lacks something of Anselm's refinement.

Having established the burden of sin, Nicholas shows in the thirtieth theorem that man deserves infinite punishment. This ties in with the fifth axiom, that punishment should be meted out according to the position, dignitas, of the one offended. Here, even more than usual, we can see the mathematical precision of Nicholas's method. The fifth axiom plus the twenty-ninth theorem give the thirtieth theorem:

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1. CDH I, 14, 15.



Male enim merens Deo injuriosus existit, sicut in praecedenti propositione assertum est, et juxta quintam anime conceptionem injuriosus tanto poena majori dignus est, quanto major est, cui infertur injuria. Sed omni re in infinitum major est Deus. Ergo injuriosus Deo in infinitum magna dignus est poena.

Strictly speaking, the concept of the infinity of God to which Nicholas here appeals does not appear in Anselm. And yet it is very much a part of Anselm, for it is one of the underlying assumptions that Anselm makes about God and which enables him to make his apparently absurd statement that it is better for worlds to end than one glance be made against God's will.<sup>2</sup> Because God is infinite, man's sin against him deserves infinite punishment. The proposition is explicit in Nicholas, implicit in Anselm.

With this assertion of the huge penalty man owes for sin, Nicholas begins the third book and considers the possibility of man's salvation. We can see how everything in the second book of the Arg has been leading up to the introduction of Christ in the third book, for now that the fact of sin and punishment is established, Nicholas can consider the remedy. The second book of the Arg corresponds to the first book of Cur Deus Homo, which also deals with sin and man's helplessness to do anything about it by himself, while the third book of the Arg, like the second book of Cur Deus Homo, provides the resolution. The parallel is not complete, however, for the third book in the Arg contains some points found in Anselm's first book.

The first theorem in the third book deals with divine mercy. Because man was made weak, it is right and just that once fallen, he be raised up through divine mercy.<sup>3</sup> This point Anselm did not make, for with his concern for divine justice, he follows through his entire argument without even mentioning how God's mercy functions. Only at the end of Cur Deus Homo does he consider God's mercy.<sup>4</sup>

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1. PL 210: 610C.

2. CDH I, 21.

3. PL 210: 609D.

4. CDH. II, 20.

The second theorem adds another reason why man should be saved. God had decreed that man was to enjoy his company with the angels, so this has to happen, even if man has fallen. This assertion that God carries out his design (decretum) is close to what Anselm says about the relationship between God and man. But Anselm explains why God completes what he has begun, while Nicholas states this as a fact. Otherwise, says Anselm, God would have done something in vain, for the purpose of rational creation would not have been fulfilled.<sup>1</sup> God cannot repent of a good that he has undertaken.<sup>2</sup> Nicholas leaves out this reasoning and simply says that even if man has fallen, he is predestined to be saved: 'Ergo etsi lapsus esset, fuit ad praedestinatum gloriam reparandus.'<sup>3</sup>

Nicholas of Amiens's necessity has nothing to do with the fact that man must replace the angels that were fallen so that the predestined number of the saved will be completed. Anselm had many difficulties with this concept, and Nicholas may have shown some theological wisdom in dealing only with God's initial decree for man without reference to the angels.

From the necessity that man be saved, Nicholas considers in the third theorem the necessity of satisfaction. First, the fault should be remedied by a man: 'Justus enim fuit ut homo hominis culpam deleteret, quam angelus vel alia creatura.' Secondly, the fault is to be wiped out by making the appropriate satisfaction:

*Sed si divinam justitiam attenderis, quae culpam impunitam nunquam dimitti, oportuit quod culpam satisfactio sequeretur. Ergo homo debuit satisfacere pro hominis culpa, et hoc erat propositum.*<sup>4</sup>

Nicholas introduces the term satisfacere, even though the word is not defined. But satisfaction through man is looked upon as the necessary condition for

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1. CDH I, 25.

2. CDH II, 1.

3. PL 210: 610D.

4. PL 210: 610D.



the eradication of man's fault.

The next theorem discusses satisfaction in more detail. Following ii, 30 (man deserves infinite punishment), we can see that man cannot possibly make satisfaction: '... homo vel alia creatura ad tantum satisfactionem sufficere non potuisset.'<sup>1</sup> Man's impotence can also be seen in another way. Man owes everything to God. Satisfaction is an act done only on account of a crime. It is owed according to the dignitas of the one offended. God is infinitely dignus. Given all these facts, whatever man can do, it is not sufficient for satisfaction. Because man cannot satisfy sufficiently for sin, no other creature can. The structure of Nicholas's thinking is so mathematical here that we could almost reduce his statements to symbols and derive an equation from them. We notice that man's inability to satisfy God is primarily based on God's infinity. Nicholas ignores the main Anselmian explanation for man's helplessness: even before man sinned, he already owed God everything; so, after sin, he has nothing with which to pay back God. Nicholas mentioned this point earlier, but he does not return to it now.<sup>2</sup>

The fifth theorem considers the God-man as the necessary antidote for man's helplessness. Nicholas repeats three theorems in order to reach this conclusion. First, according to ii, 21, it was fitting (opportunitum) that divine glory be communicated to man.<sup>3</sup> Second, after ii, 3, because of sin, there had to be satisfaction: 'Sed peccaverat: ergo oportuit peccatus satisfactione deleri....' Third, as in iii, 4, no creature could satisfy fully. The first statement is patterned on Our Deus Homo II, 1, the second on I, 11, and the third on I, 5 and I, 23. And so we arrive at the theorem: 'Ergo constat a Deo hominem reparandum, et sic patet propositum.' Because everyone else has been eliminated, only God is left to provide for man. We notice that there

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1. PL 210: 610D-611A.

2. PL 210: 608D.

3. PL 210: 611B-C.

is no necessity here; there is only a convenience in the constat, even if there is a certain necessity for man by the use of reparandum.

But God does not act alone. We remember from the third theorem that it is just that man destroy the fault of man:

*Sed sequum fuit hominem hominis<sup>1</sup> culpam delere, sicut per tertium conjectum. Ergo oportuit Deum esse hominem qui satisfaceret pro creatura; et sic patet corollarium.<sup>2</sup>*

From the theorem (propositum) that only God can satisfy, we go to the corollary that it was necessary that it be a God-man who satisfy. The necessity is a mild one. Oportuit can be translated as 'it was necessary' or 'it was fitting'. The force of the word seems to lie somewhere in between the extremes. Nicholas at no time repeats Anselm's 'only God can; only man ought'.

In the remaining theorems of the third book Nicholas is less influenced by Anselmian ideas. In some passages Nicholas appears to be closer to the climate of the Paris schools in the 1180s than to the writings of St. Anselm. In the thirteenth theorem, for example, Nicholas says that we should add our own offerings to those of the victim, an assertion that Anselm did not include in his theology of the Redemption.<sup>3</sup> The fifteenth theorem brings an idea that the school of the Lombard had reached through much discussion and argument. God could have redeemed us in another manner; there is no necessity in the actual mode. Nicholas refers back to a proposition in his first book (I, 18): God is omnipotent. And so he can conclude:

*... potuit alium modum redemptionis reperire et bonum et competentem, quia quidquid ab eo est, bonum est, et nullum ab illo vel in illo malum est, sicut prima secundi libri declarat.<sup>4</sup>*

Nicholas's approach is as simple and basic as usual. He does not venture into difficult distinctions between necessity in God and in man. He tries only

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1. This is the reading of Magdalen College MS. 192, f. 13r. Migne has the confusing 'a Deo hominis', which does not make sense.

2. PL 210: 611B-C.

3. PL 210: 612C.

4. PL 210: 612D.



to guarantee God's omnipotence and to show that anything God provides for us is good. Nicholas does not give himself the time or the space to touch on the ambiguities of his statement and the problem of the actual mode versus others. By rejecting the necessity behind the Anselmian arguments, Nicholas reveals some attraction to the thinking of the Paris schools. Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Stephen Langton - all sought to guarantee God's omnipotence and thus refused any necessity in the actual mode of the Redemption.

Our study of the second and third books of the Ars Fidei Catholice shows that they depend heavily, but not exclusively, on Anselm. There is something in the language and in the ideas, especially at the end of the third book after the God-man has been reached, that recalls Paris after the Lombard's Sentences became well-known, in the last decades of the twelfth century. The most original quality of the Arg is its method. Although it is entirely possible that Nicholas knew of Adelard of Bath's translation of Euclid,<sup>1</sup> the combination of Euclidean method with theology is Nicholas's own achievement. Nicholas depends much more on a mathematical process of reasoning than Anselm in the sense that Nicholas's mathematics are on the surface, clearly stated, while Anselm's are underneath, holding up the structure of his thought.

As far as the actual theological content of the work is concerned, the Arg owes much to Anselm but does not follow him on some key points:

1. In satisfaction the sinner must return more than he has taken away.
2. Christ's death is acceptable because it is the only act possible that is not already owed to God.
3. Sin not only offends God's honour but also upsets a universal order.

But Nicholas does grasp one Anselmian idea that underlies all his teaching on the satisfaction Christ gives for us: man, after offending God, has nothing to offer him because he already owes God everything. This idea seldom appeared in the twelfth century, but it is essential in Nicholas's theology.

The Nicholas who knew Cur Deus Homo is a perplexing figure amid the intellectual life of the late twelfth century. There is some evidence, however,

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1. F. Kietzrieder, Adelard von Bath (Münich, 1935), 132-3.

that Nicholas is an isolated thinker who did not attract any attention from other theologians until a half century after his death and who, therefore, did not transmit Cur Deus Homo to any of the Paris masters of theology at the opening of the thirteenth century.

In order to provide some biography of Nicholas, we turn first to Glorieux, who listed Nicholas as a regent master at Paris until his death in about 1204.<sup>1</sup> Glorieux was not sure if Nicholas was a disciple of Gilbert de la Porrée, as indicated by a miniature in Valenciennes MS. 197. But if he was, then one would have to attribute to him a defence of Gilbert's commentary on Boethius De Trinitate.

But Nicholas could not have been a disciple of Gilbert, who died in 1154. Nicholas says in his Chronicle that he was born in 1147. Also the Chronicle shows that Nicholas was alive at least until 1204. But the Valenciennes MS. is from the end of the twelfth century and speaks of Nicholas as already dead.<sup>2</sup> The Nicholas who was a disciple of Gilbert de la Porrée thus has no connexion with our Nicholas of Amiens.

Nicholas's Chronicle is our best source of information about him. It is preserved in a single manuscript,<sup>3</sup> and was probably written in northern France in the first quarter of the thirteenth century.<sup>4</sup> Excerpts from the Chronicle have been printed.<sup>5</sup> Nicholas's eight books are, for the most part, compilations of earlier writers. His personal additions begin with the year 1135. Nicholas touches on many different kinds of events; his entries are almost always very brief. He mentions papal controversies with Germany, the succession of the French

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1. P. Glorieux, Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècle, (Paris, 1930), 263-4.

2. DTC xi, 555-8.

3. Vatican MS. Reg. lat. 454.

4. Alain de Lille, p. 320.

5. MGH SS, vi, 473-4. The entire text of Nicholas's personal addition to his history is contained in Recueil des Historiens des Gaules, xiv, 21-3; xviii, 701-2.



monarchs, papal troubles with the people of Rome, English ecclesiastical events, and even something of crusading history. The entire chronicle is written from a pro-papal and very ecclesiastical point of view. Thomas Becket is seen as a martyr for the freedom of the Church; Frederick Barbarossa is the Church's enemy; the consecration of the new cathedral at Amiens in 1152 is mentioned.

Nicholas gives only limited attention to learning in the twelfth century. The first entry comes for 1139: 'Floruit hic temporibus Bernardus Clarvallensis, Petrus Abailardus, et Gillebertus postmodum Pictavensis episcopus, et Hugo canonicus S. Victoris, multa literarum scientia clarent.'<sup>1</sup> Abelard, Gilbert, and Hugh are all put on the same footing, and none is preferred to the other. Under 1148 Nicholas speaks of a provincial synod at Rheims, convoked by Eugenius IV, at which the doctrines of Bon were condemned and also those of Gilbert de la Porrée.<sup>2</sup> The next mention of intellectual personalities does not come until 1185: '... Florent in Gallis in scientia Petrus Cantor, Petrus cancellarius, Petrus Corbolicensis, Stephanus abbas Sanctae Genovefae.'<sup>3</sup> Petrus cancellarius probably refers to Peter of Poitiers, who did not become chancellor at Paris until 1193 and held the post until 1204. Thus he was chancellor at the time of Nicholas's writing, and so it is not surprising Nicholas called him by a title that he did not acquire until after 1185.<sup>4</sup> We have already discussed Petrus Cantor and Peter of Corbeil. For Stephen of Ste. Geneviève I have been unable to find any information.

The final notice concerning anything connected with intellectual history comes under 1201. Peter of Corbeil, 'in logicis et theologis acutissimus', once the master of Innocent III, was made archbishop of Sens.<sup>5</sup> We cannot be

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1. Recueil, xlv, 21.

2. Ibid., 22.

3. Ibid., xviii, 701.

4. For Peter of Poitiers, see Glorieux, Répertoire, p. 229.

5. Recueil, xvii, 702.

sure if this tribute to Peter's intellectual abilities was only a formula to be expressed for the occasion or if these words show a special admiration on Nicholas's part for Peter. But it seems more likely that the second possibility is the case, for Nicholas could have mentioned Peter's elevation without such praise for his intellectual achievements. And Peter is being lauded for the very things that were so important to Nicholas in the Ars, logic and theology.

The final complete entry in the book is also the longest one: the history of the fourth crusade up to the siege and capture of Constantinople. Shortly afterwards, the manuscript gives out in the middle of an entry. The Chronicle shows that Nicholas had some interest in the intellectual personalities of his time, but after 1185 he no longer mentions them, except indirectly in reference to Peter of Corbeil's appointment. If we try to reconcile this evidence with Glorieux's contention that Nicholas was a regent master in theology at Paris when the thirteenth century began, we have some problems. Why does Nicholas mention the masters in the 1180s and not speak of them at the time when he himself is supposed to have been among them? Why is Paris never named as a place of learning? In the 1139 entry, Nicholas does not say that any of the masters are teaching at Paris. He gives no geographical information for them. In the 1135 listing of masters, they are said to be flourishing 'in Gallis'. Nicholas does not point out Paris as a centre for studies; he is only concerned with the renown of various masters. Nicholas does not indicate any familiarity with Paris.

Nicholas's way of speaking about these masters and his silence on the subject after 1185 make it improbable that he was a master at Paris in the early thirteenth century. When Nicholas began writing his Chronicle c. 1203, he was probably a canon at Amiens. We know that in 1169 Alexander III intervened with the archbishop of Rheims to see that a certain Nicholas was given a prebend at Amiens.<sup>1</sup> Our Nicholas of Amiens would have been twenty-two at the time, a

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1. PL 200: 592.



possible age for such action to be taken on his part. At Amiens Nicholas seems to have been in touch with ecclesiastical events of the twelfth century, and he looked at them as a churchman and not as a scholar. He recorded the activities of the pope and important events concerned with the Church in northern France. Incidentally he was interested in some of the masters at Paris, but he never indicates that he is one of them.

Nicholas may have been at Paris during the 1180s, perhaps exactly in 1185, and thus have known of the masters whose names he later mentions in his Chronicle. And he may have acquired his knowledge of Cur Deus Homo through Peter of Corbeil. But there is no concrete evidence at all to show that Nicholas ever was in Paris. All the possibilities do not add up to a single probability, and the career of Nicholas of Amiens in the last twenty years of the twelfth century must remain, for the most part, a question mark. Only one fact remains: there was a canon at Amiens named Nicholas, and this fact is far stronger than anything Glorieux can bring forward to show that Nicholas was a regent master in theology at Paris.

I think that when Nicholas wrote the Ars (1187-91), he was at Amiens. He may have been just returned to Amiens, after a period as a student at Paris. The Ars, even though it is theology, has nothing to do with the theology of the schools in its methodology. One can hardly compare Peter Cantor's moral Summa with Nicholas's geometrical art of theology. The Ars does reveal some penetration of the Lombard's ideas on the Redemption, and this fact makes it possible that Nicholas was at Paris before he wrote the work. But the Ars as a whole is far removed from the mentality of the Parisian schools in the last quarter of the twelfth century. It is difficult to imagine Nicholas writing such theology under the shadow of a Paris master like Peter of Poitiers or any other of the leading figures whom we know were at Paris at this time.

From the evidence thus far we can give a tentative sketch of the life of Nicholas of Amiens. Born in 1147, he became the holder of a prebend at Amiens in 1169 or soon after. In the 1170s or early 1180s, he possibly went to Paris.

By the late 1180s he had returned to Amiens. Concerned about the progress of heresy in the Midi, he wrote his Ars Fidei Catholicae and used a manuscript of Our Deus Homo, to which he may have been introduced at Paris. More likely, he may have found a copy in a monastic library near Amiens.<sup>1</sup> At the beginning of the thirteenth century he decided to write his Chronicle and was still doing so when he died in 1204. His tastes were varied, and in his eclecticism he is much more a twelfth than a thirteenth century figure. He provides one of the last manifestations of Hugh of St. Victor's Omnia discas, for he did not hesitate to acquire learning either to build up a defence of Catholic doctrine or to write a history of the world. But his output was modest, and some of his thinking too facile. Although he was acquainted with the development of theology in Paris at the end of the twelfth century, he was not attached to this theology and emerges ultimately as a solitary figure in the intellectual history of the Middle Ages.

This portrait of Nicholas as a lonely thinker with no immediate influence is strengthened by the manuscript tradition of the Ars Fidei Catholicae. The manuscripts of this work are scattered all over Europe. Following Glorieux's list,<sup>2</sup> we can rearrange them according to country:

FRANCE

Paris Bib. Nat. lat. 6506 - 14 c.  
16082 - beg. 14 c.  
16084 - beg. 14 c.  
16297 - after 1250  
Cambrai 445 - beg. 14 c.  
Laon 412 - 13 c.  
Arras 1024 - 14 c.  
Tours 247 - 13 c. (after 1240).

GERMANY

Berlin Elector. 768 - late 15 c.  
Erfurt F. 6 - 1455  
Q. 104 - 1394  
Q. 130 - early 14 c.  
Munich Clm. 18175 - 15 c.  
Clm. 18971 - 15 c.  
5844 - 15 c.

BRITISH ISLES

Dublin, Trinity College 275 - beg. 13c.  
Cambridge, Pembroke College 20 - late 13 c. (from Bury St. Edmund monastery)  
Oxford, Magdalen College 192 - beg. 14 c.  
Norton College 140 - 14 c.  
London, Brit. Mus., Royal 8 C. IV - 13-14 c. (from Bury St. Edmund)  
Royal 10 A. X - 13-14 c.  
Harleian, p. 706 in v. ii of 1808 catalogue - century unknown, but looks like 14 or 15. Not included in Glorieux.

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1. We have already shown how rich Northern France was with manuscripts of Our Deus Homo - Chapter II.

2. Repertoire, p. 264. Glorieux does not give dates, so I have checked all the manuscripts according to their listing in modern library catalogues.



FLORIANUS

Florence Laurenz Plut. lxxvii, dext. cod. 17 - not listed in printed catalogue yet.

Vatican lat. 1041 - 15 c.  
4245 - not in a printed catalogue yet.

Madrid 489 - 14 c.  
523 - 14 c.

Prague, Univ. Library 490 - 13-14 c.  
Basel Univ. A.X. 120 - end of 14 c.  
Copenhagen Royal Library S. 1620 - 14 c.  
Lilienfeld 144 - 13 c.

The manuscripts of the Arg in the Bibliothèque Nationale are extremely interesting, for they all date from after the middle of the thirteenth century. The earliest one is MS. lat. 16297, which also contains a quodlibet by Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant's Impossibilia.<sup>1</sup> The other Paris manuscripts all combine the Arg with Arabic commentaries on Aristotle. Algazel, Avicenna, and Alfarabi are among the commentators. It looks as if the Arg was taken up mainly as a theological tract to complete the pagan philosophy of Aristotle and to show that Christian doctrine had a rational basis. These manuscripts date from the opening of the fourteenth century. In no case do we have a Paris manuscript that was written sooner than half a century after Nicholas's death.

The provincial French manuscripts provide us with further information about the use and reception of the Arg. Cambrai MS. 445 (now 474), beginning of the fourteenth century, puts Arg at the end of an edition of the complete works of Anselm.<sup>2</sup> There is even a table of the works of Anselm, followed by Seneca, Isidore, Richard of St. Victor's De Trinitate, and finally the Arg, which in this case is ascribed to St. Augustine! The inclusion of the Arg in a manuscript also containing Anselm's works might be looked upon as a coincidence if it did not happen again elsewhere. Tours MS. 247 (late thirteenth century), for example, contains works of Augustine, followed by the Arg (f. 179), then other works of Augustine.<sup>3</sup> With f. 204 Anselm's works appear and include Cur

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1. L. Delisle, Inventaire des Manuscrits de la Sorbonne (Paris, 1870).

2. Catalogue Général des Manuscrits des Bibliothèques Publiques en France: Départements, xvii (Paris, 1891), 175-6.

3. Catalogue Général ... Départements, xxvii (1900), 178-80.

Deus Homo. Among them is a list of articles condemned in 1240 by the University of Paris (f. 335v). So we have 1240 as a terminus a quo for Tours 247, which appears to be one of our earliest copies of the Ars. A third example of a manuscript using both Ars and Anselm's works is Oxford Magdalen College 192 (early fourteenth century), which starts with an alphabetical table of the books of Anselm, followed by 'Nicolai Ambianensis Ars fidei catholicae...', then the second book of Aristotle De Causis, translated by Alfarabi, and finally various works of Anselm, a semi-complete set, including Cur Deus Homo. It seems that some medieval manuscript copiers were aware of a similarity in method and content between Anselm and Nicholas.<sup>1</sup>

Arras MS. 1024<sup>2</sup> contains a great deal of philosophical writing, while Iarn MS. 412,<sup>3</sup> one of our earliest copies of Ars, follows the Paris pattern by placing the work among Arabic commentaries on Aristotle. There is a note that refers the reader to a commentary of Albert the Great, and so this manuscript would probably have to be dated after Albert's teaching career began at Paris, c. 1240.

The manuscript that seems to be earlier than all the others is Dublin Trinity College, 275. Its contents are definitely twelfth century: Simon of Tournai on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,<sup>4</sup> letters of Hugh of St. Victor,

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1. Another manuscript that includes both works of Anselm and the Ars is Lillienfeld 144 (thirteenth century). The Ars is ascribed to Alan of Lille. Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der Cistercienser Stifte (Xenia Bernardina, Part 2; Band I; Vienna, 1891), 529-31.

2. Catalogue Général des Bibliothèques Publiques des Départements iv (1872), 405.

3. Catalogue Général ... des Départements i (1849), 213-7.

4. The first entry in F.K. Abbott, Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin (Dublin and London, 1900) 41, says: 'Sententiarum (Lombardi) auct. Simone Cornsecensi, cum explic. vocum a Rogero Sarisbur.' 'Simone Cornsecensi' is clearly Simon of Tournai. I have been unable to find anything out concerning Roger of Salisbury, but the name indicates an English provenance for the manuscript.

The new catalogue of the manuscripts of Trinity College, Dublin (still in preparation) dates MS. 275 as early thirteenth century. It gives the provenance as either English or Castilian, for there is a fifteenth century note showing that the manuscript belonged to the Castilian monastery of Tarral. I should like to thank Denis Bethell of University College, Dublin, for this information about the new catalogue.



Richard of Mores's Summa super Decreta Gratiani,<sup>1</sup> and Hugh of Follet's De Claustro Animae.<sup>2</sup> These four works are followed by 'Nic. de la Querche. De Articulis Fidei' and the Liber de Essentia Bonitatis, which turns out to be the Rogatus of Alan of Lille.<sup>3</sup> There are none of the Aristotelian commentaries or great scholastic theologians. The de la Querche attached to Nicholas's name may indicate that he comes from Le Quesnoy or Le Quesnoy-sur-Deule, both in the Département du Nord, and both rendered into Latin as Quercetum.<sup>4</sup>

These are the most helpful manuscripts for our purposes. The German manuscripts are almost all too late to be of any concern to us. This survey indicates that manuscripts of the Arg did not reach Paris before almost mid-century. At the same time the Arg is found at Laon and Tours, while the Trinity College Dublin manuscript, which may be English, was earlier. At the opening of the fourteenth century the Arg seems to have been used in Paris in conjunction with commentaries on Aristotle.

The presence of the Arg in two libraries substantiates this indication that Nicholas belongs to Amiens and not Paris. The first library is that of Richard de Fournival, chancellor of the church of Amiens. He made a catalogue of his library in the mid-thirteenth century and called it his Bibliotheca.<sup>5</sup>

Under philosophical works, he listed:

103. Nicholay Ambianensis, dicti de Radiardo, liber de articulis fidei ad Clementem papam. Item cujusdam liber quem vocat Elucidarium et

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1. Richard of Mores (also known as Ricardus Anglicus) died in 1242, but according to S. Kuttner (NCE xii, 481-2), all his writings pre-date his years as prior of Dunstable (after 1202). His introduction to Gratian's Decretum was finished by c. 1196-8.

2. Hugh of Follet (Fouilloy), a canon regular of St. Augustine, died in 1172-3. His De Claustro Animae is one of four major spiritual treatises. (NCE vii, 191).

3. R.E. Abbott, Catalogue of ... Trinity College, Dublin, p. 41.

4. M. Chévin, Dictionnaire Latin-Français des Noms Propres des Lieux, (re-published 1964, Farnborough, Hants, England), 245.

5. L. Delisle, Le Cabinet des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale (Histoire Générale de Paris, 1874), ii, 518-35. Richard de Fournival only gives vague indications about his books on theology, so we do not know if he had any of Angela's books.

cujusdam alterius liber de monade (ascribit Mercurio Trismegistro). In uno volumine cujus signus est littera M.

104. Ejusdem Nicholay liber annalium sive chronicorum, describens memorabilia ab initio mundi usque ad tempus suum, in uno volumine, cujus signus est M.<sup>1</sup>

The Sorbonne catalogue of 1338 also contains a hint which may link Nicholas's work with the church at Amiens: 'Ars fidei catholicae, per propositiones cum glossa a Nicholao Ambianensis....'<sup>2</sup> Also listed in the 1338 catalogue is Nicholas's Chronicle. The Chronicle was given by master Gerard of Abbeville to the Sorbonne library.<sup>3</sup> This professor had probably inherited a part of Richard de Fournival's collection.<sup>4</sup> Besides the Chronicle, Gerard of Abbeville may have also acquired the Ars from Richard's library and in turn may have given it to the Sorbonne library. This would be the best explanation for the appearance of the Ars in the 1338 catalogue.

We can thus hazard a possible history of the entrance of the Ars at Paris. The work was written by Nicholas of Amiens c. 1190 at Amiens. A copy passed to Richard de Fournival's library and was there c. 1250. In turn it went to Gerard d'Abbeville, who brought it to Paris in the 1250s or 1260s (he died in 1272). Here the Ars acquired a certain popularity as a defence through reason of the Catholic faith. Gerard at his death gave the manuscript to the Sorbonne Library, where it was listed in 1338.

Although this history of the dissemination of the Ars in the thirteenth century is based on a number of uncertainties, one point remains clear. As far as we can tell from the manuscripts and the library catalogues, the Ars did not arrive at Paris until after 1240. Before 1240, the work was relatively unknown, and so it did not influence the crucial group of secular masters in the 1210s and 1220s who first took up Anselm and raised him to the level of an

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1. Delisle, Le Cabinet, ii, 531. I have been unable to find anything about the name de Radardo, which could be a valuable clue to Nicholas's origin.

2. Delisle, Le Cabinet, iii (1881), 109.

3. Ibid., 43.

4. Alain de Lille. Textes Inédites, p. 320.



auctoritas. There is little possibility that these masters had a copy of the Arg. The chance that Nicholas of Amiens might be the figure who bridges the gap between twelfth and thirteenth century scholastic use of Anselm is eliminated. Nicholas remains a solitary figure, very much influenced by Anselm, but not a transmitter of Anselm to the theologians of Paris at the opening of the thirteenth century.

With this view of Nicholas's position, we can summarize the climate of Paris. After the Lombard's Sentences appeared, Paris theologians generally limited themselves to the auctoritates that the Lombard used, whether he quoted them by name or not. This was a boon for Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor, but meant temporary bankruptcy for the ideas of Anselm. Why the Lombard did not use Anselm is not clear, but we can suggest that Peter Lombard's mind was hardly the kind to favour a theology relatively free of authorities and which devoted itself to finding reasons for the givens of faith. Partly because Peter Lombard did not use Anselm, the course of Parisian theology for half a century moved on without taking Anselm into serious consideration. Nicholas of Amiens does not interrupt this situation, for he is an isolated exponent of Anselm.

But once the search for authorities reached out beyond Peter Lombard's sources and once the Parisian masters were prepared to expand outside a moral-exegetical theology and philosophically construct a Christian world order, Anselm's time had come. But in 1200, the moment had not yet arrived.

### 3. Alexander Nequam

At the opening of the thirteenth century, one indication of a revival of Anselm's popularity comes in Alexander Nequam's little-known Speculum Speculationum. Alexander wrote this work in about 1213, just before he became abbot of Cirencester. The only surviving manuscript, British Museum Royal 7 F. 1, calls him a canon of Cirencester.<sup>1</sup> In the Speculum we find references to earlier

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1. British Museum, Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King's Collections, G.F. Warner and J.P. Gilson (London, 1921), 1, 199.

works of Alexander, such as his Gloss on the Psalter, the De Naturis Rerum, and his commentaries on Proverbs and on the Song of Songs.<sup>1</sup> All Alexander's surviving major works were composed after his retirement to Cirencester in c. 1200.<sup>2</sup> The Speculum would thus come at the very end of this period, very close to 1213.

Our probable date for the composition of the Speculum Speculationum indicates that it was written long after Alexander had left the intellectual centres of Paris and Oxford. Alexander had studied arts at Paris, probably between 1175 and 1182, then taught at Dunstable and St. Albans until about 1190. From that date until 1197 he studied theology at Oxford and then entered the order of Augustinian Canons at Cirencester at some time between 1197 and 1200.<sup>3</sup> Whatever prompted Alexander to take up the works of Anselm, there is almost no chance that it was his training at Paris or Oxford. Alexander lived and worked in intellectual isolation when he was writing the Speculum, and it was probably in the library of Cirencester itself that he found his copy of Anselm's works.

The Speculum as we have it is probably incomplete. The first two books concern God and the Trinity; the third deals with creation and the angels; the fourth, grace and free will. In four books Alexander goes no further than Peter Lombard did in one and a half, and we can be fairly certain that Alexander had originally intended to add other books. He indicated in the preface that he was going to write on the Incarnation and the virtues.<sup>4</sup> The hand changes three pages before the end,<sup>5</sup> and the last chapter ends in the middle of a sentence.<sup>6</sup>

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1. R.W. Hunt, 'Alexander Nequam' (Oxford University D. Phil. thesis, 1936), p. 17.

2. Ibid.

3. A. Dumen, 'Alexander Neckham', NCE i, 297-8. J.C. Russell, 'Alexander Neckham in England', EHR, XLVII (1932), 260-8.

4. British Museum Royal MS. 7 F. 1, f. 1rb.

5. Ibid., f. 92r.

6. Hunt, p. 124.



For our purposes the incompleteness of the work is no obstacle to detecting a strong Anselmian influence on Alexander's thought. For the most part, this influence does not include the use of Cur Deus Homo, but from a brief review of Alexander's use of other writings of Anselm, we can conclude that if Alexander had written on the Redemption, he almost certainly would have used Cur Deus Homo.

It would be helpful if we had other theological works of Alexander, composed at an earlier date, which might have included sections on the Redemption. Alexander's Quaestiones de rebus theologicis sound promising, but we find almost immediately that no one knows which questions were actually written by Alexander and which have been falsely ascribed to him.<sup>1</sup>

Another of Alexander's works, however, does give some indication that he knew the Cur Deus Homo. The De Naturalis Rerum, which dates from the earlier part of Alexander's stay at Cirencester, is an encyclopedia of scientific lore that includes an account of the creation. Considering the fall of the angels, Alexander says that they could not rise again because they had fallen of their own accord, without having anyone to tempt them. This same explanation for the irreparable condition of the angels had appeared towards the end of the Cur Deus Homo:

GDH II, 21

Hoc quoque removet eorum restorationem quia sicut ceciderunt nullo alio nocente, ut caderent, ita nullo alio adjuvante surgere debent. Quod est illis impossibile.

De Naturalis Rerum<sup>2</sup>

Et quia nullo impellente cecidit, maxime etiam cum non haberet naturam ad casum proclivem, de jure peccatus ejus esse irremediabile censuit justissimus iudex.

It is of course possible that Alexander extracted his idea from a source other than Cur Deus Homo. Anselm's balance between nullo alio nocente and nullo alio adjuvante is not reproduced in Alexander. Still, the reason is the same: the angels cannot rise because they fell of their own accord, with no one forcing

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1. Hunt, p. 151d: 'It seems impossible to decide whether any of the questions are really by Alexander.' As far as I can determine, no work has been done since Hunt's thesis on the problem.

2. De Naturalis Rerum, ed. T. Wright (Rolls Series, xxiv, 1863), p. 20.

then.

In the Speculum Speculationum we have little difficulty in determining whether or not Alexander extracted various ideas from Anselm, for Alexander himself mentions Anselm. More often than not, he tells us the book and chapter from which he has derived his idea. We find that Alexander uses Anselm in many different ways. Sometimes he rephrases him; he often quotes him directly; occasionally he tries to draw out Anselm's implied meaning. We will only present a very few of the Anselmian uses in the Speculum, but at the end of this presentation we will list all the instances in a table.

When Alexander treats the justice and mercy of God, he shows without hesitation his debt to Anselm:

... imploremus dulce subsidium ut ea que propositum sumus fructuosam  
**procreent intelligentiam in animo lectoris. In primis ergo verbis**  
anselmi cantuariensis utemur....<sup>1</sup>

The problem Anselm proposes is how God can be both merciful and beyond suffering.<sup>2</sup> If he is the latter, he cannot suffer together with men, but if he does not have compassion, then how can he be merciful? Anselm answers by distinguishing God's mercy secundum nos and secundum se. God is merciful secundum nos, but not secundum se. He does save sinners, and so to us he appears to have compassion. We thus gain from the misericordie effectum, while God himself does not feel any affectum at all. This series of oppositions between God's point of view and our own is typically Anselmian, and Alexander has assimilated a part of Anselm's theology that was seldom touched in the twelfth century: the ability to distinguish God in himself from God as man sees him and benefits from him. By using this passage, Alexander shows how well he knew Anselm's work and how expertly he could apply Anselm's solutions to his own problems.

When Alexander uses Our Deus Homo, he cites Anselm but mentions no particular work. As far as I can determine, the extant part of the Speculum never

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1. British Museum Royal MS. 7 F. 1, f. 47rb.

2. Proslorion, 8. Schmitt, Opera Omnia i, 106.



mentions Cur Deus Homo. But this particular citation assures us that Alexander knew the treatise and probably would have used it if he had written on the Redemption.

The problem is to prove the immortality of the soul. Alexander takes the first four chapters of the second book in Cur Deus Homo. These chapters depart from Anselm's central argument in order to show that rational creation must be saved. Otherwise God would have made the world in vain. Alexander is not interested in this idea as such. But he is concerned with the proofs Anselm uses, for they can easily be turned into a demonstration of the soul's immortality:

GDH II, 1

Rationalem naturam a deo factam esse iustam, ut illo fruendo beata esse, dubitari non debet. Ideo namque rationalis est, ut discernat inter iustum et iniustum, et inter bonum et malum, et inter magis bonum et minus bonum. Simili ratione probatur quia adhuc accipit potestatem discernendi, ut odisset et vitaret malum ac amaret et eligeret bonum atque magis bonum magis amaret et eliberet.

Speculum, iii, 87: f. 70rb.

Item: Anselmus. Anima facta est rationalis ut discernat inter iustum et iniustum, bonum et malum, magis bonum ac minus bonum. Accipit aut potestatem discernendi, ut vitet malum et eligat magis bonum, et ut summum bonum super omnia amet....

Alexander's debt to Anselm is clear. The latter has provided a rational proof for the immortality of rational nature, and it is only a matter of substitution of anima for rationalis natura for Alexander to achieve his aim. He condenses Anselm and provides a much tighter structure.

Alexander concludes, with Anselm, that it is necessary that the soul rejoice eternally in God.<sup>1</sup> He follows the next chapter of the Cur Deus Homo (II, 2) by asserting that if man had never sinned, he would never have died. This proves the resurrection, since if man was to be perfectly restored, he should be made such as he would have been if he had not sinned. This is nothing more than the third chapter of Anselm:

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1. British Museum Royal MS. 7 F. 1, f. 70va.

Speculum: f. 70va.

Inde probatur resurrectio, quia si homo perfecte restaurandus, talis debet restitui qualis futurus esset si non recessisset.

CDH II, 3

Unde aperte quandoque futura resurrectio mortuorum probatur. Quippe, si homo perfecte restaurandus est, talis debet restitui, qualis futurus erat, si non recessisset.

If God made rational nature for the purpose of rejoicing in him, then it is alien to him that any rational nature be allowed to perish completely:

Speculum: f. 70va.

Item, si deus rationales naturas facit ad gaudendum de se, valde alienum est ab eo, ut ullam rationales naturas penitus perire sinat.

CDH II, 4

At si nihil pretiosius cognoscitur fecisse quam rationales naturas ad gaudendum de se, valde alienum est ab eo, ut ullam rationales naturas penitus perire sinat.

Alexander is more subservient than usual to Anselm, for his quotations are" direct and without disagreement of any kind. It is not difficult to understand why, for these passages in Cur Deus Homo, with their claim to rationality and their logical explanation of God's activities, make up a type of thinking that guarantees certitude for the theologian.

There are fifteen instances in the Speculum in which Alexander quotes Anselm. They all come in the second and third books, and they are of every type, from direct quotations to discussions of Anselm's overall meaning in a particular book:

USES OF ANSELM IN ALEXANDER NEQUAN'S SPECULUM SPECULATIONUM

H = Homologion; P = Prologion; V = De Veritate; Ca = De Casu Diaboli; Co = De Conceptu Virginali.

A star (\*) signifies a passage in which Alexander gives special tribute to Anselm.

<u>MS. folio,</u> <u>lk. ch. in</u> <u>Alexander</u>	<u>Source in</u> <u>Anselm</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Nature of Use</u>
37ra - ii, 32	H 32, 62, 63, 33	The Word as understood in different ways.	Independent comment on quoted ans. passages.
32va - ii, 35	P 18, 19, 21	Eternity of God.	*Direct quote; no criticism.
36rb - ii, 44	V 5	The nature of truth and falschhood.	*def. of a word; direct quote; some reflection by Alexander.
36va - ii, 44	H 22 <u>passim</u>	God as incircumscribed.	def. of a word; Ans. rephrased.



USES OF ANSELM IN ALEXANDER NEQUAM'S SPECULUM SPECULATIONUM - continued

<u>MS. folio,</u> <u>Bk, ch. in</u> <u>Alexander</u>	<u>Source in</u> <u>Anselm</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Nature of Use</u>
42ra - ii, 6	P 7	Divine omnipotence.	Direct quote; def. of a word.
47rb - va; ii, 64	P 8, 9	Divine mercy.	*God as seen in diff. ways - def. of a term.
49va - ii, 68	M 31	Relationship bet. God and creature.	Rephrases Anselm.
51rb - iii, 6	M 34, 35	How the same word can be applied to both God and creature.	Quotes directly; def. of a word.
58vb - iii, 34	Ca 21, 22, 23	Whether the angels fore-knew their fall.	Indep. comment - def. of a word; direct quotes.
48vb-59ra - iii, 35	Ca <u>passim</u>	If angels had virtue before fall.	Interp. of Ans.'s general meaning.
61va - iii, 46	Ca 16, 20	Evil as a privation.	Def. of term; direct quote.
63ra - iii, 48	V 4, 12; Ca 27	Meaning of truth.	Def. of term.
62va - iii, 46	V 8; Co 15	Meaning of <u>debere</u> in order to understand evil of crucifixion.	Def. of term; direct quote.
63rb - iii, 48	V 4	Devil and truth.	Refers back to 63ra.
70rb - iii, 87	GDH 1, 2, 3, 4; V 8	Immortality of soul.	Condensation and direct quotes.

M used in 4 passages of Alexander: M 22, 32, 33, 34, 35, 62, 63 are used.  
P used in 3 passages of Alexander: P 8, 9, 18, 19, 21 are used.  
V used in 5 passages of Alexander: V 4, 5, 8, 12 used, 4 and 8 used twice.  
Co used in 1 passage of Alexander: Co 15 used.  
GDH used in 1 passage of Alexander: GDH 1, 2, 3, 4 of Bk. II used.  
Ca used in 4 passages of Alexander: Ca 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27 used.

The table provides us with a comprehensive idea of Alexander's debt to Anselm. Augustine is still by far the most important theological source for Alexander, but Anselm has assumed a real prominence in the Speculum. Alexander is more than willing to acknowledge Anselm and to praise him for his acuteness and his understanding.

It is obvious that Alexander was writing at Cirencester and not at Paris. At his best, he is a first-rate critic and interpreter of Anselm's thought.<sup>1</sup>

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1. The outstanding instance is Alexander's critique of Anselm on the knowledge the devil had about his fall before it happened - Br. Mus. Royal MS. 7 F. 1, f. 58vb - De Casu Diaboli 21, 22, 23 (Schmitt, Opera Omnia, 1, 266-71).

But such more often, Alexander is nothing more than a 'scissors and paste' theologian cutting out passages from Anselm when they are appropriate and using them without any development. At such times, Alexander's Speculum resembles a monastic florilegium, a collection of various authorities that have not been digested. To be perfectly fair to Alexander, however, he is somewhere in between the florilegium stage and that of the Parisian master of theology. He is not quite able to push his theology beyond the grammar and logic that are so dear to him, and yet these very subjects give him a critical sense that is valuable for him as a theologian. Alexander's theology is one of transition. We can see both the monastic and scholastic strains within it. In the midst of this heterogeneous work, there is a solid debt to the thought and works of Anselm of Canterbury.



Chapter VI

PARIS REVIVAL

1. William of Auxerre

William of Auxerre is a much better theologian than Alexander Nequam, as the influence of his Summa Aurea indicates. Alexander of Hales, Hugh of St. Cher, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas all made use of this work.<sup>1</sup> William is thus in the mainstream of Parisian theology in the thirteenth century. More precisely, William is one of the headwaters of that stream, for from him flow the great and lesser masters.

Because of William's position, it is essential to determine Anselm's influence on the Summa Aurea. The work was probably written between 1215 and 1220<sup>2</sup> and follows the general outline of the Lombard's Sentences. The first book is dedicated to God, the second to creation, angels and man, the third to Christ and the virtues, and the fourth to the sacraments and the last things. The two sections which we will deal with on the Redemption are in the third book and are called 'De merito Christi' and 'De effectu meriti Christi'.<sup>3</sup>

An early mention of William's point of view on the Redemption comes when he is discussing free will. William builds up a certain necessity for the Redemption only through Christ, but then he rejects any necessity by quoting

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1. G. Gal, 'William of Auxerre', NCE xiv, 921-2. A competent general introduction to William is Carmelo Ottaviano, Guillermo d'Auxerre: La Vita, Le Opere, Il Pensiero (Biblioteca di Filosofia e Scienze, XII, Rome, 1950).

2. There seems to be general agreement on this date. In Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, xii (Quaracchi, 1951), 114: the editors point out that the Glossa of Alexander of Hales is dependent on the Summa Aurea: 'Summa vero Guillelmi communiter assignatur circa 1220 vel parum post; ac proinde Glossa Alexandri finaliter assignanda nobis videtur circa 1223-1227.'

3. The only passages in the Summa Aurea in which Anselm is quoted by name are outside the section on the Redemption. In Paris edition of 1500 (Philippe Pigouchet), f. iira: Anselm's proof for God's existence from the Proslogion is ascribed by name to Anselm. Anselm is also named on f. xxix, rb-va: the types of truth: De Veritate 2, 4, 5. Also f. lxxvii, man's will towards evil. No particular passage in Anselm is cited. (Pigouchet numbers his leaves like folios in a manuscript, so we will do the same.)

Augustine:

Necesse ... fuit ut filium dei incarnetur. Quod quidam concedunt, dicentes quod ex quo peccavit homo necesse fuit filium dei incarnari. Sed hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit quod alius fuit modus nostre liberationis deo possibilis.<sup>1</sup>

Anselm may be among the quidam of whom William is thinking. The refutation is quick and short. William sees no reconciliation possible between this point of view and that of Augustine. We will have to wait until our examination of his teaching on the Redemption to be more certain of William's attitude toward Anselm. For the moment, this statement is only part of a discussion on God's free will and makes no attempt to treat the Redemption as a whole.

In the seventh chapter of William's third book, 'De merito Christi', we start out with ideas that look as if they come directly from Peter Lombard. The passion of Christ is both an act of pure love for us and the manifestation of his humility. But in developing the idea of Christ's humility, William brings in the notion of satisfaction:

*Humilitas igitur passionis Christi non tantum fuit meritoria vite eterne; sed etiam sibi et nobis satisfactoria pro peccatis primorum parentum.*<sup>2</sup>

We have to consider not only the merit Christ gained for eternal life but also the satisfaction he provided for the sins of Adam and Eve. William does not develop this concept. Instead he talks about Christ as sufficiens pretium and the equality of Christ's humility with the pride of our first parents. Christ is the medicine of the human race. In his contraries reply to contraries. In William's mind, all these themes are merged with the idea that Christ humbled himself on the cross for us. The idea of satisfaction is, for the moment, just one more theme.

But William eventually emphasizes the necessity of satisfaction. Men could have had mercy and charity before the coming of Christ, but he could not

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1. Pigouchet, f. lxxv, va. All citations have been checked against the 1518 Paris edition of Francois Regnault. The manuscripts consulted are: Oxford Balliol College 85; Oxford Oriel College 24; Oxford Merton College 109 and 217; British Museum Royal 9 B. V and Royal 8 G. IV.

2. Pigouchet, f. exix.



attain justice because he could not satisfy for original sin:

Misericordiam et caritatem poterat habere homo ante adventum Christi, sed veram iusticiam non poterat habere, quia non poterat satisfacere pro peccato originali vel pro peccato primorum parentum.<sup>1</sup>

Such a statement, that justice can be gained only through satisfaction for sin, indicates that William knew Cur Deus Homo. For both Anselm and William Christ's uniqueness is based on the fact that he alone could provide the satisfaction that would restore justice to mankind.

But there is a major problem in this idea. Long before Christ, God had already given Abraham an eternal inheritance, and so the latter seems already to have merited for himself and his posterity what they needed and to have had no need for Christ. This objection is a long way from anything in Anselm, but the manner in which William answers it points to his acquaintance with Cur Deus Homo.

William concedes that Abraham did possess eternal life as God's gift, but he could not enjoy it because of the debt of sin he owed. Also his children could not receive eternal life in their inheritance from him, for the debt passed on from father to son. The situation is similar to the one encountered in civil transactions when a father has some land but also owes money. The son inherits the debt along with the land and so is obliged to pay the debt before he takes full possession of his land. It is the same with Abraham and his descendants. The debt must first be paid before mankind can benefit from rightful possession:

Abraham igitur et alii patriarche debebant habere iure hereditario terram illam quantum tunc erat ex se; sed quia obligata erat debito peccati, oportebat quod debitum illud solvere prius.<sup>2</sup>

The teaching of the Cur Deus Homo on satisfaction is partially based on this same very legalistic concept. Man must pay God what he owes him before he can receive what God has promised him.

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1. Pigouchet, f. cxix.

2. Ibid., f. cxix, rb.

And so William can reject the argument that Abraham gained for us entrance to paradise, for man must first be absolved from the debt of original sin:

... quoniam apertio ianue nihil aliud intelligitur quam absolutio debiti pro peccato originali. Instantia: Iste debet intrare terram suam, ergo debet absolvi a debite pro quo obligata est hereditas sua.... Solus enim Christus potuit satisfacere pro peccato originali, unde solus post resurrectionem fuerit beatus meruit apertionem ianue paradisi.<sup>1</sup>

In these few sentences William connects the debt to be paid with the satisfaction man owes. They are, in fact, the same, and only Christ is capable of providing for them. Anselm himself could not have set forth the idea in clearer terms. William is doubtlessly using Anselm, for whom debt and satisfaction were also intimately related.

In the next chapter, 'De effectu meriti Christi', we find more evidence that William of Auxerre was aware of Cur Deus Homo. William asks if another mode was possible. Using Augustine, he says that it is possible that God could have redeemed man in another way, but none would have been better.<sup>2</sup> There is a contrary argument, however, which claims that if God had saved us by his will alone, it would have been far better, for he would not have had to undergo any insults or sufferings. This argument is the same as the objections of the infidels in the first three chapters of Cur Deus Homo, and there are a few phrases which indicate that William was aware of these passages:

Contra. Deus potuit sola voluntate sua nobis conferre immortalitatem et eternam salutem. Ergo pro nostra salute non oportuit filium dei contumelias pati, crucifigi, iudeos excruciari. Maximas ergo expensas fecit deus pro liberatione nostra, et sine omnibus expensis potuit nos liberare quoniam (?) sola voluntate.<sup>3</sup>

Anselm spoke in I, 3 of the contumeliam that Christ had to suffer. Also he used the phrase sola voluntate when he wanted to express the idea that God could have acted in another way.<sup>4</sup> The Leon writers mentioned God's sola potentia in this

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1. Figouchet, f. cxix, va.

2. 13 De Trinitate 10: 13 - PL 42: 1024.

3. Figouchet, f. cxix, vb.

4. CDM I, 6.



connexion.<sup>1</sup> William's adoption of the phrase  sola voluntate  indicates that  Our Days Homo  is his source.

But the reasons by which William refutes the arguments of the infidels do not come from Anselm. One explanation is that this means is the best means for inciting us to the love of God.<sup>2</sup> Here we find the harvest of Abelard, perhaps as transmitted through Peter Lombard.

William comments on Paul's words in Hebrews 2:10, 'Decebat enim propter quem omnia ....' He says that Augustine had explained this passage by saying, 'Nisi Christus moreretur, homo non redimeretur, et non redemptus periret. Quod si esset, frustra facta fuissent omnia.' This citation from Augustine seems wrong (however contradictory Augustine is), for we know that in 13  De Trinitate  he proposes other possible modes for the redemption. This passage comes in fact from the  Glossa  of Anselm of Laon, which William may have thought was written by Augustine.<sup>3</sup> Because William believed the passage was from Augustine, he felt he had to reconcile its necessitarian outlook with a milder fittingness for the actual mode of Redemption. His solution was to distinguish the different senses in which the term  redimere  can be used. In the large sense, it is the same as  liberare ; narrowly, it means to free by the paying of a just price. According to the first meaning, it is false to say that if Christ had not died, man would not have been redeemed, for God could have freed man in another way. But according to the narrow sense, the statement is true, for there was no other means of redemption, i.e., paying a just price. This answer is very close to that of Stephen Langton, but there is something in William of Auxerre's explanation which indicates the presence of Anselm:

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1. Lottin,  PM  v, No. 54, p. 51.

2. Figouchat, f. cxix, vb.

3.  Bibliorum Sacrorum cum Glossa Ordinaria . With the commentary of Nicholas of Lyre and others. (Lyons, 1639), vi, 815. The section is headed with the name  Ansel , and so may belong to the original gloss of Anselm of Laon. For a history of the  Glossa , see Beryl Smalley,  The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages  (Oxford, 1952), 46-66, esp. 60-1 for the role of Anselm of Laon.

Langton, Glossa in Romance 3, 25<sup>1</sup>

... redimere enim est aequipollens gratiam reddere pro re obligata. Sed non pretium (invenire res) quae tantum vel plus valerent quantum pretium sanguinis Christi, nec enim purus homo vel angelus.

William of Auxerre, f. 120ra.

... nullum fuit aliud precium vel satisfactio pro peccato humani generis nisi filii dei....

Langton says that Christ's offering or price was the most valuable and compares it to that of a pure man or an angel. But William of Auxerre says much more categorically that no other price was possible. Also William links the idea of price with that of satisfaction. For William of Auxerre the strict definition of redimere is very close to that of Anselm. We can see how William has profited from both theologians. Langton has given him this basic distinction in the meanings of redimere, while Anselm has enabled him to set forth a precise meaning for the narrow definition.

The next major problem is that of the devil.<sup>2</sup> William quotes Augustine's famous statement on the abuse of power. Because the devil put his hand on him over whom he had no right, it was just that he lose those in whom he seemed to have some right.<sup>3</sup> God is thus seen as choosing to act according to his own justice rather than his omnipotence. All this is very familiar, but it brings in a host of problems. Why did not the devil lose his power over man when he unjustly took possession of Jeremiah, who had been cleansed in the womb? It can be answered that although Jeremiah was cleansed then, he was not wholly freed from original sin and so the devil had some right over him. But, on the other hand, God could have created a novum hominem free from all sin, so if the devil had put his hand on him, he would have lost his right over men.<sup>4</sup> This phrase novum hominem is the same as the one in Cur Deus Homo when Anselm dis-

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1. This passage from Langton is quoted in D.E. DeClerck, 'Le Dogme de la Rédemption: De Robert de Melun à Guillaume d'Auxerre', RTAM xiv (1947), 273.

2. Pigouchet, f. cxx, ra.

3. 13 De Trinitate 14: 18 - PL 42: 1028.

4. Pigouchet, f. cxx, rb.



cusses the possibility of a man of another race.<sup>1</sup> Once more we find William of Auxerre adopting an Anselmian term. The school of Laon used the phrase hominem iurum.<sup>2</sup>

The answers are that Jeremiah was still a debtor to penae and that a novus homo would not be appropriate because he would not be a sufficiens precium. And so William can eject the devil completely from the theology of the Redemption:

Tamen dominus curasset genus humanum sola voluntate, non fecisset iniuriam diabolo, quoniam diabolus non erat nisi custos carceris et detinebat iniuste hominem quantum in se erat, tamen homo iuste detinebatur a diabolo.<sup>3</sup>

The devil has no right over man which impedes God from acting by will alone and providing man with free forgiveness. The devil is looked upon as nothing more than jailkeeper. We find Anselm's and Hugh of St. Victor's familiar distinction between man who is justly held by the devil, who unjustly holds man. By now the refutation of the rights of the devil has become so familiar that we cannot look upon it as a direct Anselmian influence.

William not only limits the devil's role; he also insists on a distinction between the devil's loss of power and man's liberation from sin. The first does not produce the second. Because of Christ, the two may happen at the same time; but there is no causal connexion:

Iustum dico fuisset quantum ad diabolum cuius longa prescriptio vel quasi prescriptio rapta fuisset merito per tale factum, sed non fuisset iustum quantum ad deum cui oportebat satisfieri.<sup>4</sup>

In other words, the devil's loss of power when he tried to exercise domination over an innocent man was just for him, but it did not thereby provide justice between man and God. First God had to be satisfied. The Augustinian confusion between the devil's loss of power and man's liberation from sin is admitted

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1. CDH II, 8.

2. Lottin, PW v, no. 47, p. 44.

3. Pigouchet, f. cxx, rb.

4. Ibid.

and refuted. Redemption comes only through the satisfaction made by Christ and not by any error on the devil's part. Admittedly, Augustine would have agreed, but a number of passages in his De Trinitate had confused this point and prepared the way for the long history of debate over the position of the devil in the scheme of the Redemption, a history that climaxed in Anselm's theology.

Anselm had been the first to point out that the devil has only a very limited role in the Redemption and that the central event is man's satisfying of God. Now William of Auxerre makes the same point and so purges the theology of the Redemption of an unhappy growth. William benefited from Anselm's influence, and later theologians gained from William's distinction. We shall soon be seeing Bonaventure stating that the devil's loss of power has nothing to do with man's satisfaction to God. Whatever the devil does, we still must ourselves compensate to God. Our liberation from sin is founded not on the devil's error but on our satisfaction. Such assertions are basically Anselmian conceptions of the Redemption.

For William, satisfaction is essential. But in two ways he does not go as far as Anselm. First he never defines satisfaction as carefully as Anselm does. We find none of Cur Deus Homo's assertions that Christ's offering of his own life is the only thing in the universe that is not already owed to God. Second, William is not willing to look upon redemption through satisfaction as the only possible way for man to be saved. We have already seen how he divides redemption into a strict and a broad sense. He makes a similar point just as soon as he asserts the necessity of satisfaction in the passage on the devil. First he gives the classic Anselmian case for a strong necessity:

*Sed contra. Divina iusticia exigebat quod satisfaceret pro peccato primi parentia. Sed non poterat satisfieri nisi per mortem filii dei. Ergo necessarium erat Filium Dei moriturum.*<sup>1</sup>

We see how concisely William can summarize a great deal in Anselm. Because

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1. Pigouchet, f. cxxi, rb.



divine justice demanded satisfaction for sin but no satisfaction could be given except through the death of God's son, it was necessary for the Son of God to die. Anselm is turned into a neat syllogism.<sup>1</sup>

William's response to the argument is significant. To the necessity of a satisfaction that can be made only through Christ's death, William replies with words that seem to be taken directly out of Cur Deus Homo. We remember that when Boso was finally convinced of Anselm's point of view, he said of Redemption through Christ: 'Nihil rationabilius, nihil dulcius, nihil desiderabilius mundus audire potest.'<sup>2</sup> We find some of Boso's statement taken up in William's refutation of necessity:

Dicimus ad primum quod divina iusticia exigebat quod iuste liberaretur genus humanum quia exigeret ad hoc ex necessitate satisfactionem et simpliciter.

Sed ad hoc ut melius, levius, dulcius, competentius liberaret, nihil enim ita dulce est sicut audire quod Christus filius dei passus est et mortuus pro redemptione generis humani.

Tanta vero pena sive miseria quam passus est filius dei pro emenda fuit de iusticia, non ex iusticia hoc necessitate exigente sicut dictum est, sed exigente hoc ut competentius fieret liberatio generis humani.<sup>3</sup>

'Nothing so sweet is to be heard.' William may have adopted this phrase from Cur Deus Homo because he thought it was a singularly apt expression of man's receptivity to Christ's death. But the way William uses the phrase indicates that he may have been using Boso's own words to reach a conclusion that disagrees with Anselm's. Instead of looking upon Christ's death as the only way of answering the demands of God's justice, we can take it as the best, most fitting, most competent means. William's distinction between de iusticia and ex iusticia emphasizes that Christ acted from justice, but not with any justice forcing him to do as he did. In all cases God's freedom is safeguarded, while at the same time the actual mode is taken as the one by far the most suitable

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1. A further argument for the necessity of the actual mode comes from Augustine commenting on Romans 5, 19. This turns out to be the Glossa again (Bibliotheca Sacrorum, Lyons, 1639, vi, 74).

2. CDH II, 19.

3. Figouchet, f. cxx, rb-va.

for man.

As far as the competence of the actual mode is concerned, we return here to De Trinitate. But William of Auxerre remains firmly grounded in Anselmian concepts of satisfaction and divine justice, and it is these concepts that William will pass on to his successors. Certainly Anselm is diluted, for the theses of Cur Deus Homo are never applied towards the same end as Anselm used them - the assertion that the actual mode is the only one. But William's attention to Anselm has enabled him to use a vocabulary that makes it much easier for him to express what man lost by sinning and what he regains through Christ. William can adopt Anselm's concepts and terminology without conceding anything to Anselm's rigidity. This type of adoption, while holding back from complete agreement, will become the pattern in the Franciscan school's use of Anselm.

We see the use of Anselmian vocabulary when William lists some of the reasons why God chose to free the human race through the death of his Son. The Son, as creator of the human race, should also be its re-creator. Only the Son would be sufficiently powerful to give us as much grace as Adam had power to give us sin. This explanation seems to have nothing to do with Anselm until we look at the way it is expressed: '... quod non potuit esse nisi esset deus.'<sup>1</sup> For a moment we see part of the well-known Anselmian distinction: only God can; only man ought.

At no time do we find an extended passage that can be compared word for word with a particular passage in Anselm. But William of Auxerre still may have had Cur Deus Homo at hand when he was writing the Summa Aurea, for his concise summary of the argument on necessity, his use of so many Anselmian terms, and his application of Boetius's language in his refutation of necessity - all these indicate that William was familiar with Cur Deus Homo. But this does not mean that William accepted what he read. His assimilation of Anselm's

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1. Pigouchet, f. cxx, va.



thinking on satisfaction and man's debt indicates a strong influence on him, but his teaching on the Redemption would have been intact without his use of Anselm.

We must not look upon Anselm's presence in William of Auxerre as that of a separate, isolated source conflicting with the school of Lombard influences. On the contrary, William succeeded in integrating Anselmian elements into the general stream of twelfth century sources. He subordinated Anselm whenever he became too divergent from the main tradition. This seems to be a conscious integration, for William appears to have been aware of Anselm's position and desired to reconcile Anselm with other sources. And so Anselm's authority for William is not that of a textbook but that of a tradition which represents a certain way of thinking about the Redemption.

Paris theology is thus prepared for Alexander of Hales and his Glossa in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, in which the Lombard's sections on the Redemption are explained and commented on by using Cur Deus Homo. The distance between William and Alexander in their ways of using Anselm is quite small, for Alexander's only innovation is the insertion of citations from Cur Deus Homo. He thus gave Anselm an authority that he would enjoy throughout the thirteenth century, but William of Auxerre had already preceded Alexander in looking upon Anselm as someone to be consulted for his theology of the Redemption.

We can take together Alexander Nequam, William of Auxerre, and Alexander of Hales as the three thirteenth century theologians who rediscovered Anselm and put him to use. In effect, they made Anselm's theology of the Redemption become once more a living source for men's thought on the redemptive act. As far as we can determine, Alexander Nequam discovered Anselm on his own, far away from the influences of the schools. William of Auxerre was in the midst of the intellectual ferment of Paris when he made use of Cur Deus Homo, but he did not make his source public. Alexander of Hales, confident in his own abilities as a teacher and thinker, did not hesitate in making known his dependence on Anselm.

Why did these men turn to Anselm, after so many years when theology seemed to be doing well without him? Our only answer has to be a very general one.<sup>1</sup> Theology was becoming far more complex than it had been in the twelfth century. Theologians were no longer satisfied with rephrasing the Fathers. They wanted to penetrate the problems that the Fathers had dealt with. There is no sudden break, but the revival of Anselm's thought on the Redemption indicates an attempt to grasp problems in themselves outside of their scriptural context.

Anselm had set out to explain the ways of God to man. He had a vision of an ordered, hierarchical creation. So did medieval man as a whole, but Anselm made explicit and rational what was implicit and unconscious. After Anselm, theologians as a group abandoned his goal of a rationalized world view and sought mainly to understand how God had revealed himself to man in Scripture. Whenever men like Gilbert de la Porrée or Abelard went further and tried to go behind Scripture to gain a rational understanding of the dogmas that the Church claimed to draw from Scripture, the mainstream of twelfth century theology attacked them. Anselm had been fortunate to work in relative intellectual isolation. Around him there was no group of theologians ready to interpret unfavourably some of his passages in which old ideas received novel formulations.

But at the opening of the thirteenth century, theology turned in the same direction that Anselm had once taken. The masters of Paris began to seek a more unified understanding of revealed truth that could be based at least partly on philosophical principles. These theologians saw that the problems of Christian dogma ultimately had to be treated in themselves and not only in the

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1. Of course, there is a subordinate answer that cannot be ignored. By 1220 Anselm had been dead long enough to be considered an authority to be named and quoted from. In the twelfth century he was too recent to assume this status in the minds of theologians.

Also, we could say that thirteenth century theologians were able to use Anselm because they were sophisticated enough to borrow ideas from Cur Deus Homo without accepting any Anselmian necessity. Because of elaborate distinctions, these theologians were able to modify the rigidity of the Anselmian structure. Twelfth century theologians, on the other hand, lacked the expertise necessary to see the possibility of using Anselm without accepting him completely.



context of their Biblical sources. This realization, which had begun to appear with Peter Lombard and advanced very slowly, prepared the way for the revival of Anselm. Thus Peter Lombard, the very man who ignored Anselm on the Redemption, indirectly made it possible for Anselm's type of theology to be accepted and valued.

Anselm was a boon for the thirteenth century not only because he approached the problems individually and sought to assert the unity of the whole but also because in doing so, he combined faith and reason in a unique way. Fides quaerens intellectum, rejected by some theologians as the wrong approach, is nevertheless the implicit method of the thirteenth century. Theologians already believed firmly what they subsequently tried to establish by the processes of reason. If they had had no faith, their impressive Summas would have never been written, for their faith was the impulse, the emotional foundation that made their rational quest possible and even necessary.

Anselm's approach was thus parallel to that of the thirteenth century, for both he and his successors sought to use reason to verify the givens of faith. And so it is hardly remarkable that the Cur Deus Homo, which seeks to explain as reasonable and necessary what we already know by faith, returned in the thirteenth century and gained such widespread acceptance. The twelfth century had ignored the work because it went too far, asked too much, presumed too much. But the thirteenth century was as bold and as optimistic as Anselm had been that man could go a great distance in understanding the ways of God to man.

## 2. Alexander of Hales

If William of Auxerre provided the initial impetus for the return of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo as a source on the Redemption, it was Alexander of Hales who guaranteed Anselm's position in the Parisian schools and transmitted him to posterity as an auctoritas on the Redemption. Some time in the 1220s, Alexander became a regent master in theology and radically transformed the

curriculum of the schools by commenting on Peter Lombard's Sentences instead of on the Bible. We have a record of these lectures in the texts of Alexander's Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, which for centuries were confused with the Summa ascribed to Alexander.

During the 1950s the Franciscan fathers at Quaracchi provided an edition of the Glossa and also encountered the problems of authorship, manuscript sources, and textual criticism which this work entails.<sup>1</sup> Thanks to the labours of the Quaracchi fathers, we can begin to grasp Alexander's great debt to Anselm simply by looking at the indexes to the volumes. We find that Cur Deus Homo and many other works of Anselm are used frequently. Often Anselm is cited by chapter, and Alexander's quotations of him are very close to the text we have in Schmitt. Cur Deus Homo is included and used not only in the third book of the Glossa, which, as a commentary on the Lombard's third book, had to deal with the Redemption. Scattered references to this treatise of Anselm are contained also in every one of the other three books in the Glossa. Alexander knew Anselm so well that he could refer to him frequently as an authority whose views were to be considered and respected.

Before we begin our analysis of Anselmian passages, we can briefly summarize the findings of Quaracchi on Alexander's life and work. Born c. 1185-6 of a wealthy English family that was probably not noble, Alexander went to Paris c. 1200-1201 and became a regent master in arts there, probably before 1210. Either immediately afterwards or within the space of a few years, Alexander seems to have entered the faculty of theology, became a bachelor and eventually a regent master. The latter status he appears to have attained by 1221.<sup>2</sup> But whether or not he began to teach immediately is not clear. The editors date the Glossa between 1220 and 1225. Besides the argument that Alexander had

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1. Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi Magistri Alexandri, (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi (BFSMA); XII (1951) - Liber Primus; XIII (1962) - Liber Secundus; XIV (1954) - Liber Tertius; XV (1957) - Liber Quartus. Quaracchi (near Florence)).

2. BFSMA XII, 61\*-65\*.



reached the minimum age of 35 by 1220-21 and could have already had eight years of study in theology, the Quaracchi editors point out a line in Glossa 1, d. 22, n. 9,<sup>1</sup> speaking of the Lateran Council as nuper habitum. It would be more natural to make such a statement if one were writing before 1225 rather than after. I find this argument weak, but in the context of other evidence for Alexander's composition of the Glossa in the early 1220s, the nuper may indeed indicate that Alexander was writing less than a decade after Lateran.

Other reasons for an early date for the Glossa include the fact that Alexander gave no lectures between 1229 and 1232, during the university strike, his representation in Rome, and his trip to England.<sup>2</sup> So the Glossa, which represents the text of his lectures on the Sentences, would have been written at least before 1229. The Quaracchi fathers also point out an article by P.K. Lynch which shows that Alexander was not only ignorant of the Decretals of Gregory IX (1234) but also of Compilation V issued 1226-7.<sup>3</sup> We can thus be almost certain on two points. The Glossa was composed in the mid-1220s; Alexander was already a regent master at Paris when he presented this commentary on the Lombard, for it is difficult to imagine a mere bachelor radically altering the curriculum by lecturing on the Sentences instead of the Bible.<sup>4</sup>

The Glossa itself as we have it is contained principally in three widely scattered manuscripts: Assisi MS. 189, to which Quaracchi gives the code A; Erfurt MS. Amplon. C. 68 = B; London Lambeth MS. 347 = L, which contains only the first three books of the Glossa. These manuscripts all share many of the same grammatical and textual errors,<sup>5</sup> but at the same time they are widely divergent. The first, A, is shorter than the others and has so many mistakes

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1. BFSMA XII, 220.

2. BFSMA XII, 110\*

3. 'A Terminus ante quem for the Commentary of Alexander of Hales', Franciscan Studies x (1950), 46-66.

4. BFSMA XII, 66\*

5. BFSMA XII, 117\*-118\*.

that the editors at Quaracchi wondered if the scribe knew any theology at all.<sup>1</sup> E is by far the longest and most carefully expressed of all three texts. Its changes and additions are attributed to the scribe himself.<sup>2</sup> All the manuscripts descend not from a direct reportatio of Alexander's lectures but from a draft of that reportatio made by a scribe who was extremely careless and made many errors. This situation explains the common grammatical mistakes in all the manuscripts.<sup>3</sup> Thus A, L and E all go back to a common source, but they are not dependent on each other.

The lateness of E is substantiated in the preface to the third book of the Glossa. The Franciscan editors show how contemporary authors like Richard Rufus and Philip the Chancellor used the A and L redactions, while the redaction of E was not quoted until later.<sup>4</sup> Part of the famous Douai MS. 474 is nothing more than a compendium of part of L. Since the Douai MS. was written between 1228 and 1236, we can be sure L is prior to this date.<sup>5</sup> But the manuscript that seems closest to the original reportatio of Alexander is not L, but our sparse and poorly written A. The Quaracchi editors assign the additions and notes of L to a disciple of Alexander who may have been English.<sup>6</sup> This is very important, for L contains many references to Anselm that A lacks. If a disciple of Alexander is responsible for these insertions, then the additional Anselm citations indicate the archbishop of Canterbury's growing

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1. BPSMA XII, 116\*.

2. BPSMA XII, 125\*.

3. BPSMA XII, 120\*: 'Quod autem non ab ipsa reportatione, sed ab eius primo apographo proveniant tot defectus codicis ALĒ, facile intelligitur.'

4. BPSMA XIV, 31\*.

5. BPSMA XIV, 20\*-21\*.

6. BPSMA XIV, 34\*-35\*: 'Nos, considerato quod redactione A et L ad eodem annos fore spectant, considerata et earum identitate sepe litterali, iamiam magis inclinamur ad videndum in lectiones ipsius Helensis et nonnullas eiusdem questiones extraneas, a quodam discipulo recollectas atque demum elaboratas; et hac de causa non eodem forte gradu authenticas ac ipsa reportatio codicis A.



popularity among Alexander's circle. We also find in E that there are uses of Anselm that do not appear in A or L, a sign of Anselm's increasing prominence in the 1230s, when E was written.

We will limit ourselves to the third book of the Glossa so that we can see Alexander's teaching on the Redemption as a whole. In this book the variant readings of the manuscripts are so great and the additions so many that Quaracchi made no attempt to combine all the manuscripts into one text. Instead the editors used A as the main text and provided short additions from E at the bottom of every page. Long extra passages from E are relegated to the end of each distinction.<sup>1</sup> Because the text of A and E, except for these additions, is almost the same, the Quaracchi basic text is entitled AE. But to avoid confusion, I will quote from the Quaracchi AE text as A and only indicate E when I am using lines that belong exclusively to E. The L redaction receives its own section in every distinction.

The Glossa follows in order the distinctions of Peter Lombard's Sentences. Alexander's work is in the literal sense a commentary on the Sentences, for the Paris master's purpose is to clarify the language of the Sentences. It is rather remarkable that Alexander fits Anselm into such a context, for if there was ever a theologian who ignored Anselm, it was Peter Lombard. And yet Alexander must have felt that the Lombard's outlooks on the problems of Christian theology could not have been complete without Anselm's ideas. More than a century after the writing of Cur Deus Homo and more than a half century after the Sentences, the works finally meet and join with each other in widening medieval man's understanding of the Redemption.

The first use of Cur Deus Homo comes when Alexander is explaining why the Redeemer was to be a man. Three of his sources are from Anselm. If God had become an angel, as such he would only be able to save himself, for the work of one angel cannot apply to another. And by extension of this principle, one

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1. BPSMA XIV, 35<sup>o</sup>-36<sup>a</sup>.

angel's good act could not affect man.<sup>1</sup> Anselm had used this reason, the uniqueness of each angel, to explain why no angel could provide redemption for another.<sup>2</sup> Alexander has understood the implications of the idea and has applied it to the angel's possible action towards human beings.

A second reason for the necessity that the redeemer be a man is that if Adam had resisted temptation, he would have done so without the aid of another creature. Likewise, if his race is to rise again, it should do so without the aid of another creature. In order to see how close Alexander's language is to that of Anselm, we can place the two passages parallel to each other:

Class III, d. 1: 10 -  
BFSMA XIV: iii, p. 14.

Adhuc, sicut Adam sine sustentatione  
alterius creaturae, si non peccasset,  
stetisset, sic oportet ut si idem  
genus post peccatum resurgere habet,  
ut non alia creatura adiuvante  
resurgat.

GDH I, 8

Sicut Adam et totum genus eius per se  
stetisset sine sustentatione alterius  
creaturae, si non peccasset, ita  
oportet, ut si idem genus resurgit post  
casum, per se resurgat et relevetur.

The two statements could hardly be closer without being exactly equivalent. But here Alexander does not cite Anselm by name. Later on he does so.

The final reason from Anselm is that just as a man satisfies for the fault of a man, so it is necessary that the one who satisfies be of the same race as the sinner. The words reproduce a sentence in Cur Deus Homo II, 8. Bringing these ideas together, Alexander adds a quotation from Augustine's De Vera Religione, that the same nature is to be taken up which is to be liberated. The use of Augustine confirms the outlook of the Anselmian statements, but we notice that the rational justifications have come from Anselm, while Augustine has only provided the final authority.

In the next distinction (2), Alexander discusses the nature of the God-man. Explaining why Christ was born of a woman, he uses Anselm's by now classic four modes explanation. For the first time, Anselm's name is included, but not

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1. BFSMA XIV, 14 (Redaction A).

2. GDH II, 21.



the title Cur Deus Homo:

Glossa III, d. 2: 6 -  
BFSMA XIV: III, p. 24.

Anselmus: Quatuor modis potest Deus hominem facere: aut de viro et femina; aut de viro et non femina, sicut EVA; aut nec de hoc nec de illis, sicut Adam; aut de femina et non viro. Ut ergo monstraretur potestas et compleretur ordo, hunc ultimum modum complevit....

CDH II, 8

Quatuor modis potest deus hominem facere. Videlicet aut de viro et femina, sicut assiduus monstrat usus, aut nec de viro nec de femina sicut creavit Adam; aut de viro sine femina sicut fecit Evam; aut de femina sine viro, quod nondum fecit. Ut igitur hunc quoque modum probet suae subiacere potestati et ad hoc ipsum opus dilatatum esse, nil convenientius, quam ut de femina sine viro assumat illum hominem ...

We find Cur Deus Homo cited by title for the first time in the third book when Alexander mentions the central Anselmian formula for satisfaction:

Anselmus, in libro Cur Deus homo: Hanc satisfactionem non potest facere nisi Deus verus, nec debet nisi verus homo. Quod autem non possit nisi verus Deus, patet, quoniam illud quod debetur maius est omni homine, scilicet satisfactio pro originali.<sup>1</sup>

These words summarize much of Anselm's crucial chapter II, 6, in which he sets forth the rational necessity of the God-man. The unusual sentence is not the one which states 'only God can; only man ought', for this formula was fairly popular in the twelfth century. Instead we note Alexander's ability to express the idea that what man owes God is greater than any man. This is close to Anselm's statement in II, 6 that man must pay something that is greater than all which is not God. Alexander has not reached this assertion here, but elsewhere he does so.<sup>2</sup> He grasps Anselm's point that man cannot possibly give God sufficient satisfaction because that would demand a price greater than all creation. And so only God himself can satisfy.

A further use of Anselm in the second distinction comes only in L. The subject is whether or not God could take on angelic nature in order to save it. Alexander says God could assume it, but by doing so, he would not repair the fault in such a nature. In explaining himself, he uses Anselm's statement,

1. BFSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 11.

2. BFSMA XV (Liber Quartus), distinction 1 (pp. 36-7): Alexander says man must give God something greater than all that is beneath God: 'Satisfactio autem illa est maius omni rationali creatura corrupta.'

that just as the angel did not fall through the intervention of another, so it ought not to rise through the help of another.<sup>1</sup> The author does not refer to Anselm, but the source is definitely Cur Deus Homo.

From the second distinction until the twelfth we find no citations at all of Cur Deus Homo, but other works such as the De Incarnatione Verbi are used. There are few large areas in the Glossa from which Anselm is completely missing.

The twelfth distinction includes a discussion of whether it would be possible for God to use a man not of Adam's race to redeem us. Anselm is used immediately. Such an event would be useless for man, because if it happened, man would not be elevated to that dignity which he was to have if he had stood. And so the restoration would not be complete. This is almost a word-for-word rendering of Anselm, with a few minor changes.<sup>2</sup>

Another question we can ask about the Redeemer is whether he could lie. Alexander refers to a long discussion in Cur Deus Homo and quotes Anselm as saying that Christ could have lied, but since all power follows will, Christ could not have willed to lie. And so by saying that Christ could not will such a thing, we are not depriving him of power but are merely saying that Christ's will was such that he would never lie.<sup>3</sup> Alexander has skillfully extracted the main points from Anselm's discussion with Boetius.

In the thirteenth distinction, concerning the grace that was in Christ, one problem is how Christ in his mortality could avoid being ignorant.<sup>4</sup> The answer comes from Anselm. God could not have done such great things when he was a man without having immense wisdom. Alexander's answer skips Anselm's other point, that it would be foolish for one who is all wisdom to take on ignorance.

Again we find that the L redaction provides an additional use of Anselm.

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1. BFSMA XIV: Redaction L - p. 26. CDH II, 22.

2. BFSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 124. CDH II, 8.

3. BFSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 124. CDH II, 10.

4. BFSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 132. CDH II, 13.



Christ had previous knowledge of his passion before he became a man, but when the text of Hebrews v, 8 says that he learned obedience, we can best understand the words through Anselm's explanation that what he already knew through wisdom, he now learned in a different way through experience.<sup>1</sup> Christ already had knowledge, but in another way he was able to learn.<sup>2</sup>

Within the sixteenth distinction of the third book in Alexander's Glossa, all the redactions say that it was necessary for the human race to be redeemed. A and E then ascribe to Anselm the statement that no means was more convenientior than the passion of Christ. L, however, credits Augustine 13 De Trinitate with this point. The conclusion in all three redactions is that it was necessary for Christ to die:

Glossa A and E, d. 16 -  
BFSMA XIV: 111, p. 170.

Necesse fuit genus humanum redimi  
sed dicit Anselmus quod nullus modus  
erat convenientior quam per passionem  
Christi; ergo necesse fuit passionem  
Christi esse.

Glossa L, d. 16 - p. 172.

Item necesse fuit genus humanum redimi,  
ut dicit Anselmus.... Sed nullus modus  
convenientior redemptioni quam per  
passionem, ut dicit Augustinus, xiii  
De Trinitate; ergo necesse fuit  
passionem esse et Christum mori.

If we take A as being closer to Alexander's actual statement, then in moving from the convenientior to the necesse, he was following Anselm's essential principle that any parvam rationem in God, if not overcome by a greater reason, contains a necessity in itself.<sup>3</sup> Thus, by Anselmian reasoning, because this mode is the most fitting for God, it is thereby necessary. The editor of L probably thought the passage had to be ascribed to Augustine because it spoke in terms of what is convenientior. But Alexander's original intent seems to have been to show how what is most fitting as a means for the Redemption in Anselm's eyes leads logically to the necessity of Christ's death. By this conclusion, Alexander ascribes a necessity to the actual mode of Redemption

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1. CDH I, 9.

2. BFSMA XIV: Redaction L - p. 139. CDH I, 9.

3. CDH I, 10.

that was never found in Peter Lombard.

The seventeenth distinction brings a discussion of Christ's wills that eventually calls upon Anselm. When Christ said he had to drink from the chalice, he did not mean he could not avoid death but that it was impossible for the world to be redeemed in any other way. Christ preferred to suffer death rather than that the world not be saved.<sup>1</sup> The rearrangement of the Anselmian passage is very slight.

Considering the merit of Christ (d. 18), Alexander again shows a sensitivity to Anselm when he takes a small point and makes sure that Anselm is correctly understood. The problem is how to interpret Paul speaking of the way God has exalted Christ. The Lombard's Gloss on II Philip 9 says that this exaltation is according to Christ's human nature, which was made more glorious in the resurrection. But a passage from Anselm says that there was no humiliation of the divine substance, rather only an elevation of human nature. Anselm thus seems to rule out any glorification of divine nature.<sup>2</sup> Alexander resolves the difficulty without refuting Anselm by saying that the exaltation of divine nature is only subjective, as it appears to men in the risen Christ, but that objectively divine nature is never exalted. At times such as this, Alexander looks upon Anselm as a source that cannot be wrong if understood correctly.

Alexander returns to the problem of necessity in Christ later on in the eighteenth distinction. He takes Anselm's explanation of Psalm 109, which seems to indicate that Jesus had to take the course he did, in order to be exalted. Anselm insists that Christ in himself had no need to die. He was free to do what he wanted.<sup>3</sup> This is one more borrowing from a section of Cur Deus Homo rarely considered in the twelfth century: Anselm's explication of Old Testament references to Christ and New Testament discussions of the work of

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1. BPSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 178. CDH I, 10.

2. BPSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 190. CDH I, 8.

3. BPSMA XIV: Redaction A - pp. 194-5. CDH I, 9.



Redemption. Alexander shows much less interest in the rational exposition of sin and satisfaction in I, 11-15 and 19-25 than in Anselm's understanding of Christ in the context of Christian revelation in I, 4-10. There is only a single reference in all the Glossa to the later chapters in Book I (excluding the chapters on the angels, 16-18). Instead of investigating the meaning of sin, Alexander uses Anselm's exposition of troublesome passages from Scripture. Alexander concentrates on the Biblical Christ, not on the logically necessary God-man. It is Alexander's desire to understand the texts of the Bible concerned with Christ, rather than any quest for a rationally necessary being, that leads him back to Anselm.

Later in the eighteenth distinction, Alexander asks whether the martyrs sufficiently paid for their sins without the passion of Christ. The Lombard's Gloss on the Psalms indicated that without the passion of Christ, the martyr's death would have been insufficient.<sup>1</sup> Alexander opposes this by deliberately misconstruing an idea of Cur Deus Homo. Anselm had said that nothing is of greater value than a man's free offering of himself to God in a death that is not owed. And so Anselm apparently indicates that the martyrs did not need Christ. Alexander subsequently explains that Anselm was only speaking of Christ's death, not that of the martyrs. They owed something already to God, the punishment of sin, and so their deaths cannot be looked upon as a free offering of themselves.<sup>2</sup> We find here one more instance of Alexander's desire to understand exactly what Anselm means: 'Dicendum quod Anselmus loquitur de Christo....'

The next distinction (19) explains the effect of Christ's merit. If we want to know why God became man, we turn to Anselm:

Anselmus in libro Cur Deus homo ostendit quare Redemptor debeat esse Deus, et quare homo, et quare mortalis, hoc modo: Offensa Dei excedit omnem creaturam; sed quaelibet culpa mortalis est offensa Dei; ergo excedit

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1. PL 191: 1283A-B, commenting on Psalm 147(8).

2. BPSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 198. CDH II, 11.

omnem creaturam. Ergo necesse erat satisfactorum esse super omnem creaturam; oportuit igitur ipsum esse Deum.<sup>1</sup>

Again, we have the appearance of Anselm's central principle that man's crime outweighs in its evil the good of all creation. The only one who can possibly give satisfaction is God, for only he can provide a sufficiently large compensation.

The twentieth distinction provides us with the most material taken from Anselm. The subject is the necessity of the actual mode.<sup>2</sup> Alexander uses the late twelfth century distinction between redimere and liberare. Another means was possible for man's liberation, but not for his redemption. Alexander follows William of Auxerre in adding a new element to this distinction by combining the reasons for necessity with Anselm's ideas. And so Alexander is able to accept the full force of Anselm's concept of necessity by applying it only to the strict definition of redemption, while at the same time Augustine's convenientia and possible other ways can be seen in terms of man's simple liberation. Such a response to the problem of necessity avoids the apparent limitation of God that twelfth century thinkers had thought they found in Cur Deus Homo. Now Anselm can be used seriously, even though the new distinction is one he would have never made. Anselmian necessity can be seen in a limited and well-defined context.

Alexander even uses Anselm as the authority to rescue Augustine's convenientia. The problem is that Psalm 21 seems to show that no mode was more fitting, but Augustine and others indicate other possibilities. A reconciliation is achieved through Anselm, who pointed out the advantages of the actual mode:

Anselmus, Cur Deus homo, solvit ista dicens; Sicut per hominis inobedientiam more in humanum genus intraverat, ita oportebat ut per hominis obedientiam vita restitueretur; et quemadmodum peccatum, quod fuit causa nostrae damnationis, initium habuit a femina ... etc.<sup>3</sup>

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1. BPSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 212. CDH I, 21; II, 6.
  2. BPSMA XIV: Redaction A - pp. 229-30. CDH inssim.
  3. BPSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 231. CDH I, 3.



Anselm, the great advocate of necessity, can also be taken up in order to show that the actual mode of the Redemption was the most fitting possible. Anselm is thus used in a very Augustinian way, but this is not incorrect, for there is much in Anselm that comes from Augustine. Once again, Alexander emphasizes the more traditional side of Anselm's thought, centred on the Christ of divine revelation rather than on the God-man which the human mind must invent. Alexander sees Christ as the answer to the requirements of man's fall as seen in Genesis, and he never really touches upon Christ as a logical antidote for the unlimited satisfaction due for sin.

Alexander cannot be accused of distorting Anselm. Rather he emphasizes parts of Anselm that previous theologians have not touched. Two reasons help explain his attention. First, as we have already said, Anselm was by now sufficiently far in the past to become an authority. Secondly, Anselm had a gift for clarity and brevity that made it much easier than it had been in Augustine for the theologian to understand what he was saying and to know where to find it. Such is the case when Alexander discusses the devil and his position in the Redemption. Instead of turning to the confusing and sometimes almost contradictory chapters of Augustine's 13 De Trinitate, Alexander can clear up many difficulties by a few brief quotes from Anselm.<sup>1</sup> These uses make the essential point about the devil that he has no rights at all. The Lombard's indecision on the matter, which enabled him to incorporate mildly conflicting passages from Hugh of St. Victor and Augustine, is permanently resolved in favour of a devil without any prerogative at all. The inclusion of Anselm on a point of theology in Alexander's commentary on the Lombard thus modifies the outlook of the Master of the Sentences.

The next problem is how Christ's death could overcome the evil of sin when that death in itself was a great evil for those who killed him. According to Anselm II, 15, Christ's murderers acted in ignorance. If they had known

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1. EFSMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 232. CDH I, 7.

what they were doing, they would have never crucified him.<sup>1</sup> And so we can assert that no evil can be as evil as such a life was good. The worth of Christ's offering for overcoming the debt of sin is thus assured. Alexander summarizes and condenses much of II, 15 here. His grasp of Anselmian ideas is so good that he can be just as faithful to Anselm when he is giving a précis for a chapter as when he is quoting word for word.

In other passages, of course, Alexander uses more traditional points about Christ's humility exceeding man's pride, so he by no means gives up the ordinary ways of discussing the Redemption. But in adding Anselm to this framework, he deals with questions that give a depth to his work. This is all the more extraordinary in a work that is basically nothing more than a simple (by comparison with later theologians) commentary on Peter Lombard. Alexander uses Anselm to achieve a theological completeness that the Lombard lacked.

There are many other passages in the twentieth distinction in which Anselm's ideas on necessity are carefully considered, but they continue the pattern of favourable treatment of Anselm and a genuine desire to understand his meaning. Also there is no need for a detailed examination of the uses of Anselm in the other books of the commentary, for these passages do not vary with the practices we have already found: concentration on the first ten chapters of Cur Deus Homo; lack of concern with the meaning of satisfaction and the debt of sin; occasional attention to the Anselmian summary about the God-man's necessity; much attention to the problem of God's freedom and will. Anselm's angelology is taken up, and his complex calculations with the number of angels and the number of men are carefully examined.<sup>2</sup> In these other books of the Glossa, E gains the same prominence in including extra Anselmian passages that I showed in the third book. One of the most significant developments is the application of Anselm's ideas on satisfaction to the concept of

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1. BFEMA XIV: Redaction A - p. 233.

2. BFEMA XIII: Redaction A - pp. 96-7. CDH I, 18.



the repentance of the individual sinner.<sup>1</sup> The inclusion of Cur Deus Homo in a commentary on the Sacrament of Penance is by no means forced or artificial. The ideas of sin and satisfaction that Anselm had applied to the whole human race are translated to the individual level. No one outside of Anselm's immediate circle had previously tried to do so.<sup>2</sup> It is indicative of Alexander, with his knowledge and respect for Anselm, that he was willing to interpret Anselm's ideas in such a way.

We can gain a brief review of the places in Cur Deus Homo used by Alexander if we list the chapters in Anselm and place next to them the pages in the Glosses which use them:

<u>GDH-Bk I.</u>	<u>Bk and Page in Glosses</u>	<u>GDH-Bk II.</u>	<u>Bk and Page in Glosses</u>
cc. 3-4	iii, 170, 173, 231, 232-9	c.1	ii, 40
c.5	iii, 235, 241	c.2	ii, 179
c.7	iii, 235, 241	c.4	iii, 236, 242
c.8	iii, 190, 200, 235, 241; i, 452	c.5	i, 437
c.9	iii, 139, 194, 203, 235, 241	c.6	iv, 36-7
c.10	iii, 170, 178, 184	c.7	iii, 25, 32, 212, 217, 232
c.11	iv, 228-9, 250	c.8	iii, 14, 24, 32, 124, 126
c.16	ii, 320	c.10	iii, 125-7; i, 429, 432, 437
c.18	ii, 96-7	c.11	iii, 198, 205; ii, 292
c.23	iv, 230	c.13	iii, 132, 138
		cc. 14-15	iii, 233, 239
		c.16	ii, 320; iv, 327
		c.22	iii, 14, 26; ii, 42, 54, 190-1.

This list confirms our previous remark that there is a heavy emphasis on Alexander on the traditional and Biblically-oriented first ten chapters of the first book in Cur Deus Homo. Also we see that Alexander spends much time on the middle chapters of the second book, which, having established the necessity of Christ, begin to determine by logic and reason his wisdom, personality, and freedom of activity. The uses indicate that Alexander was interested not in establishing the rational necessity of Christ but in showing how the Christ of revelation fulfils the requirements of man's salvation without

1. BPSMA XV: Redaction A - pp. 36-7. GDH II, 6; p. 228 - GDH I, 11; pp. 326-7 - GDH II, 6.

2. See Chapter I on Anselm's immediate circle.

compromising his own divinity.

There is no doubt at all that Alexander was profoundly influenced by Anselm and that he considered Cur Deus Homo as a major source of thought and authority on the doctrine of the Redemption. Alexander was able to integrate Anselm's teaching with the writings of the Fathers and the twelfth century authorities. This process of use and integration was followed not only with Cur Deus Homo but also with other Anselmian works, such as Monologion, Proslogion, De Casu Diaboli, De Conceptu Virginali, De Processione Spiritus Sancti, and De Libertate Arbitrii. But none of Anselm's other works is used quite as often as the Cur Deus Homo, not even the Monologion, which is quoted twenty-three times in all four books.

But Alexander is selective in his use of Anselm, and he adopts Anselm's arguments to guarantee God's free activity because he is concerned with free will and necessity in God and Christ. He reduces the rigidity of Anselm's structure, for he at no time seeks the same rational necessity for the Redemption by a God-man that Anselm demanded. Alexander is astute and cautious, but his traditionalism does not keep him away from Anselm. At last Anselm has been taken up by someone who can appreciate him without hesitation. The twelfth century fades back into the distance as a much less rich time for Anselm's thought.

And so we find in Alexander a Cur Deus Homo which has been broken up into its components, each of which is put to good use. But the integrity of the whole is missing, and we emerge from a reading of the Glossa with a knowledge of fragments of Anselm's thought, but no feeling for its unity. This is how it had to be, for Alexander had not set out to explain Anselm. He was using Anselm as a tool in filling out what was missing and insufficiently set forth in the Lombard's Sentences. Despite the absence of Anselm for so long and regardless of Alexander's commentary on a work from Paris theology that owed nothing to Anselm, Alexander still managed to inject with ease the entire Anselmian corpus into the intellectual world of Paris in the 1220s. Alexander was not concerned



with preserving the Lombard's approach but with enlarging and deepening the questions that the Lombard had asked about the meaning of the Redemption. And Anselm provided an invaluable aid in reaching this goal.

### 3. William of Auvergne

The influence of Anselm on the section of William of Auvergne's Magisterium Divinale entitled 'Cur Deus Homo' has long been recognized. In 1921 Josef Kramp wrote, 'Anselm's influence on William through the work Cur Deus Homo is unmistakable.<sup>1</sup> Kramp went no further in investigating this influence, but a recent thesis presumably gives full treatment to the degree of influence and the exact borrowings.<sup>2</sup> But there is still sufficient reason for us to look at the passages in William of Auvergne's Cur Deus Homo that owe something to Anselm. In order to see the revival of Anselm in the 1220s and the 1230s in its entirety, we will consider the contribution of William and then relate his work to that of the other Paris theologians who were becoming aware of Anselm at the same time.<sup>3</sup>

William was not trying to write a Summa of theology but a polemical answer to the heretical opinions of his time.<sup>4</sup> The Magisterium Divinale is thus directed towards a far wider audience than the members of the Paris schools. It is intended to answer the arguments of Albigensians and rigorous Aristotelians alike. And so William does not reason on the basis of authorities

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1. Josef Kramp, 'Des Wilhelm von Auvergne Magisterium Divinale', Gregorianum ii (1921), 46: 'Anselmus Einfluss auf Wilhelm durch die Schrift Cur Deus Homo ist unverkennbar'. For William's relationship with the University of Paris, A. Mammo, Guilielmo d'Auvergne e l'Università di Parigi dal 1229 al 1231 (Mélanges Mandonnet, ii, Paris, 1930).

2. E.A. Weis, 'The Anselmian Tradition in William of Auvergne's De Causis Cur Deus Homo' (Thesis of the Gregorian University, Rome, 1965). I have been unable to obtain a copy of the thesis.

3. The edition of William of Auvergne I have used is the Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia i (Paris, 1674), reprinted without change by Minerva (Frankfurt am Main, 1963). Number references are to pages, not columns.

4. Josef Kramp, 'Des Wilhelm von Auvergne Magisterium Divinale', Gregorianum i (1920), 576-9.

but by means of proofs that anyone would have to accept whether or not they were an orthodox Christian. This approach is similar to Anselm's outlook in Cur Deus Homo, and so it is no wonder that in describing the Redemption, William adopted not only Anselm's title but also his method. William's purpose was to safeguard the whole of Christian revelation from destruction by heretics and infidels. As it happened, the doctrine of the Redemption was one of the few areas of belief that was not under attack at the time. But William had set out to provide a rational protection to all aspects of Christian belief, so the Redemption is included in this structure. Anselm was ideal for William, even if it had been more than a century since his work was written. But there had been changes in thought and expression, so the borrowings from Anselm are submerged in a work that is very much the product of William's own mind and own century.

William of Auvergne's approach is different from that of Alexander of Hales. For Alexander, Anselm was chiefly used in order to explain troublesome Biblical passages about the Redeemer. But for William, Anselm offered reasons that made the Redemption logically necessary. Alexander was attracted by one facet of Cur Deus Homo, William by another.

The first few chapters of the 'Cur Deus Homo' in the Magisterium Divinale are concerned with man's fall. Not until the fifth chapter does William ask how original sin was to be dealt with. William states the problem in so many different ways that satisfaction seems to be lost amid other images:

Post haec, qua medicina curandum fuit originale peccatum ...; qua satisfactione emendandum, quia reversa transgressio fuit legis positae, et alieni juris invasio; quo sacrificio expiandum, seu repropitiandum, quia revera peccatum fuit, et offensa in Deum; quo lavacro diluendum ...; quo pretio redimendum ... inquirere tentabimus.<sup>1</sup>

Medicine, satisfaction, sacrifice, cleansing, and payment - all the various ways that centuries of Christian thinking had expressed the Redemption are collected together here. So pride, avarice, and disobedience must be remedied

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1. Opera Omnia i, 558.



by their contraries. William says also that satisfaction ought to be equal to or greater than the transgression, and so we might conclude that he is following a completely different path from that of Anselm. The archbishop of Canterbury consistently said that man must offer God more than man has taken away, not just something equal.

But in the sixth chapter, William does approach Anselm. William adopts one of Cur Deus Homo's main ideas. Man cannot return to his position that he had occupied before the fall simply by returning to humility. Man has done injury to God, and so besides coming back to humility from pride, he must compensate God:

Si quis autem dixerit, quia usurpatae dominationis depositio, et reditus ad infimum suae servitutis debeat esse emendatio huiusmodi usurpationis, errat indubitanter, quia hoc non est, nisi restitutio ipsius ablati, dum se ipsum quem male usurpaverat sibi, Deo restituit, sed usurpationis adhuc injuriam, et contumeliam non emendat.<sup>1</sup>

Anselm had spoken of our injury and insult to God in the same way and had said that it is not sufficient only to return what had been taken away. Man ought to give back for his insult more than he took away.<sup>2</sup> In William of Auvergne, as in Anselm, restitution entails both man's restoration to God of the service he owed God in the first place and man's compensation for the injury done to God. William explains that man owes God everything, and so when he sins, he owes him even more. But we cannot give God more than we have, and so it is clear that our first parents had no way of compensating for their original sin.<sup>3</sup> For the moment William is only talking about the humility man owes God, but soon he will apply the same principle to man's obedience.

We realize immediately that William of Auvergne is developing a theme that appears nowhere in Alexander of Hales's Glossa. Alexander uses the term satisfactio but did not discuss its full meaning. Now William is trying to

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1. Opera Omnia 1, 560.

2. CDH I, 11.

3. Opera Omnia 1, 560.

determine what it is exactly that man owes God when he sins, and so the two theologians are concerning themselves with widely different parts of Cur Deus Homo. William, as we indicated before, follows the rational exposition, while Alexander keeps close to Anselm's explanation of Biblical authorities.

William soon concludes that only God is able to provide the necessary amount of humility in compensation, for only he can lower himself as much as man tried to exalt himself in sinning. We see how the non-Anselmian concept of contraries being applied to contraries is taken here to complete the Anselmian idea of what man owes God.

The same reasoning can be used for avarice and disobedience. In the second case, William quotes Aristotle's Topics to say that every being has only one opposite.<sup>1</sup> The only possible opposite for the disobedience of one who is obliged to obey is the obedience of one who is not obliged to obey. This unlikely path leads us directly to Anselm, for now we are discussing obligation and debt. Someone must pay who does not already owe, but only God can do this, for as men we already owe God everything.<sup>2</sup> We can see how close William is to Anselm by placing the two writers next to each other:

GDH I, 20

... Cum reddis aliquid, quod debes Deo, etiam si non peccasti, non debes hoc computare pro debito, quod debes pro peccato.... In obedientia vero quid das deo, quod non debes cui iubenti totam quod est et quod habes, non debes? Si me ipsum et quidquid possum, etiam quando non pecco, illi debet, ne peccem, nihil habeo, quod pro peccato reddam.

'Cur Deus Homo' of William, p. 561.

... quod unaqueque creature ex toto posse suo, et viribus, per se ipsam et pro se ipsa obedire tenebatur auctori suo jure creationis, et conservationis suae; ergo quantumcumque obediret, etiam si totum posset in obediendo creatori suo expenderet, non exsolveret, nisi proprium debitum, debitum inquam quod tenebatur ratione propriae creationis; non solveret ergo debitum primae inobedientiae, sive transgressionis.

In both writers the same principle emerges; once man sins, he has nothing with

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1. William gives no precise reference to any part of the Topics - Opera Omnia I, 560. For William's use of Aristotle, see 'Guillaume d'Auvergne, Critique d'Aristote', Aimé Forest in Etudes Médiévales Offertes à M. le Doyen A. Fliche (Montpellier, 1954), 67-79. We notice that the Registerium is the first thirteenth century work in which both Anselm and Aristotle are used. In later works, we find this much more often.

2. GDH I, 20.



which he can pay God in satisfaction, for from the outset man owes his creator and conservator everything. This central Anselmian idea returns frequently, and William insists on driving in his point with almost excessive eagerness: '... et totum habet ab alio, et ideo in totum, et pro toto tenatur.'<sup>1</sup> Even if a creature had something of its own, it would be only a possession that had been entrusted to it and so would not belong to it.

We remember that William of Auxerre, who wrote at the very beginning of the 1220s, also talked of what man owed God. William of Auxerre described man's debt by means of the image of inheritance. This exposition lacked William of Auvergne's fullness of detail in setting forth man's total dependence on God for everything he has and his consequent inability to give God anything that is not already owing him.

Another link with Anselm, much less strong, appears when William of Auvergne discusses divine mercy and justice. He says that in the Redemption God's mercy must operate within the confines and demands of his justice:

... dandum ergo fuit humano generi per Dei misericordiam tantum, ac tale beneficium, quod justitiae divinae satisfaceret de culpa condigne; sic enim et obtinebat justitia Dei satisfactionem condignam.<sup>2</sup>

We can pick out no particular passage in Cur Deus Homo which matches this one, but we still find an adherence to Anselmian principles here. William refers to a passage from one of the Psalms that mentions the union of mercy and justice. But William's way of dealing with a mercy that would satisfy a divine justice indicates that Anselm as well as the Bible have shaped his thought.

William eventually returns to the theme of debt and links it to the idea of sacrifice. He uses the term sacrificium in the sense of something that man had not owed but is now due to God for his sin. Such application of the term goes beyond the concept of a propitiatory offering and suggests Anselmian satisfaction:

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1. Opera Omnia 1, 561.

2. Ibid.

Ex sacrificio ergo non debito alias, et sanctitate alias non debita, sed ad hoc specialiter assumptum et acceptum, impetrare oportuit apud Deum generi humano gratiam sanctificationis.<sup>1</sup>

The sacrifice had to be a greater good than the sin of the human race was an evil. And so only the Son of God could provide it.<sup>2</sup> In this process, man is to participate in divinity.<sup>3</sup> The theme that man alone as pure creature could not possibly carry out the necessary work returns frequently. This seventh and longest chapter concentrates on two Anselmian ideas: the magnitude of the satisfaction to be offered and the necessity that the one who satisfies give something not already owed.

These passages indicate that William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales were independent of each other in their uses of Anselm, at least on the Redemption. Kramp set out to show that Alexander borrowed from William of Auvergne, but it was the Summa fratris Alexandri, written in the 1230s, which Kramp was considering, and not Alexander's Glossa of the 1220s.<sup>4</sup> With the Quaracchi researches complete, we can now compare Kramp's chronology for the 'Cur Deus Homo' section of the Magisterium Divinale with the date for the Glossa of Alexander.

From an exhaustive comparison of internal with external evidence, Kramp concluded that 'Cur Deus Homo' was written as the second part of the Magisterium and was composed between 1223 and 1228. The exact date would be closer to 1223 than to 1228 if we assume that Alexander's progress on the work was even and regular.<sup>5</sup> Elsewhere Kramp explained that the lack of agreement among manuscripts and printed editions of Magisterium concerning which sections came

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1. Opera Omnia, 1, 563.

2. Ibid., 564.

3. Ibid., 566.

4. 'Des Wilhelm von Auvergne Magisterium Divinale', Gregorianum 1 (1920), 539; 11 (1921), 187. Kramp seems to have been unaware of Alexander's Glossa as a work separate from the Summa fratris Alexandri.

5. Kramp, Gregorianum 11 (1921), 54.



in what order is due to the fact that the work, written over a twenty year period from 1223 to 1240, was issued in sections.<sup>1</sup> The first section to be completed was the 'De Trinitate', and the 'Cur Deus Homo' came next. But William did not intend that the completed Magisterium be arranged in that order.

If Kramp's dating is correct, and modern writers in various encyclopedia articles on William of Auvergnus seem to agree with him,<sup>2</sup> then William of Auvergnus was writing his 'Cur Deus Homo' at almost exactly the same time as Alexander of Hales was composing his Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Again assuming that Alexander followed a regular pace, he would have reached his third book (dealing with the Redemption) by 1226, and so he would have written on the subject about one or two years after William had done so.

We know that William and Alexander came into contact with each other at least once. Bonaventure says that William as bishop of Paris (after 1228) determined in the schools of the Franciscans on the question of causality in the presence of 'brother Alexander'.<sup>3</sup> But we do not know if William had any relations with the Franciscans in the 1220s before he was bishop of Paris, and so we cannot know if during the mid-1220s Alexander and William were intellectually in contact with each other.

It still seems likely that in the close-knit community of Paris, two bright young theologians would have been aware of each other. Nevertheless, we have no evidence that either inspired the other with a devotion to Anselm's theology of the Redemption, and so we can only say that both of them at about the same

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1. Kramp, Gregorianum 1 (1920), 374-5.

2. LKT x, 1127-8; NCE xiv, 924.

3. Quoted in 'Guillaume d'Auvergne et l'Ecole Franciscaine de Paris', La France Franciscaine v (1922), 427. From Bonaventure Opera Omnia iii, 595-6 (III Sent., d. xl, dub. liii): '... hunc modum dicendi et hujus questionis determinationem plures sustinent, bene intelligentes. Et Dominus Guillelmus, Parisiensis episcopus, in determinando in scholis Fratrum Minorum, approbavit istum modum dicendi coram fratre Alexandro bonae memoriae.'

time assimilated Anselm, but in very different ways. Also William of Auxerre does not seem to have provided the two with an introduction to Anselm, for his uses are so obscure that his work can hardly be looked upon as a potential incentive for the study of Anselm. The most we can say is that in the 1220s the Cur Deus Homo began to interest three important Paris theologians. The leading figure is Alexander of Hales, for he introduced Anselm into the schools by quoting his works. The use of Anselm by the two Williams was much less obvious. Alexander brought Anselm into the open by recognizing him as one of the central authorities of Christian theology.

What was explicit for Alexander of Hales is implicit in William of Auvergne. A few of his main ideas on the Redemption come directly from Anselm. Without Anselm's concept of debt, the rational structure of William's proof of the necessity of a God-man would collapse. But Anselm is mingled with other received teachings on the Redemption. The result is an intellectual structure in which Anselm only provides some of the supports.



## Chapter VII

### THE FRANCISCAN SCHOOL

#### 1. The Summa Theologica and Alexander of Hales

Alexander of Hales, as we have seen, was the central figure in the 1220s for the reception and popularization of Cur Deus Homo. At some time in the 1230s, probably in 1236, Alexander joined the Franciscan order but kept his chair of theology at Paris.<sup>1</sup> He became the master and the guiding force of the Franciscan school at Paris. During this time, he wrote his Summa Theologica. But the work was far from complete at his death in 1245. And so historians have claimed that the Summa Fratris Alexandri or Summa Theologica is a composite product of the Franciscan school of which very little was written by Alexander himself.<sup>2</sup>

Fortunately the Franciscan scholars at Quaracchi considered the vast problems of texts, manuscripts and authorship in their edition of the Summa. In the 'Prolegomena' to the fourth volume, which contains the third book of the Summa, these scholars concluded that their internal criticism largely agreed with historical evidence and tradition that ascribed the work to Alexander of Hales himself. The first three books of the Summa were put together between 1236 and 1245 by Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, who succeeded to Alexander's professorship in 1241. The two men can thus be looked upon as the editors of the Summa, while at the same time the work is made up mainly of the writings of Alexander integrated with texts from other authors.<sup>3</sup> And so the Quaracchi scholars conclude that the Summa is authentically the work of Alexander (except for parts of the second book and all of the fourth), but he

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1. NCE I, 296-7.

2. For a history of the debate over the authorship of the Summa, see Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica iv: Prolegomena in Librum III (Quaracchi, 1948), lxx-lxxxi.

3. Summa Theologica, Prolegomena in Librum III, cccvi-cccvii.

is not the author simpliciter.<sup>1</sup>

We will only consider a small part of the Summa's third book. The section on the Redemption is complete here, but the proposed later section on the virtues was never realized.<sup>2</sup> The Franciscan editors had no trouble in ascribing this book in its incomplete form to Alexander. Their opinion seems to have been generally accepted since 1948.<sup>3</sup> When we speak of the author of the Summa, we will refer exclusively to Alexander even though we also acknowledge the contribution of John of La Rochelle.

It is important to distinguish between the Alexander who wrote the Glossa in the 1220s and Alexander who was the main author of the Summa Theologica. In the 1220s, Alexander was a secular master in the theology faculty. But when Alexander wrote the Summa in the 1230s and 1240s, he was the intellectual light of the Paris Franciscans, and his work was the textbook for a generation of Franciscan scholars. The Summa must be seen in terms of the Franciscan order at Paris, for it sprang from its midst and inspired contemporary and future Franciscan theologians. Bonaventure, writing his Commentarium Sententiarum in 1249-51 and frequently borrowing from the Summa, was careful to point out that he was not disagreeing with the teachings of Alexander.<sup>4</sup> Alexander represented the fountainhead of contemporary theological wisdom for the Franciscans.

As we review the passages in the Summa which reflect the influence of Anselm, we must consider not only the presence of Anselm in the mind of Alexander but also the dissemination of Anselmian language and ideas in the Franciscan school. We shall find that it is Alexander of Hales who is responsible for the

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1. Prolegomena, ccclix.

2. Ibid., cccxxvi.

3. LKT I, 307-8.

4. In the 'praefatione ad II Sent.', quoted by Quaracchi in Prolegomena, cccxvii: 'Fortassis autem alicui videbitur me ab eius sententia deviasse, cum sermo fuit de generatione aeterna in primo libro, dist. 27. Cum enim scribatur in Summa quia Pater ideo generat quia est Pater....'



almost unlimited popularity of the Cur Deus Homo in the mid-thirteenth century.<sup>1</sup> But for the moment Alexander can be seen only in the context of the Franciscan school. Because of this Franciscan Alexander, Anselm and Cur Deus Homo became almost the property and pride of the Paris Franciscans.

Fortunately there is a literary link between the Glossa and the Summa in the Questiones disputatae generally entitled Antequam esset frater.<sup>2</sup> Written between 1220 and 1236,<sup>3</sup> these questions touch almost every aspect of theology, including the Redemption. The fifteenth question, on the necessity of the Incarnation, provides a definition for satisfaction which includes the honour of God and the type of sin.<sup>4</sup> Alexander says that the good lost through the first sin was greater than the value of the entire human race. All these ideas come directly from Cur Deus Homo, and this is the first time we are aware in Alexander's writing that he has attempted to provide a complete definition of satisfaction. We remember that in his Glossa he almost totally ignored the chapters in Cur Deus Homo which defined satisfaction. The inclusion of this definition indicates a continuing and deepening interest on Alexander's part in Anselm's theology of the Redemption.

The Summa's third book substantiates Alexander's increased interest in Anselm. There is so much material taken from Anselm that we will have to limit ourselves to two sections, the question on the necessity of the Incarnation at the very opening of the third book and the question on the necessity of the

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1. Two non-Franciscan figures who contributed to Anselm's revival in the 1230s are Philip the Chancellor and one of the sources in the strange MS. Douai 434. In Philip's Summa de Bono there are many passages on satisfaction which might owe something to Anselm. In Oxford Magdalen College MS. 66, f. 117r, Anselm is quoted.

For the mysterious magister Guido, who quotes Anselm on the Redemption in Douai 434, ff. 75rb-75vb, see P. Glorieux, 'Les 572 Questions du Manuscrit de Douai 434', RFAM x (1938), 234.

2. Magistri Alexandri de Hales Questiones Disputatae 'Antequam esset frater' (BFSMA, xix, Quaracchi, 1900).

3. NCE 1, 296-7.

4. Questiones Disputatae (BFSMA, xix), 211-13.

passion of Christ later on.<sup>1</sup>

The first problem is whether or not human nature has actually fallen from a better state. By the use of quotations from Anselm, Alexander shows that man's present wretchedness is not a natural state of affairs, so man must have fallen. Also ignorance is not natural to human nature, so we must have previously occupied a state of wisdom.<sup>2</sup> Alexander borrows from widely scattered sections of Cur Deus Homo in order to make his point. Also he manipulates Anselmian ideas for the sake of proofs that Anselm simply assumed. The archbishop of Canterbury took it as a given that man had fallen,<sup>3</sup> but Alexander uses Anselm to assert the rational necessity that man had fallen.

The second point is that man, although fallen, could still be restored. Satisfaction must be provided according to the degree of the sin; otherwise the sin would remain inordinatum.<sup>4</sup> Anselm's classic idea of the inordinatum and the impossibility of its existence in a God-ordered universe appears here for the first time. Because man cannot give the proper amount of satisfaction, there can be no remission for his sin. Man must give back more than he has taken away from God, but he is utterly incapable of doing so.<sup>5</sup> We see the main themes of Anselm's satisfaction theory emerging. And so from these arguments it would appear that man's sin is beyond restoration. But we shall see that many reasons make it possible for man to be restored, while they make such redemption impossible for an angel. A man would have to be saved by another man who would be of the same genus, but since all angels are of different

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1. Quaestio I, De Necessitate Incarnationis, pp. 4-24; Quaestio I, Membrum III, De Necessitate Passionis Christi, pp. 205-11. Because of the complex division into tractates, questions, membra, tituli, and capita, for the sake of easier references we will only give the page number, which (unless otherwise noted) refers to the third book of the Summa, as published in the fourth volume by Quaracchi.

2. Summa, pp. 4-5. CDH I, 9; II, 13.

3. See the end of CDH I, 10.

4. Summa, p. 8. CDH I, 20.

5. CDH I, 11, 19.



genera, one of them could not save another.<sup>1</sup> Various other reasons are brought forward to show that man can be restored to his former state.

But if man can be restored, can we also say that it is necessary that he be restored? Among the reasons to develop a necessity, one of them offered by Alexander combines two centrally important Anselmian ideas. First any small inconvenientia in God is impossible; second it is not conueniens that God's plans for man be ruined completely.<sup>2</sup> Combining these two principles we can only conclude that man must be redeemed so God's purposes will not be frustrated. Otherwise something inconueniens would follow. Another Anselmian reason is that if God does not complete what he has begun, then he has acted in vain.<sup>3</sup> Most of the time Alexander either quotes Anselm directly or else paraphrases him with words very close to the original. He acknowledges both Cur Deus Homo and Anselm as his sources, sometimes giving the book of the work from which he has drawn his quotation. Occasionally he even gives the exact chapter.

One of the most interesting arguments in the series the Quaracchi editors have ascribed to Aristotle.<sup>4</sup> But it could just as well have come from Anselm I, 18. Nothing is superfluous in the universe, and so no species is superfluous. But unless human nature gains beatitude, it would be superfluous, so it is necessary for the human race to be restored. Anselm restates the Aristotelian concept of the completeness of the universe in all the species and the usefulness of each individual species. According to Anselm, the perfection of creation can be understood as existing in the number of natures, and so human nature must be fulfilled in order to complete the universe. We would not dare to declare useless even the most insignificant worm, so all the more we

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1. Summa, p. 9. CDH II, 8.

2. Summa, p. 12. CDH I, 10, 20.

3. Summa, p. 12. CDH I, 4.

4. De Animal. Generatione ii, 6; De Anima iii, 9. Summa, p. 13.

cannot see human nature as becoming useless. I can see no difference at all between the Anselmian and Aristotelian arguments for the relevance of each species for the completeness of the universe. We thus find one of the many moments in thirteenth century theology of the Redemption when Aristotle substantiates a point that could also come from Anselm. The two thinkers are so close not because their underlying assumptions about the universe are similar, but because thirteenth century theologians emphasized ideas in Aristotle that contributed to a Christian world view. Anselm was among the first medieval thinkers to present a philosophically reasoned world view, and so at times the rationalized Christianity of Anselm comes into contact with the purified ideas of Aristotle.

Having completed the arguments for the necessity of man's restoration, Alexander presents the other side. In the first place, we know that there is no necessity in God, for neither force or prohibition can compel him in any way.<sup>1</sup> So there is no necessity for God to restore man. Another Anselmian point is that if it is necessary for God to restore human nature in order to avoid something that is not decent, then he is forced to do so by the necessity of avoiding an indecentia. But this is impossible, so it is not necessary for him to procure human salvation.<sup>2</sup> Also, no necessity can precede God's will, so that basis for man's restoration would be no necessity but God's will alone.<sup>3</sup>

The arguments on both sides are formidable, and they are legitimate, expert uses of the different points of view contained in Anselm himself. In his response, Alexander says that there are two kinds of necessity, that of the cause and that of what is caused, the causati. As far as the second is concerned, the necessity that we attach to it by virtue of the cause working upon it is absolute. The necessity of that which is caused implies something fixed

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1. Summa, p. 13. CDH II, 10.

2. CDH II, 4.

3. CDH II, 17.



and unchangeable, while the necessity of a cause can be dependent only on itself if that cause is God. Here we must make a further distinction in the necessity of a cause. There can be either a necessity of immutability or one of inevitability. The second is not to be attached to God, for inevitability implies either force or prohibition, and we know that these do not operate in God. So the only necessity in God is that of immutability.

But according to Anselm, the only necessity, strictly speaking, is that of force or prohibition.<sup>1</sup> So the force of immutability can only be a necessity in the broadest possible sense. Developing this idea further, we see that what we call necessity in God, such as that he avoid any evil act, is only the necessity that he preserve his own goodness. And this in turn is only the immutability of his goodness. So what seems like a necessity preventing God from doing something turns out to be only the unchangeability of his nature.

This entire argument assimilates Anselm's own ideas on necessity and freedom in God and draws from many different parts of Cux Deus Homo.<sup>2</sup> The actual distinction between necessity of a cause and that of what is caused does not come from Anselm. But the explanation of God's unchangeability as the basis for what is called necessity in him is taken from the core of Anselm's teaching. Because of Anselm's equation between necessity and unchangeability in God, he can set forth the necessity of the Redemption without limiting God's free choice. And so Alexander concludes:

Quando ergo quaeritur utrum necesse sit humanam naturam reparari, dicendum quod, si loquamur ex parte causae, quae Deus est, quod ibi est, necessitas immutabilitatis solum, licet non proprie dicatur necessitas.<sup>3</sup>

Once Alexander settles God's necessity, he says that as far as human beings (the causati) are concerned, there is no necessity that we be redeemed, except perhaps the necessity of our own indigence. But our situation cannot compel

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1. CDH II, 5.

2. Including CDH II, 5 and II, 17.

3. Summa, p. 74.

God in any way.

The next problem is the assertion that since anything inconveniens in God is impossible, he must redeem human nature. Rational creation cannot perish; God's designs must be fulfilled. So God must redeem man. Alexander counters these reasons with Anselm's idea that no matter what happens, divine providence operates without obstruction. If man flees from his obligation to honour God, he finds that he still honours God indirectly by being submitted to him in eternal punishment.<sup>1</sup> The trouble with this argument is that Anselm intended it only to show that the individual sinner gives God the honour that he owes him and that it is impossible for God's honour to be diminished. But the fact of God's honour being provided for does not also take care of the necessity that God complete his propositum for man. If man were totally condemned, the propositum would be annihilated, even if the souls in hell were still preserving God's honour.

Alexander thus uses an Anselmian argument for the wrong end. He makes it seem as if Anselm would have seen the designs of providence carried out even if man had never been restored. Anselm makes it perfectly clear that man must be saved because God's designs cannot be changed. This does not impose a necessity on God; it merely points out the immutability of God. Alexander does not want to rest his case on this immutability of God alone; he has to add that at any time divine providence might have so willed not to save man. Alexander thus uses one Anselmian argument to weaken the strength of Anselm's case. We begin to see here a retreat from the secure necessity of Anselm in favour of a God who can contravene even his own immutability. But this last point is only implied in Alexander, for he would have argued that God remains immutable whether or not man is saved. But Anselm could not have allowed this, for he saw only one path in the design of the universe, and that path led only to the figure of the God-man.

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1. Summa, p. 14. CDH I, 15.



The next question brings another departure from Anselm's strict necessity of the Redemption. Again Alexander uses Anselm but makes a point Anselm would never have accepted. The problem is whether human nature could be restored without satisfaction for sin. A number of Anselmian reasons are immediately brought forward to make restoration seem impossible without satisfaction. Sin cannot remain inordinatum; <sup>1</sup> if satisfaction is not given and the sinner is let off, then he and the good man are treated in the same way. <sup>2</sup> There would be a turning aside, deformatas, from the right order of things. <sup>3</sup> Since sin forgiven without punishment would be subject to no law, injustice would be freer than justice. Moreover, injustice becomes similar to God because he is subject to no law. <sup>4</sup>

But the very same chapter in Anselm provides a number of arguments against the necessity of satisfaction. If God tells us to forgive those who harm us without any satisfaction given us, then he should do the same. <sup>5</sup> If God is free and subject to no law, then he can forgive sin without satisfaction without breaking any law. Whatever God wants is just and right.

In the response, Alexander says that we can accept the statement if it is expressed in the passive voice: human nature could not be restored without satisfaction. But when we say that God cannot restore human nature without satisfaction, we have to distinguish absolute from ordered divine power. Alexander ascribes this division to Anselm himself: '... notandum, salvo meliori iudicio, secundum B. Anselmum, quod duobus modis est considerare divinam potentiam....' <sup>6</sup> If we consider divine power absolutely, we think of

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1. Summa, p. 15. CDH I, 12.

2. CDH I, 12.

3. CDH I, 15.

4. CDH I, 12.

5. CDH I, 12.

6. Summa, p. 15.

an infinite capability that has no limits. In this way human nature could be repaired without any satisfaction. But if we look at God's power within the limits of order, then God has to follow the dictates of justice in exercising his power. And so satisfaction is necessary.<sup>1</sup> The rest of the discussion is extremely complex and goes far beyond anything Anselm had ever said. But we end with Anselm's statement that God cannot forgive sin without satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> But this has been severely restricted by Alexander's distinction between the types and exercises of divine power.

The distinction actually comes from the *Summa* of Prévostin and William of Auxerre.<sup>3</sup> Alexander used the distinction in the first book of his *Summa* when he was discussing the power of God, and he had claimed that by using his absolute power only, God could rightly damn Peter and save Judas. He said it did not subtract from God's power to say that God would instead follow his ordained power and do the opposite. In God's ordained power is shown the immutability of the ordering of power according to justice.

Everything seems in order here, but the distinction between types of power in God leaves open the possibility for an unordered, completely arbitrary power that follows no reason of which men can know. This is the foundation for the unbridled God that Scotus would unleash upon scholastic theology at the end of the century. Anselm had always said that divine power follows the immutability of God breaking away from this pattern in order to assert an absolute power. He had said that God's freedom only extends to what is right and

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1. *Summa*, p. 16.

2. *GDH* I, 19.

3. Cited in the *Summa Theologica* I (Quaracchi, 1924), p. 220; note b; Prévostin, *Summa* I, f. 75b, at Todi, Bibl. Communale MS. 71. William of Auxerre *Summa* I, c. 11, q. 5. In Alexander's *Summa* I, pp. 220-21, the text goes: "... potentia Dei intelligitur dupliciter: uno modo absoluta, alio modo ordinata secundum rationem divine praeordinationis iustitiae reddentis unicuique secundum merita. De potentia ergo absoluta posset damnare Petrum et salvare Iudam; de potentia vero ordinata secundum praeordinationem et retributionem secundum merita, non posset; nec in hoc derogatur eius potentia, sed ostenditur immutabilitas ordinis potentiae secundum praeordinationem et iustitiam.



fitting,<sup>1</sup> and he had made it clear that man's right reason can lead him to a competent understanding of what is right and fitting. What is good and just on the divine level is the same on the human, and vice versa. There is an inter-connexion among the layers and levels of existence, and so we cannot posit one justice for God according to his absolute power and another for man.

Alexander's response to Anselm illustrates the fundamental weakness in any thirteenth century theology of the Redemption that tried to posit a certain necessity in the actual mode of redemption. Theologians from William of Auxerre onwards wanted to make God's power more unrestricted than Anselm had, and so such theologians could not be satisfied with Anselm's dependence on divine immutability to create a necessity in the ordering of things. Instead these theologians, including Alexander of Hales, saw that God might break through that order at any point and impose his own reasons that were not answerable to man's reason. And so at the very moment when Alexander exalted Anselm's theology of the Redemption at Paris and among the Franciscans, he unconsciously provided the groundwork for the refutation of Anselm by Duns Scotus in another fifty years. Anselm at his peak is perilously close to decline.

One final note about this passage of central importance. Alexander refers to Anselm as beatus, a title he also uses for saints like Augustine. And so we have a first instance among theologians in which Anselm is ranked among the saints of the Church. It is ironic that Anselm attained this position in the writings of a scholastic theologian at the very place where Alexander mistakenly attributed an idea to Anselm. And it was this idea that contributed to the destruction of Anselm's theology of the Redemption.

Although the chapters that follow this one take much from Anselm, limitation of space forces us to touch on them only in the briefest possible way. To show that man cannot satisfy for any sin without the grace and aid of God,

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1. CDH I, 12.

Alexander uses Anselm's ideas that any offence whatsoever exceeds the value of all creation and that since we owe God everything from the start, we have nothing to offer him after we have sinned.<sup>1</sup> And so it follows that man cannot compensate for original sin.<sup>2</sup> Alexander sets forth with fullness and clarity Anselm's concept of the nature of sin and satisfaction.

Satisfaction cannot be made through the angelic nature for a number of reasons, most of which are derived from Anselm.<sup>3</sup> In the Solutio Alexander gives Anselm one of the highest compliments any theologian could give another: 'Concedendum igitur, secundum Anselmum et veritatem, quod non potuit homo nec debuit per angelum reparari.' Anselm is synonymous with truth, at least on this point. Anselm's reasons are also used to represent the correct point of view in the next problem, whether man's restoration could be carried out by a creature other than an angel. The conclusion is that only God could provide the necessary satisfaction, for only he could provide as payment something greater than all creation.<sup>4</sup>

In the next problem, Alexander reaches the same point Anselm attained in the second book of Cur Deus Homo when he summarized all his previous rationes necessarias and said that only God can and only man ought to make the necessary reparation. Alexander asks 'utrum reparatio humani generis debeat fieri per hominem deum.'<sup>5</sup> The negative position is taken by Anselm 'ponendo opinionem infidelium'.<sup>6</sup> Alexander is aware of Anselm's procedure in Cur Deus Homo and is ready to use these same objections. On the other side, the arguments for the necessity of the God-man also come from Anselm. The inordinatum again

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1. Summa, p. 17. CDH I, 21.

2. Summa, p. 18. CDH I, 21.

3. Summa, p. 21. CDH I, 9, 11; II, 8.

4. Summa, p. 22. CDH II, 5, 6.

5. Summa, p. 23.

6. CDH I, 3, 6.



returns, one of Alexander's favourite justifications. He then summarizes II, 6 in his own language. But to be sure he has been correctly understood, he then acknowledges and quotes Anselm directly. After using some of Anselm's arguments for the union of God and man as set forth in II, 7, Alexander concludes: 'Quod concedendum est, quod hanc satisfactionem requirit necessitas iustitiae, ut fiat per Deum unitam humanae naturae.'<sup>1</sup> This awkward sentence seems to avoid deliberately Anselm's forthright: '... necesse est ut eam faciat deus homo.'<sup>2</sup> Alexander does not want to link the word necesse too closely with God, and so he writes in terms of the necessity of justice requiring satisfaction, to be done through a God united to human nature. But in his conclusion, Alexander does not want to use the full strength of the Anselmian arguments and limits their implications.

And so Alexander's section on the necessity of the Incarnation comes to an end. Much later he writes on the necessity of the Redemption, and here we find how well he can combine the ideas of Anselm with the concepts of Aristotle. He takes the Aristotelian doctrine of causality, which looks for four causes in events, formal, material, efficient, and final, and says that we can use the word necessary in four ways according to the four kinds of causes.<sup>3</sup> Alexander's understanding of the necessity that exists in each of the four types of causality enables him to show in what way the actual mode of the Redemption is necessary. In us, he says, there is a necessity for dying or suffering according to material, formal, and efficient causes. But in Christ there was a necessity to die only according to the final cause, as we see from Paul to the Galatians iv, 4-6. God sent Christ in order to redeem us. The only necessity for Christ's death comes from its purpose. So there was no necessity for his death according to the efficient cause, for no created cause

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1. Summa, p. 24.

2. CDH II, 6.

3. Summa, p. 206.

could force him to die. And there was no necessity according to the material cause, for that necessity for death according to the material cause comes from the vice of propagation in us.<sup>1</sup> This Aristotelian distinction of causality enables Anselm's necessitarian point of view to be understood properly and to be taken in a way that does not endanger the free will of God. Aristotle and Anselm have been combined here in a promising way.

Continuing to blend Anselm with Aristotle, Alexander considers the necessity according to the final cause. He says, secundum Anselmum, that Christ suffered because of the necessity of redemption.<sup>2</sup> But Alexander points out a difference between redemption and liberation and leaves open the possibility that Christ could have liberated man in another way. Once more we find a convenient distinction that enables Alexander to claim to be following Anselm without applying Anselm's necessity of the death of Christ.

The final problem concerns the necessity of the passion of Christ in terms of the superior efficient cause.<sup>3</sup> According to Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle, the inferior efficient cause refers to an outside agent that exercises force or prohibition on the thing cause. This is by definition eliminated from Christ's passion. But there can also be a necessity according to the superior efficient cause, and this would refer not to any compulsion but to the immutability of the cause and the thing caused. In the response we see that Alexander links the problems in the Aristotelian definitions of necessity to an Anselmian point of view. He says that according to Anselm, God's immutability is not a necessity at all. The only efficient reason for Christ's death was his unchangeable and immutable will to die. And so the necessity for the passion of Christ, even according to the superior efficient cause, is ultimately based on the will of God.

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1. Summa, p. 207.

2. Summa, p. 209.

3. Summa, p. 210.



All this is good theology and is an excellent use of Cur Deus Homo. But we see in the replies to the objections that Alexander, as usual, has not taken Anselm's understanding of the divine will in the same sense as Anselm did. To the Anselmian idea that what is conueniens is necessary, Alexander says that no matter what God does, whether he saves man not at all or by another way, it would always be conueniens.<sup>1</sup> This is an admission that Anselm would not have made, for he could not see any fittingness in any of the other ways of Redemption. Anselm depended on the immutability of the divine will to guarantee the theologian that God will follow the course that the best reasoning indicates is the right one. But Alexander is not quite convinced that because God is immutable and because human reason shows him as acting in one way, then this is the only way he would have taken. Alexander never quite makes the last step towards saying necesse est ut Deus.

Here we must stop our analysis of Alexander of Hales's use of Anselm in his Summa. The other passages that we might have taken up would only emphasize what we have already found: Alexander used Cur Deus Homo as the textbook of his theology of the Redemption. As far as the concept of sin and satisfaction is concerned, we have nothing but Anselm, more consistently and expertly set forth than ever before. But in linking the actual mode of the Redemption to any necessitarian scheme, Alexander is much more cautious than Anselm had been. He made distinctions that Anselm would never have felt obliged to make. These distinctions are often reservations which eliminate the main aspects of Anselm's necessity. The strength and weakness of Cur Deus Homo are found at one and the same time in the monolithic structure of the central argument, moving from sin to the necessity of satisfaction to man's weakness to the necessity of a God-man. Anselm never leaves any gaps in this progression, until he can reach his magisterial assertion in the sixth chapter of the second book. In Alexander's section on the necessity of the Incarnation, he reaches this

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1. Summa, p. 210.

same chapter after going through the other chapters, but his God-man is only one that is eminently suited for his role but not absolutely necessary.

From all appearances, Alexander and his collaborators never let us know that they are not providing us with a teaching strictly adherent to Cur Deus Homo. The Franciscan school, having just adopted Anselm, seeks to emphasize his usefulness instead of criticizing the aspects of his theology that are out of date. But the seed is already sown. Bonaventure is much more cautious about the problem of necessity than Alexander. And Duns Scotus will totally reject Anselm's argument. In the final analysis, even the patchwork quilt of Aristotelian concepts and Anselmian borrowings could not hold up in the face of a God who was becoming less and less knowable the more profoundly theologians studied him. But for the moment, the Franciscans could rejoice in the wealth of arguments and rational thinking that they could draw from Cur Deus Homo.

Anselm was especially suited for a group of men who wanted to follow the rationalistic trends of theology of their time but still hold themselves back from apparent surrender to pagan philosophy. Anselm's overwhelming faith in the power of reason to lead man to God offered the Franciscans at Paris a secure way to elucidate their own faith. But even at the beginning, Alexander and his fellow Franciscans did not possess all of Anselm's courageous yet naïve confidence. And so we find in the great Summa of the Franciscan school an attention and acceptance of Anselm mixed with a much less obvious restriction of him.

## 2. Robert Grosseteste and Oxford

While Alexander of Hales and other Parisian masters were popularizing Anselm's ideas in the 1220s and 1230s, Robert Grosseteste was also introducing Cur Deus Homo to the secular and Franciscan theologians of Oxford. Grosseteste probably studied at Paris between about 1209 and 1214.<sup>1</sup> At this time it is

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1. Daniel Callus, 'The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste', Oxoniensia x (1945), 42-72, esp. p. 50.



highly likely that he came to know another theology student, William of Auvergne. The flowering of Anselm in the writings of men like William of Auvergne in the 1220s indicates that they might already have known and studied Anselm while they were students. So it is possible that Robert Grosseteste was also introduced to Anselm at this time.

Even if we cannot find an exact date for Grosseteste's initial acquaintance with Anselm, we still know that by the mid-1220s, the regent master in theology and chancellor of the University of Oxford was using Anselm in his Quaestiones disputatae. Grosseteste's De Libero Arbitrio dates from this time. There are two recensions, both of which were probably written in Grosseteste's time.<sup>1</sup> Anselm's De Libertate Arbitrii and De Concordia Praescientiae are quoted many times. In one of the recensions, Cur Deus Homo is cited by name, book, and chapter. The subject is the two-fold way in which necessity can be understood. There are an antecedent and a posterior necessity. In God there can be no antecedent necessity at all, for that would mean the existence of a cause prior to God.<sup>2</sup> Grosseteste quotes word for word Anselm's criticism of Aristotle's De Interpretatione, in which the Philosopher had created a more rigid necessity in events than a Christian theologian could allow.<sup>3</sup> It is interesting that Grosseteste borrows from the only place in Cur Deus Homo at which Anselm considered an opinion of Aristotle. The thirteenth century discovery of Anselm made him into a theologian whose 'modern' qualities were emphasized. In a century in which Aristotle was being criticized, Anselm was taken, at least for a moment, as a critic of Aristotle.

A far more significant use of Cur Deus Homo occurs in both recensions when Grosseteste is discussing the different ways in which the divine nature

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1. S. Harrison Thomson, The Writings of Robert Grosseteste (Cambridge, 1940), 90-91: 'I suggest ca. 1225'.

2. Both recensions of the De Libero Arbitrio are contained in L. Baur, Die Philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, BGFMA IX (1912), 150-241. The manuscript is Oxford Exeter College MS. 26.

3. Baur, p. 158; CDH II, 17.

can be understood. First it can be taken in itself without any connexion to anything else. Or it can be looked at in terms of created things. In the first way, many things can be predicated of God that are not true when God is considered in his relationship to created things. As a case in point, he asks whether God could have saved the world in another way. Considered only in terms of his own substance, God could save man in any way he liked, but because he does all things in a way most ordained to the good of creation, there was only one possible way:

*Dicit enim Augustinus quod Deus potuit aliter liberasse genus humanum quam liberavit, et huius oppositum dicit Anselmus. Quae contrarietas solvi nequit, nisi dicatur, quod si ipsa divina substantia in se absolute fuerit considerata potuit quidem, si autem consideretur secundum istam habitudinem ad creata, quod optime et ordinatissime facit, non potuit.*<sup>1</sup>

Grosseteste is more forthright than most of his theological contemporaries because he concedes without qualification the divergence between Anselm's and Augustine's views on the necessity of the actual mode. His distinction between God in the absolute and God in his ordained activity towards creation recalls the differentiation between God's absolute and ordained power that Prévostin had already made and which we noticed in the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales. This distinction eventually brings the downfall of Anselm in Duns Scotus, but for the moment it is not pushed further than is necessary in order to reconcile the Anselmian and Augustinian viewpoints.

Grosseteste used this distinction between necessity in Anselm and the possibility of another way in Augustine only in order to show that God's activity has to be put into its proper framework. He was not interested in discussing further the theology of the Redemption. But this one sentence gives us a vital insight into the way Grosseteste had already in the 1220s become aware of Anselm's theology of the Redemption and had reconciled it with that of Augustine. Anselm would have disagreed with Grosseteste's interpretation, for the archbishop of Canterbury would not have made such distinctions in God's

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1. Baur, p. 180.



activity. But even if Grosseteste is not faithful to Anselm's rigid structure, he at least considers his thought important enough to contrast it with that of Augustine. Baur, the editor of the work, said that it was natural for Grosseteste to use Anselm in this treatise on free will,<sup>1</sup> but when we remember that the theologian is writing at the very moment when Anselm is just coming into vogue, we can see that his use of Anselmian works is unusual and innovative.

In the early 1230s, Grosseteste began lecturing to the Oxford Franciscans.<sup>2</sup> At this time he was gathering together his sermons and lectures of earlier Oxford years into what became his Dicta. There are 147 of these, and they reveal much about Grosseteste's use of Anselm. Dictum 28, for example, concerns the problem of satisfaction.<sup>3</sup> At the opening we find two principles that come directly from Cur Deus Homo. In satisfaction one renders to God something not previously owed. But even before we sin, we already owe God everything we have and everything good we can do:

Satisfactio est ad honorem eius apud quem delictum est, solutio alicuius rei ante debitum non debite. Homo vero etsi nunquam erga dominum deliquisset, deberet deo tam corpus quam animam suam et omnia opera bona que per corpus et animam possit exercere.<sup>4</sup>

But at this point Grosseteste leaves the Anselmian framework, for he is concerned with the satisfaction of the individual sinner. So he cannot completely accept Anselm's idea that man has nothing to offer God as compensation, for the individual sinner would then be totally incompetent to gain full forgiveness. Grosseteste says that before we sinned, we did not owe God the sufferings and pains of body and soul. And so after the fall, man can render these to God as partial compensation for sin, for they were not originally owed:

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1. Baur, p. 112: 'Es liegt in der Natur der Sache, dass er in dieser Frage stark an Augustinus, Anselmus, und Bernardus sich anlehnt.'

2. Callus, p. 52.

3. There are many manuscripts. I used Oxford Bodleian MS. 830, ff. 26vb-27ra and Oxford Bodleian MS. 789, f. 23va. Harrison Thomson dates the Dicta at between 1229-31 (p. 214).

4. Bodl. MS. 830, ff. 26vb-27ra.

'Sufferencia igitur voluntaria penarum absque dubio est satisfactiva pro culpa....'<sup>1</sup>

Grosseteste here has shown an awareness of one of the largest problems in Cur Deus Homo. If man already owes God everything, then is divine forgiveness gained totally through the will of God without any act of sorrow or penance being done on man's part? In Anselm's own time, his follower Ralph had tried to reconcile Anselmian theology with satisfaction by the individual sinner, and here in Grosseteste the tradition is continued.<sup>2</sup>

During this same period, while Grosseteste was lecturing to the Franciscans and before he became bishop of Lincoln, he wrote the De Cessatione Legalium.<sup>3</sup> In one section Grosseteste says that there are many things which are stated by the authority of Scripture which can also be shown by reason. A number of theologians had shown, for example, that it was necessary for God to become man to liberate the human race. Robert gives special mention to Anselm's Cur Deus

Homo:

Quod autem oportet unum in persona esse Deum et hominem, liberatorem hominis lapsi a culpa et poena et reductorem illius ad gloriam, quam peccando amiserat, et hoc per crucis passionem luce clarius ostendunt beatus Augustinus, Gregorius, et Anselmus, maxime in libro suo qui intitulatur Cur Deus homo, et sparsim omnes expositores Sacrae Paginae rationabiliter declarant, quod hominis lapsi restorationem oportuit fieri per Dei hominis passionem.<sup>4</sup>

But as far as Grosseteste can remember, these writers implied that if man had not fallen, God would not have become man, and so God was only made man in order to restore fallen man. Grosseteste is certainly correct, as far as Anselm is concerned. The Cur Deus Homo is based on the assumption that man has fallen, and there would be no purpose for God to become man if man had maintained his

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1. Bodl. MS. 830, f. 27ra.

2. For Ralph and this problem, see Chapter I.

3. Dominic Unger, 'Robert Grosseteste.... On the Reasons for the Incarnation', Franciscan Studies xvi (1956), 1-36. The relevant section is in Oxford Bodl. MS. lat. theol. c. 17, ff. 176ra-178rb.

4. Unger, pp. 3-4.



innocence. Grosseteste says he wants to show that there are rationes efficaces to indicate that the Incarnation would have taken place even if man had not fallen. So he says he will skip the reasons traditionally given for the Incarnation and provide some of his own. The rest of the section develops the inevitability of the Incarnation with a treatment much fuller than that given by Rupert of Deutz in the twelfth century. But we have clearly left the area of Anselm's influence.

At some time after he finished the De Cessatione Legalium, Grosseteste delivered a sermon known as 'Exiit edictum'.<sup>1</sup> Here he referred to his previous work: '... nos quoque pro modulo nostrae parvitas alias aliqua de eadem scripsimus quaestione.'<sup>2</sup> But this time he showed the necessity of the actual mode of the Redemption and did not concern himself with Incarnation without the Fall. He did not mention Anselm, but his ideas are obviously taken from Cur Deus Homo. When man dishonoured God, he was unable to provide sufficient satisfaction. Even if he had been able to offer the whole of creation as compensation, it would have been insufficient:

... satisfactio deberet aequipari in honoratione et etiam bono inhonorationi et malo, quibus delinquens inhonoravit eum, cui satisfacit. Si autem creaturas quas Deus creaverat omnes, si fieri posset, Deo obtulisset, homo non tantum honorasset eum, quantum inhonoravit per inobedientiam decedendo eum.<sup>3</sup>

Everything man has, he already owes God before he sins; so he has nothing to give him afterwards.<sup>4</sup> We could hardly be closer to Anselm. But satisfaction, despite man's helplessness, is still necessary, for justice has to be done:

Nec potuit homo sine satisfactione reconciliari Deo, quia Deus iustus non esset si deliquentes contra ipsum ad reconciliantem sine satisfactione admitteret.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Unger, pp. 18-23. London British Museum Royal MS. VII F. 2, ff. 76va-77vb.

2. Unger, p. 18.

3. Unger, p. 18.

4. Unger, p. 19.

5. Unger, p. 19.

And so the only answer was a God-man. Grossseteste leads up to this conclusion in a way that parallels the rigid, dialectical structure of Anselm's summary assertion of the necessity for a God-man.<sup>1</sup>

Such a being would not be a debtor to sin and his life would be worth incomparably more than all of creation, so his offering would be sufficient. Robert does not say that his death is the only thing in existence not already owed to God, for unlike Anselm, he believes in supererogatory works, as we have seen from Dicta 28. But Grossseteste still follows Anselm in saying that as far as the entire human race is concerned, man has nothing to offer God as compensation for original sin. He goes on to say that no evil could outweigh the good of that life offered for us; nothing could dishonour God so much as that good honours God. We have returned to the Anselmian categories of honour and dishonour.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, salvation for the angels is impossible because they are all of different genera, and so one could not save another. Also their work would not apply to man's salvation, for he has to satisfy for himself:

*Pro homine enim ... non debuit satisfacere nisi homo; pro angelo vero non posset assumptus angelus satisfacere, cum angeli non sint de una geniti radice.*<sup>3</sup>

Other reasons that do not come from Anselm are brought forward to show the necessity of the actual mode, but probably the majority of proofs come from Cur Deus Homo. They are the familiar, easy arguments about the incompetence of man or angel, and Robert does not have the time or the chance in a sermon to go any further. It is significant that in the 1230s the ideas of Anselm on the Redemption were actually being preached from the pulpit to satisfy the intellectual needs of a university intelligentsia. From almost total obscurity outside the monasteries in the 1180s, Anselm has attained unprecedented renown

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1. CDH II, 6.

2. Unger, p. 19.

3. Unger, p. 21.



in the 1230s, both at Oxford and Paris. The demands of scholasticism for sharp, clear, precise answers to individual problems of theology have been the salvation of Anselm.

After Grosseteste became bishop of Lincoln in 1235 he seems to have kept up his use of Anselm. In Robert's Concordancia Patrum,<sup>1</sup> Anselm's works, including Cur Deus Homo, are used. This remarkable collection of citations from the Bible, the Fathers, and more contemporary theologians is arranged by means of symbols that stand for various subjects. According to R.W. Hunt, the signs 'were used to build up a theological subject index to books which were available to the two men (Grosseteste and Adam Marsh)'.<sup>2</sup> The entire manuscript was done by an English scribe between 1235-50. Robert is called episcopus, and paleographical reasons are responsible for the later date.<sup>3</sup> On the basis of this index, Hunt has concluded that Grosseteste had the following works of Anselm: De Casu Diaboli, De Concordia Praescientiae, Cur Deus Homo, De Incarnatione Verbi, De Libero Arbitrio, Monologion, De Conceptu Virginali, Prologion, De Similitudinibus, De Veritate.<sup>4</sup> Grosseteste thus had almost the complete works of Anselm. The only other medieval writer with nearly as many is Bede. St. Bernard is well represented, but there are only one work from Hugh of St. Victor and three from Rabanus Maurus. Anselm has a commanding position among post-patristic sources in Grosseteste's reference work to theological problems. Hunt says that the system of index signs was used by the English Franciscans after the death of Marsh and Grosseteste.<sup>5</sup> In this way future English Franciscans would have learned the worth of Anselm from the prominence that their Master Robert had accorded him.

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1. Lyons MS. 414, ff. 17a-32a.

2. R.W. Hunt, 'The Library of Robert Grosseteste', Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop, ed. D.A. Callus (Oxford, 1955), 124.

3. Writings, p. 122.

4. Writings, pp. 143-4.

5. Writings, p. 125.

There is another work once ascribed to Grosseteste which reveals Anselmian influence. This is the Expositio super Bristolan Pauli ad Romanos, contained in a single Cambridge manuscript.<sup>1</sup> There is much Anselmian language here,<sup>2</sup> and if the work were authentic Grosseteste, it would only be another witness to Anselm's influence. But Beryl Smalley has compared the quotations from Grosseteste on Romans given by his fifteenth century admirer Cascoigne with parallel passages in the Cambridge MS. and has found no correlation at all. Her conclusion was: 'Grosseteste cannot have been the author, as used to be thought. Only the few lines marked Lincolniensis can be ascribed to him.'<sup>3</sup> She concluded that the manuscript might be from a lecture by Adam Marsh or another of the early Franciscan Oxford masters. The anonymous work might in this case provide an indication of the growing influence of Anselm in the Oxford Franciscan school itself.

A similar instance can be found in two manuscripts of St. John's College, Cambridge.<sup>4</sup> These contain the works of Anselm and Augustine. We find the Grosseteste-Marsh system of symbols for subjects. And in the margins are notes, some of them rather long. At the text of Cur Deus Homo I, 9, we find an obscure explanation of debt and sin:

Contra hoc est esse videtur quia si debitor fuit alicuius, potuit illud non solvere et ita peccare. Item sicut sponte assumpsit hominem, sic omnia humana, et nullorum actuum humanorum fuit debitor. Item si debitor est sub lege esse videtur et non dominus legis. Item nunquid qui ex gratia facit unum aliquod bonus debitor est ad omnia alia bona que possunt comitari illud unum bonum? An fuit debitor et tamen habens debiti privationem, non contradictionem, sicut fuit mortalis et immortalis? An et sic debitor et sic non debitor humanorum actuum, sicut debitor et non debitor promissorum?<sup>5</sup>

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1. Cambridge Genville and Caius College MS. 439, ff. 57-70.

2. For example, f. 56v is full of forms of the term satisfacere. But I can find no marginal references to Anselm.

3. Beryl Smalley, 'The Biblical Scholar', Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop (Oxford, 1955), p. 76, n. 2.

4. Cambridge St. John's College MS. 17, esp. f. 2v, and MS. 47. The two originally formed a single volume.

5. Quoted in R.W. Hunt, 'Manuscripts Containing the Indexing Symbols of Robert Grosseteste', Bodleian Library Record iv (1953), 254-5.



Whoever wrote this note, he was trying to understand the sense in which man is a debtor to sin. Hunt thinks 'there is at least a possibility that a substantial part of the annotation of this volume came from Adam.'<sup>1</sup> If this is correct, then we have another instance of the use of Anselm by the Franciscan school of theology at Oxford. It appears that the Franciscans studied Anselm by using Grosseteste's system of symbols and that they included marginal glosses for points which bothered them.

Taking all this evidence together, we can say that Grosseteste's use of Anselm was not limited to his own theological speculations. He also disseminated Anselm among his students at Oxford. At least from the writings I have found, it seems that Grosseteste himself never actually gave a detailed, thorough criticism of Cur Deus Homo. It may be that there are other works of Grosseteste in which Anselm is reviewed more thoroughly. Or the pattern that we have found, consisting of occasional references to Cur Deus Homo whenever it is convenient, may be the one we would uncover in a more exhaustive investigation of Grosseteste's writings.

Whatever further research might show, we can be sure of a few points. Grosseteste knew and understood Anselm well. He seems to have been aware of Anselm's shortcomings, as on personal satisfaction and the necessity of a God-man limiting God's power, and he provided his own answers to these problems. Also he broke the rigidity of the Anselmian theology of the Redemption by positing an Incarnation even if man had not sinned. Grosseteste's use of Anselm seems to have been consistent throughout his teaching life. His elevation to the see of Lincoln did not diminish his interest in Anselm. Finally, Grosseteste handed on the Anselmian theology of the Redemption to Adam Marsh and other Franciscan scholars. As we can see from the note in the St. John's MS., these men had their problems with Anselm. But they accepted him as an essential authority on the Redemption. And so the Oxford Franciscans came to

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1. Hunt, 'Manuscripts ...', p. 246. The note is also copied in the margin of a manuscript of Anselm's work at Oxford: Merton College MS. 40, f. 47.

know Our Deus Homo at almost the same time as their Paris brethren.

### 3. Bonaventure

Bonaventure's Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum was written between 1249 and 1251.<sup>1</sup> By that time he had already studied under Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, and so his views in the Commentaria are often very close to those of his former masters. He claimed in the Preface to the Second Book that everything he taught was consistent with the ideas of Alexander.<sup>2</sup> But there are times when Bonaventure does not follow Alexander of Hales in the latter's use of Anselm, even though we find many borrowings from Anselm in Bonaventure that also appear in Alexander's Summa. In the next few pages we will concentrate mainly on Bonaventure's link with Anselm, but we will also keep in mind the teaching of Alexander about Anselm that Bonaventure received. At times Anselm is seen only through the understanding of Alexander, but more often than not, Bonaventure makes his own evaluation and finds that he cannot go nearly so far as Alexander did in showing the necessity for the actual mode of the Redemption.

The main problem, just as in Alexander's Summa, is how to show the necessity of the Redemption by the death of a God-man for man's salvation. Alexander had accepted this necessity but limited it with so many conditions that he ended up a good distance from Anselm's position. Bonaventure could not even go this far, for he saw any assertion of necessity as a limitation of the absolute power of God. And yet he still used much of Anselm's theology.

The twentieth distinction in Bonaventure's Commentaria on the Lombard's third book is entitled 'De Christi passionis congruentia'.<sup>3</sup> The subject is

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1. NCE ii, 658-64.

2. 'Praelocutione ad II Sent.', Opera Omnia, ii. All other references to Bonaventure will be to the Quaracchi edition of Opera Omnia iii: Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum (1887). To simplify citations, only page numbers will be given.

3. Commentaria, p. 416.



thus the suitability or aptness of Christ's death, not its necessity. The first question is whether it was congruum that human nature be restored by God. An affirmative answer can be given if we draw forth four principles from Cur Deus Homo:

1. God's permanence would not allow his propositum to be weakened.
2. His goodness would not damn for the sin of one man all his posterity.
3. It does not seem right that highest wisdom allow the noblest creature to be deprived of its own end.
4. It is not fitting for highest virtue to allow that its servant be unjustly detained by another forever.

Like Anselm, Bonaventure is considering the nature and definition of God to show that it is unfitting and inconsistent that man be allowed to perish. His knowledge of Cur Deus Homo enables him to range widely over the work and to assimilate its underlying ideas.<sup>1</sup> We see how Bonaventure could be more independent than Alexander of Hales in his use of Anselm, for Bonaventure does not hesitate to summarize the logic of Cur Deus Homo, instead of quoting and rephrasing various sections in the work.

In setting up the sed contra of the proposition, Bonaventure draws one of his reasons from Anselm. If it were not fitting for the human race to remain unrestored, and if any slight inconsistency in God is impossible, then the human race must be restored not because of God's goodness but because of the necessity that he avoid something indecens.<sup>2</sup> Anselm had envisioned this same line of reasoning when he said that God seems to be forced by the necessity of his nature.<sup>3</sup> The response to this and the other objections is that it is right that the human race be redeemed, not only ex parte Dei, but also ex parte hominis. From God's point of view, it is consistent with his power, wisdom, and mercy. From man's position, we can see the suitability by considering his dignity and his fallen state. If man were deprived of his end, then all things would be deprived of their meaning and purpose. This concept of the necessary

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1. Commentaria, p. 416; CDH I, 4, 7; II, 16.

2. Commentaria, p. 417.

3. CDH II, 5.

meaning that man's salvation given to creation is derived from Cur Deus Homo and reflects Bonaventure's ability to take up the essential themes in Anselm.<sup>1</sup>

Bonaventure says that the necessity we find in God that he redeem man stems only from the immutability of his purpose and not from any force or obligation constraining him.<sup>2</sup> This is the answer of Anselm himself to any assertion that his ideas limit divine freedom. It is also the response that we found in the Summa of Alexander to the problem of necessity. There are two necessities, one of force and prohibition, the other of immutability. Only the second is to be found in God.<sup>3</sup> And so Bonaventure can summarize by distinguishing the various types of suitability and necessity:

Si enim quaeratur, utrum congruum sit, reparari genus humanum, concedendum est simpliciter, quod verum est. Si vero quaeratur, utrum sit necessarium, non est simpliciter respondendum, sed distinguendum. Est enim necessarium ex parte Dei, non ex parte nostri; et ex parte Dei non quacumque necessitate, sed necessitate immutabilitatis, quae non opponitur libertati voluntatis, ac per hoc nec gratiae nec liberalitati.<sup>4</sup>

This is probably the clearest explanation of the problem of necessity that has been given since the time of Anselm himself, and we can be sure that if Bonaventure had simply maintained this position, he would have been the closest follower Anselm had ever had. But as the questions within the distinction proceed, more and more problems arise until Bonaventure finally has to abandon this position and say that there is no necessity at all in God to redeem man. By this point, the convenient 'necessity of immutability' is forgotten.

Having established the fittingness of man's restoration, Bonaventure asks whether it was more appropriate for the human race to be restored through satisfaction rather than any other way. Again the word on which the statement is based is a form of congruum, not necessesse. Anselm is being used to prove what is essentially an Augustinian position on the Redemption. Four reasons show

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1. Commentaria, p. 418. CDH II, 21.

2. Commentaria, p. 418.

3. CDH II, 5.

4. Commentaria, p. 418.



that this is the best way. The order of divine justice is better preserved when evil is punished rather than left unpunished, and so satisfaction preserves that order.<sup>1</sup> Divine wisdom is shown when the deformity of the order of things is rectified by the giving of satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> If evil is not punished, then injustice is subject to no law, and then divine power would not preside over all things. So if satisfaction is given, the ordering of divine power is seen to work in the best possible way.<sup>3</sup> And finally, when satisfaction is given, divine honour is preserved, for man gives God back what he has taken away from him and also provides the necessary compensation for his offended honour.<sup>4</sup>

These justifications for satisfaction rephrase Anselm, but the conclusion is far different, for Bonaventure is only using Cur Deus Homo to show the fittingness of this mode, not its necessity. He points this out himself when he says that it could be said from these reasons that not only is this the best way but also that another way would not be efficacious. But he denies the second half of the proposition:

Ex his eisdem rationibus non solum potest concludi, quod haec via sit magis congrua, sed etiam, quod alia non potest esse congrua; verumtamen non sunt ita efficaces ad probandum secundum, sicut ad probandum primum, quia praeter has congruentias possunt et aliae reperiri, licet istae sint magis excellentes.<sup>5</sup>

Thus other reasons, even if they are less excellent, could be found to show the usefulness of other means of man's liberation that would not include satisfaction. Already Bonaventure is backing away from any assertion that there is only one possible way for man to be redeemed.

After listing negative reasons for redemption through satisfaction, Bonaventure summarizes the question. He links Anselm with Augustine and says that

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1. Commentaria, p. 419. CDH I, 11, 12.

2. Commentaria, p. 419. CDH I, 15.

3. Commentaria, pp. 419-20. CDH I, 12.

4. Commentaria, p. 420. CDH I, 11.

5. Commentaria, p. 420.

according to both of them, it was more fitting that the human race be redeemed through satisfaction than through any other way.<sup>1</sup> The two great thinkers on the Redemption are reconciled here in a superb example of the thirteenth century's ability to synthesize what might seem to be points of view beyond reconciliation:

Dicendum quod absque dubio magis congruum fuit, genus humanum reparari per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam, secundum quod dicit Anselmus et Augustinus.<sup>2</sup>

For God it is right that mercy and justice join together.<sup>3</sup> By mercy God guarantees our forgiveness. By justice he exacts the required satisfaction. Anselm had also shown how these two attributes in God combine in the Redemption through satisfaction.<sup>4</sup> The two work together as one to fulfil each other's requirements, and the unity of God is ensured while the salvation of man is guaranteed. From God's part we turn to man's role. For us it was right that we were led back to justice through justice. But Bonaventure's language shows here how far away he is from any absolute necessity that man provide satisfaction. He says it is better for us to be reconciled to God through satisfaction rather than without it.

The section is permeated with Anselmian reasoning. To the objection that man's reparation without satisfaction would better fit divine sufficiency, Bonaventure points out that God demands observance of his commands from us not because of any lack in his own completeness but for the sake of our right ordering. So our obligation to satisfy does not spring from any divine lack but from the need that we return to our ordinationem debitam.<sup>5</sup> We are very close to Anselm's principle that divine honour cannot be diminished by sin but

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1. Commentaria, p. 420.

2. Commentaris, p. 420.

3. Commentaria, p. 421.

4. CDH II, 20.

5. Commentaria, p. 421.



that we must pay for sin because we have confused the ordering of things and not because we have subtracted anything from God.<sup>1</sup> As for the argument that free forgiveness would be a better example for man to imitate, Bonaventure uses Anselm's answer that we are to follow God in some things but not all.<sup>2</sup>

The third question is whether any pure creature could satisfy for the whole human race.<sup>3</sup> One reason adduced in favour of this statement is that the devil lost the human race because he attacked an innocent being, so if there could be any pure creature whom the devil attacked, it would seem that this innocent being could redeem the human race from the devil's power and thus provide the necessary satisfaction.

Contrary reasons include the Anselmian point that if a pure creature were a man, then he would be a sinner and a debtor. If it were not a man, then it could not satisfy, for only a man can satisfy for a man.<sup>4</sup> Another reason is that the satisfaction ought to be proportionate to the offence and the injury. But the injury is measured according to the position of the person offended. Since God is infinite, the offence is infinite, so no creature could satisfy. Anselm makes this same point by his question to Boso about one glance against God's will being worse than the destruction of the universe. Bonaventure has extracted the Anselmian principle that the gravity of the offence depends upon the rank of the person offended.<sup>5</sup>

A further explanation for a pure creature's inability to satisfy is that satisfaction demands the return of more than what has been taken away. But man in sinning has deprived God of all that he had planned to do with the human race. And so no pure creature can compensate for more than the value of

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1. CDH I, 15.

2. Commentaria, p. 421. CDH I, 12.

3. Commentaria, p. 422.

4. CDH I, 23; II, 8.

5. CDH I, 21.

the entire human race.<sup>1</sup> Finally, if our restoration were carried out by a pure creature, we would be in its debt and so would become its servant and have to deny God the service we owe only to him.<sup>2</sup> Bonaventure has mustered a wide range of Anselmian ideas to make his point. His command of Cur Deus Homo is complete."

In the conclusion, Bonaventure repeats that a pure creature that was not man would not be able to do work that would apply to mankind. Also his merit could never be sufficient to compensate.<sup>3</sup> And so it is necessary that the person satisfying be God and man. This is far from saying that 'only God can and only man ought', and we never have the ascent to a climax of logical necessities that we find in II, 6 of Cur Deus Homo and even in Alexander's Summa.

To the contention that the devil's assertion of power over an innocent creature would provide the necessary satisfaction, Bonaventure cogently answers that the devil's loss of possession would have nothing to do with the payment of satisfaction that man owes God: 'Longe enim plus est recompensare Deo illatam iniuriam quam vincere diabolicam fraudem.'<sup>4</sup> This same point is implied but not expressed with nearly such clarity in Alexander's Summa.<sup>5</sup> Probably because of Anselm Bonaventure makes the very necessary distinction between the devil's abuse of power and man's satisfaction. This distinction was never made in Augustine. In the twelfth century the confusion between man's defeat of the devil and his liberation from sin obscured the understanding of the doctrine of the Redemption. Only now, in the clarity of Bonaventure's analysis, is the ancient problem dispersed for good.

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1. CDH I, 23.

2. Commentaria, p. 423. CDH I, 5.

3. Commentaria, p. 423.

4. Commentaria, p. 423.

5. Summa Theologica, IV, p. 22.



Another argument for the worth of an innocent man had said that the soul of one such being should be worth the souls of unlimited sinners.<sup>1</sup> This is true, Bonaventure replies, but God demands satisfaction not according to the value of sinners but according to what the human race would have been if it had not sinned. We return to Anselm's principle that man by sinning had deprived God of his propositum for the human race and that this can only be compensated for by providing something worth more than the whole race.<sup>2</sup>

Bonaventure asks in the next question if anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself. The conclusion is brief: no one could do so.<sup>3</sup> In answering various objections, Bonaventure distinguishes the debt that we owe to God by right of our condition from what we owe because of the evil of our offence. Satisfaction is owed for the second, but man cannot pay it by himself because his sin has rendered him powerless. Bonaventure's use of Anselm in distinguishing types of debt brings forth an idea only implied in Anselm, the difference between debt iure conditionis and reatu praevericationis.<sup>4</sup>

The fifth question asks whether God ought to accept the mode of satisfaction provided through the passion of Christ.<sup>5</sup> In order to answer affirmatively, Bonaventure says that God could only be satisfied through the death of someone who wasn't a debtor to death. But we were all bound to death for our sin. But Christ was not, so our debt is paid by him and could be paid by someone else 'in no better way'. Anselm puts the same idea in far stronger terms when he says that Christ's death was the only thing in the universe not already owed to God, and so it was the only way man's sins could gain satisfaction.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Commentaria, p. 423.

2. CDH I, 23.

3. Commentaria, p. 426.

4. Commentaria, p. 426.

5. Commentaria, p. 427.

6. CDH II, 11.

Bonaventure's statement has none of Anselm's force of necessity.

Reasons against God's acceptance of Christ's death include Anselm's charge that it seems cruel for a just person to suffer for guilty ones and for an innocent one to be damned so that a sinner be freed.<sup>1</sup> God seems to rejoice in the blood of an innocent being.<sup>2</sup> Satisfaction does not seem to be carried out when one sin is added to another, but this appears to have happened when Christ was killed. And so Christ's means of salvation have contravened God's order.<sup>3</sup>

Bonaventure's response is that this mode of satisfaction was 'most acceptable for placating God', 'most fitting for curing our sickness', 'most efficacious for drawing the human race to God' and 'most prudent for banishing the enemy of the human race'.<sup>4</sup> Bonaventure calls upon Anselm and cites II, 11. Christ could not give more to God than he did through his death. This is one of the few instances in which Anselm is quoted word-for-word instead of being incorporated into Bonaventure's thought. Bonaventure moves through the other reasons and then summarizes: '... satis apparet, quod modus iste satisfaciendi pro nobis fuit congruentissimus et a Deo maxime acceptandus.'<sup>5</sup> The only element missing is the one that was the purpose and basis of all Anselm's arguments: that this way is the necessary one.

In answering the arguments against the applicability of Christ's death to man's situation, Bonaventure frequently uses Anselm and shows that because Christ chose death freely, God did not act in a cruel way.<sup>6</sup> Bonaventure

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1. Commentaria, p. 427. CDH I, 8.

2. CDH I, 10.

3. CDH I, 12; II, 15.

4. Commentaria, p. 428: '... acceptabilissimus ad placandum Deum, congruentissimus ad curandum morbum, efficacissimus ad attrahendum genus humanum, prudentissimus ad expugnandum generis humani inimicum.'

5. Commentaria, p. 428.

6. CDH I, 9, 10; II, 11.



acknowledges his debt to Anselm here: '... haec est summa responsio Anselmi in libro Cur Deus Homo.'

The sixth question, whether God could have saved the human race in another way, is by far the most important in revealing Bonaventure's relationship to Cur Deus Homo. First he quotes all the standard authorities to indicate that another mode was possible: Pope Leo on the omnipotence of God; Augustine's De Trinitate; Gregory on Job.<sup>1</sup> He also says it would be inconueniens if God could not free man in another way, for then his divine power would be limited.

The arguments to show that no other means of Redemption was possible are just as familiar. The Gloss asserts that unless Christ died, man would not have been redeemed. And so if man perished, all things would be made in vain. Likewise, Anselm in Cur Deus Homo has said that it was impossible for the world to be saved otherwise.<sup>2</sup> Finally there is an argument not ascribed to anyone in particular but clearly nothing but Bonaventure's summary of Anselm's logic. God cannot negate himself. If he is to restore the human race, he does it necessarily through justice. But justice cannot be given without satisfaction. But only a God-man can satisfy, so it was impossible for the human race to be redeemed in any other way.<sup>3</sup>

Bonaventure's response breaks up the question into two parts. We must consider the possibility of another mode in terms of the power of God redeeming us and in terms of the human race that is to be redeemed. As far as God is concerned, he could certainly free the human race in another way, 'sicut sancti dicunt'. Bonaventure calls upon Hugh of St. Victor's De Sacramentis and Peter Lombard. Bonaventure insists that 'divine power is not to be limited'. Just as God made creature by the sole impulse of his mind, so he could restore him in the same way. In one way, this statement is nothing special, for it only

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1. Commentaria, p. 430.

2. CDH I, 10.

3. Commentaria, p. 431.

reaffirms the Church's teaching on God's omnipotence. But at the same time Bonaventure dismisses all Anselm's arguments that tried to show that any other way of Redemption was impossible. Anselm sought to reconcile this narrow point of view with God's omnipotence. The central Anselmian principle had been that the necessity of the actual mode was based on divine immutability. Because God is as he is, there is no other way for the world to be redeemed. In such a way Anselm could have both God's power and a necessity for the God-man. Earlier Bonaventure appeared to be accepting this point of view, but now he is decisively rejecting it.

To both the Gloss and the Our Deus Homo, Bonaventure now answers that these authorities are to be accepted and understood as considering only man's point of view and presupposing the divine disposition which decreed to free us in this way and in no other:

Ad illud vero quod obicitur in contrarium de Glossa et de Anselmo dicendum, quod auctoritas illas intelliguntur, quantum est ex parte nostra, praesupposita dispositione divina, qua nos sic et non alio modo, liberare decrevit.<sup>1</sup>

The basis for any necessity in the God-man rests not in the nature of God and creation but in God's own dispositio. Bonaventure has to distort Anselm in order to make him fit into his own plan. He indicates that he is being faithful to Anselm's meaning. But Bonaventure can be accused of stretching his predecessors a bit too much towards his own point of view. Anselm would never have agreed with Bonaventure's conclusion. The archbishop of Canterbury would have conceded that the basis for all things rests ultimately in the divine will, but he would have said that God always acts in a way that is most consistent with right reason. And so Anselm could see no separation between the way God acted and other ways in which he might have acted. But Bonaventure felt he had to insist on this separation.

As for the objection that God could not act against justice, Bonaventure denies that God could not liberate the human race except through the way of

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1. Commentaria, p. 431.



justice.<sup>1</sup> Instead God could have used only his mercy, Bonaventure insists, and still there would have remained nothing inordinatum in the universe or even ignominium. Sin brings its own punishment, and if thus God had liberated the human race, justice would still not have been contradicted. Bonaventure also refutes the idea that Christ could satisfy only through his death. Although this means is more appropriate, a lesser punishment for such a noble person would have sufficed for the redemption of our race. But God in freeing us gave more than was necessary. These two assertions knock down most of the Anselmian structure, for they disregard Anselm's arguments on the necessity of satisfaction for sin and the need for Christ's death as the only thing in the universe which can pay for sin because it is the only offering not already owed to God. We see in how limited a sense Bonaventure took all the Anselmian arguments that he used in previous questions.

We remember that in stating this particular objection (that God would not act against justice), Bonaventure merely summarized the reasoning of Cur Deus Homo. But he did not cite the work as his source. Now perhaps we can understand why Bonaventure acted in such a way. If he had acknowledged the argument as Anselm's, he would have had to admit that in disagreeing so fundamentally with its assertions, he was disagreeing with Anselm. But we have already seen that Bonaventure prefers to show that Anselm was right, if he is taken in the correct sense. But here is a case in which, by Bonaventure's reasoning, Anselm could not possibly have been right. Rather than contradict such a respected authority openly, it is possible that Bonaventure chose to state the argument without giving its source so that he would not have to make a clear break with Anselm.

But such possibilities cannot be proven. The one undeniable fact is that Bonaventure, after using so much of Anselm, is declaring his independence. He is so concerned about not limiting divine power that he will not even take the

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1. Commentaria, p. 431.

usual way out by distinguishing liberare from redimere. Ever since Stephen Langton, theologians had been saying that God could not redeem the world in another way, even though he could choose another mode in liberating it. But Bonaventure refuses to make this distinction because of the overwhelming fact of God's power:

*Esto tamen, quod non alio modo potuisset satisfieri pro genere, nec genus humanum aliter redimi, sicut multi concedunt; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod alio modo non potuerit liberari. De libertate enim firmiter credo, quod alio modo potuit liberare; de redemptione vero nec nego nec audeo affirmare, quia temerarium est, cum de divina potentia agitur, terminum ei praefigere. Amplius enim potest, quam nos possumus cogitare.<sup>1</sup>*

Bonaventure leaves open the possibility that God, as well as liberating us by another means, could also redeem us in another way. In the Somma of Alexander, the distinction between liberation and redemption was used to guarantee the necessity of redemption while guarding God's freedom to act in another way. But Bonaventure thinks that even a distinction between liberation and redemption would be temerarium, for it would impose a limit on divine power. He resorts to the theological truism that God can do more than we can think of. Anselm would have agreed, but the emphasis in Bonaventure is completely different. For the archbishop of Canterbury such a thought was only an incitement to know God better, while for Bonaventure it was a warning, and even a signal for retreat from the hidden purposes of God.

The manifestly reasonable God of Anselm that Alexander of Hales rediscovered becomes in Bonaventure the God that still does what is fitting but cannot be depended upon to follow any given way. The structure of Anselmian necessity which held up the whole of Cur Deus Homo comes crashing down not in Duns Scotus but in Bonaventure himself. At the very height of scholastic reasoning, the decline has already begun, for theologians like Bonaventure begin to see that the further they went in knowing the ways of God, the less they could claim to know. Anselm's optimism is severely limited here. The theology of

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1. Commentaria, p. 432.



the Redemption begins to retreat from its confidence in rational necessities that God become man and die for us.

#### 4. Duns Scotus

From the Commentaria of Bonaventure to the Ordinatio of Duns Scotus we omit a half century in which the Franciscan school extended itself greatly at both Oxford and Paris.<sup>1</sup> Anselm's theology of the Redemption appeared in the works of such men as Matthew of Aquasparta,<sup>2</sup> Richard of Middleton,<sup>3</sup> Peter John Olivi,<sup>4</sup> and Roger Marston.<sup>5</sup> We will not examine their relationships with Anselm, except to say that often they only repeat what Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales had already said about the Redemption. Sometimes they are original in their uses and interpretations of Cur Deus Homo. But none of them gives the thorough, comprehensive critique of Anselm's ideas that we find in Bonaventure. For these theologians, Anselm is an auctoritas of the first rank, a writer to be respected and used when appropriate.

Scotus was the first scholastic theologian after Bonaventure to take the Cur Deus Homo as an entity and to examine it completely. The result was catastrophic for Anselm. Scotus became the great medieval critic of Cur Deus Homo, the theologian who challenged and refuted both the assumptions and the proofs

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1. The best general outline of the Franciscan School (but limited to moral questions) is A.-M. Hamelin, L'École Franciscaine de ses Débuts jusqu'à l'Occasion (Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensis, xix, 1967).

2. (Died 1302). Questiones Disputatae de Incarnatione et de Langu (BFSMA, ii, second edition, 1957, Quaracchi).

3. Ricardus de Mediavilla (died 1307), Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi Questiones (Brescia, 1591). Also E. Hocedez, Richard de Middleton. Sa Vie, ses Oeuvres, sa Doctrine (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, vii, 1925), esp. pp. 290-92.

4. (Died 1298). Questiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum, ed. Bernard Jansen (BFSMA iv-vi, Quaracchi 1922-26).

5. (Died 1303). Questiones Disputatae: De Emanatione Aeterna, de Statu Naturae, et de Anima (BFSMA vii, Quaracchi, 1932). Also, A. Daniels, 'Anselm-zitate bei dem Oxfordener Franziskaner Roger von Marston', Theologische Quartalschrift (Tübingen, 1911), 35-59.

that Anselm had set forth for the necessity that God become man. Bonaventure had disagreed with such in Anselm, but he never directly criticized Anselm by name. Scotus brings his disagreement out into the open and shows that it is impossible to accept Anselm's teaching on the Redemption. But his work is not exclusively negative. After sweeping aside all the arguments that Anselm had so carefully assembled, Scotus tells us under what circumstances Anselm's ideas might have some validity. And he presents his own view of the workings of the Redemption which substitutes a loving God who can be easily satisfied for Anselm's uncompromising God of justice who can only be satisfied through an infinite offering. Scotus's theology of the Redemption brings our study of Our Deus Homo's medieval influence to a fitting end, for the Subtle Doctor was able to combine all the strands of criticism of Anselm's ideas into a tight unity. Moreover, Scotus provided his own original contribution to the theology of the Redemption, one that sceptical twentieth century man can view with a great deal of sympathy.

The text we will use will be the Opus Oxoniense or Ordinatio of Scotus's Quaestiones in Quattuor Libris Sententiarum. We are concerned only with Book III, Distinction 20, on the necessity of the Redemption. This was printed by Luke Wadding and others in the Opera Omnia.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately the modern edition of Scotus's work under the supervision of G. Balic is still a long way from reaching the third book of the Ordinatio, so we will have to be content with the seventeenth century Wadding text. I have compared it with Balliol MS. 203, ff. 185v-187v, which was written in 1460-61 for William Gray by a scribe from Hease. According to the Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Balliol College, Oxford,<sup>2</sup> this manuscript represents the third book of the Ordinatio, the lectures of Scotus on the Sentences at Oxford that he himself revised and corrected. There are many divergent readings between the seventeenth century

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1. Printed at Lyons, 1639. Our Quaestio is in vii, pp. 425-31.

2. R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford, 1963), p. 199.



edition and the Balliol MS., but almost all of them are minor changes in word order, deletions or additions of minor words, and various substitutions that make no significant changes in the theological meaning of the passages. So we will follow the Lyons edition as the best text we have at the moment of the Ordinatio. In instances where the disagreement between Lyons and Balliol 203 could be of some importance, I will indicate the variant reading.

After stating the question, 'whether it was necessary for the human race to be restored through the passion of Christ',<sup>1</sup> Scotus presents a number of arguments against any necessity. First he argues on the basis of a comparison between the status of man and that of the angels.<sup>2</sup> The fundamental question is why it should be necessary for man to be restored when the angels are not redeemed. If it is not necessary for the more noble being to be saved through Christ's passion, then how can it be necessary for a less noble being to be restored in such a way? Since the passion was not necessary for the angels who fell, then it could not be necessary for man.

We might answer this, Scotus says, by pointing out that not all the angels fell, but the whole human race did fall. If the latter is not restored, then it will perish completely, while the angels as a nature are not in any danger of perishing. The argument here takes the general lines of Anselm's statement that human nature cannot have been created in vain. But, in turn, this argument can be opposed when we realize that since each angel is of a different species, then by the same reason as we previously used for the preservation of man as a species, we have to insist that each individual angel should be saved. Indeed, it would be more unfitting for any individual angel to perish than for the whole human species, which is inferior to any of the angelic species.

Scotus is twisting Anselm's own ideas about the unfitting quality in the fall of an entire species and the position of the angels in the hierarchy of

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1. 'Quaestio Unica: Utrum necesse fuerit genus humanum reparari per passionem Christi', Opera Omnia vii, 425.

2. Opera Omnia vii, 425.

being. He strengthens this idea by considering the possibility that we could choose between destroying a heavenly orb or a species of flies. If we say that the flies should be preserved and an orb annihilated, we are being 'frivolous', for the heavenly orb is worth much more. So it is with the restoration of fallen angels and man. It seems that the angel should have priority in redemption.<sup>1</sup>

But if this argument about the inappropriateness in the perishing of a species has no strength when used to show that man must be saved, we can say alternatively that man fell when he was tempted by another, while the angel fell alone, without anyone tempting him. So man deserves redemption, while the angel does not. Scotus has taken this reason directly from Anselm; he cites the appropriate passage in Cur Deus Homo II, 21. But, he says, if we look at Apocalypse xii, the account of the fall of the angels indicates that Iaxifer tempted his fellows, so they, like man, fell with someone else tempting them. So the angels are no more guilty for their fall than man is for his fall, and there seems no reason why man should have priority in redemption.

In this first set of arguments against the necessity of the redemption, we can already see the power and consistency of Scotus's mind. He takes Anselm's arguments in a way that they have not been previously considered, for he knows how to manipulate them until their very logic seems to destroy them. Scotus comes to Cur Deus Homo with fresh insight, and the result is both striking and original.

A second major argument against redemption for man through Christ's passion is that any small offering on Christ's part would have been sufficient for redeeming the human race, so he did not have to die. But if such a lesser penalty would have been a sufficient counterweight to sin, then it would have been more convenient as a mode of redemption than the passion was. So it was both unnecessary and inappropriate that man be redeemed by the death of Christ.

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 426.



Finally, the action by which Christ's executors deprived him of his life was as great an evil as his life was a good, so no redemption is possible.

In opposition to these reasons, Scotus presents only Anselm himself. Citing and quoting from II, 15, one of the many summaries of Anselm's thought near the end of Cur Deus Homo, Scotus shows that Anselm 'explicitly seems to say that it was necessary for man to be redeemed through the death of Christ'.<sup>1</sup> But he also refers to II, 3 and 16 in Cur Deus Homo as further proof of this tenet in Anselm.

At this point in normal scholastic procedure, Scotus would present his own answer to the problem. But he breaks away from the usual structure by presenting systematically and in detail Anselm's theology of the Redemption. On the surface and, indeed, in the manner of exposition, this is a sympathetic account of Anselm's thought. But once Scotus has finished, he sets out to demolish this theology point by point. Only after Scotus has completed his destruction of Anselm does he give his own answer to the necessity of the Redemption and finally respond to the original objections to necessity. This procedure, so unusual in scholastic theology, enabled Scotus to have the space and opportunity to set forth Anselm's arguments in a coherent, complete way. I have found no such treatment of Cur Deus Homo in any other thirteenth century theologian. Scotus apparently wanted to be sure that once and for all, Anselm's necessity for the actual mode of the Redemption would be totally demolished.

First Scotus makes sure that his readers (or listeners) are aware of Anselm's contribution to the theology of the Redemption:

Ad istam quaestionem quae est vere theologica,<sup>2</sup> propter quam solum videtur Anselmus fecisse totum librum Cur Deus Homo, et ibi videtur eam solvisse. Primo videndum est secundum Anselmum, quod necessarium fuit hominem redimi.<sup>3</sup>

Then Scotus presents four central reasons in Anselm for necessity: it was

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 426: '... expresse enim videtur dicere, quod necesse erat hominem redimi per mortem Christi.'

2. Balliol MS. 203, f. 186r, here adds secundum theologos.

3. Opera Omnia, vii, 426.

necessary for man to be redeemed; man could not be redeemed without satisfaction; satisfaction was to be given by a God-man; satisfaction through Christ and no one else was the most convenient (and thus the only possible) mode of redemption.

To prove the necessity that man be redeemed, Scotus points out Anselm's argument that God and nature do nothing in vain. But rational creature would have been created in vain unless he could attain the highest good, which is God. Scotus cites Cur Deus Homo II, 2 and 4.<sup>1</sup>

As for the necessity that satisfaction be provided, Scotus uses I, 24 and 25: 'Anyone who does not pay God what he owes him is unjust.'<sup>2</sup> But no unjust person is admitted to eternal beatitude. Every sinner takes away from God the honorem debitum and so must satisfy. Sometimes Scotus quotes directly from Anselm; sometimes he rephrases him. He is able to pick out key words and ideas without difficulty. He disposes of the argument that man is powerless to give satisfaction by using Anselm's story of the man who is ordered to perform a task and not to fall into a ditch. When he does fall, his inability to carry out his work is his own fault. So it is with man, who was warned not to sin.<sup>3</sup> God's mercy cannot intervene, for it is 'mockery' to say that God remits the debt because man cannot pay it. If we claim that God remits the punishment by conferring beatitude, then we are saying that God makes man happy on account of sin.<sup>4</sup>

In order to show that a God-man must make this satisfaction, Scotus follows Anselm in eliminating the possibility of a purus homo. He who satisfies must offer something greater than the value of that for which man ought not have sinned. But that means something greater than the value of all that is not

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 427.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 427.

3. GDH I, 24.

4. GDH I, 24.



God. He must render God not only something greater than all creation but greater than all possible creations. This last point indicates how well Scotus understands Anselm. None of the other scholastics had made Anselm's point that man owes God something more valuable than all possible creations, but Scotus includes this idea: '... non potuit satisfacere, nisi redderet Deo aliquid maius omni creatura facta, et possibili fieri.'<sup>1</sup>

Another indication of man's impotence to render God the necessary satisfaction is the fact that whatever he does in the way of prayers and good works, they are already owed to God and so cannot count towards satisfaction for sin. Scotus recognizes Anselm's exclusion of supererogatory works from man's activity.<sup>2</sup> Man has to restore to God all that he took away, which was whatever God had planned to do with human nature. God had ordained to make complete the number of elect from the just, and man had been made to complete that number. But man cannot possibly make it likely for this decree to be carried out, for a sinner cannot justify sinners.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, it was not fitting that a purus homo not descended from Adam redeem us, because then man would not be restored to his pristinam dignitatem, for he would be just as much in debt to that man for redemption as he was to God for creation.<sup>4</sup>

Having completed Anselm's arguments for the impotence of any human being, Scotus presents the fourth central idea of Cur Deus Homo, the necessity of Christ. First, he is not a debtor to death, as Anselm shows in II, 11. He who satisfies must give something greater than all that is not God. Christ could do so by offering his death, which he did not owe: 'Igitur Christus homo, qui maior erat omnibus sub Deo per mortem, quam non debuit pati, satisfacere

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 427.

2. GDH I, 20.

3. GDH I, 23.

4. GDH I, 5.

debit.<sup>1</sup> Scotus has recognized the fundamental idea in Cur Deus Homo: Christ is able to carry out the satisfaction because he can give God something that is not owed and which is worth more than all creation and all that is not God.

Scotus strengthens this argument by turning to II, 14, in which Boso says that just as he would rather see an infinite number of worlds perish rather than do one thing against the will of God, so he would rather bear all sins rather than kill Christ the man.<sup>2</sup> Because Christ's life was of such worth, his death was acceptable to God as satisfaction for sin. Scotus ends by emphasizing that his collection of Anselm's ideas has been truthful and accurate: 'Hasc veraciter, ex dictis eius collegi.'

Having completed his exposition of Anselm's theology of the Redemption, Scotus immediately shows his disagreement with it: 'In istis dictis Anselmi videntur aliqua dubia.'<sup>3</sup> This mild sentence introduces Scotus's outright dissent, which is something that we have not seen in two centuries of criticism and use of Cur Deus Homo, except in Roscelin of Compiègne. Scotus's attack is direct and uncompromising.

Opposing the first article, that man must be redeemed, Scotus says that Redemption was possible in any number of ways. He quotes Augustine 13 De Trinitate: 'Alius modus redimendi hominem Deo non deficit: eius enim potestati cuncta subiacent.'<sup>4</sup> We notice that in this quote Scotus does not include Augustine's phrase that no other mode could have been more appropriate for healing man. Scotus wants to emphasize the power of God to redeem man in any way at all.

The necessity that Christ suffer is only a consequent one, not an ante-

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 428.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 428.

3. Opera Omnia, vii, 428.

4. PL 42: 1025.



cedent one. By this, Scotus means that there is no prior necessity for Christ to die. The necessity of the action is derived from the fact that the action takes place and not from any prior cause of the action. This is very close to what Anselm says himself in II, 17, in which he distinguishes between necessitas praecedens and necessitas sequens. And so both Anselm and Duns Scotus say that the only necessity in the death of Christ is a consequent one. The act is necessary because it happens and not because of some prior efficient cause forcing it to happen. But Anselm had reconciled this point with his framework of necessity by bringing in the immutability of God's purposes and activity. Scotus, however, does not see that there is any room left for a necessity of the Redemption once this distinction between types of necessity has been made.

An even more fundamental objection to the first article is that there is no necessity at all for the human race to be restored, and so there is no need for Christ to suffer. Man's predestination to glory is contingent and not necessary. It would not be an inconvenientia if man were frustrated from achieving beatitude, unless we presupposed the absolute predestination of man. But since the latter must be excluded in order to leave room for human free will, we see that there is not any absolute necessity that man be redeemed. This is the first time that any theologian has challenged Anselm's frustra argument. Anselm would have claimed that he was speaking of the predestination of the race and not of the individual, so he could speak in terms of absolute necessity without challenging individual free will. But Scotus will not let Anselm distinguish between race and individual.<sup>1</sup>

Opposing the articles that man cannot be redeemed without satisfaction and only a God-man can provide it, Scotus says that he sufficiently treats satisfaction when he discusses penance. But even if we accept the necessity of satisfaction, it is not necessary that the one who satisfies be God. It is

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 428.

here that Scotus presents an original set of objections to Cur Deus Homo that anticipates his own theology of the Redemption. As for what Anselm says that man must offer God something of greater value than that for which he ought not sin, something greater than all creation, 'I believe, saving his dignity, that this is not true.' Scotus realizes how contrary his ideas are to those of Anselm and how he, in effect, is accusing Anselm of being a disseminator of falsehood: 'Credo, salva reverentia sua,<sup>1</sup> quod hoc non est verum.'<sup>2</sup> Scotus says that the good of satisfaction did not have to exceed the worth of all creation. It was only necessary that it was a greater good than was the evil of the sinning Adam:

Non enim oportuit satisfactionem pro peccato primi hominis excedere totam creaturam formaliter in magnitudine et perfectione. Sufficisset enim obtulisse Deo maius bonum, quam fuerit malum nullius hominis peccantis.<sup>3</sup>

Scotus thus rejects Anselm's central idea that one act against God's will exceeds in evil the good in all creation and so all creation cannot compensate for that evil. He says that a sufficiently unselfish act of man's love for God can adequately compensate for sin. If Adam had loved God sufficiently for his own sake and had used his free will more in this act than he had in the act of sinning, then such love would have sufficed for remitting his sin, and satisfaction would have been sufficient: '... talis dilectio sufficisset pro peccato suo remittendo et fuisset satisfactum.'<sup>4</sup> And so 'the proposition (of Anselm) is false, that man ought to offer God something greater than all for which he ought not sin'.<sup>5</sup> Man's only duty is to pledge his love to God, and in this framework satisfaction is automatically taken care of. The necessity of satisfaction is not removed; rather the meaning of satisfaction is

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1. Balliol MS. 203, f. 187r, writes: salva gratia sua.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

3. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

4. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

5. Opera Omnia, vii, 429: '... propositio illa est falsa, quod debuit offerre Deo aliquid maius omni eo pro quo peccare non deturcat.'



redefined in a way that centres on an act of love instead of a compensatory act of justice. Love of God becomes the key element in satisfaction, just as love of created things is the key factor in sin:

*Sed sicut pro amore creaturae, ut obiectio diligibilis, non debuit peccare, ita satisfaciendo debuit offerre Deo aliquid maius attingendo per actum obiective, quam sit creatura, scilicet amorem attingentem Deum propter se, et ille amore obiective, ut terminatur in Deum, excedit amorem creaturae, sicut Deus creaturam.<sup>1</sup>*

We note that the act of love in Scotus is not a subjective emotion but an objective movement of man towards God. This very act of loving God can compensate for man's wrong love of creature. Scotus is setting forth a theology of satisfaction based on love first and justice only secondarily.

Scotus emphasizes that this act of love, even when it includes Christ's love for God through his death, is not greater than the value of all creation, even though it is sufficiently satisfactory:

*Tamen ille actus, quo convertor ad Deum per amorem in sua formali ratione non est maior omni creatura, nec etiam amor Christi creatus, quo dilexit Deum, fuit talis.<sup>2</sup>*

And so Scotus criticizes Anselm for wanting to have infinite compensation, when the 'formal reason of the matter' does not make such infinity necessary: 'Unde ipse vult omnino infinitatem habere, ubi non est ex formali ratione rei.' The Anselmian act of infinite satisfaction through the unowed death of Christ is reinterpreted as a finite act of love by man for God by which man satisfies for sin.

Finally, Scotus opposes the fourth article, that only Christ can make the necessary satisfaction. First an angel could carry out the necessary satisfaction, as long as God decided that he would accept the angel's offering. The crucial factor now is no longer the unowed or infinite quality of the offering but God's decision to accept it: '... tantum valet omne creatum oblatum, pro quanto Deus accepterat illud, et non plus....'<sup>3</sup> Also a pure man would be able

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

3. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

to give satisfaction. God could give him sufficient grace, and he could be born of a woman without sin through the Holy Spirit. Man would not be excessively in debt to such a creature, as Anselm had claimed, because everything this redeemer received would be from God, so man's primal debt would still be to God:

Et cum dicit, quod tunc obligaremur ei tantum, quantum Deo, falsum est. Immo simpliciter Deo, quia totum quod ille haberet, esset a Deo. Obligaremur tamen multum sibi, sicut obligamur Beatæ Virgini et aliis sanctis....<sup>1</sup>

Scotus does not hesitate to judge many of Anselm's ideas as being completely false. His critique does not mince words.

Not only would an angel or a pure man be adequate, but also any man, even though he was born with original sin, could satisfy for himself if the necessary grace were given him.<sup>2</sup> Again, the important factor is not the condition of the being but the decision of God to give grace to one being or another and to accept their offering. God can redeem man in any way he chooses. But this unlimited God is not an arbitrary God, for Scotus still sees him working in ways that human reason would be able to explain. In every case, satisfaction is to be provided in one way or another and divine grace is to make such satisfaction possible. At no point does Scotus say that God could have restored man by using a sinful man devoid of grace. God is given more room for manoeuvre in providing a means of Redemption, but God still remains essentially approachable through man's reason.

Having completed his critique of Anselm, Scotus returns to the usual scholastic procedure and answers the original question on the necessity of the actual mode of Redemption. There was no necessity at all, he says, unless we presuppose divine ordering, which ordained that it be carried out in such a way.<sup>3</sup>

Justice was involved in the actual mode of the Redemption, but it was not

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 429.

3. Opera Omnia, vii, 430.



Anselm's type of infinite justice compensating for Adam's infinite injustice. The justice of Christ is seen in his attempt to correct the errors of the Jews and his preference to die rather than to remain silent. Christ reconciles the injustice of his own time rather than a primal injustice:

Christus igitur volens eos ab errore illo revocare, per opera et sermones, maluit mori, quam tacere, quia, tunc erat veritas dicenda Iudaeis, et ideo pro iustitia mortuus est.

To this new understanding of justice is added a revised interpretation of how man is in debt to Christ for his death. Scotus says that even though God could have redeemed us in another way, we still owe him a great deal. Because other ways were possible but Christ still chose to die for us, we ought to be even more grateful to him than we would have been if there had been no other means. Christ came this way and died as he did in order to show his love for us and to draw us to love him and his Father:

Ex quo enim aliter potuisset homo redimi, et tamen ex sua libera voluntate sic redemit, multum ei tenemur, et amplius quam si sic necessario et non aliter potuissemus fuisse redempti. Ideo ad alliciendum nos ad amorem suum, ut credo, hoc praecipue fecit, et quia voluit hominem amplius teneri Deo.<sup>2</sup>

Because God did what he did not have to do, we can be all the more drawn to his love, for he loved us so much. In all this there is no necessity, only congruitas. Abelard lives again in such language, but this teaching fills out the incomplete detail of Abelard's ideas. Scotus has tempered his teaching on love with an insistence on the act of love as an act of satisfaction.

Scotus says that if we wish to save Anselm, we can say that all his reasons proceed from the presupposition of the divine ordinance, which ordained that man be redeemed in such a way. And so it is only from preordinatio, not necessitas, that God wanted only his Son for the redemption of men. Scotus makes no claim that this interpretation is consistent with Anselm's original intent. He says 'we can say' or 'let us say', and uses the subjunctive mood to show that what

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 430.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 430.

we are saying is not what Anselm himself had said:

*Si autem volumus salvare Anselmum, dicamus, quod omnes rationes suas procedunt praesupposita ordinatione divina, quae sic ordinavit hominem redimi ... nulla tamen necessitas absoluta fuit.*<sup>1</sup>

With this remnant of Anselm, we can turn back to the original objections to the necessity of the Redemption. Here Anselm comes out somewhat better than he did in the critique. Scotus accepts Anselm's idea that because the whole human race fell, it ought to be restored: *... tunc teneo illam responsionem, quod quia tota species humana cecidit, ideo magis debuit reparari.*<sup>2</sup> But he still leaves open the possibility that the entire race could have perished, for it was not predestined. The situation of the angels, he says, has no bearing upon that of man, and the fact that the fallen angels are beyond redemption does not disqualify the human race from redemption.

Scotus also accepts Anselm's idea that man ought to be saved because he fell at the suggestion of another, while the angel is beyond redemption because he fell of his own accord. Lucifer's temptation of the other angels, Scotus points out, was not nearly as strong a factor in their fall as was the devil's temptation of man.

To the objection that any offering of Christ's was sufficient for redeeming humanity, Scotus concedes that through simply wishing man's redemption, he could have satisfied. But Christ did not so wish. Again he returns to Christ's death as an act of love for us.

Scotus still claims that the slightest wound to Christ could have redeemed the whole world. But he does not accept the consequence of this idea, that Christ's death because not absolutely necessary was thus inappropriate. Instead he returns to his principle that Christ's offering, whether it was a wound or his life, was only worth as much as it was accepted for. In other words, the redemptive act derives its value only from God's evaluation of it. So Christ's

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1. Opera Omnia, vii, 430.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 430.



death can be looked upon as a fitting offering, if not a necessary one. God is sole judge of the worth of the satisfaction. At such a moment we approach the concept of an arbitrary God.

To the final objection, that Christ's killers had done a greater evil than the good of his death could compensate, Scotus disagrees with the traditional answer of Anselm that if his killers had known he was the Son of God, they would have never killed him.<sup>1</sup> Scotus says that the passage Anselm uses from I Cor. 2 about the ignorance of his murderers refers not to the Jews but to the demons. If they had known he was God, they would not have incited men to his death, for they would have never willed the good that would come of it. The real reason why Christ's death takes care of the sin of his murderers is the same one that has been used all along. God loved Christ more in accepting his passion than he hated the evil of the sin. The passion centres on God's act of love for man overcoming man's love for created objects. The evil of these men could not outweigh the good of Christ's act, for Christ had not only the power of his will for good but also the highest love: '... actus ille habuit bonitatem non solum ex potentia volitiva, sed ex summa charitate, qua voluit mori....'<sup>2</sup> Once more the Redemption is looked upon as a mystery of love instead of as an act of justice. But love at no time excludes justice, for the two are mingled in the satisfaction that Christ offers for sin.

In demolishing Anselm, Scotus has guaranteed the Redemption as a manifestation of God's power and his love. The beauty and order of Anselm's perfect rational structure are replaced by a more open interpretation in which God works in less well-defined ways. There is no more necessity for man to be saved or for Christ to die. Man becomes totally subject to the will of God, which loses its Anselmian quality of immutability and is no longer amenable to man's reason. But God, even if beyond man's understanding, is still seen as a

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1. CDH II, 15.

2. Opera Omnia, vii, 430.

benevolent being who gives man what he needs and showers him with his love. Strange as it may seem, the unpredictable and undefined God of Duns Scotus is more loving and lovable than the rationally attainable but uncompromisingly rigid God of Anselm.

For Scotus the reasons of the heart count a great deal in the Redemption, and so we find Abelard. But Scotus is not open to the charge of exemplarism that was unfairly used against Abelard. Scotus carefully placed the mystery of love in the context of satisfaction. Because of satisfaction he retains something of Anselm. But the satisfactory activity of Christ is not unique. Christ's death is not an infinite offering, but rather a pre-eminently effective act of love to God that counterbalances man's act of love for created things. Scotus's insistence that man can attain satisfaction and thus God through love makes man a much more potent agent in his own salvation than he had ever been in Anselm. Man's own works can now contribute to the satisfaction that he provides. There is an increasing emphasis on the sinner's unselfish act of love that brings out the personal and individual nature of the redemption of each human being. Scotus leaves behind Anselm's universal panorama in which only one act can possibly compensate for the sin of a whole race.

Anselm's triumph had been to sweep away the old three-cornered contest between God and the devil over a passive man and to involve man more directly in the action because it was necessary for a God-man to give God satisfaction. But in Anselm's schema, man still remained essentially passive and helpless, except when he was united to God in Christ. The link between the God-man and individual men is not visible in Anselm. But in Duns Scotus, man becomes potentially active whether he is together with Christ or alone. Scotus emphasized the possibility for man to love God if God gives him the grace and thus to provide satisfaction for himself.

For Scotus the mystery of divine love exalts the position of the individual man and makes him a much more active participant in the drama of the



Redemption. This change of view is of profound significance not only for theology but also for our understanding of the way medieval man looked at himself, God, and the world. When Scotus said that there was more than one way for man to reconcile himself to God, he began to think in terms of the individual instead of the genus. Scotus reverses Anselm's exaltation of the general over the specific and the archbishop's emphasis on the salvation of the individual mainly for the sake of the race. In the theology of Scotus, the individual human being is the focus of the redemptive act. Helpless fallen man no longer cries out for one infinite act of justice to preserve his race from perdition. Instead the individual sinner confesses his guilt and offers his love to God before the mystery of God's love on the cross.

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