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Turkish Islamic Ideals of Education: Their Possible Function for Islamic Identity and Integration in Europe

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Is not Islam the main obstacle to integration in the societies of Western and Middle Europe and to the process of European integration?¹ The central thesis of this contribution is that the forms of Islam developed in the secular societies of Eastern Europe could be a bridge for integration in the Western European societies, as well as in a democratically founded greater Europe, with its Christian, atheistic and Muslim traditions. One condition is that a capability to compromise takes the place of the pressure on the Islamic communities, a pressure nourished by the fear of "fundamentalism". Forming a pair with it, the other condition is a clear disapproval of cultural relativism discrediting the combination of a cultural pluralism with universalism: for example, we cannot tolerate or even respect the violation of human rights, as in the case of the Islamic persecution of apostates. From the point of view of cultural relativism values, such as persecution, would be only the opinion of another culture. But so that living together in cultural pluralism in Europe may be possible, certain universal principles of democratic life are necessary - including an acceptance of public secular tolerance.²

In a European context the Turks have played a central role as to the presence and kind of Islam: There is Turkey itself with its European part, and the ambitions of the state with its European and Asian parts to become a member of the European Community with ca. 50 million Muslims. Besides that, nearly all of the Muslims in the European parts of the Soviet Union, estimated at more than 12 million, speak Turkish languages, such as the Azeris, Tatars, Bashkirs and Chuvash. And nearly all the Muslims in the rest of Eastern Europe are of Tatar and Turkish origin, or are Muslims from the time of the Ottoman-Turkish empire.³ With the end of the Cold War the demarcations between these Eastern European countries and Western Europe are losing their strictness. It is very well possible that rather soon there could be religious freedom for Muslims in Eastern Europe similar to that in Western Europe. In the Southwest of Europe the Arab-Berber influence from the time of Muslim Spain and Sicily during the 8th and 9th centuries and in

modern times from the Spanish, Italian and French (former) colonies is of more importance⁴, while in Portugal, with 30.000 Muslims from its former colonies in India, as well as in the Northwest of Europe, the Muslim immigration from the former British colonies on the Indian subcontinent predominates.⁵ But in all other European countries the Turkish Muslims are again in the majority, as migrants for work.⁶

Even if we use only roughly estimated numbers⁷, the main point for our consideration is clear: Besides in Turkey itself, there are in the European House another 15 million Muslims speaking Turkish languages and 6.5 million more with some hundred years of Ottoman-Turkish cultural background. On the other hand, there are only some 2.5 millions Muslims from Arab, perhaps 3/4 million from Indian and 1/4 million from Black African countries in Europe. That means: presumably more than 70 million Muslims in the European House have more or less Turkish traditions of Muslim life in secular states dating at least from the First World War - and only 3.5 million have other traditions of Islam. Therefore, this contribution will discuss the Turkish-Islamic ideals of education as the most relevant for Europe - though Arab and Pakistani immigrants usually have a higher standard of education, especially in the field of Islamic sciences.

And if we discuss the subject in the context of a greater Europe, it will be clear that integration cannot mean a total assimilation with one of those traditions in society, but has to be a combination of partial assimilations - for living together with people of other traditions - with integral units in other areas of life, which for people of a common tradition ensures a continuity of identity.⁸ That implies an integration both into society at large and into the structures of the particular religious and national community. And from a democratic standpoint such an integration must be combined with the intention of legal and social equality, at least after a transitional period.

Religion may contribute to the segregation of a particular community from the encompassing larger society. Or it may contribute to a dynamical identity which mediates between cultures. In both cases religion will have to make a special contribution in the midst of the process of change promoted by the conflict between cultures. Religion maintains the ability to function in a social context by preserving the cultural identity and integrating energies which would otherwise differentiate in such a situation.⁹ This is important especially in the case of the Muslim immigrants to Western Europe, because to a worker of Muslim origin the only support in this society is his religion; it is the only thing that belongs to him and that he can master. Therefore, there are high expectations and hopes that religion can be an integrating force also between the first generation of immigrants and the second and third generations growing up in both cultures or nearly completely in the new one.

Here their religion is regarded as a rather strange, foreign one - though Europe has a long Jewish-Christian-Islamic tradition. But in its appearance the Islamic "religion" (Arabic "*din*") means a whole "world of life" (J.Habermas: "*Lebenswelt*") and is usually combined with many elements from the culture of the immigrants' native countries. That constitutes their Muslim identity, which is derived from their encompassing wider culture back home where most people are Muslims. As far as possible, I will try to pay attention to this very important innate Muslim identity, but will nevertheless distinguish it from a new Islamic identity founded in Europe - "Islamic" denoting what belongs to Islam in a strict sense, to the Islamic religion in distinction from Muslim culture.¹⁰ Of course this religion will not be purely without local traditions and connections with the Muslim countries and their culture and politics. And we should also consider the fact that Islam is a religion highly dependent on public and communal celebrations and expressed in such daily practices as dietary and dress regulations and that few of the migrants are able to explain these celebrations and practices.

In this situation Islamic education could fulfill an important function, if it enabled the ethnic-religious community gradually to change the Muslim norms of behaviour within the group into new Islamic norms of behaviour. On the one hand, there are the obvious influences of the linguistic, national and social background and the individual relationship to the countries of origin - nearly all mosques are based on such a background. On the other hand, time will be an important factor, because knowledge of the language and rules of the encompassing larger society are increasing, even today making the younger generation competent actors on the new scene. As we all know, integration is often misunderstood to be assimilation. Instead, it should be defined as the participation of groups or individuals in society while retaining and developing their own identity with its essential parts remaining intact - that is the meaning of the Latin word "integer" in "integration".¹¹

So the mosques and their Qur'an courses, on the one hand, may serve as ghettos in the positive sense of being a realm for securing traditional beliefs and values in the face of the risks of naturalization, modernization, delinquency. The mosque may be a meeting place allowing the reconstitution of social networks and fulfilling very helpful psycho-social functions, as a pure enclave and a place of certainty, of truth in midst of the many uncertainties.¹² On the other hand, it is important that such a mosque-ghetto should be open to developing a dynamical identity in interaction with society. Here the imam can play an important part by interpreting what the Qur'an contains of relevance to current problems and teaching authoritatively from the sources about normative Islam. This is not so easy a task because he will have to find a balance between the expectations of the older people and newer immigrants,

on the one hand, and of those having the centre of their lives more here in the new country, on the other.¹³

I think it is very important to see the individual together with his family group and the authoritative teaching in this light. The experiences with a multi-faith-syllabus, as the one used in Birmingham since 1975, show that the desired emphasis is on instruction in the child's own religious tradition by someone from within that tradition.¹⁴ There are distinctive Pakistani expectations, especially in Britain, and distinctive Arab ones, especially in France, and in a similar way of smaller groups with various background. But the dominating Turkish background expects good, traditional Islamic instruction, which strengthens the identity of young Muslims, and has an affinity with the Turkish ideals of education. After such a reinforcement it could become possible for children to partake in multi-faith education in the upper grades without fear.

A second reason to look in this direction - in spite of all the tension between the Turks and other Muslims, especially those from Arab countries - is Atatürk's very serious intention 70 years ago to understand Islam in a way allowing for contacts with the European countries to be strengthened. The Directorate of Religious Affairs in Ankara has the task to watch over Atatürk's legacy regarding Islam, as it is mainly taught in the secular atmosphere of the Theological Faculty founded 1949 at the University of Ankara. The criticism of the followers of Said Nursi Bediüzzaman and of those of Süleyman Tunahan led to the foundation of Higher Islam Institutes in Istanbul in 1952 with lectures also by the representatives of the traditional Islamic values. Since the 70's the influence on the students of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, especially of Sayyid Outb's writings and of Khomeini's revolution, is remarkable.¹⁵ And there were also the conflicts between the right wing national Turkish Sunnites and the so-called communist Alevis.¹⁶ But since 1980 the Turkish state has tried to find a balance between these interests and a concept harmonising the legacy of Atatürk with an emphasis on the traditional Islamic values and on the connection with the *umma*, the community of the Muslims.¹⁷

This does not mean that the problems with Islamic education in Western Europe can be solved by taking over the school books of the Turkish State and organizing religious lessons in schools by its representatives. The connection with national feelings is too strong for the context in our countries, and the experiences in Belgium have shown the difficulties with a direct dependence on foreign states and their politics in religious affairs.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Turkey's immediate support of the sanctions against Iraq in the Gulf crisis of 1990 has changed the relations Europe/Turkey for the better. And the fact remains that Turkey is a full member of the KSZE. It signed the

latter's statement on the human dimension regarding the rights of "national minorities" (or of "regional culture" as stated in the Statement of Vienna), and of the freedom to practice one's religion in public and to convert to another religion, in Copenhagen, in 1990.¹⁹ However, to us this Turkish Muslim identity is an important factor in our search for a new Islamic identity for Muslims in Western Europe only and, in face of the fact that to find such an identity will be the task especially of the generations to come, a possible bridge to the first generation of immigrants. Or will that road be rejected completely in looking for better results from the work of scholars without a Turkish laicistic background?

A difficulty for non-Turkish Muslims is that the special trait of the Turkish Islamic character of Muslims from Turkey - we know there are Kurdish and other minorities, too - has its roots in national pride and esteem: the Turks as a nation crave for knowledge having a strong, diligent character and educating both sexes, girls and boys, to be strong and eager persons. Turkish books emphasize the fact that the Turkish tribes coming from central Asia to the West took over Islam because they found there, in a worldwide religion, the same ideals they had in their tribes. This way Atatürk was able to integrate into the state not only most of the Sunni Muslims, the majority group, but also the Alevi Muslims, a large cultural minority in Turkey, consisting of nearly a quarter of its population, which had maintained in a special way the old Turkish traditions from the time of the natural cults, shamanism and the old ideals of tribal community. Bringing together the Sunnites and the Alevites into one ethnic or national identity as Turkish Muslims, Atatürk introduced the idea of an Islam combining both groups, thereby at the same time allowing for an opening to modern Europe when Turkish Islam would be purified of various kinds of superstitions. The prolongation of the old Turkish identity is an Islam in harmony with rationality and progress, a rational belief and morality showing the way to modern times. Kemal Aytac from the Faculty of Education at the University of Ankara showed, in his book on Atatürk's speeches on politics in religion²⁰, how Atatürk stressed the self-responsible character of Islam which from the first word revealed in the Qur'an onwards - "Read!" (Sura 96,1) - recommends progress and diligence: Only due to the influence from traditional customs of the neighbouring nations had Turkish Islam lost its primal purity.

At the national celebration of the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Atatürk said: "The Turkish people must become much more religious; with this I mean religious in all purity. In Islam there is nothing against reason and against progress!" Another new book, that by Yahya Akyüz on the history of Turkish education²¹, shows that Atatürk's principle of laicism, which means that the secular state watches over religion, is not against Islam but is justified

by its contributions to the pursuit of the goal to have set by a system of education claimed to be identical with the national character and to have its foundation in science.

In accordance with the preceding book scholars of Turkish Islamic education in publications of the last past years pursue the goal of becoming self-conscious, self-responsible men and women. As Ibrahim Canan explains in his voluminous book on Islamic education from the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad²², they use their religion as a guide: to get on well with their encompassing society and to meet as a community, strengthening each other; or if that is not possible, to move to another place with better conditions of life. Such an interpretation of Islam is not common practice and by no means known and taught by all Turkish imams and teachers. But these and other publications with an established reputation in present-day Turkey show at least possibilities of compatibility with Christian and secular thoughts while maintaining an Islamic identity.

Religious views in support of a laicist Islamic education

Four main points are forwarded in support of such an interpretation of Islamic education. The first is that the conception of Allah is founded primarily on love, not on fear. A typical view among the Alevites in Turkey is that the Sunnites worship from fear but the Alevites from love and that to go to the mosques as the Sunnites do is an outward gesture, not necessarily signifying a pious disposition and proper behaviour.²³ In rural Sunni Islam, indeed, it is usually central to think of how one can accumulate the most religious merits (*sevap*) by regarding the classification of acts as necessary (*farz*) or merely recommended (*eftal*) or frowned upon (*makruh*) or forbidden (*haram*). There, easily, a spirit of fear may grow in availing oneself of the possibility in Islam of "*kaza*" - for example, not to fast or to pray now, with the intention of making up later on what one has neglected and sinned- religious obligations thus becoming a mountain of debts which are to be paid off.²⁴ But there is also the great Islamic tradition of the Sufi mystic and his love for Allah, connected with the names of Rabi'a al-Adawiyya and al-Gazzali and in Anatolia especially with Celaleddin Rumi and Yunus Emre.

Therefore, the book of Halis Ayhan on religious education and teaching²⁵, published by the Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey, could argue against stressing fear above all else in many Qur'an courses: "That is a wrong interpretation of the Qur'an." The theological argumentation then puts the emphasis, as in the book of Haurani Altintas, on religious life from knowing.²⁶ A human being is not tainted with an hereditary inclination to sin by nature, but has an innate capacity (*fitrat*) to do what is right. So it is man's task, pure

and without burden, as it is his nature, to get knowledge of God (*marifetullah*) and to answer with love for God (*muhabetullah*). There is the pedagogical argument, too²⁷: to produce a strong fear of Allah during the sensitive years of growing up will disturb the development of the person meant to become harmonious and really capable of being happy and of loving. Instead of that boys and girls are to be guided by having the innate faith nurtured by giving thanks to the creator. The influential book of Bayraktar Bayrakli comparing Islamic education with Western education²⁸ stresses the view that the creator knows what is best for mankind best, better than humans who refer only to human ideas. And God is teaching both by nature and by prophets - especially those of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Therefore Bayrakli argues that we should see and educate mankind taking into consideration the qualities God created and gave to humankind.²⁹

In reference to the second main point: people are seen as created by the creator individually different yet of the same kind, while at the same time also belonging to the animal kingdom. To support this view, Canan mentions many traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, such as: "Show love and warmth and mercy to people, so that God may show the same to you." Or: "Every being having lungs and being hungry has a right over you - you are responsible to God for this animal."³⁰ Islam then means peace, patience, forgiveness and love - though one must strive to do what is good and avert what is bad, if necessary, using punishment in education. Before punishing, Islamic education sees the close connection between conveying knowledge and instilling responsibility, and then proceeds, if necessary, to admonish - as Bayrakli³¹ remarks with the words of the Qur'an concerning the conflict of Moses with Pharaoh: "He is adverse. Therefore speak mildly to him, so that perhaps he will accept admonition or be afraid of God" (Sura 20,43).

The third main point is the process of "making known", the conveying of knowledge as a major means to develop innate capacities. The primary driving force, whose gradual direction Bayrakli³² calls the heavy task of education, is love, including sexual attraction. According to Canan, both sexes shall pursue a development in conformity with their specific innate characteristics³³ and found a family. But the word of the Qur'an, that the husband earns the livelihood for the family and is therefore the administrator for the wife (Sura 4,34), is a description and not a normative instruction for every man and every woman.³⁴ Another innate driving force in Bayrakli's concept of education³⁵ is anxiety, joined with learning to regulate it by means of trust, as of a child in its mother and of men in the forgiveness of God, "Who shows you in fear and trust the flashes of lightning and impregnates the clouds with rain" (Sura 13,12). Another innate driving force is the impulse to rule and fight, whereby the inclination to massacre (Sura 2,29f.) is to be driven out by means of

knowledge³⁶, and so on.

The fourth main point is the effect on attitudes. As Canan³⁷ remarks, the Prophet Muhammad placed education on a level equal to that of praying, if people care for their families. And the family has to provide a good education for all its members, as Akyüz³⁸ points out referring to a *Hadith* sentence of the Prophet Muhammad: "Knowledge is a commandment for women and men." Altintas in his book, and Akyüz as well,³⁹ at the same time adopt the really popular traditional rules for respectful attitudes in the family and neighbourhood, from Ibrahim Hakki Erzurum'lu, who with his book on a knowledge of God is a great authority from the great "time of the tulips" (18th century) of the Ottoman empire. So does Faruk Bayraktar, in his book on the relations between teachers and pupils in Islamic education⁴⁰ based on the principle of love and respect.

The new Turkish books are not in an isolated position in the Muslim world, but can be seen to be touch in with modern Yugoslavian and Arab Muslim thinking and in dialogue with Christian-secular Europe. For example, the Bosnian-Austrian Muslim representative, Smail Balic, argues that most conflicts of Muslims with their European surroundings have their starting point in popular religiosity, popular customs and a low level of education. With the heightening of the social and cultural level the conflicts will also disappear, while it is important that Islam should remain in its religious-ethical substance in the hearts of these people. And in the case of verses of the Qur'an, such as Sura 4,34, he sees the task for good theological hermeneutics in classifying such a verse in the category of abrogated verses (*ayat mansukha*). Only in a society with a specific social consciousness could this verse have the value of a recommendation, and there is not one case of corporeal punishment of a wife registered during the exemplary life of the Prophet Muhammad.⁴¹ As for the Arabs there was a rather official meeting of Muslim and Christian theologians on "Education and Systems of Values", in Morocco in 1985, with a wide consensus on a preference of positive sanctions, - such as encouragement, praise, reward, to negative sanctions, such as intimidation, criticism, punishment.⁴² And in France itself Mohammed Arkoun, for example, an Arab scholar of the generation raised in colonial times and living in Europe at the time as a professor at the Sorbonne, is proud of the Arabic culture and of Islam, and is moreover a full and loyal member of the European community, versed in their ways of religious studies and education.⁴³

Another point to look for with respect to the success of the line of thought in these more or less official Turkish books is the development in the Islamic organizations, for example in Germany. In the past few years a considerable number of mosques and associations has severed its connections with the

-formerly predominant- Ottoman-conservative Turkish *Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren Köln* (=IKZ, otherwise known as the Islamic Centre Foundation, of the Süleymanli movement for courses in the Qur'an), with the fundamentalistic Turkish *Organisation der Nationalen Sicht in Europa* (Avrupa'da Milli Görüş Teskilati = AMGT) and with the Iran-oriented fundamentalistic *Verband der Islamischen Vereinigungen und Gemeinden* (Islam Cemiyetleri ve Cemaatleri Birliği ICCB) to join up with the *Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion* (Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birliği = DITIB, otherwise known as the "Federation of Turkish Islamic Cultural Associations"), which represents official Islam in Turkey. Most Turkish Muslims in their daily practice are guided by traditionally Turkish popular Islam, which is not that much interested in theological, political and organizational issues. Therefore, there is a tendency for them to go to the mosque in the neighbourhood independent of its ideological-organizational trend. What it looks like is that a lot of them - who are not involved in any special movement - have asked for such an organization only because one was there and the other was not.⁴⁴

I therefore think these Turkish scholars may show a way towards preserving an Islamic identity, along with a certain degree of ethnic identity in combining it at the same time with such values which are highly held respectable in Europe. For many Muslims to become Dutch, English, French, or German entailed, up till now, a feeling of betraying their religion and culture and of becoming Christians, since it meant adapting to a society that was deeply permeated by a secularity inspired by Christianity⁴⁵ - that is a very high threshold. But if the Turkish Islamic scholars and authorities show a way of how to stay a good Turk and a good Muslim without any basic conflict, but rather with a certain convergence in relation to European society and ways of thinking, that is quite another thing.

I think it could work, because after immigration no one automatically belongs to any given community, but a community may now be chosen according to how convincingly it represents Islam.⁴⁶ And the younger generation increasingly has the qualifications to read what is written in the Qur'an and to discuss the value of traditions. It is my thesis that for this choice of an Islamic community not only a good organization, financial power and political influence will be decisive, but to a large extent also the most extensive integration of women, both in the encompassing society as well as in the religious community of the minority group - which is the main source of tension. For in the preservation of Muslim identity women play a primary part by socializing their children.⁴⁷ Radio and television should bring the new Turkish Islamic ideals of education to them.⁴⁸

For the books quoted are rather new and so far not well known. And there

are major obstacles facing the Muslim population in Germany, for example, who want to get to know the ideas expressed in the books. The books are in Turkish and will have to be translated to reach non-Turkish readers. Who would read them in Turkish? Most Turks here are labourers who do not read much, and some of them cannot read at all, especially women over 40. Imams and teachers should read - but they have a lot of difficult work to do every day and need a special reason to read. That could be a program of study in Turkey and of further education in Germany. But that would occur only if the Turkish state and/or the German state declared that in order to work in the field of subsidized religious education such further education was obligatory, for example in North Rhine Westphalia. In this part of Germany, where most of the Muslims live, the Minister of Culture installed, in 1979, a mixed committee to develop a programme of I.R. ed., including a list of recommended books, to be used by teachers of the mother tongue, after they had received additional training.⁴⁹ However, if the mass media were to give basic information to everyone regarding the Turkish-Islamic ideals of education to be found in these recommended books, it would be most efficient. In this way the interest would not merely be imposed, but come from those at the grass roots.

If, from their experiences with society, foreigners come to the conclusion that the main reason for their marginal position is related to their being Muslim, joining a Muslim organization can be considered to be a consequence of the changing meaning of Islam and to be a kind of ethnic or religious collective action. Islamic organizations must then be regarded as some kind of emancipatory organizations.⁵⁰ It is important that also in Turkey there no longer is a domination of ideological secularism, which was basic for the foundation of the Republic, but a pragmatic secularism, which allows non-religious and religious forces to compete with each other in order to solve the concrete problems of society.⁵¹ DITIB is an especially important organization in a European context. But also the more traditional and fundamentalistic organizations⁵², in asking for their own Islamic schools, for Islamic education in schools led by their own fundamentalistic teachers, or (e.g.: IKZ) for Christian-Muslim cooperation-schools - are becoming stabilised in the long run, in the sense of a gradual integration eliminating political and social discrimination in a climate of compromise involving as many sections of society as possible.

Because of the very strong family ties we should plan integration only in a context of the family, not of the children only, without seeking the confidence of the parents. Empirical research on the situation in Western European society shows that the majority of Muslim youths choose a bicultural option with regard to integration: to become full members of the encompassing

society without complete identification with its norms and values.⁵³ A European policy of integration will be acceptable to Muslim parents, if it does not aim at alienating the children and youths from their traditional culture, and if the other sections of society accept their cultural autonomy and at the same time contribute to their integration into society at large, which represents more or less the interests and universal values of all of them. For all processes of social integration model themselves after the integration process of the individual person - both of them aimed at coping with tensions. And only if we have the confidence that the others do not plan to destroy us or what is important in our lives, but that we all pursue the common goal of constructing our society in a European House, then we will be able to accept other opinions, too.

With the growing integration of a greater Europe the structural obstacles to Muslims in Western societies will largely diminish.

Notes

- ¹ A major official of the European Community denied that the Soviet Union was mature enough to be included into Europe because a quarter of its population are Muslims, not for reasons of atheism or a faulty understanding of democracy; cp. Balic, B 22/90, 30.
- ² Cp. Tibi, 45sq.
- ³ With the Khanat of the Golden Horde in the 13th century the Tatars also came into what is now Poland and, in the 19th century more of them came as migrant traders (now ca. 15,000) to the Eastern parts, when they were part of Russia. The ca. 1.500 Muslims in Finland, having come as traders when Finland in 19th century was an autonomous part of the Russian empire are also of Turkish Tartar descent. With the spreading of the Ottoman-Turkish empire through the Balkans and into Central Europe during the 14th through the 17th century, Turkish Muslims came to these countries, whose original inhabitants in part also became Muslims: in Bulgaria out of ca. 750,000 Muslims over half a million are ethnic Turks, and they constitute the greater part of the Muslim population of Greece (ca. 90,000 from 140,000) and Rumania (nearly all 35,000). Yugoslavia has nearly 4 million Muslims from that time, Albania 1.75 millions and Hungary some thousands, almost all of them ethnic Turks. And there is Cyprus with its 152,000 Turkish Muslims.
- ⁴ Among the estimated 200,000 Muslims in Italy there are hardly any Turks and only 30,000 Yugoslavs, in Spain the tens of thousands of Muslims are nearly all Arab. Only ca. 100,000 of the nearly two million Muslims in France are Turkish - to be distinguished by their staying only for some time to work in rotation - and ca. 15,000 are Yugoslavian while, except for 70,000 Black Africans, nearly all of the others are Arab. In Belgium the Arabs with perhaps 160,000 constitute the majority of the Muslims, but ca. 90,000 Turks and 2,000 Yugoslavs are there, too.
- ⁵ In Great Britain of the estimated 900,000 or more Muslims only 40,000 are Turkish Cypriots, the others are nearly all "Coloured", from India (550,000), Black African (150,000) and Arab (150,000) regions, the majority of the Muslim population being Pakistani. Also in Norway there are only 2,500 Turkish among the 12,000 Muslims, with a Pakistani majority.
- ⁶ In Germany of the 1.8 million Muslims 1.5 million are migrant labourers from Turkey and 100,000 from Yugoslavia, and only 130,000 from Arab and 40,000 from Indian countries. In The Netherlands, out of the 310,000 Muslims ca. 160,000 are from Turkey and 2,000 from Yugoslavia, the others are mostly labourers from Morocco (110,000) and from other Arab countries (10,000), and Pakistani (5,000) or descendants of the Hindustani from the former colonies in Surinam (20,000) and

- Indonesia (1,000). In Austria of the 70,000 Muslims nearly all are workers from Turkey or to a smaller extent from Yugoslavia, or Bosnian descendants from the time of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In Switzerland there are now perhaps 70,000 Muslims - ten years ago, out of the ca. 52,000 there were 38,000 from Turkey and 9,000 from Yugoslavia, and only 5,000 from Arab countries. In Sweden, out of the 25,000 Muslims there are ca. 16,000 from Turkey, perhaps 6,000 from Yugoslavia and only 3,000 from Arab countries. And in Denmark there are now an estimated 76,000 Muslims - ten years ago out of the 30,000 ca. 16,000 were from Turkey and 2,000 from Yugoslavia, the others mostly from Pakistan.
- ⁷ Statistics from Balic, B 22/90, 31; differentiation mostly from Nielsen: 1981, 11 sqq and for The Netherlands from Custers:1987, 13 sqq.
- ⁸ Colpe:1983, 2 sq.
- ⁹ Basic statement by Mol, exemplified by Abali:1983.
- ¹⁰ With Waardenburg I think this distinction is helpful and that for any future integration much will depend on the way in which Islam will be accepted by the non-Muslim European culture as a religion and identity without it being denigrated.
- ¹¹ Waardenburg in Gerholm and Lithman (eds.):1988, 24; cp. Colpe:1983 and for the discussion on integration Elsas:1982, 48-122.
- ¹² Bastenier in Gerholm and Lithman (eds.):1988, 137.
- ¹³ Whether Islam or Muslims will be capable or incapable of being integrated into Western European society will depend on interaction within the community, with society as a whole and also with Muslim countries, and on how the particular groups will interpret and apply Islam and why (Waardenburg *op cit.* 26 and 30; cp. my own publications).
- ¹⁴ Here other religions were intended to be studied for their own sake and on their own terms. But to many Muslims, the original state of affairs was in some ways preferable, because the system was Christian and they had the right to withdraw their children, while the new concepts seem to imply that all religions are equally open to questioning - though in theory it is accepted that children should know about the religions of others, for the sake of better community relations (Nielsen in Gerholm and Lithman (eds.): 1988, 69).
- ¹⁵ Cp. Ayas:1990.
- ¹⁶ Birge:1937; Haas:1988, Kehl-Bodrogi:1988, Bozkurt:1988.
- ¹⁷ Cp. Blaschke/Bruinessen:1985; Spuler-Stegemann:1985; Kreiser:1986; Werle/Kreile:1987; for the situation of education: Jacob:1982; Scheinhardt:1986; Erichsen:1988; Bilgin:1989; and Bilgin/Erichsen:1989.
- ¹⁸ Bastenier in Gerholm and Lithman (eds.):1988, 139-141; and there are unforeseen developments in the Muslim countries, as Talat Halman, Ankara's diplomatic representative in the UNO, remarked for Turkey, too, in an interview in "Milliyet" of 23.7.1987, where he thought of the possibility of a Turkish Islamic Republic by infiltrating the leading positions of the state and its bureaucracy, or by a "referendum".
- ¹⁹ Das KSZE-Treffen in Kopenhagen im Juni 1990. Das Dokument des Kopenhagener Treffens über die menschliche Dimension vom 29.Juni 1990, in: *Europa-Archiv, Zeitschrift für internationale Politik* 15, d.d. 10.8.1990, D 380-394.
- ²⁰ Aytac:1986, esp. 12-14.
- ²¹ Akyüz:1985, esp. 306.
- ²² Canan:1980, 377.
- ²³ Naess:1988, 179.
- ²⁴ Schiffauer:1988, 149 sq.
- ²⁵ Ayhan:1985, 117.
- ²⁶ Altintas:1981, 55.
- ²⁷ Wieland:1986, 298 mentions this as a widespread opinion among present scholars in Turkish Islamic Education.
- ²⁸ Bayrakli:1980, 103.
- ²⁹ And it is also an argument in view of the necessity of religious education in the midst of the general education at school, as Beyza Bilgin, professor of Islamic education at the Theological Faculty of the University of Ankara, remarks in her

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- book on religious lessons in grammar school (Bilgin:1980, 53 sq.).
- ³⁰ Canan:1980, 151 and 197.
- ³¹ Bayrakli:1980, 169.
- ³² *Ibidem*, 121.
- ³³ Canan:1980, 300.
- ³⁴ *Ibidem*, 337.
- ³⁵ Bayrakli:1980, 122.
- ³⁶ *Ibidem*, 110.
- ³⁷ Canan:1980, 45.
- ³⁸ Akyüz:1985, 51.
- ³⁹ *Ibidem*, 121-123.
- ⁴⁰ Bayraktar:1987, 223.
- ⁴¹ Balic:1990, 101 sq.; cp. also Balic:1984.
- ⁴² Cp. Balic: 1990, 100.
- ⁴³ Cp. Balic, B 22/1990, 33 sq. and Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders, *Verlag Symposium Islam en Emancipatie*. Zaterdag 9 december 1989.
- ⁴⁴ Özcan, esp. 192-221; Elsas, 1980, 28-65; 1983, 57-117; 1986.
- ⁴⁵ Leveau in Gerholm and Lithman: 1988, 110.
- ⁴⁶ Schiffauer:1988, 154 sq.
- ⁴⁷ Joly:1988, 46; Andezian:1988, 197.
- ⁴⁸ Of course Imams and teachers should become acquainted with these books, but all of the Muslim organisations together have influence only on a relatively small part of the Muslims in Western Europe through mosques and lessons. Yet, the existing programs of the mass media could give basic information for all and further information for Imams and teachers with a much wider and quicker dispersion.
- ⁴⁹ Cp. Wagtendonk's article in the present volume
- ⁵⁰ Th. Sunier's paper "Islam and Ethnicity among Turks in The Netherlands" forthcoming in the volume "Islam in Dutch society. Current developments and future prospects".
- ⁵¹ Steinbach:1990, 16.
- ⁵² Cp. Breiner's differentiation of five trends of understanding Islam: 1. "secularism" and besides that 2. "fundamentalism" as reform Islam, which stresses a new beginning with the study of the Qur'an and the Sunna of Prophet Muhammad and tries to dismiss all other influences for understanding and using Islamic law (*shari'a*) - therefore seeing no validity in the non-Islamic structure of state or even of society -, and 3. "modernism" as reform Islam too, but from a conviction that these original sources through their universal principles may throw light on the modern condition without destroying it; 4. "traditionalism", in the sense of propagating to enforce the traditional *shari'a* and 5. "traditionalism", in the sense of traditional agreement with the government in power, and accepting to that effect a limited application of the *shari'a*, in accordance with the age-old teaching of Islamic scholars (*ulama'*) that obedience is better than civil war.
- ⁵³ M. Rooijackers' paper "Young Turkish Muslims in The Netherlands; Religious Commitment, Integration and Subjective Well-being" forthcoming in the volume quoted in note 50.